Manchester Development v.

Court of Appeals

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only
upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court . Thus, in the
present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction
upon the Court. For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed
which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.

Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of
the action in the Magaspi case.

In this case, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the
government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and
attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted. In
the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also
for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment.
Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient,
nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of
opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular."
Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegations of
damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee.

In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of
the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages
and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount
of damages as alleged in the original complaint.

The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the
practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification
of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in
the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the
filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken
cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel
filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for
in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of
October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the
amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer
thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent
with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

----------------------
Nestle Phils. v. FY Sons, G.R. No. 150780, May 5, 2006

Petitioner asserts that the documentary evidence presented by respondent to prove actual
damages in the amount of P4,246,015.60 should not have been considered because
respondent’s complaint only prayed for an award ofP1,000,000. It further contends that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the claim only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.

Indeed, a court acquires jurisdiction over the claim of damages upon payment of the
correct docket fees. In this case, it is not disputed that respondent paid docket fees based
on the amounts prayed for in its complaint . Respondent adduced evidence to prove its
losses. It was proper for the CA and the RTC to consider this evidence and award the sum
of P1,000,000. Had the courts below awarded a sum more than P1,000,000, which was the
amount prayed for, an additional filing fee would have been assessed and imposed as a
lien on the judgment. However, the courts limited their award to the amount prayed for.

Both the RTC and CA found that respondent had satisfactorily proven the factual bases for
the damages adjudged against the petitioner. This is a factual matter binding and conclusive
upon this Court.[23] It is well-settled that –
. . . findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon
the Supreme Court. This rule may be disregarded only when the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not supported
by the evidence on record. But there is no ground to apply this exception to the instant case.
This Court will not assess all over again the evidence adduced by the parties particularly
where as in this case the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely
coincide.[24]

Likewise, the determination of the amount of damages commensurate with the factual
findings upon which it is based is primarily the task of the trial court.[25] Considering that the
amount adjudged is not excessive, we affirm its correctness.

Moreover, given that petitioner was not able to prove that respondent had unpaid accounts
in the amount of P995,319.81, the seizure of the P500,000 time deposit was improper. As a
result, the refund of this amount with interest is also called for.
--------------
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989

The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective
in that sense and to that extent.

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the
intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the
original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until] the case
was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed
on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original
complaint was null and void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that,
unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules
by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in
Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the
additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by
manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient
considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the
lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine
and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay
the same.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.

-----------

Phil. First Insurance v. Paramount Gen. Insurance, G.R. No. 165147, July 9, 2008

In Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, the Court clarified the effect of
the Sun Insurance ruling on the Manchester ruling as follows:

As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 [of this Court which was issued based on the
Manchester ruling] that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, has not been altered. ---- What has been revised is the rule that
subsequent "amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount
sought in the amended pleading," the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of
the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period
or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing the awards of
claims not specified in the pleading – i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint
or similar pleading – as to which the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien
on the judgment.
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed
on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case,
the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court,
"specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of filing fees
in any case."

Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim
purely for money and damages and there is no statement of the amounts being claimed.
In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may
be dismissed, or the claims as to which amounts are unspecified may be expunged,
although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint
and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred.
---- The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees
paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable
time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such
payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action,
unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of
action.

Ayala Corporation v. Madayag: 1awphil

xxxx

Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the [Sun Insurance] ruling of this Court
wherein it stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body
and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer xxx the amount of which is left to the discretion of
the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter
shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

x x x While it is true that the determination of certain damages x x x is left to the sound
discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the
amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for
the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to
claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court
is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the
amount thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

-----------

Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders

The jurisdictionally flawed transfer of the case from Branch 24, the SCC to Branch 22, the regular
court, is topped by another jurisdictional defect which is the non-payment of the correct docket
fees. In its order dated 19 May 2008 which admitted R-II Builders’ Amended and Supplemental
Complaint, respondent RTC distinctly ruled that the case was a real action and ordered the re-
computation and payment of the correct docket fees.[53] In patent circumvention of said order,
however, R-II Builders filed its 14 August 2008 motion to admit its Second Amended Complaint
which effectively deleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or
possession of the entire Asset Pool and, in addition to reducing the claim for attorney’s fees and
seeking its appointment as a receiver, reinstated its cause of action for resolution of the DAC.
Admittedly, this Court has repeatedly laid down the test in ascertaining whether the subject
matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation by determining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. While a claim is, on the one hand, considered capable of pecuniary
estimation if the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the action is considered
incapable of pecuniary estimation where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a consequence of,
the principal relief sought.

While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the
property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered
immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent
doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not
operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover
said real property. It is a real action.

