Human Factors in Process Plant Operation by David A. Strobhar

HAZards & OPerability (HAZOP)
1
2
3
A hazard and operability study is the method recommended for

identifying hazards and problems which prevent efficient
operation.
HAZOP is a technique which provides opportunities for people
to let their imaginations go free and think of all possible ways in
which hazards or operating problems might arise, but to reduce
the chance that something is missed, it is done in a systematic
way, and each section and each sort of hazard is considered in
turn. The study is carried out by a team so that the members can
stimulate each other and build upon each other's ideas.
4
The HAZOP method was developed to identify hazards in process

plants and to identify operability problems that, although not
hazardous, could compromise a plant's productivity.
Team Approach:
HAZOP should be conducted with a team who represents different
disciplines of the system
Systematically Structured
The HAZOP study should be performed in a deliberate, systematic
manner during study the process sections to reduce the possibility of
omissions and to stimulate the imaginative scenarios and identify
potentials of process upset or malfunctions that badly impact the
Environmental, Safety and productivity issues
Within a study node, all deviations associated with a given process
parameter should be analyzed before the next process parameter is
considered. All of the deviations for a given study node should be
analyzed before the team proceeds to the next node.
5
The best time to conduct a HAZOP is when the Process and

instrumental diagrams (P&ID) are available because it is
possible to change the design without major cost. The HAZOP
study concentrates on how the design will cope with abnormal
conditions
6
Deviations
Departure from the original design intensions or the expected
performance of an activity (s).
For example process parameters might becomes abnormal to
exceed the maximum limits that may be withstand, (e.g. the
pressure might be increased, the level might be decreased, the
temperature might get reduced and so forth)
Regardless the reasons that leads to the deviation the team
should be encouraged to deal with such hypothetical deviations
to examine its credibility.
7
Causes
How the deviation might occurs (the reason of process upset
being appeared)
Normally when incidents occurs there will be one or two
definite root causes for such occurrence, while in the HAZOP
study it is a matter of hypothetical deviation to be proposed to
challenge the design intention and design envelope. Accordingly
it is so important to investigate all possible causes the may lead
to the deviation based on the operational experience and
challenged brain storming of the team members.
8
Consequences
Negative impact of the deviation on the process safety. The team
should be directed to think about the ultimate consequences of
the deviation assuming failure of all existing safeguards.
Every pair of Cause and Consequences are creating a Scenario
Consequences might be health, safety and environmental.
9
Safe Guards.
Engineering and / or administrative controllers that mitigate the
risk by reducing the frequency of the causes or severity of the
consequences.
10
Findings & Recommendations

Enlisting of the overall findings with a suggestions for
procedural or design change or further engineering studies to be
required
11
Quantitative increase referred to outside upper system tolerance

more of any relevant physical parameter than there should be,
such as more flow (rate, quantity), more pressure, higher
temperature, or higher viscosity.
12
Quantitative decrease referred to outside lower system tolerance

opposite to More “Less of any relevant physical parameter than
there should be, such as less flow (rate, quantity), low pressure,
low temperature, or short time”.
13
Complete Negation of the system intent no forward flow when

there should be.
Sequential process step omitted.
14
Qualitative increase referred to expected received quality. More

things present than should be (extra phases, impurities).
Transfer from more than one source or to more than one
destination.
15
Qualitative Decrease referred to expected received quality

system composition different from what it should be (in multi-
component stream).
16
Logically opposite to the intension reverse flow, Vacuum.

Sequential process steps performed in reverse order.
17
HAZOP Guide words approach

Applying the applicable guide words on process variable will
systematically generate most of the upset scenarios regarding
this variable. Repeating this for all the process variables well
generate a compressive matrix including an upset scenario in
every single cell
18
the guide word combined with the process parameter results in

the deviation
Considering the deviation, the study team agrees on its possible
causes (e.g., operator error causes block in pump), the
consequences of the deviation (e.g., line rupture due to high
pressure), and the safety levels or safe guards which prevent the
cause from leading to the consequence (e.g., pressure relief
valve on pump discharge line).
The consequence specified presupposes the failure of active
protection systems (e.g., relief valves, process trip signals). If
the causes and consequences are significant, and the safety
levels are inadequate, the team may recommend a follow-up
action.
19
Leak – Rupture – Loss of Containment

