Nazario Jap Dos Santos

December 12 2018
IS Seminar
MLA Citation 7th Edition (Little Seagull)

Transitional Justice: Public Perception on Reconciliation in East Timor

After almost 450 years of Portuguese colonization, East Timor unilaterally proclaimed its

independence on the 28th of November, 1975. In the same year, a week after independence, the

Indonesian army, with the support of western powers invaded East Timor. During the

occupation, there were lots of atrocities and genocide committed by the Indonesians and the

Timorese. It was estimated that at least 102,800 Timorese and more than 3000 Indonesian

soldiers died as a direct result of the occupation. The occupation ended in 1999 after a

referendum held by the United Nations in which the large majority of Timorese voted for

independence. When the result of the referendum was announced, the local pro-Indonesian

militia with the support of the Indonesian army reacted violently by looting, killing, and burning

many towns and cities. The United Nations under the authorization of the Security Council

agreed to send peacekeeping forces and a peacebuilding mission called United Nations

Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET). During the transitional period to

independence, East Timor was under the care of UNTAET. UNTAET created a Commission for

Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR in Portuguese) tasked to “inquire into human rights violations

committed within the context of the political conflict in East Timor between April 25th, 1974,

and October 25th, 1999” (Hayner, 40). The commission concluded that during the conflict both

pro-Indonesian and pro-independence factions committed crimes such as burning many towns

and cities and the killing of civilians. Moreover, the Indonesian army committed crimes against

humanity, such as genocide. Hence, the commission embarked on a mission to reconcile and

reintegrate people who committed crimes back to the community. In the eyes of the international
community, the reconciliation process in East Timor is considered to have been successful.

However, since the commission terminated its mission in 2006, there have been few studies to

assess public opinion about the reconciliation, especially among the generation who did not

experience the process of reconciliation. This paper examines the public perception of

reconciliation in East Timor through an interdisciplinary lens especially in the area of politics,

economics, and anthropology and challenges the claims from scholars and Timorese leaders that

the reconciliation in East Timor was successful.

In the field of transitional justice, much attention has been given to the subject of

reconciliation. According to Joan R. Quinn, in the context of political conflict or violence,

“reconciliation may be understood as the process of establishing improved relationships between

previously alienated individuals and group” (Quinn 46). However, many scholars have argued

that there is no universal definition for the term reconciliation. Nevertheless, scholars agree that

knowing the truth about the past is important and necessary for reconciliation to take place. It is

important to distinguish between individual and national reconciliation. Individual reconciliation

mostly involves reconciliation between victims and perpetrators (Hayner 183). Hence, individual

reconciliation is hard to achieve because forgiveness, healing, and reconciliation are deeply

personal. National reconciliation often happened through a commission of truth and

reconciliation, which is sponsored or created by the state. National reconciliation often happens

by having the deponents “speaking openly and publicly about past silenced or highly conflictive

events and by allowing an independent commission to clear up high profile cases” (Hayner, 183).

This process is important in national reconciliation because it helps the commission to “ease up

some of the strains that may otherwise be present in national legislative or other political bodies”
(Hayner 183). The reconciliation that took place in East Timor is an example of national

reconciliations processes that were created by the state.

In order to investigate the violence and crimes that happened in East Timor from 1974-

1999, a commission for truth, and reconciliation (CAVR) was formed in the country. In

accordance with Hayner’s five definitions, we can see that the work of the commission for truth,

and reconciliation in East Timor was able to match these definitions. The first definition is that

the commission is tasked to “focused on the past, rather than ongoing events” (Hayner 11). The

CAVR was created to “inquire into a pattern of human rights violations within the context of the

political conflicts between 1974 and 1999 in order to establish the truth about past human rights

violations” (Laakso 48). The investigations of the events from 1974 to 1999 are important

because this was the period of the civil war between the Timorese political parties, and the

Indonesian occupation. In addition, 1974-1999 was the period in which most of the violence,

killing, and crimes occurred. The commission of truth in East Timor received 7,669 individual

statements from deponents, held public hearing and community reconciliation meetings

throughout the county (Hayner 40). Furthermore, the commission also took mortality surveys in

which it interviewed 1,200 randomly chosen households in order to assess the number of deaths

as the result of the conflict (Chega, 22). The commission also carried out a graveyard census and

noted the years of death in each of 1,600 cemeteries across East Timor (Hayner 40.) [It seems to

me that a new paragraph should start here, but that this information should perhaps come earlier,

when you first introduce the reconciliation commission.