For failure of R-II Builders to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint or, for that
matter, its Amended and Supplemental Complaint as directed in respondent RTC's 19 May 2008
order, it stands to reason that jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach. Applying the
rule that "a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court" in the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,[76] this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. To temper said ruling, the
Court subsequently issued the following guidelines in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon.
Maximiano Asuncion.

------

Unicapital v. Consing

It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the complaint does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable
period.84 Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that the stringent rule on non- payment of docket
fees enunciated in the case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA85 should be applied in this
case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the government by
his failure to pay the correct amount of filing fees.

Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to
defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.

----------------

Ramones v. Spouses Guimoc, G.R.No. 226645, August 13, 2018

An Information for Other Forms of Swindling was filed against the spouses Guimoc before
the Municipal Trial Court of Mariveles, Bataan. The petitioner, upon being informed that
she needs to pay the docket fee of P500,00 paid the same. After trial, only Elenita was
found guilty of the crime charged, but the spouses were found civilly liable; Elenita for the
amount of P507,000.00 and Teodorico for P60,000.00, with legal interest from December
13, 2006. The spouses appealed to the RTC, and in their Memorandum of Appal argued
that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to award damages as Isabel failed to pay the
correct amount of docket fees pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 35-
2004(SC Circular No. 35-2004), which provides that the filing fees must be paid for
money claims in estafa cases. They claimed that due to petitioner’s failure to make an
express reservation to separately institute a civil action, her payment of filing fees in the
amount of P500.00 was deficient. The damages sought was worth P663,000.00;thus, the
correct filing fees should have allegedlybeen around P9,960.00.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.

Accordingly, subsequent decisions now uniformly hold that “when insufficient filing fees
are initially paid by the plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the government, the
Manchester rule does not apply.”

In line with this legal paradigm, prevailing case law demonstrates that “[t]he non-
payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where the
plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and the amount
paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject
to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment.” “The reason is that to
penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not fair if the party has acted in
good faith.”

In this case, it is undisputed that the amount of P500.00 paid by petitioner was insufficient
to cover the required filing fees for her estafa case under the premises of Section 21, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. Nonetheless, it is equally
undisputed that she paid the full amount of docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court of
the MTC, which is evidenced by a certification dated April 11, 2016 issued therefor. In
addition, petitioner consistently manifested her willingness to pay additional docket fees
when required. In her petition, she claims that she is “very much willing to pay the correct
docket fees which is the reason why she immediately went to the clerks of court[,] and
records show that she paid the [MTC] of the amount assessed from her.” Indeed, the
foregoing actuations negate any bad faith on petitioner’s part, much more belie any intent
to defraud the government. As such, applying the principles above-discussed, the Court
holds that the court a quo properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. However, petitioner
should pay the deficiency that shall be considered as a lien on the monetary awards in her
favor pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court

. Besides, the Court observes that if respondents believed that the assessment of filing fees
was incorrect, then it was incumbent upon them to have raised the same before the MTC.
Instead, contrary to the CA’s assertion, records show that respondents actively participated
in the proceedings before the MTC and belatedly questioned the alleged underpayment of
docket fees only for the first time on appealbefore the RTC, or five (5) years later after the
institution of the instant case. The Court is aware that lack of jurisdiction, as a ground to
dismiss a complaint, may, as a general rule, be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
However, in United Overseas Bank, the Court has observed that the same is subject to the
doctrine of estoppel by laches, which squarely applies here. In United Overseas Bank:

In its Order, the lower court even recognized the validity of petitioner’s claim of lack of
jurisdiction had it timely raised the issue. It bears to stress that the non-payment of the
docket fees by private respondent and the supposed lack of jurisdiction of the Manila RTC
over Civil Case No.98-90089 was raised by the petitioner only five years after institution
of the instant case and after one of the private respondent’s witnesses was directly
examined in open court

Since the Manila RTC ruled that the petitioner is now estopped by laches from questioning
its jurisdiction and considering that its Order denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss is not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion but wholly substantiated by the evidence on the
record, this Court would no longer disturb said order.

Accordingly, the Court sets aside the assailed CA rulings. A new one is entered ordering
Elenita and Teodorico to pay petitioner the amounts of P507,000.00 and P60,000.00,
respectively, both with legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
reckoned not from December 13, 2006 as ruled by the MTC, but from the time the
Information was filed on June 30, 2006, consistent with existing jurisprudence on estafa
cases, and six percent (6%) per annum, from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction. Further, the
MTC is directed to determine the amount of deficient docket fees, which shall constitute a
lien on the aforementioned monetary awards.

As a final note, it must be pointed out that this Decision only relates to respondents’ civil
liabilities as records are bereft of any showing that further recourse was taken against the
rulings of the courts a quo on the criminal aspect of this case.