Section 1.

EXECUTIVE POWER
The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers enumerated. Residual unstated powers
of the President are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare.

1) marcos-vs- manglapus
FACTS:
Only about three years after Pres. Aquino replaced Marcos, the latter, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
return to the Philippines to die. But Pres. Aquino, considering the dire consequences of his return to the
nation at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar his and his family’s return. The
Marcoses now seek to enjoin the implementation of the Pres. Aquino’s decision, invoking their constitutionally
guaranteed liberty of abode and right to travel.
ISSUE: Is the President granted power in the Constitution to prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?
RULING:
Yes. It would not be accurate to state that “executive power” is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers in here in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Although the Constitution imposes limitations
of the exercise of specific powers* of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of “executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Executive power is more than the sum of specific
powers so enumerated. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as
protector of the peace. The President is also tasked with xxx ensuring domestic tranquility xxx. The demand of
the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines xxx must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. There exists factual basis for
the President’s decision. The Court cannot xxx pretend the country is not besieged from within xxx. xxx the
catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses xxx may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break
the camel’s back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and
capriciously xxx in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest
and welfare and in prohibiting their return. The Court voted 8-7.
* The Court enumerated the specific powers of the President: the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under
the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to
enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power
to address Congress [Art VII, Secs 14-23] (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 689)

2) Fact:
 The special prosecutor in the Watergate scandal subpoenaed the tape recordings of conversations involving
the President and his advisers regarding the scandal. The President’s counsel moved to quash the subpoena
citing Article II of the United States Constitution (the “Constitution”) and its grant of privilege to the President.
The President’s counsel also argued it was a non-justiciable question because it was a disagreement between
parts of the executive branch.
Issue:
 Is the President’s Article II constitutional privilege absolute?
Held:
 The President’s executive privilege is not absolute and must bend to Amendment 4 and Amendment 5
requirements of speedy and fair trials and of the ability of defendants to face their accusers.  Courts are not
required to proceed against the President as if the President was any other individual.  Furthermore, Courts
should review communications claimed to be privileged in camera (by the judge only in chambers).
Discussion:
 The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) had to balance the executive privilege against the
rights of citizens to face their accusers and to have a speedy and fair trial. The Court made the point that the
President is not a normal citizen, and therefore should receive great deference regarding executive claims of
privilege. However, executive privilege is not absolute and must be balanced against the right of the accused
in criminal proceedings. The Court took great care to limit its opinion because it was delving into a political
dispute between the President and Congress, something the Supreme Court is loath to do.

3) Akbayan v aquino
Facts:

Petitioners, non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers requested, via the
petition for mandamus and prohibition, to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiation process and all pertinent attachm ents and annexes thereto. The Congress, through the House
Committee called for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive refused to give them the
said copies until the negotiation was completed.

JPEPA was the bilateral free trade agreement entered between the Philippine government with Japan,
concerned with trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services,
investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons,
cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the
business environment, and general and final provisions.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to request for the full text of JPEPA.
Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and power to
concur in treaties, from the negotiation process.

Discussion:

Standing

In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a
public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which
possesses the right. As the present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all
suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of
Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the
present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This,
respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of
executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public
disclosure.

“Showing of Need” Test

In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a “sufficient showing of need” only
means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree to
overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a
balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights.

However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been established that the
subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by
merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further
showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no force and
effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies
would be whether an information is a matter of public concern.

Treaty-making power of the President

Petitioners argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since whatever
power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by
delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of
Presidential Decree No. 1464.

The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and
international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes.

As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII – the article
on the Executive Department.

While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the
President only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is
vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into
trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of
a power already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives
accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the
requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties will substantively
conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution.

It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere
in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains
only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a while that has been given the authority to concur as a
means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House
of Representatives fail to present a “sufficient showing of need” that the information sought is critical to the
performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.

Held:

The petition was dismissed.

Petitioner’s demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become moot and academic,
it having been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006. As for their demand for copies of the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied,
respondents claim of executive privilege being valid.

Diplomatic negotiations have, since the Court promulgated its Resolution in PMPF v. Manglapus on September
13, 1988, been recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction and the reasons proffered by petitioners against the
application of the ruling therein to the present case have not persuaded the Court. Moreover, petitioners both
private citizens and members of the House of Representatives have failed to present a sufficient showing of
need to overcome the claim of privilege in this case.

That the privilege was asserted for the first time in respondents Comment to the present petition, and not
during the hearings of the House Special Committee on Globalization, is of no moment, since it cannot be
interpreted as a waiver of the privilege on the part of the Executive branch.

For reasons already explained, this Decision shall not be interpreted as departing from the ruling in Senate v.
Ermita that executive privilege should be invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary by order
of the President.

4) Soliven vs. Makasiar

● While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit. The privilege of
immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of
the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
Facts:

Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if
criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently
have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an
indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be
exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not be held
liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to
proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.

Issues:

(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Held:
(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands
undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a
criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

6) Senate v ermita

FACTS: 

On September 28, 2005, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 464[1]. Effective on the date
of its issuance, the said order aims to (a) ensure the observance of the principle of the separation of powers;
(b) ensure adherence to the rule on executive privilege; and (c) respect the rights of public officials appearing
in inquiries in aid of legislation.

Section 1 of the said order requires all heads of the departments of the Executive Branch to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either the Senate or the House of Representatives. Section
2(a) of the same order enumerates the kind of information covered by executive privilege, while Section 2(b)
lists down the list of officials covered by the order. Finally, Section 3 requires all officials mentioned in Section
2(b) to secure authorization from the President prior to appearing before the Senate or the House of
Representatives. 
Curiously, E.O. 464 was issued at a time when both the Senate and the House of Representatives were
conducting congressional inquiries, to wit: (a) the North Rail Project; (b) the "Hello Garci" wiretapping scandal;
(c) Ginintuang Masaganang Ani fertilizer fund scam; and (d) the Venable contract. With the issuance of E.O.
464, the public officials invited to attend said inquiries were effectively barred from attending without consent
from the President. 

ISSUES: 

1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
2. Whether or not E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
3. Whether or not public officials who invoked E.O. 464 as an excuse not to attend congressional hearings
should be held liable for grave abuse of discretion. 

HELD: 

1. Yes, E.O. 464 frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. But the assailed order is not entirely
unconstitutional. In fact, Section 1 is valid on the ground that it merely stresses the voluntary nature of the
"question hour" as found in Section 22, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, as opposed to "inquiries in aid of
legislation" in Section 21, Art. VI, which are mandatory in nature.

To reiterate, while the concept of question hour and inquiries in aid of legislation are closely related, the two
are not one and the same; attendance to the former is meant to be discretionary while attendance to the
latter is compulsory. 

Section 2(a) of E.O. 464  is likewise valid, it being merely an enumeration of information covered by executive
privilege. 

However, the Court ruled that Sections 2(b) and 3 of the assailed order are void. 

Section 2(b) is unconstitutional because it allows the President to invoke executive privilege based on the
classifications or categories of persons, when in fact such categorization should only apply to information. 

The unconstitutionality of Section 3, on the other hand, is due to the fact that it merely invokes executive
privilege without asserting why. Congress has the right to know why an information is subject to executive
privilege, such that an "implied claim" of executive privilege not accompanied by any specific allegation of the
basis thereof is insufficient.

In its ruling, the Court similarly touched on the concepts of the "power of inquiry" of Congress and what
constitutes "executive privilege."

Under Article 21, Sec. VI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress is vested with the power to "conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation." This power of inquiry is co-extensive with its power to legislate. As such, Congress has the
authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, and the latter cannot put up defenses to
frustrate such power unless the congressional hearings made in the exercise of such power involve infomation
that fall within the rubric of "executive privilege."

According to Schwartz, executive privilege is "the power of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress." It has three varieties: (a) state secrets privilege, which is invoked by US
presidents on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial
military or diplomatic objectives; (b) informer's privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose
the identities of persons who furnish information on violations of law to officers charged with the
enforcement of that law; and (c) generic privilege, for internal deliberations or intragovernmental documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

But not all information covered by executive privilege are considered privileged in all cases (see US v. Nixon re:
Watergate scandal). The Court ruled that while executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof
may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Given
this, the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