Those general deviations are some how an indication that the
facilities sitting issues are addressed
Start Up – Shut Down – Maintenance/Testing
Looking for the above general deviations helps to ensure that the
human factors issues are addressed
In General most of the experts considering that Loss of
Containment is considered as an ultimate deviation. and
consequently tends to consider High Pressure & High Level to
be the most critical deviations
20
A common mistake in many safety reviews is to delve into the

analysis without a basic understanding or agreement of how the
facility was designed or intended to be operated. Prior to a
discussion of the hazards and consequences, the team should
identify and agree to the design philosophy of the facility under
review. Sometimes, some features of a facility are assumed, but
never documented
Typical periods when these assumptions may not be true are
during startup or shutdown, turnarounds, maintenance activities,
unusual environments, process upsets, labor disputes, etc. The
HAZOP review should strive to examine these circumstances,
usually the period when most accidents occur.
21
Typical examples are as follows:

•The facility is manned (operated) with an adequate staff as
intended by the design philosophy.
•The failures of process equipment, instrumentation and safety
devices occur randomly.
•The failure rates and demand rates of safety devices are
considered low.
•Facility maintenance and operational testing is considered
accomplished accurately and timely
22
Typical examples are as follows:

•The time to repair equipment or perform maintenance is
considered negligible.
•Production flows are a constant volume.
•Production flows are generally of an identical composition.
•The facility is designed, operated, and maintained to good
management and engineering standards.
•Management is concerned with safety.
23
HAZOP Review Applications

A HAZOP review method is suggested for the process when the
following more complex facilities are under study. These facilities
contain processes which typically are complex in nature, have
chemical processes containing volatile hydrocarbons/toxic chemicals,
or have high employee concentrations:
•Facilities with toxic or highly corrosive fluids and vapors treating
equipment (e.g. H2S Treating Facilities, such as 'an Amine unit).
•Gas Injection Systems
•Gas Loading Facilities (Truck, Rail, Ship)
•Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Processing Plants
•Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Processing Plants
•Gas Storage Facilities
•Manned Offshore Facilities (e.g. production and storage facilities)
•Refinery Unit Process
24
•Chemical Plant Unit Process
24
Node
Node (Sometimes called Process Section) is identified as any
section or piece of the process that inside it the process
parameters or variables are substantially changes.
For Examples
Pump raising the pressure of the liquids
Tank has its own varying level.
Separator pressure and level may vary.
Temperature is an important variable that considered in Heat
Exchanger
25
Before the review actually starts, the team leader and scribe
should identify, highlight and list the nodes that will be selected
for the review. The team leader should confirm the selection
with the project manager before the review begins. These nodes
may be modified during the review process, but a baseline and
estimate for the review may be prepared from the listing. The
level of resolution of the nodes depends on the level of safety
review that is desired.
A facility or process is divided into systems and subsystems. The
subsystems usually will contain one or two components which
are the "nodes". The guidelines for identifying and selecting
nodes are as follows:
•Divide the facility into process systems and subsystems.
•Follow the process flow of the system under study.
•Isolate subsystems into major components which achieve a
single objective (i.e. increase pressure, remove water, separate
gases, etc.).
26
1. Free Water Knock Out (FWKO) Vessels

2. Distillation Column
3. Multi-phase Separator
4. Reactor Vessel
5. Process Tower
6. Mixing Vessel
7. Pumping unit
8. Gas Cooler
9. Heat Exchanger
10. Compressor
11. Metering skid
12. Storage tank
13. Furnace or incinerator
14. Flare
15. Fire pump
27
16. Cooling Tower
27
The Concept of Nodes in HAZOP.

The term "node" is used to describe the selection of one or more
items of equipment as a focal point of study. A node could be as
small as a line, a pump, a vessel or a heat exchanger, or as large
as an entire process plant. The practicality of not only selecting
nodes, but also of sizing nodes, is of critical importance.
28
Line-By-Line Method
Consider a vessel where there are a number of lines entering the
vessel and a number of lines leaving the vessel. The early
method was to take each of the lines entering the vessel, in turn,
and treat them as separate nodes, applying deviations, such as
High Flow, Low/No Flow, Reverse/Misdirected Flow, High
Pressure, Low Pressure and so forth. Each line leaving the vessel
was also treated as a separate node. The vessel itself may not
treated as a separate node because it was considered to be
adequately addressed by applying deviations to the entry and
exit lines.
29
Compound Nodes Method

Following on from the early method of line-by-line assignment
of nodes, the concept of compound nodes was devised.
With compound nodes, a section of routing, say, involving feed
piping from a feed vessel, a centrifugal pump, a control valve set
and a heat exchanger supplying a reactor vessel would be
considered as a single node.
In time, compound nodes were expanded considerably to
typically include all of the equipment shown on one or more
piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs).
30
Experience Gained in Choosing & Sizing Nodes

The early methodology of choosing single lines as nodes,
although comprehensive, proved to be extremely time
consuming and resulted in extensive repetition of recorded data.
This led to extreme fatigue and loss of interest by HAZOP
teams, resulting in low-efficiency HAZOP.
Increasing the size of nodes to take into account more equipment
items was found to result in less repetition, greater progress and
more efficient HAZOP.
Maximizing Node Sizes
For the relative new members to HAZOP, small node sizes, even
those confined to single lines, can have the benefit of
familiarization with the HAZOP methodology. Thus, as greater
familiarity and confidence are gained with the HAZOP
methodology, the node size can be increased to include more
equipment.
31
What therefore is the practical and optimized limit to node size?

Given that small node sizes are inefficient, very large node sizes
may also be inefficient when they become unwieldy and hard to
handle.
In general, the optimum node size can include multiple items of
equipment, provided that they share a common function.
When there is a discrete change in functionality, this becomes a
boundary point, and one or more additional nodes need to be
designated to reflect the different functional groupings.
32
Purpose & Function

The team should be concerned about the purpose of every
process section and identifies the specific vessels, equipments
piping segments and instrumentation to be included in the
HAZOP study
33
Materials Volume
HAZOP team is usually concerns about the trapped volume or
the stock materials holed by the vessels, tank and equipment
34
Materials Composition
The composition/Phase of the materials handled within different
section of the process is also an item for example gas outlet of
production separator, oil outlet and water outlet.
35
Study objectives
Study objectives should be clearly identified prior conducting
the analysis session to help the team in the node selection for
example does the HAZOP is made for a novel process , Existing
facilities also the complexity and scale of the facilities to be
analyzed for example “ Management of change for small
modification or introducing a new major equipment of applying
a new technology.
36
Isolation Points
Reliable isolation points between the nodes is an important item
to be considered.
37
Major Equipments/Component
It is strongly suggested to consider every major component to be
a study node for example production separator, Main injection
pumps, inlet scrubber, Storage tanks, Generators…..and so forth
38
One line section between each major sections

At least one line section (Study Node) between each major
Section of the process is suggested for example Separator and
charge pump are connected at least with one node also inlet
scrubber and G/L module should be connected with at least one
study node.
39
Section @ each Connection to Major Process Section

Each distinguished connection to a major component could be
process node for example the connections to the production
separator (fluid inlet, gas outlet, oil outlet, water outlet and other
connections)
40
Additional line section for each flow split (unique function or

destination)
The main branches from common major sections (Headers)
those have a unique function or distention may be a study node.
41
1. Select the process Node

2. Define Design Intentions
3. Select Process Variable
4. Apply a Guide Word to the selected variable to form a deviation
5. Assess the Consequences of the Deviation (Assuming NO SAFE
GUARDS)
6. Identify the possible causes of the deviation and the likelihood
7. Involve the existing safeguards of the system against the
deviation with an appropriate credibility
8. Based on the Consequences, causes likelihood and safeguards
credibility Risk to be assessed
9. Recommendations or Actions to be taken (If Any)
10. Repeat with another Guideword
11. Repeat for another process variable
12. Repeat with all other Nodes
42
1. Piping & Instrumentation Drawings (P & IDs), that are "as-

built“ verified for the existing hydrocarbon processing facilities*
2. Plot plan or equipment and main piping layout and pertinent
elevation drawings, including surface drainage arrangements. *
3. Cause and effects charts (SAFE charts) with schedule of
alarm and trip settings. *
4. P & IDs for vendor packages. *
5. System design philosophy and process description. *
6. Fire and explosion protection system drawings or
arrangements (fire & gas detection/alarm, protection - passive
and active). *
7. Chemical and physical properties of commodities involved,
especially hazardous materials (Crude oil GOR, Material Safety
Data Sheets (MSDS), etc.). *
44
8. Operating procedures (including. start up or shut down) and

