Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 9

20th Century Musings in the 21st Cent… Subscribe Fazer login

Three Worlds or Two Worlds?


J. Otto Pohl
1
Apr 13, 2021

Three Worlds or Two Worlds?

By

J. Otto Pohl

The international history of the 20th Century often follows a traditional “Three Worlds” model
of the US, Europe, and Japan as the First World, the USSR and its Eastern European satellites as
the Second World, and the rest of the planet as the Third World. In this schematic the Third
World is often portrayed as a non-aligned region serving as a battle ground between the First
and Second Worlds. This basic conceptual frame work is oversimplified. For while most of the
Third World and members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) had no formal military
alliances with either the US or Soviet bloc in general the post-colonial states were much closer to
the USSR than the Western bloc. This can clearly be seen in the close relations established with
Moscow by such non-aligned states as India under Nehru, Egypt under Nasser, and Ghana under
Nkrumah. Some members of the NAM such as Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, and
Ethiopia after 1974 were socialist or socialist orientated states openly allied with the USSR. Non-
alignment thus did not mean neutrality or equidistance between the US and USSR.

 In addition to the NAM founded in 1961 in Belgrade there also existed a number of Afro-Asian
solidarity organizations drawing inspiration from the 1955 conference in the city of Bandung in
Indonesia. The Afro-Asian solidarity movement unlike the NAM was considerably more
fractured in terms of organizations. It also had a specific geographical focus that excluded Latin
America up until the 1966 Tri-Continental conference in Havana when a competing set of Afro-
Asian-Latin American solidarity organizations emerged. Perhaps more importantly it excluded
the only member of the NAM in Europe, Yugoslavia. This was due to ideological reasons relating
to the split in 1948 between Moscow and Belgrade and the prominent role of the USSR in the
Afro-Asian solidarity organizations. The Afro-Asian movements often included the USSR not
only as a full member, but as an important leader and frequent host of conferences. The USSR
was an important organizer in both the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)
and the Afro-Asian Writer’s Association (AAWA) both headquartered in Cairo. The Soviet
Committee for Solidarity with Asia and Africa was an important member of AAPSO. The Soviet
Union’s membership in these organizations rested on its inclusion of the Central Asian nations
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and most importantly Uzbekistan. Out of
six conferences held by the Afro-Asian Writers’ Association two including the first one were
held in the USSR. The Soviet Union hosted the organization’s 1958 conference in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan and the 1973 conference in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan.  In the same year  as the founding
of the AAWA in Tashkent the Kyrgyz Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries was founded on 21st November. Likewise Soviet representatives to AAPSO were
mostly Central Asians, particularly Uzbeks. The USSR thus projected itself to the former
colonial states in Africa and Asia as an Asian state by virtue of the inclusion of Kazakhstan and
Central Asia within its union.

The close affinity between the USSR and the Third World rested upon three pillars. These were a
similarity in geo-political interests, the projection of the USSR and particularly its Central Asian
republics as a model for economic development in other parts of Asia and Africa, and the USSR
as a source of material and technical assistance for the post-colonial states. The first pillar was
largely a result of colonialism and its after effects. Russia had never had any overseas colonies.
 All of its colonies were adjacent territories in Asia. It had never had any African colonies and its
role in the slave trade from Africa was extremely marginal. The few African slaves to make it to
the Russian Empire mostly came through other European states and served in a domestic
capacity at the Tsar’s court. The Soviet Union thus did not have the same historical baggage that
the First World did regarding Africa, the Middle East,  South  Asia, and South East Asia. In
Central Asia they had successfully managed to change the region to such an extent that neither
the vast majority of the indigenous population or people outside the territory viewed it still as a
colonial relationship. The USSR thus appeared to the Third World to be a power free from the
taint of the African slave trade and colonialism.