FACTS: The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both petitioners,
Brigadier General Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan),
belonged to the Philippine Marines. At the time of the subject incidents, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
were assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City, the former as the PMA Assistant
Superintendent, and the latter as the Assistant Commandant of Cadets.
On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP
to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security (Senate
Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct
of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing
of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as
commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of “Joint Task Force Ranao” by the AFP Southern Command. “Joint
Task Force Ranao” was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in the
provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.
  A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen.
Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee “in spite of
the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an
appearance;” that such directive was “in keeping with the time honored principle of the Chain of Command;”
and that the two officers “disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Articles of War 65 (Willfully Disobeying
Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x xx” Both Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.
            On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464). The OSG notes that the E.O. “enjoined officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
approval.
It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed,
particularly seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners
from testifying before Congress without her prior approval be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges
stated in the charge sheets against petitioners be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga, Col. Galarpe, Col. Roa, and
their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from
proceeding against petitioners, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate on 28 September
2005.
Petitioners characterize the directive from President Arroyo requiring her prior approval before any
AFP personnel appear before Congress as a “gag order,” which violates the principle of separation of powers
in government as it interferes with the investigation of the Senate Committee conducted in aid of legislation.
          Finally, it is stressed in the petition that Gen. Gudani was no longer subject to military jurisdiction on
account of his compulsory retirement on 4 October 2005. It is pointed out that Article 2, Title I of the Articles
of War defines persons subject to military law as “all officers and soldiers in the active service” of the AFP.
ISSUE: Whether or not (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners
from testifying before Congress without her prior approval is constitutional.
Whether or not (2) Gen. Gudani was no longer subject to military jurisdiction on account of his
compulsory retirement. 
RULING:  1. Yes. The order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga, preventing petitioners from
testifying before Congress without her prior approval is constitutional and the petition is denied.
 Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of their
Commander-in-Chief and Commanding General in obeisance to a paramount idea formed within their
consciences, which could not be lightly ignored. Still, the Court, in turn, is guided by the superlative principle
that is the Constitution, the embodiment of the national conscience. The Constitution simply does not permit
the infraction which petitioners have allegedly committed, and moreover, provides for an orderly manner by
which the same result could have been achieved without offending constitutional principles.
Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a
member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial
relief to compel the attendance. Such judicial action should be directed at the heads of the executive branch
or the armed forces, the persons who wield authority and control over the actions of the officers concerned.
The legislative purpose of such testimony, as well as any defenses against the same—whether grounded on
executive privilege, national security or similar concerns—would be accorded due judicial evaluation. All the
constitutional considerations pertinent to either branch of government may be raised, assessed, and
ultimately weighed against each other. And once the courts speak with finality, both branches of government
have no option but to comply with the decision of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their
liking or disfavor.
Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the
legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. [60] This
is the fair and workable solution implicit in the constitutional allocation of powers among the three branches
of government. The judicial filter helps assure that the particularities of each case would ultimately govern,
rather than any overarching principle unduly inclined towards one branch of government at the expense of
the other. The procedure may not move as expeditiously as some may desire, yet it ensures thorough
deliberation of all relevant and cognizable issues before one branch is compelled to yield to the other.
Moreover, judicial review does not preclude the legislative and executive branches from negotiating a
mutually acceptable solution to the impasse. After all, the two branches, exercising as they do functions and
responsibilities that are political in nature, are free to smooth over the thorns in their relationship with a salve
of their own choosing.
      2. General Gudani was still subject to military jurisdiction, despite his compulsory retirement. 
It has further been held, and is now settled law, in regard to military offenders in general, that if the
military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them previous to the date of the termination of their legal
period of service, they may be brought to trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge being
meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly been applied to cases where the offense was committed just
prior to the end of the term. In such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go
unpunished. It is held therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a
discharge is complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him—as by arrest or the
service of charges,—the military jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached may be continued by a trial by
court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of the enlistment of the accused.
 

SECTION 2
POE V. COMELEC
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, 8 March 2016

FACTS:

In 1968, Grace Poe-Llamanzares was born and found as newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and in 1974 she was
legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE aka FPJ and JESUS SONORA POE aka SUSAN ROCES.

In 1991, she immigrated to the US  after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the
US. In 2001,  she then became a naturalized American citizen .

On 13 December 2004, she rushed back to the Philippines due to her father’s deteriorating medical condition,
who then eventually expired. She then decided to quit her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and
the petitioner and her husband have the desire to reside permanently in the Philippines.

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and without delay, secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed,
while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of
their family home there.

On 18 JULY  2006, under RA 9225, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship. She registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006 and secured 
from the DFA a new Philippine Passport.

In 6 October 2010, before assuming her post as Chairperson of the MTRCB , executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a
notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9225. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." On that day, she accomplished a sworn
questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. In
the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the
Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.

On May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared in her COC that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and
that her residence up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted
from May 24, 2005.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC TO DENY or CANCEL her candidacy on the ground particularly among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her
biological parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground
that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her
COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as
candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(a) Whether or not Grace Poe-Llamanzares, a foundling, be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen.

(b) Whether or not Grace Poe-Llamanzare satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

a. YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional
requirement that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency. There is high probability that
Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside
from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99%
probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical
parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstantial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4
of the Rules on Evidence. 

The Supreme Court pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language either to exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.

That FOUNDLINGS are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they
are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

b. YES. GRACE POE-Llamanzares satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements of
ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of
not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon
returning to the Philippines, she presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to
abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

SECTION 4
PIMENTEL V. JOINT COMMITTEE
PIMENTEL v. JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS
SUBJECT: 

FACTS 
Nature of Action: Petition for Prohibition 
PARTIES’ CONTENTION:
Petitioner: 
1. Sen. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee
of Congress to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily
canvass the votes cast for Presidential and VicePresidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following
the adjournment sine die of Congress on June 11, 2004.
 2. He prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from
conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing.
 3. With the adjournment on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress, all its pending matters and proceedings
terminate upon its expiration (citing Section 15, Art. VI of the Constitution).
 Respondent:
 1. The precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the
ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee.

ISSUE Whether or not the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to canvass the votes for
President and Vice-President upon its adjournment is null and void.

HELD: NO
SC RULING: Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did
not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11,
2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress,
but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next
regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time).
Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he term of office of the
Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "[t]he Members of
the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Consequently, there being
no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators
belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence."
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment
of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of
being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened
by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the
newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it
rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has
accomplished its purposes. (Pelayo v. Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 1374, 1385 [1968], citing Bautista v.
Fugoso, 60 Phil. 383, 389 [1934] and Aquino v. Commission on Elections, L-28392, January 29 1968)
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and
proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as
well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing
the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio.
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint
Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public
session of both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special
session.
2) LOPEZ V. SENATE
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence on Canvassing
Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee, composed of members of both houses
FACTS:
On 2 June 2004, Ruy Elias C. Lopez, representative representing the 3rdLegislative District of the City of
Davao, asks this Court to declare unconstitutional the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections,
which the Senate and the House of Representatives, in joint session, approved, after much debate, on 28
May 2004.
Petitioner alleges that the Canvassing Rules was adopted by both Houses of Congress with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy other than this petition. Here quests the Court to issue a temporary restraining order directing
Respondents to cease and desist from implementing, executing, and/or enforcing the Canvassing Rules.
On 4 June 2004, the Court however denied the application for a temporary restraining order, by a vote of
9-4 and required Respondents and the Solicitor General to comment on the petition by 12nn on 7 June 2004.
The Senate, the House of Representatives and the Office of the Solicitor General seasonably filed their
separate comments.
Petitioner contends that the Canvassing Rules are unconstitutional because:
1) It constitutes a delegation of legislative power to a Joint Committee of Congress;
2) It constitutes an amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution;
3) It deprives him of his rights and prerogatives as a Member of Congress; and
4) By the passage of the Canvassing Rules, Congress has neglected to perform an act which the
Constitution specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office
The contested provisions of the Canvassing Rules pertain to the functions of the Joint Committee, as
follows:
“SEC. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate
to be appointed by the President of the Senate and eleven (11) members from the House of Representatives
to be appointed by the Speaker. The Members of Each House panel shall elect from among themselves their
respective Chairman in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in
two division of eleven (11) members each composed of a chairman, five (5) members from the Senate and
five (5) members from the House of Representatives: Provided, that a member of Congress who is a
candidate for President or Vice-President shall not be eligible for appointment to the Joint Committee.
Each division shall be chaired by a Chairman of the Joint Committee.
The Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of candidates for the offices of the President and
Vice-President.

The Representatives of the province or city whose certificate of canvass is being canvassed shall
be an ex officio member of the Joint Committee, without voting rights, for the duration of the canvassing of
the aforesaid certificate of canvass.”
The Solicitor General, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, are similar in that they agree that the
adoption of the Canvassing Rules are internal matters of Congress which is beyond this Court's scope of
judicial inquiry. They are likewise unanimous in their argument that there has been no invalid delegation
to the Joint Committee of the Constitutional duties of Congress.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether or not it constitutes an amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
HELD:
a.) NO. The assailed Rules, and the procedure laid therein, are but an offshoot of legislative practice.
Congress, as a matter of legislative practice, functions by way of delegation towards committees.
The formation of congressional committees arises from plenary power possessed by the legislative
body for all purposes of civil government. The entire House or Senate is too large to conduct basic
functions, such as to conduct investigations in aid of legislation, and thus must always use a
committee. A bill that is filed in Congress is always referred for preliminary consideration to the
particular congressional committee which would have specialized competence to examine the
merits of the proposed law. Yet, while the final report of the congressional committee as to the
proposed bill may have persuasive effect on the body as a whole, it is by no means binding. In
fact, Congress as a whole has the power to revive a bill that has been tabled due to unfavorable
action by the congressional committee.
The procedure outlined in the questioned Rules does not in any way contravene Sec. 4, Article VII
of the Constitution. In fact, it strictly adheres to the provision. Under the Rules, the Senate President
opens the certificates of canvass in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
joint public session. Upon approval by Congress in joint public session of the Joint Committee
report, Congress as one whole body is deemed to have determined the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates and canvassed the certificate of votes.

3) TECSON V. LIM
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly
misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino
citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a
Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may
resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or
"Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates"
for President or Vice-President before the elections.

