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SEC 32. ADMISSION BY SILENCE
PEOPLE VS ROA
Facts: Victim’s mother confronted appellant but he remained
silent. He was also confronted about the alleged rape and cursed
but he did not retaliate and remained silent. Appellant was
maltreated into jail where he was detained, but he did not
complain.
Held: His admitted silence when Nina's mother confronted and
even cursed him by his claim, betrays his guilt just as his passivity
does when he was allegedly maltreated and haled into jail by
Nina's father on account of the incidents. For an innocent man
would certainly strongly protest and deny a false accusation and
do something positive to spare himself of punishment. But he did
not.
PEOPLE VS MAGDADARO Y GERONA
See: page 55 on Admission
by Silence
PEOPLE VS PARAGSA
Facts: Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol,
the complaining witness, but he stoutly denied that he did so by
employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and
Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of the incident, it was
Mirasol who invited him to the latter's house where they had
sexual intercourse after kissing each other; and that the
intercourse they had that afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their
third sexual intercourse.
Held: A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the
prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive
to justify a conviction. Certain circumstances negate the
commission by the appellant of the crime charged and point to the
conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant
and the complaining witness was voluntary. Force and
intimidation were not proven.
Mirasol did not offer any resistance or vocal protestation against
the alleged sexual assault. She could have easily made an outcry
or resisted the appellant's advances without endangering her life.
But she did not. She was allegedly raped in her own home, not far
from her neighbors and during the daytime. If, indeed, she was
raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she could have
revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her
aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her.
Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was
raped. It was only after her mother arrived from Sagay, Negros
Occidental, three (3) days after the incident, and confronted her
about the rape incident that her mother learned through her aunt
Lita that she eventually revealed to her mother what the accused
did to her in the afternoon of July 13, 1971.
Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother
at all to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses
to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually
sweethearts; and that they had two previous sexual
communications.
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied
admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is
applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party
can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear:
1. that he heard and understood the statement;
2. that he was at liberty to interpose a denial;
3. that the statement was in respect to some matter
affecting his rights or in which he was then interested,
and calling, naturally, for an answer;
4. that the facts were within his knowledge; and
5. that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from
his silence would be material to the issue.
These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present
case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the
accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an
admission of the truth of such assertion.
SOLAS VS POWER TELEPHONE SUPPLY
Facts: In this case, petitioner's allegations that respondents
committed acts of harassment, i.e., the withholding of his salary
for the month of February and directing him to return the company
car, cellphone and office keys, have been rebutted and sufficiently
explained by private respondent company in its Position Paper.
Respondents were able to show that its acts were not intended to
harass or discriminate against petitioner.
Held: Notably, petitioner never refuted respondents' explanations
for withholding his salary and the reasons why he was required to
return the company car, key and cellphone. This constitutes
admission by silence under Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Verily, the only conclusion that may be reached is that
respondents' explanations are truthful and, based thereon, the
NLRC and the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that there was no constructive dismissal in this case.
PEOPLE VS RANARIO
Held: It is true that when Leon Caday made his confession, in
which he implicates Fulgencio Ranario, the latter was present
and said nothing, according to justice of the peace Castor del
Bando, but it does not appear that Fulgencio Ranario heard
the confession of Leon Caday nor had the opportunity to
deny it.
On the other hand, however, it does appear that when Leon
Caday, in the presence of the Constabulary soldiers, was shown
the bolo that Fulgencio Ranario carried and said it was the one
that had been given him by the appellant, a discussion took
place between them in which the said Fulgencio Ranario
denied having given the said Leon Caday his bolo and having
been in his house.
SEC 33. CONFESSION
PEOPLE VS DE LOS SANTOS
HELD: It is significant to consider that the confession was taken
on December 7, 1971 by Pat. Conrado Francisco while the alleged
maltreatment was done in the evening of December 6, 1971. It is
unbelievable that the alleged maltreatment made by the two
policemen was what induced appellant to admit the crime the
following day. Ordinarily, confessions executed through
intimidation or maltreatment are obtained during or
immediately after the supposed maltreatment.
In the instant case, appellant alleges that in spite of the alleged
manhandling, he never admitted anything that evening and the
two policemen desisted from further harming him. However, when
investigated the following day by police detective Conrado
Francisco, appellant readily confessed his participation in the
killing of Gregorio Dotado. In fact, during the cross-examination,
appellant expressly acknowledged that Pat. Francisco neither
maltreated nor intimidated him during the investigation.
A confession is deemed to have been made voluntarily if the
accused did not complain to the proper authorities regarding the
alleged maltreatment despite the opportunity to do so.