The European powers of the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal all members of
NATO, however, still maintained large colonial empires after the end of World War II. The
French in Vietnam and later Algeria, the British in Kenya and later Aden, the Belgians in the
Congo, the Netherlands in Indonesia, and Portugal in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau
all fought hard against post-war independence movements to maintain their rule. The US had
allied itself with these states to form its primary alliance, NATO, to contain the USSR and thus
became indirectly associated with European colonial rule in Asia and Africa. The geopolitical
crises of Asia and Africa after World War II were mostly either directly tied to the struggle for
freedom from colonial rule or were a result of the aftermath of colonialism. The direct colonial
conflicts have already been listed above. Conflicts that were part of the aftermath included the
fights against apartheid in South Africa, South African rule over Namibia, and White minority
rule in Rhodesia in Africa. In the Middle East the struggle for Palestinian national self-
determination against Israel dominated regional politics. Finally, in South East Asia the main
post-colonial conflict from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s was the US intervention in the
Vietnam War. In all of these conflicts the USSR and the Third World were on one side and the
US and its European allies on the other for most of the period under consideration. This
situation essentially made the USSR a natural ally of most African, Arab, and Asian states and
anti-colonial movements.  This included prominent non-aligned states such as India, Egypt, Iraq,
Ghana, Mali, and Guinea, as well as actual communist ruled ones like North Vietnam.
 Organizations such as the ANC in South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia, the MPLA in Angola,
FRELIMO in Mozambique, FLOSY in South Yemen, and the PLO in Palestine gravitated
towards the Soviet Union and its allies for both political and material support in their
independence struggles. Colonialism and its legacy gave the USSR and socialist bloc a clear
advantage against the NATO powers in the fight for hearts and minds in Africa, the Middle East,
and large parts of Asia.

The second pillar of relations between the Soviet Union and the Third World was the projection
of the USSR as a model for the social and economic development of former colonies in Asia and
Africa. The Russian Empire had been quite economically and socially backward compared to
Western Europe prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. Central Asia in particular had been
particularly undeveloped with very little modern physical and social infrastructure or
industrialization. By the mid-1950s the USSR had made incredible strides in improving material
standards of living, eliminating illiteracy, education, medical treatment, and providing cultural
amenities to a population that had gone from 20% to 50% urban. Nowhere were these
accomplishments as extreme due to the very low starting base as in Central Asia. In 1917 what
became Soviet Central Asia had a level of development equal to that of neighbouring
Afghanistan. By the mid-1960s the material standard of living, level of education, and access to
health care in Soviet Central Asia all considerably exceeded the nearby and by no means
completely undeveloped states of Turkey and Iran. Thus Soviet Central Asia, a region that had
formerly been colonized by the Russian Empire, had a very low level of economic and social
development at the time of the Revolution, and was populated by Asians with a traditionally
Islamic culture became a model offered by Moscow to other parts of Asia and Africa. This
model, however, was not transferable. Nove and Newth point out in their 1967 study which notes
the impressive economic accomplishments of the Soviet Union in this region that the
development of the periphery of the USSR was only possible due to the massive transfer of
resources from the centre in Moscow. As a redistributionist state the Soviet Union took
resources from richer western regions such as the occupied Baltic states and Ukraine and used
them to build roads, railroads, factories, hospitals, schools, universities, apartment blocks, and
other infrastructure in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Among those resources taken from other
places under direct Soviet rule were people. A very large number of Russians and other skilled
workers from other regions of the USSR migrated to the region to live. The commitment of
money, goods, and people by Moscow to develop the region could not be replicated in the former
European colonies of Asia and Africa. The inability to repeat the success of Soviet economic
development in Central Asia elsewhere in Asia and Africa was not, however, apparent to
everybody. Many leaders from former European colonies in Asia and Africa believed that they
could emulate some of the Soviet development policies that had been so successful in Central
Asia.

The transformation of Kazakhstan and Central Asia from backward colonies under Tsarist rule
to relatively modernized semi-colonies under Soviet rule took place in a mere matter of decades
rather than the centuries. Not only did the Soviets greatly increase the material standards of
living in the region, but they also solidified the population into five main modern nations (six if
one counts Kara-Kalpakistan) with their own administrative territories, histories, and national
symbols. The formation of these proto-nation states represented a huge accomplishment in
nation building even if they remained politically and economically controlled by Moscow.  In
contrast the continued lack of national consolidation in much of the remaining part of Asia and
Africa remained much weaker.

Soviet rule over Central Asia manifested itself as the logical conclusion of indirect rule. The
territories remained completely subservient to Moscow politically and economically but ruled
locally by local cadres. These local cadres both pledged fealty to the greater Soviet state of the
USSR and socialist ideology and promoted their own national culture and members of their
nationality into important posts on the republican level. As time went on the party and
government on the republican level became more and more indigenized.  The Soviet government
not only ruled through the local national elite they had created that elite. This elite was thus
entirely dependent upon Moscow for their power and privileges which derived in large part on
the transfer of resources from elsewhere in the USSR. This allowed both the Central Asians,
particularly the elite created by the Soviet government and the central Soviet government to
embrace the illusion that the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Tajiks enjoyed real
national self determination.

In reality the Central Asian republics were semi-colonies. In terms of political and economic
control from Moscow they did not in fact differ from the relationship of colonies in other parts
of Asia and Africa with their European masters. The difference was in terms of the direction of
the flow of resources between the centre and the periphery. In the classic colonial relationship
the resources of the colonies flowed to Europe making Asia and Africa overall poorer and
Europe richer. This led to these regions becoming underdeveloped. In the case of Soviet Central
Asia resources flowed from other regions under Moscow's control to develop the region making
it much richer than it would have been if the republics had been fully independent nation states.
Underdevelopment was imposed by the Soviet government not upon Central Asia but upon the
richer western regions such as western Ukraine and the occupied Baltic States.

Central Asia and particular Uzbekistan with its impressive cities of Tashkent, Samarkand, and
Bukhara thus became a model of socialist modernization for the newly independent states of
Asia and Africa. The Soviet government took large numbers of official delegations from Asia and
Africa as well as African Americans on tours through Tashkent to demonstrate how a formerly
colonized and economically backwards Islamic Asian nation had been successfully developed
along socialist lines. The first congress of the Afro-Asian Writers’ Association took place in
Tashkent in 1958. The Asian parts of the USSR allowed the Soviet Union to project itself as a
leading and economically successful Afro-Asian state.

Ironically, now that the Central Asian republics are nominally fully independent states and have
far fewer Europeans they have been almost completely excluded from the purview of Asian
studies programs. But, in the 1960s the acceptance of the USSR as a fellow Afro-Asian state was
secure in most of Africa and Asia with the notable exception of China which claimed they were a
European colonial power. The Chinese, however, were never able to rally the support of Soviet
Central Asians and in fact a number of Muslims fled China into the USSR during the 1960s. Due
to a number of factors China was never seen as a better model or patron than the USSR in most
of the Third World. The Soviets badly beat the Chinese in the struggle for influence in the Third
World during the 1960s and 1970s.

The Soviet government as well as political and intellectual leaders from Africa and Asia were of
course right in noting the deep historical similarities between the Central Asian republics and
other post-colonial states. In no way can the long term historical legacy of Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan be considered the same as countries like
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Nonetheless this recent trend of associating
Central Asia with Central Europe points to one of the primary reasons for the need to re-
evaluate the role of the USSR and particularly Central Asia in Afro-Asia during the late
20th Century.

The final link between the USSR and the rest of Asia and Africa was the provision of various
forms of economic, technical, educational, and military assistance by Moscow to various states
and national liberation movements in the region. The ability of newly independent states in
Africa and Asia to acquire aid from the USSR allowed them to counter to some extent their
dependency upon their former colonial masters and their US ally. National liberation movements
relied even more heavily upon the USSR for military training and arms since the US and NATO
powers were not options. They were either fighting against NATO members like Portugal or de-
facto allies of the US like Israel or South Africa.

Taken all together it is obvious that the relationship between the USSR and the Third World was
quite robust and included issues of common geopolitical interest, cultural exchange, economic
emulation, and military cooperation. The Second and Third Worlds geographically bordered
each other in Asia and the USSR participated in those Afro-Asian organizations that were based
upon geography and opposition to colonialism rather than a commitment to non-alignment.
These facts lead us to re-examine the general exclusion of the USSR, particularly Central Asia,
from most accounts of Afro-Asia both as a large geographical region and a concept complete
with a series of common geopolitical positions on colonialism, apartheid, Palestine, and the
Vietnam War. There is no doubt when viewed as a general voting bloc on these issues in the UN
General Assembly that the Second and Third Worlds converged and that the USSR was
politically part of Afro-Asia in a way that South Vietnam, Israel, and South Africa were not.

So how do we undertake an historical re-evaluation of the role of the USSR and particularly its
Central Asian republics as being part of Afro-Asia from the late 1950s to the late 1970s? It is not
enough to say that it is obviously part of Asia. That has not gotten the region incorporated into
any Asian Studies Programs in the US. Instead it is necessary I think to show that historically
that these states are in a very real sense post-colonial Afro-Asian states and not merely
geographically eastern versions of Mitteleuropa.

Such an undertaking is much easier said than done. The orthodox position in US academia is
that the USSR was unique among all human societies in being immune from the social
phenomena that have affected the rest of the world. Thus there are for example the arguments of
people like Francine Hirsch and Amir Weiner that here was never any official racial
discrimination in the USSR under Stalin except for anti-Semitism. Even some scholars like
Madina Tlostanova in Putin’s Russia reject this overarching defence of the Stalin regime from
the charges of racial discrimination. But, it is an almost completely unchallenged orthodoxy
among tenured professors in the US. Like other matters pertaining to the history of Afro-Asia it
is up to scholars actually based in Africa and Asia to provide a different and more accurate
interpretation of the past.

There have been some small attempts by various scholars to deal with Central Asia as part of the
post-colonial world rather than a displaced part of communist ruled Europe. Among these
scholars are David Chioni, Deniz Kandiyoti, John Heathershaw, Shoshona Keller, Vera Tolz,
Laura Adams, and Rossen Djagalov. But, much of this work has been theoretical and general and
almost all of it remains heavily Moscow centric with very little on the concrete connections and
similarities between Central Asia and specific states elsewhere in Afro-Asia. On this count
Kandiyoti has done the most on showing the parallels between Central Asia and the Middle East
and Djagalov has shown some of the literary connections with various Asian and African writers.
Nonetheless, the vast majority of literature dealing with “post-colonialism” does not even
mention the USSR. There is not a single reference to it at all for instance in the classic work on
post-colonial literature, The Empire Writes Back. This work has a definition of post-colonial that
is so broad as to include White Canadians and White Australians, but it still somehow manages
to completely exclude Central Asians that lived under Tsarist Russian colonial rule and then
Russian dominated Soviet semi-colonial rule for nearly a century and a half. Yet one of the most
famous and talented writers in the USSR, Chingiz Aitmatov from Kyrgyzstan, certainly fit the
model of a post-colonial writer as pointed out by Laura Adams. His novel The Day Lasts more than
100 Years deals very much with post-colonial issues including the loss of traditional culture and
way of life by the urbanized and heavily Russianized indigenous Communists ruling the country.
He terms them Mankurts, a type of Central Asian zombie that has completely forgotten his
ancestral heritage and given complete loyalty over to foreign conquerors. It is amazing that this
novel was first published in the USSR given its extremely anti-Soviet tone. Certainly it would be
impossible to write anything so anti-Soviet and get tenure at a US university today. The
important take away here, however, is that he treats the USSR’s relationship to the indigenous
people of Central Asia in this novel in a manner similar to how many other Asian and African
writers have dealt with colonialism in their home countries. Central Asia like South Asia, South
East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa is post-colonial because it still suffers problems today that
can be traced directly back to the years it spent under colonial and semi-colonial rule. Among
the problems inherited from Russian and then Soviet rule that are similar to those inherited from
European colonial rule in other regions of the world are ethnic strife, economic dependency, and
corruption.

Recently there has been a revival of scholarly interest in various Afro-Asian movements. The
most well known product of this revival has been Vijay Prashad's, The Darker Nations: A Peoples'
History of the Third World. This book makes no mention of the important role of the USSR and
Central Asians in such organizations as AAPSO and AAWA. Of particular interest has been the
AAWA and their journal Lotus. A group of scholars at American University of Beirut including
Prashad have been working on placing the journal in its proper historical and literary context.
Yet other than mentioning that most of the funding came for the journal came from the Soviet
bloc none of their work makes any real reference to the Soviet Union. This is despite the fact
that the AAWA was in fact formed in the USSR in 1958. Tashkent was the capital of the Uzbek
SSR and deliberately chosen for the founding meeting of the AAWA to show that the USSR was
an Asian state.

It is generally forgotten today, particularly in the US, that up until  the 1978 Vietnamese invasion
of Cambodia and 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that most of post-colonial Asia and Africa
did not side with the US on any major regional issues. This was true for the issues surrounding
Vietnam, South Africa, Namibia, and Palestine. Indeed this last issue is part of the cause of this
amnesia since many US “progressive” scholars are strong supporters of Israel and want to
portray Zionism as a national liberation movement rather than a colonial one. This is contrary
not only to the views of the Arab states and Soviet bloc during most of the Cold War but also all
of Black Africa and most of Asia. It is especially contrary to the views held by people like Nelson
Mandela and others involved in the national liberation struggle against apartheid in South
Africa. The military alliance between Israel and apartheid South Africa for instance is still
almost a completely taboo topic among US academics.

Thus geo-politically the Second and Third Worlds lined up against the First World on most of
the regional conflicts in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa between 1955 and 1979. These issues
included Algeria, Congo, Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia, and Portuguese colonialism in
Africa. The Israeli-South African alliance has already been alluded to above but Israel also
became a close ally of France during its failed attempt to suppress the Algerian Revolution. The
joint attack on Egypt in 1956 of France, Israel, and the UK was the most blatant manifestation of
this alliance not only against Pan-Arabism but against Pan-Africanism. The current revisionist
portrayal of Israel during this time by US and European (particularly German) “progressives” as
an anti-colonial power thus falls afoul not only of Israel’s own settler colonialism against the
Palestinians but also their support of the French in Algeria and South African apartheid.
The rejection of Israel by African and non-Arab Asian states thus stemmed from Israel’s strong
support for colonialism in Algeria and apartheid in South Africa and not from some irrational
“anti-semitism” as many “progressives” in the US and Europe currently argue. It is true that
many non-Arab states did not care about the Palestinians even symbolically. For instance
Nkrumah in Ghana contrary to the later Rawlings argued strongly that African states should not
even symbolically provide support to the Palestinian struggle. Instead Nkrumah sought to curry
good relations with Israel. But, the strong support provided by Israel to apartheid South Africa
had changed the minds of almost all Black African leaders by 1973.

Poor Soviet domestic treatment of some of its non-European nationalities did not seem to
adversely affect its influence in Africa, Asia, or the Middle East. Soviet settler colonialism in
Crimea which had many similarities with the forms of settler colonialism practiced in South
Africa and Palestine was never an international issue for the Third World. For instance the Stalin
regime had uprooted the indigenous Crimean Tatars from their homeland in 1944 and sent them
to live in Uzbekistan and the Urals under severe legal and material restrictions. The special
settlement restrictions imposed upon the Crimean Tatars from 1944 to 1956 closely resembled
those later imposed upon Blacks in South Africa after 1948 and Palestinian Arabs in Israel from
1948 to 1966. The few powers to express concern over the issue of the Crimean Tatars such as
Turkey and Saudi Arabia were closely allied with the US. Indeed Turkey was a member of
NATO.

Other national groups subjected to the same treatment as the Crimean Tatars were ethnic
Koreans, Germans, Finns, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Greeks, Kurds, and
Meskhetian Turks. The only group among these stigmatized nationalities that made any type of
successful appeal to the Third World regarding Soviet repression were the Kalmyks deported
from their homeland on the Caspian Sea in December 1943 to Siberia. Between 1944 and 1948
their registered population in the USSR declined from 92,983 to 73,446 due to poor material
conditions in exile. The Kalmyks are a Buddhist Mongol people and members of their diaspora in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey made appeals to a number of Asian states such as Indonesia,
Thailand, Ceylon and Pakistan in 1953. A small delegation of Kalmyk emigres in the US even
attended the famous Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 to bring up the issue
of their continued exile in Siberia. But, this issue evaporated in the early days of the formation of
the Third World. After 1957 the Soviet government allowed the exiled Kalmyks to return to their
former homeland and in 1958 restored the Kalmyk ASSR. Similarly the Chechens, Ingush,
Karachais, and Balkars were all allowed to return to their restored homelands in the Caucasus
during this time leaving only the ethnic Germans, Crimean Tatars, and Meskhetian Turks in
exile in Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia during the 1960s and 1970s.  From the vantage
point of the Third World the accomplishments of the USSR in Uzbekistan completely
overshadowed the continued denial of the civil rights of the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian
Turks living in that republic.

Of course even less sympathy could be elicited from the Third World for European nationalities
in the USSR and Warsaw Pact states. The issue of Jewish emigration so important to the US and
Israel was viewed as further colonization of Palestine by the Third World not a freedom struggle.
The German emigration movement of course never had serious international support outside of
Germany. But, even issues that became international in the US and Europe like the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 did not become issues in the Third World. The Soviet stance
against European colonialism in Africa and Asia, White rule in Rhodesia, apartheid in South
Africa, and Zionism cast it in a favourable light in the Third World. This continued until the
USSR acted in a manner that was considered an attack upon the Third World in late 1979.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan to prevent the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party
of Afghanistan) regime from falling earned it the animosity of many in the Third World. In
addition to Islamic states like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran supporting the Mujihadeen
against the PDPA government and the Soviet expeditionary forces the OIC (Organization of
Islamic Countries) openly took a stand against the USSR on this issue. In the UN a reversal of
the normal pattern of votes occurred on the issue of Afghanistan. Now the Third World sided
with the First World against the USSR and its East Central European allies. The major exception
was India. The conflict between India and Pakistan on the one hand and India and China on the
other led them to supporting the Soviet side in the Afghan conflict against the Mujahideen
supported by Pakistan, the US, and China. The opposition to the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan was especially strong in Islamic countries and volunteers from Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and other Muslim states appeared in Afghanistan to wage a jihad against the USSR and PDPA.

The break between the Second and Third worlds represented by the Soviet military intervention
in Afghanistan followed on an earlier regional conflict where the USSR found itself opposed by
most of the Third World. In late 1978, Vietnam, a Soviet ally invaded Cambodia and removed the
Khmer Rouge government supported by Beijing. In addition to China most of the countries in
Asia also opposed the Vietnamese intervention. Many like Thailand and other members of
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) joined with China, the US, and UK to provide
military assistance to guerrillas opposing the Vietnamese occupation. In the UN the seat for
Cambodia was denied to the Vietnamese installed People’s Republic of Kampuchea government
and given to a coalition of exile forces dominated by the deposed Khmer Rouge. Going by the
name Democratic Kampuchea this exile government had the support of most of the Third World
in the UN. The only major exception again was India.

Once the Soviet Union and its allies such as Vietnam began to militarily intervene in non-
aligned states it started to lose support in the Third World. Prior to that the USSR and Warsaw
Pact were seen as allies of the Third World in its various struggles against the US in Vietnam,
Portugal in Africa, South African apartheid, the White Rhodesian government, and the State of
Israel. Indeed the USSR was seen not only as an ally of Afro-Asia but one of its members. It had
this membership by virtue of its Central Asian republics. Here the Soviet Union presented a
successful model of decolonization and socialist modernization that had overcome the problems
of underdevelopment and avoided those of neo-colonialism. In this light the Soviet Union
membership in Afro-Asia was generally accepted by the Third World until the end of the 1970s.
At the end of that decade Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Soviet support for Vietnamese
intervention in Cambodia marked the split between the socialist bloc and the Third World. But,
from 1955 to 1978 it makes little sense to view the USSR as an entity completely separate from
Afro-Asia rather than an integral part of it.

Subscribe to 20th Century Musings in the 21st Century


By J. Otto Pohl  ·  Launched a year ago

History of the 20th Century

Digite seu email… Subscribe


1 like 1

Comments

Write a comment…

Ready for more?

Digite seu email… Subscribe

© 2022 J. Otto Pohl ∙ Privacy ∙ Terms ∙ Collection notice

Publish on Substack Get the app

Substack is the home for great writing

You might also like