ART.

III

SECTION 5

PASCUAL v. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS (110 Phil. 331)

FACTS

Wenceslao Pascual, Provincial Governor of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction on
the ground that RA 920 (An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works) contained in Section 1-C (a) an
item of P85,000 “for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement” of Pasig
feeder road terminals privately owned by respondent Zulueta. The latter filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that Pascual had no legal capacity to sue, and that the petition did not state a cause of action.
The lower court granted the said motion.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Pascual.

As a taxpayer, Pascual had legal standing. The SC also ruled that the subject appropriation was illegal
because it appropriated public funds for the improvement of private property. The right of the
legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and under constitutional provisions
against taxation except for public purposes. Taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only.

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is
designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.

Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC

-SC’s appellate jurisdiction may not be increased w/o its concurrence and advice.

Q: DOTC bundled bidding projects.  

X assailed bundling of projects b4 SC claiming that it will amount to monopoly.  Proper?

A: NO. Reasons:

2. X’s argument requires presentation of evidence, and SC is not trier of facts.

2.        Viol of Hierarchy of courts.  

Q: Why hierarchy of courts is part of DP?

A: Bec parties will be given opportunity to present evid in lower courts, unlike if case is filed in
SC.

Q: Court is not trier of facts. What is only constitutional xpn?

A: Factual issues in declaration of ML.  

Q: In direct recourse to SC, what is only questions involved?

A: Questions of law.
SC is allowed to make Intermediate Review by CA of Death, RP, Life Impr. Cases.

People v. Mateo y Garcia, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004.

Q: Can SC create intermediate review by CA for cases of DRL before case is elevated to SC?

A: YES. While Const requires mandatory review by SC of DRL cases, nowhere has Const
proscribed intermediate review.

Power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in SC.  

Rule of additionally allowing intermediate review by CA b4 case is elevated SC on automatic

review = procedural matter.

-Order change of venue

People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. L-32282-83, November 26, 1970. Q: Can SOJ order transfer of
venue?
A: NO, only SC can. This power is deemed to be incidental and inherent power of Court.

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Mario J. Gutierrez

Facts: A group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of
Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio
Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the
group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta
Balboa. After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations for arson with homicide and for arson, charging that the seventeen
private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons, for the crimes. On 22 June
1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47V and 48-V to the Circuit
Criminal Court, issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to
either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in
their affidavits. The respondent judge declined the transfer. Because of the lower court’s denial, they
filed a case for certiorari and mandamus to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Can the transfer of venue be allowed?

Ruling: Though the Secretary of Justice is not authorized to transfer specific and individual cases, the
Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and
inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts "can by
appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the
judiciary an effective institution of government". One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts
is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site,
whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice,
so demands. The requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied in the filing of the criminal
case in Ilocos Sur. The holding of the trial is a matter of venue rather than jurisdiction. There is factual
basis that the witnesses claim: (1) 82 of the armed suspects are still unidentified; (2) Vincent Crisologo,
private respondent, belongs to an influential family in the province; (3) it is not shown that the Executive
branch is able or willing to give these witnesses full security during the trial and possible murderous
assault after; (4) confirmation and promotion of Judge Gutierrez was actively supported by Cong. and
Gov. Crisologo.

Dispositive: Writs are granted, order is declared in grave abuse of discretion as it declines to transfer the
venue. Respondent Court is accordingly directed and ordered to remand the two criminal cases
aforesaid to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District for hearing of the evidence for the
prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at the earliest available date. The accused are
required to file bail bonds to answer for their appearance.

ROC v. NCC = NCC prevails (e.g. Support beyond minority)

Santero v. CFI-Cavite, G.R. Nos. L-61700-03, September 14, 1987.

Q: In settlement of estate, A asked for support even though he is already 18yo. B opposed this
since ROC only allows support to minor.  Correct?

A: NO. NCC allows support even if beyond age of minority.  

A Substantive law prevails over Procedural Law.

SANTERO v. CFI-Cavite, G.R. No. L-61700-03, Sept. 14, 1987

FACTS: Petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero and Winy Santero are the children
begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven children begotten by the same Pablo
Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since
neither of their mothers, was married to their father Pablo. Pablo Santero in turn, who died on
November 30, 1973 was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero who died in 1970 and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero who died in 1976.
Private respondents filed another Motion for Allowance dated March 25, 1985 with the respondent
court to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed Santero as children of the late Pablo Santero
with Anselma Diaz praying that an order be granted directing the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo, to
deliver the sum of P6,000.00 to each of the seven (7) children of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from
the estate of Pablo Santero. The respondent Court granted the motion of the private respondents but
oppositors (petitioners herein) asked the court to reconsider said Order.

On September 10, 1985, an Amended Order was issued by respondent Court directing Anselma Diaz to
submit her clarification or explanation as to the additional three (3) children of Anselma Diaz included in
the motion. In compliance therewith Anselma Diaz filed her "Clarification" stating among others that in
her previous motions, only the last four minor children as represented by the mother, Anselma Diaz
were included in the motion for support and her first three (3) children who were then of age should
have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of
their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero under Art. 188, of the New Civil Code.

On October 15, 1985, petitioners herein filed their Motion to Admit Supplemental Petition opposing the
inclusion of three (3) more heirs. We denied that "Motion for Extension of Time to file their
Supplemental Petition" as per Our Resolution dated October 23, 1985.

On November 11, 1985, another Order was issued by the respondent court directing the administrator
of the estate to get back the allowance of the three additional recipients or children of Anselma Diaz
apparently based on the oppositors' (petitioners herein) "Urgent Motion to Direct the Administrator to
Withhold Disbursement of Allowance to the Movants."

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondent court acted with great abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting the allowance to the respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel-
P2,000.00 each despite the fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully employed with the
exception of Miguel.

2. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in granting the allowance based on
the allegations of the said respondents that the abovenamed wards are still schooling and they are in
actual need of money to defray their school expenses for 1982-83 when the truth is that they are no
longer schooling.

3. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in granting the motion for allowance
without conducting a hearing thereon, to determine the truth of allegations of the private respondents.

RULING: 1. No. The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no
moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art.
188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction.
Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are
entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero.

2. No. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the
children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered;
but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents
pertaining to them.
3. No. It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted by respondent Court without hearing.
The record shows that the "Motion for Allowance" dated June 30, 1982 contains a Notice of Hearing
addressed to the lawyers for the petitioners and setting the hearing thereof on July 8, 1982 at 9:00 in
the morning. Apparently a copy of said motion was duly received by the lawyer, Atty. Beltran as he filed
an opposition thereto on the same date of hearing of the motion.

The petition for certiorari is dismissed.

Damasco v. Laqui 

FACTS 

In 1987, petitioner Efigenio Damasco (Damasco) was charged with grave threats  committed against
Rafael Sumadohat after uttering how he was going to kill the latter and that he  had a gun and lived
nearby. The Information dated 11 September 1987, stating the foregoing  incident, was filed only on 17
September 1987. Respondent Judge Hilario Laqui (Judge Laqui) 

found through the presented evidence that the crime committed was only of light threats. 
Consequently, Damasco was convicted of the latter crime. 

Damasco filed a motion contending that he cannot be convicted of light threats,  necessarily included in
grave threats charged in the information because the lighter offense had  already prescribed when the
information was filed, with the crime being committed on 8 July 1987  and the information being filed
only on 17 September 1987 after the lapse of 71 days. The crime  of light threats, which is a light
offense, prescribes in 2 months which means 60 days. 

The lower court denied Damasco’s petition, holding that since the Court acquired  jurisdiction to try the
case because the information was filed within the prescriptive period for the  crime charged, which is
Grave Threats, the same cannot be lost by prescription, if after trial what  has been proven is merely
light threats. The OSG recommended that the petition be given due  course because the principle that
the lower court was applying was not applicable in the present  case where the legal dispute lies in
whether or not it was proper for Judge Laqui to still convict  Damasco after finding him guilty of the
lesser offense of light threats but which has already  prescribed. 

ISSUE 

Whether or not it was proper for Judge Laqui to convict Damasco after finding him guilty of the lesser
offense of light threats which has already prescribed. 

HELD 

NO. In Francisco v. CA, the Court held that where an accused has been found to have  committed a
lesser offense includible within the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted  of the lesser offense
if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would  be to sanction a
circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the  petitioner of the
graver offense. A departure from the ruling in Francisco v. CA, can be done only  “through an overhaul of
some existing rules on criminal procedure to give prescription a limited  meaning, i.e., a mere bar to the
commencement of a criminal action and therefore, waivable.” 
Petition granted. Decision set aside. 

Baguio Market Vendors vs. Judge Cabato-Cortes

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 165922              

BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (BAMARVEMPCO), represented by RECTO

INSO, Operations Manager, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

For review1 are the Orders2 of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City finding
petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative liable for payment of foreclosure fees.

The Facts

Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit cooperative

organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. 3 Article
62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives:

from the payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in
connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is brought by the Cooperative
Development Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of
the cooperative.4

In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
(trial court) a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended. 5 Under
Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended, 6 petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees
based on the value of the mortgagee’s claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought
exemption from payment of the fees.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 30 August 2004, Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (respondent), Executive Judge of the
trial court, denied the request for exemption, citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, exempting from the Rule’s coverage only the “Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities” and certain suits of local government units. 7

Petitioner sought reconsideration but respondent denied its motion in the Order dated 6 October 2004.
This time, respondent reasoned that petitioner’s reliance on Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is misplaced
because the fees collected under Rule 141 are not “fees payable to the Philippine Government” as they
do not accrue to the National Treasury but to a special fund 8 under the Court’s control.9

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner maintains that the case calls for nothing more than a simple application of Article 62(6) of RA
6938.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Manifestation (in lieu of Comment), joins causes with
petitioner. The OSG submits that as the substantive rule, Article 62(6) of RA 6938 prevails over Section
22 of Rule 141, a judicial rule of procedure. The OSG also takes issue with respondent’s finding that the
legal fees collected under Rule 141 are not “fees payable to the Philippine Government” as the judiciary
forms part of the Philippine government, as defined under the Revised Administrative Code. 10

Although not a party to this suit, we required the Court’s Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) to
comment on the petition, involving as it does, issues relating to the Court’s power to promulgate judicial
rules. In its compliance, the OCAT recommends the denial of the petition, opining that Section 22, Rule
141, as amended, prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938 because (1) the power to impose judicial fees is
eminently judicial and (2) the 1987 Constitution insulated the Court’s rule-making powers from
Congress’ interference by omitting in the 1987 Constitution the provision in the 1973 Constitution
allowing Congress to alter judicial rules. The OCAT called attention to the Court’s previous denial of a
request by a cooperative group for the issuance of “guidelines” to implement cooperatives’ fees
exemption under Article 62(6) of RA 6938. 11 Lastly, the OCAT recommends the amendment of Section
22, Rule 141 to make explicit the non-exemption of cooperatives from the payment of legal fees.

The Issue

The question is whether petitioner’s application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees
under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner’s foreclosure proceeding.

Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure

Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA 6938

The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is limited to two
types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative
Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of cooperatives. By
simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner
to claim exemption from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable
on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development
Authority which can claim exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of
cooperatives.

The Power of the Legislature

vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court
to Enact Judicial Rules

Our holding above suffices to dispose of this petition. However, the Court En Banc has recently ruled in
Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from
Payment of Legal Fees12 on the issue of legislative exemptions from court fees. We take the opportunity
to reiterate our En Banc ruling in GSIS.

Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing
scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the
193513 and the 197314 Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the “power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.”
However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to “repeal, alter or
supplement” such rules.15

The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by
deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress’ subsidiary and corrective power. 16 This glaring and
fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice 17 that this Court’s
power to promulgate judicial rules “is no longer shared by this Court with Congress”:

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII 18 x x x .

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was
also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive. x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)

Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to rest with our
recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for
exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291,
exempting GSIS from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all kinds.” 19 Reaffirming
Echegaray’s construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice and procedure as “one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence”:

[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As
one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. 20 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 30 August 2004 and 6 October 2004
of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.

In re: Perpetual Help Community Cooperative, A.M. No. 12-2-03-0 (Resolution)

Facts:

In a Petition[1] dated 24 October 2011, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCCI), through
counsel, requests for the issuance of a court order to clarify and implement the exemption of
cooperatives from the payment of court and... sheriff's fees pursuant to Republic Act No. 6938, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9520, otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008.

PHCCI contends that as a cooperative it enjoys the exemption provided for under Section 6, Article 61 of
Republic Act No. 9520, which states:

(6) Cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the
Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such
actions is brought by the Authority before the court, to enforce the... payment of obligations contracted
in favor of the cooperative.

It claims that this was a reiteration of Section 62, paragraph 6 of Republic Act No. 6938, An Act to Ordain
a Cooperative Code of the Philippines,[2] and was made basis for the Court's Resolution in A.M. No. 03-
4-01-0, as well as of Office of the

Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 44-2007.[3]

It avers that despite the exemptions granted by the aforesaid laws and issuances, PHCCI had been
continuously assessed and required to pay legal and other fees whenever it files cases in court.

PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office of the Executive Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, a Motion to implement the exemption of cooperatives from
the payment of court and sheriff's fees in cases filed before the courts in... his jurisdiction, but the
Executive Judge ruled that the matter is of national concern and should be brought to the attention of
the Supreme Court for it to come up with a straight policy and uniform system of collection. In the
meantime, the MTCC has continued the... assessment of filing fees against cooperatives.

Records reveal that on 21 September 2011, Executive Judge Antonio Estoconing (Executive Judge
Estoconing), MTCC, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, issued an Order treating the motion filed by PHCCI
as a mere consulta considering that no main action was filed in his... court. Executive Judge Estoconing
submits that he had second thoughts in considering the exemption in view of the guidelines laid down in
the Rules. He reported that many cases filed by PHCCI are small claims cases and under Section 8 of the
Rule on Small Claims, the... plaintiff is required to pay docket fees and other related costs unless he is
allowed to litigate the case as an indigent.

Hence, this Petition.

Before this Court is the issue on whether cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and
sheriff's fees. The fees referred to are those provided for under Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of
Court.

Issues:

whether cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and sheriff's fees. The fees referred to are
those provided for under Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

The term "all court fees" under Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520 refers to the totality of
"legal fees" imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as an incident of instituting an action in court.
[4] These fees include filing or docket... fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies,
mediation fees, sheriff's fees, stenographer's fees and commissioner's fees.

In the GSIS case, the Court citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,[9] stressed that the 1987 Constitution
molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary; took away the power of

Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure; and held
that the power to promulgate these Rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress, more so, with
the Executive,[10] thus:

Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As
one of the safeguards of this Court's institutional... independence, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court's exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared
by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive

In a decision dated 26 February 2010 in Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative

(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes,[18] this Court reiterated its ruling in the GSIS case when it denied
the petition of the cooperative to be exempted from the... payment of legal fees under Section 7(c) of
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court relative to fees in petitions for extra-judicial foreclosure.

With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is evident that the exemption
of cooperatives from payment of court and sheriff's fees no longer stands. Cooperatives can no longer
invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as... basis for exemption from the
payment of legal fees.

-Congress cannot admit anyone to POL

In re: Cunanan, Resolution, March 18, 1954, 94 PHIL 534-597.

Q: Can Congress pass law governing admission to Bar. Proper?
A: No. Only SC can promulgate rules concerning admission to practice of law

Legal Profession- In re: Cunanan

Resolution Cunanan, et. al

18March1954

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953;
Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972
popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he
obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past
few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar
examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C.,
and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages
of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951
Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not
overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions
of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is
contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration
of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.

 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring,
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this court.

 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place
by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in
the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.

 Reasons for Unconstitutionality:

1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter
them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the
bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are
considered the bare minimum.)

4. It is a class legislation

5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and
being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.

HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of
the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.

2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955)
is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to
1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5%
w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have
filed petitions for admissions or not.)

PNB vs. Asuncion (1977)

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a collection case against several solidary debtors. One of them died during the pendency
of the case. The court dismissed the case against all the defendants on the ground that the petitioner
should file a claim in the estate proceedings. Petitioner argued that the dismissal should be confined to
the defendant who died.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court erred in dismissing the case.

RULING:

Article 1216 of the Civil Code gives the creditor the right to proceed against anyone of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. Hence, in case of the death of one of them, the creditor
may proceed against the surviving debtors. The Rules of Court cannot be interpreted to mean that the
creditor has no choice but to file a claim in the estate of the deceased. Such construction will result in
the diminution of the substantive rights granted by the Civil Code.

PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and
that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts that Sec 8 was
meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to
the right to speedy trial.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for
Reconsideration given they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments. The
rule should be applied prospectively.

The court upheld the petitioners’ contention that whileSec.8 secures the rights of the accused, it does
not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural
rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive
application.

2. WON the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application
without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.

The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The
time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and the accused. When the rule was
approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do
so would be tantamount to the denial of the State’s right to due process. A retroactive application
would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes B
and their heirs.

Congress cannot prohibit plea-bargaining

Estipona v. Lobrigo, 2017 BARQ2016 20:

S23 of R.A. No. 9165 provides that:

 “any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of imposable penalty shall not
be allowed to avail of provision on plea-bargaining.” Is this Constitutional?

NO.

It constitutes unlawful encroachment by Congress into exclusive rule-making authority of SC.

Plea bargaining does not create/takes away right. It is procedural law.

Estipona v. Lobrigo
FACTS:

Petitioner Salvador Estipona, Jr. was accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for having illegally have in his possession 0.084 gram of shabu. Under Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165, plea-bargaining is prohibited in all drug cases.

On June 15, 2016, he filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,
praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and be allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165 (for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia).

The trial court denied his Motion holding that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 expressly prohibits plea-
bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial
court.

Arguing that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165 is unconstitutional for it encroaches upon the Supreme Court's rule-
making power and therefore violative of the equal protection clause, he filed a Petition before the SC to
declare Sec. 23 unconstitutional.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that (1) Congress was not impleaded, (2) the
constitutionality of the law cannot be attached collaterally, (3) the proper action should have been a
petition for relief before the RTC, and (4) the petition fails to satisfy the requisites for judicial review.

ISSUES:
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL
VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON

THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10

HELD:

The SC ruled:

On Matters of Technicality:

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless, without much
further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules
of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties'
arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural
flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk
from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications.

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial
and transcendental importance are present. We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on
illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions, and that its
disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes,
and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens.

Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should
not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends
for enlightenment and guidance. When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural
rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue.

On SC's Rule-Making Power:

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no
longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.

It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was
granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this
power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to
be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement.

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs
exclusively to this Court.

The power of Congress (to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines under Sec. 13, Art, VIII of he 1935
Constitution), however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan, Congress in
the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of
law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in
the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This
Court struck down the law as unconstitutional.

The rule making power of this [1987] Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The
Court was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive. x x x.

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x. The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches
of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass
upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court. Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous
attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of
Court (Rules).

On Plea-Bargaining:

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.
"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates
the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established
to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights
or obtain redress for their invasions." Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining
whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If
the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

Does Sec. 23, RA 9165 Violate the Equal Protection Clause?

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the
Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether
or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to
declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of
the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
SECTION 6

MACEDA V. VASZQUEZ

Administrative Supervision of Courts: The power of administrative supervision of the SC over all courts
and its personnel is EXCLUSIVE. Thus, a criminal case against a judge may NOT proceed.

Facts:

A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Judge Maceda of the RTC for
allegedly falsifying his Certificate of Service. He moves to have his case referred to the SC. He contends,
among others, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over his case and investigation of the Ombudsman
constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

Issue:

Does the Office of the Ombudsman have authority to investigate a criminal complaint against a judge for
alleged falsification of Certification of Service in the absence of an administrative action?

Held:

No. In the absence of any administrative action taken against Maceda by this Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers. The Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest MTC clerk. It is only
the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of the govt may
intrude. Thus, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this
Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties. In the case at bar, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of Maceda’s
certificates of service to this Court.

NOTE: Only SC can:

1.        Discipline court personnel

2.        Investigate court personnel.  

Rule if court personnel is complained b4 CSC

-Hanngang investigation lng ang CSC; CSC will refer case to OCA

-SC can adopt investigation of CSC, pero SC will discipline personnel

Civil Service Commission v. Ramoneda-Pita, A.M. No. P-08-2531, April 11, 2013.

Q: A, court personnel, was investigated and dismissed by CSC.  

Then CSC referred matter to OCA then to SC. SC dismissed her. Is CSC resolution of dismissal
of A binding?

A: NO.  

Only SC can 1. Discipline court personnel and 2. Investigate court personnel.

Q: Can SC adopt investigation of CSC?

A: YES, only to investigation, but it cannot adopt discipline of CSC.

OTHER MATTERS: S14-16

If d ka member ng Judiciary = SC has no disciplining authority over u

Noblejas v. Teehankee, G.R. No. L-28790, April 29, 1968.

Q: A was commissioner of LRA.  

Under law he is entitled to same compensation as judge of RTC.  

He was performing adjudicatory functions also concerning land registration.  

He was suspended by ES.  

He claims that only SC can suspend him in view of his rank equivalence to judge.  Correct?

A: NO. law does not mean that he is member of Judiciary bec that will be unconstitutional.

He is under Executive Dept., hence can be disciplined by ES.  If Judiciary will discipline him, it
will be violation of SOP.
SECTION 7

VARGAS V. RILLORAZA

Bawal dagdagan ng Congress ang Qualification ng SC justices.

Vargas v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948.

Q: Congress enacted People’s Court Act. Law provides:

2. An additional disqualification for SC justices that they must not have served under
Japanese Govt.

2.        Allowing CFI judges to sit as substitute justices of SC. Proper? 

A: NO.  

2. Congress has NO power to add grounds for disqualification of SC Justice. Congress

cannot modify or add disqualification of judicial officers.

REPUBLIC V. SERENO

Temporary sit = Violation of SOP. Congress encroached Appointing Power of Pres and
confirmation by ComApp (dati wala pang JBC).

Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

Q: Can SC take cognizance of quo warranto even if there is impeachment complaint already
filed in Congress?

A: Yes. They are independent. See Table.

Q: Is failure to submit SALN to JBC void nomination and appointment of Sereno as CJ?

A: Yes, failure to submit SALN means that her integrity was not established at time of her
application.

Q: Is Sereno de jure or de facto officer?

A: De Facto Officer
SECTION 8
Chavez v. JBC Case Digest

Doctrine of Operative Facts0 Comments

(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress
as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of
the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Sec. 8, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts:

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the Judicial and Bar Council was substantially altered.
Instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added as two representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. In 2001, the JBC En Banc, allowed the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Escudero and Congressman Tupas, Jr.
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. Francisco Chavez filed a petition
questioning this practice.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC.
The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the
Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a
unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress
in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house
of representation, defeating the principle of balance. They further argue that the presence of two (2)
members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are
undeniably presidential appointees.

Issues:

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8
instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?

Held:

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is
clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the
supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a
representative from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission
had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in
Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever
is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either
case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to
provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to
conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress,
or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly
cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached.
The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the
Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every
possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to
break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being
drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional
Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to
amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role
of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule,
however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair
play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine
is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in
reliance upon a law creating it.

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid

Jardeleza vs. Sereno

FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza
(Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he
was interviewed. However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ
Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in
question. During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due
process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist. Hence,
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the
list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him,
despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases
where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.

DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically
denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process. The Court does not brush aside the unique and
special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and
to explain one’s self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the
observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This
holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to
the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who
vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented
with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an
unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly
apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear
the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an
exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness. Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule
that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated
position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules
of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination,
but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of
due process.

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA VS JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

FACTS : The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is
a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the
following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6,
Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection
and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said
stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration
of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did
not pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer,
through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC
en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the
JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the
petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the
petitioner to take recourse to this Court

ISSUE : WON  the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its
principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is
not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function
HELD : The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two
special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither
acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy
that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional
mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power of
supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of
oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.

Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC
complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then
the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and
ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules

The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. It is essential to
the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The
remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial
duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act
are mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC

The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a
person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this
remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."

In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that
no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant
judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a
judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person

Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 The special
civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded
judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the
Court will set aside procedural infirmities

b. Powers Functions:

1. Primary = recommend appointees to Judiciary

2. Secondary = others as SC may assign
3. Incidental
-searching, screening, selecting, preparing short-list
-setting of standards, criteria

Villanueva v. JBC, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015.

Q: A was appointed as judge of MTC in 2010.  

In 2011 he applied to be judge of RTC.  
JBC did not include him in shortlist bec of internal rule of 5y service requirement before he can
qualify to second level courts. Proper? 

A: Yes.  

Constitution and laws only provide for minimum requirements. JBC may add more qualifications
bec functions of searching and screening are incidental to JBC’s principal function of choosing
nominees for appointment.

NOTE:  
PROCEDURAL: SC has supervisory power over JBC.
Pet for certiorari is not appropriate remedy to question JBC. JBC does not fall within scope of
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

AGUINALDO V. JBC

Rule in Clustering = pwede naman yan, basta JBC will not make rule na President can choose
only 1 nominee per list, bec it will impair Pres’ power of appointment [kc pano kung trip nya na
dalawang nominee ang piliin in 1 short list]

Aguinaldo v. JBC, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016.

Q: Congress passed law creating 6 new positions in SB.  

JBC made clustering.

-It submitted 6 separate shortlists to President.  

-JBC made rule: President can only pick 1 from each shortlist.  

But president ignored clustering.  

-He still chose more than 1 nominees in 1 shortlist. Is this method of clustering by JBC proper?

A: NO. JBC’s independence cannot impair President’s power to appoint members and his
statutory power to determine seniority of newly-appointed SB Justices.

Clustering can be abused to favor or prejudice nominee. This is very reason why selection of
judges was removed from ComApp and was given to JBC.

JBC can make internal rules like “unanimity rule”

SECTION 14

Air France v. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966.

Q: CA in its decision failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues laid before it.  Is CA’s
decision defective?

A: NO. As long as decision of CA contained necessary facts to warrant its conclusions = no

violation.  Mere failure to specify contentions of party is not required by Const and law.

SC’s Minute Resolution = also decision based on merits but cannot be binding precedent.
[purpose nyan ay pang mabilisan na decision; it is promulgated by SC COC]