maintenance schedules. **
44
Credible Scenarios or Causes

The objective of performing a HAZOP review is to identify and
develop credible process upset scenarios or causes which could
adversely impact safety, health, environment, quality,
productivity or public perception of the company. Obviously a
multitude of events both common (line rupture) and very
farfetched could be identified (meteor striking facility). The aim
is to identify events that have a very real possibility of occurring
at the facility. Although all such farfetched events may be listed,
it is generally not practical or necessary to do so.
45
46
47
a. Always check the design rating versus operating conditions

for each piece of equipment. Consider whether the deviations
may cause the specified design ratings to be exceeded.
b. Identify scenarios where equipment could be used in more
than one service (i.e. common spare pumps, test and
production separator, pipeline multi-service included in
contingency plan) or where there are alternative methods of
operation.
c. Check the means of pressure relief for each piece of
equipment. Verify that PSV's can not be isolated from the
equipment it is intended to protect
d. Consider common unit upsets or equipment failures.
e. For existing facilities, verify that equipment and PSV
numbers are consistent between the P&lDs, the equipment
data plates, tags in the field, equipment lists, and PSV lists. If
there are discrepancies, the equipment numbers in the
Operating procedures should also be check.
48
Technical Suggestions
f. For existing facilities, verify out of service equipment and
that lines are properly blinded or isolated.
g. Verify that liquid and vapor sample stations meet appropriate
specifications.
i. Review acid gas lines for check valves where appropriate.
j. If the system contains anhydrous ammonia or other highly
hazardous material, verify that product lines are in
compliance with the appropriate industry standards.
k. Review heaters for adequate alarms in the event of loss of
process flow (consider tube skin temperature alarms).
49
• List both operating and design information in the "intention"

for each parameter. List Operating, then Design
• Identify control loops by number and equipment by number.
• If cause from adjacent Node, identify specific examples of
the cause if possible, i.e. "Block valve closed on upstream
Node".
• Strive to be as specific as possible on identification process
upsets, i.e. "Process upset resulting in loss of reaction", etc.
50
• Safeguards that are located on other nodes can be referenced.

Generally is not necessary to be specific when using "Alarms
on other nodes" as a safeguard. However be sure to verify it
before applying it. If the consequences are . severe, a specific
reference of the alarm should be made.
• The consequences of control valves failing open or closed
should be evaluated regardless of the specified failure
position of the valve.
• Do not use indicator or an alarm that derives its signal from a
control loop as a safeguard if that control loop is the cause of
the deviation.
51
Avoid duplicating recommendations for similar equipment or

occurrences. The original recommendation should be numbered,
subsequent recommendation should be referenced to the original
recommendation.
fire protection system or response is not used as a safeguard.
52
Recommendations produced by the HAZOP reviews are the

most important item of interest from the report. They therefore
require special attention.
It should be remembered that, the purpose of a HAZOP is to
identify hazards, and then to assign a risk ranking to those
hazards. It is not the purpose of a HAZOP to issue SPECIFIC
recommendations. The HAZOP analysis should merely list the
hazards that have been identified, along with their associated
risks. These findings will then be turned into specific
recommendations by the appropriate departments and/or
individuals following the conclusion of the HAZOP . The
HAZOP team should be particularly careful not to become a
“one-minute engineering department”; the purpose of the PHA is
to find problems, not to solve them.
53
The Team Leader is not responsible to produce any

recommendations. He is to guide the team in the review to arrive
at a consensus of what is the required level of protection desired
for the facility. In this respect the Team Leader can suggest
methods of protection commonly employed by the company's
philosophy of protection or applied in the petroleum or chemical
industries. All recommendations should be arrived at via a
consensus of the team review members.
54
Team members should primarily consider the technical merit of

recommendations and should not be intimidated by their cost or
project schedule impact, however the practicality of all
suggestions should be kept in mind. It must also be realized that
an infinite amount of money would be required to eliminate "all"
hazards an employee, the public, or the company could be
exposed to. The final decision on any major recommendation
should be evaluated in its absolute terms, i.e. its cost to
implement by performing a value analysis (cost versus benefit).
55
Recommendations should be as precise as possible and include

specific equipment references (e.g. the facility equipment tag
numbers) when appropriate. Later interpretation by management
and design engineers trying to resolve the recommendation may
be confused if the exact nature of the recommendation is not
understood. Where further clarifications are needed, the
"comments" and "remarks" columns of the worksheet should be
used
56
The team members should not feel obligated to make

recommendations that completely resolve the concern. An
engineering or operations group will evaluate a recommendation
after the review to determine the best course of action. In many
cases a recommendation may be made to evaluate, study or
perform a cost benefit analysis, rather than insist a particular
feature be added to the process. Experience has shown that many
review teams waste valuable time trying to determine the exact
nature of an item to recommend.
Future in-depth evaluations of the recommendation may entirely
alter the suggested solution. If the review team recommended a
study or evaluation of the problem, they could immediately
continue to other areas of the review.
57
If a HAZOP review consistently indicate considerable design

faults, the quality of the design or it's completeness may be in
question. When this occurs an evaluation of the project design,
team qualifications or timing and level of the HAZOP review is
in order.
A review may uncover "common" minor safety hazards that are
of the nature of slips, trips and falls. These may be noted and
appropriate recommendations made, however the team should
strive to avoid undue concentration on these events, as the
objective of these reviews are to identify potential major process
hazards.
58
Overall recommendations usually can be categorized as one of

the following:
1. Modify the design.
2. Add an indicator
3. Add an alarm
4. Add an interlock.
5. Develop or change a procedure.
6. Develop a preventive maintenance procedure.
7. Conduct a more detailed safety review.
8. Review the design.
9. Provide a means to isolate.
10. Improve fire or explosion protection.
11. Improve emergency response
59
All the recommendations produced by the team should be easily

understood by future readers of the report. It therefore
imperative the recommendations be clear, concise, unambiguous
and relevant. They should also be given a ranking based on
reducing risk at the facility.
60
HAZOP recommendations should be adequate and specific as

possible. It should be considered that, this recommendations are
the interpretation of the HAZOP study revealed.
General recommendations should be avoided, instead they
should self explanatory with reference to specific equipment
tagging .
61
Examples of inadequate versus adequate recommendations are

illustrated in Table
62
63

Human Factors in Process Plant Operation by David A. Strobhar

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Human Factors in Process Plant Operation by David A. Strobhar

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

HAZards & OPerability (HAZOP)

A hazard and operability study is the method recommended for

The HAZOP method was developed to identify hazards in process

The best time to conduct a HAZOP is when the Process and

Findings & Recommendations

Quantitative increase referred to outside upper system tolerance

Quantitative decrease referred to outside lower system tolerance

Complete Negation of the system intent no forward flow when

Qualitative increase referred to expected received quality. More

Qualitative Decrease referred to expected received quality

Logically opposite to the intension reverse flow, Vacuum.

HAZOP Guide words approach

the guide word combined with the process parameter results in

Leak – Rupture – Loss of Containment

A common mistake in many safety reviews is to delve into the

Typical examples are as follows:

Typical examples are as follows:

HAZOP Review Applications

•Chemical Plant Unit Process

1. Free Water Knock Out (FWKO) Vessels

16. Cooling Tower

The Concept of Nodes in HAZOP.

Compound Nodes Method

Experience Gained in Choosing & Sizing Nodes

What therefore is the practical and optimized limit to node size?

Purpose & Function

One line section between each major sections

Section @ each Connection to Major Process Section

Additional line section for each flow split (unique function or

1. Select the process Node

1. Piping & Instrumentation Drawings (P & IDs), that are "as-

8. Operating procedures (including. start up or shut down) and

Credible Scenarios or Causes

a. Always check the design rating versus operating conditions

• List both operating and design information in the "intention"

• Safeguards that are located on other nodes can be referenced.

Avoid duplicating recommendations for similar equipment or

Recommendations produced by the HAZOP reviews are the

The Team Leader is not responsible to produce any

Team members should primarily consider the technical merit of

Recommendations should be as precise as possible and include

The team members should not feel obligated to make

If a HAZOP review consistently indicate considerable design

Overall recommendations usually can be categorized as one of

All the recommendations produced by the team should be easily

HAZOP recommendations should be adequate and specific as

Examples of inadequate versus adequate recommendations are

You might also like