If appellant's confession was voluntary, we have to conclude that
Dotado was slain in the manner and for the reason set out in that
document. It is needless to say that no one in his right mind
would convict himself without compulsion by fabricating a
highly self-damaging story and suppressing the truth which
would absolve him.
Another factor that militates against the claim of appellant of
involuntariness in the execution of the confession is the fact that
the confession is replete with details that only the confessant
could have known.
The Court is of the view that appellant's admission voluntarily
made and confirmed by him in open court during his trial,
renders worthless the challenge now interposed by him to the
admissibility of his sworn statement (confession).
PEOPLE VS SATORRE
Facts: Appellant claims that his alleged confession or admission,
which was concocted by the Barangay Captain, is inadmissible in
evidence for being hearsay and for being obtained without a
competent and independent counsel of his choice.
HELD: An admission as an "act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact." A confession, on the other hand is the
"declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein." Both
may be given in evidence against the person admitting or
confessing. On the whole, a confession, as distinguished from an
admission, is a declaration made at any time by a person,
voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement, stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the
commission of a crime.
Evidently, appellant's alleged declaration owning up to the
killing before the Barangay Captain was a confession. Since
the declaration was not put in writing and made out of court,
it is an oral extrajudicial confession.
Rationale for the admissibility of a confession: is that if it is
made freely and voluntarily, a confession constitutes evidence
of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption
that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and
knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless
prompted by truth and conscience.
Basic test for the validity of a confession: Was it voluntarily
and freely made?
On Voluntariness
The term "voluntary" means that the accused speaks of his free
will and accord, without inducement of any kind, and with a full and
complete knowledge of the nature and consequences of the
confession, and when the speaking is so free from influences
affecting the will of the accused, at the time the confession was
made, that it renders it admissible in evidence against him. Plainly,
the admissibility of a confession in evidence hinges on its
voluntariness.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
language such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no
suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details — which could only be
supplied by the accused — reflecting spontaneity and
coherence, it may be considered voluntary.
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie
case against the party by whom it is made. Such confessions
are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be
proved that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake;
and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative
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proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when
uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest.
To be sure, a confession is not required to be in any particular
form. It may be oral or written, formal or informal in character.
It may be recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or tape.
However, while not required to be in writing to be admissible
in evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by video
tape or other means, to reduce the confession to writing. This
adds weight to the confession and helps convince the court that it
was freely and voluntarily made. If possible the confession, after
being reduced to writing, should be read to the defendant, have it
read by defendant, have him sign it, and have it attested by
witnesses.
Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not support a
conviction where it is uncorroborated. There must be such
corroboration that, when considered in connection with
confession, will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient corroboration of
a confession. It is not necessary that the supplementary
evidence be entirely free from variance with the extrajudicial
confession, or that it show the place of offense or the
defendant's identity or criminal agency. All facts and
circumstances attending the particular offense charged are
admissible to corroborate extrajudicial confession.
PEOPLE VS CAVITE
HELD: None of the three (3) affidavits contains any
acknowledgment of "guilt of the offense charged" on the part of
the affiants. Not one of them acknowledged having laid a hand
on the victim or assisted in inflicting any injury on him, or
having taken, or assisted in the taking of any property for
him. On the contrary, they all disclaimed any participation in the
offense or even knowledge of any intention or plan to kill or rob
Pedro Nacional. The most that perhaps may be said about the
affidavits, as evidence against the affiants, is that they are
admissions that the latter were in fact at the scene as the crime
was being perpetrated.
Moreover, it is impermissible to pick the affidavits apart, lending
credence only to the portions seen as incriminatory, while
disregarding as false and unacceptable those supportive of
innocence, absent, as here, any circumstance which would
logically justify such dismemberment.
The circumstances surrounding the custodial investigation of the
three affiants, Cavite, et al., suggests that the counsel who
assisted them — the same for all three as it turned out — was less
their free choice, as he should have been, than the arbitrary one
of their investigators.
UNITED STATES VS CORRALES
HELD: The statutory provision excluding evidence as to
confessions until and unless the prescribed foundation is laid is
not applicable to admissions, which do not amount to
confessions although they may be sufficient, when taken
together with other evidence of surrounding circumstances,
to sustain an inference of the guilt of the accused.
The reason for the rule excluding evidence as to confessions
unless it is first made to appear that they are made voluntarily
does not apply in cases of admissions, although, of course,
evidence of the fact that a particular statement was made under
duress would tend very strongly to destroy its evidentiary value.
There is no provision of law which prescribes that either
confessions or admissions are not competent evidence
unless made under oath. It is the fact that they are made by the
accused and against his own interest which gives to them their

evidentiary value, and provided the fact is established it does not
matter whether they are made under oath or not.
PEOPLE VS ARTELLERO
Issue: Whether the extrajudicial confession of accused Rodriguez
is admissible not only against him but also against appellant.
HELD: We find that Rodriguez's confession is
constitutionally flawed so that it could not be used as
evidence against them at all.
The four fundamental requisites for the admissibility of a
confession are:
1. the confession must be voluntary;
2. the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel;
3. the confession must be express; and
4. the confession must be in writing.
We find the second requisite lacking.
The accused and appellant were arrested and brought to the
police station at around 5:00 P.M. of October 11, 1991.
The extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez was taken at 2:00 P.M.
of October 15, 1991. Atty. Lao confirmed on the stand that the
police investigators called him at around 2:00 P.M. of October 15,
1991, and that he conferred with the accused for about 10 minutes
prior to the execution of the extrajudicial confession.
Evidently, the accused were detained for four days, but Atty. Lao
of the PAO was called only on the fourth day of detention
when accused was about to put his confession in writing.
Under the factual milieu, the moment accused and appellant
were arrested and brought to the police station, they were
already under custodial investigation. An accused who is on
board the police vehicle on the way to the police station is already
under custodial investigation, and should therefore be accorded
his rights under the Constitution.
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage
when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person
as a suspect. When Rodriguez and appellant were arrested by
the police in the afternoon of October 11, 1991, they were already
the suspects in the slaying of the security guard, Ramon Matias,
and should have been afforded the rights guaranteed by
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly the
right to counsel. Jurisprudence is clear that an accused under
custodial investigation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof. In this case,
Rodriguez and appellant were in the hands of the police for about
four days without the assistance counsel.
The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has
been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements,
and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial
confession. Thus, admissions obtained during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are
still flawed under the Constitution.
Even granting that the extrajudicial confession of accused was
admissible, such confession is only admissible against the
confessant. In order to be admissible against his co-accused,
there must be independent evidence aside from the
extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In this case,
however, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the
alleged conspiracy.
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PEOPLE VS URRO
HELD: It is established doctrine that the confession or
"declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt
of the offense charged" may be given in evidence against
him, where it is voluntary.
Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by force or
intimidation are null and void and are abhorred by the law,
which proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to
secure a confession. A coerced confession "stands discredited in
the eyes of the law and is as a thing that never existed.
While there is convincing evidence of violence, the validity and
admissibility of the confession are destroyed. The issue
generally focuses on the voluntariness of the confession which
in turn depends upon the credibility of the witnesses.
The case at bar is replete with numerous clear warning signals for
the rejection of the alleged confessions.
- The prosecution could not even establish who actually
reduced the confessions to writing and the intrinsic evidence
of the language and style of the confessions themselves
indicate their prefabrication per the homology and
identity of the words used, sentence for sentence, and
word for word but for necessary changes in the names
of the accused referred to, and that they could not have
been the confessions, voluntarily made, of two different
persons;
- The fact that the alleged confessions were made in a
language (English) not known to the accused, nor even to
their investigator and the official before whom they allegedly
swore to the truth thereof.
PEOPLE VS BASCUGIN Y AGQUIZ
HELD: The decisive factor in Bascugin's conviction was his
admission to the crime when he was examined by his lawyer in
court. Bascugin's confession was freely, intelligently, and
deliberately given. Judicial confession constitutes evidence of
a high order. The presumption is that no sane person would
deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless
prompted to do so by truth and conscience. Admission of guilt
constitutes evidence against the accused.
PEOPLE VS MUIT
HELD: The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and
Muit strengthened the case against them. There is nothing on
record to support appellants' claim that they were coerced
and tortured into executing their extra judicial confessions.
One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
appellants' extra judicial statements is that each contains many
details and facts which the investigating officers could not
have known and could not have supplied, without the
knowledge and information given by appellants.
Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when
they executed their statements.
The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only
against the person making it recognizes various exceptions,
to wit:
1. Where several extra judicial statements had been made by
several persons charged with an offense and there could
have been no collusion with reference to said several
confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material
respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-
defendants and is admissible against other persons
implicated therein.

2. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence
against the person implicated therein to show the
probability of the latter's actual participation in the
commission of the crime and may likewise serve as
corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and
circumstances that other persons had participated in
the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These
are known as "interlocking confessions".
REPUBLIC ACT 7438 aborted or did not push through as the parties, petitioner, and
PEOPLE V. FELIXMINIA Y CAMACHO
HELD: A person under custodial investigation should enjoy the
right to counsel from its inception to its termination. Truly, the
accused's counsel of choice must be present and must be able to
advise and assist his client from the time he answers the first
question until the time he signs the extra-judicial confession.
PEOPLE V. JIMENEZ
HELD: The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial
investigation should be of the latter's own choice, not one foisted
on him by the police investigators or other parties. In this case,
former Judge Jabagat was evidently not of Marcos Jimenez' own
choice; she was the police officers' choice; she did not ask Marcos
if he was willing to have her represent him; she just told him: "I am
here because I was summoned to assist you and I am going to
assist you." This is not the mode of solicitation of legal
assistance contemplated by the Constitution.
The typewritten confession is, in any event, unsigned, as are the
handwritten notes from which the former was derived. The
interrogation of Marcos Jimenez having been conducted without
the assistance of counsel, and no valid waiver of said right to
counsel having been made, not only the confession but also any
admission obtained in the course thereof are inadmissible against
Marcos Jimenez. Any confession or admission obtained in
violation among others of the rights guaranteed in custodial
investigations shall be inadmissible in evidence against the
person making the confession or admission. This is so even
if it be shown that the statements attributed to the accused
were voluntarily made, or are afterwards confirmed to be true
by external circumstances.
PEOPLE V. CHI CHAN LIU
HELD: Anent appellants' claim that their constitutional rights were
further violated for during custodial investigation, they did not have
counsel of their choice nor were they provided with one, this
deserves scant consideration since the same is relevant and
material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession
extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his
conviction. In this case, neither one of the appellants executed
an admission or confession. In fact, as the records clearly show,
appellants barely even spoke and merely kept repeating the
phrase "call China, big money." The trial court convicted them not
on the basis of anything they said during custodial investigation
but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of appellants'
constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation.
AQUINO V. PAISTE
HELD: Republic Act No. (RA) 7438 has extended this
constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has
not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for
questioning. Specifically, Sec. 2 of RA 7438 provides that
custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an
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invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed.
When petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR
to be investigated, she was already under custodial
investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her rights
under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a
lawyer then, she was provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy,
which fact is undisputed. However, the custodial investigation
on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either
respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the amicable
settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was
executed with both parties affixing their signatures on it in the
presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.
When the accused never raised any objection against the
lawyer's appointment during the course of the investigation
and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer, the accused is deemed to
have engaged such lawyer.
Note that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission
made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if
obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
MESINA V. PEOPLE
HELD: Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the fact that he was one
of those being investigated did not by itself define the nature
of the investigation as custodial. For him, the investigation was
still a general inquiry to ascertain the whereabouts of the missing
patubig collection. By its nature, the inquiry had to involve
persons who had direct supervision over the issue, including
the City Treasurer, the City Auditor, the representative from
different concerned offices, and even the City Mayor. What was
conducted w s not an investigation that already focused on the
petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry into the
missing city funds. Besides, he was not as of then in the
custody of the police or other law enforcement office.
PEOPLE V. GUTING Y TOMAS
HELD: Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the
police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
Hence, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation
when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre
and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father to death. Accused-
appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and
voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by
the police authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked
accused-appellant who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did
so in response to accused-appellant's initial declaration that his
father was already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no
idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider
accused-appellant as the suspect in his father's killing.
Accused-appellant was also merely standing before PO1 Torre
and PO1 Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and
was not yet in police custody.

