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Arc-flash Assessment for High Voltage Transmission Lines-A BC Hydro

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Arc-flash Assessment for High Voltage
Transmission Lines–A BC Hydro Perspective
Jahangir Khan, Senior Member, IEEE, Mažana Armstrong, Senior Member, IEEE, Ali Moshref, Senior
Member, IEEE
Abstract—BC Hydro has recently undertaken a system-wide
arc-flash assessment. The calculation of incident energy for the
high-voltage transmission lines is challenging primarily due to
the lack of (a) established methodologies, (b) understanding
of live-line arc hazard scenarios, and (c) published examples
of arc-flash studies. This work provides an overview of BC
Hydro’s current approach in conducting transmission line arc-
flash hazard assessment. A set of credible scenarios are identified
- followed by a discussion of applicable methodologies and
input parameters. The incident energy levels are calculated for
all transmission voltage classes, from 69 kV to 500 kV. This
is done through two types of analysis: (a) sensitivity analysis
against fault clearing time and fault current, and (b) line-
specific analysis to determine the arc hazards along a line. For
the latter, an automated process is outlined to study multiple
lines simultaneously. Finally, highlights of the interim results are
presented, and areas of further work are indicated.
Index Terms—Arc-flash, live-line work, long arc, transmission
line, incident energy.
I. I NTRODUCTION
S part of an ongoing safety improvement initiative, BC
A Hydro is currently undertaking a system-wide review of
the arc-flash hazards. Arc-flash is deemed as a serious safety
risk at BC Hydro as there have been 23 arc-flash incidents
and 183 arc-flash near-misses during the period of 2002–2014.
Most of these incidents happened at lower voltages compared
to that of the high-voltage (HV) transmission system. The
broad objective of the on-going arc-flash program is to address
various deficiencies and manage the risks to the workers.
Understandably, the incident energy associated with arc-
flashes on HV transmission system is relatively low, primarily
due to larger working distances and faster fault clearing times.
However, the severity can be high, and the hazard cannot
be ignored as there have been recorded incidents of arc-flash
injuries at HV levels [1].
While arc-flash studies are routinely conducted for low
voltage systems, similar studies for HV systems, especially
those pertaining to live-line work, are rare. There exists a
knowledge-gap on applicable methods, particularly for long
arcs that are unique to HV systems. Available industry stan-
dards do not adequately cover this issue [1–3]. The live-
line work scenarios prone to arc hazards, and the associated
Jahangir Khan is with BC Hydro, 6911 Southpoint Drive, Burnaby, BC,
V3N 4X8, Canada (e-mail: mjakhan@ieee.org).
Mažana Armstrong is with Powertech Labs Inc, 12388 – 88th Avenue,
Surrey, BC V3W 7R7, Canada (e-mail: mazana.armstrong@ieee.org).
Ali Moshref is with BBA Inc, 1050 West Pender Street, Suite 850,
Vancouver, BC V6E 3S7, Canada (e-mail: ali.moshref@bba.ca).
1
working distances are also not easily identifiable [4, 5]. Large
parametric variations (i.e., variation of fault impedance, fault
current, fault type and fault clearing time) along a line also
pose a unique challenge. Finally, considering the presence of
numerous structures on a transmission line, what mitigation
can be implemented, remains to be answered.
This article shares BC Hydro’s recent experience on study-
ing the arc-flash hazards on its entire HV transmission system.
We discuss various live-line work scenarios that are prone to
arc-flash hazards, conduct a sensitivity analysis of incident
energy for each voltage class, and discuss an automated
method to calculate the incident energy levels along a line. A
summary of the interim results is presented, and the limitations
of the current approach are discussed.
II. W ORK S CENARIOS
BC Hydro’s existing live-line work methods have built-in
safety measures that significantly reduce the arc-flash hazards.
However, under some special circumstances, particularly due
to worker error or unplanned events, arc hazards can pose a
risk. The following scenarios were initially identified as having
high exposure to arc-flash hazards:
a) Erroneous attempts to apply grounding on an energized
line
b) Fault across a broken or contaminated insulators with a
worker nearby
c) Flashover across a contaminated insulated tool being
used by a worker
d) Loss of control of jumpers while splicing conductors or
jumpering
e) Operation of a faulty switch while a worker aloft is
conducting visual inspection
f) Flashover between insulator tie wire and bonded pole
hardware
g) Arcs from charging current reaching a structure or an
adjacent phase
h) Phase-to-phase flashover in the event of a loss of control
of one phase into an adjacent phase, or loss of control
of a jumper
i) Mis-operation of uninsulated equipment (e.g. crane)
j) Arc-flash hazard related to the use of a portable line
disconnect switch
Upon further review of the above scenarios and considering
the likelihood of such incidents, three ‘root’ scenarios were
selected for further consideration. These are discussed below.