SECTION 11
ESTRADA V. DASIERTO
FACTS:
Former President Joseph Estrada was elected during 1998 elections. Sometime in October 2000, however,
several allegations of corruption and of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords were made against him
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Some Congressmen moved to impeach Estrada which caused
several sectors, former Presidents Aquino and Ramos to call for Estrada’s resignation. Some senior advisers of
Estrada as well as a number of his cabinet resigned from their positions. Impeachment trial commenced with
Chief Justice Davide presiding.
The impeachment trial was put to a halt after the public prosecutors tendered their collective resignation
before the Impeachment Tribunal caused by the decision of 11 Senators not to open the second envelope (an
alleged secret account of Erap amounting to 3.3B Pesos in the name of Jose Velarde). An indefinite
postponement of the Impeachment proceedings was granted by the Chief Justice.
The next day, EDSA 2 commenced with the PNP and AFP joining the crowd. In the succeeding days, a chain of
resignations from the military, the police, and the cabinet ensued. On January 20, Supreme Court declared the
seat for presidency as vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post.” At noon, Chief Justice,
whose authority was later unanimously confirmed by SC, administered the oath to Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. That same afternoon, Estrada and his family left Malacañang and transmitted a signed letter
appointing then Vice-President Arroyo as Acting President, citing Section 11, Article 7 of the Constitution, to
the House Speaker and Senate President.
Several cases were filed against Estrada in the Office of the Ombudsman. Estrada filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for prohibition which sought to enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him, not until his term as president ends. He also filed a petition for quo warranto praying
for judgment confirming him to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Philippines “temporarily unable
to discharge the duties of his office.”
RULINGS:
Political Question/Justiciable Controversy
1. The Court held that the cases at bar do not involve a political question and therefore falls within the ambit
of judicial scrutiny pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers of coordinate branches of government.
2. Political question refers to those questions which, under our Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government. It is concerned with the issues dependent on the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure.
3. To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.
EDSA 1 vs EDSA 2
4. EDSA People Power I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government while EDSA People Power II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.
5. EDSA I is extra constitutional but EDSA II is intra
6. EDSA I presented a political question constitutional . while EDSA II involved legal questions Resignation .
7. Using the totality test, the Supreme Court held that petitioner resigned as President – which was confirmed
by his leaving Malacañang.
8. Facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacanang
Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after
January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
9. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) He acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) He emphasized he was leaving the
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-
assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) He expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the
people as President; (4) He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in
the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) He called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
10. Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: (1) there must be an intent to resign
and (2) the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long
as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
11. A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time
he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such
resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him
. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
Recognition of Presidency of Arroyo
12. The issue whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of former
President Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing Arroyo as
President is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat—it is a political issue
which cannot be decided by the Supreme Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
13. Implicitly clear in the recognition by both houses of Congress of Arroyo as President is the premise that the
inability of former President Estrada is no longer temporary.
14. Former President Estrada cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily since such claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
President Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court.
Conviction by Impeachment as a Bar to Prosecution
15. The Supreme Court rejects former President Estrada’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the
reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His impeachment trial was aborted by
the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7,
2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus
Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he
should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted The plea if granted, would put a
perpetual bar against his prosecution. It will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who
has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution.
Presidential Immunity from Suit
16. Estrada does NOT enjoy immunity from suit. Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit being brought to
court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond with the ruling in In Re: Saturnino
Bermudez.
17. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character (plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption). Estrada cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not
acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
other trespasser .
Public Office is a Public Trust
18. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. It declared as a
state policy that “(t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.” It ordained that “(p)ublic officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.” It set the rule that “(t)he right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.” It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an
anti-graft court. It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which
is to “(investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.”
The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.
Theory of Derivative Prejudice
19. The Court cannot adopt former President Estrada’s prejudice of the Ombudsman flows to his subordinates.
theory of derivative prejudice , i.e., that the 20. Our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure give investigating
prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by
their superiors. They can be reversed but they cannot be compelled to change their recommendations nor can
they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating
prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman
resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and petitioner believes that the finding of probable cause
against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

SECTION 13
CLU V. EXEC SECRETARY
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of EO 284 which ostensibly restricted the number of positions that
Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries and other appointive officials may hold in
addition to their primary position but in effect allowed them to hold multiple positions contrary to Art VII, Sec
13 of the Constitution.* In averring that EO 284 creates an exception to the rule in Art VII, Sec 13, respondents
contend that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in the Constitution” in said section makes reference to Art
IX-B, sec 7(2)** insofar as appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
ISSUE:
Does the prohibition in Art VII, Sec 13 of the Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general
under Art IX-B, Sec 7(2) of the same?
RULING:
NO. Art IX-B, sec 7(2) is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to appointive public officials, while Art
VII, Sec 13 is meant to be the exception applicable particularly to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet
Members, their deputies and assistants.*** Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution. EO 284 is thus null and void as it is repugnant to Art VII, sec 13. It was noted,
however, that the prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment by the Pres., VP, Cabinet
members, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure (provided in Sec 13, Art VII) does not
comprehend additional duties and functions required by the primary functions of the officials concerned who
are to perform them in an ex officio capacity**** as provided by law.

* The pertinent provision of the assailed EO read: “Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his
position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations”
** [Civil Service Commission] Art IX-B, sec 7(2): Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries
*** In the case at bar, there seemed to be a contradiction between Art IX-B, sec 7 and Art VII, sec 13 of the
Constitution. One section is not to be allowed to defeat another if by any reasonable construction the two can
be made to stand together. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition
on the President and his official family insofar as holding other offices or employment in the govt or elsewhere
is concerned. If the contention of the respondents is adopted, the aforestated intent of the framers would be
rendered nugatory. It must therefore be departed from (Civil Liberties Union v. Exec Sec, 194 SCRA 317)
**** “Ex-officio.” – means “from office; by virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position.” Also denotes an “act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any
other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.” An ex-officio member of a board is one
who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To
illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the exofficio
Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority. The ex-officio
position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is
that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. For
such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a
per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is
designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. (Ibid.)

DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, GR No. 184740, 2010-02-11

Facts:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista
was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as
DOTC Undersecretary
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista's appointment/designation, which is proscribed by
the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment
Issues:
Petitioner argues that Bautista's concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
He points out that while it was clarified in Civil Liberties Union that the prohibition does not apply to those...
positions held in ex-officio capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the post of
DOTC Undersecretary
The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment naming her as OIC of MARINA shows that she does not
occupy it in an ex-officio capacity since an ex-officio position does not require any "further warrant or appoint.
Petitioner further contends that even if Bautista's appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA was intended
to be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition
Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility between the posts of DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA
Administrator... respondents submit that the petition should still be dismissed for being unmeritorious
considering that Bautista's concurrent designation as MARINA OIC and DOTC Undersecretary was...
constitutional. There was no violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution because respondent
Bautista was merely designated acting head of MARINA on September 1, 2008. She was designated MARINA
OIC, not appointed MARINA Administrator.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA,
concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been
appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple... offices for Cabinet Members and
their deputies and assistants.
Ruling:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of... the armed forces, are proof of the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon
said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and... assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
multiple offices or employment in the government during... their tenure, the exception to this prohibition
must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it
must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding
multiple... government offices or employment.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section
7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another... office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the
position.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is... hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
Principles:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure,... directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including... government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or... their subsidiaries.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is
to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment
results in security of tenure for the... person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature
of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution,
three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that... appointment is essentially executive while designation
is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where
the person is merely designated and not appointed, the... implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the...
person named

SECTION 15
G.R. No. 191002
April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL -
ARROYO, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:

Relevant Subjects/Doctrines:

The ban on making presidential appointments around the time of

presidential elections in Section 15 is confined to appointments in the
Executive Department. It does NOT extend to the Judiciary. The filling of a
vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period prescribed by Section 4 (1), Article VIII
was made a true mandate for the President.

FACTS:
Seven days after the presidential election, Chief Justice Puno is set to retire on 17 May
2010. On January 2010, the JBC begun to take applications for the position of Chief
Justice. However, objections arose to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo during
appointment of Chief Justice Puno’s successor.
The petitions were filed questioning her authority to appoint a new Chief Justice while
there is ban imposed on presidential appointments two months immediately before
the next presidential elections up to the end of the President’s term under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution. This view however seemingly conflicts with Section 4(1),
Article VIII which provides that any vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy, and Section 9, Article VIII which provides that
the President shall issue appointments to the Judiciary within 90 days from submission
by the JBC of the list of nominees.
It is argued that there is no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the
prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno because as there will still be
about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4 (1), Article VIII remaining (the
period that remains of the 90 days counted from Chief Justice Puno’s retirement after
the end of GMA’s term).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on making presidential appointments under Section 15, Article
VII extend to appointments to fill vacancies in the SC or the Judiciary.

HELD:

NO. The appointment under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to
fill vacancies in SC or the Judiciary.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII
as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.

SECTION 16
GR No. 164978 
October 13, 2005 
Aquilino Pimentel, et al, Petitioners, v. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al, Respondents 

Relevant Subjects/Doctrines: Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly  against the
legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint  is limited to the power to
prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint  a person to an office in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress  impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office. 

Facts: 

1. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of  preliminary injunction to
declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria  Macapagal-Arroyo of the following officials: 
∙ Executive Secretary EEduardo R. Ermita; 
∙ Florencio R. Abad; 
∙ Avelino J. Cruz, Jr; 
∙ Michael T. Defensor; 
∙ Joseph H. Durano; 
∙ Raul M. Gonzalez; 
∙ Alberto G. Romulo; 
∙ Rene C. Villa; and 
∙ Arthur C. Yap 
2. These officials were declared as acting secretaries of their respective Departments. 3. The Senate and the House
of Representatives ("Congress") commenced their regular session on  26 July 2004. 
4. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted  on 25 August 2004. 
5. Meanwhile, the above-mentioned officials were appointed as acting secretaries on August 23,  2004 with the
exception of Arthur C. Yap who was appointed on August 15, 2004. 6. On September 22, 2004, the Congress
adjourned. 
7. The following day, September 23, 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to the   above officials as
secretaries of their respective Departments to which they were previously  appointed in an acting capacity. 
8. Hence, this petition. 
9. Petitioners’ and respondents’ arguments were in sharp contrast: 
∙ Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as  acting secretaries
because "in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an  Undersecretary who can be
designated as Acting Secretary.” Petitioners base their  argument on Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292 ("EO  292"), which enumerates the powers and duties of the undersecretary.
Petitioners  further assert that "while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether  regular
or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the  Commission on Appointments,
without first having obtained its consent." 
ON THE OTHER HAND:
∙ Respondents maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity  to department
secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments  even while Congress is in session.
Respondents point to Section 16, Article VII of the  1987 Constitution. 

