The different interests of the defendant which the right to speedy trial are Based on a confidential information that
ion that petitioner Henry Uy had been
designed to protect are: (1) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; (b) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility
that the defense will be impaired. But the right to speedy trial cannot be
invoked where to sustain the same would result in a clear denial of due
process to the prosecution. In essence, the right to a speedy trial does not
preclude the people’s equally important right to public justice [Uy v. Hon.
Adriano, G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006],
G.R. No. 159098             October 27, 2006
SPS. HENRY and ROSARIO UY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ARSENIO P. ADRIANO, in his capacity as Pairing Judge
of RTC, Br. 64, Tarlac City, CITY PROSECUTOR ALIPIO C. YUMUL
and PIÑAKAMASARAP CORP., respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Challenged in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62103 which affirmed the
Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City2 denying the motion
to quash the Information in Criminal Case Nos. 6512-94.
engaged in manufacturing, delivering, and selling "fake" Marca Piña soy
sauce,3 Orlando S. Bundoc, Intelligence Officer II of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), applied for a search warrant4 for
unfair competition which was granted on February 14, 1994. When the search
warrant was implemented on even date, Atty. Francisco R. Estavillo, agent of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac, seized fifty-five (55)
bottles of label Marca Piña soy sauce.5
Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Tarlac City on March 23, 1994, charging petitioner Henry Uy with
violation of Article 189 (Unfair Competition) of the Revised Penal Code.6
On November 8, 1994, private respondent Piñakamasarap Corporation moved
to amend the criminal charge by including Henry's spouse, petitioner Rosario
Uy.7 The court granted the motion in its Order dated November 15, 1994 and
admitted the amended criminal complaint which reads:
The undersigned, LUIS E. GONZALES, Comptroller of
PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION of 583 Sta. Veronica St.,
Novaliches, Quezon City, and by authority of the said corporation,
under oath accuses HENRY UY, ROSARIO GUTIERREZ UY and a
certain JOHN DOE of Violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about February 14, 1994, and for sometimes (sic) prior
thereto, in Municipality of Tarlac, Tarlac, Philippines, the said Rosario
G. Uy accused, being then the owner of a business establishment with
principal address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subdivision, San Vicente,
Tarlac, Tarlac, and her co-accused, husband, HENRY UY, and a
certain John Doe, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously conspire and confederate together and help one another
engaged in unfair competition with the intention of deceiving and
 defrauding the public in general and the consuming public in general
and PIÑAKAMASARAP Corporation, the manufacturer and bottler of
soy sauce under the name "MARCA PIÑA," a [trademark] duly
registered with the Philippine Patent Office and sell or offer for sale
soy sauce manufactured by them with the brand name "Marca Piña"
which is a bastard version of the trademark, and using the bottles of
Piñakamasarap Corporation and substituted the contents thereof with
those manufactured by the accused and passing to the public that said
products to be the products of Piñakamasarap Corporation which is not
true, thereby inducing the public to believe that the above-mentioned
soy sauce sold or offered for sale by said accused are genuine
"MARCA PIÑA" soy sauce manufactured by PIÑAKAMASARAP
CORPORATION, and of inferior quality to the damage and prejudice
of the Piñakamasarap Corporation.
Contrary to law.
Tarlac, Tarlac, November 8, 1994.8
After preliminary examination of the prosecution witnesses, the court found
probable cause to indict petitioners.9 On January 30, 1995, the court issued a
warrant of arrest against petitioners.10 They were released after posting a cash
bond on February 1, 1995.11 On July 10, 1995, petitioners were arraigned,
assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.12 Petitioners, through
counsel, waived the pre-trial conference on October 25, 1995. The initial trial
was set on November 27, 1995.13
However, it was only on February 26, 1996 that the first witness of the
prosecution, Atty. Estavillo of the NBI, testified. In the meantime, in October
1996, this Court issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 104-96 providing,
inter alia, that the RTC shall have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of
Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act (R.A.) No.
166, as amended, thus:
VIOLATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SUCH
AS, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, VIOLATIONS OF ART. 188 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE (SUBSTITUTING AND ALTERING
TRADEMARKS, TRADE NAMES, OR SERVICE MARKS), ART.
189 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE (UNFAIR COMPETITION,
FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARKS, TRADE
NAMES, OR SERVICE MARKS, FRAUDULENT DESIGNATION
OF ORIGIN, AND FALSE DESCRIPTION), P.D. NO. 49
(PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS), P.D.
NO. 87 (AN ACT CREATING THE VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY
BOARD), R.A. NO. 165, AS AMENDED (THE PATENT LAW),
AND R.A. NO. 166, AS AMENDED (THE TRADEMARK LAW)
SHALL BE TRIED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED RAFFLE
SCHEME EXCEPT THOSE COVERED BY ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 113-95 DATED 2 OCTOBER 1995, IN WHICH CASE,
THE DESIGNATED REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS SHALL
CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE PROVISIONS THEREIN.
CONSIDERING THAT JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS HEREINBEFORE
MENTIONED IS NOW CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, THE DESIGNATION OF
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS IN CITIES UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.
113-95 IS DELETED AND WITHDRAWN.
Despite the administrative order of the Court, the MTC continued with the
trial. Gloria P. Tomboc, Analyst of the Bureau of Food and Drugs
Administration (BFAD), testified on August 25, 1997. In the meantime,
Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code were amended by R.A. No.
8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code. Two years
thereafter, Alfredo Lomboy, supervisor of Piñakamasarap Corporation,
testified on August 30, 1999.
On December 12, 1999, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence.14 In
the meantime, on October 22, 1999, Atty. Joselito L. Lim had moved to
withdraw his appearance as counsel for petitioners;15 the court had granted the
motion on October 25, 1999;16 and the new counsel of petitioners, Balbastro
and Associates, had entered its appearance on November 24, 1999.17
On February 15, 2000, the court resolved to admit the documentary evidence
of the prosecution except Exhibit "E" which was rejected by the court, and
Exhibits "I" and "J" which were withdrawn.18 The prosecution rested its case.
On March 10, 2000, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed a Motion for
Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence.19 The court granted the motion. In their
demurrer,20 petitioners argued that a judgment of acquittal is proper since no
sufficient evidence was presented to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they
are guilty of the offense charged. The prosecution was not able to establish
that they gave their goods the general appearance of another manufacturer or
dealer and that they had the intent to defraud the public or Piñakamasarap
Corporation. Moreover, under both R.A. No. 166, as amended, and its
repealing law, R.A. No. 8293, the RTC had jurisdiction over the crime
charged; hence, the amended complaint should be quashed.
The prosecution opposed the demurrer to evidence, contending that it had
presented proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of petitioners for the
crime charged. The prosecution maintained that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Blg. 129, the MTC had jurisdiction over the crime charged in the light of the
imposable penalty for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code.21
In its Resolution dated May 16, 2000,22 the court held that there was prima
facie evidence which, if unrebutted or not contradicted, would be sufficient to
warrant the conviction of petitioners. However, the court ruled that the RTC
was vested by law with the exclusive and original jurisdiction to try and
decide charges for violation of R.A. No. 166 as amended by R.A. No. 8293.
Accordingly, the court denied the demurrer to evidence and ordered the
records of the case forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
appropriate action.
The City Prosecutor forwarded the case records to the Clerk of Court of RTC,
Br. 63, Tarlac City.23 On June 19, 2000, the RTC ordered the City Prosecutor
to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation and to file the necessary
Information if he found probable cause against petitioners.
The City Prosecutor found probable cause based on the findings of the MTC
in its May 16, 2000 Resolution that there was a prima facie case against
petitioners.24 He filed an Information in the RTC on July 18, 2000 for
violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.25 The Information reads:
That on or about February 14, 1994 and sometime prior thereto, at
Tarlac City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, being the owner of a business establishment with principal
address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subd., San Vicente, Tarlac City, the
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in unfair competition
with the intention of deceiving and defrauding the public in general
and the PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, the name "MARCA
PIÑA," and sell or offer for sale soy sauce manufactured by them with
the brand name "Marca Piña," which is a version of the trademark, and
using the bottles of Piñakamasarap Corporation and substituted the
contents thereof with those manufactured by the accused and passing
to the public the products, thereby inducing the public to believe that
the soy sauce sold or offered for sale by the accused are genuine
"MARCA PIÑA" soy sauce, to the damage and prejudice of
PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.26
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information,27 alleging that their rights
to due process and speedy trial had been violated. Other than the notice of
hearing sent by the court, they never received a subpoena which required them
to submit their evidence during a preliminary investigation. Petitioners further
averred that certain delays in the trial are permissible, especially when such
delays are due to uncontrollable circumstances or by accident. In this case, the
inordinate delay was obviously brought by the lackadaisical attitude taken by
the prosecutor in prosecuting the case. Petitioners pointed out that there was
already a delay of six (6) long years from the time the initial complaint was
filed, and that they had already been prejudiced. Their life, liberty and
property, not to mention their reputation, have been at risk as there has been
no determination of the issue of whether or not to indict them. Thus, the case
should be dismissed in order to free them from further capricious and
oppressive dilatory tactics of the prosecution. Indeed, their right to a speedy
trial is part of due process, both of which are guaranteed by no less than the
fundamental law itself. They insisted that they should not be made to unjustly
await the prosecution of the charges against them.
In opposition, the City Prosecutor clarified that subpoenas were sent to the
parties during the preliminary investigation. In fact, petitioner Henry Uy
appeared and submitted the case for resolution without submitting additional
evidence. Also, the proceedings in the MTC were not part of preliminary
investigation but the trial on the merits.28
On September 8, 2000, the court issued an Order denying the motion to
quash.29 The court ruled that:
While there must have been a protracted trial since the case was
originally filed before the Municipal Trial Court, a period of about six
(6) years, as the accused contends, nevertheless the delay if any, is
partly attributable to the accused. [They] allowed the prosecution to
rest the evidence in chief before raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction. Had the accused immediately raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, this case could have been filed anew before the RTC. The
accused allowed themselves to be arraigned without raising the issue
of jurisdiction. In fact, the prosecution [had] rested its evidence in
chief.
