Case Neg—ASEAN

Case
 AT Solvency
Cooperation is laughable – ASEAN countries are driven by competition,
not collaboration.
Gordon 09 [Gordon, Sandy. “Regionalism and Cross-Border Cooperation against Crime
and Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific.” Security Challenges, vol. 5, no. 4, 2009, pp. 75–102.
JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26460070. Accessed 27 Dec. 2022] [pT]
In the two Asian regional associations that form the subject of this paper, however, the
situation is very different. Antagonisms in this part of the world are still raw and both
associations still lack confidence in their cooperative mechanisms. While cooperation
in ASEAN is far advanced of SAARC, both, we suggest, are well short of any ‘tipping
point’.
More to the point, there is no reason to suppose that neighbouring members of a
regional association should be intrinsically more able to cooperate than more distant
countries. Indeed, according to the Kautilyan dictum, neighbours are often enemies and
such enemies often seek to balance their enemies with powerful friends in more distant
places.8 This dictum has certainly proven true enough in two of the areas we cover—
South and South East Asia.
For example, within the ranks of the ten ASEAN countries, Thailand and Myanmar are
traditional competitors. They have engaged in conflict and competition for hundreds of
years.9 At the time ASEAN was formed, tension lingered between Malaysia and
Indonesia as a result of the policy of Confrontasi exercised by Indonesia under Sukarno.
Singapore had recently broken away from Malaysia because of the city-state’s Chinese
majority and the two remained uneasy partners. And Malaysia and the Philippines had
also been in competition over north Borneo. Indeed, given the diversity and tensions
that existed at the time ASEAN was established in 1967, the fact that the association
exists at all is something of a miracle.
In view of the initial difficulties in establishing ASEAN, it is not surprising that the model
chosen for cooperation was a ‘consensus’ one in which the agreement of all was
needed to make any decision. Such a model was also deemed to be consonant with the
so-called ‘Asian-way’. According to this model, non-interference and mutual respect
would allow the flow of cooperation amongst hitherto difficult neighbours gradually to
increase, including through informal mechanisms capable of dealing with difficult
issues in non-threatening ways.10 Wesley also notes how the ‘Asian way’ arose out of
the colonial past and represented to an extent an expression of pride and a warning to
western nations “to keep their advice about economic planning, human rights and
democracy to themselves”.11 Some argue that the ‘Asia way’, with its reliance on family
and respect for sovereignty rather than supra-legal structures, will lead to a quite
different form of regionalism to Europe—one in which the idea of region supersedes any
action that should be deemed to flow from such a concept.12
For these reasons, among others, the cooperative mechanisms in ASEAN are still
relatively weak. This is especially true in sensitive areas like crime and terrorism. For
example, an original resolution to set up a shared criminal intelligence database in 1992
was not implemented until the Electronic ASEAN Data System (e-ADS) came into
existence in 2007. And even in the case of e-ADS, Burma and the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) have not yet been included.13

ASEAN multilateralism is a joke – they’re incapable of getting anything

done at the negotiating table.
Lohman 21 [Walter Lohman is director of The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies
Center. He holds a master’s degree in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia. 11-
11-2021, "ASEAN’s quest for relevance," GIS Reports,
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/asean-failures/] [pT]
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 to give its
members the geopolitical room they needed to build autonomous foreign policies amid
the great power competition. To fulfill this mission, however, it is not enough for ASEAN
to claim, as it does, that it is at the center of regional geopolitics. Its ability to navigate
great power politics relies on it being relevant to the most critical challenges the region
faces. That relevancy is being called into question on two key issues: turmoil in
Myanmar and the continued territorial impasse in the South China Sea.
Coup in Myanmar
Full military government returned to Myanmar with the February 2021 coup that
nullified national elections and ousted its democratically elected government. Since
then, the conflict between the military and much of the rest of the country has only
deteriorated. Following the hopeful years of 2011 to 2020, Myanmar has descended
into intense civil conflict. Confrontations with ethnic-minority armies have reignited
along its borders and violence has broken out in the central Bamar-majority heartland,
in places like Yangon and Mandalay. Hundreds of civilians have been killed and
thousands jailed.
Although the junta has officially committed to holding new elections by August 2023,
there is no credible sign that it intends to relinquish power. It has a track record. In
1990, following massive losses in a national election it expected to win, it launched a
brutal crackdown. Nationwide elections were not held again for 20 years. The regime
ostensibly followed a “road map to democracy” that it had initiated seven years earlier
and a constitutional reform process that went back well before that. Meanwhile, the
situation in Myanmar became an obstacle to its and ASEAN’s relations with the United
States – benefiting China’s position in the region in the short and medium term.
ASEAN largely supported Myanmar in this process – admitting it into the organization
along the way: it became a member in 1997. ASEAN may be demonstrating a similar
indulgence this time around. It took three months for its representatives to come up
with its “five-point consensus” for dealing with the 2021 coup. The points include:
cessation of violence; constructive dialogue; appointment of a special ASEAN envoy;
access for the envoy to Myanmar and all parties concerned; and humanitarian
assistance delivered through ASEAN facilities.
Four months later it appointed the envoy, who has not yet visited Myanmar. In fact, he
was forced to cancel a planned visit because the government failed to meet another
one of the demands – guaranteeing access to all sides of the conflict. It has since
reaffirmed this decision. So far, only the humanitarian assistance point has seen
progress, with slightly more than $1 million in aid delivered eight months following the
coup.
South China Sea dispute
The South China Sea dispute is the other top-shelf international problem for ASEAN.
Like the Myanmar crisis, it is one with which ASEAN has a long, fraught history. It has
consistently pinned all its hopes on negotiating a code of conduct with China, which
ASEAN first formally proposed in 1992. The organization made no progress until 2002,
when it concluded not a binding “code” but a “declaration.”
Today, negotiations on the code are still ongoing. Virtually every year, ASEAN and China
claim to be on the verge of a breakthrough, and 2021 has been no exception. On a
September 2021 visit to Phnom Penh, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed
confidence that the code would be concluded during its ally Cambodia’s turn in ASEAN’s
rotating chairmanship next year. The statement marking the conclusion of the most
recent ASEAN summit again referenced the “progress” made toward a code of conduct.
Over this near 30-year focus on a code of conduct, China has occupied, reclaimed and
militarized several land features in the disputed waters, and unilaterally imposed
fishing bans. It has also become a looming naval presence, not just for the claimant
states, but for foreign navies as well. Meanwhile, China continues to thumb its nose at
the ruling handed down by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2016 which
invalidated its maritime claims.
At the heart of ASEAN’s failure to effectively address this issue is the fact that several
of its members, including Cambodia, Thailand and Laos, have no interest in the conflict.
Among the claimants, some are more interested than others – Vietnam and
the Philippines being the most vocal.
ASEAN operates by consensus. These varying levels of commitment present a problem.
What wins out is process – living to hold another meeting. This approach is impossible
to reconcile with more results-oriented perspectives from outside the region. It also
plays into an apparent Chinese strategy to drag out the process while creating faits
accomplis in the sea.
There’s widespread distrust among member states.
Jie 18 [Lee Jun Jie is a humanities educator in Singapore and a postgraduate alumni of
the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
December 2018, "Colonialism and ASEAN Identity: Inherited “mental barriers” hindering
the formation of a collective ASEAN identity," Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia,
https://kyotoreview.org/trendsetters/colonialism-asean-identity/] [pT]
Despite these efforts, ASEAN has thus far failed to develop a degree of “ASEAN
consciousness” in both its bureaucrats and citizens that will nudge them to think of
themselves as a member of the wider ASEAN body (Denoon and Colbert 1998-1999).
There is no real sense of regional belonging or sentiments of “we-feeling” among the
political elites and populace of Southeast Asia to the ASEAN Identity and the idea of
ASEAN Community rarely motivate their actions (Narine 2002). Instead, self-interest
and functional considerations continue to drive the policy decisions of the bureaucrats
of ASEAN (Hund 2010). The political elites of ASEAN also continue to look at their
neighbouring countries with much suspicion (ibid.). The dispute between Cambodia and
Thailand over the ownership of the Preah Vihear border territory which escalated into an
armed conflict in 2008 serves as an illustrative example of the weakness of ASEAN
solidarity, not to mention the strength of ASEAN unity (Weatherbee 2012: 3-
22). 2 Citizens of ASEAN continue to remain largely uninterested and ignorant of the
lives, culture and economy of their fellow counterparts in other member states (Heng
2015). An ASEAN-wide survey carried out by Roberts in 2007 revealed a high level of
trust deficit among ASEAN elites and citizens (Roberts 2007). Thus, as aptly described
by Jones and Smith, ASEAN remains largely an “imitation community” that are
“rhetorical shells and provides form but no substance to genuine regional integration”
(Jones and Smith 2002). Khoo further argues that ASEAN continues to be an
“intergovernmental neighbourhood watch group” that is still far off from the ASEAN
Community it envisions (Khoo 2000). The prospects for the fulfilment of the motto of
“One Vision, One Community, One Identity” has thus far remain unpromising and has yet
to move beyond being mere political slogans.
 Inherency
No inherency - ASEAN already allows significant free movement of labour.
Bui 22— [Bui Thi Ngoc Lan Faculty of International Law, Hanoi Law University, Vietnam,
“The Features of Free Movement of Labour in ASEAN and the European Union under
Comparative Perspective,” Centre for International Law, June 2022,
https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/3.-Ideas-in-Progress-2022-Bui-Thi-
Ngoc-Lan.pdf, accessed 1-14-2023; MJen]
In order to provide broad direction through strategic measures for the AEC from 2015 to 2025, the AEC Blueprint 2025
was adopted by the ASEAN Leaders at the 27th ASEAN Summit on 22 November 2015 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Under Section A.5. of the AEC Blueprint 2025 , to facilitate the movement of skilled
labour in ASEAN, member states shall focus on the measures on participating in mutual recognition of qualifications
through allowing practitioners in 08 professions to practice in other member states,7 implementing of the ASEAN Qualification
free
Reference Framework (AQRF), and the ASEAN Agreement on Movement of Natural Persons (MNP).8 Briefly put,
movement of labour continues to be recognized as one of core elements in the AEC, and ASEAN
member states are required to promote to its facilitation through approved measures
regulated in both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law. In terms of the approach to free movement of labour, despite being similar
to the movement of natural persons (mode 4) under the World Trade Organization, ASEAN’s approach to free
movement of labour is based on “the ASEAN Way” and the vast diversity among
member states, and seeks to manage free movement of skilled labour through
harmonization. This approach could be explained based on the international economic integration combining with the
ASEAN Way. The centre point of this theory is that the creation of a single market generates additional welfare effects by enabling
labour to move to where it is most productive.9 A shift occurs from less productive to more productive jobs until marginal
productivity is achieved. A prerequisite to allow such a shift is that labour must be mobile with no constraints on migration both in
the narrow sense (e.g. work permits, residence permits) and the broader sense (e.g. specific differences between countries
regarding performance of a given job, living and housing conditions, and/or language barriers).10 Managed movement may mean
that a skilled labourer moving between member states must first conform that state's domestic regulations on work permit, visa,
professional certifications and so on. For example, professional engineers must be authorized as registered foreign professional
engineers (RFPE) in Singapore under the ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Engineering Services. They are further bound
by Singapore’s laws and regulations, such as the Professional Engineers Act, the Professional Engineers Rules, and any terms and
conditions set by the Professional Engineering Board (PEB).11 The ASEAN Way refers to a set of diplomatic norms shared by the
members of ASEAN.12 It involves in the principle of non-interference, consultation and consensus, etc. Combining the two, free
movement of labour in ASEAN allows skilled labour to enter the region after the worker
satisfies any preconditions in accordance with domestic law. The facilitation for free movement of
labour within ASEAN through harmonization requires ASEAN member states to participate in regional agreements that harmonize
the region’s criteria on professional capabilities, and any regulations on entry and stay for natural persons. Based on that,
ASEAN encourages all member states to take part in Mutual Recognition Arrangements
(MRA), such as the ASEAN Agreement on Movement of Natural Persons 2015 (MNP) and ASEAN Qualification Reference
Framework (AQRF). Having a mutual recognition framework for qualifications is an effective
way to assess and harmonize the differences in qualification requirements across
countries.13 The MRA is a device to achieve free(r) movement of professional cross-national borders14 because it allows
member states to recognize their counterpart’s qualification system. So far, there has been 8 MRAs concluded among ASEAN
members, namely MRAs on engineering services, nursing services, surveying qualifications, architectural services, medical
The MNP was signed in 2015 to
practitioners, accountancy services, dental practitioners and tourism professionals.
regulate the access of foreign service suppliers to the member states’ market. The objective
of the MNP is to facilitate
and eliminate restrictions in the movement of natural persons
engaged in the conduct of trade in goods, trade in services and investment between the
member states. The agreement applies to the measures affecting the temporary entry or stay of natural persons in following
groups: business visitors, intra-cooperate transferees, contractual suppliers and other categories specified in the member states’
schedules of commitments.
 UQ
There is ZERO uniqueness for this aff – ASEAN growth is high and
resilient – this postdates all 1AC evidence
Wu 12-9, Bryan Wu, 12-9-2022, "Asean growth 'resilient', faster than China for second
consecutive year in 2023: Maybank," Edge Singapore,
https://www.theedgesingapore.com/capital/asean/asean-growth-resilient-faster-china-
second-consecutive-year-2023-maybank tanya
Asean growth 'resilient', faster than China for second consecutive year in 2023:
Maybank
Asean is emerging as a “defensive harbour” against the backdrop of rising US interest
rates and potential US or global recession, and could “emerge as a bright patch in the
darkening storm”, say Maybank analysts.
In their regional economics report dated Dec 5, analysts Chua Hak Bin, Lee Ju Ye, Brian
Lee Shun Rong and Luong Thu Huong note that the probability of a US recession over
the next 12 months is estimated at 40%, based on the three-month to 10-year spread.
They are forecasting Asean-5’s gross domestic product (GDP) to slow but remain
relatively resilient at a rate of 4.7% in 2023, down from 5.9% in 2022, despite the US and
global growth downturn. The analysts are also projecting the grouping’s GDP growth to
be higher than China’s expected growth rate of 4.0% in 2023 for a second consecutive
year. The Asean-5 grouping comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand
and Vietnam, and excludes Singapore.
The Maybank team says that China’s shift away from its zero-Covid policies will be slow
and incremental. Restrictions to mobility and travel will remain stringent for most of
2023, while the real estate crisis in China will also dampen consumer spending and
investment, they add.
Meanwhile, Asean economies and markets will continue to be cushioned by the
reopening tailwinds and could “partially decouple” from a US recession for several
reasons.
First, the analysts believe the tailwinds of the economic reopening are dissipating but
still not over. They note that accommodation, food services, construction and air
transport are still below pre-pandemic levels in some Asean countries, with foreign
visitor arrivals still generally less than 50% of pre-pandemic levels.
As of 3Q2022, construction is still 18% below pre-pandemic levels in Singapore and 20%
below in Malaysia and Philippines. Accommodation and food services is 28% below pre-
pandemic levels in Philippines, 25% below in Thailand, 12% below in Malaysia, 11%
below in Singapore and 7% below in Vietnam.
Among the Asean member countries, Singapore has seen the strongest recovery in
foreign visitors to pre-pandemic levels, reaching 53% of pre-pandemic levels in October,
while Vietnam was the weakest, only attaining 33% of pre-pandemic levels in November.
Tourists to Asean thus far have largely been intra-Asean visitors and from India. More
Northeast Asian visitors from Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong are expected in early 2023
with the recent relaxation of their quarantine requirements and border controls, say the
analysts.
On top of these tailwinds, the Maybank team says that intra-Asean trade has proven
resilient, forming a significant source of demand for the region. “Intra-Asean trade is
growing at over 30%, partially cushioning the slump in exports to the US, the EU and
China,” they say.
Intra-Asean market accounts for 19% of Asean’s total exports, higher than the share of
exports to China, the US and the EU, which account for 16%, 15% and 9% respectively.
According to the analysts, Asean has also benefited from the reconfiguration of
manufacturing supply chains away from China to the Southeast Asia region, which has
seen foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asean increase significantly. “The pandemic
shock, development of the Electric Vehicle industries and US Chips Act have reinforced
these shifts,” explain the analysts. “Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore are big
beneficiaries of the supply chain shifts to Asean.”
They note that Indonesia’s foreign investment realisation surged by 66.4% in 3Q2022,
driven by an 81.8% growth in manufacturing amid the government’s push to develop
downstreaming industries such as nickel ore processing for electric vehicle (EV)
batteries and energy storage systems. Vietnam’s foreign investment realisation also
grew 15.1% in the first 11 months of 2022, the highest dollar amount realised in 11
months over the past 5 years.
Closer to home, Malaysia’s approved manufacturing FDI soared to a record high of
RM180 billion ($55.2 billion) in 2021 and is expected to translate to actual flows. In
Singapore, fixed asset investment commitments in electronics — which have surpassed
$4 billion annually since 2019 — also remained firm in the first 9 months of 2022.
 AT ASEAN Centrality
1] Koty concedes alt causes that they’ve all highlighted for us!

A] Says economic community requires free movement of goods, services,

and capital too which the aff can’t solve by opening borders for human
migration – insert their ev
When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Economic Community
(AEC) was set up at the end of 2015, the region achieved a significant milestone in
terms of its growing political, economic, and cultural integration. As set out in 2007’s
ASEAN Economic Blueprint, the AEC seeks to “transform ASEAN into a region with free
movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labour, and freer flow of capital.”

B] Concedes protectionist policies and politics thump labor movement,

and that common industry guidelines across countries is key to
integration and growth – the aff does none of this – insert their ev twice
Insert #1
The lack of a cohesive regional framework, the existence of nationalist and
protectionist policies as well as middling political strategies will undoubtedly impede
ASEAN’s skilled labour mobility ambitions still further.
Insert #2
Establishing common guidelines for industries across the ASEAN region, however,
could support the growth of regional businesses and sectors, build a larger and more
qualified workforce, and promote interconnectivity.

2] Intal negates:

A] Can’t solve “skills”—they need immigrants from outside ASEAN – insert

rehighlighting
Skills mobility is essential to the ASEAN region’s continuing rapid economic growth
and industrial upgrading. It will require tapping skills and talent from everywhere in
the ASEAN region and beyond

B] The aff can open borders, but it doesn’t guarantee workplaces &
governments hire migrants—informal restrictions deck solvency – insert
rehighlighting
Current practices in ASEAN contain obstacles on the hiring of foreign skilled
professionals by the private sector and their ban in the public sector (with the notable
exception of Singapore) These include both formal and informal restrictions, including
constitutional and legal restrictions and labour market tests, onerous and time-
consuming procedures and various upfront payments. It would be helpful for
employers and foreign workers if these restrictions are liberalised and made
transparent and the procedures simplified. While the AEC Blueprint focuses on
enhancing the flow of skilled and professionals, they account for less than 10% of intra-
regional labour flows, with Singapore the leading destination. The majority of
intraregional migrants are middle- and low-skilled and irregular, and are commonly
found in construction, agriculture, and domestic work. There is no AEC coverage on
them. ASEAN’s major receiving countries are Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore.
Malaysia and Thailand host millions of irregular workers from neighbouring ASEAN
countries. The ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of
Migrant Workers, known as the Cebu declaration, makes commitments to protect
migrant workers, but this is non-binding. ASEAN has reaffirmed this by signing the
ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers,
but the commitments remain voluntary (ASEAN Secretariat 2017). An assessment of
the progress made by ASEAN in regional skilled labour mobility (Testaverde et al., 2017)
concluded that, notwithstanding the commitments and framework agreements that
regional leaders place on this issue, the slowness of actual implementation highlights
the difficult political and regulatory landscape. The ASEAN agreements cover skilled
workers and professionals, but there are several gaps in its provisions. They facilitate
the issuance of visas and employment passes, and work to harmonise and standardise
qualifications. However, most foreign skilled professionals are intra-corporate
transferees, AFAS and AMNP do not cover individual professionals and skilled workers,
and MRAs cover only a small segment of ASEAN professionals. AMS have signed MRAs
in six areas: engineering, nursing, architecture, medicine, dentistry, and tourism and
framework agreements in surveying and accountancy. Conclusion and implementation
of MRAs for professionals have been a long and arduous process, in part due to
‘occupational protectionism’. There are genuine cross-country differences in what a
professional must know to practice, and automatic recognition of foreign
qualifications and work experience is rare. Partial recognition is usually possible with
compensatory measures to bridge differences in training and quality standards and
work experience, but this can be difficult and highly sensitive. The implementation of
MRAs is timeconsuming, technically demanding, and sometimes politically difficult as a
wide range of stakeholders are responsible for different aspects of the recognition
process. It requires support from the public and professional associations, which in turn
rests on perceptions of benefits and threats pose by foreign professionals. More
importantly, MRAs do not guarantee labour market access, which is still subject to
national laws, regulations, and measures. The challenges to ASEAN skills mobility have
been categorised by Papademetriou et al. (2015) as follows: (i) Issues related to the
recognition of credentials. (ii) Restrictions on hiring foreign workers in certain
occupations and industries, and on employment visas. (iii) Perceived costly barriers
due to cultural, language, and socioeconomic differences . It
is necessary to
overcome each of these challenges to achieve full skills mobility.
The second challenge and part of the first challenge can be achieved by reforming the
laws and regulations and following through on commitments such as expanding MRAs
on skills. However, a continuing challenge will require a positive change in perceptions
and behaviours of individuals and businesses surrounding labour mobility within
ASEAN, which would in turn influence people’s economic decisions to move. Without a
serious effort to enhance ASEAN skills mobility, the region may lose its talent to other
parts of the world. ASEAN’s major sending countries are Indonesia, Myanmar, the
Philippines, and Viet Nam, with major destinations in the Middle East, Europe, North
America, and Australia–New Zealand rather than in ASEAN. It is important to note the
reasons behind the extra-ASEAN preference and strategise to make ASEAN an
attractive destination region of choice for skilled migrants. Rising job opportunities and
wage levels, an increasingly open society that accepts foreigners, and an increasingly
better living environment can make the ASEAN region an increasingly attractive
destination.

C] That means timeframe for solvency is decades – insert rehighlighting

By 2040, ASEAN should strive for an integrated skilled-labour market characterised by
an enhanced circulation of skills within the region, and enabled by a mutual recognition
of educational qualifications, professional licenses, and work experience; a minimal list
of restricted or prohibited occupations for ASEAN foreign workers; preferential
recruitment of ASEAN nationals where labour market tests are deemed necessary; and
use of digital technology to disseminate labour market information in every ASEAN
country.

---ASEAN unity is bad:

It prevents Chinese regional hegemony and ensures U.S. influence.

Li 22 [Zhuoran Li is a Ph.D. candidate in China studies and a research assistant at the
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University., 06-02-2022,
"What Does ASEAN Centrality Mean to China?" The Diplomat,
https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/what-does-asean-centrality-mean-to-china/][pT]
However, ASEAN centrality poses significant challenges to China’s own Southeast
Asian strategy in the long run. First, China prefers a separated rather than a unified
ASEAN. As the ASEAN Outlook indicated, a joint ASEAN with a unified strategic outlook
would improve policy coordination among ASEAN states. The Southeast Asian states
can bind together to bring diplomatic mass and persuasive pressure to bear on Beijing.
China therefore wants to engage with ASEAN members individually to maximize
China’s diplomatic and military leverage rather than engaging the entirety of ASEAN.
By taking advantage of ASEAN’s consensus-based decision making process, Beijing can
use a “divide and manage” strategy by pressuring and flipping one ASEAN state to
forestall the emergence of unwanted ASEAN joint policies. In addition, ASEAN-led
regional organizations, such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defense Ministers
Meeting Plus, force China to play by ASEAN rules. Thus, ASEAN centrality aims to tie
China’s hands and regulate Beijing’s engagement with ASEAN by embedding Beijing in
ASEAN-led regional organizations.  
Second, ASEAN centrality suggests that China cannot dominate Southeast Asia and
push the U.S. and Japan out of the region. The ASEAN Outlook rejects not only an
American-led military bloc but also a China-led regional framework. China’s strategic
goal in Southeast Asia is to establish a “Community of Common Destiny” by promoting
a Sinocentric economic and political regional order. Beijing has long viewed American
involvement in the Southeast Asia as hostile to China. China consistently criticizes the
American position on the South China Sea disputes as “outside power trying to incite
conflicts.”
The key objective of this “Community of Common Destiny” is to push the United States
out of the Western Pacific and make Southeast Asia China’s sphere of influence. In
contrast, ASEAN’s strategic goal has been to keep the United States engaged and
committed to ASEAN-based institutions while limiting China’s influence on them. A
Vietnamese diplomat once said to his American counterpart that American involvement
in Southeast Asia will ensure that China treats Southeast Asian states better. The
emphasis on openness and connectivity in the outlook means that ASEAN welcomes
deeper American, Japanese, and even Indian involvement in the region as outside
balancers against China. ASEAN wants to leverage these outside balancers to check
China’s ambitions.

