Professional Documents
Culture Documents
China Interests Middle East North Africa MedYearbook2021
China Interests Middle East North Africa MedYearbook2021
China Interests Middle East North Africa MedYearbook2021
Keys
the US, in spite of its declared aim to turn away from harshest sanctions ever, is affirming its regional
and pay less attention to the MENA region, cannot power status and has established an allied network
disengage from it, other external actors, among them of non-state actors.
China, but also Russia, the EU and potentially oth- This fragmentation of the region suits China’s ten-
ers, too, are increasingly formulating interests of dency to not perceive the Middle East and North Af-
their own. Thus, the Middle East and North Africa rica as one unit, and fits its practice of maintaining
region has become a “proxy stage,” where China bilateral relations with the regional states, instead of
has to articulate its interests not only vis-à-vis the a regional approach.
United States, but also against – or eventually in co-
operation with – other external actors.
This goes hand in hand with a new regional order in Chinese Relations in the Middle East
the making, in which how the final balance of power and North Africa
is going to stabilize is still not clear. The order among
the Arab states has undergone a profound change: The Middle East and North Africa has traditionally
former Arab nationalist and/or socialist leaders been outside of China’s sphere of interest – rather,
IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2021
(Egypt, Iraq, Syria), due to different reasons, have based on the ancient Chinese world view of concen-
weakened; the Arab unity front has split, due to its tric circles, it has been the western hinterland to its
inability to successfully represent rare, all-Arab con- western periphery. Geographical distance, loose
sensus interests on the international fora (Palestine, historical contacts, social, cultural and linguistic dif-
concern over Israel’s nuclear capability); Gulf Arab ferences, etc, have all contributed to this perception.
states have started to intervene in the political and Consequently, the rapidly developing, wide variety
security processes of other Arab states on the basis of relations China has established throughout the
of their financial support. Different capabilities, po- MENA region are relatively new. They also reflect
litical systems, threats such as migration, terrorism, both the international context and China’s inner de-
or the Israeli and/or Iranian nuclear programme, have velopments, and thus may be very different from
country to country regarding their underlying basis, connect China to Europe, both over land and over
Keys
scope and extent. While the “Five Principles of sea, it practically avoided, or rather left the Middle
Peaceful Coexistence” formulated by Chinese pre- East and North Africa untouched (Land routes in-
mier Zhou Enlai are valid to this day, especially non- cluded Iran and Turkey, while the maritime route was
intervention and non-interference, the earliest rela- planned to pass the Red Sea from the Bab el-Man-
tions were concluded on the platform of the deb to the Suez Canal, but with relatively little atten-
69
priority on China’s foreign and security policy agen- participation, e.g. the String of Pearls, the China-Pa-
da. Although Deng Xiaoping’s “low profile” policy kistan Economic Corridor, CPEC.)
still seems valid, at least to a certain extent in Chi- The hierarchy of the relations builds up within three
na’s MENA relations, the new policy launched by Xi main categories (or levels): strategic partnerships,
Jinping brings China “closer to centre stage and comprehensive strategic partnerships and potential
makes greater contributions to mankind.” partnerships. Besides these, specific partnerships
This Chinese evolution, based on and backed up by can also be concluded. It is indicative that China
rapid Chinese economic growth, resulted in – has “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with Al-
among others – an enhanced self-confidence, a new geria, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and
economic outreach to wider regions and to a Chi- “strategic partnerships” with eight others. With Tur-
nese presence farther away from China’s traditional key, China has concluded a specific “comprehen-
neighbourhood. The “pivot to Asia” announced by sive cooperative partnership,” and with Israel a
President Barack Obama, the “looking to the east” “comprehensive innovative partnership.” (It should
policies both in Europe and the MENA region, as be noted, however, that these relationships are not
well as the increasing reluctance of Western states alliances, as, historically, China shies away from
IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2021
lished, leaked information reveals agreements on en- to hold that “development comes before security in
ergy, infrastructure, economic, trade and military co- promoting stability.” This is the result of several differ-
operation (joint naval exercises have been held ent factors, besides the principles of non-interference
before), which includes the fight against terrorism and non-intervention, including economic needs and
and extremism in the region. It is still unlikely that Chi- China’s military capabilities, which limit the country’s
The Geopolitical Chessboard in the Mediterranean
na would sell Iran military equipment of strategic sig- military power projection to its immediate neighbour-
nificance before the nuclear negotiations come to a hood. However, most analyses contemplate that the
conclusion, in spite of the fact that the arms embargo defence of Chinese interests, investment and Chi-
imposed on Iran in the JCPOA terminated in 2020. nese labour (human capital) will, sooner or later,
make it necessary to further expand Chinese secu-
rity and military engagement. The undergoing devel-
The increasing reluctance opment of Chinese military capabilities (blue-water
navy, 5th generation tactical aircraft, longer range
of Western states to get involved planes) suggests that such a scenario in the mid to
in the transition and conflicts of long term cannot be ruled out, and the first Chinese
the MENA region was the context military base in the region, in Djibouti, is often de-
to China’s “march west” policy and scribed as a step in this direction.