The parties may[,] however[,] stipulate in the pre-trial that all the
proceedings taken before the Municipal Trial Court are automatically
reproduced and are considered part of the prosecution's evidence, so
that the trial will now be with respect to the reception of defense
evidence.30
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order31 which the trial
court denied.32 At the same time, the court granted the oral motion of the
prosecution to amend the Information to reflect in its caption that the law
violated by the accused is R.A. No. 8293 and not Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code. On October 12, 2000, the City Prosecutor filed an amended
Information. The inculpatory portion reads:
That on or about February 14, 1994 and sometimes prior thereto, at
Tarlac City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, being the owner of a business establishment with principal
address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subd., San Vicente, Tarlac City, the
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in Violation of Sec.
168 of R.A. No. 8293 with the intention of deceiving and defrauding
the public in general and the PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION,
the name "MARCA PIÑA," and sell or offer for sale soy sauce
manufactured by them with the brand name "Marca Piña," which is a
version of the trademark, and using the bottles of Piñakamasarap
Corporation and substituted the contents thereof with those
manufactured by the accused and passing to the public the products,
 thereby inducing the public to believe that the soy sauce sold or
offered for sale by the accused are genuine "MARCA PIÑA" soy
sauce, to the damage and prejudice of PIÑAKAMASARAP
CORPORATION.
CONTRARY TO LAW.33
Petitioners then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,34 on the sole ground
that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their
motion to quash based on violation of their right to a speedy trial. They
claimed that there was no active effort on their part to delay the case as they
merely attended the scheduled hearings and participated in the preliminary
investigation. On the contrary, it is the prosecution that has the unmitigated
obligation to immediately file the Information with the proper court. The
public prosecutor is supposedly knowledgeable of the existing laws and
jurisprudence since his office has the delicate task of prosecuting cases in
behalf of the State. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, he is the officer
responsible for the direction and control of criminal prosecutions. In the case
at bar, the public prosecutor failed in his bounden duty by neglecting to file
the case in the court of competent jurisdiction. The prosecution could not
advance a single reason to justify the procedural error and instead pointed its
accusing finger to petitioners who are just ordinary citizens. Their failure to
call the attention of the prosecution is neither acquiescence nor consent on
their part. While their former lawyer was obviously lackluster in their defense,
the act of the counsel should not deprive them of their constitutional right to a
speedy trial. For petitioners, the prosecution's blunder in procedure and
ignorance of existing laws and jurisprudence far outweigh whatever minimal
participation, if any, they had in the protracted proceedings.
On March 21, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition.35 The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Orders dated September 8,
2000 and October 9, 2000 of the public respondent are
hereby DISMISSED.36
In dismissing the petition, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
[T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays" (Castillo v.
Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 69, 76); "or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried." (Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 316
SCRA 65, 93)
In the instant case, aside from the fact that it took almost six years for
the prosecution to complete the presentation of its evidence, petitioners
failed to show that the delay, if ever there is any, was caused solely by
the prosecution. Neither did the petitioners show that the proceedings
before the Municipal Trial Court was attended by vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays attributable to the prosecution or that unjustified
postponements of the trial were asked for and secured by the
prosecution to the prejudice of the petitioners. The fact alone that the
prosecution had consumed six (6) years to complete its presentation of
evidence, without any allegation or proof that the prosecution has
caused unreasonable delays or that the proceeding was attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, to Our minds is not
sufficient for the application upon the petitioners of their
Constitutional right to speedy trial. "A mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the Constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case." (Binay v. Sandiganbayan,
supra, p. 93). In the case at bar, petitioners failed to present, for Our
perusal, the circumstances attending the trial of their case before the
Municipal Trial Court.
The only controversy of the instant case lies in the fact that the
Municipal Trial Court which heard the case has no jurisdiction over
the said case. While it may be conceded that the prosecution erred in
not filing the information against the petitioners to a proper court, still,
petitioners are not blameless in this regard. Petitioners, through their
counsel, had actively participated in the proceedings before the
Municipal Trial Court. Petitioners had to wait for almost six (6) years
to elapse before they brought to the attention of the Municipal Trial
Court that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case against the petitioners.
Petitioners have, by reason of their participation in the proceedings
before the Municipal Trial Court and also by reason of their silence
and inaction, allowed the Municipal Trial Court to proceed with a case
for six (6) years despite absence of jurisdiction of such court to hear
the case. We cannot allow the petitioners to reap from their acts or
omissions. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one,
more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and
position, entraps and destroys the other." (Fortune Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 355, 364)
"The constitutional privilege was never intended as furnishing a
technical means for escaping trial." (Esguerra v. Court of First
Instance of Manila, et al., 95 Phil. 609, 611-612) "The right of an
accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution, but
the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures rights to an
accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. (Domingo
v. Sandiganbayan, 322 SCRA 655, 667)37
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court
denied.38
Petitioners sought relief from this Court on a petition for review, alleging that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE COURT A QUO'S
DENIAL OF PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH, BASED ON
VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL (SEC. 16,
ART. 3, 1987 CONSTITUTION).39
Petitioners reiterate their arguments in the CA to support the present petition.
They aver that:
In this case, the prosecution took six (6) long and grueling years before
it filed an Information with a competent court, despite the fact that
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over trademark cases
remained unchanged since the birth of the Trademark Law. Surely, this
inordinate delay can be considered a "vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delay" which is constitutionally impermissible in this
jurisdiction pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Indeed, petitioners have been prejudiced. Their lives, liberty and
property, not to mention their reputation have all been put at risk for so
long.
The public prosecutor failed to explain the reason for the delay. Truth
to tell, even at this last stage, the public prosecutor chooses to remain
silent why it had unjustifiably taken him too long to file this case
before a competent court. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals
deliberately ignored this glaring flaw committed by the public
prosecutor and instead focused on petitioners' alleged negligence in
not raising the issue of jurisdiction earlier. It further ruled that due to
this fact, petitioners are thus not entirely blameless for the delay of the
trial.
Truth to tell, these findings of the Court of Appeals are palpably
erroneous.
Firstly, it is elementary that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. This is because no amount of
waiver can confer jurisdiction on a court over an offense for which
such jurisdiction has not been conferred by law in the first place.
Secondly, even assuming that petitioners failed to raise the issue of
jurisdiction earlier, still, they could not be estopped from invoking
their right to speedy trial. The delay to be considered "partly
attributable" to the accused (which could work against him in invoking
the right to speedy trial) presupposes an active effort of the defendant
to delay the case (Manabat v. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295). There is no
violation of the right to speedy trial where the delay is imputable to the
accused (Solis v. Agloro, 63 SCRA 370). Here, it was the prosecution
that had the unmitigated obligation to file the Information with the
correct court, within a reasonable time. It did not. Such blunder was
fatal to its cause.
To emphasize, petitioners need not even call the attention of the
prosecution that it had failed to file the case with the proper court,
contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals. x x x40
xxxx
Although petitioners agree with the Court of Appeals that mere
mathematical reckoning of time would not be sufficient for the
application of the right to speedy trial, still, the public prosecutor's
blunder should already be considered "vexatious, capricious and
oppressive" warranting the dismissal of the case.
Indeed, to condone the public prosecutor's manner of having directed
this case, just like what the Court of Appeals did, might give rise to a
disturbing precedent where the constitutional right of the accused
could very well be set aside to justify the mishandling of the
prosecution by officers of the State.41
Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that the accused is entitled to a speedy, impartial and public trial. Section 2,
Rule 119 of the said Rules provides that trial, once commenced, shall be
continuous until terminated:
Sec. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. – Trial, once
commenced, shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until
terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for
good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense
counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-
term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy
trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty
(180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by
the Supreme Court.
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding
section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme
Court provide for a shorter period of trial.
However, any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the
prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set
forth in the order that the ends of justice is served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused on a speedy trial, shall
be deducted.
The trial court may grant continuance, taking into account the following
factors:
(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding
would likely make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or
result in a miscarriage of justice; and
(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and
complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the
prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation
within the periods of time established therein.
In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be
granted because of congestion of the court's calendar or lack of
diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part
of the prosecutor.42
Under the Constitution and Section 1(7) of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the accused shall be entitled to have a speedy and
impartial trial. "Speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily a flexible
concept.43 In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial
was violated, the delay should be considered, in view of the entirety of the
proceedings.44 Indeed, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
would not suffice45 as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in
judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum.46
Apart from the constitutional provision and Section 115, Section 1(i) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, A.O. No. 113-95 of the Court provides that:
The trial of cases for violation of Intellectual Property Rights covered
by this Administrative Order shall be immediately commenced and
shall continue from day to day to be terminated as far as practicable
within sixty (60) days from initial trial. Judgment thereon shall be
rendered within thirty (30) days from date of submission for decision.
More than a decade after the 1972 leading U.S. case of Barker v. Wingo47 was
promulgated, this Court, in Martin v. Ver,48 began adopting the "balancing
test" to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been
violated. As this test necessarily compels the courts to approach speedy trial
cases on an ad hoc basis, the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant
are weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to wit: (1) length of the delay; (2)
reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and
(4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay.49 None of these elements,
however, is either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and
must be considered together with other relevant circumstances. These factors
have no talismanic qualities as courts must still engage in a difficult and
sensitive balancing process.50
A. Length of the Delay
The length of delay is to some extent a "triggering mechanism." Until there is
some delay, which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity to
inquire into the other three factors. Nevertheless, due to the imprecision of the
right to a speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is
necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.51
B. Reason for the Delay
Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
accused have the burden to prove the factual basis of the motion to quash the
Information on the ground of denial of their right to a speedy trial.52 They
must demonstrate that the delay in the proceedings is vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive; or is caused by unjustified postponements that were asked for
and secured; or that without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the case being tried.53 On the other hand, the
prosecution is required to present evidence establishing that the delay was
reasonably attributed to the ordinary processes of justice, and that petitioners
suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued after an inevitable and
ordinary delay.54
The records bear out the contention of petitioners that there had been a
considerable delay in the trial in the MTC. Upon motion/agreement of
petitioners and the prosecution, or because of the joint absences, the trial of
the case was delayed for more than 11 months.55 In its own instance, the MTC
also reset some of the trial dates in order to correct mistakes in scheduling or
because the witnesses were not duly notified,56 thus, delaying the trial of the
case for an additional seven months. Even petitioners contributed to the delay
of more than five months – they or their former counsel were either absent or
moved for postponements to attend another pending case or due to health
concerns.57 The delay of about 21 months, covering 15 re-settings, can be
attributed to the prosecution. However, except in five instances, when the trial
was reset because the private prosecutor had to attend to some
professional58 and personal matters,59 the delays were brought about because
of the recent engagement of legal service,60 absence of the public
prosecutor,61 and unavailability of documents62 and witnesses.63
Not only the petitioners but the State as well were prejudiced by the inordinate
delay in the trial of the case. It took the prosecution more than four years to
rest its case after presenting only three witnesses. Had the prosecution,
petitioner and the trial court been assiduous in avoiding any inordinate delay
in the trial, the prosecution could have rested its case much earlier. The court
even failed to order the absent counsel/prosecutor/witnesses to explain/justify
their absences or cite them for contempt. The speedy trial mandated by the
Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is as much the
responsibility of the prosecution, the trial court and petitioners to the extent
that the trial is inordinately delayed, and to that extent the interest of justice is
prejudiced.
The case before the RTC should not be dismissed simply because the public
prosecution did not move for the dismissal of the case in the MTC based on
A.O. No. 104-96 declaring that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases
under Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; or for failure of the
MTC to motu proprio dismiss the case on that ground. The City Prosecutor
then believed in good faith, albeit erroneously, that under R.A. No. 7691
which amended B.P. Blg. 129, the MTC had jurisdiction over the crime
charged.
The mistake of the City Prosecutor and the failure of the MTC to dismiss the
case motu proprio should not prejudice the interest of the State to prosecute
criminal offenses and, more importantly, defeat the right of the offended party
to redress for its grievance. Significantly, petitioners do not attribute to the
prosecution or to the MTC any malice aforethought or conscious disregard of
their right to a speedy trial; nor have substantially proven the same by clear
and convincing evidence. Hence, absent showing of bad faith or gross
negligence, delay caused by the lapse of the prosecution is not in itself
violative of the right to a speedy trial.
Different weights should be assigned to various reasons by which the
prosecution justifies the delay. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order
to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the prosecution. A
more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather
than with defendant.64
In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,65 the Court had carefully balanced the societal
interest in the case, which involved the so-called "tax credit certificates scam,"
and the need to give substance to the defendants' constitutional rights. In said
suit, we upheld the decision of the Sandiganbayan (Special Fourth Division)
that the dismissal of the cases was too drastic, precipitate and unwarranted.
While the Court recognized that defendants were prejudiced by the delay in
the reinvestigation of the cases and the submission of a complete report by the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor to the Sandiganbayan, we underscored that
the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute cases
simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor. "An overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a case may enable
defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without having been tried, thereby
infringing the societal interest in trying people accused of crimes by granting
them immunization because of legal error."66
The same observation was made in Valencia v. Sandiganbayan.67 Here, the
Court noted the haphazard manner by which the prosecutor handled the
litigation for the State when he rested the case without adducing evidence for
the prosecution and simply relying on the Joint Stipulation of Facts, which the
accused did not even sign before its submission to the Sandiganbayan. In
allowing the prosecution to present additional evidence and in dismissing the
claim of the accused that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been
violated, we ruled:
As significant as the right of an accused to a speedy trial is the right of
the State to prosecute people who violate its penal laws. The right to a
speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays x x x [T]o erroneously
put premium on the right to speedy trial in the instant case and deny
the prosecution's prayer to adduce additional evidence would logically
result in the dismissal of the case for the State. There is no difference
between an order outrightly dismissing the case and an order allowing
the eventual dismissal thereof. Both would set a dangerous precedent
which enables the accused, who may be guilty, to go free without
having been validly tried, thereby infringing the interest of the
society.68
Certainly, the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the
same would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. It should
not operate in depriving the State of its inherent prerogative to prosecute
criminal cases or generally in seeing to it that all those who approach the bar
of justice is afforded fair opportunity to present their side.69 For it is not only
the State; more so, the offended party who is entitled to due process in
criminal cases.70 In essence, the right to a speedy trial does not preclude the
people's equally important right to public justice.71 Thus, as succinctly decreed
in State v. McTague:72
The constitutional and statutory provisions for a speedy trial are for the
protection of the defendant, but that does not mean that the state is the
only one that may initiate action. There is really no reason for the
courts to free an accused simply because a dilatory prosecutor has
'gone to sleep at the switch' while the defendant and his counsel rest in
silence. These solicitous provisions are not to be used as offensive
weapons, but are for the benefit of defendants who claim their
protection. They are a shield, and they 'must not be left hanging on the
wall of the armory.' It is for the protection of personal rights, not to
embarrass the administration of the criminal law nor to defeat public
justice.
Be that as it may, the conduct of the City Prosecutor and the MTC must not
pass without admonition. This Court must emphasize that the State, through
the court and the public prosecutor, has the absolute duty to insure that the
criminal justice system is consistent with due process and the constitutional
rights of the accused. Society has a particular interest in bringing swift
prosecutions, and the society's representatives are the ones who should protect
that interest. The trial court and the prosecution are not without responsibility
for the expeditious trial of criminal cases. The burden for trial promptness is
not solely upon the defense. The right to a speedy trial is constitutionally
guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant and the
knowledgeable.73
C. Petitioners' Assertion of the Right
The assertion of the right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary
weight in determining whether defendant is being deprived thereof. Failure to
claim the right will make it difficult to prove that there was a denial of a
speedy trial.74
Except in only one instance in this case,75 the records are bereft of any
evidence that petitioners, through counsel, have bothered to raise their
objection to the several re-setting of the trial dates. This is not unexpected
since, as already shown, the reasons for the delay are not in themselves totally
inexcusable or unreasonable. Moreover, petitioners actively participated in the
trial when the prosecution presented its evidence, as they scrutinized the
documentary evidence and cross-examined the witnesses. Until the filing of
the motion to quash in the RTC, they never contested the prosecutorial
proceedings nor timely challenged the pendency of the case in the MTC.
While it is true that lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage of the
proceedings, such defense must be seasonably raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. Otherwise, active participation in the trial would estop a party
from later challenging such want of jurisdiction.76
In the same vein, one's failure to timely question the delay in the trial of a case
would be an implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right to
question the same. Except when otherwise expressly so provided, the speedy
trial right, like any other right conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be
waived when not positively asserted.77 A party's silence may amount to
laches.78 The right to a speedy trial is a privilege of the accused. If he does not
claim it, he should not complain. R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is
a means of enforcing Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution.79 The spirit
of the law is that the accused must go on record in the attitude of demanding a
trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be held, in law, to have
waived the privilege.
This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' untiring argument that, being
"ordinary citizens," they should not be made to suffer from the "lackluster"
performance of their former counsel who failed to recognize the MTC's want
of jurisdiction. Too often we have held that a client is bound by the acts,
mistakes or negligence of his counsel.80 This is, as it should be, since a
counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at
least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his
client. Any act performed within the scope of his general and implied
authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the act of the client.81 If the
rule were otherwise, there would be no end to litigation so long as a new
counsel could be employed who would allege and show that the prior counsel
had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned.82 It would enable
every party to render inutile an adverse order or decision through the simple
expedient of alleging gross negligence on the part of the counsel.83 Every
shortcoming of a counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client
through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be
disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on
ad infinitum.84 Proceedings would then be indefinite, tentative and at times,
subject to reopening by the simple subterfuge of replacing counsel.85
While the rule admits of certain exceptions,86 we find none present in this
case. Other than his obvious failure to assert lack of jurisdiction, Atty. Lim
undeniably represented the cause of his clients in the MTC proceedings.
Interestingly, their new counsel, wittingly or unwittingly, raised the issue of
jurisdiction only four months after it entered its appearance,87 thus, adding to
the delay.
D. Prejudice to the Petitioners
In the Barker case,88 the different interests of a defendant which may be
affected by the violation of the right to a speedy trial were identified. It was
held that prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interests of a
defendant which the speedy trial right was designed to protect, namely: (1) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern
of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious.
There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately
events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in
the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown. Even if an
accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints
on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often
hostility.89 After all, arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the
defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his
employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him
to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and friends.90
Again, a perusal of the records failed to reveal that the delay in bringing
petitioners to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction caused them any
prejudice tantamount to deprivation of their right to a speedy trial. Petitioners
in this case were not subjected to pretrial incarceration, oppressive or
otherwise, thus eliminating the first Barker consideration bearing on prejudice.
As to the minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused, there is no
showing that petitioners suffered undue pressures in this respect. Mere
reference to a general asseveration that their "life, liberty and property, not to
mention reputation" have been prejudiced is not enough. There must be
conclusive factual basis, as this Court cannot rely on pure speculation or
guesswork. Surely, a pending criminal case may cause trepidation but, as
stressed in Barker, the standard here is minimization, not necessarily
elimination of the natural consequences of an indictment. While this is not to
be brushed off lightly, it is not by itself sufficient to support a claim of denial
of the right to a speedy trial.
There is no factual basis for the claim of petitioners that we are not supplied
with any specific allegation in the record, nor witnesses or evidence may
become unavailable because of the delays in this case. To repeat, the claim of
impairment of defense because of delay must be specific and not by mere
conjecture. Vague assertions of faded memory will not suffice. Failure to
claim that particular evidence had been lost or had disappeared defeats speedy
trial claim.
As neither the specific types of prejudice mentioned in Barker nor any others
have been brought to the Court's attention, we are constrained to dismiss
petitioners' claim. The passage of time alone, without a significant deprivation
of liberty or impairment of the ability to properly defend oneself, is not
absolute evidence of prejudice. The right to a speedy trial is not primarily
intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by the passage of time;
that interest is protected primarily by the due process clause and the statutes of
limitations.91
In several cases where it is manifest that due process of law or other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or statutes has been denied, this Court has not
faltered to accord the so-called "radical relief" to keep accused from enduring
the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial.92 In this case, however, there
appears no persuasive, much less compelling, ground to allow the same relief
for absence of clear and convincing showing that the delay was unreasonable
or arbitrary and was seasonably objected to by petitioners.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. The March 21, 2003 Decision and July 17, 2003
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 64, Tarlac City, is directed to proceed with the trial on the
merits of the criminal case with all reasonable and judicious dispatch
consistent with the right of petitioners to a speedy trial. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and
Chico-Na
An accused has a right to a public trial, but it is a right that belongs to him
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not
be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret
conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with a publicized
trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to
come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe
the trial process [Re: Request for Live TV Coverage of the Trial of former
President Joseph Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001],
A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C.       June 29, 2001
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG
MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
VITUG, J.:
The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start
hearing the criminal charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to
cover the event via live television and live radio broadcast and endeavors this
Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP),
an association representing duly franchised and authorized television and
radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to
allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the
proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history."2 The request was
seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief
Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo
Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez
formally filed the instant petition,3 submitting the following exegesis:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the
former highest official of the land, members of his family, his cohorts
and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution
thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a
matter over which the entire citizenry has the right to know, be
informed and made aware of.
"4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to
be informed on matters of public concern, as in the instant cases, can
best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio and
television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings
will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in
the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the
supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-
perceived attempts on the part of the present dispensation, to railroad
the instant criminal cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada."4
Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind
the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation.
In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991
resolution of this Court in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C.
Aquino. The resolution read:
"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion
regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom. Similarly,
Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the question
squarely.
"While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United
States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Cameras in the
Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the
United States prohibits the presence of television cameras in criminal
trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the
taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or
radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of
any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all
concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To
so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and
departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our
judicial proceedings are formulated.
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by
forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial while permitting the
newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news
reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to
bring his typewriter or printing press into the courtroom.
"In Estes vs. Texas. the United States Supreme Court held that
television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial
of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4, the Court
through Mr. Justice Clark identified four (4) areas of potential
prejudice which might arise from the impact of the cameras on the
jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in part
pertinently stated:
"Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of
telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play
to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to
extraordinary out-of court influences which might affect their
testimony. Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judge's
responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may
as well affect his own performance. Judges are human beings
also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as
laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental
harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and
distracts him from the effective presentation of his
defense. 1âwphi1.nêt
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which
intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his
case in the eyes of the public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a
writ of mandate to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial, since
within the courtroom, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater
than those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter or
destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and
decorum that the requirements of impartiality imposed by due process
of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal
proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and
photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom.
 "Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due
process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and
considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the
people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting,
degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of
court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court
hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of
the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken
prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
" Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to
prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the
last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to
PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings.
Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and
restricted as above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness,
and it has become an important instrument in the quest for truth. 5 Recent
history exemplifies media's invigorating presence, and its contribution to
society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice
of the enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience during the
impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly political exercise, indeed the
most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times, that would soon
culminate in EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing
out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to
public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the
accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.6
When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence7 tells us that the
right of the accused must be preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very
life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused
receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a
verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence
testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether
open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract
from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence,8 and
decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions
or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor
made an object of public's attention9 and where the conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force or influence10 but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to
thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to presume firmness of mind and
resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that "television can work
profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."11
Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media
can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion,
it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying
degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have
on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated
but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or
innocence to yield to it.12 It might be farcical to build around them an
impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public
opinion.13
To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana
the subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to
the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can create.14 The effect of
television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for
it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we know it now. 15
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not
be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete
conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial;
it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come,
sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the
trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough
facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not
too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract
the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free
to report what they have observed during the proceedings.16
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and
the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to
provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the
proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial
process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process17 which
must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be allowed
the press in carrying out the important function of informing the public in a
democratic society, its exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance
of absolute fairness in the judicial process."18
This Court, in the instance19 already mentioned, citing Estes vs. Texas,20 the
United States Supreme Court holding the television coverage of judicial
proceedings as an inherent denial of due process rights of an accused, also
identified the following as being likely prejudices:
"1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of the greatest
significance. x x x. From the moment the trial judge announces that a
case will be televised it becomes a cause celebre. The whole
community, x x x becomes interested in all the morbid details
surrounding it. The approaching trial immediately assumes an
important status in the public press and the accused is highly
publicized along with the offense with which he is charged. Every
juror carries with him into the jury box these solemn facts and thus
increases the chance of prejudice that is present in every criminal case.
x x x.
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be
impaired. The impact upon a witness of the knowledge that he is being
viewed by a vast audience is Simply incalculable. Some may be
demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement;
memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy
of statement may be severely undermined. x x x. Indeed, the mere fact
that the trial is to be televised might render witnesses reluctant to
appear and thereby impede the trial as well as the discovery of the
truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the
presence of television places on the trial judge. His job is to make
certain that the accused receives a fair trial. This most difficult task
requires his undivided attention. x x x
"4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the
defendant. Its presence is a form of mental if not physical-harassment,
 resembling a police line-up or the third degree. The inevitable close-up
of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well
transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to
concentrate on the proceedings before him -sometimes the difference
between life and death -dispassionately, freely and without the
distraction of wide public surveillance. A defendant on trial for a
specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city
or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from
radio and television coverage will inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live
television and radio coverage could have mischievous potentialities for
intruding upon the detached atmosphere that should always surround the
judicial process.21
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 Apri1 2001,
expressed its own concern on the live television and radio coverage of the
criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and radio
coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings
intended to assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life
and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal
justice system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow
the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt
of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if
popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve
the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few
grandstanding lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see
protracted delays in the prosecution of cases before trial courts brought about
by petitions seeking a declaration of mistrial on account of undue publicity
and assailing a court a quo's action either allowing or disallowing live media
coverage of the court proceedings because of supposed abuse of discretion on
the part of the judge.
En passant,  the minority would view the ponencia as having modified the
case law on the matter. Just to the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its
standing resolution of 23 October 1991. Until 1991, the Court had yet to
establish the case law on the matter, and when it did in its 23rd October
resolution, it confirmed, in disallowing live television and radio coverage of
court proceedings, that "the records of the Constitutional Commission (were)
bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom" and
that "Philippine courts (had) not (therefore) had the opportunity to rule on the
question squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority
opinion really in point?
In Nebraska Press Association vs, Stewart,22 the Nebraska State trial judge
issued an order restraining news media from publishing accounts of
confession or admissions made by the accused or facts strongly implicating
him. The order was struck down. In Richmond Newspaper; Inc., vs,
Virginia,23 the trial judge closed the courtroom to the public and all
participants except witnesses when they testify. The judge was reversed by the
U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that criminal trials were historically open.
In Globe Newspaper vs. Superior Court,24 the US Supreme Court voided a
Massachusetts law that required trial judges to exclude the press and the
public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim of certain
sexual offenses.
Justice Steward, in Chandler vs. Florida,25 where two police officers charged
with burglary sought to overturn their conviction before the US Supreme
Court upon the ground that the television coverage had infringed their right to
fair trial, explained that "the constitutional violation perceived by the Estes
Court did not stem from the physical disruption that might one day disappear
with technological advances in the television equipment but inhered, rather, in
the hypothesis that the mere presence of cameras and recording devices might
have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the accused."26
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do
not allow live television and radio coverage of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great
dimensions so involving as they do a former President of the Republic. It is
undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's focal points in the
two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of
the events has left a still divided nation. Must these events be invited anew
and risk the relative stability that has thus far been achieved? The
transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to turn a blind eye to yet
another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep
into even the business of the courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule
of law. At the very least, a change in the standing rule of the court contained
in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the
people in any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable
controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted before them.27 A trial is
not a free trade of ideas, Nor is a competing market of thoughts the known test
of truth in a courtroom.28
The Court is not all that umnindful of recent technological and scientific
advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid
to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the
concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Right to meet witnesses face to face. Right to cross-examine complainant and
witnesses. The testimony of a witness who has not submitted himself to
crossexamination is not admissible in evidence. The affidavits of witnesses
who are not presented during the trial — and thus, are not subjected to cross-
examination — are inadmissible because they are hearsay [People v. Quidato,
G.R. No. 117401, October 1, 1998; Cariago v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No.143561, June 6, 2001].
G.R. No. 143561      June 6, 2001
JONATHAN D. CARIAGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DAVAO
LIGHT and POWER CO., respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 13363 entitled People v.
Jonathan Cariaga, promulgated on April 24, 1995 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 11,2 which convicted petitioner
Jonathan Cariaga of the crime of Qualified Theft.
In an amended Information3 dated October 3, 1989, petitioner was charged
with qualified theft as follows:
"That sometime during the period from October, 1988 to January,
1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, being then an
employee of Davao Light & Power Co. Inc., Davao City, and as such
has access to the said company, with intent to gain, with grave abuse
of confidence and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
 steal and carry away electrical equipment, supplies and materials
totaling P7,038.96 belonging to Davao Light & Power Company, to
the damage and prejudice of the said company, in the aforesaid amount
of P7,038.96.