That makes Asian war inevitable.

Nagara 22 [Bunn Nagara is a political analyst and honorary research fellow at the
Perak Academy. He was formerly a senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic and
International Studies (ISIS). 1-29-2022, "Belligerent and bereft of ideas, the US is forcing
conflict on East Asia," South China Morning Post,
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3164921/how-belligerent-us-forcing-
conflict-east-asia] [pT]
A pandemic, trade war and crimps on global supply chains or not, East Asia is still
humming. The region remains the world’s most vibrant economic space. It was the case
before Covid-19 and Trumpism, and it will be in the future.
The United States and Europe are major economic stakeholders in East Asia without
being part of it. But will Washington further risk its considerable stake with more
political posturing?
The 15-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, initiated by the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, took effect on January 1 with China at the
centre of the world’s largest trade bloc. China has also formally applied to join the 11-
member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the
successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership which the US led before quitting under
former president Donald Trump.
These groupings complement existing trade pacts between China and its regional
partners. But US President Joe Biden’s “new economic framework” is conspicuous by its
absence after more than a year of his administration.
Washington’s latest approach is an alliance of democracies to compete against China.
There are doubts over that prospect while greater strides are evident in politico-military
initiatives such as the Quad and the Aukus agreement.
Prioritising military approaches over economics jars with a region invested in peace,
stability and prosperity. East Asia’s business is business, with a collective repudiation
of conflict regardless of cause or justification.
US-China competition might be inevitable, but bruising rivalry and physical confrontation
are not. Attempts to flex that rivalry in such competition will prove to be a costly failure.
There is no regional market for conflict, and even keen allies on paper will not measure
up on the ground or in regional waters. Hubris encourages wishful thinking that will
prove injurious and costly in hindsight.
There can be no limited confrontation between major, nuclear-armed powers with no
face to lose if escalation is swift. The damage will be indiscriminate and difficult to
calibrate.
US military prowess is not what it was. It now relies on accurate assessments of
China’s advancing military capacity and the unflinching commitment of its allies, neither
of which can be assured.
China has home-ground advantage while the US has a history of impermanence and
messy retreats. The purpose of deterring Chinese aggression is certainly welcome, but
not the prospect of failure and backfire, given US unilateral tendencies, the implications
of domestic political partisanship and uncertain commitment in prolonged, distant
conflicts.
It is also impolitic to overplay the democratic argument in East Asia. Washington’s
laissez-faire capitalist model might be challenged by China’s state capitalism, but
hoisting ideological colours will not fly in the region. Today’s China is not interested
in exporting its ideology. A developing East Asia is loath to replay Cold War
divisiveness.
Besides, this region is home to a wide range of industrial policies, public-private
partnerships and state-led enterprises. A US-defined free-market, democratic alliance
triggers consternation in the region, while promoting it smacks of intrusiveness.
East Asian nations are pragmatic and go with whatever works best, irrespective of
ideological labels. Economic integration is understood as sinking or swimming with the
economic interests of behemoths such as China and the US.
Any strategy risking US interests by targeting China’s would be unhelpful and
unwelcome. Yet, a second-year Biden administration is still stuck in Trump’s trade
war and decoupling mode, bereft of new thinking on China or the region.
Bipartisan agreement in Congress on the need to contain or constrain China suggests
there will be no change. Preparations for this year’s midterm elections amid Biden’s low
approval ratings confirm this.
An urgent reset is needed – if not in US-China relations, then at least in evaluating the
interests of all regional stakeholders. Broadening economic options in East Asia without
strings would be ideal.
Challenging Beijing’s South China Sea claims without also challenging Taipei’s equally
disputed claims lacks consistency and credibility. Moreover, vast US-China differences
over trade, technology, currency and politics transcend intraregional disputes.
Today’s impasse demands thinking and acting outside the box of immediate political
expediencies. Is the US, still the premier world economic power, capable of creative and
timely policy innovation? Ratcheting up the trade war or decoupling while heading
towards physical confrontation saps East Asia’s vitality and confidence, to the detriment
of all.
The US should bank on its status as the leading economic power rather than the leading
military power to offer the region constructive, marketable ideas. Bill Clinton’s
Democrats won an election with “It’s the economy, stupid.”
Barack Obama used the TPP to set the terms of world trade instead of China. But he
presumed the global trading order had to be carved out by one or the other great power
rather than built in partnership through stakeholder consultation.
Going forward, what should a new economic framework look like? First, countries must
be free to choose whichever framework they prefer or to mix and match elements from
different frameworks. There must be no Cold War bipolarity, zero-sum mentality or
pressure to enlist as asset or ally.
Second, commercial competition between frameworks must not be politicised.
Differences in US-China relations must not restrict or sour the regional business
environment. Third, a road map to end superpower rivalry must include clear steps to
boost inclusive sustainable growth and regional resilience.
Nothing less will work. Everything else must gel with these or nothing worthwhile will
result. There is little room for optimism.
---War Impact Defense

1. No Asia war -- a multitude of factors guarantees peace for the next

decade, your realist theories are flawed. Alagappa ‘14
Muthiah Alagappa [a nonresident senior associate in the Asia Program, first holder of the Tun Hussein
Onn Chair in international studies at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies], 12-19-2014,
"International Peace in Asia: Will it Endure?," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/12/19/international-peace-in-asia-will-it-endure. CL recut AM
Asia continues to face numerous internal and international security challenges that have or could result in the use of military force. Long-running conflicts on the
Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and between Pakistan and India remain unresolved. A large number of territorial disputes remain, some between major
countries including China, India, Japan, and Russia. The rapid rise of Asian countries (especially China), continuing historical animosities, the spread of nuclear
weapon and ballistic missile capabilities, and international terrorism reinforce existing security concerns as well as pose new strategic challenges, while sustained
rapid economic growth along with increased scientific and technological prowess has enabled Asian countries to develop sophisticated military capabilities. Citing
these challenges and perceived institutional weaknesses in comparison with post-World War II Europe, observers—especially in the West—opined in the 1990s that
Asia was “ripe for rivalry” and Europe’s past (war torn nineteenth century) would or could be its future.4 They envisioned a dangerous region in which rivalry,
power-balancing, conflict, and war would be endemic. The continued rise of China (and its aggressiveness in the pursuit of disputed territorial claims) in the
context of the perceived weakness of the United States in Asia as well as rising nationalism and possible miscalculation continue to fuel prognostications of
conflict and war in Asia.5 In contrast to those dire warnings, this article makes two claims. First, Asia has witnessed a substantial reduction in the number of major

and minor inter-state wars. After reaching a peak in the 1970s, major inter-state war has declined in number,
frequency, and intensity measured in terms of battle deaths. From 1979 to 2014, there were only two major inter-state wars compared to
13 in 1945 to 1979. Connected to earlier wars, the nature, purpose, scope, and outcome of these wars since 1979 reinforce rather than undermine my central claim
that Asia has witnessed substantial decline in major wars.6 It has even enjoyed a long period of peace, comparable in duration, nature, and complexity to the “long

peace” of the Cold War in Europe.7 Second, the long peace in Asia will continue in the foreseeable
future. Entrenched conflicts will likely remain unresolved with a few becoming even more acute. The Asian strategic environment will become more complex
with growing economic interdependence, cross-cutting links, and some new security challenges. And, armed clashes cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, major war
in Asia is unlikely in the coming decade or two. I made these claims about a decade ago.8 I am now even more convinced and set them out in this article to
balance the growing chorus—now, also in Asia—of conflict and war in Asia. What explains the substantial decline in the frequency of major war in Asia and the
claim that the inter-state peace that has endured in Asia since 1979 will continue in the foreseeable future? These are the central questions animating this article,

Decline in the number and intensity of inter-state wars in Asia since 1979 is due largely to
which advances three related arguments:

the growing legitimacy of the Asian political map, rising nationalism, focus on
and success in economic growth, and the development of effective deterrence
in relevant dyads. Together, these developments reduced the salience as well as
altered the role of force, more specifically war, in the international politics of Asia. Factors that underpinned the decreasing frequency of
inter-state war will continue to be salient in the foreseeable future and sustain the long peace in Asia. A development that could substantially alter the strategic
environment would be a shift in military technology and strategy from deterrence to offense. Such a shift would make war more costly, but also restore it as a
rational instrument of policy in pursuit of certain political objectives. The international peace that has prevailed in Asia, as in Europe during the Cold War, is of the
minimal type (absence of major war but not devoid of competition, conflict, minor war, and military incidents). That is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
Stronger peace would require resolution of outstanding disputes, which appears unlikely. Before developing these arguments, the article identifies limitations in
structural and liberal explanations of war and peace, and substantiates the claim of relative peace since 1979. War and peace: Limitations of structural and liberal
explanations Structural explanations by themselves cannot explain war and peace in Asia since 1945. Anarchy (deep structure) and distribution of power are two
key concepts deployed by realists to explain security and war. Peace does not feature prominently in realist theories, except possibly as a consequence of a
certain type of hegemony (which makes sense only if the ideational component is invoked) or certain balances in the distribution of power. Neorealists use
anarchy to explain security dilemmas and the recurrence of inter-state war; however, as a constant in a system of sovereign states, anarchy cannot explain change,
including a growing sense of security and transitions to peace. Even neorealists admit they cannot explain the occurrence of specific wars, leaving it of limited
intellectual or policy significance. The distribution of power (unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity), a favorite of classical realists, suffers limitations in explaining
war and peace in Asia too. There is no agreement as to which distribution is conducive to peace.9 In Asia, a high incidence of war, a transition to inter-state peace,
and the termination of some inter-state and intra-state wars, but the persistence of others, all occurred during a structure of military bipolarity from 1945 to
1991.10 Inter-state peace broke out at different times and varied by sub-region, preceding the structural transformation to unipolarity in 1991. Realist theories

hegemonic theories, which

continue to have a strong hold on policy makers and think tank communities. Especially power transition and

have been deployed to understand and project consequences of the ongoing change in distributions of power, underlie the claim that

Asia is headed for conflict and war. The consequence of nuclear weapons for
the theory of hegemonic war and the difficulties associated with power
transition theories appear to be underplayed or overlooked. In contrast to realist theories, most
liberal theories are unit-level, relying on the type of political (liberal-democratic, authoritarian, or illiberal) or economic (market-
oriented capitalist or mercantilist) system. Their focus is on explaining peace. War is explained in negative terms. In liberal-democratic theory, the normal

These
condition among liberal democracies is peace. War occurs only between non-democratic states or between democratic and illiberal states.

theories (democratic peace, commercial liberal peace, sociological liberal

peace) do not fare much better in explaining war and peace in a region with
diverse political systems. There have been very few democracies in Asia; yet,
the region has experienced peace since about 1979 . Despite China and Taiwan being
Leninist-authoritarian states until the 1970s, they have not gone to war since 1958 . Likewise, North and South

Korea (the latter until the 1980s) were totalitarian-authoritarian states, but there has not been
a war since 1953. The connection between economics, security, and war is complex. A high level of economic
interdependence (commercial liberal theory), as between China and Taiwan, may increase the cost of war,
moderate the intensity of political conflict for a certain period and buy time, but
it cannot resolve or mitigate political conflict in perpetuity. Eventually, a political solution is required.
High levels of economic interdependence have not prevented rising security concerns (China-Japan, China-United States, China-Taiwan, China-South Korea, and
South Korea-Japan). Likewise, the relationship among economics, politics, security, and war in the domestic arena is complex. Strong economic performance may
provide the basis for political legitimacy and stability, especially for governments in authoritarian systems, but only for a limited time. Continued success has the
potential to undermine their legitimacy and stability claims, as was the case in Taiwan and South Korea. Strong economic performance alone cannot resolve
identity and sovereignty contestations, which in the domestic arena are commonly labeled as minority or center-periphery conflicts. Despite 20 years of strong
economic growth, Suharto’s Indonesia could not resolve the Aceh problem. Strong national economic growth and centralization of power, in fact, aggravated that
conflict. Resolution required political re-imaginations including autonomy-based solutions that became more possible in subsequent administrations. Sustained
strong economic performance, however, can strengthen the state, which can have far reaching internal and international ramifications. But the relationship

between good economic performance and international behavior of states is double-edged. Focus on economic development through participation in
regional and global economies (to access international capital and markets) would argue for maintenance of a peaceful international environment. However,

success could also enable countries to build up their national military capabilities, making
settlement of international disputes through war more attractive. Continued success in economic performance in major countries like China can bring change in

Commercial liberal
the international distribution of power and stimulate behavior that does not augur well for international stability.

theory is, thus, of limited value in explaining the outbreak and maintenance of
peace. Peace in Southeast Asia is incorrectly attributed to sociological liberalism or, specifically, the ASEAN Way. That approach fails to take account of
the fact that peace in maritime Southeast Asia was a consequence of internal political change in Indonesia in 1965 that terminated its confrontation with Malaysia
prior to the 1967 formation of ASEAN. Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia did not individually possess capabilities to fight and win wars even if there were
disputes meriting resort to war. Peace in continental Southeast Asia followed the Vietnamese withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia. ASEAN membership came
later. The ASEAN Way had little or no effect in continental Southeast Asia. Cuts in Soviet assistance to Vietnam, intensified Sino-Vietnamese conflict, and
Vietnam’s overreach were more relevant in explaining Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia and Laos. Failure to appreciate such facts gives false credence to the
claims of ASEAN propagandists, who overplay ASEAN’s role in preserving peace in the sub-region From war to relative peace After peaking in the 1970s, the
number, frequency and intensity of wars in Asia declined substantially, as seen in Table 1. The two later major wars (the 1987 Sino-Vietnamese border war and the
1991 India-Pakistan War in the Kargil district in Indian Kashmir) were limited in purpose, scope, duration, and outcome. They reinforce the claim that war ceased to
be a rational instrument of state policy in resolving inter-state disputes in Asia from the late 1970s. Unit-level factors like nation- and state-making, along with
national resilience and state capacity, continue to be the driving factors of war, peace, cooperation, and order in the region. There were 9 war dyads in Asia, all
commencing before 1979 (Table 2). Of these, four (US-North Vietnam, Vietnam-Cambodia, Vietnam-Laos, and Vietnam-China) have ended. The inter-Korean and
China-Taiwan dyads are stalemated, although they continue as highly militarized inter-state disputes. Despite breaches and standoffs, the Sino-Indian border
dispute is being handled through bilateral negotiations; war appears unlikely. With the Chinese invasion/liberation and occupation of Tibet in 1950, the Sino-
Tibetan dispute became an internal one with continuing peaceful resistance to Chinese rule, which like that of the Uighurs, has the potential to become violent, but
not to lead to international war. Only the India-Pakistan dyad continues to be war prone. There have been four wars in that dyad, three over Kashmir and one arising
from rebellion in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Even that dyad has experienced an “ugly” peace since 1999.11 Overall, the number of war dyads in Asia has

reduced dramatically. The prospect for war in the dyads appears highly unlikely, and there has been no new inter-state war dyad. Though there
are strong elements of competition in the US-China relationship, it does not
qualify as a war dyad for now. Despite many points of tension, deterrence and uncertainty in
outcome are among the reasons why war between these two countries appears
highly unlikely. Unit-level factors like nation- and state-making, along with national resilience and state capacity, continue to be the driving factors
of war, peace, cooperation, and order in the region. Along with substantial decline in major wars, there has

been a decline in minor interstate wars in Asia (Table 3) as well as settlement of several inter-state disputes
through war or negotiations. Asia has experienced relative inter-state peace since 1979, although the beginning of peace varies by sub-region. Northeast

Asia has not experienced a major war since the 1958 military clash between the PRC and Taiwan, and maritime
Southeast Asia has not witnessed a war since the termination of the Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia in 1965. Peace in continental Southeast Asia was
a later development, beginning sometime in the late 1980s after the punitive Chinese attack on Vietnam in 1979 and subsequent stalemate in the Sino-Vietnamese
dyad. Peace between these two countries was formalized in the land border treaty signed in 1999. The “ugly peace” peace in South Asia dates from after the 1999
Kargil War, although there was no major war in this dyad for 28 years between 1971 and 1999. Unit-level factors like nation- and state-making, along with national
resilience and state capacity, continue to be the driving factors of war, peace, cooperation, and order in the region. Explaining conflict and war in Asia Internal and
international contestation over the legitimacy of nations and states along with weak state capacity was the driver of numerous internal and international wars in
post 1945 Asia and external intervention in some of them. System-level factors (ideological contestations between great powers and distribution of power) played
an important role in some conflicts, but were not the primary cause of war. Causation was largely local. System-level variables were
significant in defining the international context, stimulating and facilitating certain external interventions as well as in prolonging certain conflicts, but did not
cause conflict or war.12 This is reflected by the fact that termination of the Cold War did not end these conflicts and wars. With the exceptions of Japan, Thailand
and Nepal, Asian countries gained their independence from colonial rule in the post 1945 era.13 Upon independence, incumbent governments embarked on nation
and state building projects that were contested by rival political groups that also had deep roots in the struggle for independence. Many became violent struggles
—in heartlands over the type of state and between the center and periphery over the composition and identity of the nation. Irreconcilable constructions of nations
and states severely undermined the legitimacy of some countries. China-Taiwan, North Vietnam-South Vietnam/US, India-Pakistan, and North Korea-South Korea
conflicts became inter-state. The China-Taiwan conflict has its origins in the civil war over the right to rule China. It became inter-state with the establishment of
the KMT in Taiwan and US support for that regime in the context of the Cold War. Such support along with the growing internal and international legitimacy of
Taiwan prevented forcible unification. The conflict is now primarily over the status, identity, and sovereignty of Taiwan. Likewise, clashing constructions of nations
and/or states inform the continuing conflicts between North and South Korea and India and Pakistan. The outbreak of the Korean War was embedded in the Cold
War ideological confrontation and PRC calculations of Chinese national interest. With the end of the Cold War and improvement in Soviet/Russian and Chinese
relations with South Korea, clashing constructions of the Korean nation and state have come to the fore. Both North and South Korea seek unification and
constructing the successor Korean state on their own terms. Some attribute the outbreak of the Korean War to great power competition, but great powers
intervened in support of rival Korean groups. Termination of the Cold War did not end this conflict. The Korean conflict evolved with contention over unification and
identity of the successor Korean state. US-China interests and competition and the North Korean nuclear problem matter, but are not at the core of the conflict.
The conflict between India and Pakistan is rooted in the construction of two nation-states upon partition of British India with focus on the status of Kashmir.
Islamabad envisages Muslim majority Kashmir as an integral part of Islamic Pakistan, whereas secular India sees it as an integral part of the Indian nation and
state based on the accession by the ruler of that state at the time of independence. Since 1953, there has been no war on the Korean Peninsula, and there has
been no outbreak of war across the Taiwan Strait since the 1958 PRC shelling of Quemoy and Matsu under Taipei’s control. The India-Pakistan dyad has been
more war prone, but the frequency and intensity of war have dropped sharply. The driver of most inter-state wars in Asia has been the clashing construction of
nations and states. Clashing constructions of nation and state underlay the war between North Vietnam and US-supported South Vietnam. The 1954 Geneva
accords temporarily divided Vietnam along the 17th parallel into North Vietnam and the State of Vietnam. The latter , together with the United States rejected the
partition. Though Hanoi signed the accords, partition was not the goal sought by Ho Chi Minh. He envisaged a united Vietnamese nation with a socialist state
under the control of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Saigon too envisaged a united Vietnamese nation but under its control. Both exploited Cold War ideological
and strategic struggles for their benefit. Viewing the conflict primarily through the Cold War lens, beginning in the early 1960s, the United States intervened
militarily in support of South Vietnam before becoming a direct protagonist against North Vietnam, which had strong backing from the Soviet Union and China.
External military intervention intensified, prolonged, and internationalized the war, but the cause of the war was local. Exhaustion on the part of the United States
and the ensuing doctrine that Asian countries must become more self-reliant for their security (the Guam or Nixon doctrine) led to the signing of the Paris Peace
Accords in 1973 and American disengagement. Subsequently, North Vietnam “liberated” South Vietnam in 1975, and unified the Vietnamese nation under
communist rule. Since then, the legitimacy of the Vietnamese nation, its communist system of government, and international sovereignty of Vietnam have no

Growing international legitimacy,

longer been objects of international contestation. Explaining the transition to peace

economic development, and greater state capacity explain the declining utility
of war as an instrument of state policy and the reduced frequency of war in Asia .
The Asian political map was highly uncertain in the early post-1945 era, but, before long, some contestations were resolved through war or negotiations. The
international legitimacy of Malaysia, Singapore, Bangladesh, and unified Vietnam, and the independence of Cambodia, Laos, and East Timor, which were previously

internal legitimacy of political systems and

contested, became more accepted. Concurrently, the

governments became stronger. Contestations by communist parties in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia weakened and then
terminated. Democratic governments replaced authoritarian ones in South Korea and Taiwan. The growing international and domestic legitimacy of Taiwan
“normalized” one stalemate, as the enduring division of the Korean Peninsula did another. A few countries may still disappear. A few new countries may appear as
a consequence of internal contestation. A small number of countries may experience territorial change. Yet, over time the Asian political map has stabilized.
International recognition along with rising nationalism and growing state capacity increased national resilience. Invasions, conquests and domination through war
became politically, diplomatically, and economically costly and normatively unacceptable. Asian countries became more secure. Their international survival was
no longer in question. The survival of even small countries like Brunei was assured. Beginning with Japan and the Newly Industrializing Economies (South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), Asian countries, embracing the capitalist path and participating in regional and global economies, experienced rapid
economic growth, which later spread to other countries including the ASEAN 5, China and India. Focus on economic development required a peaceful, stable, and
cooperative international environment that made war costly. It also strengthened state capacity, including the administrative and physical reach of the state, and

economic growth enabled

contributed to greater national resilience, leaving states less vulnerable to external intervention. Successful

greater allocations for military modernization and strong deterrent capabilities against external threats to sovereignty. Those
confronting superior adversaries have chosen to develop their own capabilities, including nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and cyber know-how, to ally with

external powers like the United States, or to engage all major powers to ensure a power balance and prevent domination of the sub-region by any single power.

Deterrence has stalemated acute conflicts (China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan,

North-South Korea), preventing war. Increasingly, deterrence (conventional and nuclear) has become the dominant strategy
of nearly all Asian countries (small and big) and the mainstay of peace in Asia. Although China is vastly superior to Taiwan in many dimensions of power, and use
of force to achieve unification remains a key element of Chinese policy, it has been deterred by the international legitimacy of Taiwan, Washington’s support for
Taipei, and the attendant political, diplomatic, and economic costs of engaging in war. Even if it chooses war, success is not assured. Failure would almost

Deterrence (including the

certainly have adverse consequences for the CCP’s domestic legitimacy and for Beijing’s international aspirations.

development of nuclear weapons by North Korea) has also prevented war on the Korean Peninsula and

acted as a strong restraint in the India-Pakistan dyad. A consequence of the above changes, notably the
acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, has been transformation in the role of military force in Asian international politics. It has become
much less an offensive tool or relevant in the resolution of political and economic disputes. Instead, defending one’s existing territory and deterring external
threats have become the primary role of armed forces. Yet, armed clashes, including minor wars, could be used in the service of a strategy of salami slicing.
Countering such tactics as well as countering threats posed by militant non-state actors requires more specific deterrents including offensive capabilities. Will
peace endure? Peace defined as the absence of major war will endure in the foreseeable future. Although changing distributions of power, growing military
capabilities, continuing disputes and the emergence of new challenges will likely create an unsettling environment for many countries and fuel talk of war, war in

Asia is unlikely to materialize. Excessive attention to the rise of China and attendant change in the international distribution of power have privileged
 realist theories like power transition and hegemony, whose primary focus is on change through war. That focus has diverted
attention from the root cause of war, peace, cooperation, and order in the
region. The rise of China should be put in perspective. The primary driver of war in post 1945 Asia has been the contested legitimacy of nations and states,
not the weakness or rise of China. Inter-state peace in Asia will endure due to the increasing international legitimacy of countries, a continued focus on economic
growth and development, growing national resilience and state capacity, and maintenance of effective deterrence. The political map of Asia has been relatively
stable over the last thirty years. Increasing international legitimacy along with respect for the principles of territorial integrity and political independence implies
that the Asia political map will change only gradually. Changes will be a consequence of internal political developments, not inter-state war. Fundamental change
(the appearance of new countries or disappearance of existing ones) will be driven by the outcome of domestic contestation over the type of political system and
the identity of the national political community. Only minor territorial changes may occur as a consequence of inter-state armed conflict. Invasion, conquest, and
domination through war have become features of the past, but that does not mean obsolescence of the use of force. For various reasons (political legitimacy,
poverty eradication, resolution of domestic conflict, desire to achieve developed country status, the need to end stagnation, aspirations for national power and
influence), economic growth will continue to be the priority for several more decades. Participation in regional and global economic systems to mobilize factors of
production and access markets will remain key features of the economic policies of Asian countries. Internationalist orientations argue for a peaceful and stable
environment. State capacities can be expected to increase and, along with rising nationalism, to make countries less vulnerable to international intervention.
Resorting to war to resolve inter-state disputes with no certainty of success will be costly. Deterrence will continue to inform national security strategies of most
countries in the region. It has prevented war even in acute conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and between India and Pakistan. Deterrence
(especially nuclear deterrence) will play a key role in preventing the outbreak of war between China and the United States, China and India, China and Japan, and
Japan and Russia. Constant efforts must be made to review, renew, and upgrade it, including extended deterrence in the context of changing political and strategic
circumstances, changing military technology, and development of new capabilities. While strategic deterrence can prevent major inter-state wars, it cannot prevent
minor wars, military incidents, or militant activities by non-state actors. Military capabilities and confidence building measures must be developed to deal with
these situations. General and specific deterrence strategies, capabilities, and crisis management among key players must command greater attention.

2. No war – their evidence is western bias. Mahbubani ‘14

Kishore Mahbubani [dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National
University of Sinapore], “East Asia will avoid war in 2015. Here’s why.,”
http://blogs.ft.com/the-exchange/2014/12/30/east-asia-will-avoid-war-in-2015-heres-
why/. CL recut AM
Few years in recent decades dawned with as much of a sense of pessimism as 2014. One consistent theme in the predictions for the year was that 2014 looked

eerily similar to 1914. Most pundits predicted doom and gloom, especially in east Asia. Yet,
while there were many horrific events — from the downing of flight MH17 over Ukraine, to the abduction of hundreds of schoolgirls in Nigeria and the rise of the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant — we have avoided outright world war. Now that the year is closed, with no repetition of 1914, it may be wise to investigate
why the pundits were wrong, particularly on their ideas around the potential for conflict in Asia. These were no lightweight pundits. The eminent historian Margaret
MacMillan, in an essay for Brookings in December 2013, said, “We are witnessing, as much as the world of 1914, shifts in the international power structure, with
emerging powers challenging the established ones.” She added, “the same is happening between the US and China now, and also between China and Japan”, and
also said that “there is potential for conflict between China and two of its other neighbours — Vietnam and Malaysia — as well.” Graham Allison, the famous
Harvard professor, also warned that east Asia was headed towards the “Thucydides Trap”, adding: “When a rapidly rising power rivals an established ruling power,
trouble ensues.” In early 2013, the then prime minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, warned that 2013 was looking dangerously like 1913. The Economist
also warned at the end of 2013, “A century on, there are uncomfortable parallels with the era that led to the outbreak of the first world war.” I experienced this
pessimism personally in Davos in January 2014. Several leading western intellectuals asked me whether war would break out between China and Japan. I was so
confident that there would be no war in east Asia that I offered to take bets with ten-to-one odds against myself with eminent western journalists. Two took up my

there would be no war in

bets. And I will be collecting on these bets when I return to Davos in January. Why was I so confident that

east Asia, either in the East China Sea or the South China Sea? The simple answer is that I
know the Asian dynamic. While many Asian neighbours will make angry
nationalist statements (and they have to do so to manage popular nationalist sentiments), they are also careful and
pragmatic in their deeds. For over two decades I have been writing about the rise of Asia and the dynamic driving it. There is
an extraordinary consensus among east Asian leaders that Asia needs to use
this window of opportunity to focus on economic development and growth. War
is the biggest obstacle to development. If Asians were truly stupid, they would engage in such wars and derail their
enormous development promise. Most Asian leaders, barring North Korea, understand well the dangers of war. Hence, while there will be

tensions and rivalries in the region, there will be no wars in the region, in 2014 or in 2015. As 2015
unfolds, I would like to encourage all western pundits to understand the underlying Asian

dynamic on its own terms, and not on the basis of western preconceptions.
3. Deterrence is real---our evidence is based on an empirical analysis of
states that have the potential to go to war---deterrence accounts for
the decision not to go to war, which validates the entire disad
Stephen L. Quackenbush 10, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science,
University of Missouri, January 2010, “International Interactions General Deterrence and
International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory,” International Interactions,
Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 60-85
[Numbers changed to words: 384,865 to “three hundred eighty-four thousand”]
Case selection has been the biggest obstacle to the empirical analysis of general
deterrence (Huth 1999). The only previous quantitative study focusing on direct general deterrence is by Huth and Russett
(1993:63, emphasis added), who argue that “the population of enduring rivalries in the international system includes all dyadic
relations in which a dispute created the possibility of one or both parties resorting to overt military force to achieve a gain or redress
a grievance.” According to this line of reasoning, then, enduring rivalries are the proper cases for the study
of general deterrence. Similarly, Diehl and Goertz focus attention on rivalries, whether or not they become enduring, and
argue that “the rivalry approach provides a solution” (Diehl and Goertz 2000:91) to problems with deterrence case selection.
According to Diehl and Goertz (2000), a dyad is in a rivalry if they engage in a militarized interstate
dispute. Thus, selecting all rivalries as cases of general deterrence would capture (by definition) all failures of general
deterrence.4 However, deterrence in dyads that have not fought would be ignored, which is
particularly problematic because those are the dyads where deterrence has always
worked. Furthermore, identification of the length of a rivalry, and thus the span of general deterrence, requires the assumption
that the rivalry begins either with the first dispute (and thus deterrence failed when it was attempted for the first time), or at some
arbitrary length of time before the first dispute and after the last.5
Therefore, the
rivalry approach is limited as a path to general deterrence case selection .
However, one can safely assume that every state wishes to deter attacks against itself—this
is the basic rationale for the maintenance of armed forces (Morgan 1983). This assumption is equivalent to the alliance portfolio
literature’s assumption that every state has a defense pact with itself (Bueno de Mesquita 1975; Signorino and Ritter 1999).6 Hence,
the difficult part of general deterrence case selection is not determining who makes
deterrent threats (everyone does), but rather what states the threats are directed against.
General deterrent threats are directed against any state that might consider an attack;
these are states that have the opportunity for conflict.
Thus, the key to selecting cases of general deterrence is identifying opportunity for
conflict.7 To identify cases where opportunity exists, I use the recently developed concept of politically active
dyads (Quackenbush 2006a). A dyad is politically active “if at least one of the following
characteristics applies: the members of the dyad are contiguous, either directly or through a colony, one of the
dyad members is a global power, one of the dyad members is a regional power in the region of the
other, one of the dyad members is allied to a state that is contiguous to the other, one of the dyad
members is allied to a global power that is in a dispute with the other, or one of the dyad members is
allied to a regional power (in the region of the other) that is in a dispute with the other” (Quackenbush
2006a:43). Quackenbush (2006a) finds that politically active dyads are able to identify opportunity as
a necessary condition for international conflict , while previous measures of opportunity
such as politically relevant dyads and regional dyads are unable to do so. Thus, we can
have confidence that all politically active dyads could fight if they had the willingness
to do so. The goal of deterrence is to dissuade other states from attacking the deterring state.
In other words, states seek to ensure that other states—those with the opportunity to attack—
do not gain the willingness to attack, and they do this through deterrence. While other e
 DA—Terror
Counterterror response curbs terrorism in the ASEAN region now but it’s
close.
CRS 17 [The Congressional Research Service serves as a nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. This report was authored by
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Bruce Vaughn, Thomas Lum, and John W. Rollins.
5/17/2017, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia”,
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170505_R44501_355e3437898708ad4230515
0ba1a54c2ebe32c54.pdf] [pT]
Violent militancy has been a threat in Southeast Asia for many years, increasing in
intensity in the years following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States,
and then seemingly easing in the late 2000s-early 2010s, as Southeast Asian
governments’ efforts to degrade domestic militant groups appeared to bear fruit. The
rise of the Islamic State and the potential it raises for militant recruitment in Southeast
Asia and beyond raises new challenges that may guide U.S. counterterrorism policy.
Most analysts assess that terrorist threats in Southeast Asia remain lower than in some
other regions. The State Department’s 2015 Country Reports on Terrorism said in its
Overall Strategic Assessment that Asian countries “actively sought to address threats
and degrade the ability of terrorist groups to operate. Governments worked to
strengthen legal frameworks, investigated and prosecuted terrorism cases, increased
regional cooperation and information sharing, and addressed critical border and
aviation security gaps.”148
However, risks remain that Southeast Asia could still be subject to terrorism—either
locally organized “lone wolf” attacks or more organized and larger-scale trans-national
efforts. Many of the region’s most prominent militant groups and individuals have
publicly expressed support for the Islamic State, and analysts report substantial IS
recruitment activity aimed at the region’s large Muslim populations. Analysts have
expressed concern about the region’s ability to monitor and track new threats arising
from the potential return of battle-trained individuals from the Middle East.
It remains difficult to assess whether concrete operational and planning linkages have
been established between the Islamic State and Southeast Asian militants, or whether
the region’s generally successful counterterrorism efforts continue to marginalize
militant groups. The course of the region’s counterterrorism activities—and the
effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia—are likely to remain
priority issues for the United States and governments in the region. In part for these
reasons, Congress may opt to consider the legislative and oversight tools at its disposal
to help develop and shape the ordering and pursuit of priorities to counter terrorism and
violent extremism in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN adoption of a Schengen style agreement creates an easy avenue

for terrorism.
Marquez 18 [Matthew G. Marquez is a member of the University of the Philippines
Open University. “The ASEAN Single Visa Scheme and Its Implications to Border
Security in the Region: A Philippine Perspective”. Journal of Management and
Development Studies Volume Number 7, 13-23] [pT]
However, there are several issues impeding the implementation of a single visa
scheme. According to Goodrich (2015), security issues remain primary concern
especially in terms of policy differences among AMS. There are also issues involving
security and stability that plague Southeast Asia. Terror groups continue to threaten the
tourism industry in the Philippines and Indonesia. Official reports indicate that the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has penetrated the Region, recruiting local
clandestine groups to their cause; this includes the Maute group in the Philippines. Also,
there are existing threats of illegal animal trade, drug, and human trafficking in the
Mekong Region (Auethavornpipat, 2017, Viano, 2010, p.97). At a regional level, AMS
cannot effectively solve the problem of the Rohingyas much less tourists wandering the
region on a wider scale (Lego, 2017). In March 2017, terrorism has been noted to thwart
the potential tourism growth engines (Flores, 2017).
Last April 2017, the Abu Sayyaf, a local terrorist group in the Philippines, infiltrated
Bohol Province with failed attempts in kidnapping tourists. This prompted tourists to
cancel their bookings in the Philippines due to the fear of getting kidnapped and even
due to the prospect of being killed (Flores, 2017). As a result of these threats, several
foreign embassies in the country like the US and Australian Embassies have issued
travel advisories instructing their nationals to avoid some areas when vacationing in the
country (Chandran, 2017, Flores, 2017). In addition, there were reports of Jihadist
foreign fighters participating in the Marawi siege in 2017. Former Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff General Eduardo Año cited the presence of suspected
foreign terrorists in Southern Philippines amid continuing firefights in Marawi City. He
believed that they may have entered through the Philippines’ backdoor. However,
reports also confirmed that some of these foreign fighters came to the country through
airports and other regular points of entry (Lopez, 2017).
These security threats have shown the weaknesses of intelligence gathering and border
control management in the Philippines. Thus, an ASEAN single visa scheme may
become a possible avenue for individuals with links to terrorists and other transnational
criminal groups to freely roam the Region and cause serious security repercussions.
Ineffective ASEAN counterterror response undermines unity and
credibility.
Chandran 16 [Nyshka Chandran is a former writer for CNBC.com, who focused on
Asia-Pacific politics. She holds a bachelor’s degree in Political Science and History from
the University of Toronto, 9-8-2016, “Is fighting terrorism key to ASEAN unity and
credibility?,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/10/is-fighting-terrorism-key-to-
asean-unity-and-credibility.html] [pT]
Among the many criticisms leveled against the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), disunity is perhaps the direst. From the South China Sea dispute to free trade,
the 10-member bloc’s legitimacy has been called into question as it remains unable to
offer a coordinated response on the region’s most pressing issues.
Now, it’s hoped that counterterrorism can encourage ASEAN unity amid a spate of
recent attacks. Last week alone saw two separate bombings, one at a night market in
the Philippine city of Davao and the other at a school in Thailand’s southern Narathiwat
province.
Unlike other political issues that have caused ruptures among members, nations so far
seem to be in unison on terrorism, as indicated by the ASEAN summit in Laos this week.
“If ASEAN cannot unite on this issue, then its raison d’être and future will be called into
question once again,” said Colin Chapman, founder and editor-in-chief at think-tank
Australian and South East Asian Strategies.
On Wednesday, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong warned that members
must work more closely together on intelligence sharing and counter extremist
doctrines. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte said he intended to use the summit to
seek better support for regional counter-terror efforts. Japan meanwhile promised $440
million on Wednesday to help Asian countries strengthen anti-extremist measures for
the next three years, but it was not clear who the recipients would be. Australia also
expressed its desire to expand counter-terror arrangements with Indonesia and
Malaysia.
Not only would a unified response to counter-terrorism give the bloc credibility, it would
also create a mechanism for responses to other threats, such as epidemic diseases
and climate change, explained Jonah Blank, senior political scientist at RAND
Corporation
But the biggest hurdle to a coordinated regional crackdown on militant networks may
be ASEAN itself. Even optimists can’t ignore the organization’s long history of internal
divisions.
“ASEAN has never been unified about anything. There are few mechanisms in place for
genuine cooperation by all—or even most— ASEAN nations on any issue,” explained
Jonah Blank, senior political scientist at RAND Corporation.
Among the stumbling blocks are:
  The South China Sea dispute: A March statement failed to address The Hague’s
rejection of Beijing’s territorial claims.
 Progress towards the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) remains stalled.
 Human rights: ASEAN has so far failed to address government repression in
Cambodia or Myanmar’s Rohingya refugee crisis.
Much of the group’s discord can be attributed to its philosophy, dubbed the ASEAN
Way, which promotes non-interference in domestic affairs. In an April paper, Mark
Beeson, professor of international politics at the University of Western Australia, noted
that while the principle is admirable, it’s an obstacle to effective cooperation.
“The emphasis on consensus, not losing face and voluntarism has meant that the
politics of the lowest common denominator has tended to prevail and difficult problems
have been avoided rather than confronted,” he summed up.
Differences in the economic, political and social systems of member nations are also a
key reason, he warned, adding that “such diversity means that full agreement on any
single issue can seem insurmountable.”
For Chapman however, the problem is plain and simple: “Leadership is lacking self-
confidence.”
Recommendations
Disrupting the cycle of radicalization is a key element of anti-terrorism cooperation,
Adam Greer and Zachary Watson, fellows at the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), wrote in an August 10 note.
“ASEAN needs to develop local, data-driven restorative approaches to prevent and
rehabilitate radicalization,” Greer and Watson said, noting the example of Singapore’s
Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG). Originally created to reform Singaporean
detainees of Jemaah Islamiyah, the Indonesia-based militant network, the RRG now
offers a range of social engagement on extremism.
Leaders can’t forget about closing geopolitical gaps either.
Disputed territories, such as Indonesia’s Sulu-Sulawesi region, often lack administrative
control and tend to become a hotbed for rogue groups, Greer and Watson explained.
“If ASEAN nations are serious about addressing terrorist threats, serious effort need to
put toward restoring governance and providing basic social services to populations in
[these] poorly-governed regions,” they wrote.

Terror attacks risk extinction.

Fyanka 20 [Bernard; February 7; Ph.D. in History and Strategic Studies from the
University of Lagos in Nigeria; African Security Review, “Chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism: Rethinking Nigeria’s counterterrorism
strategy,” vol. 28]
Introduction
The end of the Cold War might have represented the end of mutually assured
destruction (MAD), but it did not necessarily dispel the dangers of the nuclear age – in
fact, to some extent the globalised proliferation of non-conventional weapons has
instead escalated the possibilities for a nuclear attack being carried out. During the
Cold War, the belligerents of any nuclear conflict would have been easily identifiable;
however, in the post-Cold-War era, non-state actors and terrorist groups like Boko
Haram have emerged as potential players in a new variety of nuclear conflicts that
would entirely be based on terrorist models. The ominous possibilities for this new kind
of warfare are indeed terrifying, and the rise in terrorist attacks around the globe
enhances the likelihood of such an occurrence. Since 9/11, the body of academic
literature on the threat posed by terrorists regarding weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs) and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices has
increased. In Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett’s edited volume, Jihadists and
Weapons of Mass Destruction, there is disagreement as to whether this threat is
overestimated or underestimated.1 In recent times, however, ample ideological
incentive for the use of CBRN devices has been provided by the likes of Abu Mus‘ab al-
Suri – author of the ‘Global Islamic Resistance Call’ – who has stated that ‘[t]he aim of
carrying out resistance missions and individual jihad terrorism “jihad al-irhabi al-fardi” is
to inflict the largest human and material casualties possible on American interests and
its allied countries’.2 This echoes the previous call of Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Husayni
al-Baghdadi, who maintained:
If the objective and subjective conditions materialize, and there are soldiers,
weapons, and money – even if this means using biological, chemical, and
bacterial weapons – we will conquer the world, so that ‘There is no God but Allah,
and Muhammad is His Prophet’ will be triumphant over the domes of Moscow,
Washington, and Paris.3
For Boko Haram and other groups, there definitely exists a strong motivation for the
use of WMDs, and the global reach of this thinking is not in doubt:
The globalization of the jihadist struggle has also led to an increased emphasis
on Islamic identity. In combination with the ideological theme of revenge, the
global struggle for Islamic identity has the potential to create a new jihadist cultic
worldview in which its endorsers seek out WMDs because they represent the only
means to significantly transform reality.4
Contextual scenarios in Nigeria strongly suggest that Boko Haram is one such group
which has embraced the jihadist world view that endorses the use of WMDs. In this
regard, the strengthened affiliation of Boko Haram’s splinter group – the Islamic State
West Africa Province (ISWAP) – with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) confirms
their ideological persuasions. The motivation for Boko Haram to use such weapons is
thus grounded in the recent use of chemical weapons by ISIS in both Iraq and Syria
against both military and civilian targets.5 If ISIS is claiming ownership of a faction of
Boko Haram as its West African province, it is likely to extend its tactics to its African
allies.
In the light of the above, the use of WMDs by terrorists cannot be explained within the
framework of orthodox terrorism theories. With this in mind, what Russell Worth Parker
refers to as the ‘Islamic just war theory’ suitably anchors a discourse on terrorism and
advanced weapons of war.6 Most theorists do not support a subjective theory of ‘just
war’, but rather the traditional version that relies on Western ideas of morality and
proportionality, as well as on motives for waging war.7 On the other hand, jihadist
traditions reinterpret just war’s key tenet of proportionality to suit Islamists’ conflict
rationale. According to the Western form of just war theory, wherein discrimination
proves strategically impossible, any response should be proportionate to the action that
compels it – hence, proportionality dictates that a military operation should not cause
greater harm than the act that it was designed to counter or prevent.8 This
proportionality argument is exemplified in the use of nuclear weapons in the Second
World War; since casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan exceeded one million
Allied lives, with similar estimates for Japanese military and civilians, a nuclear attack
was preferable. Eventually, the actual casualties suffered from the bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki reached 200,000, which represents 10% of the casualties that
would likely have been incurred if Japan had been invaded (see
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/). In the light of this argument, justification for the use of
WMDs by terrorist groups would rest on their interpretation of the extent of the damage
caused by the military aggression and long-term imperialism of Western powers.
Fighting faceless enemies in a CBRN conflict, whether in West Africa or the Middle
East, is hard to imagine. Enemies who can easily blend into the crowd and take on the
face of ordinary civilians represent a nightmare scenario for security strategists all
around the world. The risk of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorist groups is largely
dependent on their ability to obtain weapons-grade nuclear material like uranium and
plutonium, combined with gaining the capability to build and deploy weapons which
make use of them. The global proliferation of nuclear material has made this possible
today.
Global proliferation of fissile material
The collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex ushered in a period of uncertainty
regarding the security of nuclear material. Consequently, the risk of fissile material
falling into the hands of terrorist groups – or into the hands of states that sympathise
with or harbour such groups – increased considerably. Lax security at former Soviet
nuclear facilities was widespread, making the theft of nuclear material possible. In the
chaos that followed the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s, radioactive material was
frequently stolen from poorly guarded reactors and nuclear facilities in Russia and its
former satellite states. Police operations have intercepted shipments of Soviet nuclear
material in cities as far away as Munich and Prague, and experts believe that large
batches are still unaccounted for and most likely accessible to well-connected traders
on the black market.9
Over 1800 metric tons of nuclear material is still stored in facilities belonging to more
than 25 countries all around the world.10 Not all of this material is located in military
stockpiles – in fact, most countries maintain civil stockpiles of plutonium for use in
nuclear power reactors. The civil stockpiles in the United Kingdom (UK), India, Belgium,
France, Germany, Japan and Russia add up to over 230 metric tons of plutonium. In
spite of these enormous quantities, the UK, India, France, Japan and Russia have not yet
reduced the reprocessing of plutonium for civil use. Although civil plutonium is not
weapons-grade, it remains viable as a raw material that can be transformed through an
enrichment process for use in a bomb. The United States (US) on the other hand has a
comparatively small amount of civil plutonium because of its 1970 policy to suspend
the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.11
About 25 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is required to build a bomb – an
insignificant amount in comparison to the global stockpile, which is in excess of 1.6
million kg. On the other hand, about 8 kg of plutonium is needed to build a bomb – a tiny
fraction of the 500,000 kg global stockpile.12 Nuclear facilities that are relics of the
Cold War era, especially those located in Eastern Europe, represent a high security risk.
More than 130 nuclear reactors powered by HEU are operational in over 40 countries –
the fallout of an early Cold-War-era programme in which the US and the Soviet Union
helped their allies to obtain nuclear technology. Several other reactors have been shut
down but may still contain nuclear fuel on site. In total, the world’s research reactors
contain 22 tons of HEU – enough to build hundreds of nuclear bombs. The problem is
that research reactor fuel tends to be stored under notoriously light security, making it a
very vulnerable target for terrorists.13
 DA—Populism
COVID’s decrease in migration ensured a growing but fragile movement
away from populism – best studies prove
BIPP 22 {The Bennett Institute For Public Policy, University of Cambridge} - ("Support
for populist politics ‘collapsed’ during the pandemic – global report," Bennett Institute
for Public Policy, published 1-18-2022, accessed 12-15-2022,
https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/blog/great-reset/)//marlborough-wr/
Support for populist parties and politicians, and agreement with populist sentiment, has diminished during the pandemic,
according to a “mega-dataset” taking in attitudes of over half a million people across 109 countries since
2020.¶ A University of Cambridge team say there are clear signs of a turning tide for the “populist
wave”, as the mishandling of coronavirus by populist leaders – along with a desire for stability and
a decline in “polarising” attitudes resulting from the pandemic – starts to move public opinion.¶ The authors of the new
report, from Cambridge’s Centre for the Future of Democracy (CFD), describe the study as the first global overview of how the Covid-
19 crisis has affected political beliefs.¶ They say that threats posed by the pandemic saw a “technocratic” shift in political authority
worldwide, with increased trust in government, and in experts such as scientists and civil servants. Yet faith in the
democratic process has continued to falter.¶ “The story of politics in recent years has been the emergence of
anti-establishment politicians who thrive on the growing distrust of experts,” said Dr Roberto Foa, Co-Director of the CFD and the
report’s lead author.¶ “From Erdogan and Bolsonaro to the ‘strong men’ of Eastern Europe, the planet has experienced a wave of
political populism. Covid-19 may have caused that wave to crest.”¶ “Electoral support for populist parties has collapsed around the
world in a way we don’t see for more mainstream politicians. There is strong evidence that the pandemic has severely blunted the
rise of populism,” said Foa.¶ The findings are published today by Cambridge’s Bennett Institute for Public Policy.¶ The first months
of the pandemic saw many political leaders get a boost in ratings – a classic “rally round the flag” effect in troubled times, say
researchers.¶ However, the approval ratings of populist leaders the world over began declining almost as soon as
coronavirus hit, and have continued to sink ever since.¶ On average, populist leaders have seen a 10 percentage point drop
between the spring of 2020 and the last quarter of 2021, while ratings for non-populists – on average –
returned to around pre-pandemic levels.¶ Electoral support also plunged for their parties – seen most clearly in
Europe, where the proportion of people intending to vote for a populist party* has fallen by an average of 11 percentage points to
27%.¶ Overall, across Europe, early lockdowns saw voting intention for incumbent parties increase. Yet all the continent’s governing
populists – from Italy’s Five Star to Hungary’s Fidezs – bucked the trend with the largest declines in support.¶ Support for Europe’s
opposition populist parties also fell over the pandemic – by 5 pp on average to 11% – while it rose for “mainstream” opposition.¶
Researchers suggest several factors for populism’s fading appeal. One is simply the botch job made of the pandemic by populist
governments: from Bolsonaro’s mask veto to Trump’s “bleach injection” suggestion.¶ The report’s polling shows the public
considered populist leaders to be less trustworthy sources of virus-related information than centrist counterparts.¶ In June 2020,
approval of government handling of the crisis was 11 percentage points lower on average in countries with populist leaders than in
those with more centrist governance. By the end of 2020, this gap had widened to 16 points. ¶ Researchers also found that
political “tribalism” – fertile ground for populists – has declined in most countries. The percentage of party
supporters expressing a “strong dislike” of those who vote for opposing politicians fell in most nations (although not the US) during
the crisis.¶ “The pandemic fostered a sense of shared purpose that may have reduced the political polarisation we’ve seen over the
last decade,” said CFD researcher and report co-author Dr Xavier Romero-Vidal. “This could help explain why populist leaders are
struggling to mobilise support.Ӧ Some of the ideas propagated by populists are losing ground. Levels of agreement with
statements such as “corrupt elites” divide our nation or the “will of the people” should be obeyed fell in almost every nation
surveyed.¶ For example, agreement with four such statements** fell on average by 9 percentage points in Italy to 66%, 10 points in
France to 61%, and 8 points in the UK to 64%, between 2019 and 2021.¶ Commitment to these ideas has also waned. Even among
supporters, in almost every nation a smaller number now “strongly agree” than did in 2019. In developed democracies, this shift is
predominantly among those aged over 55.¶ Moreover, areas with the sharpest drops in populist attitudes are some of the poorer
“left behind” regions – from Eastern Poland to Southern Italy and Northern Hungary – that have been a focus for populist rhetoric
and support. ¶ “This may be down to some rebalancing of wealth as people escaped cities overrun with the virus,” said Foa. “In
addition, Covid-19 border closures stopped migration and globalised trade more effectively than
any populist government.”

That’s especially true for ASEAN countries – populism is declining BUT

progress is fragile
Peter Drysdale and Adam Triggs 19 {Peter Drysdale is emeritus professor of
economics and head of the East Asian Bureau of Economic Research and East Asia
Forum at the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National
University.Adam Triggs is director of research of the Asian Bureau of Economic
Research at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University,
and a non-resident fellow in the Global Economy and Development program, Brookings
Institution} - ("Asia has taken a stand against economic nationalism," Australian
Financial Review, published 11-6-2019, accessed 12-18-2022,
https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/asia-has-taken-a-stand-against-economic-
nationalism-20191106-p537t9)//marlborough-wr/
The worldview of populist politicians has been in the ascendancy, characterised
by isolationism, protectionism and nationalism. The path to prosperity, they argue, is
one where economies are closed. Trade is restricted. Markets are managed. Foreign
investment is blocked. Immigrants are expelled. Economic co-operation is for the weak.
The protectionist, isolationist economic model of the populists has been nothing short
of a catastrophic failure, associated with a collapse of global confidence and
investment that threatens global jobs and growth. Global GDP growth is falling, trade
growth has halved since 2017, foreign investment has fallen by almost a third since
2017 and supply chains are unravelling at dangerous speed, threatening a sharp rise in
production costs and a sharp fall in already anaemic productivity growth.
The leaders of the ASEAN+6 group – which includes the 10 ASEAN countries plus Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and, hopefully soon, India –

are poised to sign the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement,
comprehensively rejecting the flawed economic model advocated by political populists.
In signing RCEP, Asia has chosen openness over protectionism, regionalism over nationalism,

cooperation over confrontation, and solidarity over suspicion. It has sent a clear and
unambiguous signal to the world: that Asia remains very much open for business,
committed to the open regionalism that has seen East Asia’s share of global GDP soar from 15 to 30 per cent since 1980, while South Asia’s
remains stubbornly has not budged, stuck around 3 to 4 per cent.

RCEP was hard fought, but a choice made easier by the calculation that Asia needed to
push back against protectionism even as the United States chose that path.

Empirics prove – opening borders is the strongest driver of a global

movement towards populism
Stéphane Dion 19 {Special Envoy of Canada’s Prime Minister to the European Union
and Europe, and Ambassador of Canada to Germany} - ("“Cultural insecurity as the main
root cause of populism”," GAC, published 11-8-2019, accessed 12-15-2022,
https://www.international.gc.ca/country_news-pays_nouvelles/2019-10-08-germany-
allemagne.aspx?lang=eng)//marlborough-wr/
However, the most prevalent variant of populism is the right-wing one, and its main driver is ethno cultural anxiety
linked to the fear of uncontrolled migration. Cultural backlash against immigration is, by far, the
main predictor of right-wing populist vote. Much more than economic anxiety or distress, populism’s
appeal is correlated with a growing sense of cultural insecurity. Populism’s supporters are hostile towards
immigration, and give a high premium to authoritarian values such as stability, order and tradition. One might almost say “it’s
NOT the economy, stupid”, being that so many voters are inclined to let their voting preferences be guided by their cultural and
Populists speak about migration –
identity concerns over economic interests. For them, “it’s the migration, stupid.”
and Islam in particular – as an existential threat to national culture and to Western civilization.
Everywhere, populism has influenced mainstream political parties’ platforms and discourse. This creates an
especially difficult political arena for center-left parties, who are struggling to campaign and build their
credibility with voters on issues like “identity” and cultural security. With the political spectrum polarizing,
it becomes harder to build consensus, and to build the coalitions that so many European electoral
systems require for effective, stable governance. Central, Eastern and Balkan European post-communist countries are the only
region where populists routinely beat mainstream parties in elections. These countries are new democracies and have had little
recent experience with immigration, especially with non-Christian immigration, and consider it with much apprehension.2 We should
not be surprised by the fact that the countries having little experience of immigration - especially non-white and non-Christian
immigration - register an exceptionally strong cultural backlash against it. Similarly, everywhere in Europe, it is in the racially
homogeneous community zones with the lowest percentage of foreign born people that the vote for anti-immigration
parties is the highest. These towns and rural areas like their homogeneous societies and fear the cosmopolitanism
that they see in large metropolitan cities like London, Paris or Vienna. Similarly, in the United States, “the racial and ethnic isolation
of whites at the zip code level is one of the strongest predictors of Trump support.”3 Everywhere, one will find aging
rural areas in demographic decline, economically stagnant and
ethnically homogeneous towns and
unable to retain their young people. As a result, they are losing confidence in the future
of their way of life. Campaigns to restrict immigration provide strong appeal to them, offering hope to protect the world they know.4
A sense of demographic displacement is also at play. Many countries
feel threatened by the prospect of
immigration, especially when it is juxtaposed with the economic emigration of their own
populations, which is resulting in a massive brain drain and a collective societal loss. In post-communist European
countries, some of which have almost disappeared over the two last centuries, or at minimum have been dominated by various
imperial powers, an aging non-renewing population is all the more vulnerable to nativist populist rhetoric. The existential fear of
disappearing continues to be part of their collective memory. Now that they are finally able to enjoy their own sovereignty, large
parts of their population desire an ethnically homogeneous state, as a safety net.

1AC proves this is particularly true of ASEAN countries – I read yellow

Intal 19 Jr, Ponciano, and Mari Pangestu. "5. Skills Mobility and Development in
ASEAN." (2019). (Professor of Economics and De La Selle University)//Elmer
Introduction: ASEAN Vision 2040 and the Role of Skills Mobility and Development The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) break-up, Brexit in the European Union (EU), and the anti-globalisation wave are in part due to insufficient attention by
The angst felt
policymakers and analysts for the distributional aspects of globalisation and regional economic integration.
by the middle class as they face income and wage stagnation and job and social
disruptions have fallen mainly on the role of foreign competition and foreign labour and
public perceptions have not given due recognition to the disruptive effects of
technological change and the inadequate catch-up in skills development of the labour
force. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) aspires and should
continue to aspire in the foreseeable future towards a freer rather than free regional
market for skilled labour or a free regional market for all labour. This is in recognition of
the political and social sensitivities associated with cross-border movement of people
and labour amongst independent nation states (notwithstanding the rapid rise of
crossborder tourism and student exchanges), and the particular huge diversities
amongst the ten ASEAN member countries in geographic and demographic sizes, levels
of economic development and wage incomes, and in socio-cultural-linguistic-religious
characteristics of the population and labour force. While not recommending the free or
freer movement of the less-skilled and unskilled-labour across the region, it is
necessary to have an ASEAN framework to regularise and facilitate such movements to
minimise the large numbers of irregular migrant workers found in many ASEAN
countries and a code to protect the wellbeing of all regular and irregular, skilled, and
unskilled foreign workers. By 2040, ASEAN should strive for an integrated skilled-labour
market characterised by an enhanced circulation of skills within the region, and
enabled by a mutual recognition of educational qualifications, professional licenses,
and work experience; a minimal list of restricted or prohibited occupations for ASEAN
foreign workers; preferential recruitment of ASEAN nationals where labour market tests
are deemed necessary; and use of digital technology to disseminate labour market
information in every ASEAN country. In an integrated ASEAN labour market for skills, the
private sector should be able to hire skilled workers from any other ASEAN country
with minimal regulatory barriers , and skilled workers in ASEAN should be able to
choose to work in any ASEAN country. Also by 2040, the ASEAN region would have further embraced the service
and knowledge economy and the digital age. ASEAN would require accelerated skill development in

every ASEAN country so as to be internationally competitive , and economically and

socially inclusive and cohesive. Countries can achieve the skills objective, not by working
alone, but by cooperation and integration within the ASEAN Framework and the ASEAN
Plus Frameworks. Skills mobility cum development is a positive sum game for both
receiving and sending countries in the ASEAN integration project. It results in an expanded pool of
human resources with multi-national and deeper skill sets for every ASEAN country . II.
Why Skills Mobility and Skills Development are Important Current demographic, economic, and technological trends mean that the
economies of ASEAN Member States (AMS) by 2040 will reach highand upper middle-income status, and have a growing labour
force that is increasingly skilled (with declining working-age population in ageing societies offset by the youthful populations in
other ASEAN countries). They will have achieved technological advances, particularly the digital revolution, e-commerce and
industry 4.0, and demand an increasingly skilled labour force, including skills that are currently scarce across ASEAN (or even non-
existent). 1. Skills
mobility is essential to the ASEAN region’s continuing rapid economic growth
and industrial upgrading. It will require tapping skills and talent from everywhere in the
ASEAN region and beyond. Fostering a freer intra-regional flow of skills will provide a
competitive edge to the ASEAN region. 2. A freer movement of skilled workers is also
necessary for deepening ASEAN services integration. As the region becomes richer, its
consumers will demand a variety of cross-border services. Each AMS has unique services that can be
demanded elsewhere in ASEAN. For example, ASEAN consumers may want to eat in restaurants run by Thai chefs, and access
online education provided by Malaysian education sites and fintech services by Singapore financial institutions. With skills mobility,
supplying these services becomes realisable and costeffective. 3. Skills
mobility is also crucial for achieving
the ASEAN objective of inclusiveness and having a cohesive ASEAN community.
Abilities and talents can be found throughout the ASEAN region. At the same time,
opportunities to utilise these skills to their maximum potential are unevenly
distributed across countries and geographic locations due to differences in level and
rate of development and in economic structure. Skills mobility can make ASEAN a
region where a person’s place of birth does not constrain his/her economic
opportunities. 4. Skills mobility is closely associated with production of skills for the regional, global, and future labour
market. It is well known that employees of multinational corporations (MNCs), with work experience and socio-cultural-linguistic
and management skills sets honed by international and regional postings are widely sought after by corporations (both big and
small) seeking to venture or expand into new regional and international markets. A growing ASEAN labour force needs to be better
No single ASEAN economy can
educated and trained for the ongoing technological revolution and globalisation.
efficiently rely on domestic production of all the required skills. As in the case of goods production,
in the production of human capital there also exist comparative advantages and scale economies. There are large benefits to be
gained by cooperating in the production of human capital and expanding the talent pool beyond national borders. 5. Looking
towards 2040, ASEAN must consider the implications of the digital age for labour employment and mobility. E-commerce and other
e-services can be provided across borders without physical movement of providers, resulting in ‘virtual migration’. This would
include telemedicine, business process outsourcing and call centres, online education and fintech services. These service providers
can work in their home base without migrating. The increasing demand for virtual migrants would help to offset some of the
concerns of receiving and sending countries and migrant workers themselves regarding physical labour mobility. However, ASEAN
would need a framework governing the virtual employment of foreign workers. III. Skills Mobility in ASEAN – Existing Measures and
Challenges The importance of skills mobility is articulated in numerous ASEAN agreements and vision documents. The ASEAN
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint indicate that labour mobility is
considered an important part of the ASEAN integration project. In the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II in 2003, AMS are committed
to ‘facilitate movement of business persons, skilled labour, and talents’ for deeper economic integration. The AEC Blueprint in 2007
reflected this commitment by specifying key areas of collaboration amongst AMS, including the facilitation of working visas and the
harmonisation and standardisation of qualifications, including Mutual Recognition Arrangements for professionals (MRAs). The
ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons (AMNP) was signed in 2012 to enhance the flow of natural persons
engaging in trade in goods, services, and investment. In 2014, ASEAN Economic Ministers endorsed the ASEAN Qualification
Reference Framework (AQRF) to complement the MRAs by providing guidelines for comparing qualifications across member states,
with voluntary referencing. The AEC Blueprint 2025 reaffirms that facilitating the movement of skilled labour and business visitors is
a key element of a ‘highly integrated and cohesive ASEAN economy’ (AEC Blueprint, 2025). Current
practices in
ASEAN contain obstacles on the hiring of foreign skilled professionals by the private
sector and their ban in the public sector (with the notable exception of Singapore)
These include both formal and informal restrictions, including constitutional and legal
restrictions and labour market tests, onerous and time-consuming procedures and
various upfront payments. It would be helpful for employers and foreign workers if
these restrictions are liberalised and made transparent and the procedures simplified.
While the AEC Blueprint focuses on enhancing the flow of skilled and professionals, they account for less than 10% of intra-regional
labour flows, with Singapore the leading destination. The majority of intraregional migrants are middle- and low-skilled and irregular,
and are commonly found in construction, agriculture, and domestic work. There is no AEC coverage on them. ASEAN’s major
receiving countries are Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Malaysia and Thailand host millions of irregular workers from
neighbouring ASEAN countries. The ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, known
as the Cebu declaration, makes commitments to protect migrant workers, but this is non-binding. ASEAN has reaffirmed this by
signing the ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, but the commitments remain
voluntary (ASEAN Secretariat 2017). An assessment of the progress made by ASEAN in regional skilled labour mobility (Testaverde
et al., 2017) concluded that, notwithstanding the commitments and framework agreements that regional leaders place on this issue,
the slowness of actual implementation highlights the difficult political and regulatory landscape. The ASEAN agreements cover
skilled workers and professionals, but there are several gaps in its provisions. They facilitate the issuance of visas and employment
passes, and work to harmonise and standardise qualifications. However, most foreign skilled professionals are intra-corporate
transferees, AFAS and AMNP do not cover individual professionals and skilled workers, and MRAs cover only a small segment of
ASEAN professionals. AMS have signed MRAs in six areas: engineering, nursing, architecture, medicine, dentistry, and tourism and
framework agreements in surveying and accountancy. Conclusion and implementation of MRAs for professionals have been a long
and arduous process, in part due to ‘occupational protectionism’. There are genuine cross-country differences in what a
professional must know to practice, and automatic recognition of foreign qualifications and work experience is rare. Partial
recognition is usually possible with compensatory measures to bridge differences in training and quality standards and work
experience, but this can be difficult and highly sensitive. The implementation of MRAs is timeconsuming, technically demanding,
and sometimes politically difficult as a wide range of stakeholders are responsible for different aspects of the recognition process.
It requires support from the public and professional associations, which in turn rests on perceptions of benefits and threats pose by
foreign professionals. More importantly, MRAs do not guarantee labour market access, which is still subject to national laws,
regulations, and measures. The challenges to ASEAN skills mobility have been categorised by Papademetriou et al. (2015) as
follows: (i) Issues related to the recognition of credentials. (ii) Restrictions on hiring foreign workers in certain occupations and
industries, and on employment visas. (iii) Perceived costly barriers due to cultural, language, and socioeconomic differences. It is
necessary to overcome each of these challenges to achieve full skills mobility. The second challenge and part of the first challenge
can be achieved by reforming
the laws and regulations and following through on
commitments such as expanding MRAs on skills. However, a continuing challenge will require a positive
change in perceptions and behaviours of individuals and businesses surrounding labour mobility within ASEAN, which would in turn
influence people’s economic decisions to move. Without a serious effort to enhance ASEAN skills mobility, the region may lose its
talent to other parts of the world. ASEAN’s major sending countries are Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Viet Nam, with
major destinations in the Middle East, Europe, North America, and Australia–New Zealand rather than in ASEAN. It is important to
note the reasons behind the extra-ASEAN preference and strategise to make ASEAN an attractive destination region of choice for
skilled migrants. Rising job opportunities and wage levels, an increasingly open society that accepts foreigners, and an increasingly
better living environment can make the ASEAN region an increasingly attractive destination. IV. Benefits and Costs to Sending and
Receiving Countries and Migrant Workers Since labour market liberalisation is a politically sensitive issue, it is necessary to evaluate
the benefits and costs to ASEAN countries and workers. A. For Receiving Countries and Citizen Workers Affected Benefits include (i)
relaxing domestic shortages of general and specific skills; (ii) upgrading and developing specific sectors of the economy (e.g.,
educational, medical, and information technology services); (iii) attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign MNCs by
relaxing rules on intra-corporate transferees and business visitors; (iv) relaxing skill shortages faced particularly by small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as compared to large and foreign enterprises; (iv) encouraging the development of private
enterprise and entrepreneurship. Concerns
include (i) at the national level, countries and
communities may be concerned about overcrowding and upward price pressures from
increased demand for public spaces, housing, education, health and recreational
facilities, and the displacement of local SMEs and professionals by FDI and foreign
professionals; (ii) at the individual level, citizen workers may be concerned about job
displacement and retrenchment, competitive pressure from foreign workers and
dimmer prospects of job promotion. (iii) communities and individuals often cannot
make the distinction between job displacement due to technological change and due
to the entry of foreign firms and foreign workers. Receiving countries could provide
educational and training opportunities for foreign students to work after graduation;
minimise discrimination against the foreign workforce in various areas of public
policy; ensure the fair treatment of workers by employers; and provide better labour
market information on areas with skills shortages. Ultimately, ASEAN should aspire to be a region
characterised by the circulation of skills, with each country both receiving and sending skilled professionals in line with its economic
structure. B. For Sending Countries and Workers Seeking Foreign Employment Benefits include (i) reduced socio-political pressures
from a large pool of educated unemployed and underemployed persons; (ii) inward remittances contribute to improved household
incomes, and the balance of payments; (iii) mobility of labour (as well as tourism) improves knowledge, understanding, and
appreciation of ASEAN neighbours and is an excellent way of building an ASEAN Community. Concerns include: (i) brain drain,
although this can be offset by eventual returnees (and their skills, experience, and financial assets) and growing role of virtual
migration; (ii) concern over lack of protection of their rights and welfare of nationals working abroad; (iii) for individuals, migration
for work is largely an economic decision made by balancing the costs and benefits of seeking work abroad. Benefits include
opportunities for a better income and career advancement, to travel and gain work experience in a different environment, and in
some cases the opportunity to migrate permanently. Costs include financial, social, and psychological costs such as adapting to a
foreign environment, family disruptions, and the difficulty of re-integrating upon return. Sending countries could improve educational
standards, curricula, and the linguistic skills of potential migrant workers; seek recognition and accreditation of their degrees and
diplomas; improve knowledge and understanding of the cultures and social norms of other ASEAN countries; improve the provision
of information about the labour market in destination countries; facilitate exit procedures and minimise exit costs of obtaining
passport, visas, transportation, and accreditation; and troubleshoot problems and attend to the needs of its nationals abroad
through its embassies and labour attaches V. Lessons from the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union NAFTA and the EU have very different models of managing labour mobility and its interplay
with trade liberalisation, corresponding to each bloc’s economic and policy objectives. Their provisions offer useful lessons for the ASEAN labour mobility objective. A. NAFTA now defunct and replaced by the US, Canada, Mexico Agreement (USCMA) NAFTA
focused on trade integration, with relatively narrow provisions for skilled labour mobility. The NAFTA Treaty established a new migration category in the US available exclusively to workers from Mexico and Canada pursuing jobs in 70 highly skilled occupations (e.g.
accountants, architects, computer systems analysts, economists, engineers, hotel managers, etc.). The lack of a quota and an easier application process made the NAFTA Treaty visa more attractive than the US global H1-1B visa. However, NAFTA did not include
specific provisions to facilitate the movement of low-skilled labour. The US and Canada offered limited avenues for the legal temporary employment of foreign low-skilled workers. Applicants from Canada and Mexico with college degrees and job offers in the US
were eligible to apply and there was no numerical quota. Employment was for 3 years, and the visa was renewable indefinitely. Migrants could bring their dependents. Canadian applicants could apply on entry to the US with only proof of a job offer and proof of
education; there was no requirement for a labour market test in which employers certify that US workers were unavailable to fill positions. On the other hand, Mexican applicants must apply for the visa in Mexico and the employer must go undergo a labour market

test. B. The EU The

EU has broader integration objectives and guarantees the four
fundamental freedoms on movement of goods, services, capital, and workers. Citizens
of any EU country and their families have the right to live in any other EU country for up
to 3 months; after which they must be working, enrolled in full-time education, or able to
demonstrate financial independence. After 5 years of residence, they earn the right to permanent residence.
Citizens of any EU country are also generally permitted to work freely in the job and country of their
choosing. The EU has also implemented various policies to facilitate the movement of
workers of any skill level. These include mutual recognition of common forms of
documentation and relative streamlining of entry processes; and the portability across the EU of
various social rights and entitlements, including access to health care, social welfare, and pensions. In actuality, migration flows
have generally been rather subdued despite the accession of Central and Eastern Europe countries, possibly due to various other
barriers. Also, EU member countries may restrict access to their labour markets for public sector jobs and ‘in an emergency’ with
approval from the European Commission; and may impose temporary mobility restrictions on citizens of new EU members. Besides
direct policy, many supportive programmes facilitate movement within the EU. The Erasmus Programme began in 1987 as a student
exchange programme for Europeans, while the parallel Erasmus Mundus Programme is oriented towards non-Europeans. Erasmus
Plus (2014–2020), which succeeded Erasmus, incorporates all EU schemes for education, training youth, and sport. It provides
grants to give students and teachers or trainers a unique opportunity to participate in different European countries. Previously, these
opportunities were restricted to applicants who had completed at least 1 year of study at the tertiary level, but are now also available
to secondary school students. Participants study at least 3 months or do an internship for a period of at least 2 months and up to 1
academic year in another European country. The period spent abroad is recognised by their university when they return. Students do
not pay extra tuition fees to the host institution and can apply for an Erasmus grant through the home institution to help cover the
additional expenses of living abroad. Millions of European students in thousands of higher education institutions participate in
Erasmus across 37 European countries. The main benefit of the programme is that it fosters learning and understanding of the host
country, as both a time for learning and a chance to socialise and bond with other European students. Similarly, the Bologna
Process is based on an intergovernmental agreement with membership extended beyond the EU. The 1999 Bologna Declaration
committed 29 European governments to pursue complementary higher education reforms and establish a European Higher
Education Area of compatible national systems. Participation and cooperation are voluntary. Bilateral agreements between
countries and institutions oblige signatories to recognise each other’s degrees, moving from strict convergence in time spent on
qualifications towards a competency-based system. National reforms have made university qualifications more easily comparable
across Europe. Country scorecards (reports, conferences, communiqués, and policy declarations) are closely monitored at the
European-level and structured around a series of biennial ministerial meetings. The European Commission has played an active role
in this process. The EU Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS), first piloted within the Erasmus networks, has become the
European standard. The European Commission also provides financial incentives for higher education cooperation and reform
projects in line with the Bologna objectives, as well as funding national Bologna Promoters, and informational activities. It also
promoted joint degrees and the bachelor/master structure through its Erasmus Mundus programme and other pilot studies.
Likewise, the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) aims to relate different national qualifications systems to a common
European reference framework. Individuals and employers use the EQF to understand and compare more easily the qualification
levels of different countries and education and training systems. This means that there is no need for individuals to repeat this
learning when migrating. The core of the EQF comprises eight reference levels (1–8) describing what a learner knows, understands,
and is able to do (‘learning outcomes’). Levels of national qualifications are placed at one of the central reference levels. This makes
it much easier to compare national qualifications. ECTS credits are a standard means of comparing the ‘volume of learning based
on the defined learning outcomes and their associated workload’ for higher education across the EU and collaborating European
countries (European Commission, 2017: 10). ECTS credits are used to facilitate transfer and progression throughout the EU. VI. The
Role of ASEAN in Regional Skills Mobility and Development 1. Emphasise the welfare gains from ASEAN skilled labour mobility The
economic benefits of cross-border labour mobility are numerous. For destination countries, positive impacts include better
employment opportunities and higher wages for workers; however, low-skilled workers could have negative impacts in rigid labour
markets. For sending countries, out-migration boost wages for those remaining behind, migrant workers benefit from higher wages
received, and their households benefit from remittances. Overall, there are economic benefits from improved economic growth and
from remittances. The negative effects of ‘brain drain’ in sending countries are offset by ‘brain circulation’ and eventual returnees.
The EU and NAFTA experiences indicate that intra-regional skills mobility remains limited even in the absence of legal and policy
barriers. The same may hold true in the ASEAN region. Additionally, when skills migration takes place, a preference for non-ASEAN
There
destinations may emerge, linked to permanent migration to North America, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.
is a need to emphasise the benefits of working in another ASEAN country , which
include closeness to home and cultural similarities; diversity of work, linguistic, and
cultural experiences, which can enhance soft skills; and the facilitation of ASEAN-
community building. Familiarity with other ASEAN countries can be enhanced by intra-ASEAN student and staff
exchanges and tourism. For employers, businesses, and professional groups, more exchanges and cooperation promote business
activities and intra-ASEAN FDI and services, leading to the employment and re-deployment of staff who are ASEAN nationals. 2.
Incentives to attract ASEAN foreign professionals and skills as well as safeguarding the interests of citizen workers The key
advantages of ASEAN destinations include closeness to home and less pronounced sociocultural diversities relative to destinations
in North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. It
is necessary to minimise visa procedures and
labour market access restrictions so that ASEAN professionals can access better
employment and income opportunities in the region. ASEAN migration should also
entail less financial and time costs of labour mobility and family disruptions. ASEAN can also
provide a centralised database of job market information. To attract foreign skills and talents, policy and practice should provide a
welcoming environment, including availability and competitive cost of housing, transport and education, competitive taxation rates,
portable social security plans, ease of sending remittances overseas, and a safe and unpolluted living and working environment. For
skills and talent seeking eventual migration and permanent settlement, availability of permanent residence schemes is an important
attraction. Governments are elected by citizens, hence concerns over foreign competition should be addressed in parallel to the
welcome mat for foreigners, and that the foreign presence should not undermine social cohesion. In all countries, employment of
nationals has priority over employment of foreigners but such ‘protectionism’ should not lead to shortages of skilled personnel that
ultimately prevent the country from achieving its economic growth and upgrading potential and fail to enhance the wellbeing of its
citizenry. Policy and practice would have to ensure that citizen workers have developed technical, social and linguistic skill sets that
enable them to compete effectively with foreigners within their country or abroad. Policy and practice would also have to ensure
that citizen workers are not discriminated in the recruitment, employment and promotion processes of private sector employers. .
Accelerate the ASEAN-wide accreditation system for universities and training institutions The process of comparing and
recognising academic and training credentials within a country is complex enough but the issue becomes even more problematic
and sensitive across the 10 diverse ASEAN countries. To hire a foreign skilled worker or professional from another ASEAN country,
the prospective employer must assess the merits of the paper qualification and work experience. For top-end jobs, employers can
resort to expensive head-hunting recruitment agencies. But for lower-level jobs, an ASEAN-wide accreditation of education and
training institutions would be a tremendous help to employers in their assessment of suitable candidates for employment and
promotion. 4. Providing an equal opportunity for developing relevant skillsets An individual born anywhere in ASEAN needs to be
given equal opportunity to develop skill sets that are in demand in the region. At the national level, this means a comprehensive
education and training system available to all. Financing and finding the teachers put tremendous strain on low-income countries
and policymakers will need to prioritise and seek foreign assistance (in ASEAN, amongst ASEAN dialogue partners, international
and regional institutions). It is essential that the education and training process results in the production of marketable skill-sets,
embodying some quality-standard and relevance to the present economic structure of the country as well as its future evolution.
While expanding the enrolment and scope of tertiary institutions, all ASEAN countries would need to improve the quality dimension
of its institutions so that they can eventually compete with the best in the world. In this respect, the Singapore experience may offer
some useful lessons for some ASEAN countries. Singapore’s school system has been producing students that achieve high
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test scores run by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and Singapore’s leading universities are ranked by various international ranking agencies as amongst the best
in Asia. Also, Singapore’s education and training system is being revamped to prepare students for the technological requirements
of future jobs. Singapore has achieved this level of educational excellence through continuous effort in developing Singapore’s
human resources, learning from the best institutions and examples the world has to offer, entering into partnerships with
worldrenowned institutions, and recruiting from the world’s best from the advanced industrial countries, China and India to teach
and research in its universities, research institutes, and training centres. The Singapore education and training system is currently
being revamped to meet the future job requirements brought on by technological changes. At the ASEAN regional level, this offers
tremendous opportunity for cooperation and integration in a win-win framework. ASEAN countries that are more educationally
advanced, with educational and training institutions of international standing and repute, could build physical campuses in other
ASEAN countries and also offer online education (currently undertaken in the ASEAN region mainly by non-ASEAN universities and
colleges). 5. Develop strong regional consciousness through travel and study experiences Migration and interest in migration often
begin when individuals are studying abroad, and many ASEAN students who study overseas remain abroad for work experience and
opportunities. There is more limited student movement amongst ASEAN countries, in part due to a dearth of scholarships and
financial assistance schemes, and a lower profile of ASEAN tertiary educational institutions. Therefore, ASEAN should encourage
student exchange through the ASEAN University Network (AUN), and Singapore’s ASEAN scholarships, amongst others. This can be
achieved by improving the global rankings of ASEAN universities and training institutes. 6. Manage a gradual approach towards
ASEAN labour mobility and integration Given the diversity of the AMS, ASEAN should adopt a more gradual approach towards an
integrated ASEAN skilled labour market. Ideally, a regional framework based on binding bilateral agreements would be preferable,
perhaps within a subset of AMS. Such an ‘ASEAN minus X’ approach would provide some flexibility. However, a voluntary regional
approach may be appropriate to accommodate the diverse sensitivities in ASEAN. A more inclusive and equitable ASEAN and AEC
could emphasise regional and bilateral cooperation instead of binding integration agreements. AMS have different priorities and
face different socioeconomic realities. However, when political leaders and policymakers formulate and implement national visions,
plans, and policies, they should also consider impacts on other ASEAN countries and, whenever and wherever possible, adopt
positive-sum, not zero-sum, strategies. The ASEAN body need to take a leadership role in driving the discussion around mobility.
However, countries at the top end of economic development (Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) could also play a more pro-active
role in driving skills mobility and development. VII. Concluding Summary Due to demographic, economic, social, and technological
changes in the ASEAN region and globally, ASEAN needs to move forward with skills mobility to build competitive and knowledge-
driven economies. This will help maintain a united ASEAN and will contribute towards ASEAN centrality. A single ASEAN market for
skills and talent will require free movement for various occupations and non-discriminatory treatment for foreign workers in national
legislations and policies, employment practices, employment remuneration and benefits, and common quality assurance and
qualifications recognition. A single ASEAN market for skills and talents by 2040 pre-supposes the establishment of a single market
for goods and services in ASEAN. A single market for goods appears more likely than a single market for services as services
delivery requires Mode 3 (right of establishment) and Mode 4 (temporary movement of natural persons). Mode 4 covers contractual
service suppliers (self-employed independent service suppliers and employees of foreign service suppliers), intra-corporate
transferees and persons directly recruited by the foreign affiliate, and service sellers or persons responsible for setting up a
commercial presence. While intra-corporate transferees are well taken care of with the liberalisation of FDI, liberalising Mode 4
would take care of other service suppliers as well. Service-market integration will complement the skilled labour-market integration.
The digital age makes possible virtual migration with an important impact on ASEAN skilled labour mobility. Many more services are
being delivered online with short visits by service suppliers, and do not require the physical movement of service suppliers. This
would remove some of the concerns over overcrowding or sociocultural disruptions by an influx of in-migrants (although the same
is felt about large influxes of tourists) and concerns over brain drain caused by large outflows of the skilled. The economic
importance of labour market integration cannot be overstated. Yet, it is necessary not to integrate hastily and acknowledge political
and social concerns. First, a liberalised skills market, coupled with a strong push towards upskilling of the domestic labour force,
can be an effective strategy for achieving rapid growth without leaving anyone behind. Second, given the vast differences amongst
ASEAN countries in geographic and population sizes and in levels of economic development and wage incomes, free movement of
all labour is politically unrealistic. Third, many ASEAN countries are still engaged in post-independence nation building and are
struggling with managing plural societies and may not welcome more cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity. Some are looking
outward beyond ASEAN. Some are internally divided and prioritise national cohesion over regional cohesion. There are also growing
concerns related to security and terrorism prompting stricter immigration controls. A concerted effort is needed to instil a sense of
common destiny amongst ASEAN countries. Moving forward, AMS could agree on an ASEAN-wide framework for governing the
movement of skilled workers, with provisions for bilateral (preferably binding) agreements between AMS to operationalise the
framework. Such bilateral agreements could be gradually expanded to cover ASEAN as a whole so that the region can achieve
meaningful skills mobility.

That escalates every existential threat – nuclear war, global warming, and
mass structural violence
Gregory 19 [Madeleine Gregory, "Nationalism Is an Environmental Disaster," VICE, 10-2-
2019, https://www.vice.com/en/article/xwe4vz/nationalism-is-an-environmental-
disaster] //marlborough-oo/
Blind nationalism is the enemy of the environment. Consider President Donald Trump's infamous expanding border wall, a
physical manifestation of the current administration's xenophobic, blatantly racist nationalism. The wall's intended purpose—to
exclude people from Latin America from this country—likely won’t be achieved. Many undocumented immigrants are already in this
country, and a wall won't solve the problems that xenophobes claim they're worried about. It also won’t keep out the majority of
will do, besides serve as a
undocumented immigrants, those who overstay work visas rather than hop the border. What it
monument to cruelty, is divide populations of animal species, fragment and degrade ecosystems, and
bulldoze landmark environmental measures in the name of national security. A 2005 law called the Real ID Act
gives U.S. Customs and Border Protection the authority to waive pretty much any law at the border in the name of national security.
It's through this law that environmental protections are ignored to build Trump's wall. “Science has generated enough information to
say beyond doubt that the wall has, will have, and has had a negative effect on wildlife and ecosystems,” said Mexican conservation
biologist Rurik List. List was one of the signatories of a 2018 BioScience article decrying the wall. The article had more than 2,000
scientist signatures, including well-known biologists E.O. Wilson and Michael Soulé. Blind nationalism’s harm to the
environment doesn’t stop at the wall: It can incite conflict with serious environmental side effects, hinder global climate
action, spell doom for wildlife, and facilitates eco-fasicsm—the marriage of extreme racism with paltry
environmentalism. “Usually when something impacts the environment, there’s a large chunk of mitigation money to restore habitats
or protect alternative habitat. Those mitigation dollars [are] drying up or not being offered at all,” said Dan Millis, an organizer with
the Sierra Club Borderlands group. “People are treating the most vibrant areas of our country like a sacrifice zone.” Disrupting
borderlands research By building a wall and straining international relations, blind nationalism stymies
research in the borderlands. The basic function of science is knowledge sharing, a tradition that scientists from the
U.S. and Mexico have long taken part in to achieve environmental goals; scientists have collaborated across the borderlands, and
lawmakers in the U.S., Mexico, Canada, and other nations have signed joint treaties to protect migratory species. Our countries are
inextricably physically connected, divided only by an arbitrary border that no animal, plant, or ecosystem respects. The borderlands
form the bridge between the Rockies above and the tropics below. Erecting a wall (nationalism) could functionally end much of the
cooperation—or, at least, make collaboration much more difficult—to understand this transition zone, where many different species
and ecosystems meet. Trump's border wall would end American return of jaguar “Scientists are encountering real challenges doing
research near the border because there’s so much security,” said Jennie Miller, a senior scientist at the conservation non-profit
Defenders of Wildlife and another signatory of the BioScience border wall article. “If they can’t do research, we won’t be able to
document what the border wall is doing to the ecosystem.” Having data on such a unique ecosystem is particularly important when
facing the climate crisis, where understanding ecosystem response to climate change is pivotal in further protecting nature. Climate
change is forcing many species to move to find more suitable habitats, which is far more difficult with a wall in the way. Stopping
Nationalism’s potential for environmental hazard scales all the way up to planet-wide
international climate action
existential risk. Climate change is a global problem that affects every aspect of our world. Disputes over water
rights, endangered species, natural disasters, land development, changing weather patterns: these could
lead to wars, displace millions of people, and cause mass extinction of species. Having neighboring
countries with contradictory and self-serving environmental protections can spell trouble for addressing the climate crisis. Many
countries still see reducing emissions as an economic sacrifice, one they don’t want to
make if any other countries aren't following the program. That’s why the 2015 Paris Agreement was so
pivotal—every major world power agreed to work on climate action together. Trump’s decision to pull out of the deal in the name of
putting "America first" is exactly the kind of blind nationalism that acts against every major environmental goal. “Nationalistic views
are pure ignorance,” List said. “We must act globally because climate change affects the whole world.” Nationalism, war,
and eco-fascism Yet another facet of nationalism's negative environmental effects is war. Nationalism breeds
conflict, and conflict is bad for the environment. Conflict requires intensive resource extraction, can degrade
ecosystems, and can contaminate the environment. Military vehicles contaminate both the air and water of warzones, for example,
impacting the local region and feeding climate change. Environmental destruction has also been used as a war tactic. For example,
If nuclear
from 1965 to 1971, the US sprayed nearly 4,000 kilometres squared of Vietnamese land with herbicides.
weapons get involved, radiation contamination can severely degrade ecosystem health,
threatening the lives of humans and other animals. Already, some far-right groups have chosen to marry
violence and xenophobia with a kind of warped environmentalism. Two recent mass shooters have espoused eco-fascism, an
ideology that essentially uses the impending climate catastrophe as a backdrop to spread extreme racism. Eco-fascism
scapegoats immigrants for environmental degradation while letting profiteering corporations and the
governments that prop them up off the hook. This is hardly environmentalism’s first brush with racism, but eco-fascism’s growing
strength and capacity to incite violence cast those oft-overlooked prejudices in a fresh light. Not only is this marriage between
environmentalism, nationalism, and violence destructive and disturbing, it’s also misguided. Environmentalism necessitates that
humans act as part of ecosystems and international networks, while nationalism and eco-fascism entrench anthropocentrism and
strengthen borders. As we begin to feel the effects of climate change more acutely, relocating people out of potential disaster
zones is critical. If every border becomes a wall, these planned retreats will be a logistical and human rights nightmare. Our world is
simultaneously more connected and more divided than it ever has been. Those divisions, if weaponized, will continue to drive us
towards climate crisis and human misery. That connectivity, if utilized, is our best shot at a livable world.
 DA—China
ASEAN structurally boosts the Chinese econ – any boost to ASEAN econ
helps Chinese econ
Fung 22 [Doris Fung, former senior economist at the Hong Kong Trade Development Council,
HKTDC Research, Analysis and News – Analysis, “The Growing China-ASEAN Economic Ties”,
https://research.hktdc.com/en/article/OTUxMzk0NDE0, 1/7/22, Accessed 12/30/22]
OM
China and the ASEAN region are geographically close, and in recent years, as their
economies flourished, a long-term steady bilateral trade relationship has been built.
Following the signing of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China in 2002, the ASEAN-
China Free Trade Area was rolled out in 2010. It is the first of its kind that China has
negotiated with foreign countries. Under these initiatives, bilateral trade has expanded
rapidly as tariffs have been lowered and investment markets liberalised between the
two parties.
Since 2009, mainland China has overtaken the US and Europe to become ASEAN’s largest

trading partner. According to the ASEAN Secretariat, the total value of trade in goods between China
and ASEAN in 2020 reached US$516.9 billion, accounting for about a quarter (24.7%) of ASEAN’s foreign trade, up
from 15.3% in 2009. In 2019, ASEAN overtook the European Union of 27 member states (EU -27) for

the first time to become China’s largest trading partner, accounting for 14.7% of the
mainland’s total trade in 2020. Among the 10 ASEAN countries, Vietnam’s trade with China has been on the rise in recent years,
with its share in China-ASEAN trade climbing from 10.3% in 2010, to 19.4% in 2015, and to 28.1% in 2020. Trailing Vietnam are Malaysia (19.2%),
Thailand (14.4%) and Singapore (13%), with China’s trade with these four countries accounting for 74.7% of the total between China and ASEAN.

As trading activities between China and ASEAN increase, mainland investments are
being attracted to the ASEAN market. According to the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, at
the end of 2015, of the top 20 countries in China’s outward FDI stock, four were ASEAN members. This number rose to six by the end of 2020 –
Singapore (5th position), Indonesia (8th), Malaysia (16th), Laos (17th), Thailand (19th) and Vietnam (20th).

China has gradually become one of the leading investors in the ASEAN region in recent
years. According to the ASEAN Secretariat, in 2020 mainland China’s FDI flow to the region amounted to US$7.62 billion, accounting for 6.7% of the
total FDI absorbed by ASEAN (not including intra-ASEAN investment), and ranking the fourth-largest FDI source after the US, Hong Kong and Japan. Of
the total amount of investment made by China in ASEAN in the past five years, 24% flowed to financial and insurance activities, 21% to real estate,
followed by the manufacturing industry (16.2%), wholesale and retail trade (13.1%), and construction (6%).

China’s econ growth is directly correlated with its emissions

Edwards 21 Laura Edwards 9-3-2021 "4 Things To Know About China’s Climate
Approach" https://www.americanprogress.org/article/4-things-know-chinas-climate-
approach/ (program associate for China policy with the National Security and
International Policy team at the Center for American Progress.)//Elmer recut OM
3. China emits more carbon per unit of GDP and almost as much per capita as developed
economies There are several ways to measure a country’s carbon emissions, which can help analysts better understand the economic
structure of carbon emissions and could have implications for future trade regimes. One way is to calculate emissions per

capita. A second is to measure the amount of carbon emissions generated per unit of
gross domestic product (GDP), also known as carbon intensity. The Chinese government has previously
argued that its emissions per capita were much lower than those of developed countries; indeed, China’s massive population

and late development meant that the country’s per capita emissions were once much
lower than those of the United States and other developed countries. However, China’s per
capita emissions have nearly tripled over the past 20 years, and the country is closing the gap with OECD
nations. In 2019, China’s emissions clocked in at 10.1 tons per capita compared with 10.5 tons per capita for OECD countries, although the United

China’s carbon intensity has

States continues to have much higher emissions per capita at 17.6 tons. That said,

historically been much higher than that of both the United States and OECD countries,
and it remains so as of at least 2018. According to Climate Watch, in 2018, China emitted 695 tons of
carbon per $1 million dollars of GDP, compared with the United States’ 230 tons and the
OECD’s 214 tons—almost three times as much carbon per unit of GDP. While China has made some
progress on lowering its carbon intensity—more than halving it since 2008—it still emits significantly more

carbon per dollar of GDP than the United States. Carbon intensity may become increasingly
important as the United States and European Union discuss carbon border adjustment
mechanisms (CBAMs) to curb carbon leakage from high-emitting countries. Average carbon
intensity of industries in exporting countries such as China could be used as a basis of calculating fees for a future U.S. CBAM. While the numbers
above show China’s average economic carbon intensity, many individual Chinese industries—including aluminum and steel—also have significantly
higher carbon intensity than their U.S. counterparts or other exporters.

Climate change cannot be solved without China reducing its econ growth
Brown 21 [David Brown, Senior Journalist for BBC News, BBC News “Why China’s
climate policy matters to us all” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
57483492 10/29/21, Accessed on 12/30/22] OM
China's carbon emissions are vast and growing, dwarfing those of other countries.
Experts agree that without big reductions in China's emissions, the world cannot win the
fight against climate change. In 2020, China's President Xi Jinping said his country would aim for its emissions to reach their
highest point before 2030 and for carbon neutrality before 2060. His statement has now been confirmed as China's official position ahead of the

Explosive growth While

COP26 global climate summit in Glasgow. But China has not said exactly how these goals will be achieved.

all countries face problems getting their emissions down, China is facing the biggest
challenge. Per person, China's emissions are about half those of the US, but its huge 1.4
billion population and explosive economic growth have pushed it way ahead of any
other country in its overall emissions. China became the world's largest emitter of
carbon dioxide in 2006 and is now responsible for more than a quarter of the world's
overall greenhouse gas emissions. It is expected to come under intense scrutiny at the COP26 summit over its commitments
to reduce these. Along with all the other signatories to the Paris Agreement in 2015, China agreed to make changes to try to keep global warming at
1.5C above pre-industrial levels, and "well below" 2C. China strengthened its commitments in 2020, but Climate Action Tracker, an international group
of scientists and policy experts say its current actions to meet that goal are "highly insufficient".
Warming causes extinction
Xu 17 (Yangyang Xu 17, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M
University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and
Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California,
San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to
catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323) OM
We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than
1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in
excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not
experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the
population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming
levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the

Our criteria for extending the risk

language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C.

category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate
system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of
catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have

concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as

the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the
North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African

monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible
climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49). Warming of such magnitudes also has
catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such
as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events
(defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat
stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that,
currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a
threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to

heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat
and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost
74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to
humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air
conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary

markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question
of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope,

there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who
are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5%
compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose

livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy
floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely

with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been
estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C

(54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species

extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current
rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction

warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity

in the coming decades (56). Global

due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the

dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction,

biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us
to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats.
Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).
 PIC—Thailand
PIC: Do the aff except for Thailand

Border control necessary in ASEAN member state Thailand. Manyin et al

3.
Mark Manyin (Specialist in Asian Affairs at Congressional Research Service, BA from Tufts in International Relations),
11-8-2003, " Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress," Navy Department
Library, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/t/terrorism-in-
southeast-asia.html // ADin
For months after the discovery of the Jemaah Islamiyah network, Thai officials
emphatically denied mounting evidence that Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah members
operate in their country or that militant Thai Muslim secessionist groups have ties to
foreign terrorist networks.36 New evidence has surfaced that Thailand's public denials
were used as a cover for close, covert counter-terrorism cooperation between the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency and Thailand's Counter Terrorism Center (CTIC), which
was established in early 2001 to provide better cooperation among Thailand's main
security agencies. The CIA reportedly has assigned approximately 20 agents to the
CTIC and in 2002 provided between $10 million and $15 million to the center. Acting on
CIA intelligence, the CTIC took the lead in capturing Hambali, and also has captured a
number of other suspected JI operatives.37 President Bush's summit with Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra seemed to indicate that U.S.-Thai anti-terrorist cooperation
has been close; the two leaders announced their intent to launch negotiations on a
bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and President Bush announced his decision to
designate Thailand as a major non-NATO ally in recognition of its support of the U.S.
war against terrorism.
Bangkok publicly embraced a more active anti-terrorist campaign in May and June
2003, when Prime Minister Thaksin's government announced the arrest of three Thais in
the southern province of Narathiwat for allegedly planning to bomb Western embassies
in Bangkok -- including the U.S. embassy -- and Thai beach resorts popular among
Western tourists. The arrests, which were announced while Thaksin was in the United
States for a summit with President Bush, came a week after three Thais from a Wahabi
sect were arrested on terrorism charges in Cambodia. Another Cambodian Muslim
arrested in June 2003 had spent the previous three years studying in southern Thailand.
Thai officials said the arrests showed that foreign-linked terrorist groups have set up
cells in Thailand's predominantly Muslim southern provinces.38 Islamic secessionist
groups have operated in Thailand's Muslim majority southern provinces for decades,
though violent attacks by Islamic militants largely disappeared in the years following the
passage of the 1997 constitution, which granted the provinces greater autonomy over
local affairs.
Evidence demonstrating increased Islamic terrorist activity in Thailand had been
mounting since late 2001. Confessions of detained Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah
suspects indicate that the groups use Thailand as a base for holding meetings, setting
up escape routes, acquiring arms, and laundering money. In January 2002, Hambali is
reported to have convened a meeting of the networks' operatives in southern Thailand
at which the group decided to target "softer" targets such as the nightclubs in Bali that
were attacked in October 2002. A number of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah figures,
including convicted World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef, have taken advantage
of lax border controls and tourist-friendly visa requirements to flee to Thailand to
escape arrest in other Southeast Asian countries.39 Under interrogation, captured Al
Qaeda operative Omar al-Farouq reportedly has confessed to his attempts to cooperate
with Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani, a small separatist group in Thailand whose
founder fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan.40 One prominent anti-terrorism
expert has called attention to a previously unknown underground network, called
Jemaah Salafiya, that allegedly is affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah.41
Additionally, Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah members reportedly have purchased
weapons on Thailand's large black market in arms. Fears that radioactive contraband
has entered the Thai open market were heightened in June 2003, when Thai and U.S.
agents worked together to arrest a Thai citizen for trying to sell 30kg of cesium-137, a
substance used for medical purposes that could be attached to conventional explosives
for use in a "dirty bomb." Reportedly, the arrested individual has confessed to smuggling
the cesium into Thailand from Laos, where some authorities believe more is being
hidden.42 Finally, the confluence of these confessions with a sudden surge of violent
attacks in 2002 in Thailand's southern provinces worried some terrorism experts that
Islamic militants had become reenergized.43
 PIC—Malaysia
PIC: Do the aff except for Malaysia

Malaysia uniquely needs stronger borders because of its history as a

terrorist hub. Nasir et al 20.
Amalina Abdul Nasir (Research Analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism, a specialist
unit in S.Rajaratnam School of Internaitonal Studies), 11-24-2020, " Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Implications for
Malaysia’s Border Security," Middle East Initiative, https://www.mei.edu/publications/foreign-terrorist-fighters-
implications-malaysias-border-security // ADin
The COVID-19 pandemic has become the center of discussion globally including in the
realm of counter-terrorism. As governments around the world continue to deal with the
pandemic, the world must not lose sight of the ongoing threat of returning Islamic State
(IS) foreign terrorist fighters from Syria. Today, countries in Southeast Asia are gradually
reopening their borders for international travel.[1] This would mean that repatriation
efforts of fighters may soon resume. As foreign fighters and their families scour for
places to seek refuge, Malaysia may inadvertently turn out to be an attractive
destination given the country’s visa-waiver program; the porousness of the tri-border
region of Sabah, Indonesia, and the Philippines; and insider threats. In the past,
terrorists have capitalized on these vulnerabilities. Given the country’s susceptibility
to being used as a terrorist safe haven and platform for staging trans-border terrorist
attacks, Malaysian authorities need to strengthen and improve existing measures
aimed at countering terrorist infiltration.
The Pivot to Malaysia
Malaysia’s repatriation policy with respect to foreign fighters differs from those of
Indonesia and the Philippines.[2] Malaysia extends offers of repatriation to its citizens
who have fought in Syria on the condition that upon return they undergo a month-long
rehabilitation program. Experts have questioned the efficacy of this program, as a
number of high-profile militants such as Yazid Sufaat and Rafi Udin who participated in
it showed little sign of rehabilitation and engaged in recidivist behavior.[3]
Indonesia and the Philippines — like many Western countries — have decided to seal
their borders, barring their citizens from return.[4] Although there are no clear figures
reported on the number of Filipinos in Syria, as many as 689 Indonesians remain there.
[5] With the situation in the refugee camps getting worse, these displaced persons are
trying to find their way home. They very well might seek to exploit Malaysia’s
vulnerabilities, using the country as a gateway to return home.
Meanwhile, Malaysia itself is worryingly becoming a safe haven. As local terror
networks ramp up recruitment efforts, it becomes an added pull factor for regional
fighters to find their way home, rejoin local cells to regroup and recalibrate their
strengths.[6] The threat posed by returnees to Malaysia is not limited to domestic
returning fighters and those from the regional countries. It is further compounded by
displaced global Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) who are also desperately trying to
relocate. FTFs may relocate to Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines due to the
strong and visible footprint of Islamist terrorism after the siege of Marawi.[7]
An Easy Pass into Malaysia
One of the longest standing issues with Malaysia’s border security is its visa-waiver
program, which allows foreigners to enter Malaysia easily. It has been one of the main
reasons for the country being regarded as a safe haven, transit point, and logistics hub
by terrorist groups.[8] The United States Department of State Country Reports on
Terrorism 2019 stated that Malaysia remained a “source, transit point, and, to a
significantly lesser extent, destination country for terrorist groups including ISIS, Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG), al-Qa’ida, and Jemaah Islamiya.”[9] Malaysia has also been used
as a transit point for IS fighters planning to enter Southern Philippines.
Free from visa requirements, foreigners, especially those posing security threats, can
conveniently move in and out of the country without suspicion or raising alarms. This is
a weakness that should be neither ignored nor underestimated. A case in point was
when the country was visited on multiple occasions between 1995 and 2002 by several
of the masterminds and perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. As
mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report by The National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, the mastermind of the attacks, Khalid Sheikh
Muhammad himself, had traveled to Malaysia several times.[10] On several occasions,
he dispatched other operatives to meet Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operative,
Riduan Isammudin, also known as Hambali.[11] In addition, Malaysia, where JI’s
headquarters was then located, was frequented by Al-Qaeda operatives to do their
“homework” (i.e., to learn about security and immigration systems at airports).
The 9/11 Commission Report also highlighted the fact that in 1999, four of the 9/11
attackers — Tawfiq bin Attash (Khallad), Abu Bara al-Yemeni, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and
Khalid al-Mihdhar — had been sent to Kuala Lumpur before heading for the United
States. Apart from making Malaysia merely a transit point, two of them stayed longer to
study “airport security and conduct casing flights” (flights to determine targets).[12]
Khallad opined that “Malaysia was an ideal destination because its government did not
require citizens of Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states to have a visa.”[13] In fact,
Malaysia’s security has always been “reputed to be lax” within jihadist circles.[14]
Despite ample documentation that Malaysia’s openness was duly exploited by Al-Qaeda
in the planning of one of the most lethal attacks in history, little improvements appear to
have been made to Malaysia’s border security. Today, Malaysia is often chosen as a
connecting point for IS’ supporters traveling to and from countries such as Turkey, and
is a gateway for foreign terrorist fighters to enter Southeast Asia.[15] In fact, from 2013
to 2019, as many as 38 foreign terrorist fighters were arrested after having exploited
Malaysia’s visa-waiver policy and thereby having gained the ability to use the country as
a transit point.[16]
In other instances, the policy has allowed terrorists to make Malaysia a safe haven and
logistics hub. In 2019, Malaysian security services arrested five Egyptian nationals who
were alleged to be members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood planning to carry out
large-scale attacks in the country.[17] The cell had provided logistical support and
facilitated the movement of a number of members of the North African-based terror
group, Ansar al-Sharia.[18] Members of Ansar al-Sharia carrying fake passports had
made Malaysia a transit point before entering a third country to launch attacks.[19]
Porous Maritime Borders in the Tri-Border Area
The Tri-Border Area (TBA) comprising Malaysia’s eastern state of Sabah, Philippines,
and Indonesia in the Sulu and Celebes Seas has witnessed rampant activities of
terrorism, kidnappings, armed robbery, smuggling and other illegal maritime activities.
Between 2018 and 2020, there were 40 kidnapping attempts off the waters of Sabah.
[20] The TBA has long been a hotspot for militant groups, including Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).[21]
Filipino security expert Prof. Rommel Banlaoi highlights the fact that Sabah and the city
of Manado in northeast Sulawesi remain important “backdoor” channels into Mindanao.
[22] Sabah has been the location of choice as it shares historical roots with Mindanao
dating back to the Sulu Sultanate in the 17th century. Terrorists have continued to utilize
travel networks that have been formed through traditional movements of people
between Sabah and Mindanao. During the siege of Marawi in 2017, Malaysian IS-ASG
cell leader, Dr. Mahmud Ahmad used Sabah as a transit point to channel militants into
Marawi.[23]
Indonesian fighters have also made use of Sabah as a transit point into Philippines by
means of “rat paths” that exist in the jungles between Malaysia and Indonesia in the
Kalimantan border area.[24] The route through Sandakan in Sabah is preferred as it
allows for shorter sea travel to Mindanao as compared to Sulawesi.
 PIC/Consult/Mega CP—Singapore
CP: ASEAN member states, except the Republic of Singapore, should
open borders to other ASEAN member states for human migration. The
Republic of Singapore should close its borders to other ASEAN member
states. ASEAN member states should bring disputes against the Republic
of Singapore, claiming that the lack of “open borders between member
states through the implementation of a Schengen-style policy for visa-
free travel between ASEAN member states” violates ASEAN commitments
to free movement. ASEAN member states should use the 2019 ASEAN
Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism to request
arbitration by the panel to resolve the disputes. The panel should rule that
ASEAN member states are required to implement open borders via a
Schengen-style policy for visa-free travel between ASEAN member states.
ASEAN member states should implement and enforce the panel’s
decisions.

2019 revisions have created an opening to revive ASEAN’s EDSM by

resolving bureaucratic deficiencies but actual usage is still uncertain
because the mechanism has never been used – no country wants to use
an untested settlement mechanism, which the CP solves by
demonstrating an effective resolution through the EDSM.
Sim 20 Edmund W. Sim [Appleton Luff], ASEAN Further Enhances Its Dispute
Settlement Mechanism, 7 INDON. J. INT'l & COMP. L. 279
(2020).https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/indjicl7&div=16&g_sent=
1&casa_token=&collection=journals SM
With the adoption of its Charter in 2007, the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) committed itself to a more rules-based approach for its operations.1 This was
necessary for ASEAN and its ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) to compete
effectively for foreign investment and trade with China and India, which already have
well-established systems. As a relatively young regional integration initiative of 10
members with diverse legal and political systems, many of whom are also relatively new
countries, applying a rules-based approach to economic integration remains
challenging. 2
Dispute settlement is a fundamental aspect of any rules-based system. Uncertainty
about the ability to enforce rights and obligations provided in a legal system devalues
those rights. In other words, economic actors need dispute settlement procedures , even
if not necessarily used, to ensure that their economic and political bargains will be
honored. Recognizing this, the E.U., through its supranational court system, and the
U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA, the successor to the former North American
Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA), through its arbitration panels, provide for such
dispute settlement.
Although the ASEAN system provides for dispute settlement, it is not fully developed as
an institution. The current primary mechanism for dispute resolution regarding
economic agreements in ASEAN is the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute
Settlement Mechanism adopted in 2004 (hereinafter "EDSM 2004").3 The EDSM 2004 is
modelled after the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU), 4 and indeed many parts of the EDSM 2004 appear to have been taken verbatim
from the DSU. For example, the EDSM 2004 substitutes the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body with the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM), a quarterly meeting of senior
ASEAN Member State economic bureaucrats, for administration of the protocol.
Thus, EDSM 2004 follows the same model of the WTO DSU, with provisions for
consultations, good offices, conciliation and mediation, as well as arbitration by a panel.
Most importantly, once a panel is formed by SEOM, the parties to the dispute cannot
invoke other dispute processes, including the WTO DSU. Parties would then present
their arguments to the panel, which would in turn rule on the dispute. z The panel's
decision is automatically adopted by SEOM unless there is a consensus not to adopt
the decision. The panel's decisions can be appealed to the ASEAN Appellate Body, a
doppelganger for the WTO Appellate Body. Finally, SEOM administers the compliance
with the EDSM panel's decision.
The most notable aspect of the EDSM 2004 is that it and its C' predecessor agreement,
the 1996 Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism,5 have never been fully invoked.
No panels have ever been formed. Some commentators have opined that the EDSM
2004's nonuse evidences its success. Walter Woon, one of the drafters of the ASEAN
Charter, noted that: [t]he success of such a dispute settlement mechanism can be
measured not by the number of disputes settled but rather by the scarcity of such
cases. This is because where such a mechanism exists, the parties will often make the
extra effort to come to terms with rather than push the matter to adjudication. . .. [T]he
knowledge that either party can ultimately have recourse to the courts is a powerful
incentive for the disputants to come to an amicable settlement rather than risk a penalty
and possible loss of face rather than adjudication. This is a phenomenon well-known to
lawyers; clients can often be persuaded to settle rather than incur the risk of litigation,
with all its attendant uncertainties. 6
By this measure, the EDSM 2004 should be considered successful because it has never
been fully invoked. Its very existence, by this reasoning, forces ASEAN Member States
to settle rather than formally litigate the disputes.
Despite the elegance of this logic, however, intra-ASEAN disputes still occur, but are
generally outsourced to alternative, non-ASEAN forums such as the WTO and the
International Court of Justice.7 This perhaps occurs for two reasons.8
First, from the ASEAN member governments' point of view, the WTO process can be
seen as being less confrontational because it allows non-ASEAN members to
participate. This softens the potential for reputational damage, e.g., the loss of "face"
that is perceived to result from directly confronting neighboring ASEAN states.
Second, the parties involved have not wanted to risk their case in an untested EDSM
2004. The EDSM 2004 and its predecessor have never handled a full-on arbitration
procedure, much less attempted to enforce an arbitration panel decision against an
ASEAN member. Having had no experience with EDSM 2004, there is no guarantee that
an EDSM panel decision would be implemented. The WTO on the other hand, has tried
and tested dispute system and enforcement procedures.
Third, the procedures laid out in the EDSM 2004 contain many deficiencies and
inconsistencies. This has meant that even on a surface level the EDSM 2004 was not
created to be sufficiently robust. The timeline set forth by the EDSM is both
unrealistically short and unnecessarily rigid. The legal authority of the process remains
unclear in certain aspects. Basic procedures and safeguards to preserve the impartiality
of the process, which are common in other international dispute settlement procedures,
were omitted from the EDSM 2004. These deficiencies, elaborated upon below, further
undermine the credibility of the EDSM 2004.
Therein lies the tragedy of the EDSM 2004. On paper, it strongly resembles the WTO
process and should have all of its advantages. Yet because of deficiencies and
bureaucratic inertia, the EDSM 2004 has never been used. This lack of an effective
dispute resolution body undermines investor confidence in the AEC, as uncertainty
persists > about how AEC members' commitments would be enforced. That is not to
say that ASEAN countries should initiate EDSM disputes merely z for the sake of
developing the EDSM's efficacy. However, until parties are comfortable enough to
entrust their disputes to EDSM, the AEC will not reach its full potential.
With all of these issues in mind, in 2019, ASEAN completed a further "enhancement" of
the EDSM (hereinafter "EDSM 2019").9 The 2019 revision is a largely reasoned attempt
by ASEAN to correct the inconsistencies and deficiencies in the EDSM. On their face, the
2019 C revisions do indeed "enhance" the EDSM 2004 by eliminating structural
problems such as impractical timelines and by bolstering previously underdeveloped
systems such as appellate procedures, creation of panels and rules of conduct for
panelists. This will help give the EDSM 2019 more credibility than its predecessor.
Ultimately, however, whether the EDSM 2019 will be viewed as more credible, thereby
strengthening the AEC, will depend on factors beyond its remit. Cultural and political
factors in ASEAN will determine to what extent the EDSM 2019 is used by the ASEAN
Member States. Moreover, the relative decline of alternative dispute forums, in
particular the WTO DSU, may make the EDSM 2019 more attractive to ASEAN Member
States. Either way, the revisions in the EDSM 2019 are both welcome and timely
reinforcements to the legal and policy foundations of the AEC.

Strengthening the ASEAN dispute settlement solves war and turns the aff
– specifically in the context of borders.
Susan 12 “Intra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s
Conflict Management” Novri Susan Journal of Global Studies Vol. 3 2012 (Doshisha
University, Kyoto) https://global-studies.doshisha.ac.jp/attach/page/GLOBAL_STUDIES-
PAGE-EN-147/139628/file/vol3_4.pdf SM
Based on foreign minister meeting held in Jakarta, the chairman of ASEAN offered good
office and mediation by providing a neutral place in Indonesia to hold a peace talk in
early April 2011. At the beginning, the conflicting parties agreed it. However, as reported
by media, military force of Thailand preferred a bilateral diplomacy to solve the border
conflict on Preah Vihear Temple. The rejection basically was to de-legitimate
Indonesia’s leadership and weaken ASEAN’s strategic role in managing intraregional
conflict within its own region.53 At the same time, ASEAN, through its chairman, could
not force the Member States to continue using ASEAN DSM. This case was just
evidence that ASEAN DSM had vital weakness. Nugroho stated that the conflicting
parties were not obliged to accept the mediation of the other members of the High
Council.54 There was no power and authority of ASEAN as regional organization of
Southeast Asian countries to obligate its members to obey its own conflict
management system.
Sim, in his article, urges that the border conflict of Thai and Cambodia was basically
fuelled by internal politics in both countries; it has become a threat to ASEAN’s positive
record in preventing violent conflicts among the members. The intervention of
Indonesia as the chairman of ASEAN, thus, momentarily strengthened ASEAN
institutions at a hard time.55 The norm of “avoiding violent disputes,” as mentioned
previously, was then likely to become a regional political fallacy system. Ideally, any
intraregional conflict should be handled and solved by certain and legal mechanism of
ASEAN. However, ASEAN DSM had a weak side, namely, inability to force its member
states to follow the system. Even the new ASEAN Charter has mentioned about the
conflict management system, namely, good office, mediation, and conciliation; its
realization depended only on political will, as the chairman of ASEAN stated previously.
When conflicting parties, such as in Thai and Cambodia case, did not accept ASEAN
DSM, they could just go for other mechanisms.
That weakness of ASEAN DSM did not provide a good track for building ASEAN
Community Security. Many intraregional conflicts in the region of Southeast Asia are
settled down mostly outside of the ASEAN DSM. The Singapore-Malaysia ICJ litigation
on Pedra Branca could be the sample of intra-ASEAN dispute handled by non-ASEAN
mechanism. It also happened recently to non-border conflict, such as when Thailand
invited a World Trade Organization (WTO) to handle Thai customs valuation of
cigarettes that brought by the Philippines. Sigitan and Simpadan dispute was also
resolved without ASEAN DSM. Sim mentions, “A relatively low-profile, lowerstakes
economic dispute involving the ASEAN Economic Community would be brought to the
WTO instead of the ASEAN dispute settlement system evidences a lack of confidence in
the ASEAN system”.56
The lack of regionalism feeling and poor institutionalized conflict management system
of ASEAN will obviously create more cases of unresolved intraregional conflicts. The
member states will easily escape from their ‘obligation’ to participate in the governance
of ASEAN which is on the way towards establishing ASEAN Community 2015. The
implementation of ASEAN DSM in managing border conflicts, in general intraregional
conflicts, may have been undertaken optimally as its way. However, this paper found
that the weakness side of ASEAN conflict management was on the non- Intra-Regional
Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management 71
binding mechanism and institutionalized conflict management system which was not
concrete. Therefore, instantly, it can be said that in the future, the region will face many
intraregional conflicts, including border conflicts, with the mobilization of means of
violence. There should be more active efforts to establish a stronger regionalism
feeling, solidarity, unity, and governance system of ASEAN.
Conclusion
This paper found the fact of ASEAN’s conflict management system is very loose and
weak. As elaborated earlier, ASEAN DSM was not built as a legal binding system to
guide intraregional conflict to find a problem solving. The ASEAN Charter and ACT may
provide some ideal mechanisms of conflict management. However, the system does
not tie the ASEAN Member States in order for them to utilize and follow its mechanism
consistently. At the same time, ultra-nationalism is much larger than a regionalism
feeling of ASEAN people, or even leaders. When Indonesia and Malaysia disputed
Simpadan and Ligitan, ultra-nationalism protests occurred in a larger scale compared
with the people who value more regionalism feeling. The protest demanded the
Indonesian government to declare war and close down its embassy in Malaysia. The
protest occurred again during the Ambalat block dispute. The phenomenon also rose up
in Bangkok regarding to the status of border conflict around the Preah Vihear Temple.
ASEAN needs to conduct more peace campaigns focusing on the regionalism feeling to
the ASEAN people. Peace education program for the ASEAN youth will help the ASEAN
people to gain more regionalism feeling and reduce ultra-nationalism.
Institutionally, ASEAN DSM is dealing with the classic issue of the principle of “non-
interference” to member sovereignty. As Abad, Jr. mentioned in his article that the
principles hampered ASEAN to conduct more responsive conflict management. He
stated that ASEAN has built a collective agreement to broadly comprehend and monitor
its very important policy of “noninterference in the internal affairs of one another”; it will
be hard to assume a more effective and practical role in conflict management,
especially when the dispute or conflict is not inter-state in nature. Clearly, ASEAN has to
develop further confidence among respective members. This issue, however, cannot be
separated from ASEAN states’ national political systems.57 However, as clearly written
in APSC (ASEAN Political Security Community) blue print, the organization has an
opportunity to strengthen its conflict management system.
As a blueprint, APSC is a new regional capital to handle the two problems mentioned
above. The ASEAN Members have more responsibility to engage fully by looking at
APSC that has been produced by them. The discourse of some scholars to build more
concrete and well-established conflict management system with more regional political
legitimacy cannot be ignored politically. As a regional political entity, ASEAN has an
obligation to create more formal regional instrument for managing intraregional
conflicts. By creating more formal settlement mechanisms and legal binding ones,
ASEAN can step much closer to APSC. At the same time, ASEAN cannot only rely on the
political will of its members; it also needs stronger leadership and better governance. In
the case of Preah Vihear Temple case, Marty Natalegawa, then, mentions that one big
purpose of ASEAN’s DSM has been achieved; it was marked by the cease fire and
agreement to hold peace talk between Thailand and Cambodia. However, there should
be more confidence in leadership among the ASEAN Members to handle intraregional
conflicts.
 PIC--Indonesia
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations should require Open Borders
between member states through the implementation of a Schengen-style
policy, except Indonesia.

Indonesian deforestation low now – govt programs reduce the impact of

current workers on forests
Kieft 22 — (Johan Kieft, Senior Regional Advisor Asia-Pacific on Green Economy,
Regional Technical Specialist at UN Environment Programme, “Record low
deforestation rates in Indonesia despite ongoing pandemic”, UN-REDD, 1-13-22,
Available Onlien at https://www.un-redd.org/post/record-low-deforestation-rates-
indonesia-despite-ongoing-pandemic, accessed 1-29-23, HKR-AM)
Indonesia’s deforestation rate hit a historic low in 2020, with the government crediting
its policies, including its social forestry policy, as well as its prohibition of forest
clearing. But other factors include the ongoing La Nina which has led to more rain, falling oil palm prices, on top of the economic
slowdown as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The country lost 115,459 hectares of forest cover in 2020, an area the size of Los
Angeles. That’s a 75% drop from 2019, according to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry.
Since COP13 in Bali, Indonesia has progressively moved forward with its REDD+ agenda ,
with international support from UN-REDD which initiated the first jurisdictional pilot in central Sulawesi. After that, the jurisdictional
approach became a key element of Indonesia’s REDD+ architecture as per Minister of Environment and Forestry Regulation
No.70/2017 regarding Procedure for Implementation of REDD+. This has led to a developed jurisdictional approach including
emission reduction purchase agreements with the FCPF and the Biocarbon Fund and a results-based payment agreement with the
Green Climate Fund through the Indonesian Environmental Estate Fund.
In the initial months of the pandemic, there was considerable concern that, similar to the East Asian financial crisis, when per capita
expenditure declined by about 24 percent between 1997 and 1998, this would result in a substantial increase in pressure placed on
forests by smallholders, both as a means of coping with the economic and social effects of the crisis and as a response to changes
in relative prices. Agriculture did act as a major shock absorber. Similar pressure has emerged recently in the aftermath of social
distancing, fueling a substantial return migration. However, similar trends were not confirmed for the 2019 pandemic.
A proactive sustainable tropical peatland policy and new, improved social safety net policies over the last two decades to mitigate
the impact of the economic crisis might have had unintended impacts on forestry policy. Government regulations, after the big peat
fire of 2015, have intensified the protection and sustainable management of peatland. Other government regulations manage the
water table, improve efforts to protect and restore vulnerable peat ecosystems.
Peatlands in Indonesia generate over 45 percent of total emissions, but with the Indonesian sustainable peatland policy in place, as
per government regulation 57/2016, peat water management is now regulated, directly reducing peat fires and hence
decomposition emissions. Other government regulations manage the water table, improve efforts to protect and restore vulnerable
peat ecosystems.
Peatlands cover less than three percent of the Earth’s surface, but they are the largest terrestrial organic carbon stock – storing
twice as much carbon as in the world’s forests.
“When peatlands degrade, they contribute disproportionately to climate change. Imagine, greenhouse gas emissions from drained
or burned peatlands account for five percent of the global carbon budget,” says Johan Kieft who focuses on green economy
mainstreaming in development planning in Indonesia to address drivers of deforestation as well as work on improving the ability to
address peat land fires and peat land management.
The Global Peatlands Initiative (GPI) is an international partnership formed in 2016 to save peatlands as the world’s largest
terrestrial organic carbon stock.
The country is now embarking on an ambitious 2030 agenda by turning Indonesian forests and peatlands into net carbon sinks.
Furthermore, government decisions, in combination with the Indonesian Environmental Estate Fund, to make Indonesia’s forests a
carbon net sink by 2030, support proactive carbon pricing.
Furthermore, a progressive roll out of an expanded social security safety net will dampen the impact of the pandemic for the poor
through the government’s solid foundation of social protection programs, including social assistance programs in the form of a
conditional cash transfers (Program Keluarga Harapan), education cash transfers (Program Indonesia Pintar), food assistance
(Sembako) and others.
Labor market programs and worker protection schemes (Kartu Pra
Kerja) have been instrumental in reducing the reliance on forests to cope with periods of
income uncertainty. These programs, in combination with a proactive forest protection
policy, have reduced deforestation and serve as the cornerstones of Indonesia’s
success in reducing deforestation rates to record lows.
“This is very encouraging news,” says Tim Christophersen, coordinator of The UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration which aims to
halt the degradation of ecosystems and restore them to achieve global goals. “Only
with healthy ecosystems can
we enhance people’s livelihoods, counteract climate change and halt the collapse of
biodiversity.” The Decade runs from 2021 through 2030, which is also the timeline scientists have identified as last chance to
prevent catastrophic climate change.
“Indonesia has addressed deforestation through the effective implementation of
moratoria on licenses for clearing natural forests. Secondly, its timber legality
framework has brought illegal logging under control. And thirdly, its social forestry
policy has enabled communities to benefit from sustainable forest use while its social
security policies address the income needs of those who rely on clearing forests to
cope with economic hardship. All three measures have led to record low deforestation ,”
says Kieft.

A consensus of studies prove immigration in Indonesia results in

deforestation – unregulated, visa-free immigration is uniquely dangerous.
Prefer Indonesia specific studies over generic analysis
Darmawan et al 16 — (Rivayani Darmawan, Postdoc in Development Economics at
University of Gottigen, Stephan Klasen, Professor of Economics at University of Gottigen
and director of the Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research and founder of the
Courant Research Center "Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Developing and Transition
Countries", Nunung Nuryartono Dean of Faculty of Economics and Management at IPB
University and member of Bank Indonesia's board of supervisors, “Migration and
deforestation in Indonesia”, EFForTS Discussion Paper Series, No. 19, GOEDOC,
Dokumenten- und Publikationsserver der Georg-August-Universität, Göttingen, 2016,
Available Online at
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/130249/1/848529499.pdf, accessed 1-29-
2023, HKR-AM)
In this paper, we study the relationship between district level in-migration and deforestation
in Indonesia, the 4th largest country in terms of population size. 4 It is claimed that the population growth has put
pressure on the environment and that particularly migration is liable for the loss of forest cover in
Indonesia (Burgess and Strand, 1993; Fraser, 1998; Amelung and Diehl, 1992;
Kartasubrata, 1993; World Bank, 1990). It has also been argued that migration increases
population pressures, which promotes technological change and income growth, but also accelerates
deforestation (Klasen et al., 2010; Grimm and Klasen, 2015). Migrants, who come to new
areas, tend to open forested land as they usually face serious constraints in claiming
land from the local people, especially when land is scarce. 5 Codjoe and Bilsborrow
(2011) argue that migrants tend to have a more destructive effect on the forests
compared to the resident population, given their short term planning horizon.
Of almost 240 million people living in Indonesia, about 58 percent of them are located on Java Island, making it as the most
populous island in the world. In the 1960s, the government of Indonesia sponsored a so-called
transmigration program which aimed to resettle people to the outer islands of Indonesia: Sumatera, Kalimantan,
Sulawesi, and Papua. During its implementation, the program resettled more than 3.6 million people who
also received houses, land and a subsistence package in the early years of their
resettlement (World Bank, 1994). The program, however, was considered to be a failure due to
its impact on Indonesia’s forest loss and human rights (World Bank, 1990; Fearnside,
1997). Comparing districts that received different numbers of transmigrant families,
Abatayo (2015) shows that 31 additional transmigrant families caused an acre of forest
loss to deforestation. As a result, the program was temporarily stopped in the 1990s . 6
Despite the temporary discontinuation of the program, studies have claimed that transmigration program
has stimulated spontaneous migration, which refers to migration without the
sponsorship by the government. These studies argued that the flow of spontaneous
migrants has further increased the demand for land in the less densely settled areas.
Holmes (2002) noted that the spontaneous migrants may be responsible for forest
encroachment along the forest boundaries, particularly when there is land scarcity and
the rejection from the local residents concerning land title.7 Billsborrow (1992) argued
that the spontaneous migrants may have a more damaging effect compared to
transmigration participants as they can independently intrude to the nearby forest,
without any supervision from the sponsored government.
Motivated by the above-mentioned issues, we examine the relationship between the in-migration and
deforestation rates between 2000 and 2010 in the outer islands of Indonesia: Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi,
and Papua. By exploiting the district level satellite image MODIS data from Burgess et al.
(2012), the Indonesia population census, and the district level data from the World Bank,
we confirm a positive relationship between the recent in-migration and deforestation.
Although we cannot prove causality, our findings confirm a positive contribution of migration on the
clearing of Indonesia’s primary forest. Additionally, we test the claim that the major source of Indonesia’s
deforestation comes from the expansion of oil palm plantations. Our econometric results confirm that the expansion in oil palm
plantations has a significant effect on forest clearing in Indonesia.

Indonesia’s a unique biological hotspot – deforestation decks species key

to global biodiversity and ecosystems services.
Petrenko et al '16 [Chelsea; July 2016; PhD in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology from
Dartmouth College; "Ecological Impacts of Palm Oil Expansion in Indonesia,"
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/Indonesia-palm-oil-
expansion_ICCT_july2016.pdf]//GJ
Southeast Asia overlaps with four of the world’s distinct “biodiversity hotspots,” each of
which has unique geological history and biota (Sodhi et al., 2004). Biological diversity provides
cultural, environmental, and financial benefits locally and globally. Species variety improves
ecosystem function through seed dispersal, nutrient cycling, and pollination. Preserving
biodiversity maintains other ecosystem services such as water filtration and carbon
storage (Koh et al., 2011). Biodiverse regions also support a variety of human lifestyles and
recreations. Thus, biodiversity affects natural resource availability and human welfare on a
range of spatial and temporal scales.
However, tropical forests in Southeast Asia are being destroyed at a faster pace than other
regions in the world, and three-quarters of this area could be lost by 2100 (Sodhi, 2004). It is
estimated that up to 42% biodiversity in Southeast Asia could be destroyed in the same time period (Sodhi, 2004). Agricultural
expansion is the leading cause of biodiversity loss (Tilman et al., 2001; Yaap et al., 2010), and in
Indonesia it is directly tied to deforestation.
Understanding the implications of palm oil production in Indonesia is critical, as the
country has both the highest rate of deforestation and the highest plant species
richness in the world. Indonesia lost an estimated 0.84 Mha of primary forest per year from 2000 to 2012, totaling more
than 6.02 Mha and significantly outpacing deforestation rates in Brazil (0.46 Mha yr-1; Margono et al.,
2014). The consequences of this loss are devastating, as a single hectare of tropical
rainforest in Indonesia harbors more than 200 species and 500 stems (Uryu et al., 2008).
Furthermore, more than 60% of Indonesian rainforest species are endemic to the region (Sodhi et al., 2004). The region is
home to a variety of unique ecological processes, such as the masting of Dipterocarpaceae (synchronized
fruiting of tall tropical trees) and the blooming of the Rafflesia and titan arum flowers. Indonesia is also home to large charismatic
fauna, such as the Sumatran tiger (Panthera tigris sumatrae), Sumatran elephant (Elephas maximus sumatranus), and Orangutang
(Pongo spp.).
DEFORESTATION EFFECTS ON BIODIVERSITY
studies are in
There is paucity of information on how palm plantations in particular affect biodiversity. However,
agreement that forest clearing for any reason has strong, negative impacts on
biodiversity. Three plant and eight animal species have already been listed as “extinct” in
Southeast Asia, and many native species are not expected to persist in the face of mass
deforestation (Sodhi et al., 2004). Given that large-scale deforestation has only occurred in the region for the past two
centuries, it is likely that the full effects of such practices have yet to be measured (Sodhi et al.,
2004).
Deforestation decreases population density and species richness of all animal groups
studied, including birds (Sodhi, 2002), mammals (Heydon & Bulloh, 1997; O’Brien et al., 2003; Meijaard & Nijman,
2001), bees (Liow et al., 2001), butterflies (Sodhi et al., 2004), moths (Beck et al., 2002), termites (Gathorne-Hardy et
al., 2002), dung beetles (Davis et al., 2001), and ants (Bruhl et al., 2003). Iconic species such as the
orangutan, found only on Sumatra and Borneo, are rapidly declining due to forest loss (Robertson & Van
Schaik, 2008; Meijaard et al., 2011). Unique fishes living in peat swamp forests are also as risk from
habitat degradation (Ng et al., 1994). In Riau, Sumatra, Sumatran elephants have declined by up to 84%, from >1000 in
1984, to approximately 210 in 2007 (Uryu et al., 2008). Sumatran tiger populations declined by 70% in a similar timespan, from 640
in 1982, to 192 in 2007 (Uryu et al., 2008).
Extinction – tipping points overwhelm resilience.
Williams '17 [Gerado; 3/20/17; environmental scientist and author; "Effects of
Deforestation: The Ultimate Guide to Deforestation Solutions," Lulu Press. Google
Books]
Deforestation introduces numerous community and environmental harms. The abrupt and
irreversible consequences of worldwide deforestation are guaranteed to jeopardize the
existence of Earth. The domino effect of deforestation includes: extinction of the
biodiversity; the annihilation of the indigenous people (local inhabitants of the area); and a global
change in climate. One wrong move can lead us all to an empty and meaningless world.
The consequence of deforestation is claimed to be a domino effect because one step to destroying nature

will cause the deaths or extinction of many more species. After the death of animal and plant life is the
partial loss of human life through poverty and pollution. If things pursue this way, human extinction

could also be inevitable. The years are counting, and each day of that year trees are being felled and lands
are being abolished of the natural wonders. If the world used to be a better and cleaner place to live in, then we can definitely start to
relive those days now. The only known way to halt this is to put a stop to every cause of

deforestation. Regardless of the pros and cons of deforestation, we must only think of one thing, and that is reviving nature while it is
still possible to be saved. While there is only an ample amount of time left, we would need it to rebuild nature and stop its total
destruction.
 CP—Labour
CP: ASEAN member states should allow unrestricted migration between
ASEAN member states for laborers.

Solves the aff – that’s what all their ev advocates – we’ll insert lines from
the 1AC that they highlighted

Avoids the link – doesn’t open borders broadly so it maintains

surveillance and exclusion of potential terrorists
1AC Koty
- As set out in 2007’s ASEAN Economic Blueprint, the AEC seeks to “transform
ASEAN into a region with free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled
labour, and freer flow of capital.” While considerable progress has been made in
liberalising and normalising the region’s activities in most of these areas,
establishing free movement of skilled labour lags appreciably behind. Although
the area has a clearly stated goal of promoting the increased mobility of skilled
workers, current policies not only trail behind those of the European Union, where
freedom of movement is essentially unencumbered, but also those of less
ambitious arrangements such as the North America Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The lack of a cohesive
regional framework, the existence of nationalist and protectionist policies as
well as middling political strategies will undoubtedly impede ASEAN’s skilled
labour mobility ambitions still further.
1AC Intal
- The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) aspires and should
continue to aspire in the foreseeable future towards a freer rather than free
regional market for skilled labour or a free regional market for all labour
- In an integrated ASEAN labour market for skills, the private sector should be able
to hire skilled workers from any other ASEAN country with minimal regulatory
barriers , and skilled workers in ASEAN should be able to choose to work in any
ASEAN country.
 CP—Asylum
CP: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations should establish ASEAN-
wide agreements on humanitarian aspects of labor migration and asylum
policy principles. It should also establish a framework to regularize and
facilitate the freer movement of labor as described in Intal.

Their own solvency advocate is explicitly against the aff plan –

Marlborough reads yellow
AC Khasru 18 Syed Khasru 11-20-2018 "Migration -- the forgotten part of ASEAN
integration" https://archive.vn/qQARO#selection-2535.0-2538.0 (Chairman, The
Institute for Policy, Advocacy, and Governance (IPAG))//Elmer
While leaders of ASEAN spoke eloquently about mutual trade and investment at their
summit in Singapore this month, they had little to say about another key flow in the
region -- migration. Admittedly, they did express collective concern about the Rohingya people who become international
refugees in fleeing Myanmar for Bangladesh and other countries. But for the most part they ignored the much
bigger movements of other groups of people who daily cross their states' borders,
mostly in search of a better life. While members of the 10-member Association of
Southeast Asian Nations have made big efforts to have advance mutual trade and
investment flows to the benefit of their 640 million inhabitants, they have not been
entirely inclusive in its march forward. Migrants, numbering around 6.5 million people,
have largely been left out of the ASEAN integration process. This must change . It is time
for ASEAN to respond more urgently to migrants' needs with coordinated policies both for
refugees, fleeing for their safety, and the much larger numbers of economic migrants.
While each country will rightly have its own laws and practices, common rules should
be developed to give migrants more protection and dignity. Migrations is a major
political factor in the region, with a sharp division between those countries which largely
supply migrants -- Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Vietnam -- and
those which receive them -- Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Together these three countries host
6.5 million migrants, 96% of them coming from other ASEAN states. These include 284,949 documented refugees seeking asylum in
neighboring states, plus unknown numbers of others who have fled for safety without registering anywhere. Almost all the rest are
economic migrants looking for jobs. As
intra-ASEAN migration has increased in recent years,
member states have taken acknowledged the problem and taken some steps to reduce
the barriers to mobility and promote greater regional integration. An ASEAN declaration
aiming to protect migrant workers was signed early as 2007. But migration has become a significant issue in official terms with the
However,
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, agreed in 2015, which envisages reducing paperwork for work visas.
the troubling fact remains that the focus of these deliberations falls more on facilitating
the migration of high-skilled migrants such as engineers and nurses and much less on
the much larger numbers of low-skill workers, who end up as laborers and cleaners.
Undocumented economic migrant in ASEAN experience myriad mistreatments
including high charges paid to people smugglers, fraud by recruitment agencies,
nonpayment of salaries, low wages, long working hours, and poor workplaces safety
standards. Worse, they sometimes suffer physical violence and illegal detention,
trafficking, and sexual abuse. Female migrants, for example from Cambodia, Myanmar
and the Philippines, are sometimes treated like modern-day slaves. The abundance of human
rights violation cases involving domestic workers in ASEAN seem to highlight a lack of legal protection for the thousands of women.
There are not enough regulatory officials and police to assess and prevent exploitation. Meanwhile,
the Rohingya
crisis has not only put pressure on neighboring Bangladesh, where most refugees have
gone, but given ASEAN members a challenge that not only members have handled well.
In 2015 when 25,000 Rohingya refugees were abandoned in the seas in a boat by human traffickers, the Philippine government
opened its doors, offering the stranded refugees emergency assistance for five months before they were relocated to permanent
settlements in the Philippines. But Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia all repeatedly rejected these latter-day boat people and towed
their vessels back out to sea. Some ASEAN members have expressed concerns that refugees bring security threats and crime,
including terrorism, human trafficking and smuggling arms and drugs. Even skilled economic migrants can be seen as a danger.
Students in Cambodia and Myanmar have often demonstrated hostility to foreign professionals coming from other ASEAN
countries, fearing the newcomers were stealing locals' jobs. For an institution like ASEAN, based on the mantra of noninterference,
But for the organization to mature and
making common policies on a tricky issue like migration is challenging.
become more like the European Union, it must tackle hard topics, including migration .
ASEAN should develop a single set of asylum policy principles. While each individual
state may have different approaches to processing refugees, they require a
standardized principles on upholding refugees' human rights. Common standards in
refugee centers and in resettling refugees are also important. However, countries
should retain the right to decide how many refugees they can realistically shelter.
Similarly when it comes to economic migration, countries may differ on the
technicalities such as job contracts and decide on accepting different numbers of
immigrant workers. But there should be ASEAN-wide agreements on humanitarian
aspects of labor migration including workplace safety, and ethical practices for
recruiting, employing, paying and treating migrants. Illegal labor migration thrives in the
absence of clear and transparent rules and migration channels. Policies should be
benchmarking policies against international standards such as those of the EU, which
are particularly robust. I am not suggesting EU-style freedom of movement but a
common EU-based framework for the human rights of refugees and migrants.
Country-specific policies for low-skilled migrants and refugees should, over time, be
harmonized. Where there is political resistance to granting naturalization to immigrants, then migrants' rights as resident
noncitizens can be made more dignified. Wealthier host countries, such as Singapore, should lead the way. While ASEAN has
primarily been an economic organization, it has already acknowledged the need for action on human rights with the creating of
bodies such as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the ASEAN Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC). However, unlike, for example, the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights, there seems to be no specific mentions of the terms "refugee," "asylum-seeker" or "forced migrant" in any of
these key ASEAN documents. This needs to be addressed, and soon. Treating
migrants ultimately benefits
both the migrants and the host country. The free movement of workers boosts
economic growth, trade and the spread of innovation. Regions which fail to facilitate
the well-managed movement of labor do not only jeopardize the dignity and even the
lives of migrants, they also harm their own economic interests.

Here's another card 1AC solvency advocate that explicitly rejects the plan
--
Intal 19 Jr, Ponciano, and Mari Pangestu. "5. Skills Mobility and Development in
ASEAN." (2019). (Professor of Economics and De La Selle University)//Elmer
Introduction: ASEAN Vision 2040 and the Role of Skills Mobility and Development The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) break-up, Brexit in the European Union (EU), and the anti-globalisation wave are in part due to insufficient attention by
The angst felt
policymakers and analysts for the distributional aspects of globalisation and regional economic integration.
by the middle class as they face income and wage stagnation and job and social
disruptions have fallen mainly on the role of foreign competition and foreign labour and
public perceptions have not given due recognition to the disruptive effects of
technological change and the inadequate catch-up in skills development of the labour
force. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) aspires and should
continue to aspire in the foreseeable future towards a freer rather than free regional
market for skilled labour or a free regional market for all labour. This is in recognition of
the political and social sensitivities associated with cross-border movement of people
and labour amongst independent nation states (notwithstanding the rapid rise of
crossborder tourism and student exchanges), and the particular huge diversities
amongst the ten ASEAN member countries in geographic and demographic sizes, levels
of economic development and wage incomes, and in socio-cultural-linguistic-religious
characteristics of the population and labour force. While not recommending the free or
freer movement of the less-skilled and unskilled-labour across the region, it is
necessary to have an ASEAN framework to regularise and facilitate such movements to
minimise the large numbers of irregular migrant workers found in many ASEAN
countries and a code to protect the wellbeing of all regular and irregular, skilled, and
unskilled foreign workers. By 2040, ASEAN should strive for an integrated skilled-labour
market characterised by an enhanced circulation of skills within the region, and
enabled by a mutual recognition of educational qualifications, professional licenses,
and work experience; a minimal list of restricted or prohibited occupations for ASEAN
foreign workers; preferential recruitment of ASEAN nationals where labour market tests
are deemed necessary; and use of digital technology to disseminate labour market
information in every ASEAN country. In an integrated ASEAN labour market for skills, the
private sector should be able to hire skilled workers from any other ASEAN country
with minimal regulatory barriers , and skilled workers in ASEAN should be able to
choose to work in any ASEAN country. Also by 2040, the ASEAN region would have further embraced the service
and knowledge economy and the digital age. ASEAN would require accelerated skill development in

every ASEAN country so as to be internationally competitive , and economically and

socially inclusive and cohesive. Countries can achieve the skills objective, not by working
alone, but by cooperation and integration within the ASEAN Framework and the ASEAN
Plus Frameworks. Skills mobility cum development is a positive sum game for both
receiving and sending countries in the ASEAN integration project. It results in an expanded pool of
human resources with multi-national and deeper skill sets for every ASEAN country . II.
Why Skills Mobility and Skills Development are Important Current demographic, economic, and technological trends mean that the
economies of ASEAN Member States (AMS) by 2040 will reach highand upper middle-income status, and have a growing labour
force that is increasingly skilled (with declining working-age population in ageing societies offset by the youthful populations in
other ASEAN countries). They will have achieved technological advances, particularly the digital revolution, e-commerce and
industry 4.0, and demand an increasingly skilled labour force, including skills that are currently scarce across ASEAN (or even non-
existent). 1. Skills
mobility is essential to the ASEAN region’s continuing rapid economic growth
and industrial upgrading. It will require tapping skills and talent from everywhere in the
ASEAN region and beyond. Fostering a freer intra-regional flow of skills will provide a
competitive edge to the ASEAN region. 2. A freer movement of skilled workers is also
necessary for deepening ASEAN services integration. As the region becomes richer, its
consumers will demand a variety of cross-border services. Each AMS has unique services that can be
demanded elsewhere in ASEAN. For example, ASEAN consumers may want to eat in restaurants run by Thai chefs, and access
online education provided by Malaysian education sites and fintech services by Singapore financial institutions. With skills mobility,
supplying these services becomes realisable and costeffective. 3. Skills
mobility is also crucial for achieving
the ASEAN objective of inclusiveness and having a cohesive ASEAN community.
Abilities and talents can be found throughout the ASEAN region. At the same time,
opportunities to utilise these skills to their maximum potential are unevenly
distributed across countries and geographic locations due to differences in level and
rate of development and in economic structure. Skills mobility can make ASEAN a
region where a person’s place of birth does not constrain his/her economic
opportunities. 4. Skills mobility is closely associated with production of skills for the regional, global, and future labour
market. It is well known that employees of multinational corporations (MNCs), with work experience and socio-cultural-linguistic
and management skills sets honed by international and regional postings are widely sought after by corporations (both big and
small) seeking to venture or expand into new regional and international markets. A growing ASEAN labour force needs to be better
No single ASEAN economy can
educated and trained for the ongoing technological revolution and globalisation.
efficiently rely on domestic production of all the required skills. As in the case of goods production,
in the production of human capital there also exist comparative advantages and scale economies. There are large benefits to be
gained by cooperating in the production of human capital and expanding the talent pool beyond national borders. 5. Looking
towards 2040, ASEAN must consider the implications of the digital age for labour employment and mobility. E-commerce and other
e-services can be provided across borders without physical movement of providers, resulting in ‘virtual migration’. This would
include telemedicine, business process outsourcing and call centres, online education and fintech services. These service providers
can work in their home base without migrating. The increasing demand for virtual migrants would help to offset some of the
concerns of receiving and sending countries and migrant workers themselves regarding physical labour mobility. However, ASEAN
would need a framework governing the virtual employment of foreign workers. III. Skills Mobility in ASEAN – Existing Measures and
Challenges The importance of skills mobility is articulated in numerous ASEAN agreements and vision documents. The ASEAN
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint indicate that labour mobility is
considered an important part of the ASEAN integration project. In the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II in 2003, AMS are committed
to ‘facilitate movement of business persons, skilled labour, and talents’ for deeper economic integration. The AEC Blueprint in 2007
reflected this commitment by specifying key areas of collaboration amongst AMS, including the facilitation of working visas and the
harmonisation and standardisation of qualifications, including Mutual Recognition Arrangements for professionals (MRAs). The
ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons (AMNP) was signed in 2012 to enhance the flow of natural persons
engaging in trade in goods, services, and investment. In 2014, ASEAN Economic Ministers endorsed the ASEAN Qualification
Reference Framework (AQRF) to complement the MRAs by providing guidelines for comparing qualifications across member states,
with voluntary referencing. The AEC Blueprint 2025 reaffirms that facilitating the movement of skilled labour and business visitors is
a key element of a ‘highly integrated and cohesive ASEAN economy’ (AEC Blueprint, 2025). Current
practices in
ASEAN contain obstacles on the hiring of foreign skilled professionals by the private
sector and their ban in the public sector (with the notable exception of Singapore)
These include both formal and informal restrictions, including constitutional and legal
restrictions and labour market tests, onerous and time-consuming procedures and
various upfront payments. It would be helpful for employers and foreign workers if
these restrictions are liberalised and made transparent and the procedures simplified.
While the AEC Blueprint focuses on enhancing the flow of skilled and professionals, they account for less than 10% of intra-regional
labour flows, with Singapore the leading destination. The majority of intraregional migrants are middle- and low-skilled and irregular,
and are commonly found in construction, agriculture, and domestic work. There is no AEC coverage on them. ASEAN’s major
receiving countries are Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Malaysia and Thailand host millions of irregular workers from
neighbouring ASEAN countries. The ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, known
as the Cebu declaration, makes commitments to protect migrant workers, but this is non-binding. ASEAN has reaffirmed this by
signing the ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, but the commitments remain
voluntary (ASEAN Secretariat 2017). An assessment of the progress made by ASEAN in regional skilled labour mobility (Testaverde
et al., 2017) concluded that, notwithstanding the commitments and framework agreements that regional leaders place on this issue,
the slowness of actual implementation highlights the difficult political and regulatory landscape. The ASEAN agreements cover
skilled workers and professionals, but there are several gaps in its provisions. They facilitate the issuance of visas and employment
passes, and work to harmonise and standardise qualifications. However, most foreign skilled professionals are intra-corporate
transferees, AFAS and AMNP do not cover individual professionals and skilled workers, and MRAs cover only a small segment of
ASEAN professionals. AMS have signed MRAs in six areas: engineering, nursing, architecture, medicine, dentistry, and tourism and
framework agreements in surveying and accountancy. Conclusion and implementation of MRAs for professionals have been a long
and arduous process, in part due to ‘occupational protectionism’. There are genuine cross-country differences in what a
professional must know to practice, and automatic recognition of foreign qualifications and work experience is rare. Partial
recognition is usually possible with compensatory measures to bridge differences in training and quality standards and work
experience, but this can be difficult and highly sensitive. The implementation of MRAs is timeconsuming, technically demanding,
and sometimes politically difficult as a wide range of stakeholders are responsible for different aspects of the recognition process.
It requires support from the public and professional associations, which in turn rests on perceptions of benefits and threats pose by
foreign professionals. More importantly, MRAs do not guarantee labour market access, which is still subject to national laws,
regulations, and measures. The challenges to ASEAN skills mobility have been categorised by Papademetriou et al. (2015) as
follows: (i) Issues related to the recognition of credentials. (ii) Restrictions on hiring foreign workers in certain occupations and
industries, and on employment visas. (iii) Perceived costly barriers due to cultural, language, and socioeconomic differences. It is
necessary to overcome each of these challenges to achieve full skills mobility. The second challenge and part of the first challenge
can be achieved by reforming
the laws and regulations and following through on
commitments such as expanding MRAs on skills. However, a continuing challenge will require a positive
change in perceptions and behaviours of individuals and businesses surrounding labour mobility within ASEAN, which would in turn
influence people’s economic decisions to move. Without a serious effort to enhance ASEAN skills mobility, the region may lose its
talent to other parts of the world. ASEAN’s major sending countries are Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Viet Nam, with
major destinations in the Middle East, Europe, North America, and Australia–New Zealand rather than in ASEAN. It is important to
note the reasons behind the extra-ASEAN preference and strategise to make ASEAN an attractive destination region of choice for
skilled migrants. Rising job opportunities and wage levels, an increasingly open society that accepts foreigners, and an increasingly
better living environment can make the ASEAN region an increasingly attractive destination. IV. Benefits and Costs to Sending and
Receiving Countries and Migrant Workers Since labour market liberalisation is a politically sensitive issue, it is necessary to evaluate
the benefits and costs to ASEAN countries and workers. A. For Receiving Countries and Citizen Workers Affected Benefits include (i)
relaxing domestic shortages of general and specific skills; (ii) upgrading and developing specific sectors of the economy (e.g.,
educational, medical, and information technology services); (iii) attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign MNCs by
relaxing rules on intra-corporate transferees and business visitors; (iv) relaxing skill shortages faced particularly by small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as compared to large and foreign enterprises; (iv) encouraging the development of private
enterprise and entrepreneurship. Concerns include (i) at the national level, countries and communities may be concerned about
overcrowding and upward price pressures from increased demand for public spaces, housing, education, health and recreational
facilities, and the displacement of local SMEs and professionals by FDI and foreign professionals; (ii) at the individual level, citizen
workers may be concerned about job displacement and retrenchment, competitive pressure from foreign workers and dimmer
prospects of job promotion. (iii) communities and individuals often cannot make the distinction between job displacement due to
technological change and due to the entry of foreign firms and foreign workers. Receiving countries could provide educational and
training opportunities for foreign students to work after graduation; minimise discrimination against the foreign workforce in various
areas of public policy; ensure the fair treatment of workers by employers; and provide better labour market information on areas
with skills shortages. Ultimately, ASEAN should aspire to be a region characterised by the circulation of skills, with each country
both receiving and sending skilled professionals in line with its economic structure. B. For Sending Countries and Workers Seeking
Foreign Employment Benefits include (i) reduced socio-political pressures from a large pool of educated unemployed and
underemployed persons; (ii) inward remittances contribute to improved household incomes, and the balance of payments; (iii)
mobility of labour (as well as tourism) improves knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of ASEAN neighbours and is an
excellent way of building an ASEAN Community. Concerns include: (i) brain drain, although this can be offset by eventual returnees
(and their skills, experience, and financial assets) and growing role of virtual migration; (ii) concern over lack of protection of their
rights and welfare of nationals working abroad; (iii) for individuals, migration for work is largely an economic decision made by
balancing the costs and benefits of seeking work abroad. Benefits include opportunities for a better income and career
advancement, to travel and gain work experience in a different environment, and in some cases the opportunity to migrate
permanently. Costs include financial, social, and psychological costs such as adapting to a foreign environment, family disruptions,
and the difficulty of re-integrating upon return. Sending countries could improve educational standards, curricula, and the linguistic
skills of potential migrant workers; seek recognition and accreditation of their degrees and diplomas; improve knowledge and
understanding of the cultures and social norms of other ASEAN countries; improve the provision of information about the labour
market in destination countries; facilitate exit procedures and minimise exit costs of obtaining passport, visas, transportation, and
accreditation; and troubleshoot problems and attend to the needs of its nationals abroad through its embassies and labour attaches
V. Lessons from the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union NAFTA and the EU have very different models of managing labour mobility and its interplay with trade liberalisation, corresponding to each bloc’s economic and policy objectives.
Their provisions offer useful lessons for the ASEAN labour mobility objective. A. NAFTA now defunct and replaced by the US, Canada, Mexico Agreement (USCMA) NAFTA focused on trade integration, with relatively narrow provisions for skilled labour mobility. The
NAFTA Treaty established a new migration category in the US available exclusively to workers from Mexico and Canada pursuing jobs in 70 highly skilled occupations (e.g. accountants, architects, computer systems analysts, economists, engineers, hotel managers,
etc.). The lack of a quota and an easier application process made the NAFTA Treaty visa more attractive than the US global H1-1B visa. However, NAFTA did not include specific provisions to facilitate the movement of low-skilled labour. The US and Canada offered
limited avenues for the legal temporary employment of foreign low-skilled workers. Applicants from Canada and Mexico with college degrees and job offers in the US were eligible to apply and there was no numerical quota. Employment was for 3 years, and the visa
was renewable indefinitely. Migrants could bring their dependents. Canadian applicants could apply on entry to the US with only proof of a job offer and proof of education; there was no requirement for a labour market test in which employers certify that US workers

EU has broader
were unavailable to fill positions. On the other hand, Mexican applicants must apply for the visa in Mexico and the employer must go undergo a labour market test. B. The EU The
integration objectives and guarantees the four fundamental freedoms on movement of
goods, services, capital, and workers. Citizens of any EU country and their families have
the right to live in any other EU country for up to 3 months; after which they must be
working, enrolled in full-time education, or able to demonstrate financial independence .
After 5 years of residence, they earn the right to permanent residence. Citizens of any EU country are also generally permitted
to work freely in the job and country of their choosing. The EU has also implemented
various policies to facilitate the movement of workers of any skill level. These include
mutual recognition of common forms of documentation and relative streamlining of
entry processes; and the portability across the EU of various social rights and entitlements, including access to health care,
social welfare, and pensions. In actuality, migration flows have generally been rather subdued despite the accession of Central and
Eastern Europe countries, possibly due to various other barriers. Also, EU member countries may restrict access to their labour
markets for public sector jobs and ‘in an emergency’ with approval from the European Commission; and may impose temporary
mobility restrictions on citizens of new EU members. Besides direct policy, many supportive programmes facilitate movement
within the EU. The Erasmus Programme began in 1987 as a student exchange programme for Europeans, while the parallel Erasmus
Mundus Programme is oriented towards non-Europeans. Erasmus Plus (2014–2020), which succeeded Erasmus, incorporates all
EU schemes for education, training youth, and sport. It provides grants to give students and teachers or trainers a unique
opportunity to participate in different European countries. Previously, these opportunities were restricted to applicants who had
completed at least 1 year of study at the tertiary level, but are now also available to secondary school students. Participants study at
least 3 months or do an internship for a period of at least 2 months and up to 1 academic year in another European country. The
period spent abroad is recognised by their university when they return. Students do not pay extra tuition fees to the host institution
and can apply for an Erasmus grant through the home institution to help cover the additional expenses of living abroad. Millions of
European students in thousands of higher education institutions participate in Erasmus across 37 European countries. The main
benefit of the programme is that it fosters learning and understanding of the host country, as both a time for learning and a chance
to socialise and bond with other European students. Similarly, the Bologna Process is based on an intergovernmental agreement
with membership extended beyond the EU. The 1999 Bologna Declaration committed 29 European governments to pursue
complementary higher education reforms and establish a European Higher Education Area of compatible national systems.
Participation and cooperation are voluntary. Bilateral agreements between countries and institutions oblige signatories to recognise
each other’s degrees, moving from strict convergence in time spent on qualifications towards a competency-based system.
National reforms have made university qualifications more easily comparable across Europe. Country scorecards (reports,
conferences, communiqués, and policy declarations) are closely monitored at the European-level and structured around a series of
biennial ministerial meetings. The European Commission has played an active role in this process. The EU Credit Transfer and
Accumulation System (ECTS), first piloted within the Erasmus networks, has become the European standard. The European
Commission also provides financial incentives for higher education cooperation and reform projects in line with the Bologna
objectives, as well as funding national Bologna Promoters, and informational activities. It also promoted joint degrees and the
bachelor/master structure through its Erasmus Mundus programme and other pilot studies. Likewise, the European Qualifications
Framework (EQF) aims to relate different national qualifications systems to a common European reference framework. Individuals
and employers use the EQF to understand and compare more easily the qualification levels of different countries and education and
training systems. This means that there is no need for individuals to repeat this learning when migrating. The core of the EQF
comprises eight reference levels (1–8) describing what a learner knows, understands, and is able to do (‘learning outcomes’). Levels
of national qualifications are placed at one of the central reference levels. This makes it much easier to compare national
qualifications. ECTS credits are a standard means of comparing the ‘volume of learning based on the defined learning outcomes
and their associated workload’ for higher education across the EU and collaborating European countries (European Commission,
2017: 10). ECTS credits are used to facilitate transfer and progression throughout the EU. VI. The Role of ASEAN in Regional Skills
Mobility and Development 1. Emphasise the welfare gains from ASEAN skilled labour mobility The economic benefits of cross-
border labour mobility are numerous. For destination countries, positive impacts include better employment opportunities and
higher wages for workers; however, low-skilled workers could have negative impacts in rigid labour markets. For sending countries,
out-migration boost wages for those remaining behind, migrant workers benefit from higher wages received, and their households
benefit from remittances. Overall, there are economic benefits from improved economic growth and from remittances. The negative
effects of ‘brain drain’ in sending countries are offset by ‘brain circulation’ and eventual returnees. The EU and NAFTA experiences
indicate that intra-regional skills mobility remains limited even in the absence of legal and policy barriers. The same may hold true in
the ASEAN region. Additionally, when skills migration takes place, a preference for non-ASEAN destinations may emerge, linked to
permanent migration to North America, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. There
is a need to emphasise
the benefits of working in another ASEAN country , which include closeness to home
and cultural similarities; diversity of work, linguistic, and cultural experiences, which can
enhance soft skills; and the facilitation of ASEAN-community building. Familiarity with other
ASEAN countries can be enhanced by intra-ASEAN student and staff exchanges and tourism. For employers, businesses, and
professional groups, more exchanges and cooperation promote business activities and intra-ASEAN FDI and services, leading to the
employment and re-deployment of staff who are ASEAN nationals. 2. Incentives to attract ASEAN foreign professionals and skills as
well as safeguarding the interests of citizen workers The key advantages of ASEAN destinations include closeness to home and
It is
less pronounced sociocultural diversities relative to destinations in North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.
necessary to minimise visa procedures and labour market access restrictions so that
ASEAN professionals can access better employment and income opportunities in the
region. ASEAN migration should also entail less financial and time costs of labour
mobility and family disruptions. ASEAN can also provide a centralised database of job market information. To attract
foreign skills and talents, policy and practice should provide a welcoming environment, including availability and competitive cost of
housing, transport and education, competitive taxation rates, portable social security plans, ease of sending remittances overseas,
and a safe and unpolluted living and working environment. For skills and talent seeking eventual migration and permanent
settlement, availability of permanent residence schemes is an important attraction. Governments are elected by citizens, hence
concerns over foreign competition should be addressed in parallel to the welcome mat for foreigners, and that the foreign presence
should not undermine social cohesion. In all countries, employment of nationals has priority over employment of foreigners but
such ‘protectionism’ should not lead to shortages of skilled personnel that ultimately prevent the country from achieving its
economic growth and upgrading potential and fail to enhance the wellbeing of its citizenry. Policy and practice would have to ensure
that citizen workers have developed technical, social and linguistic skill sets that enable them to compete effectively with foreigners
within their country or abroad. Policy and practice would also have to ensure that citizen workers are not discriminated in the
recruitment, employment and promotion processes of private sector employers. . Accelerate the ASEAN-wide accreditation system
for universities and training institutions The process of comparing and recognising academic and training credentials within a
country is complex enough but the issue becomes even more problematic and sensitive across the 10 diverse ASEAN countries. To
hire a foreign skilled worker or professional from another ASEAN country, the prospective employer must assess the merits of the
paper qualification and work experience. For top-end jobs, employers can resort to expensive head-hunting recruitment agencies.
But for lower-level jobs, an ASEAN-wide accreditation of education and training institutions would be a tremendous help to
employers in their assessment of suitable candidates for employment and promotion. 4. Providing an equal opportunity for
developing relevant skillsets An individual born anywhere in ASEAN needs to be given equal opportunity to develop skill sets that are
in demand in the region. At the national level, this means a comprehensive education and training system available to all. Financing
and finding the teachers put tremendous strain on low-income countries and policymakers will need to prioritise and seek foreign
assistance (in ASEAN, amongst ASEAN dialogue partners, international and regional institutions). It is essential that the education
and training process results in the production of marketable skill-sets, embodying some quality-standard and relevance to the
present economic structure of the country as well as its future evolution. While expanding the enrolment and scope of tertiary
institutions, all ASEAN countries would need to improve the quality dimension of its institutions so that they can eventually compete
with the best in the world. In this respect, the Singapore experience may offer some useful lessons for some ASEAN countries.
Singapore’s school system has been producing students that achieve high Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)
test scores run by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Singapore’s leading universities are
ranked by various international ranking agencies as amongst the best in Asia. Also, Singapore’s education and training system is
being revamped to prepare students for the technological requirements of future jobs. Singapore has achieved this level of
educational excellence through continuous effort in developing Singapore’s human resources, learning from the best institutions
and examples the world has to offer, entering into partnerships with worldrenowned institutions, and recruiting from the world’s best
from the advanced industrial countries, China and India to teach and research in its universities, research institutes, and training
centres. The Singapore education and training system is currently being revamped to meet the future job requirements brought on
by technological changes. At the ASEAN regional level, this offers tremendous opportunity for cooperation and integration in a win-
win framework. ASEAN countries that are more educationally advanced, with educational and training institutions of international
standing and repute, could build physical campuses in other ASEAN countries and also offer online education (currently undertaken
in the ASEAN region mainly by non-ASEAN universities and colleges). 5. Develop strong regional consciousness through travel and
study experiences Migration and interest in migration often begin when individuals are studying abroad, and many ASEAN students
who study overseas remain abroad for work experience and opportunities. There is more limited student movement amongst
ASEAN countries, in part due to a dearth of scholarships and financial assistance schemes, and a lower profile of ASEAN tertiary
educational institutions. Therefore, ASEAN should encourage student exchange through the ASEAN University Network (AUN), and
Singapore’s ASEAN scholarships, amongst others. This can be achieved by improving the global rankings of ASEAN universities and
training institutes. 6. Manage a gradual approach towards ASEAN labour mobility and integration Given the diversity of the AMS,
ASEAN should adopt a more gradual approach towards an integrated ASEAN skilled labour market. Ideally, a regional framework
based on binding bilateral agreements would be preferable, perhaps within a subset of AMS. Such an ‘ASEAN minus X’ approach
would provide some flexibility. However, a voluntary regional approach may be appropriate to accommodate the diverse sensitivities
in ASEAN. A more inclusive and equitable ASEAN and AEC could emphasise regional and bilateral cooperation instead of binding
integration agreements. AMS have different priorities and face different socioeconomic realities. However, when political leaders
and policymakers formulate and implement national visions, plans, and policies, they should also consider impacts on other ASEAN
countries and, whenever and wherever possible, adopt positive-sum, not zero-sum, strategies. The ASEAN body need to take a
leadership role in driving the discussion around mobility. However, countries at the top end of economic development (Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand) could also play a more pro-active role in driving skills mobility and development. VII. Concluding Summary
Due to demographic, economic, social, and technological changes in the ASEAN region and globally, ASEAN needs to move forward
with skills mobility to build competitive and knowledge-driven economies. This will help maintain a united ASEAN and will contribute
towards ASEAN centrality. A single ASEAN market for skills and talent will require free movement for various occupations and non-
discriminatory treatment for foreign workers in national legislations and policies, employment practices, employment remuneration
and benefits, and common quality assurance and qualifications recognition. A single ASEAN market for skills and talents by 2040
pre-supposes the establishment of a single market for goods and services in ASEAN. A single market for goods appears more likely
than a single market for services as services delivery requires Mode 3 (right of establishment) and Mode 4 (temporary movement of
natural persons). Mode 4 covers contractual service suppliers (self-employed independent service suppliers and employees of
foreign service suppliers), intra-corporate transferees and persons directly recruited by the foreign affiliate, and service sellers or
persons responsible for setting up a commercial presence. While intra-corporate transferees are well taken care of with the
liberalisation of FDI, liberalising Mode 4 would take care of other service suppliers as well. Service-market integration will
complement the skilled labour-market integration. The digital age makes possible virtual migration with an important impact on
ASEAN skilled labour mobility. Many more services are being delivered online with short visits by service suppliers, and do not
require the physical movement of service suppliers. This would remove some of the concerns over overcrowding or sociocultural
disruptions by an influx of in-migrants (although the same is felt about large influxes of tourists) and concerns over brain drain
caused by large outflows of the skilled. The economic importance of labour market integration cannot be overstated. Yet, it is
necessary not to integrate hastily and acknowledge political and social concerns. First, a liberalised skills market, coupled with a
strong push towards upskilling of the domestic labour force, can be an effective strategy for achieving rapid growth without leaving
anyone behind. Second, given the vast differences amongst ASEAN countries in geographic and population sizes and in levels of
economic development and wage incomes, free movement of all labour is politically unrealistic. Third, many ASEAN countries are
still engaged in post-independence nation building and are struggling with managing plural societies and may not welcome more
cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity. Some are looking outward beyond ASEAN. Some are internally divided and prioritise
national cohesion over regional cohesion. There are also growing concerns related to security and terrorism prompting stricter
immigration controls. A concerted effort is needed to instil a sense of common destiny amongst ASEAN countries. Moving forward,
AMS could agree on an ASEAN-wide framework for governing the movement of skilled workers, with provisions for bilateral
(preferably binding) agreements between AMS to operationalise the framework. Such bilateral agreements could be gradually
expanded to cover ASEAN as a whole so that the region can achieve meaningful skills mobility.

Solves growth - a human-centered approach to the economy solves better

than enabling low-skilled migration. I read yellow
ILO 22 International Labor Organization 11-28-2022 "Jobs in Asia and the Pacific record
modest recovery while future growth prospects remain challenging"
https://www.ilo.org/asia/media-centre/news/WCMS_862287/lang--en/index.htm
//Elmer
BANGKOK, Thailand (ILO News) – Asia-Pacific labour markets have recorded a partial rebound
from the impact of COVID-19 yet full recovery in the region remains elusive with
conditions expected to remain difficult into 2023. According to the Asia–Pacific Employment and Social
Outlook 2022: Rethinking sectoral strategies for a human-centred future of work ,
employment numbers in the Asia-Pacific region in 2022 were 2.0 per cent above the pre-
crisis level of 2019, recovering from the loss of over 57 million jobs in 2020 . Still, the recovery
is not complete. The region still lacks 22 million jobs in 2022, a jobs gap of 1.1 per cent compared to if the pandemic had not
occurred. This number is projected to increase to 26 million (1.4 per cent) in 2023 given the headwinds to growth in the current
geopolitical global and regional context. At the same time, total working hours in the region remained below those of 2019 while the
regional unemployment rate in 2022 was 5.2 per cent, an increase of 0.5 percentage points from 2019. By 2022, all subregions had
regained the employment losses of 2020 and were showing positive employment growth over 2019. However, employment growth
did not keep pace with population growth. Only in the Pacific was the employment-to-population ratio in 2022 above that of 2019.

“Although Asia-Pacific employment trends look positive, the region’s labour market is
not yet back on its pre-crisis track with numerous additional challenges casting
shadows on future growth prospects. It is vital that we bring inclusive and human-centred
growth back to the region and not settle for a ‘quasi’ recovery based on informal and
poor-quality jobs,” said Ms Chihoko Asada Miyakawa, ILO Assistant Director-General and Regional Director for Asia and the
Pacific. The report makes a first-time assessment of regional sectoral estimates over a three-decade period from 1991-2021 to
highlight which sectors are growing as sources of jobs, which are shrinking and which harbour opportunities for “decent work”. It
reveals that while IT and information services is the region’s fastest growing sector in terms of employment growth, only 9.4 million
persons worked in the sector in 2021, corresponding to just 0.5 per cent of total employment. By contrast, the three largest sectors
in terms of employment in the Asia-Pacific region: agriculture, forestry and fishing; manufacturing; and wholesale and retail trade
together accounted for 1.1 billion workers in 2021, or 60 per cent of the region’s 1.9 billion workforce. The sectors where workers
are concentrated are typically characterized by limited labour productivity, low wages, poor working conditions and low job and
income security. Most workers in these sectors lack social protection while a high degree of informality also exists, with any gains
made in recent decades largely wiped out by the pandemic. Gender inequality remains rife with all but one of the top ten high
employment growth sectors benefitting men workers over women workers. Only accommodation and food service activities bucked
this trend with 55 per cent of added jobs between 1991 and 2021 going to women. “Despite half a century of economic growth the
While IT
fact remains that most workers in Asia and the Pacific are employed in sectors that the ‘Asian miracle’ has passed by.
and modern sectors may receive the lion’s share of attention, the greatest potential to
drive growth and decent work in the region lies in far less glamorous areas. The
challenge moving forward is to increase and sustain policy attention and public
investment to achieve decent work and inclusion in all sectors , especially those where
the majority of people work,” said Sara Elder, ILO Senior Economist and lead author of
the report.