PEOPLE V. SISON
HELD: In People vs Galit, the Court reiterated the ruling in Morales
vs Enrile and Moncupa vs Enrile cases, to wit:
- At the time, a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
- He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he
might make could be used against him.
- The person arrested shall have the right to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by
letter of messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
- No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf.
- The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
- Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein
laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
MANUEL V. N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY
HELD: The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under
custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into
custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. The right to counsel
attaches only upon the start of such investigation.
Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (3) Section 12
of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.
In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during
the course of the investigation conducted by private respondents'
counsel to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
terminate their employment. Petitioners were not under
custodial investigation as they were not yet accused by the
police of committing a crime. The investigation was merely an
administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not
a criminal investigation. The questions were propounded by the
employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the
investigation was conducted at the police station did not
necessarily put petitioners under custodial investigation as the
venue of the investigation was merely incidental.
PEOPLE V. MARRA Y ZARATE
HELD: In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial
investigation when he made the admission. There was no
coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement.
Indeed, he could have refused to answer questions from the
very start when the policemen requested that they all go to
his residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level
wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. They
were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been
merely informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a
security guard's uniform.
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PEOPLE V. SUAREZ
HELD: While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a
person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of
a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused
really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for
him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he
never raised any objection against the former's appointment
during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the
swearing officer.
To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a
lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was
adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion
as would lead the accused to admit something false. The
counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth.
PEOPLE V. BULURAN Y RAMIREZ
HELD: There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused during custodial investigation since neither one executed
an extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the records 16
show that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain silent during
the custodial investigation. Any allegation of violation of rights
during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted
from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.
However, in relation to the right to counsel during custodial
investigation, there can be no valid waiver of the right to counsel
unless such waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel as
mandated by Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution and
the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7438.
PEOPLE V. GUILLERMO Y GARCIA
HELD: The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed"
implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator
to explain and contemplates an effective communication that
results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Absent that
understanding, there is a denial of the right "to be informed,"
as it cannot be said that the person has been truly "informed"
of his rights. Ceremonial shortcuts in the communication of
abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it
diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation.
Be that as it may, however, the constitutional safeguards on
custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do
not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited
through questioning by law enforcement authorities but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally
admits to having committed the offense. The rights
enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant
to preclude the slightest use of the State's coercive power as
would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not
intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting
the truth outside the sphere of such power.
Appellant's spontaneous statements made to a private security
guard, not an agent of the State or a law enforcer, are not covered
by the Miranda principles and, as res gestae, admissible in
evidence against him. Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that,
despite the inadmissibility of appellant's alleged confession to the
police, the prosecution has amply proven the appellant's guilt in
the killing of Victor F. Keyser.

PEOPLE V. GALGARIN
HELD: Because of the inherent danger in the use of television as
a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this
phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are
reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further
admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police,
with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
attempt to legitimize coerced extra-judicial confessions and
place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would
be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus
imperil our criminal justice system.
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before
media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the
presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line
between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a
difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is
essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a
confession was given under coercive physical or psychological
atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never
presume that all media confessions described as voluntary
have been freely given. This type of confession always remains
suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and
scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a
difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires
persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions
from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and
protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
GUTANG V. PEOPLE
Facts:
1. Petitioner insists that the trial court erred in admitting in
evidence the Receipts of Property Seized, considering that
it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The
said Receipts for Property Seized, which described the
properties seized from the petitioner by virtue of the search
warrant, contain his signature. According to petitioner,
inasmuch as the said evidence were obtained without
the assistance of a lawyer, said evidence are tantamount
to having been derived from an uncounselled extra-
judicial confession and, thus, are inadmissible in evidence
for being fruits of the poisonous tree."
HELD: We agree. It has been held that the signature of the
accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible in
evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel.
The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration
against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged
for the reason that, in the case at bar, mere unexplained
possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore,
the signatures of the petitioner on the two (2) Receipts of Property
Seized (Exhibits I and R) are not admissible in evidence, the same
being tantamount to an uncounseled extra-judicial confession
which is prohibited by the Constitution.
2. Petitioner also posits the theory that since he had no counsel
during the custodial investigation when his urine sample was
taken and chemically examined, Exhibits "L" and "M", which
are the respective Chemistry and Physical Reports, both
dated March 9, 1994, are also inadmissible in evidence since
his urine sample was derived in effect from an uncounselled
extra-judicial confession.
HELD: The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken
into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of
a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions
to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from the
accused. However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
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from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material.
In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed
or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced,
or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done,
without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial
compulsion.
The situation in the case at bar falls within the exemption under
the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought
to be examined came from the body of the accused. This was a
mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not
meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical
attributes determinable by simple observation.
PEOPLE V. PAYNOR
Facts: Appellant then asseverates that there was a violation of his
rights while under custodial investigation, in light of the Miranda
doctrine, when allegedly the police investigators unceremoniously
stripped him of his clothing and personal items, and the same
were later introduced as evidence during the trial.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded.
The protection of the accused under custodial investigation, which
is invoked by appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution provides that such
accused shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent, the right to counsel, and the right to waive the right to
counsel in the presence of counsel, and that any confession or
admission obtained in violation of his rights shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him. This constitutional right applies only
against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the
accused is proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may
validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his
garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to
enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of
the proscription against testimonial compulsion.
PEOPLE V. GAMBOA
HELD: As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected
to he raises the question that it was not conducted in the presence
of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense whose
confession or admission may not be taken unless he is
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against
self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test
of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to
testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the
accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed,
the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a gun.
Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the
prosecution.
PEOPLE V. CARREON
HELD: Measuring or photographing the party is not within the
privilege" (against self-incrimination). Nor is the removal or
replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that
the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
LADIANA V. PEOPLE
HELD: The legal formalities required by the Constitution apply
only to extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained during
custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated in the

