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1st Reading
1st Reading
Article 1. This Act shall be known as the “Civil Code of the Philippines”.
RA No. 386 New Civil Code of the Philippines
Effect and Application of Laws
Law as defined by Sanchez Roman
Sanchez Roman defines it as “a rule of conduct, just, obligatory, promulgated by the competent
authority for the common good of a people or nation, which constitutes an obligatory rule of conduct
for all its members.”
Classifications of Laws
I. If a right is granted or merely procedural or the manner for its enforcement is laid down
A. Substantive - A substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or
property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs
(Primicias vs Ocampo, GR No. L-6120 June 30, 1953).
B. Remedial - prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions
(Primicias vs Ocampo, supra).
II. Scope or content
A. Private Law - Private laws are enacted for the benefit of a particular individual or small group,
such as claims against the government or individual immigration or naturalization matters.
B. Public Law - Public laws are laws intended for general application, such as those that apply to
the nation as a whole or a class of individuals.
III. According to Force or Effect
A. Mandatory/Prohibitory - Mandatory Law – refers to something that is required, and not
optional or subject to discretion. In legal construction of statutes, mandatory requirements
of law are typically found by the use of words such as “must”, “will” and “shall”. Those
which have to be complied with, because they are expressive of public policy: disobedience
is punished either by direct penalties or by considering an act or contract void.
Prohibitory Law – refers to laws that are not to be done.
B. Permissive - (or suppletory) laws, those which may be deviated from, if the individual so
desires.
Article 2 – Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.
Indispensability of publication and exceptions
Publication is indispensable. In other words, no law can become immediately effective upon
approval without publication. To rule otherwise, is to run into collision with the constitutional
mandate of due process clause of the Constitution.
Exceptions: Internal instructions of administrative agencies and municipal ordinances are not
covered by the requirement.
Tanada vs Tuvera
- Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such
as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned.
Meaning of phrase “UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED”
- The phrase “unless otherwise provided” in Art. 2, refers to the date of effectivity of laws and
not to the requirement of publication (Tanada vs Tuvera).
CASES:
1. Tañada vs Tuvera 146 scra 448
Facts: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
Jurisprudence: Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Held: - Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following
its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
- Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
- It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
- The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
- the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
2. De Roy vs CA 157 scra 757
Facts: Feliza De Roy and Virgilio Ramos filed a special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare
null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision in toto which says that petitioner is liable under Article 2190 of the
Civil Code. Petitioner filed their motion for extension to appeal more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period. Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas
case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the
Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of
Appeals was promulgated.
Issue: WON SC decisions be published in the Official Gazette.
Held: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty
of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
In the instant case, what was being assailed is Resolution No. 13-2013, which provides for the
rules of procedure concerning the conduct of investigation against municipal officials in said
province, issued by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur. Clearly, it is neither penal in
nature as it does not provide for any sanction or punishment nor a tax measure. It is merely
interpretative of Title II, Chapter 4 of the LGC, which outlines the procedure when a disciplinary
action is instituted against an elective local official. Based on the foregoing, Resolution No. 13-
2013 need not be published.
On a different plane, however, are municipal ordinances are not covered by the Civil Code, but
by the LGC.
CASE:
Rodolfo Caranto v Anita Agra Caranto GR No. 202889, March 2, 2020 (Hernando)
Facts: Rodolfo has no proof that he is a legitimate brother of Juan; CA denied his petition vs Anita, SC
affirmed CA’s decision.
“A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the question must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question
by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a
question of fact.”
However, there are 10 recognized exceptional circumstances wherein the Court admits and reviews
questions of fact. These are enumerated in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. as follows:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court:
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and
(10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeal s is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record.
Article 4 – Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Operation of Laws. Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit.
Reason for its Prospectivity – Laws look at the future. Time moves forward. The rule against
retroactivity is intended to protect vested rights.
CASES:
1. Carlos v Sandoval GR No. 179922, December 16, 2008
Facts: Juan De Dios Carlos filed a civil case against Felicidad Sandoval for the following causes of action:
(a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and
(e) sum of money and damages. Petitioner prays for declaration of nullity of marriage between Felicidad
and Teofilo for lack of marriage license. RTC favors Carlos, CA reversed RTCs decision.
Issue: WON Carlos has the legal standing to pray for the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Felicidad and Teofilo.
Held: No. ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized
during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The
innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
“It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15,
2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new
Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application. Thus, as has been
emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application.
** Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when
the marriage took place. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But
the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that
any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
4. William G. Kwong Management, Inc vs Diamond Homeowners & Residents Association, GR No.
211353, June 10, 2019
Facts: No sticker, no ID, no entry policy
Held: Laws are not retroactive. Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." Lex prospicit, non respicit; the law looks forward, not backward.
This is due to the unconstitutional result of retroacting a law's application: it divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs obligations of contract.
Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do
not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes
are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings,
unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the
enactment.
2. Esther Abalos vs People GR No. 221836, August 14, 2019 (C. Reyes, Jr)
Facts: Esther Abalos was convicted with Estafa by the CA which affirmed the indeterminate penalty
rendered by the RTC, 4y 2m to 20y. Petitioner using the name of Vicenta Abalos issued 2 East West Bank
checks to Manulife with a total amount of 267,500 for rediscounting. Later on it was known that her real
name was Esther not Vicenta and the checks were dishonored. There was a demand for collection but
Esther wasn’t able to pay hence the institution of information for Estafa. Petitioner denied the
allegations. She said the checks were collateral in the name of Vicenta, not hers.
** R.A. No. 1095140 which modifies the penalty in swindling and estafa cases. Section 100 of the said
law, however, provides that it shall have retroactive effect only insofar as it is favorable to the accused.
** RPC 22,000 ceiling; amount in this case 232,500; thus, maximum penalty
** R.A. No 10951 penalty – 6y 1d to 8y 8m 1d
** RPC Penalty – 6m 1 d to 20y
Issue: WON R.A. No. 10951 should be given retroactive effect.
Held: NO. It is clear, therefore, that if R.A. No. 10951 would be given retroactive effect, the same will
prejudice petitioner. The penalty under the RPC, insofar as it benefits the petitioner must prevail.
Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA, which is four years and two months of prision
correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, is correct as it is within the
proper penalty imposed by law.
Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The term “mandatory” is a generic term describing statutes which require and not merely permit a
course of action. They are characterized by such directives as “shall”.
Effect if act is contrary to mandatory/prohibitory law (DO and DO NOT DO). The violation of such law
renders the act void.
Exceptions
a. By expressly validating the contract. Example: Art 349 RPC punishes bigamy. However,
bigamy is committed under the circumstances provided in Art 41 of the Family Code, the
subsequent bigamous marriage is considered valid. **Art 41 FC – 4 years in relation to Art
391 CC – 2 years, presumption of death instances.
b. By making the invalidity to depend on the will of the injured party, such as voidable or
annullable contracts. Example: When consent in marriage is vitiated by violence or
intimidation, the marriage is voidable and annullable. The victim may or may not however
opt to annul the marriage (Art 45 FC). The discretion to annul belongs solely to the victim or
side of the victim.
c. By punishing it criminally but validating the act. Example: Art 351 RPC punishes widows for
premature marriages. If a widow remarries within the prohibited period of 303 days,
nevertheless, the marriage remains valid but without prejudice to her criminal liability.
Another example: Art 7 par 1 of the Family Code authorizes incumbent judges to officiate
marriages within their territorial jurisdiction. However, if a judge officiated a marriage
outside his jurisdiction, nonetheless, the marriage remains valid but without prejudice to
the prosecution of the judge for administrative or criminal liability.
d. By invalidating the act but recognizing the legal effects as flowing from the invalid act
(Sampaguita Pictures Inc vs Villamayor, CV-58312, April 14, 1983). Example: under the
Family Code, Art 36, the marriage of a party suffering from psychological incapacity is void.
But children born before the final declaration of the nullity of marriage are considered
legitimate (Art 54 Family Code).
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Requisites of a valid waiver
a. A person must actually have the right which he or she renounces;
b. A person must have the legal capacity to make the renunciation;
c. The renunciation must be made in a clear and unequivocal manner;
d. The waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
CASES:
1. Famanila vs CA 500 scra 76
Facts: Roberto Famanila was hired by NFD International Manning Agents, Inc as a seaman. While
working he had a sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm, he
then had two brain surgeries. When he was repatriated in Manila, he was declared as totally disabled by
a physician. Thereafter, respondents convinced him to settle his claim amicably by accepting the amount
of US$13,200. Petitioner accepted the offer. 6 years later he filed a complaint for damages against
respondents with the NLRC but was dismissed due to prescription. Petitioner claims that he did not sign
the Receipt and Release voluntarily or freely because he was permanently disabled and in financial
constraints. These factors allegedly vitiated (defective) his consent which makes the Receipt and Release
void and unenforceable.