Chinese security engagement in the region so far
the consequent launch of the Belt has been manifest in non-military activities such as
and Road Initiative in 2013 arms trade, evacuation of citizens, humanitarian re-
lief, search and rescue operations, peacekeeping
and conflict prevention missions – and as such, Chi-
Even with the wide-scale and intensive cooperation na is presenting itself as the responsible global pow-
70
between the two states foreseen in the deal, it seems er, supporting the multilateral character of the inter-
more like a complement to the “comprehensive stra- national order. Although China is now the second
tegic partnership” agreement concluded in 2016, largest arms producer and the fifth largest exporter
than anything substantially new. As such, it also re- globally, its share in the arms trade to the Middle
mains to be seen if, when implemented, it exceeds East and North Africa is relatively limited as the bulk
the other “comprehensive strategic partnerships” of its arms exports (82%) is directed to Asia.
China concluded with Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia China’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions,
and the UAE. It should be noted, however, that, be- especially from the beginning of the 2000s, has in-
sides the international debate, the deal has become creased, providing some 2,500 troops and police
the target of fierce criticism within Iran as well: many officers, of which in 2020 approximately 800 troops
claimed that against US and Western hostility, Iran were serving in Sudan (Darfur) and Lebanon. In ad-
should turn east; others warned that the Islamic Re- dition, China’s participation in anti-piracy operations,
public should not give up its sovereignty and be- to protect merchant vessels from pirates in the Gulf
come subservient to China. of Aden, has been an especially noteworthy element,
because China’s deployment of some ten thousand
IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2021
Keys
the region. In spite of the increasing awareness of cine diplomacy as its most accentuated element.
China and its role, mostly in the context of the ex- Yet, China’s reputation and perception in the Middle
panding Belt and Road Initiative, the appeal of Chi- East and North Africa, as well as the wider Islamic
nese soft power among the public in the MENA re- world, has been tested in recent years, over the situ-
gion has remained relatively limited. Yet, the physical ation of the Muslim Uighur minority in China. While
71
With its indigenous vaccines cy of the UN Security Council. This role gave China
the chance to portray itself as a responsible super-
developed, China has launched power and helped promote China’s vision of multi-
a successful vaccine diplomacy lateralism. China, with no colonizing past, but in-
campaign towards, among others, stead a victim of colonization itself (“century of
humiliation”), to this day positions itself as a devel-
the MENA region
oping state and has advocated the reform of the UN
Security Council to change the uneven representa-
tion of Western states there. Chinese competence,
The COVID-19 pandemic, by the very fact that it however, was put to the test when, in May 2021, the
originated from China, had a direct negative impact Hamas/Palestinian-Israel conflict hit the UN Security
on China’s image in the MENA region, to the extent Council agenda and demanded urgent action.
