REYES

CASE NO. 261

ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION; Standards of Judicial Review

ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL VS ORMOC CITY

MAIN POINT: Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable
where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3)
the classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially
identical to those present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same
class.

FACTS: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed an ordinance imposing “on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., a municipal tax equivalent”
Payments for said tax were made by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Said company filed a complaint
against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the
ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of
uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection
clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

RULING: YES. A perusal of the requisites shows that it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and
exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time the ordinance was enacted,
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Was the only sugar central in the City of Ormoc. Even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to a tax because the ordinance expressly points only
to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

REYES
CASE NO. 262

ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION; Standards of Judicial Review

BASCO VS PAGCOR

MAIN POINT: A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution.

The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require
situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same

FACTS: In 1977, PAGCOR was created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile
granted PAGCOR the power “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in
1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was
updated through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Atty. Humberto Basco and
several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR. Basco et al argued that PD
1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while
most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
ISSUE: W/N PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause

RULING: No. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA
306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws
unconstitutional. Basco ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the
laws.”.

REYES
CASE NO. 263

ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION; Standards of Judicial Review

REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Landoil Group of Companies spearheaded by then Congressman Jose de Venecia, Jr., was
able to obtain foreign loans by various banks. The banks required that their loans be fully covered by
absolute and unconditional guarantee from PHILGUARANTEE, whose Board of Directors was
composed of private respondents Bondoc, et.al. He misused the proceeds of the loans to other uses
and/or appropriation, then for his own personal benefit.

Congressman de Venecia’s group of companies was unable to service these foreign loans and this
compelled PHILGUARANTEE to assume its obligation as guarantor. A case was filed against the De
Venecia, Bondoc and et al. However, Bondoc’s complaint or case was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause in the dismissal of the
complaint to Bondoc.

RULING: Yes. The dismissal of the Complaint against Bondoc and company is compelled by the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. De Venecia Jr, and the respondents Bondoc and company
are similarly situated, but the complaint against Bondoc was dismissed. To give a more favoured
treatment to one, de Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally situated is to indulge in
invidious discrimination.

REYES
CASE NO. 264

ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION; Standards of Judicial Review

HIMAGAN VS PEOPLE

MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real
differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

RA 6975 provides that upon filing of a complaint against a PNP member for grave felonies, the court
shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated.

FACTS: Petitioner Himagan, a policeman, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and
attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the information were filed, the trial court issued an Order
suspending petitioner until termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975 , or DILG Act
of 1990, Petitioner contended that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days, which was
denied by the judge, pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended
from office until his case is terminated. Petitioner claims that an imposition of preventive suspension
of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right
to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: W/N the imposition of the preventive suspension of over 90 days against the petitioner
violates his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

RULING: No. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under R.A. 6975 does not
violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The special law
for police officers is justified by their status.

REYES
CASE NO. 265

ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION; Standards of Judicial Review

ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ

MAIN POINT: The Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory
agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through
official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.

Facts: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence
for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the
investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally
disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved
to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the laws.

RULING: NO. There can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution
itself. Also, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints “in any form and in a manner,” the
framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them
from complaining against official wrongdoings.

REYES
CASE NO. 266

Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law

TELEBAP, GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.Petitioner contended that: While Section 90 of the same law
requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92
provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and
to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC TIME denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws, and that it constitutes taking of property without due process of law and
without just compensation.

RULING: NO. The said provision expressly provided that the COMELEC Time should be
considered as part of the public service time said stations are required to furnish the
Government for the dissemination of public information and education under their respective
franchises or permits. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no
private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

REYES
CASE NO. 267
Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law
Tiu v. CA

FACTS: RA 7227 seeks to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into other productive
uses. Section 12 granted special privileges to the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone
(SSEZ), which includes the City of Olongapo, Municipality of Subic, and the Lands occupied by the
Subic Naval Base. EO 97 was issued to clarify the application of the incentives.

Sec. 1 - tax and duty-free importations shall only be applied to raw materials, capital goods and
equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of
other goods are subject to the taxes and duties under Philippine laws.

Section 1.1 - enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives to the business and enterprises and residents
within the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base only. It excludes the first two component cities
as provided for by RA 7227.

ISSUE: Whether EO 97-A violates the equal protection of the laws?

RULING: NO. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only,
and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The real concern of Republic Act 7227 is
to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial
areas.

REYES
CASE NO. 268
Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law
Aguinaldo v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioners seek to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing during the 1998 elections
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) contending that it is violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution, as its classification of persons running for office is not a valid classification.
Petitioners also argue that Section 67 effectively shortens the terms of office of elected officials, in
violation of Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed section violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING: No. Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code was crafted with the intention of giving flesh to
the constitutional pronouncement that public service is a public trust. Rather than cut short the term of
office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out
their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby
cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go
back to their former position.

REYES
CASE NO. 269

Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law

De Guzman, et. al v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act of 1996. Which
states No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4)
years. Any election officer who has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality
shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original
congressional district.

Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of
the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4)
years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING: NO. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no
ground to invalidate it. The singling out of election officers in order to ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment
does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

REYES
CASE NO. 270
Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the
Law People v. Mercado, et. al. November 29, 200

FACTS: The accused, members of the PNP, kidnapped one Richard Buama, a 17 year old minor and
subjected him to extreme/brutal physical violence, and thereafter hacked and bludgeoned/clubbed
Buama who thereby sustained mortal wounds which directly caused his death. The defendants were
convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder and sentencing them the
punishment of death. The defendants raised the constitutionality of death penalty and the alleged
haste of the trial court in deciding the case resulting in grave and serious errors committed in
convicting the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment."