The commission of reconciliation in East Timor was “originally proposed by the East

Timorese and developed with the support of the UN in collaboration with the Catholic Church,

the now-dissolved National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), and a number of Timorese
groups” (Laakso 48). Hence, the commission was created under law through the UNTAET

regulation. However, the commission did not have the “power to grant amnesty and it does not

deal with serious crimes such as rape, murder and torture” (Laakso 48), instead those crimes

were expected to be dealt with by East Timor court. The commission for truth and reconciliation

in East Timor was created in late January 2002 and officially ended in October 2005 after

officially submitting its lengthy report to the Timorese president. The final report found that the

“great majority of human rights violations reported to the commission (85 percent) were

attributed to Indonesian security forces or their proxies” (Hayner 41). The commission also

concluded that approximately 10 percent of reported violence was committed by the pro-

independence forces (Hayner 41). Unfortunately, when the final report was submitted it was not

widely distributed in East Timor due to pressure from different entities and political leaders.

In the case of national reconciliation, the commission of truth and reconciliation is

essential for transitional justice. In national reconciliation, states officially create a temporary

body in order to investigate a pattern of events that took place over a period of time. The events

that took place mostly involve criminal violence.The temporary body that states choose to do this

task is the commission of truth and reconciliation. The definition of the commission of truth and

reconciliation is perhaps best defined by Priscilla Hayner, in her book Unspeakable Truts:

Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commission. According to Hayner “a truth

commission (1) focused on past, rather than ongoing events; (2) investigates a pattern of events

that took place over a period of time; (3) engages directly and broadly with the affected

population, gathering information on their experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aims of

concluding final report; and (5) is officially authorized or empowered by the state under review”

(Hayner 11-12). With this definition, a commission of truth and reconciliation can be easily
distinguished from a human rights organization created by the government or any other form of

judicial commission of inquiry. In addition, Martha Minow in her book Between Vengeance and

Forgiveness, also argues that a commission of truth and reconciliation has several theoretical

aspirations such as “(1) the overcoming of communal and official denial of the atrocity; (2) the

gathering of detailed facts to meet the victims’ needs to know, to build a record for history, and

to provide minimal accountability and visibility of the perpetrators; (3) the end and prevention of

future violence (the transformation of violence into words and institutional practices); (4) the

creation of a sufficient basis for building a domestic democratic order that respects and enforces

human rights; (5) the consolidation and legitimization of a new democratic regime (6) the

promotion of reconciliation among former opponents; (7) the promotion of psychological healing

for individuals, groups, victims, bystanders, and offenders; (8) the restoration of the victims’

dignity; (9) the administration of the offenders’ punishment; (10) the expression that such

collective violence should never occur again; (11) the building of an international order that has

the capacity to prevent and respond to atrocities” (quoted in Etienne,  Neto and Conceicao 370).

Therefore, the aim of reconciliation is to end the cycle of violence and prevent future violence

that can occur in the future. However, it does not undermine the victims who suffer during the

conflict and their stories should become a reference for future generationThe definition that

provided by Minow can help us to identify the public perception of reconciliation in East Timor

that carried out by the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation.

The theoretical aspirations which provided by Martha Minow can be only measured trough

public perception of the reconciliation itself. The commission for truth, and reconciliation in East

Timor ended its mission in 2006 after it submitted the final report to the government. The reports

include recommendations that it expected the government to implement in the future. The
recommendations that the commission for truth, and reconciliation recommended was “that the

government set up a reparations program and memorials to remember the victims as well as

conduct further inquiry into mass graves and the fate of the disappeared” (United States Institute

of Peace). However, most of the recommendations have not been implemented in East Timor

yet. In 2008, Etienne Mullet, Felix Neto, and Mario da Conceicao, examined the East Timorese

view on the work of the commission of reconciliation in East Timor. However, the study only

looks at the citizens who were already familiar with the work of the commission and directly

involve in the reconciliation process. In addition, the study also found that most participants

strongly valued the symbolic nature of the truth commission as distinguished from its judicial or

therapeutic nature. However, there as mentioned above, there are no follow up study to assess the

public perception of reconciliation in East Timor, especially those who did not directly involve

in the reconciliation process or have knowledge on the reconciliation in East Timor.

Therefore, this paper aims to examine public perception of reconciliation in East Timor in

order to understand the success of the reconciliation process in East Timor. The survey on the

public perception of reconciliation in East Timor was conducted with the cooperation of

commission of truth and reconciliation of East Timor where the commission helps in sending out

the survey. All of the participants were volunteers and asked to fill the questionnaire via survey

monkey which distributed via social media such as Facebook, What’s App, and emails. The

questions used in this paper were taken from the James L. Gibson Survey of Truth and

Reconciliation in South Africa from 2000-2001, with several modifications in order to fit the

purpose of this paper. In addition, the data of the sample were collected from April11st to April

31th, 2019, with most of the respondents never being directly interviewed. The results of the

survey are compiled based on the answers that were provided by the participants. In addition, the
answers were than tally up to give an indication on the perception of the participants which then

subjected to statistical analyses. The independent variables that used in this survey and statistical

analysis are age, gender, and educational levels with the dependent variables are the questions of

the survey (see appendix). The responses were then used to analyze and examines the public

perception of reconciliation in East Timor.

The sample of participants in this paper is composed of 113 men and 87 women from the

Dili region. The mean age of the participants that responded to the questionnaire is in the range

of 18-64 which can be seen in the figure below.

Figure 1: The number of participants’ age group Figure 2: The percentage of participants’ age group

The participants were composed of mainly educated people with 23.98% or 47 of the

participants having finished their secondary education and 76.02% or 149 participants are

currently enrolled in college or having earned their bachelor degree.

The number of participants of age group, education, and gender can be used to analyze the

public perception on reconciliation in East Timor through the questions that asked in survey.

From the number of respondents 71.90% of the people know the commission of truth, and

reconciliation of East Timor, and 28.10% of the respondents do not know the commission of

truth, and reconciliation. However, when these numbers are narrowed down it shows a different

figure that can help us understand the public perception on the reconciliation in East Timor.
 Figure 3: Numbers of participants who know CAVR by age range

This number indicates that 42.5% of the respondents’ ages 18-24 do not know the CAVR

(Commission for Truth and Reconciliation). The number indicates that there are alarming

number of people who were children during the conflict and the reconciliation process do not

have knowledge of the commission of truth and reconciliation process. In addition, it means that

there is the commission of truth and reconciliation and the commission for truth and

reconciliation do not have program in raising awareness to the public, especially children who

did not participate the reconciliation process. In addition, the number become more alarming

because from all the participants of different age group only 48, 36% of the respondents know

about the activities of the commission of truth and reconciliation and only 24.84% of the

respondents know a moderate amount about the activities of the commission for truth and

reconciliation and 26.8% of the respondents does not know about the activities of commission

for truth, and reconciliation of East Timor. Therefore, although commission of truth and

reconciliation were established in East Timor to address the conflict from 1975-1999 and

facilitate deponents to come forward and tell their stories. The majority of the people knows very
little or does not have knowledge about the mandate of the commission. Therefore, it is hard to

conclude that the work of the commission can be considered successful and information about

the reconciliation actually reaches the public.

It is important also to analyze the public perception on some of the works that had done

by the commission of truth and reconciliation in order to better understand the public perception

on reconciliation in East Timor. Therefore when asked how well the commission for truth and

reconciliation had done in letting the families of the victims know what happened to their loved

ones, 81.58% of the respondents agreed that the commission did an excellent job in letting the

families of the victims know what happened to their loved ones. Almost the same percentage of

the respondent also agreed that the commission provided a true and unbiased history of East

Timor. In addition, when asked on how well the commission did in making sure that those guilty

of atrocities are punished, only 19.87% agree that the commission did excellent job and 36.42

agreed that the commission did a good job. Meanwhile, 19.87% of the respondents agreed that

the commission did an average good work, and 23.85% of the people agreed that the commission

did a bad job in making sure that those guilty of atrocities are punished. It is important to

understand that the commission of truth and reconciliation in East Timor does not have a

mandate to persecute for individual who committed genocide, crimes against humanity, and war

crimes, torture, and murder and sexual offenses during the conflict (Stahn 958). Therefore, based

on the answer, the majority of the people actually believe that the commission has a mandate to

persecute individuals who committed atrocities during the conflict. In fact, only the state that has

a right in prosecuting individuals in East Timor and Indonesia for serious crimes which they

committed during the conflict. Therefore, it is up to East Timor government to bring justice to

the victims of the conflict.