that there was perceivable resentment against Chi-
nese communities living in the region. Indirectly, the The Hamas/Palestinian-Israel Conflict
pandemic and the consequent lockdowns and travel
IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2021
restrictions affected Chinese tourism to the Middle China’s support of the Palestinians reaches back to
East and North Africa, and also had an impact, albeit the Cold War and its support of national liberation
as yet unclear, on student movements and probably movements. China abstained from voting on the UN
on the operation of the Confucius Institutes as well. Partition Plan on Palestine and supported the Pales-
Yet, with its indigenous vaccines developed, China tinian right of return. In 1988, together with the so-
has launched a successful vaccine diplomacy cam- cialist countries, it also recognized the declaration of
paign towards, among others, the Middle East and the State of Palestine. China-Israel diplomatic rela-
North Africa (in which Russia, and potentially others tions, however, were only established in 1992, in
as well, has become a competitor). The Health Silk spite of the fact that in the MENA region, Israel was
Road originally proposed by China in 2017 has thus the first country to recognize the People’s Republic
of China in 1950. As a consequence, in recent dec- condemnation of human rights violations and medi-
Keys
ades, China has been among the very few countries ated negotiations, to which China offered its servic-
to maintain good relations with both the Palestinians es. Wang also called for the immediate cessation of
and Israel. This policy of “not taking sides” was chal- military actions, the lifting of the Gaza Strip’s block-
lenged by the Hamas-Israel confrontation. ade and delivery of humanitarian aid. Yet, when
In spite of the fact that the eleven-day-long rocket Wang named Israel (“Israel must exercise restraint in
The Geopolitical Chessboard in the Mediterranean
exchange and aerial operations between Hamas particular”), but did not mention the rockets fired
(from the Gaza Strip) and Israel looked as if it was from the Gaza Strip to Israel, China’s position as an
“business as usual” (in spite of the fact that the last unbiased neutral mediator was brought into ques-
such confrontation took place in 2014), many things tion both by Israel and the United States.
have changed in the background: 1. A political crisis When the United States blocked the joint resolution,
is prevailing both in Israel and among the Palestini- China took its chance to criticize the “only country”
ans; 2. Israel’s Arab citizens stood up together with responsible for the failure, and accused the United
the Arab residents in Jerusalem and the Palestinians States for its one-sided support to Israel and for dis-
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 3. There has regarding the humanitarian concerns in Gaza. With
been a shift in the global perception of the Palestin- that, China also tried to divert political and media at-
ian cause, especially in the US, where domestic de- tention away from criticism over its treatment of its
velopments over Floyd George last year have Uighur minority in Xinjiang.
changed the US public’s perception of civilian re-
sistance, and where a group of Democratic Con-
gressmen and women started to push President Joe The crisis between Israel and
Biden over his human rights programme; 4. All this
put the Palestinian issue back on the international Hamas provided China with the
agenda, from where it had practically disappeared, opportunity to not only present itself
as a non-biased mediator, but, at
72
four-point proposal on the settlement. While the serve China’s position well both in the context of
content was not new (the proposal was in fact a rep- US-China relations and, more specifically, in the
etition of similar former calls) and generally reflected Middle East and North Africa.
the international consensus, it seemed to again con-
firm China’s general non-aligned position. It called
for a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders References
(“a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian
state… with East Jerusalem as the capital, to achieve Csicsmann, László; N. Rózsa, Erzsébet and Szalai,
the harmonious existence of the Arab and Jewish Máté: “The Mena Region in the Global Order:
nations and lasting peace in the Middle East”), the Actors, Contentious Issues and Integration Dy-
namics.” MENARA Methodology and Concept Concept Papers, No. 5, November 2017. http://
Keys
Papers, No. 4, 2017. http://menaraproject.eu/wp menaraproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017
-content/uploads/2017/11/menara_cp_4.pdf /12/menara_cp_5-1.pdf
Deng Xiaoping: “Observe calmly; secure our posi- N. Rózsa, Erzsébet: “Deciphering China in the Mid-
tion; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capaci- dle East”, EU ISS Brief, 2020, www.iss.europa.
ties and bide our time; be good at maintaining a eu/content/deciphering-china-middle-east
73
2019/06/Chinas_Changing _ Role_in_the_ framework of the MENARA Project.” MENARA
Middle_East.pdf Methodology and Concept Papers, No. 1, No-
Lons, Camille; Fulton, Jonathan; Sun, Degang; Al- vember 2016. http://menaraproject.eu/wp-con
Tamimi, Naser: “China’s Great Game in the Mid- tent/uploads/2016/11/menara_cp_1-4.pdf
dle East.” ECFR Policy Brief, October 2019, United Nations Situation in the Middle East, includ-
https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/china_ ing the Palestinian Question – Security Council
great_game_middle_east.pdf VTC Open Debate. 16 May 2021, www.unmul
Makdisi, Karim; Hazbun, Waleed; Senyücel Gün timedia.org/avlibrary/asset/2619/2619227/
do ǧ ar , Sabiha and Dark , Gül ş ah: “Regional Wang, Jisi: “‘Marching westwards’: The Rebalanc-
Order from the Outside in: External Interven- ing of China’s Geo-Strategy.” ISS Report no.73,
tion, Regional Actors, Conflicts and Agenda in 7 October, 2012. Center for International and
the Mena Region.” MENARA Methodology and Strategic Studies.