THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 

plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
CRISANTO TAMAYO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-41423             March 19, 1935

FACTS:

Appellant was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal, Province of Ilocos Sur, of a
violation of section 2, municipal ordinance No. 5, series of 1932, of said municipality. Upon appeal to the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur conviction resulted and a fine was imposed. From that decision this
appeal was brought.

While this appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed section 2 in question, which repeal was
duly approved by the provincial board, and the act complained of, instead of being a violation of the
municipal ordinances, is now legal in that municipality.

Appellant has moved for a dismissal of the action against him on account of that repeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proceedings against appellant be dismissed.

RULING:
Yes, The repeal here was absolute, and not a reenactment and repeal by implication. Nor was there any
saving clause. The legislative intent as shown by the action of the municipal council is that such conduct,
formerly denounced, is no longer deemed criminal, and it would be illogical for this court to attempt to
sentence appellant for an offense that no longer exists.
EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner, 
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE
CASTRO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986

FACTS:

 Efren Moncupa and eight others were arrested for the reason that they were suspected of being a
member of the National Democratic Front. A two separate  investigations was conducted by Taskforce
Makabansa and the investigating Fiscal of Quezon City. Both committee concluded that Efren Moncupa
was not a member of the NDF, and instead recommend for the filing an information for violation of PD
1866 against Moncupa. In filing the information Moncupa was excluded. And because he was excluded in
the information, his counsel filed a petition for Habeas Corpus.
 
            The respondent in their return of writ justified the validity of petitioner’s detention on the ground
that the privilege of the writ has been suspended. However on August 30, 1983 the respondent filed a
motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983 the petitioner was  temporarily release from detention and
stated that since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the respondent the present
petition for Habeas Corpus may be deemed moot and academic.
 
 
Issue:
 
Whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of petitioner’s temporary
release.
 
 
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the reservations of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the
temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraint on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa, such restrictions limit
the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
            A temporary release does not render the petition moot and academic if such temporary release
attached a restrictions or conditions.

Wherefore the petition is Granted and the conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner
are declared null and void.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee 
vs.
REY BARRION y SILVA, Accused-Appellant

G.R. No. 240541

FACTS:

An information charging Pascual Silva with Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence was
presented with the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan. After a trial on the merits was
conducted, the accused Silva was acquitted in a decision dated November 20, 1958, on the following
grounds: (1) prescription of the offense; (2) no positive identity as to which "La Mallorca" Bus caused the
accident; and (3) the injuries suffered by Dolores Gimeno can not be the result of the negligent act of
Pascual Silva. 

On the same date the information was filed with JP court (Oct. 25, 1957), other information charging Silva
of Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence was presented with the CFI of
Bulacan. On April 30, 1959, counsel for Silva moved to quash the information (with the CFI), on the
ground of double jeopardy, alleging that the acquittal in the JP case, which arose from the same act for
which he stood charged before the CFI, constituted a bar for his further prosecution.

The motion was denied on May 2, 1959. On May 22, 1959, however, Silva asked for a reconsideration of
the denial on two grounds: (1) The denial is not in consonance with the decisions of the Supreme Court;
and (2) the order will serve to encourage drivers to commit graver offenses. The fiscal opposed the
motion, claiming that slight physical injuries being only a light offense, cannot be complexed with
homicide or serious physical injuries as provided for in Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the information (with the CFI), on the ground of double jeopardy, alleging that the acquittal
in the JP case, which arose from the same act for which he stood charged before the CFI, constituted a
bar for his further prosecution.

RULING:
"It is clear that in the present case the second charge of Damage to Property thru reckless Imprudence
includes the first charge of reckless driving; that the facts alleged in the information on damage to
property thru reckless driving, if proven, would have been sufficient to support the first charge of reckless
driving, and finally, that the offense of reckless driving is an ingredient of the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence all for the simple reason that the basic element in both offenses is
reckless driving. Thus it is evident that we have here a case of double jeopardy.

A defendant should not be harassed with various prosecutions based on the same act by splitting the
same into various charges, all emanating from the same law violation, when the prosecution could easily
and well embody them in a single information.

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney
that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with
the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of
the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA et. Al, Petitioners Vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, et.al, Respondents

G.R No. 187167               August 16, 2011

FACTS:

R.A. 3046 was passed demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines. After five decades, RA
9552 was passed, amending RA 3046 to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The new law shorterned one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan
Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the new law on the ground that: it reduces the Philippine
maritime territory, in violation of Article 1 of the Constitution and it opens the country’s waters to maritime
passage by all vessels, thus undermining Philippine sovereignty. Respondents, on the other hand,
defended the new law as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS. Respondents stressed
that RA 9522 does not relinquish the country’s claim over Sabah.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

 RULING:

NO. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles
from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III
was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms
regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and
archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their
coasts. 

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,
lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and
are instead governed by the rules on general international law.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, et. al, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, et.al, respondents

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

FACTS:

The petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus in order to compel respondents to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations, and administrative orders.
Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette. Respondents however, argued that Issuances intended only for the
internal administration of a government agency or of particular persons did not have to be published; that
publication, when necessary, must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision
under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws
and not to the requirement of publication?

RULING:
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and
on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was
decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although
it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper
party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.