1
annielacadin ✿
7. Opinion rule
Sec. 48. General Rule
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS VS.
HEIRS OF LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR.
Facts: In a case involving the parcels of land left behind by
Spouses Navarro, petitioner and her sister discovered that
respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot
located in Masbate. Respondents based their claim on an
Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where the lot was donated
by Andres Sr. to Andres Jr.
The sisters believed that the affidavit was a forgery hence they
requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP
handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that
Andres, Sr.'s signature on the affidavit and the submitted
standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one
and the same person.
Respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as witness.
RTC: ruled that PO2 Alvarez’ testimony would be hearsay as she
has no personal knowledge of the handwriting of Andres SR, and
that there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented as an expert
witness, because her testimony is not yet needed.
PET: PO2 Alvarez will be presented as an expert witness to render
an opinion on whether the disputed handwriting was indeed made
by Andres, Sr. or whether it is a forgery.
Issue: Was the RTC correct is disqualifying Alvarez?
Held: YES.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely
perceive and make known her perception to others. We have no
doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be
disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the
disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents'
motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for
it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification.
Opinion of Expert Witness
The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the
credibility and weight of her testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear
that the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence.
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not
upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false,
but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in
and between genuine and false specimens of writing which
would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez's testimony
would be hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion as
the PNP document examiner.
Opinion of Expert Witness is Permissive
True, the use of the word "may" signifies that the use of opinion of
an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part
of the courts.
However, we have also recognized that handwriting experts are
often offered as expert witnesses considering the technical
nature of the procedure in examining forged documents.
More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the deed
of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. is crucial to
the resolution of the case.
TABAO V. PEOPLE
Facts: In a vehicular accident that resulted in the death of
Rochelle Lanete, petitioner was convicted of the crime charged,
which conviction was affirmed by the CA.
The petitioner, in his present petition, contends that:
1. the CA violated Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court when it disregarded the testimony of defense
witness Police Senior Inspector Danilo Cornelio who
testified that the petitioner's car could not have bumped the
victim because the latter's body was not thrown in line with
the car, but on its side;
2. that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is highly qualified in the field of
traffic accident investigation, and as such, his statements
are "backed-up by the principles of applied physics,
engineering, and mathematics."
Held:
The use of the word "may" signifies that the use of opinion of an
expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the
courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that courts
are bound by the testimony of the expert witness. The
testimony of an expert witness must be construed to have been
presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but
to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it,
and is for the court to adopt or not to adopt depending on its
appreciation of the attendant facts and the applicable law.
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies,
they may place whatever weight they may choose upon such
testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The
relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly
within the province of the trial court to decide.
The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to
be considered by the court in view of all the facts and
circumstances in the case and when common knowledge
utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling
effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court
whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse
of discretion.
Here, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio's testimony did he
conclusively state that the petitioner could not have been involved
in the incident. He did not discount the possibility that the victim
could have been thrown on the side. He likewise admitted that the
location of an accident victim in relation to the vehicle would also
depend on the speed of the vehicle and the point of impact.
Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses
DELA LLANA V. BIONG
Facts: Three months after a vehicular accident between the car
where petitioner was seated, and a truck owned by respondent,
petitioner was alleged to have suffered injuries as a result thereof,
which, after proper consultation, was concluded to have been
whiplash injury, making it necessary for her to undergo physical
therapy.
Since her condition did not improve, petitioner had to undergo
cervical spine surgery. For which she demanded respondent
compensation therefor.
During the trial, petitioner presented herself as an ordinary
witness, wherein she stated in her testimony that the vehicular
accident caused the injury.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.

CA: reversed the RTC ruling; petitioner failed to establish a
reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her
whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence; her failure to
present expert witnesses was fatal to her claim.
PET with SC contends that:
1. her testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury
is credible because she was a surgeon;
2. expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely relates
to matters of common knowledge
Note that petitioner in this quasi-delict case, was the lone
physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified as
an ordinary witness before the trial court. Petitioner essentially
claimed in her testimony that Joel's reckless driving caused her
whiplash injury.
HELD: Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and
even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot give
weight to her opinion that the accident caused her whiplash injury
without violating the rules on evidence.
Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference
between an ordinary witness and an expert witness.
The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in
evidence regarding:
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has suf cient familiarity;
and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is suf
ciently acquainted.
(d) Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his
impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person.
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be
received in evidence on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to
possess.
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an
admitted expert testimony, much less to an unobjected ordinary
testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the
probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple
exposition of the expert's opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the
assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by
demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his
opinion and the reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is
founded.
Here, petitioner’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value
for the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness.
As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the
nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury.
Furthermore, we emphasize that petitioner, during trial,
nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on the
nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in
her testimony.
PEOPLE V. DURANAN
Facts: Rape committed against Nympha.
According to accused, he cannot be convicted of rape since the
victim’s mental age was not proven, arguing that it is an
essential element for the prosecution of a mental retardate
that a psychiatric revaluation of complainant’s mental age be
conducted, to determine if her mental age is under twelve.
Held: The contention of the accused is without basis. Under
R130S50,, the opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in
2
annielacadin ✿
evidence regarding the mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted.
The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not
a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition
of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and
what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to
the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness
has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech,
manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and
reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify
as to what it is.
A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or
insanity of another, when based upon conversations or
dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his
appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental
condition, with the witness' own knowledge and observation, he
having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance
or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.
Here, the mother of the victim testified on the mental
condition of her daughter.
HERNANDEZ V. SAN JUAN-SANTOS
Facts: Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending
physicians regarding her mental state were inadmissible in
evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent
therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an
incompetent.
Held:
Under Section 50, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary
witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with
whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her.
Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her
behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below
average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were
admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert
opinion is not necessary. The observations of the trial judge
coupled with evidence establishing the person's state of mental
sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample
opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before
the RTC.
SPS. LIM, ET AL., V. CHUATOCO, ET AL
Facts: On the dispute involving land allegedly sold by Leoncia,
the mother of the respondents, in favor of one of their siblings, the
signature of the mother in said deed was claimed to be a
forgery.
Both the RTC and the CA concluded that forgery attended the
execution of the DOS.
Held: All the signatures were forged.
The RTC had declared that the forgeries of these three signatures
had been established by the document examiner of the NBI.
However, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that even in the
absence of expert testimony, the falsity of the signatures of
Leoncia and Francisco had been sufficiently established by
 3
annielacadin ✿

Francisco's direct repudiation of his signature, as well as the imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
denials by Eduardo and Jorge of their mother's signature. conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.

While the testimony of a person, disavowing the genuineness of
his signature may seem self-serving at first blush, it cannot be
ignored that such person is in the best position to know whether
or not the signature on the check was his, and averments he would
have on the matter, if adjudged as truthful, deserve primacy in
consideration.
Here, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to
determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-
appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or
that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection
between the deceased's drug addiction and thievery with his
violent death.

On the other hand, the denials of Eduardo and Jorge of their
mother's signature may be properly appreciated in evidence,
as Section 50, Rule 130 allows the opinion of an ordinary witness
to be received in evidence regarding a handwriting with which he
has sufficient familiarity.
The appellate court committed no error in ruling that Eduardo
would probably be the most reliable witness to testify on the
handwriting of his mother because he had worked closely
with and exchanged papers and communications with
Leoncia on a regular basis, the latter being then the
administrator of the properties left by Jose.
8. Character evidence
Sec. 51.
PEOPLE V. LEE
Bad Moral Character in Murder with Treachery and
Premeditation
While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to
determine the probability or improbability of the commission
of an offense, such is not necessary in the crime of murder where
the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The
proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases
to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent
danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction
that a prompt defensive action was necessary.
Here, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed
through treachery and evident premeditation. There was no
opportunity at all for the victim to defend himself or retaliate
against his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the
attack ensured his death without risk to the assailant. As ruled,
where the killing of the victim was attended by treachery,
proof of the victim's bad character is not necessary.

Facts: For the crime of murder committed against Joseph,

accused appellant contends that:
1. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as
a thief and drug addict.
2. accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car trying
to steal his car stereo.
3. as proof of Joseph's bad character, appellant
presented Herminia's letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking
his assistance for Joseph's rehabilitation from drugs.

HELD:

Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain

qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him from others. It is
the opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the
common report of the people who are acquainted with him; his
reputation.

"Good moral character" includes all the elements essential to

make up such a character; among these are common honesty and
veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that
measures up as good among people of the community in which
the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average
citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good behavior and
upright conduct.

Character of the offended party

Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party
may be proved "if it tends to establish in any reasonable
degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged." Such evidence is most commonly offered to support a
claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of
consent in a rape case.

In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is

admissible in two situations:
1. as evidence of the deceased's aggression; and
2. as evidence of the state of mind of the accused.

The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the

deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the
case may be, is relevant in determining whether the deceased
or the accused was the aggressor. When the evidence tends to
prove self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased
is also admissible to show that it produced a reasonable belief of