Issue: Was there a valid waiver and quitclaim
Held: YES. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is
binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of change of mind. It is only where
there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
the settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full
understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable,
the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking, as in this case. To be valid and
effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the
intention of those giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them. Further, dire necessity is
not an acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt and Release since it has not been shown that
petitioner was forced to sign it. Regarding prescription, the applicable prescriptive period for the money
claims against the respondents is the three year period pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code since
petitioner’s demand for an award of disability benefits is a money claim arising from his employment
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does
not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00
and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of
any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim."
Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the
estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such
waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides that parents and guardians
may not repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation
amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the
interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the
instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the
deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a
material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights
because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be
inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not
have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties, and its
provisions should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or
defrauded in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between parties and parties are
free to stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy. The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not contrary to law; it was in
accordance with the provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP
PGMC not to recognize its validity.
In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is guided by the following
pronouncement:
The doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word 'waiver'
covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects
his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to
which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole
benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or
privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized
that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for
the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large.
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.
Kinds
a. Express – a new law specifically mentions another law and repeals it.
b. Implied – it is not clear, not specific, no label. As a general rule, implied repeals are not
favored. Requisites of an implied repeal:
1. There is an old law and a new law;
2. Both laws covered the same subject matter;
3. The new law is repugnant or incompatible with the old law.
Effect if repealing law is repealed
Section 21, Chapter 5 of Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides that, “When a law which
expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not thereby revived unless
expressly so provided. Section 22 also provides that, “When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is
itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.”
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.
- It is an attempt to institutionalize jurisprudence as part of the law of our country.
- Jurisprudence, decisions of the Supreme Court that interpret the law.
- Stare Decisis Et Non Quieta Movere, to stand by decisions and not disturb the
undisturb.
- This article teaches us that the rulings of the SC form part of the law of the land.
Applies only to the main ruling of the SC.
- They are not laws but have the force and effect of laws.
- Obiter Dictum, incidental or collateral issues to the main issue.
Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws.
Applicability
- A judge shall not abstain or decline in adjudging the case (Jan vs Bernas)
- Under this article, the judge is somehow forced to “legislate” in a loose sense or to
fill the existing vacuum in obscure or insufficient laws.
- This Article is applicable ONLY TO CIVIL CASES. The article is not applicable to
criminal cases because of the basic principle “nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege”.
The dismissal of the case is mandatory because conviction is inconceivable.
CASE:
Silverio vs Republic 537 s 373
Facts: Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex
in his birth certificate. His sex was registered as male. He wants to change his name to Mely. He is a
transexual. The RTC granted his petition. The OSG appealed to the CA alleging that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. The CA ruled in favor of
the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the
change of either name of sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through
surgery.
Issue: WON the courts can engage in judicial legislation.
Held: NO. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "no judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law,
not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute based.
If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to
change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its
co-equal branch of government, Congress.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an
ordeal, but the remedies involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not
by the courts.
In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was
not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done.
**
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
- ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
- ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.”
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
** The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone.
This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential
requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and
family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment
(a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to
women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could
be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
- This article only applies if there is doubt. If there is no doubt on the law, the court
must apply it without fear or favor. When the law is clearly worded, no
interpretation should be made.
CASE:
Anaban, et al vs Anaban-Alfiler, et al, GR No. 249011, March 15, 2021
Facts: Pedrito and Virginia married and divorced under Ibaloi tribal customs, they had 3 children,
respondents Betty Anaban-Alfiler, Mercedes Anaban, and Marcelo Anaban; Virginia found insane by the
tribal leaders; Pedrito remarried, this time to Pepang, similarly in accord to Ibaloi customs, which is
recognized under the Old Civil Code. They begot 8 children. Pedrito died sometime in 2004.
Respondents sued for summary settlement or judicial partition of the intestate estate of their father.
During the lifetime of Pedrito he acquired a land from his father Pedro. In the certificate he was married
to petitioner’s mother, Pepang. The MCTC ruled that the marriage of Pedritio and Virginia was validly
dissolved in accordance with the customs of the Ibaloi tribe. The RTC on appeal declared as bigamous
the marriage of Pedrito and Pepang. The CA ruled that Article 78 of the OLD CIVIL CODE was unequivocal
– it only referred to celebration of marriage. There was nothing therein implying that the framers also
intended to include the validity of divorce decreed in accordance with non-Christian rites or customs. As
the statute is clear, its literal meaning must be applied without attempt at any further interpretation.