constitutional provision "exist only in custodial interrogations, or
in-custody interrogation of accused persons." In the present case,
petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made
during the preliminary investigation, not during the custodial
investigation.
However, he argues that the right to competent and independent
counsel also applies during preliminary investigations. We
disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
The accused’s interrogation by the police would already have
ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the
public prosecutor's office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in
a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's
office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under
'custodial interrogation' for the obvious reason that he is no
longer under 'custodial interrogation.
Even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by
petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his
constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it
was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or
interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under
custodial investigation as embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case.
PEOPLE V. OMILIG Y MANCIA
HELD: As correctly found by the lower courts, accused-appellant
executed his extrajudicial confession not during custodial
investigation, but during the preliminary investigation.
Custodial Investigation Preliminary Investigation
the questioning initiated by an inquiry or a proceeding to
law enforcement officers after determine whether there is
a person has been taken into sufficient ground to engender
custody or otherwise a well-founded belief that a
deprived of his freedom of crime has been committed,
action in any significant way and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial
A person undergoing preliminary investigation cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. The claim
by the accused of inadmissibility of his extrajudicial confession is
unavailing because his confessions were obtained during a
preliminary investigation.
On Independent and Competent Counsel
To be a competent and independent counsel in a custodial
investigation, the lawyer so engaged should be present at all
stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution
reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the
interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent
or terminate the interview.
Counsel should be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question until the
signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer
should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and
that the person under investigation fully understands the
nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in
relation to his constitutional rights.
Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during such investigations
should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the
individual undergoing questioning, but the word "preferably"
does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by
a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
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equally competent and independent attorneys from handling
his defense. What is imperative is that the counsel should be
competent and independent.
PEOPLE V. DENIEGA Y MACOY
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution provided a stricter rule by mandating that
waiver of the right to counsel must be made not only in the
presence of counsel but also in writing. Section 33, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court requires, moreover, that a confession, to be
admissible, must be express. Finally, Republic Act 7438
mandates that the entire confession must be in writing.
On Competent and Independent Counsel
The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should
be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual
undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the
accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and
independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who
would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless
recital of the individual's constitutional rights.
Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing
custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one)
"should be engaged:
- by the accused (himself), or
- by the latter's relative or person authorized by him
to engage an attorney or
- by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition.
Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given
as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are
generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between
lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.
SEC 34. SIMILAR ACTS AS EVIDENCE; RIAA PART II
CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
HELD: Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits the
admission of evidence that tends to show that what a person
has done at one time is probative of the contention that he
has done a similar act at another time.
Evidence of similar acts or occurrences compels the defendant to
meet allegations that are not mentioned in the complaint, confuses
him in his defense, raises a variety of irrelevant issues, and diverts
the attention of the court from the issues immediately before it.
Hence, this evidentiary rule guards against the practical
inconvenience of trying collateral issues and protracting the
trial and prevents surprise or other mischief prejudicial to litigants.
The rule, however, is not without exception. While inadmissible in
general,
- Collateral facts may be received as evidence under
exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational
similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving rise
to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the
issue or fact to be proved.
- Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant,
especially in actions based on fraud and deceit, because
it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a
person; it provides insight into such person's motive or
intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it reveals a
mistake.
Here, petitioners argue that transactions relating to the other
parcels of land they entered into, in the concept of absolute

owners, are inadmissible as evidence to show that the parcels in
issue are not co-owned. The Court is not persuaded. Evidence
of such transactions falls under the exception to the rule on res
inter alios acta. Such evidence is admissible because it is relevant
to an issue in the case and corroborative of evidence already
received.
The relevancy of such transactions is readily apparent. The nature
of ownership of said property should be the same as that of the
lots in question since they are all subject to the MOA. If the parcels
of land were held and disposed by petitioners in fee simple, in the
concept of absolute owners, then the lots in question should
similarly be treated as absolutely owned in fee simple by the
Tamayo spouses.
TANZO V. DRILON
HELD: Under the rule of res inter alios acta, evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time,
but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
like.
The series of transactions between M.J.S. International and
Liwayway Dee Tanzo were entered into under similar
circumstances as those surrounding the contract between
petitioner and Mario. Just like the alleged trust agreement
between petitioner and Mario, the loan contracts between M.J.S.
International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo provide that the creditor
shall lend to the debtor a specific amount for use by the latter in
its business operations. Hence, private respondents' modus
operandi, if there ever was one, in raising additional capital for
M.J.S. International was to borrow money from willing investors. It
is thus unlikely, considering the scheme of things, that private
respondents would all of a sudden deviate from an established
business practice to enter into a trust agreement with the
petitioner.
PEOPLE V. ACOSTA (citing People vs Dadles)
HELD: Appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by
his previous attempt to set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same
house (private complainant's) which was burned later in the night.
Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in
the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas
stove and knife. When she asked him what he was going to do
with the stove, he answered that he was going to burn the house
of private complainant.
While it is true that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not
do the same or similar thing at another time," it may be received
"to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not
by any means amount to direct evidence against the accused, it
was competent to prove the intent of the accused in setting
the fire which was charged in the information. Where a person
is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony
may be received of other similar acts committed about the
same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal
intent of the accused.
PEOPLE V. DADLES
HELD: The general rule is that evidence is not admissible which
shows or tends to show, that the accused in a criminal case has
committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he
is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other
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crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he
would be likely to commit the crime charged in the
indictment. A man may be a notorious criminal, but this fact may
not be shown to influence a jury in passing upon the question of
his guilt or innocence of the particular offense for which he is on
trial. A man may have committed many crimes and still be
innocent of the crime charged in the case on trial.
To permit proof of other crimes would naturally predispose the
minds of the jurors against the defendant. One who commits one
crime may be more likely to commit another; yet logically, one
crime does not prove another, nor tend to prove another,
unless there is such a relation between them that proof of one
tends to prove the other.
In this case we find that there is such a relation between both
incidents of kidnapping charged in the two informations that "proof
of one tends to prove the other", and evidence of similar acts
committed about the same time establishes the criminal intent of
the appellant to deprive Salvador and Alipan of their liberty.
PEOPLE V. MAGPAYO
HELD: As a rule, evidence is not admissible which shows or tends
to show, that the accused in a criminal case has committed a
crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It
is not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like
nature for the purpose of showing that he committed the crime
charged in the complaint or information.
An exception to this rule is when such evidence tends directly to
establish the particular crime, and it is usually competent to prove
the motive, the intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a
common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the other, or the identity of the person charged with the
commission of the crime on trial.
In the case at bar, evidence was introduced in Criminal Case
No. 6443 (Forcible Abduction with Rape) committed by
appellant against 11-year old Mara N. Chico on November 20,
1987, not as evidence of similar acts to prove that on April 10,
1988, the said appellant also committed a similar act of rape
(and robbery) against the person of 10-year old Lilibeth Bobis
(Criminal Case No. 6436). These offenses are separate crimes
and are the subject of separate complaints and proofs though
jointly tried. Hence, the evidence in one was not offered and
admitted to prove the other but only to show the plan, scheme
or modus operandi of the offender.
PEOPLE V. MAGTULOY Y MONTARAY
HELD: While evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time, it may be received to prove
a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like.
It appears from the records that the accused-appellant could not
get along with the victim's mother. Quarrels between the two
were frequent. On occasions like this the accused-appellant
usually vented his anger on the victim. In the morning of June
16, 1991, the victim's mother and the accused-appellant again
quarreled simply because he did not like the idea that she and the
victim will be going home to her province in the Visayas. The
accused-appellant failed utterly to refute this testimony.

MALIG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
HELD: While it may be that pursuant to Section 48, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court "evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or omitted
to do the same or similar thing at another time," the same Rule
also provides that "it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage and the like." Emiliana Gerona's credible testimony
regarding the amounts petitioners received from the Matictic
project sufficiently establishes petitioners "intent" and/or
"habit" of demanding and receiving money from the
contractor-complainant, such that the latter, in exasperation,
felt that enough was enough, to the prejudice of his future
contracts.
PEOPLE V. SAGUBAN
HELD: In upholding the validity of the above-questioned act of the
court a quo, we find that not only was the previous conviction of
the accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 6353 for rape duly
proved in the course of the trial but, more importantly, proof of
said previous conviction was not made the sole basis of
accused-appellant's conviction in the case at bench.
Rather, it was the confluence of duly established facts —
positive identification, medical certificate, healed lacerations and
body scars, as well as weak alibi — which, together with proof
of said previous conviction, all formed the basis for accused-
appellant's conviction in the present case.
SEC. 37. DYING DECLARATION
PEOPLE V. DE LAS ERAS Y ZAFRA
Facts: Hilaria rushed to her mother and found her bloodied near
the main door. She asked her what happened and who was
responsible for her condition. Her mother replied, "Gerry.” Also,
Luisito testified that he rushed to the scene of the crime when he
heard Ellen (Hilaria Binatero) cry for help. He went to the victim
and asked what happened to her and who was responsible, and
she answered "Gerry, the son of Pepe and Corning struck her”.
HELD: The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior
to her death constitutes evidence of the highest order of the cause
of her death and of the identity of the assailant. When asked by
Hilaria and policeman Luisito, the victim pointed to accused-
appellant Gerry de las Eras as her assailant. This qualifies as a
dying declaration.
PEOPLE V. PEÑA
HELD:
On Dying Declaration
An ante-mortem statement or dying declaration is entitled to
probative weight if:
1. at the time the declaration was made, death was imminent
and the declarant was conscious of that fact;
2. the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death;
3. the declaration relates to facts which the victim was
competent to testify to;
4. the declarant thereafter died; and
5. the declaration is offered in a criminal case (for homicide,
murder or parricide in which the declarant was the victim),
wherein the declarant's death is the subject of the inquiry.
The first element is lacking in the case at bar. It was not
established with certainty whether Pelagio uttered his statement
with consciousness of his impending death. While he was in pain
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when he made his statement, he expressly stated that accused-
appellant only pistol- whipped him and almost shot him.
The significance of a victim's realization or consciousness that he
was on the brink of death cannot be gainsaid. Such ante mortem
statement is evidence of the highest order because at the
threshold of death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled.
The utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining
serious injuries may be considered the incident speaking
through the victim. It is entitled to the highest credence.
Granting that Pelagio, after giving his statement, later on realized
that he was dying, his statement still can not be considered a
dying declaration.
The crucial factor to consider is the contemporaneity of the
moment when the statement was made and the moment of
the realization of death. The time the statement was being made
must also be the time the victim was aware that he was dying.
On Res Gestae
While it may not qualify as a dying declaration, Pelagio's
statement may nonetheless be admitted in evidence as part of the
res gestae. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling
occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when:
1. the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
2. the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and
3. the statements concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
Pelagio's declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae
since it was made shortly after a startling occurrence and
under the influence thereof. Under the circumstances, the victim
evidently had no opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand.
The infliction on a person of a gunshot wound on a vital part of
the body should qualify by any standard as a startling
occurrence. And the rule is that testimony by a person
regarding statements made by another as that startling
occurrence was taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto, although essentially hearsay, is
admissible exceptionally, on the theory that said statements
are natural and spontaneous, unreflected and instinctive,
made before there had been opportunity to devise or contrive
anything contrary to the real fact that occurred, it being said that
in these cases, it is the event speaking through the declarant, not
the latter speaking of the event.
In People v. Putian, the Court held that although a declaration
does not appear to have been made by the declarant under
the expectation of a sure and impending death, and, for that
reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such
declaration was made at the time of, or immediately after, the
commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting
influence of the startling occurrence still continued in the
declarant's mind, it is admissible as part of the res gestae.
Also, since res gestae refers to those exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims or
spectators to a crime before, during or immediately after the
commission of the crime, they should necessarily be the ones
who must not have the opportunity to contrive or devise a
falsehood but not the persons to whom they gave their dying
declaration or spontaneous statement. In other words, the
witness who merely testifles on a res gestae is not the declarant
referred to in the second requisite whose statements had to be
made before he "had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood.
PEOPLE V. NORRUDIN
HELD: Although Avila, Jr. did not expressly state that he was
dying when he made the declaration, the circumstances
surrounding such declaration show that the same was uttered by