Fig. 1. Erroneous grounding attempt. Center (red) circle: ‘minimum’ working
distance, outside (yellow) circle: ‘normal’ working distance.
Fig. 2. Arc across a broken or contaminated insulator. Center (red)
circle: ‘minimum’ working distance, outside (yellow) circle: ‘normal’ working
distance.
A. Scenarios 1: Erroneous grounding attempt
Consider a situation where a worker applies a ground to
an energized line, or moves an energized jumper too close to
a grounded object. Arc length can be equivalent to a phase-
to-ground flashover distance, and the working distance will
most likely be ’normal’ working distances minus the arc length
(since it is possible that one end of the arc might be closer to
the worker than the conductor). This is illustrated in Fig. 1.
B. Scenario 2: Arc across a broken or contaminated insulator
Another possible scenario is an arc across a broken or
contaminated insulator as shown in Fig. 2. Similar situations
can be perceived for switch failure during operation, arc
caused by induction (due to adjacent energized lines) reaching
a tower, or arc during insulator testing. The arc length could be
equal to the length of the insulator, and the working distance
is expected to be ‘normal’ working distance.
2
Fig. 3. Development of an arc across phases. Center (red) circle: ‘minimum’
working distance, outside (yellow) circle: ‘normal’ working distance.
C. Scenario 3: Phase-to-phase flashover
This scenario considers the possibility of an arc between
phases as shown in Fig. 3. This would only be expected for
tight spacing, especially if the worker is located between two
phases. Figure 3 shows a scenario where a worker in a bucket
is maneuvering a jumper on the center phase. The arc length
could be equivalent to the phase-to-phase electrical flashover
distance, and the working distance could be ‘normal’ working
distance.
III. I NCIDENT E NERGY C ALCULATION
Various arc-flash incident energy calculation methods and
the rationale behind the selection of each method are de-
scribed in [1, 3]. In this work, the arc flash incident energy
is calculated for high voltage open air scenarios using the
empirical equations (based on test data) described in the EPRI
Technical Report 1022632 [2]. The EPRI empirical equations
are suitable for single phase arc-flash scenarios in high voltage
transmission lines where the phase-to-phase distances are large
enough to exclude escalation of a single phase arc-flash to
adjacent phases. The EPRI empirical equations are shown
below:
Average voltage gradient (in kV peak/m):
Eave = [0.0000112G−8 + 1.19
+ (0.069G−1.239 − 0.0126)Iarc (1)
2
Incident thermal energy flux (in cal/(s.cm )):
−0.152
φ = (6.7Eave Iarc G0.58 )(3.281D)−1.58G (2)
Finally, the incident energy (in cal/cm2 ):
E =φ×t (3)
Where G is the arc gap length (m), D is the working
distance (m), Iarc is the arc current in kA (rms), and t is
the duration of the arc current in second.
 3

The independent variables listed above (G, D, Iarc and C. Arc Duration
t) effectively determine the incident energy levels. These The arc-flash durations used in this study are mainly
parameters are discussed further in the proceeding section. The based on the planned/designed fault clearing times generally
incident energy levels are categorized according to Table I. applicable for the BC Hydro transmission system. Clearing
TABLE I times for transmission lines and the associated line terminals
I NCIDENT ENERGY CATEGORIES largely depend on whether or not the line is equipped with
communication assisted protection. Without this feature, the
Category Incident Energy (cal/cm2 )
0 0-2
fault clearing time can be longer. Almost all 500 kV , 360
1 2-4 kV and 287 kV transmission lines are equipped with fast
2 4-8 communication. Assuming no communications failure, the
3 8 - 25
4 25 - 40
maximum fault clearing times for all voltage levels are given
in Table II. Since the fault clearing time, especially for lower
The lower threshold of the incident energy for Category 1 is voltage classes, has a strong dependence on the fault current,
considered to be 2 cal/cm2 according to [6]. This threshold the incident energy levels are calculated for a wide range of
is primarily used to identify arc-flash hazards for BC Hydro’s clearing times (0.03 to 0.98 s). The clearing times given in
high voltage lines. Table II are then used as a check to interpret the sensitivity
of the incident energy levels against varying fault currents.
IV. S TUDY PARAMETERS
A. Arc Gap V. R ESULTS
The arc gap lengths used for the arc-flash incident energy All the results presented in this article are to demonstrate
calculations (from 69 kV to 500 kV ) are based on the AC the applied methodology only. The results are of interim nature
flashover strength values reported by Aleksandrov/Hileman as further review is in progress.
[7, 8]. These are based on power-frequency voltage. Use of Two sets of results are prepared. The first set identifies the
minimum air insulation distances based on transient overvolt- incident energy levels against fault clearing times and fault
age would be overly conservative for the purposes of assessing currents (sensitivity analysis). The second set assesses the
arc-flash hazards. This is because the probability of an arc- incident energy along a given line at pre-specified distances
flash occurring at the exact instant as a transient overvoltage (line-specific analysis).
is minimal. Table II summarizes the arc gap lengths used for
the arc-flash incident energy calculations at each voltage level. A. Sensitivity analysis:
TABLE II This analysis is intended to help visualize the arc hazards
S UMMARY OF INPUT PARAMETERS under various operating conditions, especially for normal op-
Clearing time Working distance (m) eration. The single line-to-ground (SLG) fault levels at the line
Voltage (kV) Arc gap (m)
Cycles Sec. ‘Minimum’ ‘Normal’ terminals (i.e., at the substations) are used for this purpose. The
69 11 0.18 0.30 0.6 0.9 results are shown in Figure 4 to Figure 9 for all transmission
138 8 0.13 0.35 0.9 1.5
230 6 0.10 0.45 1.4 2.1 voltage classes, from 69 kV to 500 kV .
287 4 0.07 0.50 1.7 2.6 From these figures, it can be seen that the incident energy
360 4 0.07 0.70 2.1 3.0 level for transmission lines from 138 kV to 500 kV is expected
500 4 0.07 0.85 2.7 3.7
to be less than 2 cal/cm2 (see Figure 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9). There
is a considerable margin between the typical clearing time
It is further assumed that: (a) the arc is established directly
and the clearing time required to yield higher incident energy
along the arc gap and the effects of arc meandering is ignored
levels.
due to lack of agreed methodologies, and (b) for both single
However, for 69 kV lines, it is possible that the incident
line-to-ground (SLG) and line-to-line (LL) faults, the arc
energy level may exceed 2 cal/cm2 under typical operating
distances listed in Table II are valid.
conditions (i.e., typical fault clearing time).
B. Working Distance
The working distance is assumed to be ‘normal’ working B. Line-specific analysis:
distance as per BC Hydro’s current Safety Practice Regulations Further to the general screening done in the previous step,
(SPR) manual (Column 2 of limits of approach, LOA). These each line is assessed separately. The incident energy level is
limits are for qualified electrical workers who are exposed calculated along a line at 10% intervals taking into consider-
to energized electrical conductors and equipment. Note that ation of the decrease in fault current due to line impedance.
these distances include any extension of reach caused by the The objective is to determine whether an entire line or a part
use of conductive tools, materials, equipment or unplanned of the line has incident energy level higher than 2 cal/cm2 .
movements. The ‘minimum’ working distance (or, Column 1 To calculate the incident energy level at a location along a
of limits of approach, LOA as per BC Hydro’s current SPR line, an automated MS Excel based spreadsheet is used. For
manual) are absolute limits for qualified electrical workers for this analysis, a system base case (short circuit study case in
short duration of work. ASPEN software) is imported into the customized spreadsheet.
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Fig. 6. Arc-flash incident energy (230 kV ) Fig. 9. Arc-flash incident energy (500 kV)
 5

The general parameters (arc gap length, working distance, fault 3.00

Incident energy (cal/cm2)

(a)
clearing time and fault type) are then selected. The fault levels 2.50

(SLG or LL) are then calculated along a line at 10% intervals. 2.00

Station A

Station B
The fault current at each location is then used for incident 1.50
energy calculation. For multiple lines, this process is repeated 1.00