Issue: WON Pedri to Anaban' s divorce from Virginia Erasmo claimed to have been decreed in
accordance with the Ibaloi customs be recognized under our laws.
Held: NO, it was not. the laws governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they
are laws relating to public policy. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and doctrines of a
religion cannot be superior to or have precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated
above laws relating to marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public
policy. This holds true even up to this time. Since there was no legal and valid ground for the divorce of
Pedrito and Virginia, in the eyes of the law, they were still married and their marriage was not dissolved
as to permit Pedrito to remarry. Pedrito's subsequent marriage to petitioners' mother Pepang,
therefore, is void from the beginning, for being bigamous. Both the old Civil Code and the IPRA-IRR
prov1s10ns limited the State recognition to "marriages performed" in accordance with customary laws,
rites, traditions, and practices. There is no mention of the recognition of dissolution of marriage in
accordance with the IP's customs.
All of the courts below resolved the validity of the so-called divorce between Pedrito and Virginia
through the lens of the old Civil Code. But, in reality, when Pedrito and Virginia got married and even
when they later on supposedly divorced, the old Civil Code was not yet in effect. For it took effect on
June 18, 1949, or two (2) years after the divorce decree was purportedly handed down by the Ibaloi
council of elders. The law in effect prior thereto was still the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Article 5 of
which stated:
Article 5. Laws are abrogated only by other subsequent laws, and the disuse or any custom or
practice to the contrary shall not prevail against their observance.
This was the equivalent of Article 11 of the old Civil Code which provides that customs which are
contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.
For purposes of determining whether divorce was contrary to law, public order or public policy at the
time Pedrito and Virginia allegedly obtained their own divorce, we trace back the history of divorce or
dissolution of marriage starting from the Spanish regime. During the Spanish colonization, Las Siete
Partidas was passed which only allowed relative divorce or what is known now as legal separation. This
allowed spouses to be free of all marital obligations while their marriage subsists in the eyes of the law.
In 1917, however, Las Siete Partidas was repealed by Act No. 2710 which took effect on March 11, 1917.
Section 1 of Act No. 2710 reads:
Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband, committed in any of the forms described in article four
hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal Code.
Divorce, then, can be granted only on two (2) grounds, i.e., adultery and concubinage. This was the
prevailing law when Pedrito and Virginia got married in 1942. In 1943, however, during the Japanese
occupation, Act No. 2710 was abolished and Executive Order No. 141 (EO 141) was enacted and took
effect on March 25, 1943.
Under EO 141, absolute divorce may be granted on these grounds: (a) adultery and concubinage; (b)
attempt on the life of one spouse by the other; ( c) a subsequent marriage by either party before the
previous one was dissolved; ( d) loathsome contagious diseases contracted by either spouse; ( e)
incurable insanity; (f) impotency; (g) repeated bodily violence by one against the other; (h) intentional or
unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year; (i) unexplained absence from the last conjugal
abode continuously for at least three years; and (j) slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against
the other.
Only a little over a year, however, after the Americans had taken over the Japanese as colonizers again
of the Philippines, EO 141 became ineffective and Act No. 2710, which allowed divorce on ground of
concubinage and adultery, was once again reinstated. This was the prevailing law when Pedrito and
Virginia were granted divorce by the Ibaloi council of elders in 1947.
Thus, in 1947, only two (2) grounds were accepted for divorce, i.e., adultery and concubinage. Neither
was the reason for Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. The Ibaloi council of elders granted the divorce on
ground of Virginia's alleged insanity. The divorce, therefore, is contrary to law, hence, cannot be
recognized.
It held that customs and traditions cannot supplant existing laws unless specifically provided under said
laws. Customs and traditions cannot be made to apply over and above existing laws unless otherwise
allowed by these laws.
Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations. GENERALITY PRINCIPLE
Obligatory effect of Penal Laws
- Obligatory upon ALL who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory
- Exceptions:
1. Principles of Public International Law
a. Head of States
b. Ambassadors, Ministers, Charges de Affairs, and Ministers of Plenipotentiary
(Consuls and Vice Consuls are NOT EXEMPTED/INCLUDED)
2. Treaty Stipulations
3. Laws of Preferential Application
a. Parliamentary Immunity – done in legislative function
b. RA 75 – member of the retinue of the head of the state or ambassador;
must submit their names to the DFA for certification