Contrary to law."
The factual background of this case as summarized by the trial court and
adopted by the Court of Appeals is as follows:
"Luis Miguel Aboitiz, employed at the time of the incident in question
and for sometime prior thereto as Systems Analyst of the Davao Light
& Power Company, Inc. (DLPC), whose duty was to devise systems,
procedures or controls to promote efficiency, prevent losses due to
waste, pilferage or theft of company property, etc., received reports
that some private electricians were engaged in the clandestine sale of
DLPC materials and supplies. He initiated a covert operation with the
following objectives: (1) ascertain how DLPC materials were being
stolen, the frequency of the thefts, who were perpetrating the thefts;
and (2) `catch' at least one (1) DLPC employee that may be involved.
In October, 1988, he sought the assistance of Sgt. Fermin Villasis,
Chief, Theft & Robbery Section, San Pedro Patrol Station, Davao
METRODISCOM. He also hired one Florencio Siton, a welder by
occupation and a Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) member, as
his undercover agent under the pseudonym 'Canuto Duran', an
'electrician from Kabakan, Cotabato.'
'Canuto Duran' struck an acquaintance with one Ricardo Cariaga, a
private electrician, at the Miguel Store, situated in front of the DLPC
office along Ponciano Reyes (now Bangoy) Street, Davao City. He
told Ricardo that his boss ordered him to buy electrical materials to be
brought to Diwalwal, a gold panning area in Monkayo, Davao
(formerly Davao del Norte).
Ricardo offered to supply 'Canuto Duran' with electrical materials,
saying that he has a cousin from whom he can procure the same.
'Canuto' purchased small electrical wires which, according to Ricardo,
came from his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga, nicknamed Totoy.
On November 17, 1988, Ricardo introduced 'Canuto' to Jonathan at
Miguel Store. It turned out that Jonathan was the assigned driver of
DLPC Service Truck 'S-143' assigned to Work Gang 'Venus'. 'Canuto'
inquired from Jonathan if he could supply him with two (2) 15 KVA
transformers. Jonathan replied that he could for P16,000. 'Canuto'
placed an order for the transformers. The deal did not materialize,
however, as 'Canuto's' boss (Miguel Aboitiz) who would provide the
funds happened to be out of town. Jonathan appeared piqued. To
appease him, 'Canuto' assured him that they shall continue their
'business' relationship. Not long after, he placed an order for a
lightning arrester. Ricardo, Jonathan and 'Canuto' agreed to meet at the
corner of Jacinto and Arellano Streets.
Jonathan got DLPC Truck 'S-143' which was inside the DLPC
Compound at Ponciano Reyes Street and drove it to the designated
meeting place, leaving 'Canuto' and Ricardo at Miguel Store. After a
while, Ricardo and 'Canuto' followed. On the way, 'Canuto gave
Ricardo P1,800. At the meeting place, Ricardo gave the money to
Jonathan, after which the latter got a lightning arrester (Exh. M) from
his truck's toolbox and handed it to Ricardo, who, in turn gave it to
'Canuto'.
On January 23, 1989, Ricardo accompanied 'Canuto' to Jonathan's
house at Doña Pilar Village, Sasa, Davao City, to get a roll of
Electrical Wire No. 2 (300 meters long) valued P5,010 (Exh. J) and 2
lightning arresters with cutout, valued P1,185.75 each, or P2,371.50 The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the
for both (Exhs. I and I-1) from Jonathan. 'Canuto' paid P2,500.00 only subpoena could not be personally served upon him as according to his
for the items. He gave the money to Ricardo; Ricardo, in turn, gave it wife, Antonieta Cariaga, he was in Sultan Kudarat and the date of his
to Jonathan. return to Davao City was not certain (Exhs. Y, Y-1).

Siton's undercover work came to an abrupt end on February 1, 1989 Acting on the extrajudicial confessions of the suspects, the reports of
when members of Sgt. Villasis' team 'apprehended' 'Canuto' and turned Siton to the police and the bust, the team under Sgt. Villasis recovered
him over, including the electrical wires that he previously purchased the following items:
from Jonathan through Ricardo, to the San Pedro Patrol Station. The
team was unable to arrest Ricardo as he had already left when the team 1. 1 pc. Lightning Arrester MEW Valve Type V (Exh. "I");
arrived at his house. 'Canuto Duran' 'confessed' in order to persuade
Ricardo – and the others who were involved – to likewise come out 2. 1 pc. Lightning Arrester MEW Valve Type (Exh. "I-1");
with the truth. Thus, when Ricardo and Sergio Jamero appeared at the
San Pedro Patrol Station on the invitation of the police, they confessed 3. 1 pc. Lightning Arrester MEW Thorex Type (unmarked);
to their crimes (Exhs. A and G, respectively).
4. 1 pc. Fuse Cut-out S&C Brand with Bracket (unmarked);
Ricardo revealed that he acted as a fence for his cousin, Jonathan
Cariaga and 'Canuto Duran' on November 27, 1988 and again on 5. 1 pc. Fuse Cut-out with Fuse Holder, AB Chance (Exh.
January 23, 1989; that the items that 'Canuto Duran' bought from "M");
Jonathan, thru him, were DLPC properties.
6. 1 roll (330 meters) Aluminum Wire No. 8 (Exh. "K");
Jamero also confessed that Ricardo was his fence in disposing of
DLPC electrical materials that he pilfered but the items were not sold 7. 1 roll (300 meters) Aluminum Wire No. 2 (Exh. "J");
to 'Canuto Duran' but to someone else.
8. 1 roll (36 coils) Aluminum Wire No. 6; ) One of these
The recitals of Ricardo and Jamero in their sworn statements are
substantially corroborated by entries in the Daily Record of Events 9. 1 roll (74 coils) Aluminum Wire No. 8; ) rolls is
(blotter) of the San Pedro Patrol Station (Exhs. B, B-1; C, C-1; D, D-1;
E, E-1; and F, F-1). 10. 1 roll (41 coils) Aluminum Wire No. 2; ) marked Exh.

The accused was also invited to the San Pedro Patrol Station 11. 1 set bracket for cut-out. ) "AA"
but, according to Sgt. Villasis, he refused to give a statement.
 Sgt. Villasis testified that Exh. "U" and Exh. "AA" were the wires
recovered from Siton during the bust while the rest, particularly Exhs.
"I" and "I-1" "J" and "M" were recovered at Roselo Toledo's house
where Siton ("Canuto Duran") brought them; x x x."4
According to the trial court, "the prosecution's evidence considered as a whole
is strong, clear and convincing. The statements in the extrajudicial confessions
of Ricardo Cariaga (Exhs. A; O,O-1) implicative of the accused as the source
of the stolen articles, corroborated by Siton's testimony and the police records
(Exhs. D to F-2, inclusive) are formidable compared to the mere puny denial
of the accused."
In due course, the trial court on November 18, 1991, rendered judgment, the
decretal portion reading:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Jonathan Cariaga guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of theft, qualified by grave abuse of
confidence, under Article 310, in relation to Article 309, par. 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged, aggravated by the use of motor
vehicle which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) Years, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY, of prision mayor, as minimum, to
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND TWENTY ONE
(21) DAYS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay the costs.
No civil indemnity is awarded to DLPC, the private complainant, as
the items stolen were recovered. The return to DLPC of all the items
recovered by the police is ordered.
SO ORDERED."5
On appeal by Jonathan Cariaga, the Court of Appeals affirmed on April 24,
1995, the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals reasoned out that
the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who did not testify in open court
during the criminal proceedings against petitioner is admissible in evidence
and properly considered by the trial court as this was annexed as part of
DLPC's position paper submitted to the National Labor Relations Commission
in Case No. RAB-11-05-00308-89, a complaint filed by the accused for illegal
dismissal, as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the
credibility of Siton's testimony which corroborated that of Ricardo Cariaga's
sworn statement.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following errors:
"I The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of
Ricardo Cariaga without him taking the witness stand since it violates
the fundamental right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him
face to face. Hence, Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement is not
admissible under Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court
for failure of the prosecution to comply with the strict requirements of
said rule, to wit:
a] Ricardo Cariaga did not orally testify in the labor case;
b] Inability to testify must be for a grave cause almost
amounting to death and the prosecution must exhaust all
available remedies to secure the presence of its witnesses at the
trial;
c] That the former proceeding must also be criminal in nature.
II. The appellate court erred in holding that the lone testimony of the
prosecution's alleged eyewitness who is a paid witness and whose
 testimony was admittedly corrected or revised on the witness stand and
which materially and significantly varies with his previous sworn
statement on very vital and pivotal details is sufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
III.The appellate court erred in failing to appreciate the reasonable
doubt engendered by the exculpatory statements of the superiors of the
accused in favor of the latter."6
In his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that the sworn statement of
Ricardo Cariaga who was not presented in court is inadmissible. The
prosecution presented in evidence as Exh. P-2, Ricardo Cariaga's sworn
statement which was attached as Annex "8-A" to DLPC's position paper in the
labor case filed by Jonathan Cariaga against the latter for illegal dismissal.
The trial court admitted the same in evidence despite the timely objection of
the defense counsel; and the Court of Appeals upheld the admission thereof
citing as basis, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence and Section
1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Section 47 of Rule 130 reads:
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify,
given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-
examine him.
More specific however is the rule prescribed in Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the
Rules of Court in respect of the admissibility in evidence in a criminal case of
the previous testimony of unavailable witnesses which reads:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. – In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be entitled:
f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial.
Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a
witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found
in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in
another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the
opportunity to cross-examine him;
In Toledo, Jr. vs. People,7 this Court emphasized that "the preconditions set
forth in Section 47, Rule 130 for the admission of testimony given by a
witness out of court must be strictly complied with and that there is more
reason to adopt such a strict rule in the case of Section 1(f) of Rule 115, for
apart from being a rule of evidence with additional specific requisites to those
prescribed by Section 47, more importantly, said provision is an implementing
translation of the constitutional right of an accused person "to meet the
witnesses (against him) face to face." In Tan vs. Court of Appeals,8 it was
ruled that "'unable to testify' or for that matter 'unavailability', does not cover
the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. It may refer to
inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when
the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. It does not refer to
tampering of witnesses."
The threshold question then is the admissibility of the sworn statement of
Ricardo Cariaga which was attached to DLPC's position paper in the labor
case filed by Jonathan Cariaga against it for illegal dismissal.
The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once
and did not appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner.
Concededly, this witness was not deceased or out of the Philippines. In fact,
the private prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat,9 and
previously, his wife informed the sheriff that he was in Sultan Kudarat which
is in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from Davao City. Against this
backdrop, can this witness be categorized as one that cannot be found despite
due diligence, unavailable or unable to testify. We are inclined to rule in the
negative and reverse the Court of Appeals on this point.
It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases,
hence, "mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to
prove inability to testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power to
arrest."10 In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness
arrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where
witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. On this score alone, the
sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga should not have been admitted as
evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the other
aspects of this rule.
In his second assignment of error, petitioner assails the testimony of
prosecution witness Florencio Siton alias "Canuto Duran", the undercover
agent, as not credible because it is allegedly inconsistent in very material and
pivotal details from the sworn statement he made at the police station and that
he is admitted by the prosecution to be a paid witness. According to petitioner,
Siton's testimony was overhauled and corrected to meet the crisis created by
eyewitness Ricardo Cariaga's non-appearance in court. Petitioner argues
further that Siton had thousands of reasons to vary or exaggerate or pervert the
truth in his testimony because he admitted that he was given by DLPC through
Mr. Aboitiz, a 15 KVA transformer worth P15,000.00 to P18, 000.00 and he
also admitted on cross-examination that "after the hearing he (Mr. Aboitiz)
will hire me as an employee or that he will give me privilege."
He alleges that Siton never mentioned in his sworn statement that he bought
anything directly from petitioner and only stated that the latter was around
when he bought some wires and lightning arresters from Bondying and
Bebing Tumali, and then claimed on the witness stand that he had direct
dealings with petitioner. Siton also failed to state in his sworn statement that
he went to the house of petitioner to purchase DLPC materials; and he
mentioned therein that the arrangement was that the materials will be
delivered three days after payment, but in his testimony, the materials were
delivered upon payment.
As we have so frequently ruled, the trial judge who sees and hears witnesses
testify has exceptional opportunities to form a correct conclusion as to the
degree of credit which should be accorded their testimonies.11 Next, the rule
has also always been that the contradictions between the contents of an
affiant's affidavit and his testimony on the witness stand do not always
militate against the witness' credibility because we have long taken judicial
notice that affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete
and inaccurate.12 Indeed, a sworn statement taken ex parte is generally
considered to be inferior to a testimony given in open court as the latter is
subject to the test of cross examination.13
We have carefully gone over the records and evidence in this case and we are
persuaded that Siton's testimony in court deserves credence. We further find
the same sufficient for conviction. Siton was consistent and straightforward in
his testimony and had not been shaken by the lengthy and exhaustive cross-
examination by the defense counsel. Having thoroughly convinced the trial
and appellate courts as well as this Court of the truth of his testimony, we do
not see how he could have fabricated the entire story. The fact that he stated
on direct examination that he "corrected" his statement and that he was offered
compensation for his undercover work does not necessarily discredit him.
There is no rule of evidence to the effect that omission of certain particulars in
a sworn statement would estop an affiant from making an elaboration thereof
or from correcting inaccuracies during the trial. It appears that he was paid for
his services rendered as an undercover agent and not for purposes of
concocting a story and imputing a crime as that made out in the information.
Similarly, the alleged inaccuracies in the testimony of Siton in open court
relating to such minute details as whether the petitioner's house was two-
stories high and located in a corner are too negligible to consider.
Finally, we reject petitioner's claim that the testimonies of three witnesses for
the prosecution, namely, Sauro, Saligan and Aboitiz, engendered reasonable
doubt sufficient to exculpate him. He points out that "Rodolfo Sauro, gang
crew supervisor of petitioner testified that he has not reported any missing
materials in the truck driven by the petitioner; that Luis Aboitiz testified that
he asked Estelito Saligan to conduct investigation if there were materials
missing `but the latter came out with the report that he could not find any
missing materials'; and that Estelito Saligan, head of Materials Management
Department of the DLPC confirmed on cross-examination that there were no
properties lost or missing."
However, a more accurate reading of the testimonies of the said witnesses
reveals that Rodolfo Sauro14 testified that petitioner is permanently assigned as
driver to the S-143 truck; that he is in charge of all the equipment and supplies
stored in the truck; that there were always reserve materials kept in the truck
for emergency operations during the night and that he trusted him that these
materials were being used for emergencies.15 He also testified that he took
Jonathan's word that the reserve materials were used for emergencies because
he found him trustworthy.16 On the other hand, Engr. Estelito Saligan was
recalled to the witness stand to clarify Mr. Aboitiz's statement that "he was
ordered to make inventories and that he did not find any missing." He clarified
that he only inventoried the materials inside the warehouse which are within
his jurisdiction, but he did not conduct inventory of materials or properties
already in the possession of the operations department17 of which petitioner
belonged to. In sum, nothing in the cited testimonies confirm petitioner's
insistence that there were no stolen electrical supplies and materials from
DLPC.
In fine, we are satisfied that the participation of the petitioner in the
commission of the crime at bar was well established by the testimony of
witness Siton. In the determination of the sufficiency of evidence, what
matters is not the number of witnesses but their credibility and the nature and
quality of their testimonies.18 It is axiomatic that witnesses are weighed, not
numbered and the testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive and
if it satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. The
inadmissibility of Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement as discussed above will
not exculpate him.
The defense, verily, anchors itself on the bare denial of petitioner of the
specific acts imputed by the prosecution against him. Certainly, this negative
assertion cannot prevail over the unimpeached testimony of the prosecution
witness, Florencio Siton alias "Canuto Duran" describing in sufficient detail
the active participation of petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.
As aptly observed by the trial court:
"The accused's defense consisted of a general denial; that the items
alleged by the prosecution as having been pilfered from DLPC were
available in any store selling electrical supplies. Despite having been
positively pointed to as the person who sold small electrical wires,
lightning arresters and a roll of Electrical Wire No. 2 that were pilfered
from DLPC to "Canuto Duran" (Siton), thru Ricardo Cariaga, he did
not categorically deny the imputation: he merely declared that he did
not know Siton (he did not say that he did not know "Canuto Duran")
nor did he say that he did not sell anything to "Canuto Duran" thru
Ricardo Cariaga. As a rule, positive testimony as to a particular fact,
uncontradicted by anyone, should control the decision of the court (Ko
Tieck vs. People, L-48535-36, Dec. 21, 1991)."
We note that the information alleged that petitioner was an employee of
DLPC; that he had access to the electrical supplies of said company; and that
with grave abuse of confidence, he stole electrical materials belonging to
DLPC. The prosecution established that petitioner who was permanently
assigned as driver of Truck "S-143" had charge of all the DLPC equipment
and supplies kept in his vehicle, including lightning arresters, cut-out and
wires, which were generally used for the installation of transformers and
power lines; and specifically stored therein for emergency operations at night
when the stockroom is closed. While the mere circumstance that the petitioner
is an employee or laborer of DLPC does not suffice to create the relation of
confidence and intimacy that the law requires to designate the crime as
qualified theft, it has been held that access to the place where the taking took
place or access to the stolen items changes the complexion of the crime
committed to that of qualified theft.19 Thus, theft by a truck driver who takes
the load of his truck belonging to his employer is guilty of qualified theft20as
was proven in this case. The trial court correctly considered petitioner's use of
a motor vehicle in the commission of the crime as a generic aggravating
circumstance thus raising the penalty to its maximum.21 While the aggravating
circumstance of "by means of motor vehicle" was not alleged in the
information, there is evidence that the same was employed to facilitate the
commission of the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance may be proved
even if not alleged.22 The theft could not have been effected without the aid of
the motor vehicle,23 as proven by the prosecution, the service truck was used in
storing and then transporting the stolen electrical materials to the place where
they were sold.1âwphi1.nêt
We now come to the correctness of the penalty imposed. The trial court meted
on petitioner an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day, of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years, two (2) months and twenty one (21) days of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Since the value of the electrical materials is P7,038.96, the
imposable penalty for the felony of theft is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods in accordance with Article 309, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code.24 However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code,25 the crime of qualified theft is punished by the penalties next higher by
two (2) degrees than that specified in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, two (2) degrees higher
than prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods is prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period
which is ten (10) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months. Considering there is one generic aggravating circumstance, the
penalty should be reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the correct penalty is eight (8) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to thirteen (13) years,
one (1) month and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal  as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 1995 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is reduced to
EIGHT (8) years, EIGHT (8) months and ONE (1) day of prision mayor  as
minimum to THIRTEEN (13) years, ONE (1) month and ELEVEN (11) days
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
In People v. Lacbanes, G.R. No. 88684, March 20, 1997, it was held that the
failure to present as witness the poseur-buyer in a prosecution for illegal sale
of marijuana, is not fatal to the prosecution’s case, because what is required is
merely proof of the consummation of the sale transaction, and in this case, the
entire transaction was witnessed by Pfc. Rosales who testified on the same.
Distinguish this case from People v. Tapeda, 244
G.R. No. 88684 March 20, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CESAR LACBANES, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
For selling marijuana, accused-appellant Cesar Lacbanes was arrested and
charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act. He was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Palo,
Leyte and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment.1 In his appeal before this
Court, he assails his conviction on the ground that entrapment was never
clearly established by the prosecution's evidence.
The prosecution relied on the testimony of PFC Ricardo Rosales, a member of
the Narcotics Section of the Tacloban Police Station who testified that his
command received information that accused-appellant had been peddling
marijuana cigarettes in Tacloban City. A buy-bust operation was then set up
after conducting surveillance on the accused-appellant. At around 4:15 p.m. of
October 3, 1986 at the corner of Burgos and Tarcela Streets, Tacloban City,
their confidential agent informed PFC Rosales and his team, composed of
Patrolmen Arpon and Buena, Sgt. Madriaga and Lt. Saranza, that the former
made contact with accused-appellant. Thereafter, the team deployed
themselves in the area in such a way as to see clearly the transaction.
According to PFC Rosales, after the conversation of their confidential agent
with accused-appellant, the former handed the latter two P5.00 bills with serial
numbers MU80883 and MU840129. In return, the latter handed sticks of
suspected marijuana cigarettes to the former. Thereupon, the team approached
accused-appellant, introduced themselves as members of the Narcotics Section
and arrested him. They found the two P5.00 bills in his possession and
recovered three sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes. Accused-appellant
was brought to the police station where upon investigation, he allegedly
admitted that the marijuana in his possession was for sale and that a friend of
his named Francing was the source of the prohibited drug. The witness
testified that they informed accused-appellant about his constitutional rights
before the investigation and that the latter understood them. However, they
allegedly forgot to put down in writing accused-appellant's admission of
guilt.2
The only other witness for the prosecution was Lt. Liza Madeja-Sabong, a
forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, who affirmed her own findings
and declared in Chemistry Report No. NB-134-86 3 that the three suspected
marijuana cigarettes were positive for marijuana, a prohibited drug. 4
Accused-appellant flatly denied selling the three sticks of marijuana
cigarettes. He testified that on said date, he was asleep in his house from two
o'clock until past four o'clock in the afternoon. He was awakened by his father
who told him that a certain Lieutenant Boy Saranza, together with Patrolmen
Arpon and Buena, would like to take him to the police station to answer some
questions. He denied knowing PFC Rosales and stated that the latter was not
with the arresting group.
At the police station, when asked if he knew the whereabouts of one
Cresencio de la Cruz, he answered in the negative. He also testified that the
investigators forced him to affix his signature on a piece of paper, the contents
of which he did not know at the time but which turned out to be a receipt for
property seized. The said receipt showed that the three sticks of marijuana
cigarettes and the two marked P5.00 bills were seized from his possession. He
claimed that the policemen filed this case against him when he could not give
any information about NPAs.
He asserted that he had never been charged or convicted of any crime and that
he was also a confidential agent of the Regional Security Unit, as well as a
barangay tanod.5
Another witness, Cpl. Felix Dacut, corroborated accused-appellant's claim that
he was a confidential agent or a civilian informer of the Regional Security
Unit. 6 Capt. Manuel Abuda of the INP, Tacloban City, likewise testified that
he knows the accused-appellant to be of good moral character and that the
latter was used in the past as an agent both in buy-bust and sell-bust
operations.7
On the issue of credibility, Judge Pedro S. Espina held that as between the
positive identification and assertion of the arresting officers and the mere
unsubstantiated denial by the accused-appellant, the former is more worthy of
credence. The trial court found the prosecution's evidence weightier inasmuch
as the arresting officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their public functions which has not been rebutted by the
defense. Coupled with the presumption is the lack of any proof of improper
motives on their part.
The trial court also found the defense' s version of the incident inherently
incredible stating it was hard to believe that accused-appellant, a barangay
tanod and a confidential agent of the military who reached second year high
school, would readily sign a blank sheet of paper presented to him by the
authorities without any protest or objection. Neither did accused-appellant's
introduction of evidence of good character convince the trial court of his
innocence as he was unable to overcome the evidence for the prosecution.8
In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that the failure of the prosecution to
present the confidential informant-turned poseur-buyer is a violation of his
constitutional right to know the witnesses against him and meet them in court.
He also contended that since the testimony of PFC Rosales revolves around
the confidential informant who cannot corroborate the same, said testimony
would be plain hearsay and unworthy of credence. Therefore, the prosecution
failed to establish clearly the fact of entrapment. Moreover, the defense
pointed out that although PFC Rosales, the prosecution's star witness, was
within earshot, he did not testify as to the conversation between the
confidential informant and the accused-appellant.
This Court is not persuaded. PFC Rosales did testify that he saw the poseur-
buyer and accused-appellant exchange the two P5.00 bills and the three
marijuana sticks. 9 The P5.00 bills were presented as evidence 10 and a
photocopy of the same, the faithful reproduction of which was admitted by the
defense, was likewise proffered in the trial court. 11 The three sticks of
marijuana cigarettes were also presented before the trial court and identified
by PFC Rosales as the ones recovered from the poseur-buyer. 12 This Court
held in People v. Vocente 13 that:
The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana
requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction
whereby as in this case, the accused handed over the tea bag of
marijuana upon the agreement with the poseur-buyer to
exchange it for money. . . . What is important is the fact that
the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the appellant
and that the contents were presented as evidence in
court. Proof of the transaction suffices. The identity of the tea
bag of marijuana which constitutes the corpus delicti was
established before the court. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, accused-appellant was caught in flagranti delicto. In every
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material and
indispensable is the submission of proof that the sale of illicit drug took place
between the seller and the poseur-buyer. 14
There was no need to present the poseur-buyer as PFC Rosales witnessed the
whole transaction where the marked money was exchanged for three sticks of
marijuana cigarettes. The settled rule is that the testimony of a lone
prosecution witness, as long as it is positive and clear and not arising from an
improper motive to impute a serious offense to the accused, deserves full
credit. 15 This Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the
informer, where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative,
is not fatal to the prosecution's case. 16
Accused-appellant, on his part, merely denied that he sold the three sticks of
marijuana cigarettes. If he tried to use alibi as defense, he should have
presented his father in court to corroborate his version that he was in the
latter's house when he was apprehended.
Accused-appellant, through his statements implied that he was a victim of a
"frameup." However, . . . like alibi, frameup is a defense that has been
invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor as it is a common and standard
line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Clear and convincing evidence are required to prove the defense of
"frameup" which, unfortunately, are inexistent here. 17
Accused-appellant's claim of a "frameup" is not credible as he gave
conflicting motives of the police authorities therefor. In his direct
examination, he claimed that he was framed up by the policemen because he
did not supply them with information regarding NPAs.18 In the cross-
examination conducted by the prosecution, however, he alleged that the
policemen were retaliating against him for working for the Regional Security
Unit instead of for them.19 Such failure on the part of the accused-appellant to
muster convincing proof of a frameup lends credence to the version of the
prosecution.
In People v. Velasco, 20 this Court held that in the absence of proof of any
intent on the part of police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime
against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the doctrine that findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect, must prevail
over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been
framed. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the findings of the lower
court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and
respect since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
as they testified before the court. Unless substantial facts and circumstances
have been overlooked or misunderstood by the latter which, if considered,
would materially affect the result of the case, this Court will undauntedly
sustain the findings of the lower court. 21
The accused-appellant tried to argue on his behalf that no surveillance was
conducted before the buy-bust operation. In People v. Ganguso, 22 it has been
held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were
accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case, the arresting
officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer. Granting that there was no
surveillance conducted before the buy-bust operation, this Court held
in People v. Tranca, 23 that there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting
buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police
officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for
prior surveillance.
Additionally, accused-appellant alleged that the marked money was not
presented as proof before the trial court. Contrary to said submission,
however, the marked money was presented as proof during the direct
examination of PFC Rosales. 24 The defense even admitted that the photocopy
of the marked money was a faithful reproduction of the ones found in the
person of accused-
appellant. 25 Nonetheless, this Court held that the absence of the marked
money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as
the sale of the dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of
the transaction is presented before the court. 26
This Court cannot, however, accept as evidence the receipt for property seized
purportedly signed by accused-appellant as proof that the three sticks of
marijuana cigarettes, as well as the two P5.00 bills, were seized from him, for
the prosecution failed to prove that he was assisted by counsel at the time.
Neither does this Court condone such practice for this is tantamount to an
extra-judicial confession for the commission of the offense.
In People v. Ang Chun Kit, 27 this Court held that "conforme to these
documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime
charged, since merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished
by law. They have been obtained in violation of his right as a person under
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing
in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel."
This Court also declared in People v. De Las Marinas, 28 that it is the police
officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipt.
Undoubtedly, this is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to
remain silent. Here he was, in effect, made to admit the commission of the
offense without informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in
violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.
Nevertheless, while said receipt of property seized is inadmissible in evidence,
it was sufficiently established by the categorical and positive assertions of
witnesses as shown in the records, that indeed accused-appellant committed
the offense of selling the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes.
Accordingly, this Court finds accused-appellant Cesar Lacbanes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended. Under
the said provision, the penalty should have been reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. With the
passage of R.A. 7659, particularly Sec. 13 amending Sec. 4 of R.A. 6425, the
penalty to be imposed shall now depend on the quantity. Since the offense was
committed in 1986, the quantity of prohibited drugs involved was immaterial.
Inasmuch as the amendatory provisions are, however, favorable to accused-
appellant, they should be given retroactive effect.
Under the provisions of Section 20, Republic Act No. 6425 as last amended
by R.A. 7659, which became effective on December 31, 1993, and as
interpreted by this court in the case of People v. Simon 29 and People v. De
Lara, 30 if the quantity of the marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the
imposable penalty, in the event that the conviction should be affirmed, shall
be within the range of prision correccional (from six [6] months and one [1]
day to six [6] years) to reclusion temporal depending upon the quantity of
marijuana involved.
As in People v. De Lara, 31 there was no evidence of the weight of the three
sticks of marijuana cigarettes seized in the case at bar. Nevertheless, adhering
to the doctrine in the earlier case, this Court resolved the doubt in favor of
accused-appellant and concluded that the quantity involved was: (i) below 750
grams; and (ii) not less than 250 but not more than 499 grams. Hence, the
maximum imposable penalty should be  prision mayor and the
minimum, prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant should suffer an indeterminate
penalty of FOUR (4) years and Two (2) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
Since accused-appellant has already served ten years, two months and
seventeen days, which is beyond the maximum penalty imposed for his
offense, he is hereby ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being
held for some other legal grounds.
SO ORDERED.
In People v. Chua, G.R. No. 128280, April 4, 2001, the Court reiterated what,
in US v. Ramirez, it declared as the requisites for compelling the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence, as follows: [a] the evidence is really
material; [b] accused is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the
production of such evidence; [c] the evidence will be available at the time
desired; and [d] no similar evidence can be obtained.
G.R. No. 128280      April 4, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALICIA A. CHUA, accused-appellant.
PARDO, J.:
Accused Alicia Chua has appealed from the decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch V finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale and sentencing her to life imprisonment
and a fine of P100,000.00, and eight (8) counts of estafa sentencing her to
various penalties therefor.
On October 05, 1993, Assistant City Prosecutor Leocadio H. Ramos, Jr. of
Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila an information2 against
accused Alicia A. Chua reading as follows:
Crim. Case No. 93-127418:
"That in or about and during the period comprised between
October 29, 1992 and January 19, 1993, inclusive, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, representing herself to
have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job
placement abroad to the following persons, namely:
DOMINGO F. TERCENIO, MARTIN B. BERMEJO,
EVANGELINE F. GAVINA, DANTE F. BALUIS, EDUARD
V. ESTILLER, EDGAR B. ABONAL, VIOLETA F.
REGALADO, GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE and LONITO F.
BALUIS, without first having secured the required license or
authority from the Department of Labor.
"Contrary to law."3
On the same date, the same prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Manila nine (9) other informations against the accused for estafa:
Crim. Case No. 93-127419:
"The undersigned accuses ALICIA A. CHUA of the crime of
estafa, committed as follows: That on or about October 29,
1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
DOMINGO F. TERCENIO in the following manner, to wit:
the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representation which she made to said DOMINGO
F. TERCENIO to the effect that she had the power and
capacity to recruit and employ said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO
and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof
and by-means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded
in inducing said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO to give and
deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the
amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations
and representations, said accused well knowing that the same
were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain as in
fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00 which amount
once in her possession with intent to defraud, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO in the
aforesaid amount of P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."4
Crim. Case No. 93-127420:
"That on or about November 21, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud MARTIN B. BERMEJO in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representation which
he/they/she made to said MARTIN B. BERMEJO to the effect
that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ
MARTIN BERMEJO in Taiwan and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of
other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
MARTIN B. BERMEJO to give and deliver, as in fact he gave
and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the
strength of said manifestations and representations, said
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the
amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession
with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said MARTIN
B. BERMEJO in the aforesaid amount of P15,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."5
Crim. Case No. 93-127421:
"That on or about November 6, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud EVANGELINE F.
GAVINA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation
which he/they/she made to said EVANGELINE F. GAVINA to
the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ EVANGELINE F. GAVINA and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of
other similar deceits induced and succeeded in inducing said
EVANGELINE F. GAVINA to give and deliver, as in fact she
gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00
on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the
amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession
with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said
EVANGELINE P. GAVINA in the aforesaid amount of
P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.1âwphi1.nêt
"CONTRARY TO LAW."6
Crim. Case No. 93-127422:
"That on or about December 10, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud DANTE F. BALUIS in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which he/they/she
made to said DANTE F. BALUIS to the effect that she had the
power and capacity to recruit and employ DANTE F. BALUIS
in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent
papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
 succeeded in inducing said DANTE F. BALUIS to give and
deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the
amount of P11,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations
and representations, said accused well knowing that the same
were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in
fact she did obtain the amount of P11,000.00 which amount
once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to her own personal use and benefit to the damage
and prejudice of said DANTE G. BALUIS in the aforesaid
amount of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."7
Crim. Case No. 93-127423:
"That on or about November 24, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud EDUARD V. ESTILLER
in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representation which
he/she/they made to said EDUARD V. ESTILLER to the effect
that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ
EDUARD V.' ESTILLER in Taiwan and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of
other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
EDUARD V. ESTILLER to give and deliver, as in fact
he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the amount of
P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact
she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in
her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her
own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of
said EDUARD V. ESTILLER, in the aforesaid amount
P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."8
Crim. Case No. 93-127424:
"That on or about December 11, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and therein wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud EDGAR B. ABONAL in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representation which
he/she/they made to said EDGAR B. ABONAL to the effect
that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ
EDGAR B. ABONAL in Taiwan and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of
other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
EDGAR B. ABONAL to give and deliver, as in fact
he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the amount of
P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact
she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in
her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her
own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of
said EDGAR B. ABONAL in the aforesaid amount P15,000.00
Philippine Currency.
 "CONTRARY TO LAW."9
Crim. Case No. 93-127425:
"That on or about, December 10, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud VIOLETA F. REGALADO
in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representation which
he/she/they made to said VIOLETA F. REGALADO to the
effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ VIOLETA F. REGALADO in Taiwan and could
facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by
means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in
inducing said VIOLETA F. REGALADO to give and deliver,
as in fact he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the
amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations
and representations, said accused well knowing that the same
were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in
fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00 which amount
once in her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to her own personal use and benefit to the damage
and prejudice of said VIOLETA F. REGALADO in the
aforesaid amount P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.
"Contrary to law."10
Crim. Case No. 93-127426:
"That on or about January 19, 1993, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE
in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representation which
he/she/they made to said GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE to the
effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE in Taiwan and could
facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by
means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in
inducing said GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE to give and deliver,
as in fact he/she/they gave and delivered to said accused the
amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations
and representations, said accused well knowing that the same
were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in
fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00 which amount
once in her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE in the
aforesaid amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."11
Crim. Case No. 93-127427:
"That on or about October 29, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud LONITO F. BALUIS in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which he/she/they
made to said LONITO F. BALUIS to the effect that she had the
power and capacity to recruit and employ LONITO F. BALUIS
in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent
 papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said LONITO F. BALUIS to give and
deliver, as in fact he/she/they gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing
that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely,
to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00
which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit
to the damage and prejudice of said LONITO F. BALUIS in
the aforesaid amount P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 12
On November 8, 1993, the trial court arraigned the accused. She pleaded not
guilty to each case.13 Trial ensued. The cases were consolidated and tried
jointly.
The facts are as follows:
In September 1992, accused. Chua received a facsimile message from
Harmony Electronics Company in Taiwan.14 The message was written in
Chinese characters except for the names of To-ong Zenon Tumenlaco and
Tercenio Domingo Fornaliza. Harmony asked her to call up To-ong and
Tercenio and tell them that they were needed in Taiwan. Accused Chua
contacted To-ong and told him the message.15
In October 1992, To-ong and Tercenio went to the office of accused Chua,
and the latter told them that she could send them to Taiwan upon payment of a
placement fee of P15,000.00 each. She also asked them to secure NBI
clearances and medical certificates.16 On October 29, 1992, Tercenio, together
with private complainant Lonito Baluis, went back to the office of accused
Chua and submitted the requirements. Tercenio and Lonito Baluis paid
P15,000.00 each for which they were issued a receipt bearing the name Man
Tai Trading and General Services with accused Chua's signature.17
Accused Chua assured Tercenio and Lonito Baluis that they would be able to
leave for Taiwan soon. Three months passed, but they were not deployed.
Tercenio became apprehensive and told accused Chua that he would withdraw
his application and ask for refund of the placement fee. Accused Chua
repeatedly promised that she would give back the money to him, but she never
did. After a few more months, Tercenio could not anymore locate accused
Chua.18
Accused Chua used the same modus operandi on the other private
complainants. After requiring each complainant to pay a placement fee of
P15,000.00 each, to secure NBI clearances and to undergo medical
examinations, she would go in hiding.
In time, complainants inquired from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA) about accused Chua's activities. The POEA issued a
certification that accused Chua was not licensed to recruit persons/workers for
overseas employment.19
On October 3, 1995, the trial court promulgated a decision, the dispositive
portion 20 of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Alicia A. Chua is hereby found:
"1) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
committed in large scale in Criminal Case No. 93-127418 and is
therefore sentenced to serve a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P100,000.00;
"2) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal
Case No. 93-127419 and is sentenced to serve indeterminate sentence
of four (4) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum to six
(6) years and eight (8) months of Prision Mayor minimum as
maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,000.00 plus
legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;
"3) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal
Case No. 93-127420 and is sentenced to serve an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years of prision correccional maximum as
minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor
minimum as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of
P15,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully
paid;
"4) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal
Case No. 93-127421 and is sentenced to serve an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years of prision correccional maximum as
minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor
minimum as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of
P15,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully
paid;
"5) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal
Case No. 93-127422 and is therefore sentenced to serve an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months of Arresto Mayor maximum,
as minimum to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision
correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay the complainant the
sum of P11,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until
fully paid;
"6) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal
Case No. 93-127423 and is therefore sentenced to serve an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision
mayor minimum, as maximum and to pay the complainant the sum of
P15,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully
paid;
"7) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal
Case No. 93-127425 and is therefore sentenced to serve an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision
mayor minimum as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of
P14,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully
paid;
"8) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal
Case No. 93-127426 and is therefore sentenced to serve indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor
minimum as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of
P14,500.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the case until fully
paid;
"9) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal
Case No. 93-127427 and is sentenced to serve indeterminate sentence
of four (4) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum to six
(6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor minimum as
maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,000.00 plus
legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid.
"As earlier stated, Criminal Case No. 93-127424 is dismissed for
failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence.
"SO ORDERED.