Issue: 
1. Whether or not the appointment of the above-mentioned officials by President Arroyo as acting   secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in  session is unconstitutional. 

Resolution: 

1. No. 

On the Power to Appoint 

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere  with the exercise
of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution  expressly allows it to interfere.
Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed  strictly against the legislature. The scope of the
legislature’s interference in the executive’s  power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office.  Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that  office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular
person  to an office. 

Appointment in an Acting Capacity 

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap  measure intended
to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent  occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President,  such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter  ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could  assume office. 

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a  department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must  necessarily have the
President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a  department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice  even while Congress is in session. That person may or may
not be the permanent appointee, but  practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will
also be the permanent  appointee. 

Ad Interim Appointments vs. Appointments in an Acting Capacity 

Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only   during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a  vacancy. Moreover ad-interim
appointments are submitted to the Commission on  Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the  Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important 
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the  Commission on
Appointments. 

There was no abuse in the case based on the fact that President Arroyo issued the ad interim   appointments
immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. 

The petition was DISMISSED.

Sarmiento III v. Mison 

G.R. No. L-79974. December 17, 1987. 
Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, petitioners 
Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, and Guillermo Carague as 
Secretary of Department of Budget, respondents. 

Ponente: J. Teodoro Padilla 

DOCTRINES 

 Power to Appoint; Commission on Appointments 

1. Under the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers is to exclude  presidential
appointments from confirmation on the Commission on Appointments except  appointments to
offices mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Article VII.  

2. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the  word
"alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the   appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the   heads of departments,
because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President)  may be authorized by law to
appoint is already vested in the President, without need of  confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same  Sec. 16, Article VII. 

3. The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of  those within
the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.
As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935  Constitution includes "heads of bureaus"
among those officers whose appointments need  the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand,  deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus"
from appointments that need the  consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. 

FACTS 
Petitioners Ulpiano Sarmiento III (Sarmiento III) and Juanito Arcilla (Arcilla) sought to enjoin  
respondents Salvador Mison (Mison), from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner  of
the Bureau of Customs, and Guillermo Carague (Carague) as Secretary of Department of  Budget, from
effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments on the  ground that Mison’s
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs was  unconstitutional because it was not
confirmed by the Commission of Appointments (COA). 

Mison and Carague, on the other hand, maintained that Mison’s appointment was  constitutional
even without the confirmation of the COA.  

ISSUE 
Whether or not Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is 
unconstitutional given that his appointment was without confirmation of the COA.
HELD 
NO. The Court ruled that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional 
authority and power in appointing respondent Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,  
without submitting his nomination to the COA for confirmation. 

Apparent in the provision of the 1987 Constitution under Article VII, Section 16, that there  are
four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint: 
 First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, 
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose 
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise  provided
for by law; 
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; 
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the 
President alone. 

By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express  
enumeration of subject excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those   appointments
to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of   the COA. It is not
difficult to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting  it, struck a “middle
ground” by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the COA for the first group  of appointments, and
leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other  officers, i.e., those in the
second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers  of lower rank. 

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, a bureau head, is not
one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on 
Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of “heads of 
bureaus” from appointments that needed the consent (confirmation) of the COA.  

Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the 
Bureau of Customs. Section 601 of Republic Act (RA) No. 1937, as amended by Presidential  Decree (PD)
No. 34, provides that: x x x x “The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of  Customs shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines.” 

While these laws (RA No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of the  1935
Constitution, these have to be read in harmony with Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,  with the
result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one  that devolves
on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such   appointment, however, no
longer needs the confirmation of the COA. 

Hence, the President’s appointment to respondent Mison, absent of the COA’s confirmation,  is
constitutional. Petition and petition in intervention dismissed. JALAV

G.R. No. 106677 July 23, 1993 

HERMOGENES P. POBRE, petitioner, 
vs. 
MARIANO E. MENDIETA and HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, respondents. 

G.R. No. L-106696 July 23, 1993 

HERMOGENES P. POBRE, petitioner, 
vs. 
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Manila and MARIANO A.
MENDIETA, respondents. 

Doctrine: 
Sec. 16 of Art. VII empowers the President to appoint "those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint." The law
that authorizes him to appoint the PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners, is P.D. 223, Section 2.. 

Facts: 

1. On January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. 

At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta (private respondent) was the senior Associate Commissioner and
Hermogenes P. Pobre (petitioner) was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC. 

2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, as amended, provides: 

Sec. 2. Composition. — The Commission shall be headed by one full time Commissioner and two full time Associate
Commissioners, all to be appointed by the President for a term of nine (9) years without reappointment to start from
the time they assume the office, except the first two Associate Commissioners who shall be appointed, one for six (6)
years and the other for three (3) years, and thereafter, any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired
term only with the most senior of the Associate Commissioner succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his
term, resignation or removal. No person shall be appointed chairman or member of the Commission unless he is at least
forty (40) years of age, familiar with the principles and methods of professional regulation and/or licensing and has at
least five (5) years of executive or managerial experience. 

3. On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed petitioner Pobre, then an Associate Commissioner, as
the PRC Commissioner/ Chairman. He took his oath of office on February 17, 1992. 

4. Private respondent, Mariano A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a petition against the
appointment of Pobre stating that under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, he (Mendieta), as the senior Associate
Commissioner, was legally entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC.
5. Mendieta filed a petition for quo warranto contesting Pobre's appointment as chairman of the PRC because he
(Mendieta) allegedly succeeded Francia as PRC Chairman by operation of law. 

6. On August 5, 1992 Judge Somera rendered a decision in favor of Mendieta. 

7. On August 19, 1992, Judge Somera issued a writ of prohibitory injunction directing the Deputy Sheriff of Manila to
stop Pobre from discharging the functions and duties of the Chairman/Commissioner of the PRC, and from enjoying
the rights and privileges of that office. 

8. Hence, this petition. 

Issue: 

Whether or not the appointment of Hermogenes Pobre as the PRC Chair is lawful and valid. (YES) 

Ruling: 

Section 10, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution was modified by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides: 

Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers' lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. 

This provision empowers the President to appoint "those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint." The law that
authorizes him to appoint the PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners, is P.D. 223, Section 2, which provides
that the Commissioner and Associate Commissioners of the PRC are "all to be appointed by the President for a term of
nine (9) years, without reappointment, to start from the time they assume office . . . . 

The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate
Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or by "operation of law" for that would deprive the President of his power
to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners — "all to be appointed by the President" under P.D.
No. 223. 

In view of our ruling that said provision of P.D. 223 applies only to the unexpired term of the Chairman/Commissioner,
the underlined clause: "at the expiration of his term, resignation or
removal" can not possibly refer to the Chairman/Commissioner for it would contradict the first clause providing that he
will be succeeded by the senior Associate Commissioner "for the unexpired portion of his term only." There can be no
more "unexpired term" to speak of if the Chairman stepped down "at the expiration of his term." 

Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/Commissioner to succeed Julio B. Francia, Jr. at the expiration
of his term did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 223 and in fact conforms with the Chief Executive's interpretation
and implementation of the law, the legality of said appointment should be upheld. 

The petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The appointment of petitioner Hermogenes P. Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman
of the Professional Regulation Commission is declared lawful and in order.

Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104743, June 22, 1993

G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and
MANUEL P. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON, respondents.
Isagani M. Jungco, Valeriano S. Peralta, Miguel Famularcano, Jr. and Virgilio E. Acierto for petitioners.

SUBJECTS:
Section 16. Power to Appoint; Commission on Appointments.
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may,
by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227,1 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the
Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer
of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this
Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority (emphasis supplied).
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The petition was stemmed on the appointment of Incumbent-Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City as
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) in accordance to Sec.
13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227,1 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, which
reads;
(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the
Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer
of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this
Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority (emphasis supplied).
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and
members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the
proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following constitutional and
statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official
shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his
tenure,"3 because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public
offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint",4 since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the
President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts;5 and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election
Code

ISSUES:
Whether or not the appointment of Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City as Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) in accordance to Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227 is constitutional.

Whether or not Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution applies to the appointment of Mayor Richard J. Gordon of
Olongapo City as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).
RULING: NO
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, "(t)he basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a
local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constituents.
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of
Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA).
Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the
fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is
of no moment.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec.
7, Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive
official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more
stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official
to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as
head of the economic and planning agency;9 the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the
Cabinet; 10 and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council.
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his
incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.
WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . . Provided, however, That for the
first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed
as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional; consequently,
the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID,
hence NULL and VOID.

what the law excludes it does not include

Calderon v. Carale GR No. 91636, 208 SCRA 254 [Apr 23, 1992] 

FACTS: 
Pursuant to RA 6715155 which amended Art 215 of the Labor Code, Pres. Aquino appointed the Chairman and
Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) representing the public workers and
employers sectors. This petition questions the legality of said permanent appointments on the ground that the
same were not submitted for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (CA). 
ISSUE: 
Is confirmation by CA required for the appointments of Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC? 

HELD:
No. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence (and not the first
which alone requires confirmation by CA) of Sec 16, Art VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the
“third group” of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. Furthermore, Art 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the
confirmation by CA of appointments of the Chairman and members of the NLRC is hereby declared
unconstitutional for amending by legislation Art VII, Sec 16. It added appointments to those enumerated in the
first sentence (of said Sec. 16) which require confirmation by CA and it imposed the confirmation of CA on
appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President as set forth in the second sentence.

SECTION 17

Case Digest: Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Jose Paño, et. al.
G.R. No. L-27811  ::             27 November 1967            
Sanchez, J.

FACTS:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in
Davao.  On 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the above public land to the
plaintiff.  On 1954, the same was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared
agricultural land.  On 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of
the released area.  Plaintiff in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area.  The
Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on 1956 giving due course to
the application of plaintiff corporation.  When the case was elevated to the President of the Philippines,
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the president, declared that it would be for public interest that
appellants, who are mostly landless farmers, be allocated that portion on which the petitioner have made
improvements.

ISSUES:

May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands
that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources?

HELD:

YES.  The President’s duty to execute the law and control of all executive departments are of constitutional
origin.  Naturally, he controls and directs their acts.  Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or
reverse the action taken by his department secretaries.  It may also be stated that the right to appeal to the
President reposes upon the President’s power of control over the executive departments.  He may delegate to
his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person.  As the
Executive Secretary acts by authority of the President, his decision is that of the President’s.  Such decision is
to be given full faith and credit by our courts, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.

ANG ANGCO VS CASTILLO

Facts:The Pepsi-Cola Co. requestedfor the withdrawal of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not covered by
any Central Bank release certificate.Its counselsapproached Collector of Customs Ang-Angco to securethe
immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel tosecure the release certificate from the No-
Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Officewrote a letterto Ang-Angco whichstated that his office had
no objection to the release of the concentrates but could not take action on the request as it was not in their
jurisdiction.Ang-Angco telephonedthe Secretary of Finance who expressed his approval of the release on the
basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco finally releasedthe concentrates.When Commissioner of Customs
learned of the release he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of CustomsAng-Angco.For three
years Ang-Angco had been discharging the duties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority
of the President, rendered his judgment against the petitioner.Issue:Whether the President is empowered to
remove officers and employees in the classified civil service.Previous History:Secretary Castillo assertedthat
the President virtue of his power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, can take
direct action and dispose of the administrative case in subordinate officers of the executive branch of the
government.Holding:The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the classified
civil service.Reasoning: It is clear that under the present provision of theCivil Service Act of 1959, the case of
petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been
deprived of the procedure laid down in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be
said that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.The Power of control of the President
may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the
executive department if they are presidential appointees but not with regard to those officers or employees
who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with
the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vestthe appointment of the
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3],
Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments,
Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional
authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.Significance:It well established in this case that it is
contrary to law to take direct action on the administrative case of an employee under classified service even
with the authority of the Presidentwithoutsubmitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service.

Ruben Villaluz vs Calixto Zaldivar (G.R. No. L-22754)

Posted: August 10, 2011 in Case Digests, Political Law
0
Control Power – Removal Power – Appointees
FACTS: Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In 1960,
Congressman Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government.
He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. The Exec Sec suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate
the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that she be removed. The president then issued an AO
removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering that he is
an appointee of the president.
HELD: The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential
appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of RA 2260; being a
presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and
as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the
Philippines under the principle that “the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” . There is some
point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate,
suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential
appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the
power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who
belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the
provision of our Constitution which says that `the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.

Joson vs. Torres.Decision | May 20, 1998 | G.R. No. 131255 | PunoGROUP: 2DIGEST MAKER:
DungoSUMMARY: Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. The
case was endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared
in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension. Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct
Formal Investigation”. DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position papers substantially
complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings. Later, the Executive
Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary.The
former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay. The SC
held that the resolution of the Department Secretary was valid. DOCTRINE: Under the doctrine of qualified
political agency “...which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive.”FACTS:Sept. 17, 1996 – Private Respondents filed with the Office of the
President a letter- complaint charging the Petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority for
allegedly barging into the session hall of the provincial capitol for a session of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.oPetitioner kicked the door and chairs of the Hall and threatened them, and he was
accompanied by several men with firearmsoRespondents claim this was an offshoot their resistance to a
pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150
from PNBPresident Ramos acted on the complaint by noting that the use of force and intimidation was not
justidied and instructed the Secretary of SILG Barbers to take appropriate preventive and investigative actions.
Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against himand attached to the notice a copy of the
complaint and its annexes and directed Petitioner to submit his verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion
to dismiss, together with such documentary evidence that he has in support thereof, within fifteen 15 days
from receipt.oBarbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and private respondents to a
conference to settle the controversy, and they agreed that petitioner promised to maintain peace and order in
the province while private respondents promised to refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect their
peaceful co-existence. The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private respondents
reiterated their letter-complaint and Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer. Petitioner received a
copy of this order on November 13, 1996. On the same day, petitioner requested for an extension of thirty
(30) days to submit his answer, which was granted by the Director of the DILG.Petitioner moved for another
extension of 30 days on Dec. 9, 1996 and was granted until Jan. 30.He requested another 30 day extension
on Jan. 7, 1997 and was granted one last time until Jan. 23, 1997.The DILG also informed himthat his "failure
to submit answer will be considered a waiver and thatthe plaintiff [shall] be allowed to present his evidenceex
parte." Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. Three months later, Undersecretary Manuel
Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in default and to have waived
his right to present evidence. Private respondents were ordered to present their evidenceex-parte.
Undersecretary gave him one last chance and gave him 15 days to file an answer.
On June 23, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez issued an order stating that petitioner's counsel, whose office is in
Manila, should have received a copy of the May 19, 1997 order ten days after mailing on May 27, 1997. Since
petitioner still failed to file his answer, he was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence in his
behalf. Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated the order of default and directed private respondents to present
their evidenceex-parteon July 15, 1997On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive
suspension for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him.Secretary Barbers directed the
Philippine National Police to assist in the implementation of the order of preventive suspension. Petitioner
filed a petition in the CA challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of default. On August
20, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez issued an order denying petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss" and " UrgentEx-
ParteMotion for Reconsideration” and required the parties to submit their position papers within an
inextendible period of ten days from receipt after which the case shall be deemed submitted for
resolutionAugust 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the DILG a "Motion to Lift Orderof Preventive Suspension”
followd with a Motion to Lift Default Order and Admit AnswerAd Cautelam." Attached to the motion was the
"AnswerAd Cautelam". and sworn statements of his witnesses. The Private Respondents manifested that
they were submitting the case for decision based on the records, the complaint and affidavits of their
witnesses. In his AnswerAd Cautelam, Petitioner claimed that there was nothing in his conduct that
threatened the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm to the employees. He said that like
Vice-Governor Tinio, he was always accompanied by his official security escorts whenever he reported for
work. He also alleged that the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez was false.
Escombien was purportedly not inside the session hall during the incident but was at her desk at the office and
could not in any way have seen petitioner in the hall. On September 11, 1997, petitioner filed an "Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of August 20, 1997 denying his motion to dismiss. The "Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration" was rejected by Undersecretary Sanchez on October 8, 1997. Undesecretary
Sanchez, however, granted the "Motion to Lift Default Order and to Admit AnswerAd Cautelam" and admitted
the "AnswerAd Cautelam" as petitioner's position paper pursuant to the order of August 20, 1997.On
October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a "Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation." Petitioner prayed that a formal
investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23; and that this be held at the province of Nueva Ecija. On October 29,
1997, petitioner submitted a "Manifestation and Motion" before the DILG reiterating his right to a formal
investigationIn the meantime, on October 24, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:1.WON Preventive Suspension is Proper? – YES Preventive suspension may be imposed by
the Disciplining Authority atany time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt isstrong;
and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold
office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct.The allegations of complainants
are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.Respondent whois
the chief executive of the province is in a position to influence the witnesses.Further, the history of violent
confrontational politics in the province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.2.WON
Procedural Due Process is Violated? – YESThe rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied
him procedural due process.Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference,
theInvestigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal
investigation.This
provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation
would be conducted.The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. There is
nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that
provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position
papers.A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.3.WON the resolution of DILG Secretary is
invalid on the ground of undue delegation? – NOThe DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the
Disciplining Authority.What isdelegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to
discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the
power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials.A. O.
No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as
maybe constituted by the Disciplining Authority.This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s
claim.Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “...which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads
of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”This doctrine is corollary to
the control power of the President provided in the Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart of the
power of the presidency.As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of
his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally.The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf
of the President in certainmatters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and
supervisory) powers personally all the time.Each head of a department is, and must be, the President’salter
egoin the matters ofthat department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.RULING: IN
VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of January 8, 1998 of the public respondentExecutive Secretary is declared
null and void and is set aside. No Cost.SO ORDERED.
Drilon v. Lim 
G.R. No. 112497
August 4, 1994

Power of Control 
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Distinction between Control and Supervision

- Control is “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.”
- While the supervision is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law." 

FACTS: 
-PETITIONER Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Secretary of Justice, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as
the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment
of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
Defense of City of Manila
(1) That the procedural requirements had been observed
(2) That Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary
of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy and the
President’s sole power of supervision over local governments (Sec. 17)
RTC’s Decision
 Judge Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it
empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them.
 That the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as
vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines in violation of Art. X, Sec. 4 and 5.
 Thus, RTC revoked the Drilon's resolution and sustained the ordinance. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional. 
Sec. 187 Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory
Public Hearings. - The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending
the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day
period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

HELD:
 The Supreme Court held that the lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision.
 All Drilon did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their
functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax
 ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see
it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
 WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial
Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its
finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been
observed.

Ocampo vs. Enriquez

FACTS:  

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R.  Duterte publicly
announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E.  Marcos at the LIbingan Ng Mga Bayani
(LNMB). 

 In compliance to the verbal order of President Duterte to implement his election campaign  promise to have the
remains of the late President Ferdinand Marcos be interred at the LNMB,  Secretary of National Defense Delfin N.
Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to Chief of Staff of  the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R.
Visaya, regarding the interment  of Marcos at the LNMB. 

Rear Admiral Ernesto Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army (PA) regarding the  funeral honors and
service for the Former President Ferdinand Marcos. 

Dissatisfied with the issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, and  Petition for
Mandamus. and Prohibition with the Court. 

ISSUE: Whether or Not the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral  committed grave abuse
of discretion , amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when they  issued the assailed memorandum and directive in
compliance with the verbal order of  President Duterte to implement his election campaign promiser to have the
remains of Marcos  interred at the LNMB. 
RULING:  

NO. The respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion.  

There is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of discretion  amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its  authority to check and override an act entrusted to
the judgement of another branch.  At bar, President Duterte through the public respondents, acted within the bounds of
law and  jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocate, the Court must uphold what  is legal and just
. And that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place at the LNMB. For even the  Framers of our Constitution intend that
full respect for human rights is available at any stage of  of a person’s development, from the time he or she becomes a
person to the time he or she  leaves this earth. 

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law  or jurisprudence or (2)
executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice,ill will or  personal bias. NONE is present in this case. 

The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is  empowered to
administer,develop, and maintain military shrines is under the supervision and  control of the DND. The DND, in turn
is under the Office of the President.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self- executing   provision of the
Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may it exercise  be limited, much less withdrawn, by
the legislature. 

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use  and for specific public
purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved  land shall remain subject to the specific purpose
indicated until otherwise provided by law or  proclamation. 

The second sentence of Section 17 of article VII ( The President shall have control of all  executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed) is likewise not violated by public respondents.
Being the Chief Executive, the  President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced
by the  officials and employees of his or her department. Under the Faithful Execution Clause ( “I do  solemnly swear
that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President of the  Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man,  and consecrate myself to the service of the nation”) the
President has the power to take  necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. The mandate is self-
executory by  virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive 
functions. It is best construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The  provision simply
underscores the rule of law and, corrolarily the cardinal principle that the  President is not above the law but is obliged
to obey and execute them.

SECTION 18
JAMAR M. KULAYAN vs GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN 
G.R. No. 187298 

FACTS: 

On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were   kidnapped in the
vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.1 Andres Notter, a Swiss national and  head of the ICRC in Zamboanga
City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean  Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were purportedly
inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu  Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for
the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were  seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The  leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu
Provincial Jail.  News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.  

On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which  then
organized a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis Committee. The local group, later renamed  Sulu Crisis
Management Committee, convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail  Tan, the Provincial Governor
of Sulu. Its armed forces component was headed by respondents General  Juancho Saban, and his deputy, Colonel
Eugenio Clemen. The PNP component was headed by respondent  Police Superintendent Bienvenido G. Latag, the Police
Deputy Director for Operations of the Autonomous  Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from  different
municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. The organization of the  CEF was embodied in a
"Memorandum of Understanding"6 entered into between three parties: the  provincial government of Sulu,
represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines,  represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine
National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The  Whereas clauses of the Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary
situation in Sulu, and the willingness  of civilian supporters of the municipal mayors to offer their services in order that
"the early and safe  rescue of the hostages may be achieved. 

Meanwhile, Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government,  announced to the
media that government troops had cornered some one hundred and twenty (120) Abu   Sayyaf members along with the
three (3) hostages.9 However, the ASG made contact with the authorities  and demanded that the military pull its troops
back from the jungle area.10 The government troops  yielded and went back to their barracks; the Philippine Marines
withdrew to their camp, while police and  civilian forces pulled back from the terrorists’ stronghold by ten (10) to fifteen
(15) kilometers.  Threatening that one of the hostages will be beheaded, the ASG further demanded the evacuation of
the  military camps and bases in the different barangays in Jolo. The authorities were given no later than 2:00   o’clock in
the afternoon of 31 March 2009 to comply. 

On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring  a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu.13 It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said  declaration, describing it
as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked   Section 465 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor  the power to carry out emergency measures
during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and  to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.
In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and   chokepoints,
conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure  public safety. 

On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent P/SUPT.  Julasirim Kasim.
Upon arriving at the police station, he was booked, and interviewed about his relationship   to Musin, Jaiton, and
Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting that he was indeed   related to the three, he was detained.
After a few hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, Hadji  Hadjirul Bambra, Abdugajir Hadjirul, as well as PO2
Marcial Hajan, SPO3 Muhilmi Ismula, Punong Barangay  Alano Mohammad and jeepney driver Abduhadi Sabdani, were
also arrested. The affidavit of the  apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected ASG supporters and were
being arrested under  Proclamation 1-09. The following day, 2 April 2009, the hostage Mary Jane Lacaba was released by
the  ASG. 

On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi,   and SPO1 Sattal
H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and  Prohibition, claiming that Proclamation
1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack  or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987  Constitution.  

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and  thus null and
void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the  President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of  the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. Additionally, petitioners claim that the  Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed
forces under his command, nor  regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army. 

The respondents contended that petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts when they filed   the instant
petition directly in the court of last resort, even if both the Court of Appeals (CA) and the   Regional Trial Courts (RTC)
possessed concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court under Rule 65. 

On the substantive issues, respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires, as Governor   Tan allegedly
acted pursuant to Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government Code, which empowers the  Provincial Governor to
carry out emergency measures during calamities and disasters, and to call upon  the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion  or sedition. Furthermore, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Sulu authorized the declaration of a state of  emergency as evidenced by Resolution No. 4, Series of
2009 issued on 31 March 2009 during its regular  session. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code authorizes the   respondent
governor to declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under  Proclamation 1-09, specifically
the conduct of general searches and seizures.
HELD: 
No. The Court granted the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, claiming that Proclamation 1-09 and its   Implementing Guidelines
were issued ultra vires (acting beyond one’s legal power and authority), and thus null and  void. 

On the respondents’ contention that the petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts, the Court held that  the instant
case stemmed from a petition for certiorari and prohibition, over which the Supreme Court possesses   original jurisdiction. More
crucially, this case involves acts of a public official which pertain to restrictive custody,  and is thus impressed with transcendental
public importance that would warrant the relaxation of the general rule.  The Court would be remiss in its constitutional duties were
it to dismiss the present petition solely due to claims of  judicial hierarchy. Furthermore, it stated that there was no question that
the issues raised affect the public interest,  involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and
of the press. Moreover, the  Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. 

On the respondents’ denial that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires, the Court ruled that only the President is   vested with
calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic. It has already been established that there   is one repository of
executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1,  Article VII of the Constitution speaks of
executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily,  it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized
to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23,  Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the
calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII  thereof. 

The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one president. Springing   from the well-
entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by   their very nature, may only be
performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives  is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers
to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The President’s  Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by
the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second  paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution. Indeed, while the
President is still a civilian, Article II, Section  339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military, making the civilian  president the nation’s supreme military leader. 

The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President. Given the foregoing,   respondent provincial
governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In   issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and  called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his
own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers  contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the  local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section
465 of the Local Government  Code. 

The Court mentioned that in fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the   martial law powers
of the President, because as the Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial law does not   suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies,  nor authorize the conferment of the
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are  able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ." 

The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National   Government,
especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of  security and defense. 

The Court found, and so held, that there was nothing in the said Code which justified and authorized the acts  sanctioned by the
respondents under the said Proclamation.

SECTION 19

TRINIDAD vs. PP.

FACTS:

Grace San Diego had been the accountant of Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) from
January 1993 to March 11, 1997.

Consequently, the RTC rendered a Decision dated August 20, 2001, finding petitioner Grace San Diego guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing findings, the Court hereby finds accused GRACE SAN DIEGO y TRINIDAD
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT as defined and penalized under Article 310,
in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and accordingly, sentences her to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty years without pardon before the lapse of 40 years and with the
accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the Obando
Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., in the amount of Php6,016,084.26.

SO ORDERED.9

Due to the nature of the judgment, petitioner filed her appeal with this Court. However, in accordance with
the ruling in People v. Mateo,10 the appeal was transmitted to the CA for intermediate review. The CA then
affirmed the decision of the RTC, with modification that she indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. in the amount of Php2,080,000.00. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court appealed from which found accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that she is to indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. in the
amount of Php 2,080,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

ISSUE: won rtc can impose reclusion perpetua without pardon.

Unlike in Simple Theft where the maximum penalty cannot exceed twenty (20) years, in Qualified Theft such
limitation does not exist.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, inasmuch as the penalty imposable in the case at bar exceeds
twenty (20) years, logically, the penalty that should be imposed is reclusion perpetua, which is the penalty one
degree higher than reclusion temporal.

There is now a need to modify the penalty imposed by the lower court and affirmed by the CA. Verily, the
proper penalty imposable is, thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but it was incorrect for the RTC to
sentence the accused to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty (40) years without pardon because that
would be a limitation on the part of the power of the Chief Executive. The exercise of the pardoning power is
discretionary in the President and may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the court, save only
when it contravenes the limitations set forth by the Constitution.31 Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum is likewise imposed from date of finality of this Decision until full payment pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery
Frames.32

Llamas vs. Orbos

Facts: 

Governor Ocampo of Tarlac was found guilty of graft and corruption. He was suspended for office for 90 days;
hence his vice-governor, Llamas, assumed office. Less than two months, however, Executive Secretary Orbos,
without ruling on Ocampo's Motion for Reconsideration, issued a Resolution granting executive clemency.
Thus, Ocampo re-assumed the governorship of the province.
Llamas filed a petition questioning said Resolution. He contends that executive clemency could be granted by
the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the Constitution which
allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. According to the him, the qualifying phrase "after conviction
by final judgment" in Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution applies solely to criminal cases. He also
contends that the pardon granted was premature since Ocampo's motion for reconsideration has abated the
running of the reglementary period for finality of judgment and that his constitutional rights to due process
were violated since he was not notified of the pardon.

Issues:

1. May the president grant executive clemency in administrative cases?

2. Has there been a final judgment?

3. Was petitioner's constitutional rights to due process violated when he was not notified of the pardon?

Held:

1. Yes. The president can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII sec. 19 of the constitution. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President,
with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. If
executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the
exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following
petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same
do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

Also a number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize the exercise of executive clemency in administrative
cases. One example of which is Sec. 43 of PD 807 which provides that in meritorious cases, the president may
commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers
and employees in disciplinary cases. Moreover, the intent of the constitutional commission is to give the
president the power to grant executive clemency and is not to be limited in terms of coverage, except as
already provided in the constitution.

There is no reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. If the President
can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.

The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative
branches of the government.

2. Yes. There has been a final judgment because upon acceptance of the presidential pardon, the grantee is
deemed to have waived any appeal which he may have filed. Consequently, Ocampo's acceptance of the
presidential pardon "serves to put an end" to the motion for reconsideration and renders the subject decision
final.

Note: Conviction by final judgment is now necessary before parole or pardon could be extended. (Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution, People vs. Casido; People vs. Salle) 

3. No. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to
the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. Thus, assuming
that petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary. (Llamas vs.
Executive Secretary Orbos, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991)

Torres v. Gonzales Case Digest

Facts: 

1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was was granted conditional pardon by the president
on condition that he "would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines". He accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982, he was charged with 20 counts
of estafa (pending trial) while in 1985, he was convicted of sedition (pending appeal). In 1986, Justice
Secretary Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the
pardon. Torres was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence. Torres thus filed a petition for habeas corpus before the SC questioning the validity of the arrest
order. He claimed that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final
judgment of 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition. 

Issue:

Is conviction by final judgment necessary before a person may be validly rearrested and recommitted for
violation of the terms of his condition pardon?

Held:

The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of
such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of
a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

Since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who
is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final
judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to
have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against
him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict
who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of
such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny.

GR No. 116512 
March 7, 1997 
People of the Philippines, Plaintif-Appellee, v. William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin, Accused Appellants 

Relevant Doctrines/Subjects: 

Pardon vs. Amnesty 

∙ Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded  and proved by the
person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof. o Pardon is granted to one after conviction. 
o Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of  which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that   reason it does "nor work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of  suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored
by the terms of the pardon," and 
o It "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon  him by the sentence" 
∙ On the other hand, amnesty is by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of  Congress, and it is a
public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. 
o Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political   offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and  sometimes after conviction. 
o Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so  overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the person released  by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense. 

Facts: 

BACKGROUND: 
1. Both accused-appellants were member of the CPP-NPA. 
2. They were convicted of murder in 1993. 
3. They applied for pardon and amnesty, both of which were granted during the pendency of their appeal. 
THE INSTANT CASE: 
4. On July 3, 1996, the Supreme Court ruled that the conditional pardons granted in this case to   accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19  January 1996 during the pendency of
their instant appeal. 
5. The Court further resolved that: 
∙ Appellants be re-arrested and reconfined at the Bilibid Prison; 
∙ Further action on the appeal is suspended until the re-arrest of the Accused-Appellants; ∙ Officers of the
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon to  SHOW CAUSE why they should not be
held in contempt of court for acting on and  favorably recommending approval of the applications for the
pardon of the accused appellants despite the pendency of their appeal. 
6. In a Comment for the members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or  Pardon, dated 28
August 1996, it was explained:
∙ The applications for conditional pardon of the aforenamed prisoners were  recommended by the Committee to
the President for the grant of Conditional Pardon  (after the Secretariat had evaluated that the former
committed the crimes for which  they had been charged in pursuit of their political belief) per Memorandum
dated May  25, 1995 and approved by the President on December 29, 1995. The Conditional Pardon  paper
was signed by the President on January 19, 1996 and the subject prisoners  (accused-appellants) were
released by the Bureau of Corrections on January 25, 1996; 
∙ Prior to their release, subject prisoners filed an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal"  which was received by
the Supreme Court on January 11, 1996. Unfortunately, the  Committee failed to verify first whether the
counsel of the accused had also withdrawn  their appeal or that the NGO lawyers had filed in their behalf a
motion to Withdraw  their Appeal. It was upon the honest belief of the Secretariat that the NGO lawyers 
would perform their agreed undertaking, that the Secretariat indorsed the applications   for conditional
pardon of subject prisoners for favorable action by the Committee, and  thereafter by the President. 
∙ There was no intention on the part of the Secretariat and the Presidential Committee to  violate Section 19,
Article VII, of the Constitution, but that what happened was a clear  misappreciation of fact. 
7. However, on an article found in the Philippine Daily Inquirer’s August , 1996 issue, it was written that the National
Amnesty Commission (NAC) favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of  Franklin A. Alcorin and William O.
Casido on February 22, 1996 (also during the pendency of the accused-appellants’ case). 
8. NAC was created under Proclamation No. 347 by President Fidel V. Ramos on March 25, 1994,   to receive, process,
and decide on applications for amnesty. Under Proclamation No. 347 a grant  of amnesty shall carry with it the
extinguishment of any criminal liability for acts committed by  the grantee in pursuit of his or her political beliefs. It
also carries with it the restoration of civil  or political rights that may have been suspended or lost by virtue of a
criminal conviction. 

Issues: 

1. Whether or not the pardon granted during the pendency of the accused-appellants’ case was valid. 
2. Whether or not the amnesty granted during the pendency of the accused-appellants’ case was valid. 

Resolution: 

1. No. The pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the  appeal or before
conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph  of Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution. 
2. Yes. The grant of the amnesty, for which accused appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin  voluntarily applied
under Proclamation No. 347, was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in  by both Houses of Congress in
Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 June 1994. 
3. The release then of accused appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified  by the amnesty, but
not by the "pardon." 

The Court resolved that the release of accused-appellants William O. Casido and Franklin A.  Alcorin was valid
solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and this case is dismissed.

MIGUEL CRISTOBAL, petitioner, vs. ALEJO LABRADOR ET AL., respondents. [No.

47941. December 7, 1940] 

DOCTRINE: PARDONING POWER OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE 

Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides: "(6) The President shall have the power to  grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses,  except in cases
of impeachment, upon such conditions and 'with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem  proper to impose. He
shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly." 
In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for  disqualification
from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who  violate its command.
There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to  such disabilities. When
granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is  left of the consequences of
conviction. 

FACTS: 
On March 15, 1930, the CH found respondent Santos guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to  6
months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law, to return to the offended parties the  amounts of
P375 and P125 respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay  the costs. On
appeal, the judgment Of conviction was affirmed and the respondent was accordingly  confined in the
provincial jail from March 14, 1932 to Aug. 18, 1932. Notwithstanding his conviction,  respondent continued
to be a registered elector and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and  1937, seated as the municipal
president of Malabon, Rizal. 

On Aug. 22, 1938, CA 357 (Election Code) was approved by the National Assembly, Sec. 94 of which
disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime
against property." The respondent forthwith applied to the president for an absolute pardon. On Dec. 24,  1939,
the Chief Executive granted the petition restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political  rights, except
that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for  appointment only to
positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or  property responsibility." 

On Nov. 16, 1940, petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of respondent Santos from the  list of
voters, citing Sec. 94 of CA 357. The CFI denied the petition. Hence, this petition for a writ of  certiorari to
review the decision of the lower court sustaining the right of respondent to remain in the list  of registered
voters. 

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the pardon granted by the President restores the respondent to the full enjoyment of his
political rights. 

HELD: 
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from  the
conviction. While the pardon extended to respondent is conditioned in the sense that "he will be  eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or  property
responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political  rights." 

1. Under Section 11(6), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, there are two limitations upon the exercise  of
this Constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, to wit: (a) that the power be exercised after  conviction;
and, (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations 
imposed by the Court, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It  must
remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority  to whom it
is entrusted. 

2. The disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification  from
voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its  command.
There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to  such disabilities.
When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes an  that is left of the
consequences of conviction.

Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989.

DOCTRINES: 

 Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been
expressly remitted by the pardon. 

 Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is
the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and
not communicated officially to the Court. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is
not complete without acceptance."

 Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the
Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.

 A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is
full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity. (Garland Case) 

 While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender
is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a
pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime
and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

 Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the
stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed. (State v. Hazzard)

 In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all
the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon
blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever
may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to
equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-
abiding citizen.

 Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which, despite the public manifestation of
mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with
the actor." 

 Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his
civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation
for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and
purpose of the privilege.
FACTS:  The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum,
and to pay a fine of P3,500 and were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.

She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by
then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said pardon, petitioner
wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same
was still vacant.

The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not
earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of
P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of the
litigation, be satisfied.

