PEDRO BATUNGBAKAL, 

plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and MANUEL AGREGADO, as Auditor
General of the Philippines,defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-5127             May 27, 1953

FACTS:

This is an appeal by the National Development Company (NDC) and Manuel Agregado
as Auditor General of the Philippines from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila ordering the appellants to reinstate the plaintiff-appellee Pedro Batungbakal in
his former position as property examiner in the Comptroller's office in the NDC, with a
salary of P2,040 per annum, the compensation he was receiving when he was
suspended on December 31, 1946, and further ordering that he be paid his back salary
at the rate of P2,040 per annum from the date of his suspension up to the date of his
reinstatement, deducting therefrom whatever amount he still owed the NDC.
Batungbakal was suspended from office as property examiner for gross negligence in
the performance of duties detrimental to the company. Batungbakal filed a petition for
reconsideration with the Office of the President which declares that Batungbakal and
De la Cruz have not committed negligence in the discharge of their duties, and therefore
recommends their reinstatement to the service of the National Development Company.

However Batungbakal was not reinstated immediately as the post which was his is
already occupied, But NLC offered that Batungbakal will be offered a New post that may
be suitable for him in the National Shipyard & Graving Dock Department provided that
"he renounce his right to claim for the payment of his back salary, as payment of such
has no specific provision of law under which payment to Mr. Batungbakal of the
aforesaid amount of P7,820 may be authorized and that the provisions of section 260 of
the Revised Administrative Code which authorizes payment to a suspended employee
of his full salary corresponding to the whole period of his suspension upon his
exoneration or reinstatement may not be applied in the instant case because, as will be
noted from the facts that Mr. Batungbakal was not merely suspended from office but
also dismissed from the service and that payment of their salary for the period they
were out of the service shall be discretionary on the part of the Department Head
concerned.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Batungbakal is entitled for the repayment of his salary from the time he
was suspended until his resinstatement.
RUILING:

Having proven that he (the plaintiff) had been suspended and dismissed without cause,
contrary to the express provision of the Constitution, his reinstatement becomes a plain
ministerial duty of the Auditor General, a duty whose performance may be controlled
and enjoined by mandamus.There is no room for discretion. The Auditor General is not
being directed to perform an act which he may or may not execute according to his
discretion. He is being asked and enjoined to redress a grievance, to right a wrong
done. And the payment of the back salary is merely incidental to and follows
reinstatement, this, aside from the parallel and analogy which may be found in section
260, paragraph 1, Revised Administrative Code which provides for the payment of back
salary upon reinstatement
Lydia O. Chua, Petitioner Vs.The Civil Service Commission, The National Irrigation
Administration, Respondents

G.R. No. 88979, February 7, 1992

FACTS:

Republic Act 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as
well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 (Coverage) of R.A.
6683 provides who are qualified to avail the benefits under the law which includes all
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have rendered two
consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation with the exception
of uniformed personnel of (Armed Forced of the Philippines) AFP and (Philippine
Constabulary Integrated National Police) PC/INP.

Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the Early
Retirement Law, filed an application to the Respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA), which was denied since petitioner is a co-terminus employee,
instead she was offered separations benefits equivalent to ½ month basic pay for every
year of service commencing from 1980, or almost 15 years in 4 successive
governmental projects

She appealed with respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) but was denied citing
that her position was co-terminus thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec3.1 of
Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1.

Chua then elevated the issue to the Supreme Court by way of Special Civil action for
certiorari insisting that she is entitled to the benefits under R.A. 6683.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not petitioner's status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the

coverage of R.A. 6683.

RULING:

No. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early
retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically
excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the
PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable
maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that “what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed”.
The Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said
law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she
served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the
law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS v. DANILO T. BOLOS

G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010

FACTS:

Cynthia Bolos (Complainant) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Danilo Bolos(Respondent) under Article 36 of the Family Code which the RTC
granted. A copy of RTC’s decision was received by Respondent and he timely filed the
Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied the appeal for his failure to file the required motion
for reconsideration which is in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. His motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. The RTC then issued the order declaring its
decision final and executory.

Complainant filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC. He argued that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render
the essential marital obligations to Complainant, and that the latter should be declared
guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.

The CA granted the petition and reversed the orders of the RTC and explained that a
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did
not apply in this case as the marriage between the parties was solemnized before the
Family Code took effect.

Cynthia sought reconsideration which the CA, however, denied the motion for extension
of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period is non-extendible, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and the motion for partial
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC or 'Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages" is applicable to marriages solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code.

RULING:

The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated
on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only
room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.