MICIANO vs. BRIMO | G.R. No.

L-22595 | November 1, 1927

May 06, 2020
MICIANO vs. BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927 
Facts

Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano,
the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo‘s opposition is based on the
fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo‘s will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they
are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. 
Issue

Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
disposition. 

Ruling

Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must
govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the
testator. Therefore, the testator‘s national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of
the Civil Code.Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that ―it
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island ‖, this
condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall
not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.  Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or
good morals.  Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary
dispositions. 
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees. 
Case Title: Orion Savings Bank vs. Shigekane Suzuki,respondent; GR No. 205487 (J.
Brion) (November 12, 2014)
Doctrine:
Real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it
is located. Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are
determined by what is known as the Lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode
by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be
gained or lost.
Facts:
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms.
Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland
Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national
and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder. At the meeting, the parties agreed to
reduce the price to ₱2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the
Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349 for ₱100,000.00 as reservation fee. On August 21,
2003, Suzuki issued Kang another check, BPI Check No. 83350, this time for
₱2,700,000.00 representing the remaining balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang
then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 2003 covering Unit No. 536 and
Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and
parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the
properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s
Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the
documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to
verify the status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds. Suzuki
learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no
annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding,
Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang
had fully paid the purchase price of both the unit and parking lot. The annotation of
mortgage in favor of Orion, was subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No.
73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the
properties remained in possession of Perez.
To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim  dated
September 8, 2003, with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Suzuki then
demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to surrender
the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.
RTC ruled in favor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118 to
Suzuki. The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over
the properties prevailed over Orion’s. CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the
RTC insofar as it upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties. It deviated from the RTC ruling,
however, by deleting the award for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
expenses for litigation and cost of suit. Hence, Orion then filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.
Issue: Will the Korean Law prevail on the conveyance of the condominium unit and parking
slot?
Held: No.
The Court denied the petition for lack of merit. Philippine Law governs the transfer of real
property
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of
the country or state where it is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable
property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it
that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there. Thus, all matters
concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as
the Lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from
one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. This general
principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable
property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. This
principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable
property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to
transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the Lex loci rei sitae, even
though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is
actually made, his capacity is undoubted.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed
by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be
governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the
conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify
as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was
properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is
not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the certificates of title
is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that
he is married to Hyun Sook Jung. We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have
held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the
possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In those cases, however, there was
proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed
either conjugal or community properties. Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as
invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
Pilapil vs Ibay Somera (G.R. No. 80116)

Facts:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Friedensweiler in the Federal
Republic of Germany. Their marriage bear only one child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling on April 20, 1980.
After the birth of their daughter, the partners agreed to live separately. After three years and a half of
being married, the respondent filed a divorce proceeding against the petitioner in Schoneberg Local
Court in Germany in January, 1983. He claimed that their marriage is a failure and agreed to live
separately since April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support
and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January, 1983. The Schoneberg
Local Court approved the divorce claim for they believe on the ground that there is a ground for failure
of marriage. Geiling also filed two complaints for adultery on the City Fiscal of Manila, claiming that the
petitioner entered two affairs in the time of their marriage.

Hence, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion
to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and
decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since
the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not an alien spouse has legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after obtaining
a divorce decree

Held:

No, an alien spouse has no legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after obtaining a
divorce decree. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with
this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn
written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

In the present case, the fact that Geiling obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons.

Therefore, Geiling, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case.