90 - 100
0 - 10

10 - 20

20 - 30

30 - 40

40 - 50

50 - 60

60 - 70

70 - 80

80 - 90
(see flowchart in Figure 10) until all the lines are iteratively
tabulated.
Distance along line (%)
20.0
START

Fault current (LG, kA)

(b)
16.0

Station A

Station B
12.0
Load Short ASPEN
8.0
Circuit Basecase Basecase
4.0
· Arc gap length 0.0
·

90 - 100
Set Working Distance

0 - 10

10 - 20

20 - 30

30 - 40

40 - 50

50 - 60

60 - 70

70 - 80

80 - 90
variables · Clearing time
· Fault type (LG, LL)
Distance along line (%)

Select line

· Find station terminals and line impedance
· Find fault current along line (at 10% interval)
· Find incident energy along line (at 10% interval)
Save results
Find next All lines
line N calculated ?
Y to 500 kV lines. Adequate job planning and adherence to
END
Fig. 10. Automated calculation of incident energy
An example of line-specific incident energy calculation is
given in Figure 11. For this example, the fault clearing time
is 0.183 (s), working distance is 0.9 (m), arc gap distance is
0.3 (m), line length is 6.56 (km), fault impedance is 0 (ohm)
and the line voltage is 69 kV .
It can be seen that the fault levels are relatively higher at
the two line terminals. This translates into a relatively higher
incident energy level (higher than 2 cal/cm2 ) at the begining
(0–30%) and at the end (80–100%) of the line.
Using this approach it was determined that
a) About 70 lines at 69 kV would have incident energy
levels higher than 2 cal/cm2 in part or in full length of
the line for SLG faults.
b) Among them, about 55 lines have incident energy levels
higher than 2 cal/cm2 for LL faults.
While the aforementioned approach provides an effective
mean to conduct arc-flash risk assessment for several hundred
lines in a matter of minutes, there are several limitations.
The key limitation is in its inability to account for varying
fault clearing times along a line. Further work will be needed
to accommodate for arc meandering effects (i.e, to identify
effective worker distances) and to study the reduction in
fault current due to fault impedances (i.e., tower footing
impedance).
Fig. 11. Example of line-specific analysis (a) SLG fault current, (b) incident
energy level
VI. C ONCLUSION
This article presents BC Hydro’s approach in identifying
credible scenarios of transmission line arc-flash hazard, con-
ducting sensitivity analysis under varying fault current and
clearing time, and using an automated process of incident
energy calculation along the entire length of a line. The interim
results indicate no significant arc-flash hazard for 138 kV
applicable work methods is expected to entirely eliminate the
arc-flash hazards. However, at 69 kV , there are about 70 lines
where the incident energy level can be higher than the accepted
threshold of 2 cal/cm2 . These lines are to be further studied
with detailed look at the fault clearing time, fault impedance,
worker distance and mitigation requirement.
VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors are thankful to the following BC Hydro col-
leagues for their support and contribution: Travis Brown,
Timothy Remfert, Titus Leung, Ralph Barone, and William
Fajber.
R EFERENCES
[1] J. C. Das, Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Mitigation. IEEE-Wiley, 2012.
[2] EPRI, “Arc Flash Issues in Transmission and Substation Environments:
Results from Tests with Long Arcs,” Tech. Rep. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA:
1022632, 2011.
[3] T. A. Short, “Arc-Flash Analysis Approaches for Medium-Voltage Dis-
tribution,” IEEE transactions on Industry Applications, vol. 47, no. 4,
2011.
[4] Bálint Halász, Gábor Göcsei, Bálint Németh, Richárd Cselkó, Tamás
Bokor, “Arc protection during live-line maintenance on high voltage
systems,” in 5th International Youth Conference on Energy (IYCE), 2015.
[5] EPRI, “’Arc Flash Issues in Transmission and Substation Environments:
Modeling of Incident Thermal Energy of Long Arcs,” Tech. Rep. Product
Id: 1022633, Dec 20, 2011.
[6] IEEE, “NESC C2-2007,” IEEE/ANS, 2007.
[7] G. N. Aleksandrov, V. I. Ivanov, V. P. Radkov, “Electrical Strength of
Air Gaps Between EHV Line Conductors and Earth During Surges,”
Elektrichestro, no. 4, pp. 20–24, 1965.
[8] A. R. Hileman, Insulation Coordination for Power Systems. CRC Press,
1999.

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