Review: The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-65

Reviewed Work(s): The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-65 by Alan Watt
Review by: Max Teichmann
Source: The Australian Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Dec., 1967), pp. 110-116
Published by: Australian Institute of Policy and Science
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20634169
Accessed: 25-07-2022 01:20 UTC

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 A.Q. 4/67

BOOK REVIEWS

THE EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1938-65

The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-65, by Sir Alan Watt.

(C.U.P., 1967.) $9.35.
The book under discussion fills an important gap in Australian political
writing, and is welcome as a symptom of dawning Australian interest
in the origins of our present policies and attitudes towards other nations.
If one were to stand fast upon Nicholson's distinction between diplomacy
and foreign policy, this work would perhaps be better described as a
history of Australian diplomacy, but the distinction is probably not of
ultimate importance.
This book has sections upon the situation leading up to War, includ
ing our role, or lack of it, during Munich; the first Menzies Govern
ment's policies; the Australian Labor Party in office and the Liberal
Country Party in office. (This last part includes detailed analyses of
ANZUS, SEATO and our role in Malaya.) There is then a lengthy
section which deals with Australian relations with Asia (1945-65), and
a chapter on the British Commonwealth. Finally, Sir Alan supplies a
long section which is concerned to reappraise Australian foreign policy
and its assumptions. There is little doubt that this book deserves to
be in use in Australian Universities and higher Institutes for some years.
Of course, in employing a term like evolution, one runs the risk
of begging some important questions, for evolution suggests adapta
tion to changing conditions, a kind of progress and, perhaps, increas
ing complexity and sophistication. The concept does not, of course,
exclude mutations, but as used here, I suspect that it does.
And yet, if one were to write a book on the evolution of Indonesian,
or Chinese or Axis foreign policies, one would wish to keep notions
like aberration, false turning and blind alley, close to hand. Many
people have expressed the opinion that important aspects of American
policies since Korea can be described as a following of false trails,
explicable only in terms of aberrant features of the American polity,
perhaps best symbolized by McCarthyism and neo-McCarthyism. Austra
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BOOK REVIEWS

lian foreign policy since 1947 could also be explained in these terms?
that is, a case could be made for the proposition that domestic political,
especially electoral considerations, have introduced many distortions
into Australian foreign policies.* One whole China policy could be
described as a false trail leading up a blind alley. But in this work
the notion of evolution does not include such possibilities.
To turn to Watt's history of the development of Australian diplomacy.
Sir Alan is very good on the almost complete Australian dependence
on the Mother Country until the Japanese War?a dependence essen
tially based upon a belief in Britain's military adequacy in the Pacific,
but typified by the Menzies constitutional theory that Australia actually
lacked the legal authority to declare war on its own behalf, no matter
what other Dominions might believe or do. In this respect, Sir Robert
played the role of the King Canute of the constitutional courts. Sir Alan
also draws attention to the extraordinary situation whereby our diplo
matic resources consisted of one officer in London, attached to the
Australian High Commission, whose task it was to try and find what
the British thought of world affairs, and a Counsellor attached to the
British Embassy in Washington. On the basis of the information supplied
from these sources, we went to war?17 years after Chanak.
Sir Alan also brings out two very significant facts in the early war
period. The first was Churchill's assurance that if either Australia
or New Zealand were threatened by attack, Britain would cut her losses
in the Mediterranean, and treat these Dominions as her primary
strategic obligations, second only to the defence of Britain. Thus
reassured, the Australian Government built up its forces in the Middle
East to a level of 180,000 men. The second significant fact for Austra
lians at this time, was President Roosevelt's confession of his inability
to give us a military guarantee in the event of Japanese attack, if
America were still neutral.
There is a long but one dimensional account of our strivings for
Pacific security pacts, culminating in the ANZUS, SEATO and ANZAM
agreements. Watt considers all of these arrangements worthwhile in
their different ways. Thus he says of SEATO, "since the creation of
SEATO, no . . . armed attack has occurred in the territory of any of
the eight signatory parties and this is no doubt due substantially to the
mere existence of SEATO (p. 161)". This is an interesting interpre
tation of the Pakistan-Indian War, assuming as it does that Pakistan
was the aggressor.
* e.g., See Henry Albinski: "Australia's Policies and Attitudes Towards China", Princeton
U.P., 1965.
Ill

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 A.Q. 4/67

It also conveniently excludes the protocol states whose defence was

the main point of the Treaty. If one considers the protocol state of
South Vietnam, then the proposition can only be maintained by rejecting
the story about aggression from the North. I would be quite happy to
do so, but Sir Alan endorses this account of the origins of the troubles
in the South (pp. 344 ff.). Once this story is accepted, it appears as
though SEATO has not been so much a shield as a shroud.
A section of Article 3 of the Treaty which "bound the parties to
strengthen their free institutions" is quoted, apparently without irony.
Taken literally, I suppose that this sentence means that if a signatory
hasn't any free institutions to strengthen, he is in the most happy of
positions. If he has a few, he ought to strengthen those. But some
of us expected more than this from the Treaty. We have no hope of
getting it.
On page 163 we have a discussion of Thailand's role in SEATO?
and the falling domino argument, which after all stems from the same
circumstances as created the Treaty, i.e., the long overdue defeat of
the French, is brought into play. "If SEATO did not exist . . . might
not Thailand, under extreme pressure from Peking, feel that an accom
modation with Peking was unavoidable? And if this happened, what
would be the effect upon Malaysia?"
A neutralist Thailand had had an accommodation with Peking for
five years before the Treaty, and this had had little noticeable effect
upon Malaysia. Now of course, Thailand's relations with China are
bad, and she has an insurgency problem. The Chinese predicted that
this would happen. On the other hand, Malaysia has altered course
and seems fairly blase about the Chinese menace. One of the dominoes
has slipped out of the case.
At the bottom of all the accounts of Australian Pacific treaties, rests
a view of the menace of China. In this book the hypothesis of Chinese
aggression in Korea is accepted in toto, as is a similar interpretation
of the Sino Indian border war. The Hasluck statement of 25 November,
1964, is quoted with approval. The Minister then said, "the rising power
of China, its aggression and subversion against its neighbours, and its
political activities in other continents, make it the major danger to
peace today. The aggressive intent of the Communist Chinese govern
ment, shown blatantly by actions in India and Tibet and in the plain
declarations of its leaders, is a threat to the world. It is the most sig
nificant factor in the long term problem of world peace". I very much
doubt that this "aggressive intent" is, but have no doubt that this kind of

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BOOK REVIEWS

attitude is. Like many such attitudes, it has the character of a self
fulfilling prophecy.
In the course of analysing our relations with China, Sir Alan denies
the truth of the hypothesis that our policy of non recognition of Main
land China has been the result of American influence (p. 248). For
the last sixteen years we have regularly decided against recogntion and
admission of China to the United Nations, just at the same times as
America has taken the same decisions. We have used the same argu
ments as they, sometimes the same words, but there has been no
improper influence, just shared attitudes and an identical sense of timing.
Shades of Heckle and Jeckle.
Sir Robert Menzies' decision to hold the portfolios of Prime Minister
and Minister of External Affairs during the vital years 1960-61 comes
under criticism in this book.
He sees our equivocation about West New Guinea as having constitu
ted a policy of drift, of misstated priorities, and as involving the separation
of political and military considerations in a field where such separation
was dangerous. That is, on 9 March, 1950, Sir Percy Spender defined
West New Guinea as a "vital interest" of Australia (Watt, p. 257).
It would seem to follow from that that we should have concerned our
selves with two questions: (1) Would an Indonesian takeover be inimical
to this vital interest? (2) If so, what political and military steps should
be taken, and preparations be made, to protect this interest? In the
end, nothing was done. The assumption behind most Government and
public thinking was that Indonesian occupancy was dangerous, and
should be opposed, even at the cost of overall friendship with Indonesia.
So we opposed, and the friendship was largely destroyed. But we
refused Dutch offers for joint military arrangements, we turned down
suggestions for a Melanesian Union, and we neglected our military
strength. When the crunch came, as Sir Alan points out, we let down
the Dutch and we made the Indonesians think that we were paper
kangaroos. Round about the same time we discovered that West
New Guinea was not a vital interest after all?which, of course, it was
not. We stand a fair chance of repeating this charade at some time in
the future with East New Guinea, and if we accept the blandishments
of Mr. Lee as serious political comment, with Singapore.
Although critical of the unrealistic defence policy conducted in the
light of our possible New Guinea commitments, Watt is otherwise satis
fied with the Menzies martial performance. He speaks (p. 188) of
the Menzies Government's "energetic and consistent foreign policy in
the defence field". Presumably the panic military expenditure now
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 A.Q. 4/67

being undertaken, the widespread complaints about the inappropriate

ness of many of the weapons being ordered, and the continuing con
fusion over what precise pattern of ends these military appurtenances
are going to be used for, should be blamed upon Sir Robert's successors.
Yet this would be unfair. The fiasco of unpreparedness in the West
New Guinea affair was repeated during confrontation, where we found
one section of our tiny army in Vietnam, another lurking in the Com
monwealth force in Malaya, a third patrolling the borders of Indonesian
Borneo, a fourth "holding" the frontier between the two New Guineas
(we would have needed three Brigades had there been any substantial
infiltration), and a fifth in Australia, managing our home defence and,
presumably, being on hand to man ships and wharves had there been
strikes against war shipments. By comparison, our present military dis
positions seem models of rationality?but only by comparison.
Voices are now heard saying that we should take over British com
mitments in places like Singapore and Malaysia. Some of the same
voices say that after the Vietnam War, if American troops have become
complete box office poison, we should station our men where the
Americans had been. Meanwhile, presumably, we will go on destroying
whatever good will we still have left with the political elites of East
New Guinea. The Menzies military policy of ambitious commitments
and microscopic forces has been well described by Samuel Huntington.
"It is the people and the politicians, public opinions and governments,
who start wars. It is the military who have to fight them . . . The
tendency of the civilian politician is to court popular favour by
curbing the arms budget and simultaneously pursuing an adventurous
foreign policy." This in essence was the energetic and consistent
foreign policy in the defence field of the Menzies era. Now we have
nine battalions. If the politicians can only be restrained from dreaming
up new commitments, we might even have an army. There are
interesting accounts of the political styles of the various party leaders
and some of their principal servants. Liberal Party policy makers fare
best?Menzies, Casey, Spender are well regarded; as are Lyons, Curtin
and to a lesser extent Chifley. Evatt is treated to close scrutiny, not
always favourable, while John Burton would almost certainly not get
Sir Alan's first preference were he to run for election in the author's
electorate. Sir Earle Page is held responsible for a good deal of the
coolness which developed between the British and Australian Govern
ments after the Japanese attack?certainly his activities appear to under
line the soundness of arguments against a wartime coalition government.
It seems unlikely that Curtin would have been able to stand up to
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 BOOK REVIEWS

Churchill over the question of the diversion of the 7th Division convoy,
had he been surrounded by men who believed that we didn't even
have the authority to declare war, let alone the power to say where
our soldiers should fight, or for what.
The Holt-Hasluck revamp of one foreign policy was too new for
this book to really assess its merits?but Sir Alan is displeased, as
any professional diplomat might be, at the slogan of "all the way with
?whatever his name is". He also dislikes Panglossian accounts of the
relations between Allies. As he says (p. 324), "opportunities must
be found, from time to time, to make known, publicly, occasions on
which Australian policy differs from that of Britain (or America)".
Elsewhere, he writes that Government silence about disagreements with
U.S. policies deprives Australians of encouragement and stimulus. Not
that Watt is unduly critical of American or Australian Government
policies, especially those concerning Vietnam and Asia generally.
"Australians for the most part (excluding the extreme left wing
fringe and intellectual 'progressives') are . . . aware of the unprecedented
generosity of American Governments and people (p. 341); opposition
to sending Australian 'conscripts' seems out of date and illogical"
(p. 343). Speaking of providing economic aid, without strings, he
believes that "if the primary motive is the laudable desire to minimise
suffering and loss of human life, one would expect the same people to
show greater interest than is normally apparent in the appalling loss
of life and in the casualties on Australian roads" (p. 359). Of course,
there are no reliable statistics showing a degree of indifference to road
deaths going hand in hand with over tenderness to prolific Asians?one
can only speculate. I would hazard a guess that the aggressive drivers
who cause most of our road accidents might turn out to be the same
ones who see Asian cities as noted for their night life, rather than their
poor and their crippled, and who would be as unconcerned about the
carnage caused by personnel bombing as they are about the likely
affects of their heroic driving. But this is sheer speculation, as were
the remarks on p. 359.
One of the differences between a history of the making of foreign
policy and a history of diplomatic transactions, lies in the interest of
the former in underlying causes, and a degree of caution about the
degree of subjectivity which can enter into a nation's descriptions of
its external environment. In this sense, Sir Alan Watt's book is diplo
matic history?there is no account of the various pressure groups and
lobbies which bear down upon policy makers. Thus farmers, indus
trialists, the R.S.L., unions, churches (especially a section of the
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 A.Q. 4/67

Catholic Church) are not mentioned, while those extremely interesting

adjuncts to the Liberal Party, the Country Party and the D.L.P., are
given small recognition for their attempts to pull the Liberal foreign
policies in opposite directions. There is no account of the important
Taiwan, South Africa-Rhodesia, or India lobbies within Parliament,
especially within the governing party itself. In one case this leads to a
cryptic account of the Australian Government's decision to establish
a full mission in Taipeh in 1966, a decision not noticeably influenced
by any change in our external environment. There is also insufficient
attention paid, in my opinion, to the dynamic policymaking of the
Department of Trade, many of whose policies have had marked political
consequences. The quiet revolution in our trading relationships, which
is altering first our perspectives and then our policies with respect to
Europe and Asia, passes virtually unnoticed.
Students of Australian diplomatic history and its styles, must never
theless be in debt for an exhaustive and extremely readable description
of Australian diplomacy and its chief practitioners, and for more than
an inkling of how we came to be where we stand today.
?Max Teichmann.

THE COMMONWEALTH BUREAUCRACY

The Commonwealth Bureaucracy, by G. E. Caiden.

(Melbourne University Press.) $8.50, pp. 443.
The Australian poet, Adam Lindsay Gordon, prefaced one of his
poems with the lines?
"Rhymes rudely strung with intent less
Of sound than of words"

No-one could accuse Dr. Caiden of rudely (in whatever sense the
word is used) stringing his words. They are indeed well strung,
although the average reader may often sigh for shorter, more expressive,
even if less elegant, language.
As an example, compare the bite and brevity of Dante's reference
to "that great mass [of humanity] who in life incur nor praise nor
blame" to this author's description of the lower echelon of the public
service which he embraces within the words, "At the bottom are the

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