 In reality, realpolitik overshadowed the justice system during the reconciliation process in

East Timor. Since the commission of truth and reconciliation was tasked only to inquire about

human rights violations it did not have the mandate to engage in the prosecution of individuals

who committed crimes. In addition, many of the individuals who committed human right

violations fled to Indonesia, which adds more challenge to the judicial process. Therefore, the

new Timorese government and Indonesian government created the Commission of Truth and

Friendship in 2005. Established independently by the United Nations, the commission comprised

half Indonesian and half Timor-Leste commissioners (Strating 233). The purpose of this

commission was to find the “conclusive truth about the perpetration of gross human rights

violations and institutional responsibility by conducting an inquiry and arriving at

recommendations and lessons learned” (Strating 233). However, this commission also struggles

to persecute individuals who committed human rights violations in East Timor. There are many

works of literature which argue that reconciliation is hard to achieve without justice. In the case

of East Timor, the notion of realpolitik impedes the delivery of justice to the victims. The

hesitancy of East Timor’s government to pursue justice can be seen in the government’s

“reluctance to take primary responsibility for prosecuting high-ranking Indonesian officials”

(Robinson 215). The reluctance also can be seen in the rhetoric of the East Timor political

leaders such as the resistance leader Xanana Gusmao and the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize winner

Jose Ramos-Horta who “campaigned actively against a tribunal, against what they termed

punitive justice, and in favor of a vaguely defined reconciliation” (Robinson 220). Therefore,

with the lack of incentive from the East Timor leaders to pursue justice, most of the perpetrators

remain free in Indonesia.

 Thus, for Timorese leaders, the goal of the reconciliation is to end the cycle of violence in

the country and conflict with Indonesia. Hence, in the survey when asked do they agree that the

commission for truth and reconciliation was essential to avoid civil war and avoid bad relation

with Indonesia, 79.29% of the respondents agreed that the commission for truth and

reconciliation help in mitigating civil war and bad relation with Indonesia. The rationale of this

response can be explained through the lenses of socio-economic, security, and future political

and economic support from Indonesia The socio-economic dependence of East Timor towards

Indonesia became the main motivation for Timorese leaders to pursue international

reconciliation with Indonesia. The socio-economic dependence can be seen through the

statement of Timor-Leste Home Affairs Minister Jorge da Conceicao Teme, who stated that “the

economic dependence of Timor-Leste on Indonesia is high because all our foodstuffs are bought

from Indonesia” (Antara 61) and “Timor-Leste relies upon rice exports from Indonesia to survive

periods of food insecurity known as the hungry season” (Strating 242). As the conflict devastated

the country’s agriculture, the food dependence towards Indonesia was inevitable. Hence,

reconciliation was considered as way to ease the trade between these two countries. In addition,

the reconciliation between East Timor and Indonesia was essential in order to address security

issues. Since most of the perpetrators are in Indonesia and hold important positions in

government – from President, lawmakers, Ministry, and high-ranking military officials – the

reconciliation was considered crucial. The reconciliation was sought by the East Timor leaders as

means to mitigate potential threats from Indonesia (Strating 242-243). In addition, some of the

crimes that occurred during the conflict were committed by FRETILIN – the resistance party

who fought the Indonesia occupation – and its leaders. As concluded by the commission of truth

and reconciliation, “approximately 10 percent of reported violations were committed by pro-

independence forces led by Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN)” (Hayner 41). If

justice should take place, it means that most of East Timor’s leaders will be charged with crimes

which will create an internal conflict and possibly civil war in East Timor. Furthermore, as a new

country, East Timor is trying to integrate itself with the regional organization such as the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In order to achieve this goal, Timor-Leste

also relies on Indonesia support for its integration into the ASEAN community. Currently,

Indonesia is the main support for East Timor integration with the ASEAN community. One of

the supports came from the former Indonesia President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – a former

military officer who involved in East Timor conflict – “reiterated his support and Foreign Affairs

Minister Marty Natalegawa promised to work hard to realize Timor-Leste’s vision to be a

member of ASEAN” (Strating 242). The ambition of East Timor to join ASEAN contributes to

the East Timor leaders’ hesitancy to pursue justice for the perpetrators in Indonesia. Therefore,

through this socio-economic, security, and regional integration calculation, the East Timor

leaders sought reconciliation with Indonesia as a path for the future even if it undermines justice

for the victims.

As the leaders of East Timor made decision based on political and economic calculation,

the people of East Timor have the opposite view. Hence, the survey also sought to understand the

public perception on the perpetrators who committed crimes in East Timor. Therefore, in the

survey when asked do you think those who were granted amnesty were punished by the fact that

they had to publicly confess to doing horrible things? The answers of the respondents suggest the

otherwise and far from what expected from the claims that the scholars argue where the

reconciliation in East Timor is successful.

 Figure 4: Percentage of Participants’ opinion on the punishment of perpetrators who received
amnesty from national court after their confession.

The overall answers of the respondent suggest that the policy of the government and the

commission of truth and reconciliation in East Timor to grant amnesty for those who come

forward and confess to do horrible things in the past does not satisfy the Timorese citizens

overall. This is because as figure four suggest, 45.64% of the respondents think that those who

confess were punished only little and were not punished at all. This grievance further can be seen

in the public opinion on towards these perpetrators role and future in East Timor. Therefore,

when the survey further asked on the public opinion should the perpetrators who had received

amnesty should be prohibited from being employed by the state; the 75.63% of the respondents

support the idea that those who committed atrocities should not be employed by the state. One of

the arguments that can be made to explain this trend can be credited to the fact unemployment in

East Timor is high and it with an estimation of “unemployment rate of 11 per cent, only about

190,000 people are employed out of a population of 1.2 million. In other words, every person

with a job is supporting on average more than six people. About 485,000 people of working age
are outside the labor force or unemployed” (Belo). Therefore, the majority of the respondents do

not agree for those committed crime in the past to be employed states, as job opportunity is very

competing. The opinion also can be credited to the fact recently the East Timor army chief of

staff stated in his interview with the local TV station saying that those whose parent are militia or

live in Indonesia, should not be employed by state, especially in the army. Therefore, in order for

reconciliation to be more successful, economic growth and opportunity in the country needs to

improve. Nevertheless, given the economic growth rate of East Timor, means that competition of

jobs is very high in the country and such as accusation regarding past will continue to haunt the

minds of Timorese citizens.

The trend of the public opinion become more alarming when asked those who received

amnesty from minor crimes should be expelled from East Timor. If look at the answers of the

respondents in general trend, 60.41% of the respondents does not agree or support the idea that

those who had received amnesty for the minor crimes should be expelled from East Timor.

Although, the 39.59% who agree is still alarming, when we break down base on the level of

education and age group the figure become much more concerning.

Figure 5: Level of education and the percentage of Figure 6: Age range and the percentage of participants’
participants’ opinion opinion
 As shown in figure five, 50% of those who’s their education level in secondary school

agreed that those who committed minor crimes and received amnesty should be expelled from

East Timor. In addition, figure six shows us that more half of the respondents in the age range of

18-24 agree or strongly agree that those who committed minor crimes and received amnesty

should be expelled from East Timor. Therefore, it means that majority of the young people in

East Timor and especially those who do not have higher education degree do not understand the

purpose of reconciliation in East Timor. Furthermore, it also indicates that if the aim of the

commission for truth and reconciliation is to end the cycle of violence and prevent more conflict

in the future, the data show us that a very alarming trend.

The reconciliation in East Timor was very unique due to the integration of traditional

culture into the reconciliation process. One of the traditional cultures that integrated in

reconciliation process is nahe-biti- which means dialogue- which legitimize through the notion of

lulik. In definition, “the word lulik, in the lingua franca Tetun, is sometimes translated as

‘sacred’ or ‘forbidden’ and while this may be a useful shorthand, the influence and reach of the

concept extends well beyond any simple glossing of its meaning” (McWilliam et al 304).

However, for Timorese society lulik is also “a philosophical, religious and moral order that

represents the core of Timorese values, and for that reason, it remains an important guide to East

Timorese intentions and actions across all areas of social life” (quoted in McWilliam 305). The

idea of lulik in East Timor is tied to the idea of the spirit world. The spirit world is important in

Timorese society because it “exerts a powerful influence on East Timorese attitudes to the dead”

(Kent 1036). In the Timorese indigenous culture, the world is co-inhabited by humans and spirits

– the souls of the dead people. Therefore, in our everyday life, the souls of the dead people are

watching at us and if we do something violating the law of nature, they will punish us. The lulik
is often guarded or protected by the souls of the ancestors and that’s the reason it is sacred and

forbidden. It means that if lulik is violated, the souls of the ancestors will punish the person who

violates it. Usually, the punishment can be delivered in the form of sickness, failure in business

or career, unhappiness in the family, even death itself. In East Timor, “customary law remains

most influential in the rural areas where up to 70% of the population lives” (Larke 658) and lulik

plays an important role in enforcing customary law. Therefore, in the reconciliation process of

East Timor, the concept of lulik is used to legitimize the reintegration of the perpetrators and the

nahe-biti dialogue. Consequently, the idea of lulik legitimizes the nahe-biti dialogue in the

community and acts as deterrent for the people to violate it. Therefore, according to some

scholars, reconciliation was successful in East Timor and the re-integration of the perpetrators to

the community occurred without massive opposition from the community.

However, the views of the scholars who claim that traditional culture, help the

reconciliation process in East Timor become success should be contested. In order for the notion

of lulik and nahe-biti become successful it requires the trust of the community towards the

traditional leaders. Therefore, the survey asked the participants to rate their confidence of several

institutions in the country in the scale of one to five –with five have the highest confidence.

Figure 7: Participants confidence on institution in East Timor

 The result of the survey suggest that majority of Timorese have more confidence in

judicial institution compare to traditional leaders. Therefore, during the reconciliation process

which heavily involve with the traditional culture should be question. As the confidence or trust

of Timorese towards traditional leaders is low, it means that the community did not fully accept

that integration and compensation of the perpetrators into the community. Instead, they have

more trust in judicial institution which suggest that if the reconciliation process were able to

bring anyone who committed serious or less crimes to justice, perhaps the community will

healed faster and move on quickly. Furthermore, the trust of the community towards the

commission of truth and reconciliation itself is very low, means that when the commission

collaborates with the traditional leaders in implementing the community reconciliation process, it

did not have much approval and support of the Timorese people. Hence, the survey suggest that

despite scholars claim that traditional culture in East Timor help the reconciliation process

become successful, the survey suggest the opposite trend and in fact the trust of the community

towards traditional leaders who perform lulik and legitimize nahe-biti is very low.

The survey on the public perception of reconciliation in East Timor challenges the claims

the reconciliation process in East Timor was successful. Often, Timorese leaders and politicians

are proudly claim in international stage that the reconciliation process in East Timor that carried

out by the commission of truth and reconciliation in East Timor was success and help to mitigate

conflict in the community and Indonesia. Numerous studies also suggest that the reconciliation in

East Timor is unique in a way because it involves traditional culture which helps in the

integration of the perpetrators in the community. However, the survey on public perception

reconciliation process in East Timor, suggest that majority of the people especially among youths

did not satisfy or have negative view about the reconciliation. The commission for truth and
reconciliation in East Timor ended their mission after the submission of its final report in 2006,

majority of Timorese still do not have knowledge about the work of the commission. Since the

final report of the commission of truth and reconciliation were never published or widely

distributed in East Timor, most of Timorese citizens still have little knowledge about the

reconciliation process in the country. The survey also indicates that due to high unemployment in

East Timor, the youth in East Timor still believed that most of the perpetrators who committed

minor crimes should never be employed by the state. The argument of peace and economic

development always become a puzzle for policy maker to choose which one is important. In the

case of East Timor, the survey suggest that as the unemployment rate is high in East Timor, most

of youth agree that those who committed violence should never be employed by the states. As it

appears now, these grievances have not translated to violence yet, but are important for state to

take this matter seriously before it explodes to a full conflict in the future. The low trust of the

community towards their traditional leaders also suggest that despite claims from scholars and

leaders that traditional culture help the reconciliation process in East Timor, this survey suggest

the opposite. The community in general does not have trust in traditional leaders; instead they

have more confidence in the judicial system to address the issues of crimes. Therefore, it is

important to acknowledge that the reconciliation in East Timor involve lots of political interest

and calculation from the leaders. However, the community and the public opinion are often

ignored by the policy makers in the country. The ignorance of public perception and opinion on

the reconciliation process in East Timors should prioritize and implemented by the states base on

the recommendations that made by the commission of truth and reconciliation. Nevertheless, this

study only covers the majority of the people who live in the capital city and have access to

internet. A future study to examine the public perception of reconciliation in East Timor that
involve community in rural areas, and those who do not have access to internet is needed in order

to give a clear picture of the reconciliation in East Timor.

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Queen's University Press, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/luthercollege-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3332074.
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