RULING: No. As settled in People vs. Echagaray, death penalty is not a cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment; It is an exercise of the state’s power to secure society against the threatened
and actual evil. Procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are established.
However, this case was decided on November 29, 2000 when death penalty was not yet suspended.
It was suspended on 2006.
REYES
CASE NO. 271

ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW

PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS, 324 SCRA 689

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined
at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-
bailable offence.

ISSUE: WON there is a violation of equal protection of the law.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable basis for valid classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. The performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison.

REYES
CASE NO. 272
ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
PEOPLE V. PIEDRA, 350 SCRA 163

FACTS: Accused-appellant Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and
assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. Appellant invokes
the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly
shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received payment, appellant
was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this,
appellant concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins.
Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguena, and the alleged crime took place in
Zamboanga City.

ISSUE: WON equal protection of the law was denied to the appellant.

RULING: No. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not
prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful
administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who
are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present
in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Furthermore, the presumption is that the
prosecuting officer’s regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome
only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation.
REYES
CASE NO. 273
ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS V. QUISUMBING

MAIN POINT: The Court finds the principle of “equal pay for equal work” requires that persons who
work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions,
should be paid similar salaries.

FACTS: Private respondent International School, Inc. is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and temporary residents. Accordingly, the
School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two:
(1) foreign-hires and (2) local- hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by
the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires
constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: WON the practice is constitutional.

RULING: No. The court held that there was no reasonable distinction between the services rendered
by “foreign hires and “local hires” as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to these teachers. While we
recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an
enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-
hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter.

REYES
CASE NO. 274
ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASS’N V. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

MAIN POINT: The concept of relative constitutionality. The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in
every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the
Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in
its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of
altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its
validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light
of changed conditions

FACTS: Petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition
against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from
further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it
is unconstitutional. The provision in R.A. 7693 (The Central Bank Act) creates two classes of
employees in the BSP. Petitioner posits that the classification violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the
ground that its continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law?

RULING: YES. It cannot justify the inequality of treatment between the BSP rank-and-file employees
and those of other Government Financing Institutions (GFIs) . These rank-and file employees are
similarly situated; thus, the classification made in the Central Bank Act is not based on any substantial
distinction vis-à-vis the particular circumstances of each GFI.

REYES
CASE NO. 275
ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
YCASUEGI V. PAL, 569 SCRA 467

MAIN POINT: The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the source of
our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield
against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how
egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.

FACTS: This case talks about an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his
failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company. He argues that he was discriminated
against because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined. Petitioner
next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was not unduly discriminated against when he was dismissed
while other overweight cabin attendants were either given flying duties or promoted.

RULING: No. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin
attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how
and why they are similarly situated and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL. To make his
claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of the Constitution.
However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked.

REYES
CASE NO. 276
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
SJS v. Atienza, 545 SCRA 92

FACTS: Respondent Mayor Atienza approved Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified certain areas
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under
the reclassification to cease and desist from operation within six months from the effectivity of the
ordinance. The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against and
singled out the Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with
buildings and residences that do not comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code, and Health
and Sanitation Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 8027 is partial and discriminatory

RULING: No. An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification
are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
must not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the
same class.

REYES
CASE NO. 277
MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination; it does not demand absolute equality.

FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman with Falsification of Public
Documents and Misconduct relative to the anomalous purchase of the expensive hemoanalyzer.
Office of the Ombudsman ordered his preventive suspension. Gobenciong parlayed the theory that
the application of RA 6770 which authorized the Ombudsman to impose a six-month preventive
suspension instead of the civil service provisions of the Administrative Code (which limits the
disciplining authority to imposing a prevention suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days) violates
the equal protection guarantee.

ISSUE: Whether or not application of RA 6770 violates the equal protection guarantee

RULING: No. The fundamental guarantee is not breached by a law which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and provided
further that there is a substantial distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not.

REYES
CASE NO. 278
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
MIAA v. Olongapo, 543 SCRA 269

MAIN POINT: Although the law be fair on its face and impartial on its appearance, yet if applied and
administered by the public authorities charged with their administration with an evil eye and unequal
hand so as to practically make unjust and illegal determination, the denial of equal justice is still within
the prohibition of the Constitution.

FACTS: MIAA did not renew the janitorial and maintenance service contract of respondents Olongapo
Maintenance Services Inc. (OMSI) and Triple Crown Services Inc. (TCI) but instead awarded such
contract to a new service contractor through a negotiated contract and without the benefit of public
bidding. Respondents contended that such was a violation of their right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of the service contracts to new service contractor by MIAA without
public bidding violates the respondents’ right to equal protection of law.

RULING: Yes. The constitutional right of respondents to equal protection was violated by petitioner
when no public bidding was called precisely because the latter was going to award the subject service
contracts through negotiation.

REYES
CASE NO. 279
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Nicolas v. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438

MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause was not violated because there was a substantial basis for
a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and
all other accused
FACTS: Private respondent Lance Corporal Daniel Smith of the US Armed Forces was convicted of
the crime of rape committed against petitioner. Pursuant to the VFA agreement, Smith’s custody was
transferred to the US government and he was transferred to the US Embassy Compound for
detention. Petitioner contended that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power
is to provide for a different procedure for that accused which violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of custody of the accused violated the equal protection clause

RULING: No. The equal protection clause was not violated because there was a substantial basis for
a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and
all other accused. The rule on international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s
territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon.

REYES
CASE NO. 280
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
League of Cities v. COMELEC, 608 SCRA 636

MAIN POINT: A law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable with
Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 16 laws converting the municipality covered
thereby into a city (cityhood laws) and sought to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to subject laws. To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to
respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the standard P100 million minimum
income requirement, violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not such exemption granted to respondent municipalities violated the equal
protection clause

RULING: No. No deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The
conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit. The fundamental
right of equal protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights and privileges conferred and responsibilities
or obligations imposed. It does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual
difference between individuals and classes. Equality granted is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification.