Alexander Hill - British Lend Lease Aid and The Soviet War Effort

British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 June 1942
Author(s): Alexander Hill

Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jul., 2007), pp. 773-808
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British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet
War Effort, June 1941-June 1942
Alexander Hill
Abstract
The historiographyof Allied assistance to the Soviet Union during
the Great PatrioticWar (1941-45) has paid littleattentionto deliv-
eries made duringthe First Moscow Protocol period to the end of
June 1942, during which Britainwas the primaryproviderof aid.
Whilstaid shipped duringthis period was limitedcompared to that
for subsequent U.S.-dominatedprotocols, its significance has to be
understood in the context of the militaryand economic situation
faced by the Soviet Unionduringthe firstyear of the war.
DURING the first weeks and months following the German invasion of
DURINGthe Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, both foreign observers and many
within the Soviet Union itself saw Soviet survival as far from certain. In
a matter of weeks the Red Army had lost millions of men and vast quan-
tities of equipment, and Axis forces threatened both Leningrad and
Moscow. Additionally, the Germans had seized vast expanses of Soviet
territory along with a significant fraction of the country's population and
much prime agricultural land. Much of the Soviet industrial plant was
destroyed or captured, and a significant proportion of the remainder was
in the process of evacuation to the east. Despite these factors Soviet
Alexander Hill is Associate Professorin MilitaryHistoryat the Universityof Cal-

gary. His The War Behind the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan Movement in
North-West Russia, 1941-1944 was published by Frank Cass in 2005.
The Journal of Military History 71 (July 2007): .773-808

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*773
HILL
ALEXANDER
forces were able to halt the Axis during the defensive phase of the Battle
for Moscow, which according to Soviet sources raged from October to
early December 1941. The halting of the Axis advance before Moscow
was undoubtedly a considerable achievement given how critical the sit-
uation might have seemed but weeks before.
Subsequent Soviet victory in what became known in the Soviet
Union as the Great Patriotic War, despite its exorbitant cost, gave the
Soviet regime a legitimating device with a far wider appeal than Marx-
ism-Leninism or indeed victory in the Russian Civil War of 1917-21. In
the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 the Communist Party could claim to
have both organised and inspired the Soviet people in order to achieve
victory over fascism and Germany, war against which had been such a
major contributory factor to the collapse of the Tsarist regime and the
rise of the Bolsheviks in 1917. It is therefore understandable, and par-
ticularly in the context of the Cold War, that Soviet writing on the war
played down the role of Allied aid in the Soviet war effort, to the point
that it was almost ignored. This aid, supplied by the United States,
Britain, and the Commonwealth, was provided in the main without
charge under the U.S. Lend-Lease Act of March 1941 or its principles as
described below and adopted by the British. Whilst the capitalist world
could be accused of giving material assistance to the Soviet Union to save
the lives of its own troops, it could not be reasonably accused of profi-
teering at Soviet expense. Military and associated aid, provided at Soviet
request, was a stark reminder of the limitations of the Soviet system
under losef Stalin and the debacle faced by the Soviet Union as a result
of Soviet foreign and defence policy on the eve of war.'
Throughout the late-Stalinist and post-Stalinist Soviet period, most
Soviet authors were denied access to archival materials on the Soviet use
of Lend-Lease aid, a topic very much off-limits for historians. During
Nikita Khrushchev's premiership and a brief period afterwards, from at
the earliest 1956 until the mid-1960s, historians were allowed much
more leeway in what and indeed about what they wrote, to the extent of
being able to acknowledge the contribution of Allied aid to Soviet vic-
tory, albeit in narrowly defined areas. Suggesting that Allied weapons
systems were of significance at any point in the war was, however, unac-
ceptable. The sixth and concluding volume of the then official Soviet his-
1. For a recent detailed and nuanced work on the debate over the nature of
Soviet defence policy on the eve of war, see Evan Mawdsley, "Crossingthe Rubicon:
Soviet Plans for Offensive War in 1940-1941," International History Review 25, no.
4 (2003): 818-65. For a broader survey of arguments and debates on Soviet foreign
and strategic policy leading up to the Great Patriotic War,see Alexander Hill, "Stalin
and the West,"in A Companion to International History, ed. Gordon Martel (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2007).
774 * THE JOURNAL OF
BritishLend-LeaseAid and the Soviet WarEffort
tory of the Great Patriotic War, completed in 1965, noted that Allied
deliveries:
were not inconsequential, especially the supply to troops and the
rear of automotivetransport,fuels and lubricants(fromthe USAand
Britain401,400 automobilesand 2,599,000 tons of oil products).But
if speakingof the generalincrease in the armamentof the RedArmy,
then the assistance of the Allies played, overall,an insignificantrole.
During the war years 489,900 artillery pieces of all calibres,
136,800 aircraft and 102,500 tanks and self-propelledguns were
delivered by Soviet industry. From the USA and Britain during the
same period 9,600 artillerypieces, 18,700 aircraftand 10,800 tanks
were received. .... In addition it was often the case that the Allies
sent us already outdated examples of weapons. For instance tanks
and a large proportionof the aircraftdid not fully satisfy demandsof
weapons requiredby the characterof militaryactivity on the Soviet-
Germanfront.2
Shorter general works frequently limited references to Allied aid to
the often cited claim, attributed to the wartime First Vice-Chairman of
the Council of People's Commissars Nikolai Voznesenskii, that Allied aid
represented "only 4 per cent" of Soviet production during the war.3Men-
tion of Allied aid would occasionally creep into military memoirs, but
apparently only on the understanding that the value of Allied military
equipment, and in particular weapons systems, was denigrated or at
least compared unfavourably to Soviet equivalents (even if in very lim-
ited supply), to which there appear to have been very few exceptions.
Photographs of Allied equipment in Soviet use were not, it seems, inten-
tionally published in Soviet works concerned with wartime operations.
Despite considerable political and academic interest in Lend-Lease
in the United States in particular, the lack of information on what hap-
pened to aid once it reached the Soviet Union, and indeed on Soviet pro-
duction and losses, prevented Western authors from coming to a
balanced assessment of the significance of Allied aid for the Soviet Union
in the Great Patriotic War.4Whilst a considerable English-language liter-
ature on the diplomatic dimensions of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet
2. Institut Marxisma-Leninismapri TsKKPSS,Otdel istorii Velikoi Otechestven-

noi voini, Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945, Tom
shestoi, Itogi Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini (Moskva: Voennoe izdatel'stvo Minister-
stva oboroni Soiuza SSR, 1965), 48.
3. M. Harrison, Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment and the
Defence Burden, 1940-1945 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996), 134.
4. Although M. Harrison'sSoviet Planning in Peace and War,1938-1945 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) deserves special commendation for its
achievements in providing a context for assessing the value of Lend-Lease aid, despite
the paucity of information available at the time on the wartime Soviet economy.
MILITARY HISTORY c 775
HILL
ALEXANDER
Union emerged during the Cold War,5 such works contain very little
detail on the use value of Allied aid to the Soviet war effort, as a result of
the lack of access to Soviet archival sources and the limited content of
Soviet secondary materials.6 Very little of what has been written focuses
on British aid alone.7
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the debate on the sig-
nificance of Lend-Lease aid for the Soviet war effort has become more
sophisticated in both the former Soviet Union and the West, thanks to a
large extent to the availability of a trickle of archival information on the
use to which the Soviet Union put Allied aid, and also to greater acade-
mic freedom for Russian and many other former Soviet historians.8 More
general Western literature, and indeed much post-Soviet work in Russ-
ian, however, often still assumes that Lend-Lease aid became significant
to the Soviet war effort only as deliveries increased from 1943 onwards,
particularly in facilitating the forward movement of the Red Army with
lorries and other transport resources.9 With the possible exception of air-
craft, the value of arms provided by Britain and the United States is often
still played down, especially the significance of the relatively small quan-
5. Examples include R. H. Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-

Lease to the Soviet Union (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969). See also
Leon Martel, Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War:A Study of the
Implementation of Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979); and, focus-
ing on the U.S. provision of aircraft to the Soviet Union, Richard C. Lukas, Eagles
East: The Army Air Forces and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 (Tallahassee: Florida
State University Press, 1970).
6. For a work considering the impact of U.S. aid, published before the Soviet
Union collapsed and relevant Soviet material became more available, see H. P. van
Tuyll, Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1989). See also Roger Munting, "Lend-Leaseand the Soviet
War Effort,"Journal of Contemporary History 19 (1984): 495-510.
7. The only example being J. Beaumont, Comrades in Arms: British Aid to Rus-
sia, 1941-1945 (London: Davis-Poynter, 1980).
8. Perhaps the best published work on the significance of Lend-Lease aid for dif-
ferent dimensions of the Soviet war effort is contained within M. Suprun, Lend-liz i
severnie konvoi 1941-1945 (Moskva: Andreevskii flag, 1997). See also Harrison,
Accounting for War, Chap. 6. Useful material on specific dimensions to Lend-Lease
aid has also been published by Russian-speakingauthors in the Journal of Slavic Mil-
itary Studies. See, for example, V. F. Vorsin, "Motor Vehicle Transport Deliveries
through 'Lend-Lease,"'Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10 (June 1997): 153-75.
For a somewhat exaggerated post-Soviet Russian revisionist assessment of the value
of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet war effort, see B. Sokolov, "Rol'lend-liza v sovetskikh
voennikh usiliakh, 1941-1945," in Pravda o Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine (sbornik
statei) (Sankt-Peterburg:Izdatel'stvo "Aleteiia," 1998), published in English in the
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 7 (September 1994): 567-86.
9. See, for example, WalterS. Dunn, Jr., The Soviet Economy and the Red Army,
1930-1945 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 89; and van Tuyll, Feeding the Bear,
194-98.
British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort
tities delivered during the time of the First Moscow Protocol (agree-
ment). In effect through 30 June 1942, the Protocol covered the only
period during which Britain bore a heavier absolute burden in the pro-
vision of aid than the United States. A closer examination of deliveries
during the First Protocol period in the context of Soviet production,
losses, and force equipment levels, and a consideration of the use to
which the aid was put, can, however, lead to a revised assessment of the
relative significance of Allied, in particular British, aid to the Soviet war
effort over time.
After establishing the context in which Britain became the principal
provider of aid to the Soviet Union for the first year of the Great Patri-
otic War, this article will examine the significance of this aid for the
Soviet war effort during that period. It will argue that British Lend-Lease
aid to the Soviet Union over the first year of the war, and including the
later stages of the Battle for Moscow, was far more significant for the
Soviet war effort than acknowledged in published Soviet sources or
widely realised in the West, although it was certainly not decisive. The
strength of this argument rests on Russian-language source material
unavailable to Western and indeed to most Soviet authors prior to the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Whilst much Soviet material on Lend-Lease
aid to the Soviet Union remains "secret" in the Central Archives of the
Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation and Russian State Archive
of the Economy, or at least has not been declassified,10 valuable archival
materials of the State Defence Committee (GKO)11 concerning Lend-
Lease aid and the Soviet economy, held in the former Central Party
Archive, were kindly made available to the author, and remain, to his
knowledge, accessible to Russian and Western researchers.
Crucial in gaining an appreciation of the specific use to which British
tanks were put during the first year of the war has been the publication
of the wartime service diary of N. I. Biriukov, Military Commissar of the
Main Auto-Armour Board of the Red Army from 10 August 1941 and
responsible for the distribution of recently manufactured or acquired
tanks to frontline units.12 Soviet and post-Soviet academic authors (that
is, those providing scholarly apparatus) have been unwilling or unable to
systematically trace British or U.S. tanks or indeed aircraft provided to
the Soviet Union through to frontline units, a task made possible to a sig-
nificant extent for armour by Biriukov's information on the units to
10. As much for want of funding to formally sort through the vast quantities of
materialstill "secret"as the desireto keep muchof the materialclassified,if reliable
sourcesare to be believed.
11. Formed on 30 June 1941 for the coordination of the Soviet war effort and
chaired by Stalin.
12. N. Biriukov, Tank-frontu! Zapiski sovetskogo generala (Smolensk: Rusich,
2005).
HILL
ALEXANDER
receive such vehicles. This information can be used in conjunction with

published works and with the Order of Battle of the Soviet Army during
the war,13also unavailable to Western and to many Soviet researchers
prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, to gain a series of snap-
shots of the relative importance of these imported tanks in the fighting
before Moscow in late 1941 and into 1942.
Britain, the United States, and Aid to the Soviet Union

At the beginning of June 1941 Britain still stood alone against Nazi
Germany. Whilst the level of participation of the United States short of
war was, by this point, significant, the United States was far from pre-
pared to intervene in Europe, even without war in the Pacific. At the
beginning of September 1940 the "destroyers for bases" agreement had
finally been signed by Britain and the United States, with Britain paying
a high price for fifty badly needed World War I-vintage destroyers,
exchanged for ninety-nine-year leases on bases in the Caribbean. Safe
after his November 1940 presidential reelection victory, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt could increasingly move to make more substantial
commitments than the "destroyers for bases" agreement to assist the
British, with whom relations were increasingly tense as ad hoc agree-
ments for the delivery of war materials on a "cash and carry" basis had
led to the rapid loss of British assets worldwide. The U.S. Lend-Lease
Act, or Public Law 11, came into force in March 1941, allowing the exec-
utive, for an initial two-year period, to authorize the manufacture or pro-
curement of items for transfer to any nation whose defence was deemed
vital to that of the United States. By this point Britain had depleted its
gold reserves and had sold off a considerable proportion of its overseas
assets to pay for purchases from the United States. With Britain facing
practical bankruptcy, war materials provided under the Lend-Lease Act
were crucial in sustaining the British war effort. Materials provided by
the United States to the United Kingdom were to be categorized as
expended, returnable, military, and nonmilitary, with payment to be
required only for the latter, be it through reverse "Lend-Lease," the
exchange of information or technology, or ultimately through postwar
settlement.
13. Voenno-nauchnoe upravlenie General'nogo shtaba. Voenno-istoricheskii

otdel, Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi armii. Chast' I (iiun'-dekabr' 1941 goda) (Moscow:
n.d.); and Chast' II (Ianvar'-dekabr' 1942 goda) (Moscow:Voennoe izdatel'stvo Min-
istervstva oboroni SSSR, 1966). This information is, in part, now available in English
translation in David Glantz, Companion to Colossus Reborn: Key Documents and
Statistics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005).
14. See A. P. Dobson, US WartimeAid to Britain (London: Croom Helm, 1986),
Chaps. 1 and 2; and Jones, The Roads to Russia, Chap. 1.
To many U.S. Republicans in particular, the idea of providing mili-

tary equipment to the Soviet Union was anathema, and even more so on
such favourable terms as under the Lend-Lease Act. In Congress, there
was hostility not only to communism per se but especially to Soviet com-
munism, which had been accentuated by Soviet activities under the aus-
pices or under cover of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, including
the occupation of the Baltic Republics and the invasion of Finland.
Those most critical of the Soviet Union attempted to exclude it from
future use of the Lend-Lease Act even before German troops crossed the
Soviet frontier. Nonetheless, immediately after the German invasion of
the Soviet Union and initial Soviet approaches to the United States, the
U.S. government thawed frozen Soviet assets totalling $40,000,000 and
opted not to apply the provisions of the Neutrality Act of November 1939
obstructing the sale of arms to the Soviets. These actions allowed the
Soviet Union to purchase war materials from the United States subject
to export permit. The first Soviet order was received by the United States
on 30 June 1941, and a Soviet military mission arrived in the United
States on 26 July. Nonetheless, opposition in the United States to assis-
tance to the Soviet Union was significant, even if the Soviets acquired
goods through purchase and not through the Lend-Lease Act. In July
1941 Congress reviewed legislation introduced to preemptively exclude
the Soviet Union from Lend-Lease and indeed ensure the application of
the Neutrality Act to the Soviets. Given the Soviet Union's long-term
shortage of hard currency and diminishing gold reserves, the amount of
military aid that the United States could provide to the Soviets would be
strictly limited unless it could be supplied under the Lend-Lease Act.
Such a move would also require negotiation with Britain, which in the
short term at least would have to pass over to the Soviets some materi-
als originally destined for British use.15
By the late summer of 1941, both Britain and the United States had
received a considerable range of Soviet requests for aid. As early as 29
June 1941 the Soviet Union had requested 3,000 modern fighter aircraft
and 3,000 bombers from the British, as well as items such as ASDIC
(sonar) sets and antiaircraft guns. Also significant were requests for raw
materials such as aluminium and rubber.16Responses to Soviet requests
for aid from the United Kingdom would be formally considered to be on
a Lend-Lease basis only on 6 September, when Moscow received Prime
Minister Winston S. Churchill's often-reproduced letter of 4 September.
In this letter, responding to Stalin's message to Churchill of 3 September,
15. See Jones, The Roads to Russia, Chap. 2.

16. Most Secret, Hist. (R) 1, September 18, 1941, War Cabinet, Assistance to
Russia, 29th June, PREM3/401/1, The National Archives (TNA), Kew, Surrey, United
Kingdom.
MILITARY HISTORY * 779
HILL
ALEXANDER
in which he used the word "sell" with regard to British fighter deliveries
to the Soviet Union, Churchill pointed out that "any assistance we can
give you would better be upon the same basis of comradeship as the
American Lend-Lease Bill, of which no formal account is kept in
money." Up to this point all items or materials were apparently deemed
to be either purchases on credit with the expectation of eventual pay-
ment, be this in gold or raw materials, or, in the instance of the first 200
Tomahawk (P-40C) fighters, a "gift" from the United Kingdom." Whilst
requests for some items such as raw materials or naval supplies could be
met immediately from British and Commonwealth stocks, the delivery of
significant numbers of weapons systems such as tanks and aircraft was
more complicated. British plans to equip its own forces were dependent
on U.S. supplies, and the addition of the Soviet Union into the equation
required coordination between the two Anglo-Saxon powers prior to dis-
cussion with the Soviet Union.
Whilst the British government was relieved that the Soviet Union
was now in the war, and hopeful that it would remain so, members were
also concerned that aid to "Russia" from the United States would not
damage British military priorities.s8 This thought can only have been
made all the more unpleasant by the fact that Britain had considered
going to war against the Soviet Union in early 1940 in order to aid the
Finns.19 Of particular concern were deliveries of aircraft, especially
medium and heavy bombers, which would be one of the few means for
British forces to take offensive action against the Axis outside North
Africa. At the Cabinet meeting of 19 September 1941, after British and
U.S. military staffs had decided, broadly speaking, what could be offered
to the Soviet Union at the Moscow Conference planned for the end of the
month, opponents and supporters of more wholehearted assistance to
the Soviet Union were able to express their views a further time before
promises were made in Moscow. In the context of concerns about the
ability of the United States to fulfil existing promises to Britain, Sir
Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, leader of the Liberal Party,
17. Most Secret, Hist. (R) 1, 18 September 1941, War Cabinet, Assistance to
Russia, 25th July and 4th September, Foreign Office to Moscow, PREM3/401/1, TNA.
The latter received 6 September, as Correspondence Between the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR and ..., vol. 1, Correspondence with Winston S.
Churchill and Clement R. Attlee (July 1941-November 1945) (Moscow:Progress Pub-
lishers, 1957), 29-30. For Stalin's message to Churchill of 3 September, see ibid.,
27-29. See also Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi, 22-23.
18. For an appreciation of these priorities, see Brian P. Farrell, "YesPrime Min-
ister: Barbarossa,Whipcord, and the Basis of British Grand Strategy, Autumn 1941,"
Journal of Military History 57 (October 1993): 599-625.
19. See Alexander Hill, "The Birth of the Soviet Northern Fleet, 1937-1942,"
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 16 (June 2003): 70-71.
and vociferous opponent of both of the continental dictatorships, ques-

tioned whether aircraft allocations to the Soviet Union would detract
from British capabilities at home and in the Middle East, whether aircraft
provided to Russia would be as effective in Soviet hands as in British, and
why British aircraft should be sent to a Soviet Union not willing to pro-
vide information about its own, still sizeable production. However, by
this stage the concerns of those such as Sinclair in the British cabinet,
like the statements of the isolationists and dogmatic anticommunists in
the U.S. Congress, were increasingly brushed aside. For those such as
Lord Beaverbrook, Minister for Supply, it was crucial to make the "Rus-
sians exact and substantial offers" so that they would continue the war,
even if "the course of the war or limitations of transport" might prevent
their fulfilment "in their entirety."20
As a result of Anglo-American discussions prior to the Moscow Con-
ference, certain Soviet requests for aid had been turned down. At this
point in the war, neither Britain nor the United States was willing to sup-
ply the eight destroyers requested by the Soviet Union,21 nor indeed did
it seem likely that the nine minesweeping trawlers requested could be
supplied, although the United States was apparently "looking into the
possibility of production of the latter." Nonetheless, the United States
and Britain went to the negotiating table in Moscow willing to supply 400
aircraft and 500 tanks per month, the provision of which, if cuts to allo-
cations to the British and U.S. forces were not to be severe, would
require significant increases in U.S. output.22 British estimates of its
future loss of aircraft strength, due to a large extent to deliveries to the
Soviet Union, stood at 13 percent for medium and heavy bomber
squadrons, 14 percent for light bombers, and 9 percent for fighters.23
Between 28 September and 1 October, representatives of the Soviet
Union, the United States, and Britain attended the Moscow Supply Con-
ference, where the United States made commitments to supply
1,500,000 tons of supplies to the Soviet Union during the First Moscow
20. Secret, D.O. (41) 62nd Meeting, War Cabinet, Defence Committee (Opera-
tions), Minutes of Meeting held on Friday 19th September 1941 ..., PREM3/401/7,
TNA.
21. Destroyers would in fact be supplied to the Soviet Union only in the summer
of 1944 in lieu of the Soviet share of the Italian fleet. The Soviet Northern Fleet was
provided with Town Class ships supplied to Britain under the "destroyers for bases"
agreement, albeit with weapons and electronics fits appropriatefor a later stage of the
war. See Arnold Hague,Destroyers for Great Britain: A History of the 50 Town Class
Ships Transferredfrom the United States to Great Britain in 1940 (London: Green-
hill Books, 1990).
22. Secret, D.O. (41) 11, 22 September 1941, War Cabinet, Conference on
British-United States Production and Assistance to Russia, PREM3/401/7, TNA.
23. Ibid., Enclosure IV.
HILL
ALEXANDER
Protocol, which covered the period to 30 June 1942. The Soviets were to
pay for the supplies, in part, by cash advances on gold deliveries and by
supplying raw materials in the future. Attempts in Congress failed to
specifically exclude the Soviet Union from the second Lend-Lease appro-
priation, which passed into law on 28 October and preserved the right of
the President to designate Lend-Lease countries. By this point U.S. neu-
trality was increasingly a myth, in view of the U.S. warships convoying
non-U.S. merchantmen as far as Iceland and the United States estab-
lishing a presence in Iran on the basis of a Presidential Directive of 13
September. On 7 November 1941 Roosevelt finally declared the defence
of the Soviet Union essential to that of the United States, and incorpo-
rated the Soviet Union in the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act.24
Nonetheless, even meeting commitments under the First Moscow Proto-
col to supply 1,500,000 tons of goods to the Soviet Union by 30 June
1942 was a challenge to the U.S. administration as the industrial giant
started to flex its muscles. This left the United Kingdom as the senior
partner in the provision of aid to the Soviet Union for the period of the
First Protocol, even if some weapons supplied by Britain to the Soviet
Union came from British Lend-Lease allocations or previous direct pur-
chases from the United States.25 In addition the British would play the
dominant role in the actual delivery of aid during the First Protocol
period. Because supply routes via Iran and Alaska would require devel-
opment, more than 90 percent26 of the delivered equipment and materi-
als arrived at the Soviet ports of Archangel and Murmansk via the
increasingly perilous sea route around German-occupied Norway, from
which German submarines, surface ships, and aircraft could launch
attacks on these "northern" or "Arctic" convoys.27
Commitments and Aid of the First Moscow Protocol

In terms of basic weapons systems, the United Kingdom and the
United States had committed in Moscow to supply the Soviet Union with
24. Jones, The Roads to Russia, Chap. 2.

25. A good example of U.S.-manufactured equipment being supplied to the
Soviet Union as British aid is the 200 Tomahawkfighters mentioned above.
26. According to Soviet summary data, 99.6 percent of aid by tonnage arrived
through northern ports during 1941, and 83.9 percent during 1942. Otchet o rabote
Importnogo upravleniia [NKVT]po importu i eksportu vooruzheniia i oborudovaniia
s 22.06.1941 g. po 01.01.1946 g., 02.03.1946, f.413.o.9.d.555.1.17, Russian State
Archive of the Economy (RGAE),Moscow. My thanks to Mikhail Suprun for provid-
ing me with this report.
27. Accessible accounts of these convoys are provided in Paul Kemp, Convoy!
Drama in Arctic Waters (London: Brockhampton Press, 1999); and Richard Wood-
man, Arctic Convoys (London: John Murray,1994).
200 aircraft each per month until the end of June 1942, along with 250
tanks, giving totals of 3,600 and 4,500 respectively over a nine-month
period. However, initial British deliveries of tanks would be 300 per
month, "decreasing to 250 as American supplies increase." As for air-
craft, the commitment was to supply, in full, the quantity requested by
the Soviet Union. However, the requested ratio of 300 light and medium
bombers to 100 fighters would be replaced by 200 fighters per month
from the United Kingdom and 100 of each from the United States in
order to satisfy British demands to be able to preserve the expected rate
of expansion of its bomber forces.28 The relative significance of British
deliveries would be increased temporarily during December 1941 by the
U.S. reaction to the outbreak of war with Japan, as until 17 December
1941 U.S. supplies destined for the Soviet Union were apparently
unloaded from merchant vessels still in U.S. ports and provided to U.S.
forces.29
When Allied, and in particular British, deliveries of key weapons sys-
tems for the war as a whole are compared to Soviet production for the
same period, they can understandably be viewed as being of little signif-
icance. If Soviet production of tanks and self-propelled guns is taken as
110,340 for the whole war,30then 4,542 tanks supplied by Britain might
seem unimportant.31 However, Soviet production of principal types of
tanks and self-propelled guns (T-34, KV series, and light tanks) was in
the region of only 4,649 for the second half of 194132 and 11,178 for the
first six months of 1942,33 giving a total of 15,827 from the end of June
1941 to the end of June 1942. British deliveries alone during this time,
28. (Cypher), Special (Lord Beaverbrook), From British Supply Mission,

Moscow, to Foreign Office, Lord Beaverbrook, No. 42 Linen, 3rd October, 1941, WO
193/580, TNA;and Secret, W.P.(41) 238, 8 October 1941, WarCabinet, Moscow Con-
ference, PREM3/401/7, TNA.
29. According to Soviet sources, 447 out of 457 aircraft at U.S. ports awaiting
shipment to the Soviet Union were recalled for U.S. use between 13 and 17 Decem-
ber 1941. Of the aircraft and tanks to be provided by the United States under the First
Protocol, 95 U.S. aircraft and 27 tanks had arrived in the Soviet Union through the
end of December 1941, and 106 aircraft and 139 tanks were in transit. Iz spravki Nar-
odnogo komissara vneshnei torgovli SSSR A.I. Mikoian o vipolnenii Angliei i SShA
obiazatel'stv, priniatikh na Moskovskoi konferentsii trekh derzhav, po postavkam v
SSSR vooruzheniia, oborudovaniia i sir'ia za oktiabr'-dekabr'1941 g. [9 ianvaria 1942
g.], in G. N. Sevost'ianov, et al., eds., Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia. 1939-1945
[Rossii. XX vek. Dokumenti] (Moskva:MFD, 2004), 192-93.
30. N. Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR v 1920-1950 godi
(Moskva:ROSSPEN,1996) 164.
31. Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi, 358.
32. Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks, 162.
33. Harrison, Soviet Planning, 251.
top20
Turret 20 10 10 10 10 35 16 13 1987).
Principal Co.,
Turret
75
rear 65 30 15 45 30
and
Union
AlongsideTurret
75 65/60 30 25 25 15 45
75+35/75 38/30
Soviet front/sides
Macdona
the
Tail 55 60 21 12 16 13 75 45-47 19-25 of
to
Moscow
for
Belly 13-20 7-20 16 8 10 6-10 35 20 10-12
imprint
(mm)
Supplied an
Battle
Deck 20 17 17 10 10 6-10 25 20 10
the Cat,
Armour
Tanks
Sides 40-70 60 30 15-19 16 13 75-77 45-47 25 Black
during
Light
1 M3
Driver's
plate 60 30 25 25 22 75+35 45-47 38
Action (London
in U.S.
Table
and Glacis
47
plate 30 25 25 25 22 75 13
Tanks
Tanks II
Hull 78
nose 60 30 25 25 22 70+25 45-47 51
Models War
Valentine 150 110 109 125 215 220 140 188 70

Soviet(miles)
Range World
and
and
(tons)26.5
Weight 16 20 8.4 10.1 13.8 42.8 27.6 12.2 Grove,
Matilda Eric
German 15 15 25 16.8 33
35 22 32 36 in
Speed
(mph)
+ + + + MG + + + MG + +
British
L/50 MG L/50 MG MG L/46 L/46
of L/47.8 MG MGL/41.2 L/41.2 MG MG entries
L/42 rounds)rounds)rounds) L/50rounds)
rounds)rounds)
7.92 rounds) rounds)
7.92mm rounds)
(mm)lx40mm
Armament
Contemporary (93 x40mm
1x7.92
(791x 1x50
(992x7.92
1x37.2
(902x 1x45mm
(165 1x45mm
(188
2x7.62 1x76.2
(111
2x7.62 1x76.2
3(2?)x7.62 1x37(103
(772x7.62 x7.62
1
I
(111) IIIF Relevant
II III Stuart
Characteristics
Type MkMatilda (II)Pzkpfw Pzkpfw
MkValentine T-26S BT-7-2 KV-1 T-34/76B
38(t)C M3 Source:
784 A A A A
largely the period of the First Moscow Protocol, come to 1,442, or about
9 percent of Soviet production.34
Under the provisions of the First Moscow Protocol, Britain supplied
to the Soviet Union Matilda (MK II) and Valentine tanks, the most effec-
tive tanks the British had available in any numbers in 1941.35 Canada
would eventually produce 1,420 Valentines, almost exclusively for deliv-
ery to the Soviet Union from 1942.36 Table 1 gives characteristics of
appropriate marks of Matilda and Valentine heavy and medium tanks
compared to principal German models in the field at the end of 1941,
along with Soviet medium and heavy tanks of the same period. Details of
the M3 Light tank (Stuart I) supplied by the United States to both Britain
and the U.S.S.R. at the time are also provided. Whilst the main arma-
ments of the Matilda and Valentine were increasingly satisfactory only
for light tanks, and their lack of a high-explosive capability for dealing
with larger calibre antitank gun threats was a significant drawback, their
armour put them firmly in the heavy and medium categories, respec-
tively. As Table 1 indicates, the protection offered by the armour of both
the Matilda and Valentine was superior to all but the KV-1 and T-34.
Whilst the Matilda and Valentine were certainly inferior to the T-34
and KV-1, it is worth noting that Soviet production of the T-34 (and to a
lesser extent the KV series), was only just getting seriously underway in
1942,37 and hence the relative inferiority of British tanks to the Soviet
armoured pool as a whole was less during this period than it would be
only a few months later, after the First Protocol period. It is also worth
noting that Soviet production was well below plan targets. For instance,
production of the T-34 at Factory Number 112, according to a State
Defence Committee decree of 9 July 1941, was supposed to rise from 10
units in August 1941 to 250 by December, a total of 710 units over five
months.38 The reality was, in itself a significant achievement given the
34. Most Secret, W.P.(42) 417, 7 September 1942, War Cabinet, Report on ful-
fillment of the Moscow Protocol, October, 1941-June, 1942, p. 17, PREM3/401/7,
TNA.
35. Some of this material on British tanks up to the end of 1941 was published
as Alexander Hill, "British 'Lend-Lease'Tanks and the Battle for Moscow, November-
December 1941--A Research Note," in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies 19
(June 2006): 289-94.
36. See Report No. 38, historical Section (G.S.), Army Headquarters, 27 July
1950, Tank Production in Canada, http://www.forces.gc.ca/dhh/downloads/ahq/
ahq038.pdf. On 31 January 1942 only fifteen Canadian-produced Valentines had
arrived in the Soviet Union, increasing to thirty by 4 March. See Secret A.S.E. (1942)
74, 4th March 1942, WarCabinet, Allied Supplies Executive, Military Supplies to Rus-
sia: Progress Report .... Extract .... Tanks, DO 35/1047/4, TNA.
37. See Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks, 163-64.
38. GKO, Postanovlenie No.GOKO-82/ssot 9 iiulia 1941 g. Moskva, Kreml', Ob
obespechenii proizvodstva tankov T-34 na zavode "Krasnoe Sormovo,"
HILL
ALEXANDER
British tanks, apparently loading for shipment to the Soviet Union, exact date
unknown. In the foreground, Matilda heavy tanks, and in the background
Valentinemedium tanks. (Photo courtesy of the TankMuseum,Bovington,U.K.
print #991/D3.)
conversion of this factory from the series production of submarines to

armoured vehicles, the production of 173 units to the end of 1941.39 Pro-
duction targets continued to be unrealistic into 1942; for example, Fac-
tory Number 112 had targets to produce a total of 1,240 units during
June-September 1942 alone, where actual production was 2,584 for
1942 as a whole.40 From 22 June to 31 December 1941, according to
Colonel-General G. F. Krivosheev, only 3,200 medium and heavy tanks
were delivered to the Red Army, figures including Lend-Lease equipment
starting to filter through.41Nikolai Simonov gives production of the T-34
f.644.o.1.d.1.1.272, Russian State Archive for Socio-Political History (RGASPI),

Moscow, Russia.
39. Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks, 163.
40. GKO,Postanovlenie No.GOKO-1880/ssot 5 iiunia 1942 g. Moskva,Kreml',O
proizvodstve tankov T-34, f.644.o.1.d.38.1.266, RGASPI; and Simonov, Voenno-
promishlennii kompleks, 163.
41. Along with 2,400 light tanks. G. F. Krivosheev, ed., Soviet Casualties and
Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London: Greenhill Books, 1997), 252; and
Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks, 162.
and KV series for the second half of 1941 as 2,819 units, and Mikhail
Suprun notes that 361 heavy and medium British Lend-Lease tanks had
reached the Red Army by this point, a total of 3,180.42
Both the Matilda and the Valentine required modification for service
in Russian conditions. The pneumatic transmission on Matildas, for
instance, could not stand up to the temperatures in Russia and required
replacement with mechanical alternatives.43 Not only were the track
plates on Valentines considered too narrow, and suitable only for sum-
mer conditions, but spurs were regarded as necessary in Russian condi-
tions and had to be manufactured locally. British-supplied track pins
were viewed as weak and difficult to replace.44 Understandably consider-
ing the 40 mm gun on both the Matilda and Valentine to be inadequate,
the Soviets made abortive attempts to up gun both, the Matilda with a 76
mm gun.45Whilst both faced contemporary German tanks during British
service in North Africa, in Soviet service they were apparently used
increasingly often in defensive operations or for infantry support in con-
junction with Soviet tanks.46 This limitation was certainly realistic from
the second half of 1942 onwards, but prior to this, Soviet stocks of
medium and heavy tanks did not always permit the relegation of British
tanks to supporting roles.
Assessment of the significance of British deliveries of armour during
the first year of the war requires, however, the consideration of not only
relative quality and British deliveries as a proportion of Soviet produc-
tion, but also the scale of Soviet losses and resulting force levels; during
the period of the First Moscow Protocol Soviet losses approached and at
times exceeded domestic supply, making any additional inputs signifi-
cant.47 Whilst the Soviet Union had developed tanks far superior to those
in service in Britain and the United States, and indeed of such effective-
ness as to drive Germany to produce the overcomplicated Panther in
response to the T-34 and KV-1, the Soviets not only did not have the
planned quantities of these types, but were barely able to maintain force
levels in the face of horrendous losses. According to Krivosheev, the
Soviet Union lost 20,500 tanks between 22 June and 31 December 1941,
of which 3,200 were either heavy or medium, with an initial stock of
such types of 1,400. Only 5,600 tanks were received during the same
42. Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks, 162; and Suprun,Lend-liz i sev-

ernie konvoi, 52.
43. Biriukov, Tanki-frontu! 62 and 68-69.
44. Secret Cipher Telegram,From:30 MilitaryMission, To:The WarOffice, Recd
22/11/41, WO 193/580, TNA.
45. Biriukov, Tanki-frontu! 55 and 71.
47. Harrison, Soviet Planning, 114 and 264; and Krivosheev,Soviet Casualties
and Combat Losses, 252.
HILL
ALEXANDER
period, of which, as noted above, only 3,200 were medium or heavy

tanks including imports.48 By the end of 1941, out of 750 promised
tanks, Britain had delivered 466, of which 259 were Valentines and 187
Matildas, the remainder apparently Tetrarch. Of these, 216 Valentines
and 145 Matildas had been supplied to the Red Army.49With total Red
Army tank stocks, as of 31 December, consequently being in the region
of 7,700 according to Krivosheev (or 6,347 on 1 December according to
Suprun), of which only 1,400 were medium or heavy models, then
British deliveries to date represented in the region of only 6.5 percent of
total Red Army tank strength, but over 33 percent of medium and heavy
tanks, with British vehicles actually in Red Army hands representing
about 25 percent of medium and heavy tanks in service.50
Given disruption to Soviet production and high losses, the Soviet
Union was understandably concerned to put British and U.S. armour
into action as soon as possible, quickly attempting to amend the most
easily remedied defects. A good indication of Soviet efforts to these ends
can be gained from the service diary of N. I. Biriukov, Military Commis-
sar of the Main Auto-Armour Board of the Red Army from 10 August
1941. According to Biriukov's notes, the first 20 British Valentine tanks
arrived at the tank training school in Kazan' on 28 October 1941, at
which point a further 120 were unloading at Archangel.51 Courses for the
preparation of Soviet crews for Valentines and Matildas had started dur-
ing November whilst the first tanks, with British assistance, were being
assembled from their in-transit states and undergoing testing by Soviet
specialists.52
According to the British Military Mission in Moscow, by 9 December
1941 about 90 British tanks had been in action with Soviet forces.53 On
20 November 1941 Biriukov reported that 137 and 139 Tank Battalions
of 146 Tank Brigade, along with 131 Independent Tank Battalion, had
been equipped with 21 Valentines each; 132 Independent Tank Battalion
had 19 Valentines and 2 Matildas; 138 Independent Tank Battalion had 15
Matildas and 6 Valentines; and 136 Independent Tank Battalion had 3
Matildas and 9 Valentines.54 Of these units, the British Military Mission
was referring to 146 Tank Brigade and 131, 136, and 138 Independent
48. Krivosheev,Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, 252; and Suprun, Lend-
liz i severnie konvoi, 52.
49. Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi, 49 and 52.
50. Krivosheev,Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, 252; and Suprun, Lend-
liz i severnie konvoi, 53.
52. Ibid., 51-55.
53. Secret Cipher Telegram,From:30 MilitaryMission, To: The WarOffice, Reed
11/12/41, WO 193/580, TNA.
54. Biriukov, Tanki-frontu! 57.
BarentsSea
1. Murmansk
2. Archangel
3. Leningrad 1
4. ToKazan'
5. Ivanovo
6. Kalinin
7. Riga ea
NWNe(
8. Smolensk 2
9. Minsk Lake
10.Tula Ladoja
11. Kiev ulf of
12. Rostov n
13. Sevastopol 3
14. Kursk
i7 6
/ Frontline 5
as of early
December 4-ss
IMAoscow
1941 8
91
10
dik,,
11 14
012
S0 300
131
miles (approx) BlackSea
HILL
ALEXANDER
Tank Battalions. The first of these units to have been in action seems to
have been 138 Independent Tank Battalion, which as part of 30 Army of
the Western Front, along with 24 and 145 Tank Brigades and 126 Inde-
pendent Tank Battalion, was involved in stemming the advance of Ger-
man units in the region of the Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow in
late November. In fact the British intercepted German communications
indicating that German forces had first come into contact with British
tanks operated by the Soviets on 26 November 1941.55 More widely noted
are the exploits of 136 Independent Tank Battalion, part of a scratch
operational group of 33 Army of the Western Front, consisting of 18 Rifle
Brigade, two ski battalions, 5 and 20 Tank Brigades, and 140 Independent
Tank Battalion. The latter was combined with 136 Independent Tank Bat-
talion to produce a tank group of only 21 tanks, which was to operate with
the two ski battalions against German forces advancing to the west of
Moscow in early December. In action with the Western Front from early
December was 131 Independent Tank Brigade with 50 Army to the east
of Tula to the south of Moscow. Also seeing action was 146 Tank Brigade
with 16 Army of the Western Front from early December in the region of
Kriukovo to the immediate west of the Soviet capital.56
According to Marshal P. A. Rotmistrov, at the end of November 1941
there were only 670 Soviet tanks, of which only 205 were heavy or
medium types, for the Fronts before Moscow, that is, the recently formed
Kalinin, Western, and South-Western Fronts. Most of this tank strength
was concentrated with the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having
only two tank battalions (67 tanks) and the South-Western two tank
brigades (30 tanks).57 Alternative figures suggest that of 667 tanks with
frontline units of the Kalinin, the Western, and the right wing of the South-
Western Fronts as of 1 December 1941, 607 were with the Western Front,
including 205 which were KV series and T-34s; the Kalinin Front and the
right wing of the South-Western Front had 17 and 43 tanks respectively,
none of which apparently were KV series or T-34s.58Either set of figures is
a significant improvement on the 141 heavy and medium tanks available
to the Western, Reserve, and Briansk Fronts before Moscow as of 1 Octo-
ber 1941.59 In the light of these statistics, it is reasonable to suggest that
55. See Eastern Europe, Miscellaneous, On 26/11 .... , 0630/27/11/41,

CX/MSS/470/T17, HW 1/267, TNA. A "Front"was roughly comparable to a German
army.
56. P. A. Rotmistrov, Vremia i tanki (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1972), 107-18,
http://militera.lib.ru.
57. Ibid., 112.
58. Not including 9, 17, and 24 Tank Brigades. "Moskovskaiabitva v tsifrakh
(period kontrnastupleniia)," in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 1 (1967): 92.
59. "Moskovskaia bitva v tsifrakh (period oboroni)," in Voenno-istoricheskii
zhurnal, no. 3 (1967):71.
British-supplied tanks made up in the region of 30 to 40 percent of the

heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the
beginning of December 1941, and that they made up a significant propor-
tion of such vehicles available as reinforcements at this critical juncture.
By the beginning of January 1942, those British-supplied tank units
that had been fighting before Moscow at the end of November and dur-
ing December were at low strength, even if new units were being
equipped with tanks that had been delivered in the meantime. On 21
January 1942 Biriukov noted that 26 Valentines of 80 Tank Brigade, to
operate together with 20 T-60s, were heading in the direction of Kursk
for frontline service. He also stated that 36, 37, and 38 Tank Brigades
were equipping with British tanks; by 27 January 1942 36 Tank Brigade
had 21 T-34s, 24 Valentines, and 48 T-60s; and both 37 and 38 Tank
Brigades were to receive Matildas instead of Valentines.60
A steady stream of British-supplied tanks was provided to Soviet
units during the spring and summer of 1942. From 10 May 1942 British
tanks were sent to reinforce the Briansk and Kalinin Fronts and South-
Western napravlenie,61 with the South-Western napravlenie to receive
90 Matildas and 70 Valentines during May 1942.62 According to Suprun,
immediately prior to July 1942 and therefore at the end of the First
Moscow Protocol period, the Red Army had 13,500 tanks in service, of
which 2,200, or 16 percent, were imported, and of which over 50 per-
cent were British.63However, mechanical problems, in part due to Soviet
unfamiliarity with this new, foreign equipment, kept in the region of 50
percent of imported tanks out of service at any one time up to the end
of 1942. Soviet sources did, however, note the general relative reliability
of the Leyland engines of Matildas compared to Soviet models.64
Whilst by late 1942 Soviet production made British tank supplies
increasingly less significant, aircraft deliveries, the importance of which
arguably exceeded that of tanks during the First Moscow Protocol period,
remained significant into 1943. Soviet combat aircraft production from
the end of June 1941 to the end of June 1942 was in the region of the fig-
ure of 16,468 aircraft given by Mark Harrison.65By the end of June 1942
61. A napravlenie was a Soviet command consisting of more than one adjacent
Front.
62. Biriukov, Tanki-frontu! 148-49. On the Soviet use of tanks delivered by
the Arctic convoy PQ-12 in March 1942, see Alexander Hill, "The Allocation of Allied
'Lend-Lease' Aid to the Soviet Union Arriving with Convoy PQ-12, March 1942-a
State Defence Committee Decree," Journal of Slavic Military Studies 19 (December
2006): 727-38.
64. Ibid., 52.
65. Harrison, Soviet Planning, 251. See also Krivosheev,Soviet Casualties and
Combat Losses, 254.
HILL
ALEXANDER
the United Kingdom had delivered 1,323 fighter aircraft, or about 8 per-
cent of Soviet production from the start of the war.66Given that Soviet
combat aircraft losses for this period at best approached domestic sup-
ply, and were especially severe for the first six months of the war, then
British deliveries alone are of some significance, particularly when tak-
ing into account the extremely high Soviet losses of the first weeks of the
war, which depleted prewar stocks. According to Krivosheev, total Soviet
combat aircraft losses for the period 22 June to 31 December 1941 were
17,900. Added to the 20,000 stocks on 22 June 1941 were 9,900 deliv-
ered during the period concerned, giving a force level of approximately
12,000 at the end of 1941. Specifically regarding fighters, Krivosheev
lists stocks on 22 June 1941 as about 11,500, augmented by 6,000
received during the period to 31 December, but with losses of 9,600, giv-
ing a force on 31 December of 7,900.67 Convoys had delivered 699 air-
craft to Archangel by the time the destination changed to Murmansk in
December 1941, due to winter ice in the White Sea.68 Of these aircraft,
99 Hurricanes and 39 Tomahawks were already in service with the
Soviet air defence forces (PVO) as of 1 January 1942,69 out of a total of
1,470 (6.7 percent) as detailed in Table 2, with the Northern Fleet being
a major recipient as described below.70
Those aircraft types supplied by Britain, either from domestic pro-
duction or from British orders from the United States, such as the Tom-
ahawk, Kittyhawk (P-40E), and Hurricane, were inferior to the latest
marks of the German Bfl09, and indeed in aspects of performance to the
latest Soviet types. Britain was reluctant to supply Spitfires to the Soviet
Union given its own needs.71 Initial Soviet concerns about the Hurricane
focused on its armament and armour. The Soviets not only viewed the
armour plating protecting the pilot as inadequate against medium cali-
66. Most Secret, W.P.(42) 417, September 17, 1942, WarCabinet, Report on ful-
TNA.
67. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, 254. See also Harrison,
Soviet Planning, 114 and 251.
68. Severnie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip.3 (Moskva:
Andreevskii flag, 2000), 328.
69. As distinct from airpower attached to particular Fronts, or of the navy,
responsible for the air defence of naval bases.
70. Iu. Izotikov, "Nakakikh samolotov letal Pokhrishkin, ili ne boites' britantsev,
dari prinosiashchikh?" Vestnik protovozdushnoi oboroni, no. 4 (1991): 35. On the
Northern Fleet, see below.
71. Nonetheless, by late 1942 they were being supplied in small numbers. On 3
November 1942, 49 of 150 promised had been dispatched to the Soviet Union, with
the remainder due to be sent by the end of the month. Extract from A.B.E. (42) 21st
meeting held on Tuesday, 3rd November, 1942, Supplies of Aircraft to the USSR, AIR
20/3904, TNA.
Table 2
Aircraft in service with the air defence forces (PVO)
of the Soviet Union 1941-1942
Year Available on 1 Jan 42 1942
Type of aircraft Total Written off
1-153 264 143 52
1-16 .........411 ...........333 ........131
MiG-3 351 409 192
LaGG-3 ................170 ...........418 ........172
Yak-1 136 261 119
Yak-7 ................. -...........109 .........17
Hurricane 99 468 121
Tomahawk ..............39 ............56 .........15
Kittyhawk - 98 56
P-39 ......- .............12 ..........3
Total 1470 2307 878
Of which Lend-Lease .....138 ...........634 ........195
c Lend-Lease 9.4 27.5 22.2
Source: Iu. Izotikov, "Na kakikh samoletakh letal Pokrishkin, ili ne
boites' britantsev, dari prinosiashchikh?" Vesnik protivovozdushnoi
oboroni, no. 4 (1991): 35.
bre ammunition at ranges of 50 to 200 metres, but also considered the

all-machine-gun armament as weak. The latter was to prompt a Soviet
programme of rearmament to two 20 mm cannon and two 12.7 mm
heavy machine guns.72 However, according to Soviet experts, 80 percent
of the specialist equipment of British aircraft such as the Hurricane, for
example, radio and navigational equipment, was so valuable that they
recommended it be manufactured by Soviet industry.73
Tables 3 and 4 (following page) allow comparison of key characteris-
tics of Soviet fighters in service with the Soviet air defence forces (PVO)
in 1941-42 with Lend-Lease aircraft in Soviet service in significant num-
bers, along with the latest production mark of the German Bf109 as of
the end of 1941. Whilst Soviet pilots praised the maneuverability of the
72. Secret Cipher Telegram, Reed AMCS 0112 hrs. 4.7.42, To: Air Ministry,
From: 30 Mission, AIR 20/3904, TNA; and Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni.
Postanovlenie No. GKO-1291ss ot 16 fevralia 1942 g. Moskva, Kreml', O
perevooruzhenii samolotov "Kharrikein,"f.644.o.1.d.21.1.96, RGASPI.
Table 3
Key characteristics of Soviet-manufactured aircraft in service
with the Soviet PVO 1941-1942
Type of aircraft Armament Max Time to Service Operational
speed 16,400 feet ceiling Range
1-153 (1940) 4x 7.62 mm (16,750 ft) (Prototype) 34,750 ft
MG 265 mph 6.1 min
1-16 Type 29 1x12.7 mm MG (14,250 ft) (Prototype) 32,000 ft
(1940) 2x7.62 mm MG 286 mph 6.8 min
MiG-3(1941) 1x12.7 mm MG (25,500 ft) 5.3 min 39,500 ft 509 miles
2x7.62 mm MG 398 mph
LaGG-3(1941) 1x20 mm (16,500 ft) 8.5 min 30,500 ft 438 miles
cannon, 2x 332 mph
12.7 mm MG
Yak-i (1941) 1x20 mm (15,750 ft) 6.8 min 32,500 ft (1940) 434
cannon, 2x 348 mph miles
7.62 mm MG
Yak-7B 1x20 mm (12,000 ft) 5.8 min 32,500 ft 400 miles
cannon, 2x 354 mph
12.7mm MG
Source: Yefim Gordon and Dmitri Khazanov, Soviet Combat Aircraft of the Sec-
ond World War, vol. 1, Single-Engined Fighters (Leicester: Midland Publishing,
1998), 174-77.
Table 4
Key characteristics of Lend-Lease aircraft in service with the
Soviet PVO 1941-1942, compared with German Bfl09
Type of aircraft Armament Max Time to Service Operational
speed 16,400 feet ceiling Range
HurricaneIIA 8x.303 in MG (11C) (11C) (11C) (IIC)(Max)
(18,000 ft) [30,000] 35,600 ft 920 miles
329 mph 12 min30 sec
TomahawkIIA 2 x .5 in MG (15,000 ft) 32,400 ft (Max)1,230
(P-40B) 2 x .3 in MG 352 mph miles
KittyhawkIA 6x .5 in MG (5,000 ft) [10,000] 29,000 ft (Max)850
(P-40E) 335 mph 4 min48 sec miles
Bf109F-2 1 x 15 mm MG (19,685 ft) [16,400] 36,090 ft (Max)528
cannon, 2x 373 mph 5 min 12 sec miles
7.9 mm MG
Source: Appropriate entries in Elke C. Weal, John A. Weal, and Richard F.
Barker, Combat Aircraft of World War Two (Agincourt, Ontario: Gage Trade
Publishing, 1977).
- BritishLend-LeaseAid and the Soviet War
Effort
A Hurricane fighter operating from northern Russia during the early winter of
1941. These aircraft of 151 Wing were initially flown by British pilots before
being handed over to the Soviets. (Photo courtesy of the ImperialWarMuseum,
#CR58.)
1-153 Chaika and 1-16 Rata fighters, both still in use in significant num-
bers in 1941, both types were certainly obsolete and inferior to the Hur-
ricane in almost all regards.74The Hurricane was also both rugged and
tried and tested, and arguably at least as useful at that point as many
potentially superior Soviet designs such as the LaGG-3 and MiG-3,
which were suffering considerable teething troubles in early war pro-
duction aircraft. For instance, in the LaGG-3, of which there were appar-
ently only 263 in the Soviet inventory by the time the Soviet Moscow
counteroffensive started on 5-6 December 1941, eight "serious" defects,
many the result of "poor manufacturing standards," were identified in
74. Nonetheless, only the previous summer, when the British, who were as des-
perate then for aircraftas the Soviet Union was in the second half of 1941, were look-
ing to purchase fighter aircraft abroad, the British Air Ministry considered the 1-16,
although they viewed it, arguably unreasonably, as comparable to the Gloucester
Gladiatorbiplane fighter! It was mooted that China might be a suitable go-between in
any purchases, given the diplomatic unacceptability of direct sales of such aircraft to
Britain (and indeed, the purchase of tanks was also suggested). The proposal, unsur-
prisingly, did not get anywhere. See discussions in AIR 8/372, TNA.
HILL
ALEXANDER
early production aircraft by the newly formed Flight Research Institute.

At the end of 1941 the MiG-3 was more numerous, but was considered
difficult to fly. The Yak-1, arguably the best of the batch and superior in
most regards to the Hurricane, suffered from "airframe and engine"
defects in early war production aircraft.75
Fighter aircraft being supplied by the British to the Soviet Union in
late 1941 were, compared to Soviet types, best suited to interceptor and
escort rather than ground support roles, for instance. It is therefore
unsurprising that many such Lend-Lease aircraft served with the Soviet
air defence forces or with naval aviation-as of 5 December 1941 about
15 percent of the aircraft of 6 Fighter Air Corps defending Moscow were
Tomahawks or Hurricanes.76 Such aircraft would continue to be supplied
for service near Moscow in the coming months, as indicated, for
instance, by the distribution of aircraft delivered with convoy PQ-12 in
March 1942. Of 136 Hurricanes, 60 were destined for the Karelian Front,
40 for 6 Air Corps of the PVO (Moscow), and 36 for 22 Replacement Air
Regiment at Ivanovo.77 Six air regiments of Hurricanes were to be cre-
ated during March for the High Command reserve by a GKO order of 3
March 1942.78 Of these, 191 Air Regiment at least seems to have been
replenishing, having converted to Hurricanes in November 1941 before
service with the Kalinin Front.79As shown in Table 2, by the end of 1942,
468 Hurricanes had seen service with the Soviet air defence forces alone,
of which 347 remained active.80
Regarding other aircraft, which in many instances the British had
either purchased in the United States or supplied from their own Lend-
Lease allocations, as early as 12 October 1941 the Soviet 126 Fighter Air
Regiment was operating with Tomahawks, the first Soviet unit to be
equipped with this aircraft.81In addition to Hurricanes, the aircraft deliv-
ered by the British convoy PQ-12 in March 1942 included 44 Kittyhawks
(P-40E), described in Russian documents at this stage as Tomahawks, to
75. Gordon and Khazanov, Soviet Combat Aircraft of the Second World War,
1:28-29, 69, 126.
77. Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni, Postanovlenie No. GKO-1497s ot 26
marta 1942 g. Moskva, Kreml'. . . . raspredeleniia pribivshego iz-za granitsi s 12-m
karavanom vooruzheniia ..., f.644.o.1.d.25.1.106, RGASPI.
78. Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni, Postanovlenie No. GKO-1376ss ot 3
marta 1942 g. Moskva, Kreml',O formirovanii aviapolkov v reserv Stavki Verkhnogo
Glavnogo Komandovaniia,f.644.o.1.d.23.11.46-7, RGASPI.
79. N. F. Kuznetsov,Front nad zemlei (Moskva:Voenizdat, 1970), 73-77; and N.
G. Bodrikhin, Sovetskie asi. Ocherki o sovetskikh letchikakh (Moskva: ZAO KFK,
"TAMP," 1998), 114, http://militera.lib.ru.
80. Izotikov, "Na kakikh samolotov letal Pokhrishkin,"35.
81. A. G. Fedorov, Aviatsiia v bitve pod Moskvoi (Moskva: Nauka, 1975),
114-15, http://militera.lib.ru.
796 * THE JOURNALOF
be distributed amongst the Karelian Front (10), 27 Replacement Air Reg-

iment (for the Leningrad Front) (20), and 6 Air Corps of the PVO (14).82
Genuine Tomahawks (P-40C) also served in late 1941 in defence of the
"Doroga zhizni," or "Road of Life," across the ice of Lake Ladoga to the
besieged city of Leningrad. On 8 December 1941, 20 Tomahawks of 159
Fighter Air Regiment were allocated to the defence of the ice road from
airfields at Shugozero and Podborov'e.83 Even without 154 Fighter Air
Regiment, also equipped with Tomahawks and also committed to the
defence of communications between Leningrad and the Soviet territory
to the east, the 20 Tomahawks of 159 Fighter Air Regiment represented
almost 14 percent of the fighter strength of the Front (20/143) at the end
of November and more than 11 percent of the total aircraft strength of the
Front (20/175) at the end of December 1941, according to data provided
by the commander of the air forces for the Leningrad Front, later Marshal
A. A. Novikov.84As with much Western equipment, the process of train-
ing was hampered by a lack of technical documentation, particularly in
Russian, and Soviet unwillingness to seek British technical assistance.85
It is important to remember, especially given the historiography of
Lend-Lease in Soviet literature, which was as much a product of the Cold
War as understandable Soviet pride in its wartime industrial achieve-
ments, that Lend-Lease aid items were requested by the Soviet Union.
Whilst models of weapons systems supplied might not always have been
those desired, for example, Hurricanes instead of Spitfires, nonetheless
what was requested was subject to genuine need. In this context, raw
materials not subject to any quality concerns (be they justifiable or not),
such as aluminium and rubber, requested from the Allies and supplied in
significant quantities by Britain and the Commonwealth, should be seen
as having been of significance. Britain promised 18,000 tons of alu-
minium during the First Moscow Protocol period and had supplied
14,147 tons by the end of June 1942. Soviet production of aluminium
was 67,600 tons for the whole of 1941, dropping to 51,700 tons for 1942.
During the same period 34,856 tons of rubber, a raw material subject to
82. Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni, Postanovlenie No. GKO-1497s ot 26

marta 1942 g. Moskva, Kreml', . . . raspredeleniia pribivshego iz-za granitsi s 12-m
karavanom vooruzheniia ..., f.644.o.1.d.25.1.106, RGASPI.
83. Prikaz Komanduiushchego VVS Leningradskogofronta Voenno-vozdushnim
silam, 8 dekabria 1941 g., in Blokada Leningrada v dokumentakh rassekrechennikh
arkhivov, ed. N. L. Volkovskii (Moskva/Sankt-Peterburg:Izdatel'stvo Poligon, 2004),
242-43.
84. V. Romanenko, "P-40v sovetskoi aviatsii,"http://www.lend-lease.airforce.ru/
articles/romanenko/p-40/index.htm; and A. A. Novikov, V nebe Leningrada (zapiski
komanduiushchego aviatsiei) (Moskva:Nauka, 1970), 230.
85. As documented in the war diary of the British Military Mission to Moscow,
31 December 1942, points 38-44, ADM223/252, TNA.
ALEXANDERHILL
increasing shortage in the Soviet Union, was delivered.86 The total of

54,000 tons initially promised was revised down to 42,000 tons in light
of the war with Japan. Also worthy of note were medical supplies from
the United Kingdom and India, although deliveries fell far short of Soviet
demands.s7
Britain delivered to the Soviet Union a range of items that the Sovi-
ets could produce but not in the desired quantities, be this due to the
loss of plant or the disruption caused by its evacuation, possibly in the
context of limited initial capacity. An example of this category of aid is
telecommunications equipment. A significant shortage of field telephone
sets for the Red Army was highlighted in a State Defence Committee
decree of 20 July 1941. Whilst the People's Commissariat for Communi-
cations could be ordered to seize 20,000 standard sets from subscribers
in order to free up field sets at supply dumps, hospitals, air defence sites,
and other rear-area objectives, such a solution was only a stop-gap one.
Gor'kovsk Factory Number 197 of the People's Commissariat for Electri-
cal Industry was ordered to reestablish the manufacture of field sets, in
part because field telephone production had been disrupted by the evac-
uation of Factory Number 8 from Leningrad to Molotov, where this fac-
tory was scheduled to restore production in September with a planned
output of 5,000 for that month.88 The actual output for this factory in
November was only 1,000 units, prompting on 6 December 1941 fresh
exhortations to increase production from the State Defence Committee,
which described the existing performance at all factories as "extremely
unsatisfactory," and reminded their directors of their "personal respon-
sibilities" for the fulfillment of these military orders.89 In this context
Lend-Lease aid could to some extent make up for shortfalls in Soviet pro-
duction. Whilst only 2,010 field telephones and 7,565 kilometres of cable
86. One ramification being that in 1942, the crews of T-34s had a more unpleas-
ant ride as rubber rims on the wheels were sacrificed.
87. Most Secret, W.P.(42) 417, September 17, 1942, WarCabinet, Report on ful-
TNA;and Harrison,Accounting for War, 195. Whilst not within the scope of this arti-
cle, it is worth noting that raw materials were provided to the Western Allies by the
Soviets under reverse Lend-Lease. To 30 June 1942, these included 20,243 tons of
chrome ore and 10,000 railway sleepers, excluding supplies for the Middle East. War
Cabinet, Report on fulfillment of the Moscow Protocol, October, 1941-June, 1942, p.
25.
88. Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni, Postanovlenie No. GKO-227ss ot 20 iiu-
lia 1941 g. Moskva, Kreml', O postavke Narkomatu Oboroni sredstv sviazi,
f.644.o.1.d.3.1.209, RGASPI.
89. Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni, Postanovlenie No. GKO-998 ss ot 6
dekabria 1941 g. Moskva, Kreml',O plane proizvodstva i postavkakh osnovnikh sred-
stv sviazi dlia Glavnogo Upravleniia Sviazi KA v dekabria 1941 goda,
f.644.o.1.d.16.1.62, RGASPI.
had been delivered through Archangel by the end of navigation during

1941, these items were delivered outside the Moscow Protocol, in
response to urgent Soviet request. The Soviet Union had in fact asked for
6,000 field telephones per month at the end of September 1941.90 Britain
could offer only 2,000 immediately, with the promise of similar quanti-
ties in future months.91 Whilst it was subsequently decided that the
United States would take over the whole order, nonetheless these 2,000
phones, and an additional 2,000, were shipped by Britain by the end of
the First Protocol Period, along with more than 30,000 kilometres of
cable and 400 switchboards.92 During 1942, 23,311 field telephones
would be delivered through Murmansk alone by the United States and
Britain, along with more than 280,000 kilometres of field telephone
cable.93
The Soviet Union experienced production and supply problems with
radio sets similar to those for land-line communications, sustaining hor-
rendous radio equipment losses during the retreat of the summer and
autumn of 1941. According to Krivosheev, whilst on 22 June 1941,
37,400 sets were available to the Red Army, by 31 December 1941 total
stock was only 19,300 due to losses of 23,700 and new supplies totaling
only 5,600 sets.94 Whilst Britain had supplied only 333 separately listed
sets through Archangel by the end of navigation in 1941, British equip-
ment such as tanks and aircraft were typically equipped with radio sets,
contrary to the Soviet norm.95
This finally brings us to high technology items such as radar and
ASDIC sets, in the development of which the Soviet Union lagged far
behind Britain, the United States, and Germany. Whilst ASDIC will be
dealt with below during the examination of the local application of
British aid, we will take British GL-2 sets as an initial example of the sort
of radar technology supplied to the Soviet Union during the first year of
the war. These sets were provided to the Soviet Union for the purpose of
air defence. Whilst the effectiveness of such early "gun-laying" radars
was limited to giving accurate range and limited elevation data, their use
90. Severnie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip.3, p. 328;

and Secret Cipher Telegram, To: No. 30, Military Mission, Moscow, From: The War
Office, Reed 1435/30/9/41, WO 193/580, TNA.
91. Secret Cipher Telegram, From: The War Office, To: No. 30 MilitaryMission,
Moscow, Desp. 2145 1/10/41, WO 193/580, TNA.
92. Secret Cipher Telegram, From: Beaverbrook Mission, To: The War Office,
Reed 2225 2/10/41, WO 193/580, TNA;and Most Secret, W.P.(42) 417, 17 September
1942, War Cabinet, Report on fulfillment of the Moscow Protocol, October,
1941-June, 1942, p. 19, PREM3/401/7, TNA.
93. Severnie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip.2 (Moskva:
Nauka, 1994), 220.
94. Krivosheev,Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, 258.
95. Severnie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip.3, 328.
HILL
ALEXANDER
by the sea increased effectiveness in determining elevation.96 Six such

sets arrived in Murmansk with the convoy PQ-13 in March 1942, fol-
lowed by more.97 The Soviets perceived these sets as sufficiently valuable
to be the subject of a State Defence Committee decree of 10 February
1942, which required that Soviet industry copy the GL-2 set as the SON-
2, requested the importation of key components, and indeed allocated
100 metal-cutting machine tools from imported supplies for the estab-
lishment of production.98
The import of such items as metalworking machinery highlights the
fact that Lend-Lease aid items were at times a factor in increasing Soviet
production or establishing the production of new items. Convoy PQ-12
alone, arriving in March 1942, delivered 312 metal-cutting machine
tools, in addition to a range of other items for Soviet industry such as
machine presses and compressors. The principal recipient of the metal-
cutting tools in this instance was the People's Commissariat for the Avi-
ation Industry, which received 239 tools.99 The number of machine tools
delivered by Britain was, even in terms of Soviet wartime production,
limited. Britain shipped 1,210 machine tools during the period of the
First Protocol, compared to Soviet production (excluding presses) for
1941 of 44,510 and for 1942 of 22,935.100 However, the raw figures ignore
the fact that the Soviet Union could request specific items which it may
or may not have been able to produce for itself. Additionally, many of the
British tools arrived during the first quarter of 1942, when Soviet pro-
duction was, according to Suprun, only 2,994. The impact of relatively
small numbers of machine tools ordered according to requirements
should not, as Suprun goes on to suggest, be underestimated. For
instance, the handing over of 40 imported machine tools to Aviation Fac-
tory Number 150 in July 1942 was apparently crucial in enabling the fac-
tory to reach projected capacity within two months.101
96. Louis Brown, A Radar History of World War II--Technical and Military
Imperatives (Bristol and Philadelphia: Institute of Physics Publishing, 1999), 59-60.
97. Severnie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip.2, 220.
98. Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni, Postanovlenie No. GKO-1266ss ot 10
fevralia 1942 g. Moskva, Kreml',O priniatii na vooruzhenie voisk PVO KrasnoiArmii
i Voenno-MorskogoFlota Stantsii Orudiinoi Navodki (SON-2) i organizatsii otech-
estvennogo proizvodstva SON-2, f.644.o.l.d.21.1.31, RGASPI.
99. Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni. Postanovlenie No. GKO-1497s ot 26
marta 1942 g. Moskva,Kreml'... raspredeleniia pribivshego iz-za granitsi s 12-m kar-
avanom vooruzheniia ..., f.644.o.l.d.25.1.112, RGASPI.
100. Most Secret, W.P.(42) 417, September 17, 1942, War Cabinet. Report on
fulfillment of the Moscow Protocol, October, 1941-June, 1942, PREM3/401/7, TNA;
and Harrison,Accounting for War, 196.
The Local Application of British Aid

Whereas basic weapons systems supplied by Britain were an impor-
tant top-up to Soviet production during the First Protocol period, it can
be argued that in addition to the supply of raw materials and machinery,
British aid had the most significant impact, albeit not always immedi-
ately, in technological areas where British expertise and production were
most advanced compared to the Soviet Union, generally on the periph-
ery of the Soviet war effort. The geographical area in which Lend-Lease
aid from Britain can be argued to have had the most significant impact
on the Soviet war effort during the first year of the war was in the far
north, and in particular for the Northern Fleet.102Much of the material
initially requested by the Soviet Union from Britain was naval, in the
development and production of which Britain maintained a considerable
technological lead in many spheres. The Soviet Union had cut its own
production of naval equipment at the beginning of the war and trans-
ferred capacity to other, more pressing needs on land, as in the case of
Factory Number 112 switching capacity from the production of sub-
marines to tanks. The Soviet historical and wartime neglect of naval
forces made sense in the 1930s and during the summer and autumn of
1941 when the focus was on the Red Army, but having turned back Ger-
man forces before Moscow, the Soviets understood the significance of
northern waters for both the delivery of Allied aid and Soviet internal
communications and recognized that naval forces had a role to play in
the Soviet war effort.
Lend-Lease ships, aircraft, and equipment, when combined with the
Soviets' own war and to some extent British experience, would go some
way to make up for the relative neglect of Soviet naval forces since the
October Revolution in 1917. Given the significance of the northern route
as the principal conduit for Lend-Lease aid, from the outset the Soviet
naval command, as one would have expected, pressed the Northern Fleet
to take measures for the protection of convoy traffic and ports, be it
through minesweeping or antisubmarine measures in the White Sea, or
providing air cover for the unloading of transports in port.103The "basic
task" (osnovnaia zadacha) of the Northern Fleet for most of the war was
102. This section draws on material first published in Alexander Hill, "The Birth
of the Soviet Northern Fleet," 65-82, an extended version of which was published as
"The Soviet Northern Fleet 1939-1942," in Flot i pobeda . . . , ed. V. Il'in
(Arkhangel'sk:Administratsiia Arkhangel'skoioblasti, 2004), 100-116.
103. Direktiva Voennomu sovetu SF o tralenii min v Belom more, 30 iiulia 1941
g. and Prikaz o merakh po prikritiiu s vozdukha transportov v raione Murmanska,28
ianvaria 1942 g., in Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia. Prikazi i direktivi
Narodnogo Komissara VMFv godi Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini. T.21(10) (Moskva:
Terra, 1996), 42 and 88.
HILL
ALEXANDER
"the provision of security for external convoys," a tacit admission of the

significance of the convoys for the Soviet Union104;an order to this effect
was issued on 15 March 1942.105By this point the ability of the Northern
Fleet to carry out this mission had been eased by British aid, ranging
from the provision of minesweepers and aircraft to depth charges, radar,
and ASDIC sets, all of which the Soviet Union had requested during the
first months of the war.
As of 22 June 1941 the Northern Fleet had not increased its basic
minesweeping strength of two trawlers transferred to the Northern
Flotilla in June 1933.106By mid-September "more than 30" trawlers fit-
ted out for minesweeping had been added to the Northern Fleet, but
modern trawl gear was scarce, and hence the Soviets specifically asked
for minesweepers and sweep gear under Lend-Lease.107 In addition to
minesweeping equipment for fitting to Soviet vessels, the Soviet Union
also requested nine minesweepers. Whilst numerous minesweepers were
provided to the Northern Fleet by Britain and the United States during
the war, in 1941 any sort of escort vessel was in short supply in Britain.
There was some doubt whether these could be supplied before August
1942, the alternative being for nine Soviet trawlers to make their way to
Britain where they would be fitted out and their crews trained for the
spring of 1942.108Nonetheless, as early as March 1942 the first of seven
British "TAM"type trawler conversions delivered in February-March
1942 was incorporated into the Northern Fleet; the first "MMS"type pur-
pose-built naval trawlers arrived with the convoy PQ-18 in September
1942.109
Early in the war Soviet technology lagged behind that of Britain and
Germany in a number of aspects of mine warfare, despite the strength of
104. N. G. Kuznetsov, Kursom k pobede (Moskva:OLMA-PRESS,2003): 277.

105. Direktiva komanduuishchemu SF ob obespechenii perekhoda konvoev, 15
marta 1942 g., in Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia: Prikazi i direktivi nar-
odnogo komissara VMFv godi Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini, 108.
106. Upravlenie voenno-morskikh sil RKKA,I upravlenie. 14 iiunia 1933 g. No.
353395/ss. I.d. komandira Murmanskogo voennogo porta tov. Trukhaninu, f.r-
970.o.2.d.1.1.16, Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGAVMF), St. Petersburg, Rus-
sia.
107. I. D. Spasskii, ed., Istoriia otechestvennogo sudostroeniia v piati tomakh,
Tom IV, Sudostroenie v period pervikh piatiletok i Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini
1925-1945 gg. (Sankt-Peterburg:Sudostroenie, 1996), 433; and V. M. Ioltukhovskii,
Kontaktnie trali otechestvennogo flota (Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel'stvo "Gangut,"
2000), 21.
108. List of articles of naval supply ordered by Soviet mission in London, Item
24, Requested 6.9.41, Minesweepers, CAB 111/203, TNA.
109. A. B. Shirokorad,Korabli i katera VMFSSSR 1939-1945 gg (Minsk:Khar-
vest, 2002), 500-503.
the Tsarist navy in this regard. The development of noncontact mines

caused particular concern even before the outbreak of hostilities
between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. In August 1940 the British
naval attache in Moscow noted an "unexpected friendliness" towards
British service attaches by Soviet liaison officers apparently not shown
for at least three years. Of some interest were British dealings with Ger-
man magnetic mines.110Whilst the British could not claim to have neu-
tralised the threat from such mines, they had relevant experience to pass
on to the Soviet Union. The first British shipment of war materials to the
Soviet Union via the northern route with the minelayer Adventure con-
tained 200 "secret" magnetic mines. From the autumn of 1941, the mis-
sion of British minesweepers operating from Soviet bases was to assist
the Northern Fleet with minesweeping and to "familiarize them with the
new types of mine," in addition to providing local escort for arriving con-
voys.111British aid to June 1942 outside the Moscow Protocol included
parts and plans for equipment for dealing with magnetic mines.112
Soviet antisubmarine capabilities were also inadequate, in particular
in the sphere of submarine detection. The Soviet Union had obtained
acoustic and hydroacoustic equipment for submarines and surface ves-
sels from British sources in 1926 and received them the next year. In
1928 an investigation as to why these resources had not been utilized
noted that "attempts to construct [skonstruirovat'] this apparatus with
our own resources have been unsuccessful," indicating the scale of the
technical gap emerging between the Soviet Union and Britain in this
sphere.113 The first crude "hydroacoustic" submarine detection devices
(gidroakusticheskie sredsvta or GAS) appeared on Soviet vessels only
in 1940. Prior to the war Soviet destroyers were not fitted with any form
of active underwater detection device. As A. V. Platonov, S. V. Aprelev,
and D. N. Siniaev note, in the main "Soviet sailors did not achieve the
first level of awareness" of their antisubmarine warfare capabilities, "not
guessing that they were not capable of dealing with submarines. Only in
October 1941, when on one hand we felt the first blows from under the
sea, and on the other hand the first British ASDIC sets were received, did
Soviet sailors become aware of the complexity of the problem and ...
110. British Embassy, Moscow, 26th August 1940, Dear Admiral Godfrey [Direc-
tor of Naval Intelligence] .... [Signed] Clancy, ADM223/506, TNA.
111. Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi, 36 and 41.
112. Most Secret, W.P. (42) 417, September 17, 1942, War Cabinet, Report on
fulfillment of the Moscow Protocol, October, 1941-June, 1942, p. 20, PREM3/401/7,
TNA.
113. SSSR, Narodnii Komissariat po Voennim i Morskim Delam, Pomoshchnik
nachal'nika Voenno-MorskikhSil RKKAPo Politicheskoi Chasti, 27 dekabria 1928 g.
Nachal'niku Voenno-morskikh sil R.K.K.A.,f.r-1483.o.1.d.72.1.8, RGAVMF.
HILL
ALEXANDER
the poverty of domestic . . . acoustic systems."114Consequently, despite

the handing over of five modern Gnevnii-class destroyers to the North-
ern Fleet during 1939-40, the antisubmarine capabilities of the Soviet
Northern Fleet as a whole remained poor prior to and during the first
years of the war.
Antisubmarine warfare had been one of the topics of particular inter-
est to the Soviet liaison officers who questioned the British naval attache
in August 1940. From the summer of 1941 ASDIC sets, in addition to
ASDIC-equipped vessels, were high on the Soviet list of priorities for
delivery from Britain, which committed to supply the 150 sets initially
requested.115 Whilst this number was subsequently reduced to 100 for
the period concerned, only 57 sets had been provided by the end of
1942.116 Those sets supplied were nonetheless of significance given the
state of Soviet antisubmarine capabilities, even if their mastery (osvoe-
nie) and fitting to Soviet vessels would take some time. Repair offered an
opportunity for the fitting of ASDIC sets to Soviet vessels; for instance,
the destroyer Gromkii was equipped with ASDIC during repairs at Fac-
tory No. 402 at Molotovsk from 20 June to 9 October 1942.117 By this
point the "guardship" Groza had apparently used ASDIC (Drakon-128s)
to locate, attack, and damage a German U-boat on 10 September 1942.118
Instructional ASDIC equipment was provided to the Soviet navy outside
the Moscow Protocol.119It is also worth noting that Northern Fleet stocks
of depth charges stood at only 6,834, or 27.8 percent of the perceived
requirement, on 22 June 1941.120 As a result of a Soviet request, the
114. A. V. Platonov, S. V. Aprelev, and D. N. Siniaev, Sovetskie boevie korabli

1941-1945 gg. IV Vooruzhenie (Sankt-Peterburg:Al'manakh "Tsitadel',"1997), 115.
115. British Embassy, Moscow, 26th August 1940, Dear Admiral Godfrey [Direc-
tor of Naval Intelligence] .... [Signed] Clancy, ADM 223/506, TNA;and [To] B.A.D.
Washington. 21.10.41, Secret, Naval Cipher X by cable, From Admiralty, CAB
111/203, TNA.
116. Most Secret, W.P. (42) 417, 17 September 1942, War Cabinet, Report on
TNA.
117. L. G. Shmigel'skii, "Molotovskiizavod No.402 i severnie konvoi," in Sev-
ernie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip.3, p. 82; and A. V.
Platonov, Entsiklopediia Sovetskikh nadvodnikh korablei 1941-1945 (Sankt-Peter-
burg: Izdatel'stvo "Poligon,"2002), 178.
118. R. I. Larintsev, "Lend-lizovskiepostavki na Severnii flot i ikh effektivnost',"
in Voina v Arktike (1939-1945 gg.), ed. M. N. Suprun (Arkhangel'sk:Pomorskii gosu-
darstvennii universitet, 2001), 268; and Platonov, Entsiklopediia Sovetskikh, 254
and 259.
TNA.
120. Platonov et al., Sovetskie boevie korabli, 62.
Northern Fleet was to receive 4,000 depth charges, and a consignment

of depth charges arrived in Archangel with the minelayer Adventure on
1 August 1941.121
In addition to the ASDIC sets provided for, in particular, Soviet
destroyers, Allied-supplied radar sets for the detection of aerial and sur-
face threats had considerable significance to the Northern Fleet. Prior to
the war the Soviet navy had only a single warship equipped with a radar
set of any type, this being the cruiser Molotov.122One Soviet and British
priority was the air defence of ports, for which the British-supplied GL-
2 sets mentioned earlier were used. More valuable than the gun-laying
sets were Type 271 naval search sets and ASV (Air-to-Surface Vessel)
sets for the location of submarines and surface targets. A Type 271 set
had been installed on the British corvette Orchis in March 1941, and by
September 1941 was in general use on British escort vessels. Trials sug-
gested that, depending on conditions, a fully surfaced submarine could
be detected at a range of approximately 5,000 yards, a conning tower at
about 2,800, and 8 feet of periscope at 1,300 yards. The British escort
Vetch is credited with the first detection with the 271 set leading to a kill,
having located the German submarine U-252 at a range of about 7,000
yards during an attack on the convoy OG-82 in April 1942.123By the end
of June 1942 six radar sets for fitting to Soviet destroyers had been sup-
plied to the Soviet Union outside the Moscow Protocol.124Any British
concerns about providing the latest such detection technology to the
Soviet Union involved not the recipient, with which Britain had briefly
considered going to war in early 1940 over the Soviet invasion of Fin-
land, but the increased chance that an example would fall into the hands
of the Germans, who would develop countermeasures.125
Regarding naval aviation,126 on the eve of war the fighter strength of
the Fleet was provided by the 72nd Mixed (Air) Regiment, equipped with
forty-two 1-15 and 1-153 Chaika biplanes, which, whilst still of some
value in the hands of skilled pilots, were obsolete. To a lesser extent this
121. Boevaia letopis' Voenno-morskogo flota 1941-1942 (Moskva: Voennoe

izdatel'stvo 1983), 41.
122. Platonov et al., Sovetskie boevie korabli, 112.
123. Anthony Watts, The U-Boat Hunters (Abingdon, Oxon: Purnell Book Ser-
vices Ltd by arrangement with Macdonald and Jane's Publishers, 1976), 131-32 and
138-39.
TNA.
125. Secret, C.O.S. (42) 168, 11th March 1942, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff
Committee, Supply of Type 271 RDF Sets and ASV Sets to Russia, WO 193/580, TNA.
126. With responsibility for the defence of naval bases, in addition to other
tasks.
HILL
ALEXANDER
was also true of the 1-16 monoplane, of which only three were avail-
able.127It is therefore unsurprising that on a fact-finding mission to Mur-
mansk during the summer of 1941, the British Rear-Admiral Philip Vian
had found fighter defences "quite inadequate to allow a force to use it as
a base with safety," being another reason, in addition to the proximity of
German ground forces to Murmansk and the better port facilities at
Archangel, for the first convoys to head for the latter.128
Although LaGG-3, MiG-3, and to a lesser extent Yak-1 fighters were
being delivered to frontline units in relatively small quantities prior to
the war, the Northern Fleet was a long way down the list of potential
recipients for recent aircraft types. In fact, even by 1 December 1941,
despite the growing significance of the far north as a maritime link with
Britain, only four MiG-3s, perhaps the least satisfactory of the latest
Soviet types, had found their way to the Fleet. By this point Lend-Lease
aircraft were of considerable significance to the Northern Fleet, making
up 29 out of a total of 65 aircraft, with British-supplied Hurricanes com-
paring favourably to available Soviet types.129By February 1942, 44 out
of 90 aircraft of the Northern Fleet were of foreign manufacture.130
By April 1942 the Hawker Hurricane had clearly become the princi-
pal fighter of the Northern Fleet. Both 2nd Guards Red Banner Mixed Air
Regiment and 78th Fighter Air Regiment, based at Vaenga, were reliant
on the British Hawker Hurricane fighter. The former had 50 Hurricanes,
of which 30 were operational, and four MiG-3s, of which three were oper-
ational. The latter had 33 Hurricanes, of which 17 were operational, in
addition to 12 I-16s, of which 9 were operational. Additional fighter
strength was provided by 27th Fighter Air Regiment equipped with 29 I-
15s at more than one location, of which 27 were operational.131By 1 July
1942, 83 out of 109 fighter aircraft of the Northern Fleet were of foreign
manufacture. 132
Whilst the low state of readiness of the Lend-Lease aircraft might
have been due in part to their more intensive use, it is also indicative of
the Soviet failure either to make full use of British technical support or
to ensure adequate Soviet alternative provision. The problem was, how-
ever, exacerbated at times during the early stages of the war by a less-
than-adequate supply of spares, a problem not confined to the Soviet
127. Doklad po inspektsii Severnogo flota 11-17 maia 1941g (21 maia 1941g),
f.r-1678.o.l.d.230.1.180, RGAVMF.
128. Capt. S. W. Roskill, The Warat Sea 1939-1945, vol. 1, The Defensive (Lon-
don: HMSO,1954), 488.
129. Larintsev, "Lend-lizovskiepostavki," 263.
131. Khronika Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini Sovetskogo Soiuza na Severnom
teatre s 1.01.42--30.06.42 gg. (vipusk 2-i) (Sankt-Peterburg:Galeia Print, 1999), 60.
132. Larintsev, "Lend-lizovskiepostavki," 263.
Union, and by the significant numbers of reconditioned rather than new

aircraft supplied by Britain.133An additional problem having a limited
impact on the overall value of British aid, and in particular concerning
items shipped during the second half of 1941, was damage in transit.
Soviet complaints, and indeed the percentages involved, were suffi-
ciently serious for the Lord Chancellor's Office to launch an inquiry. The
report at the end of January 1942 attributed much of the damage to the
urgency with which equipment was stowed for shipping and to the inad-
equacy of packaging, in particular for deck-stowed equipment.134
British Aid during the First Year of the Great Patriotic War
During 1941-42 the United States was unable to supply material aid
to the Allies, and in particular the Soviet Union, in anything like the
quantities it would subsequently provide. In this period the United
States was not only shifting industrial capacity to a relatively neglected
military sector, but also building up its own armed forces to levels appro-
priate to the opposition faced. The quantitative British and Common-
wealth contribution to the Lend-Lease supply pool was therefore far
more significant during the period of the First Moscow Protocol than it
would subsequently be. The quantity of British and Commonwealth
inputs was, however, certainly small compared to both U.S. and Soviet
production for the war as a whole, and indeed, as this article has shown,
when compared to Soviet production of key items for the first year of the
war. However, Soviet losses were so high compared to production during
the first year of the Great Patriotic War that even British supplies of basic
weapons systems became significant in a period when Soviet production
was recovering from the loss and relocation of industrial capacity as a
result of the Axis invasion. British aid would also go some way to com-
pensating for unrealistic planning in the Soviet Union, both in topping up
Soviet production and providing scarce resources on demand, even if
with delay, which could, as in the case of machine tools, for instance,
unclog bottlenecks and put unused capacity in the system to use. Qual-
itatively, British aid in particular could also, during the first months of
133. For lengthy discussion on these matters, see Secret, Supply of Hurricanes
and Hurricane spares to the U.S.S.R., Notes of a meeting at the Air Ministry 11th Jan-
uary 1943, Present: Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Courtney . . . Rear Admiral
Kharlamov . . . , AIR 20/3904, TNA. By September 1942 it was apparently being
widely claimed in the Soviet Union that the Hurricane should not be supplied to the
Soviet Union because of its obsolescence. See, for example, Secret, Cypher Telegram,
WX2980, Reed ... 15/9/42, To: Air Ministry. From: 30 Mission, AIR 20/3904, TNA.
134. Secret, Inquiry into damaged supplies for Russia, Lord Chancellor's Office,
House of Lords, January 31, 1942, PREM3/401/4, TNA.
ALEXANDERHILL
the war, "fill in the gaps" in Soviet production and research and devel-
opment in areas outside the principal foci of Soviet efforts, such as naval
technology and even "basic" naval equipment, even if the rewards in
terms of Soviet capabilities in this area were not necessarily immediate.
Finally, and perhaps just as important although difficult to assess, was
the psychological impact of British readiness to support the Soviet Union
on the Soviet population, and indeed, on the leadership. Particularly
early in the war, the Soviet population was reminded that it was not
alone in the fight against Nazi Germany135, but was now part of an
alliance which would have seemed unthinkable only months before
when there was the genuine prospect of the Soviet Union and Germany
both being at war with Britain and France, had the latter two intervened
in Finland. As for the Soviet leadership, it was clearly comforting to be
increasingly aware that, despite prewar animosities, the West was willing
to provide, with few questions asked and without financial recompense,
not only significant quantities of equipment and raw materials, but also
some of the latest technology.
It would be difficult and unconvincing to argue that Lend-Lease aid
"saved" the Soviet Union from defeat in 1941. Axis forces were, for
instance, halted before Moscow with Soviet blood, and to a large extent
with Soviet-manufactured arms and equipment. Nonetheless, as this
article has suggested, Lend-Lease aid provided during the period of the
First Moscow Protocol had a far more significant impact on the Soviet
war effort and indeed on frontline capability both during and after the
Battle for Moscow than the Soviet and indeed Western historiography
would suggest. What is perhaps of particular note is not only the speed
with which Britain in particular was willing and able to provide aid to the
Soviet Union after initial hesitation, but how quickly the Soviet Union
was able to put foreign equipment into use. This is testimony both to the
political and military realism of Churchill and other key British cabinet
ministers in this instance, and to the effectiveness of the Soviet com-
mand economy when faced with a clearly defined task.
135. See, for example, the speech made by Stalin, 6 November 1941, which
mentions specific types of aid provided by Britain and the United States to the Soviet
Union. J. Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. Wartime Addresses
and Orders of the Day ... (New York:International Publishers, 1945), 30-31.
808 *

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British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 June 1942

Author(s): Alexander Hill

Alexander Hill is Associate Professorin MilitaryHistoryat the Universityof Cal-

The Journal of Military History 71 (July 2007): .773-808

774 * THE JOURNAL OF

2. Institut Marxisma-Leninismapri TsKKPSS,Otdel istorii Velikoi Otechestven-

MILITARY HISTORY c 775

5. Examples include R. H. Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-

776 * THE JOURNAL OF

MILITARY HISTORY c 777

receive such vehicles. This information can be used in conjunction with

Britain, the United States, and Aid to the Soviet Union

13. Voenno-nauchnoe upravlenie General'nogo shtaba. Voenno-istoricheskii

778 * THE JOURNAL OF

To many U.S. Republicans in particular, the idea of providing mili-

15. See Jones, The Roads to Russia, Chap. 2.

MILITARY HISTORY * 779

780 * THE JOURNAL OF

and vociferous opponent of both of the continental dictatorships, ques-

MILITARY HISTORY * 781

Commitments and Aid of the First Moscow Protocol

24. Jones, The Roads to Russia, Chap. 2.

782 * THE JOURNAL OF

28. (Cypher), Special (Lord Beaverbrook), From British Supply Mission,

MILITARY HISTORY * 783

Valentine 150 110 109 125 215 220 140 188 70

MILITARY HISTORY * 785

conversion of this factory from the series production of submarines to

f.644.o.1.d.1.1.272, Russian State Archive for Socio-Political History (RGASPI),

786 * THE JOURNAL OF

42. Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks, 162; and Suprun,Lend-liz i sev-

MILITARY HISTORY * 787

period, of which, as noted above, only 3,200 were medium or heavy

788 * THE JOURNAL OF

55. See Eastern Europe, Miscellaneous, On 26/11 .... , 0630/27/11/41,

790 * THE JOURNAL OF

British-supplied tanks made up in the region of 30 to 40 percent of the

MILITARY HISTORY * 791

792 * THE JOURNAL OF

bre ammunition at ranges of 50 to 200 metres, but also considered the

MILITARY HISTORY * 793

794 * THE JOURNAL OF

MILITARY HISTORY * 795

early production aircraft by the newly formed Flight Research Institute.

796 * THE JOURNALOF

be distributed amongst the Karelian Front (10), 27 Replacement Air Reg-

82. Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni, Postanovlenie No. GKO-1497s ot 26

MILITARY HISTORY c 797

increasing shortage in the Soviet Union, was delivered.86 The total of

798 * THE JOURNAL OF

had been delivered through Archangel by the end of navigation during

90. Severnie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip.3, p. 328;

MILITARY HISTORY * 799

by the sea increased effectiveness in determining elevation.96 Six such

800 * THE JOURNAL OF

The Local Application of British Aid

MILITARY HISTORY * 801

"the provision of security for external convoys," a tacit admission of the

104. N. G. Kuznetsov, Kursom k pobede (Moskva:OLMA-PRESS,2003): 277.

802 * THE JOURNAL OF

the Tsarist navy in this regard. The development of noncontact mines

MILITARY HISTORY * 803

the poverty of domestic . . . acoustic systems."114Consequently, despite