him under the consciousness of impending death. It has been held
in a number of cases that even if a declarant did not make a
statement that he was on the brink of death, a dying
declaration may be admissible if there are circumstances
from which it may be inferred with certainty that such was his
state of mind. Thus, the fact that the victim died shortly after
making a declaration as to the identity of his killer, gives rise
to the inference that the victim knew that he was dying at the
time such declaration was made.
A dying declaration made in the form of answers to questions put
by the person to whom the declaration is made is admissible in
court, and may be proved by the testimony of the witness who
heard the same or to whom it was made.
SEC. 38. DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
LAZARO V. AGUSTIN
HELD: It is wrong for petitioners to argue that Basilisa's alleged
sworn statement is a declaration against interest. It is not a
declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission
against interest. Indeed, there is a vital distinction between
admissions against interest and declarations against interest.
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PHIL. FREE PRESS INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS
HELD: The exception is not applicable because the only
declaration supposedly made by Gen. Menzi which can
conceivably be labeled as adverse to his interest could be
that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in offering to acquire
the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a statement
contrary to his own interest, a declaration conveying the notion
that the declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act for
the President of the Republic can hardly be considered as a
declaration against interest.
In addition, the SC is cautious in giving evidentiary weight to
testimonies of Locsion Sr. and Locsin Jr. respecting what Menzi
supposedly said. For the Locsins can hardly be considered as
disinterested witnesses. They are likely to gain the most from
the annulment of the subject contracts. Moreover, allegations of
duress or coercion should, like fraud, be viewed with utmost
caution. “It has been said that "of all evidence, the narration of a
witness of his conversation with a dead person is esteemed in
justice the weakest.” The temptation and opportunity for fraud in
such cases also operate against the testimony.

Admissions against interest Declarations against interest

those made by a party to a
litigation or by one in privity
with or identified in legal
interest with such party, and
are admissible whether or
not the declarant is
available as a witness.
those made by a person who
is neither a party nor in
privity with a party to the suit,
are secondary evidence, and
constitute an exception to the
hearsay rule; admissible
only when the declarant is
unavailable as a witness.

In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-

in-interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter's legal interest, the
former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly
executed, should be considered as an admission against
interest.

PAREL V. PRUDENCIO

HELD: The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner's

father and had adequate knowledge with respect to the subject
covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino
categorically declared that while he is the occupant of the
residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is
owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City.

It is safe to presume that he would not have made such

declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial
to himself as well as to his children's interests as his heirs.

A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords

the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. Notably, during
Florentino's lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said affidavit
until 1989, the year of his death, there is no showing that he had
revoked such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for
trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him
(Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house
which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence
showing that petitioner entered the house against the latter's will.
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SEC. 42. PART OF THE RES GESTAE CAPILA Y RAYUMA V. PEOPLE

DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE CO. V. RADIO HELD:

MINDANAO NETWORK, INC.
HELD: A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his personal knowledge, which means those facts which are
derived from his perception. A witness may not testify as to
what he merely learned from others either because he was told
or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what
he has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns
about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence
inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath or solemn
affirmation and, more importantly, have not been subjected
to cross-examination by opposing counsel to test the perception,
memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant
or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-
court statement depends.
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those
exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during,
or after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances
are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and
to fabricate a false statement.
The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did
not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who
heard the declarant complies with the following requisites:
1. that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence;
2. the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
3. that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.
HERE, while it may concede that these statements were made by
the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said
however, that these utterances were made spontaneously by the
bystanders and before they had the time to contrive or devise
a falsehood. At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt.
Col. Torres that these statements were made may be
considered as independently relevant statements gathered in
the course of their investigation, and are admissible not as to the
veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus uttered.
PEOPLE V. LOBRIGAS
HELD: The declaration made by the victim to his daughter,
Rosa, does not satisfy the requirement of spontaneity
because they were made a day after the incident and the
exciting influence of the startling occurrence was no longer
present.
Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa’s testimony on what her father
told her constitutes independent relevant statements distinct
from hearsay, and are thus admissible not as to the veracity
thereof, but as proof of the fact that they had been uttered.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only
the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the
truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not
apply, hence, the statements are admissible as evidence.
Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary
but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
such a fact.
1. The principal act, undoubtedly a startling occurrence, is the
robbery of which petitioner is being charged.
2. Immediately after the robbery, Dimas dela Cruz, the
security guard then on duty, informed Ariel that one of the
perpetrators is herein petitioner. Dimas likewise reported at
once the incident to the police and to the security agency.
When questioned by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas, who was still
shocked, named petitioner herein as one of the robbers.
3. His statements to Ariel and SPO4 Maximo were made
before he had the time and opportunity to concoct and
contrive a false story.
We cannot consider the testimony of SPO4 Maximo as
hearsay since the statement of Dimas that petitioner is one of
the robbers is part of the res gestae.
PEOPLE V. PALANAS
HELD:
Dying Declaration Res Gestae
a. the declaration must concern the a. the principal act,
cause and surrounding the res gestae, is a
circumstances of the declarant's startling
death; occurrence;
b. that at the time the declaration b. the statements
was made, the declarant is were made before
conscious of his impending the declarant had
death; time to contrive or
c. the declarant was competent as a devise; and
witness; and c. the statements
d. the declaration is offered in a must concern the
criminal case for Homicide, occurrence in
Murder, or Parricide where the question and its
declarant is the victim immediately
attending
Verily, because the declaration was circumstances.
made in extremity, when the party is at the
point of death and when every motive of
falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth, the
law deems this as a situation so solemn
and awful as creating an obligation equal to
that which is imposed by an oath
administered in court.
Here, SPO2 Borre’s statement constitute a dying declaration,
given that they pertained to the cause and circumstances of
his death and taking into consideration the number and severity
of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the
same under a fixed belief that his own death was already
imminent. In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may
likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with
the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether
it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony."
SPO2 Borre's statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him
being shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the
hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification
of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity
and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such
statement is relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the
authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2 Borre,
perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.

PEOPLE V. PALMONES
HELD:
On Dying Declaration
While it is true that the law does not require that the declarant
explicitly state his perception that he has given up the hope
of life, the circumstances surrounding his declaration must justify
the conclusion that he was conscious of his impending
death.
In the instant case, it was not proven that the victim was ever
aware of the seriousness of his condition. From the time the victim
was brought to the hospital at 10:30 p.m. until his operation at
12:00 midnight, he was still able to talk intelligently with at
least four (4) other persons on various matters. The fact that
his vital signs were strong and that he still had strength to
converse with these four (4) witnesses belie the conclusion that
the victim was under the consciousness of death by reason of the
gravity of his wounds.
On Res Gestae
Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be
admissible as part of the res gestae. In order to admit statements
as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity
is critical.
The following factors have generally been considered in
determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of
the res gestae have been made spontaneously:
1. the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
transaction and the making of the statement;
2. the place where the statement was made;
3. the condition of the declarant when he made the statement;
4. the presence or absence of intervening events between
the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and
5. the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
Here, the statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When
Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an
appreciable amount of time had already elapsed from the time
that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m.
but he only uttered the statements attributed to him about 30
minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these
statements not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where
he was brought for treatment.
81
annielacadin ✿
The Court finds that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of
the res gestae.
Re: 1st kind: Assuming that petitioner's negligence — which
allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its course — is the
startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements
contained in the fax messages were made immediately after
the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been mentioned
to determine if these utterances were made spontaneously or with
careful deliberation. Absent the critical element of spontaneity, the
fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the
first kind.
Re: 2nd kind: Petitioner's alleged absence from watch duty is
simply an innocuous act or at least proved to be one. Assuming
arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is
nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by
the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No
date or time has been mentioned to determine whether the fax
messages were made simultaneously with the purported
equivocal act.
PEOPLE V. PRECIADOS
HELD:
On Dying Declaration
In the present case, the foregoing requisites were not met. A dying
declaration is essentially hearsay, because one person is
testifying on what another person stated. This is because the
declarant can no longer be presented in court to identify the
document or confirm the statement, but more important, to be
confronted with said statement by the accused and be cross-
examined on its contents. It was patently incorrect for the trial
court to have allowed prosecution witness PO3 Leonardo
Inoc to testify on Antonio's so-called "dying declaration"
because Antonio was alive and later even testified in court.
On Res Gestae
Where a victim's statement may not be admissible as an ante
mortem declaration, it may nonetheless be considered as
part of the res gestae, if made immediately after a startling
occurrence in relation to the circumstances thereof and when the
victim did not have time to contrive a falsehood.

Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital
constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the
victim opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances, taken
together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered
by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to
be admitted as part of the res gestae.
TALIDANO V. FALCON MARITIME &
ALLIED SERVICES, INC.
In this case, the element of spontaneity is lacking in the alleged
ante-mortem statement. Antonio's statement was taken by PO3
Inoc some thirty-nine (39) hours after the incident. Thirty-nine
hours is too long a time to be considered subsequent
immediately (stress supplied) to the startling occurrence.
Even as contemplated by the rules, statements given a day after
the incident in answer to questions propounded by an
investigator cannot be considered part of the res gestae.

HELD: S42R130: two acts which form part of the res gestae:
1. spontaneous statements and
2. verbal acts.
Spontaneous Statements Verbal Acts
the res gestae is the startling the res gestae are the
occurrence statements accompanying
the equivocal act
1. the principal act be a 1. the principal act to be
startling occurrence; characterized must be

2. the statements were made equivocal;
before the declarant had 2. the equivocal act must be
the time to contrive or material to the issue;
devise a falsehood; and 3. the statement must
3. that the statements must accompany the
concern the occurrence in equivocal act; and
question and its immediate 4. the statements give a legal
attending circumstances. significance to the
equivocal act.