This was reviewed by Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. in which he held that Monsanto is not entitled to an
automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former
position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous
conviction. The basis of such decision is borne out by the records that the petitioner was convicted of the crime for which she
was accused. The Office adopts, as a juridical guide the case of People v. Lising, that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a
former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries,
benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.

ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.

RULING: The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of
the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a
mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon,
albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the
penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative,
should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of
an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the
judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict
in character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.

Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which, despite the public manifestation of
mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the
actor." 

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of
the privilege.

The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and
punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply
for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and
suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to
determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to
petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.

G.R. No. 206666               January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,
ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Respondents.
 
FACTS:
Former President Estrada was impeached and removed from the presidency. He was convicted of
the crime of plunder. During the term of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, she extended an
absolute pardon to herein private respondent. Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the position
of City Mayor of Manila which was questioned by petitioner Atty. Risos-Vidal alleging that his
conviction disqualified him from running for public office. The COMELEC took discretionary judicial
notice on Estrada’s pardon.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pardoning power of the President be limited by legislative action.
 
HELD:
No. It is apparent from Section 19, Article VII and Section 5, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that
the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment
cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of
election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from
the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

SECTION 20
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 193796               July 2, 2014

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Doctrine:

The Government of the Philippines is therefore obligated to observe its terms and conditions under the rule of
pacta sunt servanda, a fundamental maxim of international law that requires the parties to keep their
agreement in good faith.

Facts:

On October 3, 2006, Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development(IBRD) entered into Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH for the implementation of the IBRD's
"Support for Strategic Local Development and Investment Project" (S2LDIP).
The loan facility in the amount of JP¥11,710,000,000.00 was fully guaranteed by the Government of the
Philippines and conditioned upon the participation of at least two (2) local government units by way of a
Subsidiary Loan Agreement (SLA) with Land Bank.

On February 22, 2007, Land Bank entered into an SLAwith the City Government of Iligan to finance the
development and expansion of the city's water supply system, which had two (2) components, namely: (a) the
procurement of civil works; and ( b) the procurement of goods for the supply and delivery of various sizes of PE
100 HDPE pipes and fittings.

Respondent Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) participated in the said bidding and came up with the second to
the lowest bid, However, BAC informed Atlanta that the bidding was declared a failure upon the
recommendation of Land "Bank due to the IBRD 's non-concurrence with the Bid Evaluation Report and 
Atlanta was disqualified from the bidding because it lacked several documentary requirements.

 Atlanta called the BAC's attention to its use of Bidding Documents which, as it purported, not only failed to
conform with the Third Edition of the Philippine Bidding Documents for the Procurement of Goods (PBDs)
prescribed by the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) but also contained numerous provisions that
were not in accordance with RA 9184 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).

During the pre-bid conference, the BAC declared that the project was not covered by RA 9184 or by any of the
GPPB 's issuances.

Atlanta filed on December 10, 2009 a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with an urgent prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the re-bidding of
the project against the City Government of Iligan, the BAC, and Land Bank before the Manila RTC.

Manila RTC declared the subject bidding null and void on the ground that it was done contrary to the rules and
procedure prescribed in RA 9184 and its IRR.

Also, they ruled that the City Government of Iligan cannot claim exemption from the application of RA 9184 and
its IRR by virtue of Loan Agreement No. 48~3-PH with the IBRD because it was Land Bank, and not the City
Government of Iligan, which was the party to the same.

It added that the SLA subsequently executed by Land Bank with the City Government of Iligan cannot validly
provide for the use of bidding procedures different from those provided under RA 9184 because the said SLA
is not in the nature of an international agreement similar to the Loan Agreement with the IBRD.

Hence this petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the SLA between the Land Bank and the City Government of Iligan is an executive agreement
similar to Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH which should be deemed exempt from the application of RA 9184 (Yes)

Ruling:

RA 9184 recognizes the country's commitment to abide by its obligations under any treaty or international or
executive agreement.

Sec. 4. Scope and Application. - This Act shall apply to the Procurement of Infrastructure Projects, Goods and
Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds, whether local or foreign, by all branches and
instrumentalities of the government, its department, offices and agencies, including government owned and/or
-controlled corporations and local government units, subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
138.1âwphi1 Any treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which
the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed.

The IRR of RA 9184 further supplements the law's treatment of treaties and international or executive
agreements.

As the parties have correctly discerned, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH is in the nature of an executive
agreement. In Bayan Muna v. Romulo (Bayan Muna) the Court defined an international agreement as one
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, "whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation," and further
expounded that it may be in the form of either (a) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive
ratification; or ( b) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative
concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.

Being similar to a treaty but without requiring legislative concurrence, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH - following
the definition given in the Bayan Muna case - is an executive agreement and is, thus, governed by international
law. Owing to this classification, the Government of the Philippines is therefore obligated to observe its terms
and conditions under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a fundamental maxim of international law that requires
the parties to keep their agreement in good faith.

With the nature and treatment of Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH as well as its accessory SLA herein explained,
the Court thus holds that the RTC committed reversible error in ruling that the provisions of RA 9184 were to
be applied in this case. Quite the contrary, it is the IBRD Guidelines and the provisions of Schedule 4 which
should govern. As such, the procurement of water pipes by the BAC of the City Government of Iligan -as Land
Bank meritoriously submits in its petition - is beyond the purview of RA 9184, yielding as it should to the
express stipulations found in the executive agreement, to which the latter's accessory merely follows.

The petition is GRANTED.

SECTION 21

GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA

Facts:

On September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the

importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and
created a rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein for
the implementation of said proposed importation. On September 25, 1963, petitioner
Gonzales — a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, whose members are likewise engaged in the production of rice and corn
— filed an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction, praying that said
petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued
restraining respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the decision
of the Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after
due hearing, judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.

Issues:

1. Whether Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 prevail over the two executive
agreements entered into by the president with Vietnam and Burma.
2. Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts. 

Held: 

No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts as alleged executive
agreements has been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not
appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But even assuming that
said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful as well as null and void from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the
President may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement,
enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the
Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of
the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws. The American theory to the effect that in the event of conflict
between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is
not applicable to the case at bar for respondents not only admit but also insist that the
contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground
that treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent of
its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification
can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the

system of checks and balances which are constitutional set up and that of the United
States.

fundamental in

our

2. Yes. As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated

by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled
it in the affirmative by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof that the Supreme
Court may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide,
final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in — (1) All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation
is in question.” In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty,
not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law but also when it runs counter to an
act of Congress. The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with
Vietnam and Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207
enjoins our Government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice but
from importing rice except under the conditions Prescribed in said Act. Republic Act
No. 3452, on the other hand, has two main features, namely: (a) it requires the
Government to purchase rice and corn directly from our local planters, growers or
landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and leaves
such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the
proposed importation — which has not been consummated as yet — is legally feasible.
Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel
our Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have
contracted with the sellers of the rice in question because aside from the fact that said
obligations may be complied with without importing the commodity into the Philippines,
the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the
aforementioned laws. The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the
question whether or not respondents herein should be enjoined from implementing the
aforementioned proposed importation. However, the majority favors the negative view,
for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted. Respondent Executive
Secretary had and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he
exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; said importation is not sanctioned
by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the
injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly denied.

VINUYA VS. ROMULO

Petitioners Vinuya, et. al. filed a Petition for Certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive
Secretary (Alberto Romulo), the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

FACTS

 Petitioners are all members of MALAYA LOLAS.

 MALAYA LOLAS is a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military
forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
 Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ,
DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military
officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. 
 However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners.
 Said officials contended that the individual claims  of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japan's compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines
and Japan.

ISSUE/S
  WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’
claims for: (a) the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; (b) for official
apology; and, (c) other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and other international tribunals

RULING
 NO
 The petition lacks merit.
 From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners' claims against Japan.
 The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed
by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. 
 In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of
1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein
assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
 The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners' cause would be inimical to our
country's foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating
serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Department's
determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political
branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
 The Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and
those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps
are appropriate or necessary.
 The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners' claims.
 We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as
well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. However, petitioners take quite a
theoretical leap in claiming that these proscriptions automatically imply that that the Philippines is
under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes, particularly since petitioners do
not demand the imputation of individual criminal liability, but seek to recover monetary reparations
from the state of Japan. Absent the consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by
the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Indeed,
precisely because of states' reluctance to directly prosecute claims against another state, recent
developments support the modern trend to empower individuals to directly participate in suits
against perpetrators of international crimes. Nonetheless, notwithstanding an array of General
Assembly resolutions calling for the prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy
arguments warranting such a rule, the practice of states does not yet support the present existence
of an obligation to prosecute international crimes. Of course a customary duty of prosecution is
ideal, but we cannot find enough evidence to reasonably assert its existence. To the extent that any
state practice in this area is widespread, it is in the practice of granting amnesties, immunity,
selective prosecution, or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes against humanity.
 Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.  Even
if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not
 deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at
the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international
crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
 Of course, we greatly sympathize with the cause of petitioners, and we cannot begin to comprehend
the unimaginable horror they underwent at the hands of the Japanese soldiers. We are also deeply
concerned that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles of law, the petitioners appear
to be without a remedy to challenge those that have offended them before appropriate fora.
Needless to say, our government should take the lead in protecting its citizens against violation of
their fundamental human rights.
 Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners'
cause. Ours is only the power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners'
cause.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Political Questions
 refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Foreign Relations
 The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign relations.
Jus Cogens
 (Literally, "compelling law") in international law, this term refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom.
 Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.
Erga Omnes
 (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law, it has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole.