BARREDO V GARCIA

G.R. NO. L-48006

JULY 8, 1942

FACTS:

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between
Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a
taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by
Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-
old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and
one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted
the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino
Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought
an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the
sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8,
1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the
plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This
decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000
with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that
Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the
wrong side of the road, and at high speed.

Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death of Faustino Garcia caused by
negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo. On May
3, 1936 in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of
Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing
overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of
the passengers. Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil
action is reserved.

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 Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate
Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla CFI and CA awarded damages because
Fontanilla’s negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the road
and at a high speed and there is no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of
the family as Barredo is careless in employing in selection and supervision on
Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of Automobile Law and
speeding.

ISSUE:

Whether parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo
making him primarily liable and directly responsible under A1903CC as employer
of Fontanilla.

RULING:

Yes. There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the
A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages arising
from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other
action is under A1903CC it may be quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana wherein as the
negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to
proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family. Therefore the
plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second
remedy which is the civil code. Hence the parents were acting within their rights in
doing so.

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 ELCANO V HILL

77 SCRA 98

FACTS:

Defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence,

and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on
the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake.”Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was
criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano who is the son of Pedro
Elcano, and was acquitted for lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.Pedro
Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father
Atty Marvin.

ISSUE:

Whether the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald
in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed

RULING:

No.The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished
his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.Article 2176, where it refers to ‘fault or negligence,’ covers not only
acts ‘not punishable by law’ but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled

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in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made
in the two cases vary.

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 CINCO V CANONOY

90 SCRA 369

May 31, 1979

FACTS:

Cinco filed on Feb 25, 1970 a complaint for recovery of damages on account
of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo
Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal
case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident.

At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit. The
City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner’s MFR
having been denied, he elevated the matter on Certiorari to the CFI Cebu., which in
turn dismissed the petition.

Plaintiff claims it was the fault or negligence of the driver in the operation of
the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision. Therefore damages
were sustained by petitioner because of the collision and there was a direct causal
connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of
private respondents. Respondent claim they observed due diligence in the selection
and supervision of employees, particularly of Romeo Hilot.

ISSUE:

Whether there can be an independent civil action for damage to property

during the pendency of the criminal action.

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RULING:

Yes.Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as

a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Art 2177 of
the Civil Code. The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also
clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:

Sec 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32,
33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence.

Petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasi-

delict, as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil Code, is so broad that in includes not
only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction
between damage to persons on the one hand and damage to property on the other.
The word damage is used in two concepts: the harm done and reparation for the
harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to
person and property since harm is not limited to personal but also to property
injuries.

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 BAKSH V CA

219 SCRA 115

Feb.19, 1993

FACTS:

Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against

petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to
get married.

Marilou Gonzles alleged that she is a 22 yr. old Filipina, single, of good
moral character and respected reputation in her community. That Baksh is an
Iranian citizen, residing in Dagupan, and is an exchange student taking up
medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan. That Baksh later courted and proposed to
marry her. Marilou Gonzales accepted his love on the condition that they would
get married. They later agreed to get married at the end of the school semester.
Petitioner had visited Marilou Gonzales parents to secure their approval of the
marriage. Baksh later forced Marilou Gonzales to live with him. A week before the
filing of the complaint, petitioner started maltreating her even threatening to kill
her and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. A day before the
filing of the complaint, Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her
not to live with him anymore and that he is already married to someone in
Bacolod.

ISSUE:

Whether damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the

basis of Art.21 of the Civil Code.

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RULING:

Yes.In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral

seduction, Art. 21 may be applied. Where a man promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfillfulfil that promise becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act. The award of damages
pursuant to Art.21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willfulwilful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Therefore, it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of

love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with
him preparatory to their supposed marriage. In short, the private respondent
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction. The petitioner could not be held
liable for criminal seduction punished under either Art.337 or Art.338 of the RPC
because the private respondent was above 18 years of age at the time of the
seduction.

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 DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD, SUPERGUARD)

243 SCRA 220

April 3, 1995

FACTS:

Benigno Torzuela, , a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang,"

and Atty. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. Dulay.
Maria Benita Dulay, widow of Dulay, filed an action for damages against Torzuela
and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or
Superguard Security Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers of defendant
Torzuela. That Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with w/ deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC and that a
complaint for damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by
petitioners) cannot lie, since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to quasi-
offenses under Art 365 of the RPC. And that petitioners' filing of the complaint is
premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a
condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. That Article 33 of
the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v
CA). according to Petitioner the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to
the concurring negligence of the defendants. Torzuela's wanton and reckless
discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the
negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its
having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury. That their cause of
action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article
2180.That quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that
are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC. Thus, Torzuela's act of
shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art 2176.That
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Art 33 and Section 3,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

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ISSUE:

Whether civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action?

RULING:

Yes. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

"Sec 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused."It is well-settled
that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement
of an express reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this
case.The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to
include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co;
Carandang v. Santiago). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro). Although in the Marcia case,
it was heldruled that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33
where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that
Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with
reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.

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 GARCIA V FLORIDO

52 SCRA 420

FACTS:

On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis

Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester
Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a Public Utility car with
plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino
Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta
City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of
government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of
Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City.At about 9:30 a.m., while the
Public Utility car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at
kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car
collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71
owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant,
Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various
physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and
hospitalization.Alleging that both drivers of the Public Utility car and the
passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a
fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation
of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard. the
PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco,
filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private
respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus
that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.

The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et. al to in a motion to

dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or
20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro
Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and

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that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed
subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant
to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant
civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary
and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver,
Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not
applicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or
homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.

The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and dismissed the complaint

ISSUES:

1. Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on
the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants, the
civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the
termination of the criminal case

2. Whether the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on
quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be
tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and
because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants
jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages
Whether or not the dismissal of the case was proper.

RULING:

1. No.Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained

independently from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based on a
quasi-delict, a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press
recovery for damages in the criminal case.

In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the
criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala,

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much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or
acquittal of said accused.

It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for
damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for
damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present
civil case. As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private
respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action.
Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a
criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved
his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by
either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.

2. Yes, Bbecause the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict. An

action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential
averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely:a)
act or omission of the private respondents;b) presence of fault or negligence or the
lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro
Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car;c) physical
injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision;d)
existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the
fault or negligence of private respondents; ande) the absence of pre-existing
contractual relations between the parties.

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 ANDAMO V IAC (MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE,
INC)

191 SCRA 195;

NOVEMBER 6, 1990

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a

parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of
private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation.Within the land of respondent corporation, water paths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants
and other improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi,

Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the
Revised Penal Code.On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondent corporation. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on
the land.On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order suspending further
hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case. And
later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which
was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.The decision was based
on Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and
civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after
the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." Petitioners appealed from
that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

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 On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the
trial court. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the
Appellate Court .

ISSUE:

Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and
damage to an adjacent land, can be heldheld civilly liable for damages under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting
civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case

RULING:

YES.As heldheld in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in quasi-delicts, "t(t)he civil

action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and
2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the
criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction
in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."

A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements
of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault
or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the

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 TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC

16 PHIL 8

MARCH 22, 1910

FACTS:

The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street

railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The plaintiff, David
Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of
age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his
age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.On the 30th of
September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of
age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one
Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder
for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters,
the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual
interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in
wandering about the company's premises.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the
defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the
place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here
they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground.
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and
have in themselves a considerable explosive power. Tthey opened one of the caps
with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got
matches, and David heldheld the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three.
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck.
Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by
several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an

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extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care
for his wounds.

No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to

prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises
unattended, when they felt disposed so to do.

ISSUE:

Whether the defendants’ negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's

injuries

RULING:

No.Under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant
in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the
injury received by the plaintiff.

It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating
caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had
exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear
that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon
without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and
carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had
he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its
contents.Satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and
putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not
civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. Plaintiff contends, upon the
authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the
intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should
not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we

17
can not agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the
Turntable and Torpedo cases

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 TAYAG V ALCANTARA

98 SCRA 723

July 23, 1980

FACTS:

Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a Philippine

Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo Villa, which caused his instantaneous death. Pending
the criminal case against the driver, the heirs of Tayag instituted a civil action to
recover damages from the company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc.,c) and the driver. In turn,
the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the
ground that the criminal case was still pending. Judge Alcantara granted this
motion.In the criminal case, the driver was acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
The company and driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case on the ground that
the heirs do not have a cause of action because of the acquittal. Judge Alcantara
granted this and dismissed the civil case.

ISSUE

Whether Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground of
no cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver

RULING:

No.The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the

acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for
damages based on quasi-delict.That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lineo, Inc.,
has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan.
Otherwise, the accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr.
and damage to his property would not have occurred.

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All the essential elements for a quasi-delict action are present:(1) act or omission
constituting fault /negligence on the part of respondent (2) damage caused by the
said act or omission(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or
omission and (4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.

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 PADILLA V CA

129 SCRA 558

FACTS

That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in

the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused,
Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo,
Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo
Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard
Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any
authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means
of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their
stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter
brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes
and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and
merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his
family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and
moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public
positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the
accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident
premeditation.

On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the
appellants based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to pay
P9,600.00 as actual damages. The decision of the CA was based on the fact that the
petitioners were charged with coercion when they should have been more
appropriately charged with crime against person. Hence, the crime of grave
coercion was not proved in accordance with the law.

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ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to

pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal
charge

RULING:

NO.The Supreme Court, quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court and various jurisprudence including PNB vs Catipon, De Guzman vs Alvia,
held that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that
the facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist. In the case at bar, the
judgment of not guilty was based on reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof
to be used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence, the court express a finding
that the defendants’ offenses are civil in nature.

The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to
clarify whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The SC took the position that the said provision merely
emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the
same criminal act. The acquittal extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil
liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable ground.

22
 CRUZ V CA

282 SCRA 188

1997

FACTS:

Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help

Clinic and General Hospital. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the
petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a
hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her mother slept in the
clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next
day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the
clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to
ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. Because of the
untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with
the operation. The following day, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation
could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a
conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she
must be operated on as scheduled. Rowena and her other relatives waited outside
the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr.
Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy Tagamet
ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed
when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia.
They bought type "A" blood and the same was brought by the attendant into the
operating room.

After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the
operation was finished. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic
to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the
operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other
relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to
comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the
blood bank. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later

23
transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an
oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and
Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San
Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen
as soon as it arrived.

At around 10pm, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to
60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District
Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. The
transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of
Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended
transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District
Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the
ambulance. Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was
wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on
her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending
physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and
Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr.
Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood
pressure was already 0/0. While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the
patient died. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death
and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.

ISSUE:

Whether he circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction

against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

RULING:

No.The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or
fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that
it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the

24
offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time
and place.

For a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and
care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert
opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians
stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which
laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Physicians are
not warrantors of cures or insurers against personal injuries or death of the patient.

Even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in

the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these
circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of
reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of
the reckless imprudence.

Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of
Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.

25
 PHIL. RABBIT V PEOPLE

GR. NO. 147703

April 14, 2004

FACTS:

Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of

reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and
damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years, 9 months
and 11 days to 6 years, and to pay damages. But in the event the the accused
becomes insolvent, Phil. Rabbit will be held liable for the civil liabilities. But
admittedly, the accused jumped bail and remained at large.

ISSUE:

Whether an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its

accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused

RULING:

No.The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they

voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within
15 days from notice of the judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek
relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. In the case
before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the
judgment against him has become final and executory.

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the

26
resolution of the case. In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-
employee, it participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said
that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be said that by jumping
bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to
appeal.On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment, Under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. Since the civil
liability has become final and executory by reason of Napoleon Macadangdang
flight, then Philippine Rabbit subsidiary civil liability has also become
immediately enforceable.

Therefore, the decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding

and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee.

27
 PEOPLE V LIGON

152 SCRA 419

July 29, 1987

FACTS:

October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. Gabat, was riding in a 1978
Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused, Ligon
which was coming from España Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. At
the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards
the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, they stopped. While waiting, Gabat
beckoned a cigarette vendor, Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales
approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this
transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven
by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. As the Kombi continued to speed
towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his
grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the
Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical injuries
and was confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.

Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the
incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. He was traveling on the same lane in a
slightly oblique position. The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the
pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards
Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the
Luneta near the Rizal monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two
persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them
"nakaaksidente ng tao." The two men in the jeep joined the chase and at the
intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the
Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while
the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be
police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their
guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to

28
alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third person inside the
Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat.The three
were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned
over to Pfc. Fermin Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went
along with them. Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report, dated October
23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the
following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's
Office for further investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether Gabat is civilly liable.

RULING:

Yes.In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists

sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of Gabat arises. On the
basis of the trial court's evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and
defense witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil
cases, we find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act
and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should
answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the
cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set
the chain of events which led to the death of Rosales. Through fault and
negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while the
purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung
precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver
to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver's act of speeding away, instead of
stopping and picking up the injured victim. These proven facts taken together are
firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code for the damage
done to Rosales.

Therefore, he is hereby held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there
being fault or negligence, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y

29
Ortiz in the amount of P15.000.00 for the latter's death, P1,733.35 for hospital and
medical expenses, and P4,100.00 for funeral expenses.

30
 CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO

38 Phil 768

October 14, 1918

FACTS:

Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived

in San Mateo, Rizal, located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and
in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he
worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon
the company's trains free of charge. January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning
home by rail from his work and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the
plaintiff while making his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of
the coach.

On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station
there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some
distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office
for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed
down another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the railroad
company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform
begins to rise from the level of the ground. When Jose Cangco stepped off, one or
both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his
feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once
rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm
was badly crushed and lacerated. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car
moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.

The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and
with serious injuries. He was immediately brought to a hospital where an
examination was made and his arm was amputated. The plaintiff was then carried
to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was
again amputated higher up near the shoulder. Expenses reached the sum of

31
P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in
connection with the process of his curation.

ISSUE:

Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

RULING:

No.The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in

piling these sacks on the platform. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he
alighted from the train; and that they constituted an effective legal cause of the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It follows that the defendant company is liable
for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory
negligence.

The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of

carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has
suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of
defendant to exercise due care in its performance.

"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of
negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary
or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of
the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger
acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been
defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man
generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar
circumstances, to avoid injury.”

The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the
spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus
reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The cement platform
also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. The

32
plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by
no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act
would have been in an aged or feeble person. The place was perfectly familiar to
the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station.
There could be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the
step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was
alighting. It is the Court’s conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.

Therefore, Manila Railroad is liable. The contract to transport carries with it

the duty to provide safe means of entering and leaving the train. It is unnecessary
for plaintiff for breach of contract to prove the breach was due to negligence.
When a contractual relation exists, the obligor may break the contract by means of
an act which would have constituted a violation of an extra-contractual obligation
had no contract exist. Even if there was no ticket there was a contract of carriage.

33
 PAZ FORES v. IRENEO MIRANDA

NO. L-12163

March 4, 1959

FACTS:

Respondent was one of the passengers of a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga.

While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive speed, the
driver lost control, and the jeepney swerved to the bridge wall. Serious injuries
were suffered by the defendant. The driver was charged with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was
sentenced accordingly. Petitioner denies liability for breach of contract of carriage,
contending that a day before the accident, the jeepney was sold to a certain Carmen
Sackerman.

ISSUE:

Is he entitled to damages?

RULING:

Moral damages are generally not recoverable in damage actions predicated

on a breach of contract of transportation in view of the provisions of Articles 2218
and 2220 of the new Civil Code. The exception to the basic rule of damages is a
mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the
common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, of the Civil Code that
entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to
"demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased."

Where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not
recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith.
The mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an
inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier.

34
35
 FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. CA

G.R. No. 108164.

February 23, 1995

FACTS:

Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a Fareast
card issued by petitioner FEBTC. Clarita informed FEBTC that she lost her credit
card. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In
cases of this nature, the bank’s internal security procedures and policy would be to
record the lost card, along with the principal card, as a Hot Cars or Cancelled Card
in its master file. Luis then tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend.

Then he presented his Far East card to pay for the lunch, the card was not
honored, forcing him to pay in cash the bill. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by
this incident. Private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from
FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian Fastejo, vice president of the bank,
expressed the bank’s apologies, admitting that they have failed to inform Luis
about its security policy. Private respondents then filed a complaint for damages in
the RTC, which rendered a decision order in FEBTC to pay private respondents
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Is he entitled to damages?

RULING:

In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant

is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally,
in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a

36
passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier.
Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to
cause harm.

Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a
breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendant's
disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree
of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly,
Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that
clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the
Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely
when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.

37
AIR FRANCE v. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS

No. L-21438

September 28, 1966.

FACTS:

Air France, through Philippine Airlines (PAL), issued Carrascoso a first-

class round trip ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled
in first class but in Bangkok, PAL manager forced him to vacate his seat because
there was a white man who the manager alleged had a “better right” to the seat.
Carrascoso refused to vacate his seat, but was later convinced by some Filipino
passengers to give up his seat.

Carrascoso filed a case for damages against Air France. The Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila ordered Air France to pay Carrascoso moral and
exemplary damages as well as the difference in fare between first class and tourist
class for the portion of the trip.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the refund of the ticket, but
otherwise affirmed the CFI decision.

Petitioner Air France now claims that the first class ticket did not represent
the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties. It asserts that Carrascoso
knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class though he had
tourist class protection. Thus, the ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first
class seat since such would depend on the availability of first class seats.

ISSUE:

Is he entitled to damages?

38
RULING:

Though there was no specific claim of bad faith in the complaint, inference
of bad faith may be drawn from the facts of the case. Also, during the trial,
evidence of bad faith was presented without objection from the petitioner. Thus,
the deficiency in the complaint was cured by evidence.

Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso is attended with public duty. Though

based on breach of contract, the stress of Carrascoso’s action is put on wrongful
expulsion. Moreover, an act that breaks a contract is a tort. Thus, being a violation
of public duty, it is a quasi-delict.

The wrongful expulsion is independent of the breach. Two sources of

obligations are implicated in this case— contract and quasi-delict. Petitioner is still
be liable for moral damages.

39
40
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION v. COURT OF
APPEALS

G.R. NO. 84698

FEBRUARY 4,1992

FACTS:

Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and its officers liable
for the death of Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce student who was stabbed
while on the premises of PSBA by elements from outside the school. Private
respondents are suing under the law on quasi-delicts alleging the school and its
officers’ negligence, recklessness and lack of safety precautions before, during,
and after the attack on the victim. Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit but were
denied by the trial court. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Are they liable for damages?

RULING:

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes

the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited
cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals. In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly
provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students
of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of
the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.

41
 JUAN J. SYQUIA et al. v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC.,

FACTS:

Juan Syquia, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, entered in a contract of

Deed of Sale and Interment Order with Manila Memorial Park Cemetery Inc
(MMPCI). In the contract, there contained a provision which stated that the coffin
would be placed in a sealed concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased
from the elements. During the preparation for the transfer of Vicente’s remains in
the newly bought lot in Manila Memorial, it was discovered that there was a hole
in the concrete vault which caused total flooding inside, damaged the coffin as well
as the body of the deceased and covered the same with filth.

Syquia filed a complaint for recovery of damages arising from breach of

contract and/or quasi-delict against the MMPCI for failure to deliver a defect-free
concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased. In its defense, MMPCI
claimed that the boring of the hole was necessary in order to prevent the vault from
floating when water fills the grave. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding
that there was no quasi-delict because the defendant is not guilty of any fault or
negligence and because there was a pre-existing contract between the parties. The
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent is guilty of tort

RULING:

Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not

preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana:  “Article 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.

In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled “Deed of Sale and

42
Certificate of Perpetual Care” on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the
relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence,
had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but
for culpa contractual.

43
 VICENTE CALALAS V. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE
SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA

FACTS:

Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger jeepney owned and

operated by Petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, she was
just given an “extension seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the vehicle.On the
way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear
end, she gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf
Truck driven by Igclerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva, bumped to the left
rear end of the jeepney. This incident cause injury to Sunga.She filed a compliant
for damages against Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of carriage. On the
other hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva, the owner of the
truck.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and absolved Calalas
from liability holding that it was the truck owner who is responsible for the
accident based on quasi-delict.

However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court

reversed the RTC’s decision, on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based
on a breach of contract of carriage and not on quasi-delict.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of
the accident which negates petitioner’s liability?

RULING:

No. First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of carriage. In
this case, the petitioner failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination as
a common carrier in violation of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.
Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision was the truck driver, because the doctrine
of proximate cause applies only to cases of quasi-delict.

44
 The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability to a person
where there is no relation between him and another party. But in the case at bar,
there is a pre-existing relation between petitioner and respondent in their contract
of carriage. Hence, upon happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence
at once arose on Calalas’ part, which makes him liable.

45
 AMADO PICART V. FRANK SMITH, jr.,

FACTS:

On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite
direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman
on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course
and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule
of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However,
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he
pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead
of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did
not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile
approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road
for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move
to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead
of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape
hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to
the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit
by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving
Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

ISSUE:

46
 Whether Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done.

RULING:

Yes. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a

particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a

result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to
be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we
think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position
of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the
horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.

47
48
 TAYLOR VS. MANILA RAILROAD

16 PHIL 8

FACTS:

September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the

son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and
having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for
the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised
to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. After crossing the footbridge, they
met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home. The boys
then made a series of experiments with the caps. An explosion followed, causing
more or less serious injuries to all three

Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the
cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck.
Manuel had his hand burned and wounded. David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent
as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons.

ISSUE:

Are they liable?

RULING:

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts,

and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence
occurs. ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not

49
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature
of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the
cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but
he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his
act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It
would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he
exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or
that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries
incurred by him under such circumstances.

50
 JARCO MARKETING VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 129792

FACTS:

While Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the counter, she felt a
sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud.  As she looked behind her, she saw
Zhieneth's body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure.
Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help.  Although shocked, Criselda was
quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and
retrieving Zhieneth from the floor.  Zhieneth was quickly rushed to the Makati
Medical Center where she was operated on.  Criselda filed a complaint for
damages

ISSUE:

Is Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident?

RULING:

Accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence

attaches to the defendant a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening an event
happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected
by the person to whom it happens occurs when the person concerned is exercising
ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have
been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence negligence omission
to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such

51
other person suffers injury. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory;
one cannot exist with the other.

52
 JULIAN DEL ROSARIO V. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

FACTS:

August 4, 1930 2 pm: trouble developed in a wire used by Manila Electric

Company on Dimas-Alang Street for the purpose of conducting electricity used in
lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs. Jose Noguera, who had charge of a
tienda nearby, first noticed that the wire was burning and its connections smoking
the wire parted and one of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some
shrubbery close to the way. Noguera went to the nearby garage and asked Jose
Soco, the timekeeper, to telephone the Malabon station of the Manila Electric
Company.

Soco transmitted the message and the station told him that they would send
an inspector. Neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home.
Saturnino Endrina made a motion as if it touched the wire. Jose
Salvador, happened to be the son of an electrician and his father had cautioned him
never to touch a broken electrical wire, as it might have a current. Alberto del
Rosario said that "I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires" and so
feeling challenged put out his index finger and touch the wire. He immediately fell
face downwards. The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell
near the post. A crowd soon collected, and someone cut the wire and disengaged
the body. Upon arrival at St. Luke's Hospital he was pronounced dead.

ISSUE:

Is the company liable?

RULING:

The lighting company was responsible for the death. The delay in leaving
this danger unguarded so long after information of the trouble was received
constituted negligence on its part. The circumstance that the boy who was killed

53
touched the wire after one of his companions had warned him not to do so, did not
relieve the company of responsibility, owing to his immature years and the natural
curiosity of a child to do something out of the ordinary.

54
 YLARDE V. AQUINO

163 SCRA 697

FACTS:

Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon

Primary School in Pangasinan.  Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. 
During that time, the school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of
the old school shop destroyed in World War II.  Defendant decided to help clear
the area so he gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig beside a
one ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be buried.  It was left
unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students including the
Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation.  Defendant left the children to level
the loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the school workroom
where he can get some rope.  It was alleged that before leaving, he told the
children “not to touch the stone”.  After he left, the children playfully jumped into
the pit when suddenly the concrete block slide down.  Unfortunately, Novelito
Ylarde was pinned to the wall causing serious physical injuries which as a
consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter.  The parents of the victim, herein
petitioners, filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.

ISSUE:

Are Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages?

RULING:

“It is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students”.  Where the school is academic
rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, this is the
general rule.  However, in casea of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general
rule.  In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students

55
except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable.  Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable for the
reason that the school he heads is an academic school and he did not give any
instruction regarding the digging.

A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his tudents should make sure that
the children are protected from all harm.  The excavation instructed clearly
exposed the students to risk and should not be placed under the category of Work
Education such as school gardening, planting trees etc.  Aquino acted with fault
and gross negligence where instead of availing himself of adult manual laborers he
instead utilized his students.  Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to
cast away all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the excavation
would present to the children.  He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the
petitioners.

56
 CULION ICE V. PHILIPPINE MOTORS

G.R. NO. 32611

FACTS:

Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the motor schooner,
Gwendoline, which it uses for its fishing trade. In order to save costs in running the
boat, Culion Ice decided to have the engine changed from gasoline consumer to a
crude oil burner. Quest, general manager of Philippine Motors, a domestic
corporation engaged in machinery engines and motors, agreed to do the job. Upon
inspection, Quest came to conclusion that a carburetor needed to be installed. In
the course of the work, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding and that
the gasoline and other fuel was trickling freely to the floor but this concern was
dismissed by Quest. During the boat’s trial run, the engine stopped and upon being
started, a back fire occurred which then instantly spread and finally engulfed
Gwendoline. The crew members safely escaped but Gwendoline was destroyed.
Culion Ice moved for the recovery of the damages against Philippine Motors. The
trial court ruled for Culion Ice. Philippine Motor asserts that the accident was not
due to the fault of Quest.

ISSUE:

Is Quest negligent?

RULING:

When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring

professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care
and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of
automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the
doing of similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the

57
mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to
his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that
particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those
circumstances (risks) to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against
the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been
exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There
was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent
inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the
Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no
sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest’s
carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was
accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.

58
 US V. PINEDA

37 PHIL 456

FACTS:

Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist and the owner of a drug store.

Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription to
Pineda. On otheroccasions, Santos had given the medicine prescribed to his horses
with good results. Under the supervision of Pineda, the drugs were prepared and
given Santos.Santos, under the belief that he had purchased potassium chlorate,
placed two of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses.
Another package was mixedwith water for another horse, but was not used. The
two horses, who took the drugs, died afterwards. Santos took the drug packages to
the Bureau of Science for examination. It wasfound that the packages contained
not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate (a poison). When sued Pineda alleges
that he did not intentionally sold the poison and that what the law (to which he is
indicted) forbids is the sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Pineda can be held liable for the death of the horses,
assuming he did not deliberately sold poison

RULING:

Yes. In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the
careless sale of poison and medicine, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that
the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be
through negligence or mistake. The care required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior
knowledge of the business which the law demands. As a pharmacist, he is made
responsible for the quality of all drugs and poison he sells. If were we to adhere to

59
the technical definition of fraud it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict
any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a
reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that
it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly
without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with
the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted
in reliance upon it, and that the purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with
a literal following of well-known principles on the subject of fraud would strip the
law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs,
who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the
mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without good reason
so devitalize the law.

60
 BPI v. COURT OF APPEALS

216 SCRA 51

FACTS:

Someone  who  identified  herself  to  be  Fernando  called  up BPI, 

requesting for  the  pre-termination  of  her  money  market  placement  with  the 
bank.  The person who took the call didn't bother to verify with Fernando’s office
if whether  or  not  she  really  intended  to  preterminate  her  money  market 
placement.  Instead, he relied on the verification stated by the caller.  He
proceeded  with  the  processing  of  the  termination.    Thereafter,  the  caller
gave  delivery  instructions  that  instead  of  delivering  the  checks  to  her office,
it would be picked up by her niece and it indeed happen as such.  It was  found 
out  later  on  that  the  person  impersonated  Fernando  and  her alleged  niece  in 
getting  the  checks.    The  dispatcher  also  didn't  bother  to get the promissory
note evincing the placement when he gave the checks to  the  impersonated 
niece.    This  was  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  this impersonator opened an
account with the bank and deposited the subject checks.  It then withdrew the
amounts. 
 
The day of the maturity of the money market placement happened and the real 
Fernando  surfaced  herself.    She  denied  preterminating  the  money market
placements and though she was the payee of the checks in issue, she  didn't 
receive  any  of  its  proceeds.    This  prompted  the  bank  to 
surrender  to  CBC  the  checks  and  asking  for  reimbursement  on  alleged
forgery of payee’s endorsements.   

ISSUE:

Is he liable?

RULING:

61
 The  general  rule  shall  apply  in  this  case.    Since  the payee’s 
indorsement has   been   forged,   the   instrument   is   wholly   inoperative.     
However, underlying circumstances of the case show that the general rule on
forgery isn’t applicable.  The issue as to who between the parties should bear the 
loss in the payment of the forged checks necessitates the determination of the 
rights  and  liabilities  of  the  parties  involved  in  the  controversy  in relation to
the forged checks.   The acts of the employees of BPI were tainted with more
negligence if not criminal than the acts of CBC.  First, the act of disclosing
information about the money market placement over the phone is a violation of the
General Banking  Law.    Second,  there  was  failure  on  the  bank’s  part  to  even
compare the signatures during the termination of the placement, opening of  a 
new  account  with  the  specimen  signature  in  file  of  Fernando.    And third, 
there  was  failure  to  ask  the  surrender  of  the  promissory  note evidencing the
placement.   
 
The  acts  of  BPI  employees  was  the  proximate  cause  to  the  loss. 
Nevertheless, the negligence of the employees of CBC should be taken also into
consideration.  They closed their eyes to the suspicious large amount withdrawals
made over the counter as well as the opening of the account.

62
 WRIGHT V. MANILA ELECTRIC

28 PHIL 122

FACTS:

In August 1909, E.M. Wright was driving his calesa going home. He had
drunk more wine than he customarily does. Before he could be home, he would
have to cross the railroad tracks by Manila Electric. The tracks were left
unmaintained byManila Electric so much so that their elevation above the ground
is quite high. And while the calesa was crossing the tracks, the horse tripped and
the whole calesa fell down and Wright was thrown off it. The lower court found
that Wright and Manila Electric were both negligent and as per the ruling in Rakes
vs Atlantic Gulf  the lower court apportioned the damage awarded to Wright.

ISSUE:

Is Wright’s intoxication the primary cause of his injuries?

RULING:

No. Manila Electric, and as even ruled by the lower court, argued that had
Wright been sober, he would have notbeen thrown off the calesa. This is mere
guesswork and is not given credence by the SC because it’s just a presumption
thata sober man could have avoided such accident. Intoxication is not negligence
per se. It is the general rule that it isimmaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if
no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greaterdegree
of care is required than by a sober one. If one’s conduct is characterized by a
proper degree of care and prudence, it isimmaterial whether he is drunk or sober

63
 US V. BAGGAY

G.R. NO. 6659

SEPTEMBER 1, 1911

FACTS:

October 14, 1909, during the holding a song service called "buni", the non-
Christian Baggay Jr. attacked a woman Bil-liingan with a bolo inflicting a serious
wound on her head causing her to die immediately. He inflicted the same to the
women named Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother,
named Dioalan.On February 15, provincial fiscal filed a complaint for murder.
This cause was instituted separately from the other for lesiones.

RTC: Baggay was suffering from mental aberration and was exempt from
criminal liability but obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman, Bil-
liingan, in the sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an
institution for the insane until further order of the court. The court declared said
appeal out of order and dismissed it.

The counsel for Baggay resorted to this court with a petition praying that a
writ be issued directing judge Chanco, to admit the appeal and forward it, at the
same time annulling all action taken for execution of the judgments rendered in the
causes for murder and for lesiones. Attorney-General: Writ inappropriate and that
it should be remedy of mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether Baggay was exempt from criminal liability making him exempt
from civil liability as well.

RULING:

No. Principles: Article 17 of the Penal Code states: ”Every person criminally liable
for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable”. Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article
64
8 does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced, subject
to the following: ” (1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for
acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over
this age and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those
who have them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they
prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part.”

Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian,
or power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall
answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their
support in accordance with the civil law. Even when they hold the accused exempt
from criminal liability, must fix the civil liability of the persons charged with
watching over and caring for him or the liability of the demented person himself
with his property for reparation of the damage and indemnification for the harm
done. Unless, he offended party or the heirs of the person murdered expressly
renounce such reparation or indemnification

65
 MARINDUQUE V. WORKMEN’S

G.R. NO. L-8110

JUNE 30, 1956.

FACTS:

August 23, 1951 6:00 am: In Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together
with other laborers of the Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. rode a truck driven
by its employee Procopio Macunat and on its way to the mine camp at Talantunan,
while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a
coconut tree, resulting in the death of Mamador and injury to the others.

In a criminal case, Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and

sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased but has paid nothing.

Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the order of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner confirming the referee’s award of
compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death.Marinduque
Iron Mines Agents Inc. maintains that this claim is barred by section 6 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Law because: (a) Macunat was prosecuted and required
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamador’s widow
promised “to forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring him
before the authorities for prosecution and (b) an amicable settlement was
concluded between said heirs and Macunat.

ISSUE:

Whether Mamador having violated the employer’s prohibition against

laborers riding the haulage trucks was notorious negligence thereby precluding
recovery.

RULING:

66
 No. Award of compensation is hereby affirmed. Under the circumstance, the
laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence since the prohibition
had nothing to do with personal safety of the riders. Getting or accepting a free ride
on the company’s haulage truck couldn’t be gross negligence - no danger or risk
was apparent “notorious” negligence = “gross” negligence; conscious indifference
to consequences pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably
result in injury utter disregard of consequences.

67
 RAMOS V. CA

G.R. NO. 124354

DECEMBER 29, 1999

FACTS:

June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman
underwent on an operation to the stone at her gall bladder removed after being
tested that she was fit for "cholecystectomy" operation performed by Dr. Orlino
Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was to include the
anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after the operation. He assured
Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will get a good anesthesiologist who was Dra.
Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand was held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law
who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center
together with her husband went down with her to the operating room.

Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M. Herminda
noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda
becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.
She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong.

When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3
p.m. she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she stayed for a month
due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she was since then comatosed. She
suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to
five minutes. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral
parenchymal damage".Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000. Spouses
Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez

RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses

totalling to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000 moral
damages, P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit.CA: reversed ordering the
Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest

68
ISSUE:

Whether the Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case.

RULING:

Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence - applicable in this case. However, it can have no application in a suit
against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment.As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to
properly intubate the patient according to witness Herminda. With her clinical
background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with her testimony. Dra. Gutierrez' act
of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility. Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired
special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either
by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience.Dr.
Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic
encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting
barbiturate was not accepted as expert opinion.Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be
found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his
anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols.Dr. Hosaka had scheduled
another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation.
Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist
regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his
professional duties towards his patient

Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a
point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the
patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate
consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages.

69
 BATIQUIN V CA

258 SCRA 334

JULY 5, 1996

FACTS:

Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's
private patient sometime before September 21,1988. In the morning of September
21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and nurses, performed a
caesarean operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered the latters baby.
After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and
complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted
Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines.
However, the pains still kept recurring.

She then consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho
suggested that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery.- When Dr. Kho opened the
abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian
cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind
the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus, embedded
on the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove.
This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the
discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The piece of rubber allegedly found was not
presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu
City for examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which
mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an
Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's Discharge Summary.

The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence as mere

hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them are
deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated- There was also doubts as
to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Khos
testimony:1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by

70
Dr. Kho; and (2) that Dr. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The
failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to
weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin. The trial court ruled in favor of the
defendants. The CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether Dr. Batiquin is liable.

RULING:

Yes. While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari , there are exceptions, among which are when the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict, when the appealed
decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record, or when the appellate
court misapprehended the facts Substantive - The focal point of the appeal is Dr.
Khos testimony. There were inconsistencies within her own testimony, which led
to the different decision of the RTC and CA. The CA was correct in saying that the
trial court erred when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. Khos testimony and
did not consider it with other portions of Dr. Khos testimony. Also, the phrase
relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of
rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory
and then to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist. Furthermore, Dr. Kho's
knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than first-hand
knowledge for, as she asserted before the trial court.

71
D.M. CONSUNJI INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA J. JUEGO
GR NO. 137873.
APRIL 20, 2001

72
 MARCELO MACALINAO, ET AL., V. EDDIE MEDECIELO ONG

G.R. NO. 146635

DECEMBER 14, 2005

FACTS:

April 1992: Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and 2 other truck helpers to
deliver a heavy piece of machinery to Sebastian’s manufacturing plant in Angat,
Bulacan. While delivering, the Genetron’s Isuzu Elf truck driven by Ong bumped
the front portion of a private jeepney. Both vehicles incurred severe damages
while the passengers sustained physical injuries as a consequence of the collision.

Macalinao was brought to Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatment
then to Philippine Orthopedic Center then to Capitol Medical Center and lastly, to
Philippine General Hospital due to financial considerations. His body was
paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down. He filed against Ong and
Sebastian. A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries was instituted but was not ensued. Macalinao died and was substituted by
his parents.

RTC: Ong negligent and Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Ong thus ordering them
jointly liable to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil
indemnity for Macalinao’s death. CA: reversed for lack of evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether Ong may be held liable under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.

RULING:

Yes.Photographs clearly shows that the road where the mishap occurred is
marked by a line at the center separating the right from the left lane. While ending
up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the
position of the two vehicles gives rise to the conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck
which hit the private jeepney rather than the other way around.Based on the angle

73
at which it stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to the right in an
unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu truck. Since respondents failed to refute the
contents of the police blotter, the statement therein that the Isuzu truck hit the
private jeepney and not the other way around is deemed established. While not
constituting direct proof of Ong’s negligence, the foregoing pieces of evidence
justify the application of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means
“the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.

Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie
negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for
specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of
the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create
an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the
burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part. Macalinao could no
longer testify as to the cause of the accident since he is dead. Petitioners, while
substituting their son as plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about the event since
they were not present at the crucial moment. Evidence as to the true cause of the
accident is, for all intents and purposes, accessible to respondents but not to
petitioner. Two truck helpers who survived, both employees of Sebastian, and Ong,
who is not only Sebastian’s previous employee but his co-respondent in this case
as well

74
 OSCAR DEL CARMEN JR. V GERONIMO BACOY

GR NO. 17738770

APRIL 25, 2012

FACTS:

Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a jeepney
driven by a certain Allan Maglasang. The jeepney was owned by Oscar del
Carmen Jr. Allan was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case
while the father of the late Mrs. Monsalud, Geronimo Bacou filed an independent
civil action againt the former in behalf of the minor children left by the Monsalud
spouses. Del Carmen Jr. claimed he was a victim as well as Allan stole the jeep
and was not hired as a driver by the former; he was a conductor (and had been
released from employment lately) and it was the brother of Allan, Rodrigo who
was hired as a driver. Del Carmen Jr. filed a carnapping case against Allan but was
dismissed by the court for insufficient evidence.

RTC held del Carmen Jr. subsidiary liable and held the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the
principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible
for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It
disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the
carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was dismissed but also
because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the
implied permission to use the subject vehicle because the brothers were assigned to
said jeep. After a day’s work, the jeepney would be parked beside the brothers
house and not returned to del Carmens residence; the jeep could easily be started
even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not fenced or
secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even
without the ignition key.

ISSUE:

75
 Whether owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries caused
by the operation of such.

RULING:

Del Carmen Jr. was held to be primarily liable and not merely subsidiary
liable. Del Carmen Jr.s own evidence cast doubt that Allan stole the jeepney.
Given the dismissal of the carnapping case filed by del Carmen Jr. against Allan,
the former also admitted to such dismissal in the SC.

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his
servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if
those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by
defendant that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of
care. All three are present in the case at bar.

76
 MANILA ELECTRIC CO. VS. REMOQUILLO, ET ALS.

GR NO. L-8328.

MAY 18, 1956

FACTS:

Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house pf his brother-in-law.
While making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into
contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to
the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as
a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against
Manila Electric Co.

CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at
fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed
long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due
diligence.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Manila Electric Co., is guilty of negligence.

RULING:

Decision of the CA reversed. A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not
have happened but for such condition or occasion.

77
 BERNARDO V. LEGASPI

GR NO. 9308

DECEMBER 23, 1914

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover
damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff's automobile by reason of defendant's
negligence in causing a collision between his automobile and that of plaintiff. The
court in its judgment also dismissed a cross-complaint filed by the defendant,
praying for damages against the plaintiff on the ground that the injuries sustained
by the defendant's automobile in the collision referred to, as well as those to
plaintiff's machine, were caused by the negligence of the plaintiff in handling his
automobile.

ISSUE:

Whether the parties may recover.

RULING:

No.Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions collide on turning a

street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that
the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal
occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for the
damages suffered.

78
 BERNAL V. HOUSE AND TACLOBAN ELECTRIC

G.R. NO. L-30741

JANUARY 30, 1930

FACTS:

On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of Holy Friday was held in
Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came
from another municipality to attend the religious celebration. After the procession
was over, the woman and her daughter, passed along a public street named Gran
Capitan .The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother
and her friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric& Ice Plant,
Ltd., and automobile appeared from the opposite direction which so frightened the
child that she turned to run, with the result that she fell into the street gutter. At that
time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant
of J.V. House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found
her face downward in the hot water. The girl was taken to the provincial hospital.
There she was attended by the resident physician, Dr. Victoriano A. Benitez.
Despite his efforts, the child died that same night at 11:40o'clock. Dr. Benitez
certified that the cause of death was" Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the
contributory causes were, “Congestion of the Brain and viscera’s of the chest &
abdomen".

RESPONDENT’S DEFENSE: That the hot water was permitted to flow

down the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the
authorities and that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the
death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence.

The trial judge, however, after examination of the evidence presented by the
defendants failed to sustain their theory of the case, however, he nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of
the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:

79
 Whether the respondent is absolved from liability because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.

RULING:

No, the death of the child Purificacion Bernal was the result of fault and
negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to
endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it. We
are shown no good reason for the departing from the conclusion of the trial judge
to the effect that the sudden death of the child Purification Bernal was due
principally to the nervous shock and organic calefaction produced by the extensive
burns from the hot water.

On the contributory negligence, the mother and her child had a perfect right
to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run
along a few paces in advance of the mother.-No one could foresee the coincidence
of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could
only result in reduction of the damages.-The death of the child Purificacion Bernal
was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through
the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers- by who were
unfortunately enough to fall into it.

80
 PLDT V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. L-57079

SEPTEMBER 29, 1989

FACTS:

Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street
where they resided [at 25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran
fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the spouses would not have been thrown
against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from the inside lane, then it ran
over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly
undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.
Antonio failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the
darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown
against the windshield. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms,
legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut
lips. The jeep’s windshield was also shattered.

PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses
were due to their own negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor
L.R. Barte and Co. who should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint
against Barte, alleging that under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be
answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence of Barte or its
employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the accident,
and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and
appropriate signs.

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the
spouses’ complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its
earlier decision and affirmed in toto RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban.

81
RULING:

No.The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of
Antonio, and was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If
the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside
lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to
climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had not exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have
run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have
made him see the accident mound in time. The mound was relatively big and
visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence and
location of the mound, having seen it many previous times.The negligence of
Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife’s injuries but goes to the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and
thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were
known to the spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could
have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that
there was some alleged negligence on the part of PLDT.The omission to perform a
duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes
the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have
prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost
every day and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations
there; hence, the presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented
the accident. Furthermore, Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of
proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his
action must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to
prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented was just the self-
serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a portion of the
scene of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of a
medical report from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not
even been explained.

82
 GENOBIAGON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

178 SCRA 422

SEPTEMBER 22, 1957

FACTS:

Genobiagon was driving a rig along T. Padilla St. in Cebu City. The
petitioner's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of
the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him. As an old
woman was crossing the street, Genobiagon’s rig bumped her and caused her to
fall in the middle of the road. Vicente Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at
Genobiagon but the latter refused to stop. Genobiagon reasoned out that he did not
bump the old woman and that it was the old woman who bumped him. The old
woman was brought tothe hospital but she died 3 days after. Petitioner was charged
and convicted with the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence.

CA affirmed the decision but increased the civil liability from 6,000 to
12,000. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the court erred in the affirmation of conviction.

(2) Whether or not the court unjustly increased the civil liability.

RULING:

(1) No. The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not
exonerate the accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in
criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the
negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence.

(2) No. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for
death in homicide or murder is 30,000 (at present 50,000, this case was decided in
1989).RAKES V. ATLANTIC

83
 G.R. NO. 1719

JANUARY 23, 1907

FACTS:

The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the
defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car
was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each
weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills
secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping
off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of
the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front,
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the
tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff,
breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.

ISSUE:

Whether the company is liable.

RULING:

Yes.The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after
noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to
constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule. While
the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to
proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the
officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general
prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of
the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting
of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general
order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in
placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate,
although not as its primary cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the
84
victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the event
giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of
the iron rails.

85
 PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 97626

MARCH 14, 1997

FACTS:

Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current

accounts with PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC
General Manager Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds
amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the same to RMC’s account
with PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her
husband’s account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement
of accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabut’s modus operandi went on
for the span of more than one year.

ISSUE:

What is the proximate cause of the loss – Lipana’s negligence in not

checking his monthly statements or the bank’s negligence through its teller in
validating the deposit slips?

RULING:

The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing
all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that
the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed
procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original
or duplicate.

The bank teller’s negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the
selection and supervision of its bank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss
suffered by the private respondent, not the latter’s entrusting cash to a dishonest

86
employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the
funds, she would not have been able to deposit those funds in her husband’s
current account, and then make plaintiff believe that it was in the latter’s accounts
wherein she had deposited them, had it not been for the bank teller’s aforesaid
gross and reckless negligence.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance – where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. It means that the
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for
the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another,
if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm
by exercise of due diligence. (Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA, supra)

87
 JUNTILLA VS. FONTANAR

136 SCRA 624

MAY 31, 1985

FACTS:

Herein plaintiff was a passenger of the public utility jeepney on course from
Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by driven by defendant Berfol
Camoro and registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar. When the
jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to
turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the front seat was thrown
out of the vehicle. Plaintiff suffered a lacerated wound on his right palm aside from
the injuries he suffered on his left arm, right thigh, and on his back. 

Plaintiff filed a case for breach of contract with damages before the City
Court of Cebu City. Defendants, in their answer, alleged that the tire blow out was
beyond their control, taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly
bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew up. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event? 

RULING:

No. In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident was caused either
through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire.
Common carriers should teach drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed
safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire
blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times.

88
 HERNANDEZ VS. COA

179 SCRA 39

NOVEMBER 6, 1989

FACTS:

Teodoro Hernandez, the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of

the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite, was
tasked to go to the main office in Manila on July 1, 1993. He was told to encash
two (2) checks to pay for the wages and expenses of the said operation. He
estimated finishing at around 10:00 pm and getting back to Cavite at around
2:00pm. However, because some processes got delayed, he knew he would be
finishing at 3:00pm. Thinking that the workers would be disappointed in having to
wait for the salaries, as the next 3 days were non-working days, he decided to
encash the checks anyway.
Hernandez weighed his options – whether to return to Cavite and arrive in the
evening, or to go home to Bulacan and leave for Cavite first thing in the morning.
He decided to go to Bulacan, thinking it was quicker, safer, and less risky. En route
to Cavite were dark roads, where chances of robberies were more prominent.

Unluckily enough, while the jeep he rode was stuck in EDSA traffic, two
men came in and stole the money. Hernandez immediately ran after Alvarez, one
of the thieves – who was later on convicted for the crime; but was unable to catch
up with the man who had the money.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hernandez should be held accountable for the stolen money

RULING:

No, Hernandez should not be held liable for the stolen money. Pursuant to
Section 638 of the RAC, the money lost during transit due to a casualty, given that
a request of relief must be given to and approved by the Auditor General or
provincial auditor. Because Hernandez complied with the said requirements, the
Chairman therefore acted outside of his jurisdiction. The petition is granted.

89
 Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that:
When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or
is caused by fire, theft, or other casualty, the officer accountable therefor or
having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor General, or the
provincial auditor, according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the
one or the other, and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor, or
provincial auditor, may in the particular case allow, shall present his application
for relief, with the available evidence in support thereof. An officer who fails to
comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for
any such loss in the settlement of his accounts.

Hernandez was able to complete request for relief from accountability

within the given time period. The Auditor was able to absolve Hernandez form
accountability on January 27, 1984. Chairman Tantuico was not in the position to
revoke such decision. Even if he were, the facts were that Hernandez had in mind,
only the best interest for the workers. The events were fortuitous, and no one could
have known otherwise.

90
 GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION VS. GLORIA E. CHATTO
AND LINA DELZA CHATTO

G.R. NO. L-87584

JUNE 16, 1992

FACTS:

Respondents went to see the movie “Mother Dear” at Superama Theater

owned by petitioner.Hardly ten minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of the
balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into the darkness. Shocked and hurt,
respondents managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able
to get out, they walked to the nearby FEU hospital for treatment. The next day they
transferred to UST hospital. Due to the continuing pain, respondent Gloria went to
the US for further treatment.

Respondents filed a case for damages. Trial court ruled in favor of

respondents. The ceiling collapsed because of some structural construction or
architectural defect. Petitioner is grossly negligent in failing to cause proper and
adequate inspection and upkeep of the building. CA affirmed the decision.
Petitioner’s defense: The ceiling of the balcony collapsed due to force majeure 

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner is liable.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner presented Mr. Ong as its witness. Mr. Ong admitted that he
could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed. The real reason why Mr. Ong
could not explain the cause or reason is that he did not actually conduct the
investigation. It was not shown that any causes denominated as force majeure
obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling.

Such defects could have easily been discovered if only petitioner exercised
due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed
by Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection nor the nature and extent of the
same.

91
 It is settled that:The owner or proprietor of a place of public
amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement
devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being
subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against
unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.

This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:

Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the
thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence
raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant.

That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.

Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously
insists, the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be
liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated
as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation
on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must
have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.

92
 SERVANDO VS. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.

117 SCRA 832

FACTS:

Bico and Servando loaded on board the FS-176 the following cargoes:
1.528 cavans of rice and 44 cartons of colored paper, toys and general
merchandise. Upon the arrival of the vessel, the cargoes were discharged, complete
and in good order to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. At 2:00 pm of the
same day, a fire of unknown reasons razed the warehouse. Before the fire, Bico
was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice. The petitioners are now claiming
for the value of the destroyed goods from the common carrier. 

The Trial Court ordered the respondent to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
their lost goods on the basis that the delivery of the shipment to the warehouse is
not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736 of the New Civil Code, since the
loss occurred before actual or constructive delivery. The petitioners argued that the
stipulation in the bills of lading does not bind them because they did not sign the
same. The stipulation states that the carrier shall not be responsible for loss unless
such loss was due to the carrier’s negligence. Neither shall it be liable for loss due
to fortuitous events such as dangers of the sea and war. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the carrier should be held liable for the destruction of the
goods 

RULING:

No. There is nothing on record to show that the carrier incurred in delay in
the performance of its obligation. Since the carrier even notified the plaintiffs of
the arrival of their shipments and had demanded that they be withdrawn. 

The carrier also cannot be charged with negligence since the storage of the
goods was in the Customs warehouse and was undoubtedly made with their
knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged and maintained by the
Government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant since it has
no control over the same.
93
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL.

G.R. Nos. 103442-45

May 21, 1993

FACTS:

Four separate complaints for damages were filed against the NPC.
Plaintiffs sought to recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the
destruction to property caused by the flood of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan.
The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of
water through the spillways of the Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant).

In their Answers, the defendants alleged that the damages incurred by the
private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in
the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. Likewise, written notices were
sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about
the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon
"Kading" and advising them to take the necessary precautions.

RTC dismissed the complaints for lack of sufficient and credible evidence.
CA reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages based on the public
respondent's conclusion that the petitioners were guilty of: "a patent gross and
evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence… in the management and
operation of Angat Dam. The unholiness of the hour, the extent of the opening of
the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of
defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness. The resulting
flash flood and inundation of even areas (sic) one (1) kilometer away from the
Angat River bank would have been avoided had defendants-appellees prepared the
Angat Dam by maintaining in the first place, a water elevation which would allow
room for the expected torrential rains."

The appellate court rejected the petitioners' defense that they had sent "early
warning written notices".

Said notice is ineffectual, insufficient and inadequate for purposes of the

opening of the spillway gates at midnight of October 26, 1978 and on October 27,
1978. It did not prepare or warn the persons so served, for the volume of water to
94
be released, which turned out to be of such magnitude, that residents near or along
the Angat River, even those one (1) kilometer away, should have been advised to
evacuate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should be held liable.

RULING:

Yes. Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force
majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by the private
respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then
was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor
— negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force
majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the
participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it
were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

95
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA
DE JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS
DIMAANO, CONSOLACION DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO

FACTS:

Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay while
petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road. That
on October 11, 1989, a powerful typhoon hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very
strong winds, the roof of the petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown
away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents’
house. When the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed
building was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official.

In their report, they imputed negligence to the petitioner for the structural
defect of the building and improper anchorage of trusses to the roof beams to cause
for the roof be ripped off the building, thereby causing damage to the property of
respondent.

Respondents filed an action before the RTC for recovery of damages based
on culpa aquiliana. Petitioner interposed denial of negligence and claimed that the
typhoon as an Act of God is the sole cause of the damage. RTC ruled in their favor
relying on the testimony of the City Engineer and the report made after the ocular
inspection. Petitioners appeal before the CA which affirmed the decision of the
RTC.

Hence this present appeal.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents
resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building’s roof

96
ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling”, was, within legal
contemplation, due to fortuitous event?

Whether or not an ocular inspection is sufficient evidence to prove negligence?

RULING:

1. Yes, petitioner should be exonerated from liability arising from the

damage caused by the typhoon. Under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, Except in
cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.

In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is

necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of
which the loss may have been occasioned. 12 An act of God cannot be invoked for
the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to
forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a person’s negligence concurs
with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not
exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
damages or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the
result of the participation of man — whether it be from active intervention, or
neglect, or failure to act — the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

In the case at bar, the lower court accorded full credence to the finding of the
investigating team that subject school building’s roofing had “no sufficient
anchorage to hold it in position especially when battered by strong winds.” Based
on such finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and adjudged it
liable for damages to private respondents.

There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural

occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of
foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any
adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no human
participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words; the person seeking

97
exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as
commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk
or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justify demand, or the omission to do
something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do.

2. It bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of

another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of
his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence, not merely by presumptions and conclusions
without basis in fact. Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of
petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which
made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. As the
term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing.
What is visual to the eye through, is not always reflective of the real cause behind.

In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation
was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner’s
school building.

98
 AFIALDA VS. HISOLE and HISOLE

85 Phil 67

FACTS:

Loreto Afialda was employed as a caretaker of the carabaos owned by

spouses Basilio and Francisco Hisole. On March 21, 1947, Afialda was gored by
one of the carabaos, causing injuries which resulted to his death. The mishap was
due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure. Afialda’s sister, Margarita, sued
Hisole arguing that under Article 1905 of the Civil Code, “The possessor of an
animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even
if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease
only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who may have suffered it.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hisole, as the owner of the carabao, is liable for the damage
caused to its caretaker.

RULING:

No. The law uses the term “possessor and user of the animal.” Afialda was
the caretaker of the animal and was compensated to tend the carabaos. He, at the
time of the goring, was the possessor and the user of the carabao, and was thus the
one who had custody and control of the animal and was in a position to prevent the
animal from causing damage. It was the caretaker’s business to try to prevent the
animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being
injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.

99
100
 ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. CA

GR NO. 53401

NOVEMBER 6, 1989

FACTS:

Typhoon “Gening” buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy

rains and consequent flooding in its wake. After the typhoon had abated and when
the floodwaters were beginning to recede, the deceased, Isabel Lao Juan, ventured
out, and proceeded to the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and
proprietress, to look after the merchandise that might have been damaged.

Wading in waist-deep flood, Isabel was followed by 2 of her employees.

Suddenly, the deceased screamed “Ay” and quickly sank into the water. The two
girls attempted to help, but failed. There was an electric wire dangling from a post
and moving in snake-like fashion in the water.

Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of
Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from
her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded.

When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in- law had
been electrocuted, they requested the police to ask the people of INELCO to cut off
the electric current.

The body of the deceased was recovered about two meters from an electric
post. Upon the request of the relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the
body. The skin was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated
death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an “electrically charged
wound” or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a
burned wound. The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of
death as “circulatory shock electrocution”

101
In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and
employees, and sought to prove that on and even before the day of Isabel Lao
Juan’s death, the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise
area, did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and
property. The service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment had been newly-
installed prior to the date in question. As a public service operator and in line with
its business of supplying electric current to the public, defendant had installed
safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in
case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others.

An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250000 was instituted

by the heirs of the deceased with the CFI. INELCO, however, theorizes that the
deceased could have died simply by either drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself. it was pointed out that the deceased,
without petitioner’s knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by
connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting,
thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. This might
have caused the electrocution.

The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO and dismissed the complaint but awarded
P25000 in moral damages and attorney’s fees of P45000. The CA set aside the CFI
decision and ordered INELCO to pay actual damages of P30229.45, compensatory
damages of P50000, exemplary damages of P10000, attorney’s fees of P3000, plus
the cost of the suit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not INELCO is liable for damages since typhoons and floods are
fortuitous events

RULING:

No. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for
which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which

102
directly caused the victim’s death. It was through the intervention of petitioner’s
negligence that death took place.Engr. Juan from the NAPOCOR stated that when
he set out that morning for an inspection, there was no INELCO line man attending
to the grounded and disconnected electric lines. The INELCO Office was likewise
closed around the time of the electrocution. At the INELCO, irregularities in the
flow of electric current were noted because “amperes of the switch volts were
moving”. And yet, despite these danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr.
Juan to request that defendant’s switch be cut off—but the harm was done. When
asked why the delay, Loreto Abijero, one of INELCO’s linemen answered that he
“was not the machine tender of the electric plant to switch off the current.”In times
of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in
constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or
limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary,
evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area,
nor even manning its office.

The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve
itself from liability by arguing that the victim’s death was solely due to a fortuitous
event. “When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have
resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission” A person is excused from
the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must
abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or
property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.
Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased’s property, a source of her
livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.

103
 PLACIDO C. RAMOS AND AUGUSTO L. RAMOS VS. PEPSI-COLA
BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. AND ANDRES BONIFACIO

G.R. NO. L-22533

FEBRUARY 9, 1967

FACTS:

The car driven by Augusto Ramos (son of co-plaintiff Placido Ramos)

collided with the truck of PEPSI, driven by the driver and co-defendant Andres
Bonifacio. As a result, the Ramoses sued Bonifacio and Pepsi.The trial court found
Bonifacio negligent and declared that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved
that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs
damages.

The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the decision

of the trial court, but absolved PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that it
sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio. In its
decision, CA stated the basis for its decision:

“The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of

defendant company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired as a
member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when he was hired as
a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to
submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was
sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: first,
theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which
he had undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety
Council. Our Supreme Court had put it down as a rule that ‘In order that the
defendant may be considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a
professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for
employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of service.’
Defendant Company has taken all these steps.”

104
ISSUE:

Whether or not PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the selection of its

employee.

RULING:

The appellants contended that Añasco, being PEPSI-COLA's employee, is a

biased and an interested witness. This is a question of fact, and the SC would not
disturb the findings of CA.

It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question is raised as to

due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 points
out that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. This
responsibility shall cease when the employers prove that they observed the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage; hence, PEPSI-COLA
shall be relieved from liability (rebuttable presumption of negligence).

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.

105
 MMTC VS. CA

GR No. 104408

FACTS:

The case arose from Nenita who incurred injuries from being thrown out of
the windshield of the jeepney that she was riding that collided with a bus operated
by MMTC (petitioner). Nenita filed for damages for neither the operator of the
jeepney nor the MMTC would pay for the damages sustained by Nenita. The RTC
ruled that MMTC is abstained from liability for it has proven that it has shown
diligence of a good father of a family in employing and supervising its employees.
MMTC stated that it goes through a process of screening, interviewing, and
seminar attending before they hire their employees. The CA reversed the decision
of the RTC holding that the MMTC was not able to further prove that its
employees complied with its requirements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not diligence of a good father has been observed by MMTC.

RULING:

The SC ruled that MMTC, being sued as employer of the bus driver
Leonardo under Art. 2180 or vicarious liability, was not able to prove that it had
exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees as it has not proven that it exercised due diligence in
supervising its employees for mere imposition of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies without anything more is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed upon them by the law.

The basis of the employer’s vicarious liability is that the responsibility

imposed by the article arises by reason of a presumption of negligence on the part
of the persons made responsible under the article from their failure to exercise due
care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing

106
damage. Negligence is imputed to them by law, unless they prove the contrary
by showing that they exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. It is clear that it is the non-performance of certain duties of precaution and
prudence imposed upon them that is why they are made answerable for damages
caused by their employee.

For the doctrine to apply, it must first be shown that there is employer-
employee relationship and that the plaintiff must show that the tort complained of
was committed in the scope of his assigned task and that is when the employer may
find it necessary to interpose a defense of due diligence of a good father of a
family. The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by the
employer to prevent damages under Art. 2180 refers to due diligence in the
selection and supervision the employees to protect the public.

107
 KRAMER v CA

FACTS:

On April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners

Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer collided with an inter-island vessel, the
M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines,
Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish
catch.

Both parties filed their protest with the Board of Marine Inquiry for the
determination of the proximate cause of the collission. The Board decided that the
collision occurred due to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent
who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines.

The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent

Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982
wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from
pursuing his profession as a marine officer.On May 30, 1985, the petitioners
instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before the RTC.
The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on
the ground of prescription. Respondents argue that the prescription period for
actions based on quasi-delict is 4 years from when the cause of action accrued as
stated in Art. 1146 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the period should be counted from
April 8, 1976 when the collision occurred.

Petitioners argue that the period should be counted from 1982, or when the
date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia
Philippines had become final. They claimed that maritime collisions have
peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and
experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze
and resolve.

RTC denied the MTD based on the arguments of the petitioners. It stated
that prescriptive period under the law should begin to run only from April 29,

108
1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of M/V Asia Philippines had been
finally ascertained.

The CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA stated that the decisions of an
admin are not binding on the courts. If an accrual of a cause of action has to be
dependent on an action of an admin body, then it might get delayed.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the action has prescribed.

RULING:

Yes. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-
delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from
the day the quasi-delict is committed.The right of action accrues when there exists
a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:A right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created. An
obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right. An act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff

The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause of action arise.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two
(2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of
the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an
administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry that the collision was caused
by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for
damages.

The period should be counted from April 8, 1976.

109
 BATACLAN VS. MEDINA

GR NO. L-10126

OCTOBER 22, 1957

FACTS:

While running, one of the front tires of bus no. 30 burst and the vehicle fell
into a canal and overturned. Calls for help were made. Several men, one of them
carrying a lighted torch, came to help. Almost immediately, a fire started and
consumed both the bus and the four passengers trapped inside. It would appear that
as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak. The Court held that it was she
overturning of the bus and not the fire, which was the proximate cause of the death
of the victims.

September 13, 1952, around 2:00 AM: While bus no. 30 of the Medina
Transportation owned by Mariano Medina and driven by Conrado Saylon was
running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the
vehicle began to zigzag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road
and turned turtle. Bataclan, Lara, the Visayan and Natalia Villanueva, could not get
out of the overturned bus.

Calls for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an
hour, about ten men came, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo
with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably
approached the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started,
consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it.

It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape
from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating
the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch
brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.

Bataclan’s widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five
minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total

110
amount of P87,150. The Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the
plaintiffs, plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise
being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale. The plaintiffs and the defendants
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter court endorsed the
appeal to the SC because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether it was the overturning of the bus, and not the fire that burned it, was
the proximate cause of Juan Bataclan’s death.

RULING:

Yes. The proximate cause was the overturning of the busDefinition of

proximate cause:That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom The proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on
its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was
not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably,
by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and
coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was

111
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.

The coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and
the call for outside help. The burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. The driver and the
conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver
should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank. Yet neither the driver
nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the
rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

Moreover, a victim overheard Medina speaking to one of his bus inspectors,

telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they
were already old. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been
diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his
passengers. Had he changed the tires, especially those in front, with new ones, as
he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, the blow out would
not have occurred.

112
 FERNANDO V. CA

G.R. NO. 92087

MAY 8, 1992

FACTS:

November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public

Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's
Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won.

November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely

Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were
found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. The
body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the
Regional Hospital but he expired there. 

The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the
septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the
market master. Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were
presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.Dr. Juan Abear of the City
Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen
supply in the body and intake of toxic gas. November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the
purchase order. RTC: Dismissed the case. CA: Reversed - law intended to protect
the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and the indigent

ISSUE:

Whether or not Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate
cause therefore can be liable for damages.

RULING:

No. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a

particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence
113
Standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
familias of the Roman law. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in
the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences.The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to existDistinction
must be made between the accident and the injury. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where,
in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such
injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of
the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of
the public. While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost
compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs
is not one of those requirements. Accident such as toxic gas leakage from the
septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. Considering the
nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been
cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the
attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old
hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His
failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their
safety was the proximate cause of the accident.

Proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their
own negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the
public respondent.

114
 URBANO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. NO. 72964

JANUARY 7, 1988

FACTS:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano (Urbano) was on his way
to his ricefield when he discovered that the place where he stored palay was
flooded with water coming from an irrigation canal. When he investigated the area,
he saw Marcelino Javier (Javier) and Emilio Efre (Efre). Javier admitted that he
opened the irrigation canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano started to hack Javier
with a bolo. Javier was wounded at the right palm of his hand.

Upon intervention, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano

agreed to shoulder all the expenses for the medication of the wound of Javier, as
well as to pay also whatever loss of income Javier may have suffered. Javier, on
the other hand, signed a statement of his forgiveness towards Urbano and on that
condition, he withdrew the complaint that he filed against Urbano.

After several weeks of treatments and medication, the doctor pronounced

that the wound of Javier was already healed. However, on November 14, 1980,
Javier was rushed to the hospital when he had sudden lockjaw and convulsions.
The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected from
the healing wound in his right palm of his hand. The following day, on November
15, 1980, Javier died.

The heirs of Javier filed a case of homicide against Urbano. Urbano was
charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal
by the Intermediate Appellate Court.Urbano then filed a motion for a new trial
based on the affidavit sworn by the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the
deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion
was denied by the respondent court.

115
ISSUE:

Whether or not the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier may be considered

as the proximate cause of the latter’s death.

RULING:

No, the wound inflicted by Urbano cannot be considered as the proximate

cause of Javier’s death.The Court defined proximate cause as “that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.” In this
case, the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’€™s death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.The Court ruled that Urbano is
not liable for the death of Javier. Urbano is only liable for the physical injuries
inflicted to Javier through the wound on the right palm of his hand. The Court took
into account the average incubation period of tetanus toxin, and medical evidence
indicated that patients affected with tetanus experience its symptoms within 14
days. If, indeed, Javier had incurred tetanus poisoning out of the wound inflicted
by Urbano, he would not have experienced the symptoms on the 23rd day after the
hacking incident.

The medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct
and foreign to the crime. However, the act of Javier working in his farm where the
soil is filthy, using his own hands, is an efficient supervening cause which relieves
Urbano of any liability for the death of Javier. There is a likelihood that the wound
was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do.

116
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. (CARBONEL) VS. IAC (DIONISIO)

148 SCRA 353

MARCH 10, 1987

FACTS:
About 1:30 am, Leonardo Dionisio (Dionisio) was driving home from
cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had taken a shot or two of liquor.
He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts. He
was not far from his home and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street
without headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc.
(Phoenix), which was parked on Dionisio’s lane. The dump truck was parked
askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector
devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had
earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel
(Carbonel), its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view
of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning.

Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid the collision by swerving his car to
the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of
the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent
facial scars, a nervous breakdown and loss of two gold bridge dentures.Dionisio
argued that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner
in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer
Phoenix. On the other hand, it was the contention of Phoenix and Carbonel that the
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at
the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights
on and without a curfew pass; if there was negligence in the manner in which the
dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an
intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he
sustained.

117
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of
Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck
was parked

2. Whether or not the driver’s negligence was merely a passive and static
condition and that Dionisio's negligence was an efficient intervening cause and that
consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate
cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel.

3. Whether or not Phoenix has successfully proven that they exercised due
care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.

RULING:

1. Yes. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. Private respondent
Dionisio's negligence was only contributory. The immediate and proximate cause
of the injury remained the truck driver's lack of due care and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts.

2. No. Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck
driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to
private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them
the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in
fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever
the juris vinculum of liability.

3. No. Phoenix’s failure to show any effort to supervise the manner in which
the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative
showing of culpa in vigilando on its part.

118
119
 PILIPINAS BANK V CA

234 SCRA 435

JULY 25, 1994

FACTS:

Florencio Reyes issued two postdated checks to Winner Industrial

Corporation for Php 20, 927 and Vicente Tui, for P11.419.50, with due dates
October 11 and 12, 1979.

To cover the face value of the checks, he requested PCIB Money Shop's
manager to effect the withdrawal of P32, 000 from his savings account and have it
deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Pilipinas Bank’s Current
Account Bookkeeper made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for
a certain Florencio Amador. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not
noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was Reyes.
On October 11, the October 10 check in favor of Winner Industrial was
presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated that his
account had only a balance of Php 4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee was
advised to try it for next clearing. It was redeposited but was again dishonored. The
same thing happened to the October 12 check. The payee then demanded a cash
payment of the check’s face value which REYES did if only to save his name.
Furious, he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate
verification of his account. That was only when they noticed the error.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 2179 of NCC is applicable.

RULING:

No. For it to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own

negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.

120
 Proximate Cause is any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and
without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been
foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury
complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and
probable consequence.
The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee
in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of
another depositor who had a similar first name. The bank employee is deemed to
have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties.

Petition denied.

121
 QUEZON CITY V. DACARA

G.R. NO. 150304

JUNE 15, 2005

FACTS:

On February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., owner of
87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan, while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile
of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then
being repaired by the Quezon City government.

As a result, Dacara, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle
suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was sought from the city government, which however, yielded
negative results.

Fulgencio P. Dacara, for and in behalf of his minor son, filed a Complaint
for damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon.

Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the
subject diggings was provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with
reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible
during the incident. Defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing
the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident, and that the
reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of
the latter’s negligence and failure to exercise due care.

RTC ruled in favor of Dacara, ordering the defendants to indemnify the

plaintiff. Upon appeal, CA agreed with the RTC’s finding that petitioner’s
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent. Hence,
this Petition.

ISSUE:

122
 Whether or not petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of the
incident.

RULING:

Yes.Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate
cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is the existence of
a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik
Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps
which could have served as an adequate warning to motorists especially
during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. Contrary to the
testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera
which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and
barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and
adequate precautionary signs were placed. If indeed signs were placed
thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of
the policeman, none was found at the scene of the accident.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with the

modification that the award of moral damages is deleted.

123
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS V. JUANITA REYES, WILFI EDO REYES,
MICHAEL ROY REYES, SIXTA LAPUZ, AND SAMPAGUITA TRAVEL
CORP.,

G.R. NO. 185891

JUNE 26, 2013

FACTS:

Wilfredo made a travel reservation with Sampaguita Travel for his family’s
trip to Adelaide, Australia. Upon confirmation of their flight schedule, Wilfredo
paid for the airfare and was issued 4 Cathay Pacific roundtrip airplane tickets for
Manila-Hong Kong-Adelaide-Hong Kong-Manila. One week before they were
scheduled to fly back home, Wilfredo re-confirmed his family’s return flight with
the Cathay Pacific office in Adelaide. They were advised that the reservation was
still okay as scheduled. On the day of their scheduled departure from Adelaide,
Wilfredo and his family arrived at the airport on time. When the airport check-in
opened, Wilfredo was informed by a staff from Cathay Pacific that Wilfredo’s
family did not have confirmed reservations, and only Sixta’s flight booking was
confirmed.

Although, they were allowed to board the flight to Hong Kong, not all of
them were allowed to board the flight to Manila as it was fully booked. Only
Wilfredo’s mother-in-law, Sixta, was allowed to proceed to Manila from Hong
Kong.

On the following day, the Reyeses were finally allowed to board the next
flightbound for Manila. Upon arriving in the Philippines, Wilfredo went
Sampaguita Travel to report theincident. He was informed by Sampaguita Travel
that it was actually Cathay Pacific which cancelled their bookings.

ISSUES:

124
 Whether Sampaguita breached its contract of services with Wilfredo’s
family? Yes

RULING:

Yes.Cathay Pacific breached its contract of carriage with the Reyeses when
it disallowed them to board the plane in Hong Kong going to Manila on the date
reflectedon their tickets. Thus, Cathay Pacific opened itself to claims for
compensatory,actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
suit.In contrast, the contractual relation between Sampaguita Travel and
respondentsis a contract for services. The object of the contract is arranging and
facilitating the latter’s booking and ticketing. It was even Sampaguita Travel which
issued the tickets.Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for
services, the standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of a
family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. This connotes reasonable care
consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when
confronted with asimilar situation. The test to determine whether negligence
attended the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.

There was indeed failure on the part of Sampaguita Travel to exercise due
diligence in performing its obligations under the contract of services. It was
established by Cathay Pacific, through the generation of the PNRs, that
Sampaguita Travel failed to input the correct ticket number for Wilfredo’s ticket.
Cathay Pacificeven asserted that Sampaguita Travel made two fictitious bookings
for Juanita and Michael.

The negligence of Sampaguita Travel renders it also liable for damages

125
SPOUSE LATONIO VS. MCGEORGE FOOD INDUSTRIES INC., ET. AL.

G.R. NO. 206184

DECEMBER 6, 2017
FACTS:
On September 17, 2000, the petitioners, spouses Ed and Mary Ann Latonio
accompanied their eight-month-old child Ed Christianto a birthday party at the
McDonald’s Restaurant, Ayala Center, Cebu City.During the party and as part of
the birthday package, McDonald’s presented two mascots – “Birdie” and
“Grimace” – to entertain and dance for the guests. Respondent Tyke Philip
Lomibao was the person inside the “Birdie” mascot suit.
After the mascots danced, guests had their pictures taken with them.
Intending to have her child’s photo taken with the mascots, Mary Ann placed Ed
Christian on a chair in front of the mascot “Birdie.” The mascot positioned itself
behind the child and extended its “wings” to give a good pose for the camera.As
photos were about to be taken, Mary Ann released her hold of Ed Christian.
Seconds later, the child fell head first from the chair onto the floor. Several guests
attended to Ed Christian. Meanwhile, the employees of respondent Cebu Golden
Food assisted petitioners in giving first aid treatment to Ed Christian. Petitioners,
nevertheless, remained and continued with the party and left only after the party
was over.Respondent corporation assured the Latonios that they were ready to
assist in whatever medical attention would be required of Ed Christian. However,
instead of giving respondent Cebu Golden Food copies of the medical records of
Ed Christian, the Latonios demanded compensation in the amount of P15 million.
RTC found respondents Cebu Golden Foods and Lomibao to be liable of
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. CA reversed RTC’s
decision.

ISSUE:

126
 Whether or not Mary Ann Latonio’s negligence was the proximate cause of
Ed Christian’s fall.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with CA that despite Mary Ann’s insistence
that she made sure that her baby was safe and secured before she released her
grasp on Ed Christian, her own testimony revealed that she had, in fact, acted
negligently and carelessly. The Court likewise agreed with the pronouncement of
CA that indeed, it is irresponsible for a mother to entrust the safety, even
momentarily, of her eight-month-old child to a mascot, not to mention a bird
mascot in thick leather suit that had no arms to hold the child and whose
diminished ability to see, hear, feel, and move freely was readily apparent.
Releasing her grasp of the baby without waiting for any indication that the mascot
heard and understood her is just plain negligence on the part of Mary Ann.
The Court added that the cause of Ed Christian’s fall is traceable to the
negligent act of Mary Ann of leaving him in the “hands” of Lomibao who was
wearing the Birdie mascot suit. The Court noted that “hands” and “wings” were
used interchangeably during the testimonies of the witnesses, thus, causing
confusion. In the absence of negligence on the part of respondents Cebu Golden
Foods and Lomibao, as well as their management and staff, they cannot be made
liable to pay for the damages prayed for by the petitioners.

127
 GABETO V. ARANETA

42 PHIL 252.

OCTOBER 17, 1921

FACTS:

Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay, in the
City of Iloilo, with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City.
When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction
indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying his
hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that
he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to
the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta, and that he had taken up
the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment.
At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the
horse from the control of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on.
Owing, however, to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the
rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's
mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out, which he did, in order to
fix the bridle. The horse was then pulled over to near the curb.

While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from the control of the bit,
became disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels
of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going a
few yards further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which
was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came down with a crash
and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street.

Basilio Ilano had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the
sidewalk; but the other, Proceso Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and
after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the
Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and received
injuries from which he soon died.

128
 This action was brought by Consolacion Gabeto, in her own right as widow
of Proceso Gayetano, and as guardian ad litem of the three children, Conchita
Gayetano, Rosita Gayetano, and Fermin Gayetano, for the purpose of recovering
damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso
Gayetano, supposedly caused by the wrongful act of the defendant Agaton
Araneta.

Judge awarded damages to the widow to which decision Araneta appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of
the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered
the legal or proximate cause thereof.

RULING:

No. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which
it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. it was Julio who jerked
the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and Julio, after
alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in
so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free
from control, started to go away.

129
 URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

157 SCRA 1

JANUARY 7, 1988

FACTS:

When Filomeno Urbano found the place where he stored his palay flooded
with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed he went
to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier admitted that he was the one
responsible for what happened. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier
pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano hacked Javier
hitting him on the right palm of his hand . Javier who was then unarmed ran away
from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on
the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.

On November 14,1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital

in a very serious condition. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr.
Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound
in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital. The appellant claim that
there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was
wounded to the time of his death. The proximate cause of the victim's death was
due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly
healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first
week of November, 1980. Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he
returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the
wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

130
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier
was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death

RULING:

Yes. The medical findings lead the Court to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano
was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence
merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier
suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.The rule
is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra)

131
 FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA

297 SCRA 30

OCTOBER 1, 1998

FACTS :

On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the
USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived
at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in
the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as
its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port
Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was
assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking
maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.

Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself
in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a
briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the
vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila
International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking
maneuvers.

When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North
Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the
vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor
dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The
left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold
as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between
the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew
members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov
assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.

After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the
engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that the

132
vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor
did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right
anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed
into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel
sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report
to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority.
Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident.The rehabilitation of the
damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25.

ISSUE:

Whether or not both the pilot and the master were negligent.

RULING:

Yes. In a collision between a stationary object and a moving object, there is

a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and
logic). The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in
turn means negligence on the part of FESC.

As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not
be the sole cause of an injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to
produce injuries, person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for
only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with
injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as
great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. No
actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire
result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or

more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for
the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage

133
to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

134
 SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V. CUSTODIO, ET AL

17 SCRA 1088

AUGUST 31, 1966

FACTS:

In Barrio Halang, two trucks, one driven by Mudales and belonging to

Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Lagunda and owned by
Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve.
Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as truck was
full of passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda. As a result,
Custodio was injured and died.

To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales.
However, Makabuhay, widoy of Custodio, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was
running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Lagunda had time and opportunity to
avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two
trucks never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the
road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio.

The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place
on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus
with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding
downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes
or passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda
(tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6
cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed. Driver Lagunda admitted that three
passengers rode on the running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a
distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. Despite the presence of a shallow canal on
the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not
avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a
passage of trucks.

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 Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court
of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. — hereinafter referred to
as the carrier — and its driver Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had violated
the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and
Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them were held
solidarity liable.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners were guilty of negligence.

2. Whether or not petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier
and its driver.

RULING:

1. Yes. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent,
in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of
negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the
negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the
negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last,
in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus
sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this
sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.

2. Yes. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of
contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running
board of the bus, and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of
contributory negligence, because that vehicle was running at a considerable speed
despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to
its right side of the road, it was driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the
passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on its running
board, the owners of the two vehicles are liable solidarily for the death of the
passenger, although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract, whereas

136
that of the other springs from a quasi-delict. Where the concurrent or successive
negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently
of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury
to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his
act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have
resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor.

137
 VDA. DE BATACLAN VS. MEDINA

102 PHIL 181

OCTOBER 22, 1957

FACTS:

Shortly after midnight, a bus of the Medina Transportation, operated by its

owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left
the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular
chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about 18 passengers, including the driver
and conductor. At about 2am, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of
Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it
fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. The three
passengers Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named
Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus.

Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard
groans and moans from inside the bus. Calls or shouts for help were made to the
houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them
carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled
with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including
the 4 passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the
bus were removed and duly identified that of Bataclan. His widow, Salud
Villanueva brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of P87,150.

138
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through
his agent, the driver Saylon, thus making him liable.

2. Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus.

RULING:

1. No. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus
was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that
according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the
point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned
after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the
blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the
velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

2. Yes. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when
the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the
men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and
that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and

139
flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers
should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. Neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near
the bus.

140
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v. IAC & CASIANO PASCUA, ET
AL.,

189 SCRA 158

AUGUST 30, 1990

FACTS:

This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney passengers who died
as a result of the collision between the Phil. Rabbit’s bus driven by Tomas delos
Reyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo. Other passengers of the
jeepney sustained physical injuries. It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio,
the jeepney’s right rear wheel detached which caused it to run in an unbalanced
position.

Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was
then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and
eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the
jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north
(towards where it was going). The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the
greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming
from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of Rabbit. Almost at the time when
the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the
highway, or after stopping for a couple of minutes, the bus bumped from behind
the right rear portion of the jeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries.
At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles following the
jeepney, neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather
condition of that day was fair. A criminal complaint against the two drivers for
Multiple Homicide. Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned. The
case against delos Reyes was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.

As regards the damages, three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses
(owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon, (jeepney driver)Manalo, Rabbit
and (Rabbit’s driver) delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants.

141
 The trial court found the couple and Manalo (jeepney driver) to be negligent
and held that there was a breach of the contract of carriage with their passengers.
The trial court ordered them to pay the damages. Filriters was jointly and severally
liable as it was the jeepney’s insurer. Rabbit was to be paid by the jeepney for
actual damages.
IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found delos Reyes to be
negligent; ordered to pay jointly and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs; Applied
primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who
bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless
contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test to conclude that
delos Reyes was negligent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the jeepney owners and its driver are liable for the injuries
and death suffered by the passengers of the jeepney.

RULING:

Yes, but only the spouses and Filriters are liable.The trial court was correct
in appreciating Manalo’s negligence. The principle about "the last clear" chance
would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from
the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the
other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. (Anuran, et al. v. Buño et al.)

On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty
and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence: would have
been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney
was abrupt. Delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by
Manalo.
With regard to the substantial factor test, it is a rule that if the actor's conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor
neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in

142
which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. The speed of the bus was
even calculated by the IAC. But the SC was not convinced. It cannot be said that
the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed
of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet
within the speed limit allowed in highways. Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not
having avoided the collision because as was shown, the jeepney left a skid mark of
about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to
the point of collision.
The trial court’s decision was reinstated and affirmed but with the
modification that only the couple and the Filtriters Guaranty Assurance Corp. Inc.,
were liable. Indemnity for loss of life was also modified.

143
 PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V IAC (DIONISIO)

148 SCRA 353

MAR 10, 1987

FACTS:

At about 1:30 am on November 15 1975, Leonardo Dionisio was on his way

home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio had taken a shot
or two of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an
intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He
switched his headlights on bright and saw a Ford dump truck about 21/2meters
away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of
Phoenix Construction Inc. (Phoenix), was parked on the right hand side of the
street facing the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew in such a manner as to stick
out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no
lights or any early warning reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck,
front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by
petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his
employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following
morning. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to
the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck.

As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries

including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two
gold bridge dentures. Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. IAC affirmed the lower
court’s ruling, with modification on award of damages.

Petitioners argued that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his
own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the
influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass; that if
there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that
negligence was merely a passive and static condition and that private respondent
Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of
the accident and the injuries he sustained.

144
 The private respondents argued that the legal and proximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck
entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisio’s

negligence (driving faster than he should have, and without headlights) or the
negligence of the driver in parking the truck.

RULING:

It is the driver’s negligence. On Cause v. Condition petitioners' arguments

are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the
United States. These arguments, however, do not have any validity in this
jurisdiction.

Even in the United States, the distinctions between cause and condition have
already been almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must
refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have
come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But
even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which
is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause."
The truck driver's negligence, far from being a "passive and static condition", was
an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision would not have occurred had
the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of
injury for anyone driving down that street and for having so created this risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible.

Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was
only a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck driver’s negligence

145
146
 MANILA ELECTRIC V REMOQUILLO

99 PHIL 117

MAY 18, 1956

FACTS:

Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to fix a leaking media
agua,” (downspout). He climbed up to the media agua which was just below the 3 rd
floor window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet through the said
window. After grabbing hold of the sheet, he turned around and a portion of the
iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric wire of Manila
Electric Company (the Company) strung 2.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media
agua, electrocuting him and killing him.

His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company
and the TC rendered judgment in their favor. The Company appealed to the CA,
which affirmed the judgment. It is this CA decision the Company now seeks to
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Company’s negligence in the installation and

maintenance of its wires was the proximate cause of the death.

RULING:

No. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the
stage for the cause of the injury to occur).

A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the
occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if
a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury intervenes
between such prior and remote cause and the injury.
147
 If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.

The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of
Magno himself. It was to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was
qualified to do so. He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and
the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and
experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-ft iron
sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing
all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with
the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.

148
RODRIGUEZA V. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

NOVEMBER 19, 1921

FACTS:

Rodrigueza et al seek damages from fire kindled by sparks from a locomotive

engine. The fire was communicated to four houses nearby. All of these houses
were of light construction, except that of Rodrigueza which was of strong
materials. Plaintiffs say that the company failed to supervise their employees
properly and was negligent in allowing locomotive to operate without smokestack
protection for arresting sparks. They also say that the sparks were produced by an
inferior fuel used by the company – Bataan coal.
Defense said Rodigueza’s house stood partly within limits of land owned by
company. Rodrigueza did not mind the warnings from the company. His house
materials included nipa and cogon, this indicates contributory negligence on his
part.
Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad, which appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not damage was caused by Rodrigueza’s contributory

negligence.

RULING:

Yes.Manila Railroad’s defense is not a bar to recovery by the other

plaintiffs. There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon
company’s property. His house was there before the railroad company’s property.
He may be at risk for fire, but should not bear loss if the fire resulted from the
company’s negligence.

The Proximate and Only Cause of the damage was the negligent act of the
company. That Rodrigueza’s house was near was an antecedent condition that
149
can’t be imputed to him as Contributory Negligence because that condition was not
created by himself and because his house remained by the toleration and consent of
company and because even if the house was improperly there, company had no
right to negligently destroy it. The company could have removed the house
through its power of eminent domain.

150
 MCKEE V IAC, TAYAG

211 SCRA 517

JULY 16, 1992

FACTS:

A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private

respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose
Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida
Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.

When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the right side of
the road and into the lane of the car. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to
the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the
car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he
could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of
the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. Two civil cases were
filed on Jan 31, 1977.

On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of

"Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court. He was found guilty before the
trial court and was ordered to pay damages. Galang appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed
decision.

The civil cases were dismissed. Petitioners appealed to IAC. In its

consolidated decision of the civil cases, it reversed the ruling of the trial court and
ordered the defendants to pay damages. The decision is based on the findings that
it was Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident.
The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the
defendants, as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it
was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the

151
defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
and supervising the said employee.

In a Motion for Reconsideration, the decision for the consolidated civil cases
was reversed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not negligence was proven.

RULING:

No. The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded
the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the
presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this
presumed negligence, IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's
negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an
unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that
the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of
the bridge, two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of
the car.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided

by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular

case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. Furthermore,

under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that

152
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence.

The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that
his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. Under Article 2185 of
the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance
finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which
states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim
for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap
is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. The doctrine
is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence.

Petition granted. Assailed decision set aside while its original is

REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is
increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim
Koh McKee.

153
 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. SOTERO REMOQUILLO

G.R. No. L-8328

May 18, 1956

FACTS:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio
Peñaloza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a
“media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The “media agua” was just below
the window of the third story. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received
from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking
portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into
contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to as
the Company) strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from
it, causing his death by electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to recover
damages from the company. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in
their favor — P10,000 as compensatory damages; P784 as actual
damages; cP2,000 as moral and exemplary damageband P3,000 as attorney’s fees,
with costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment
with slight modification by reducing the attorney’s fees from P3,000 to P1,000
with costs. The electric company has appealed said decision to us.
The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are conclusive are
stated in the following portions of its decision which we reproduce below:c“The
electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched
between poles on the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed
there some two years before Peñaloza’s house was constructed. The record shows
that during the construction of said house a similar incident took place, although
fortunate]y with much less tragic consequences. A piece of wood which a
carpenter was holding happened to come in contact with the same wire, producing
some sparks. The owner of the house forthwith complained to Defendant about the
danger which the wire presented, and as a result Defendant moved one end of the
wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it
was.

154
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manila Electric is guilty of negligence.

RULING:
The decision of Court of Appeals was reversed. The principal and proximate
cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but
rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward
the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latter’s length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and
proximate cause with respect to injuries.“A prior and remote cause cannot be made
the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if
there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.”

155
 TEAGUE V. FERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. L-29745
JUNE 4, 1973

FACTS:
The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building,
a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and
Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila  was owned and operated by Teague. The said second
floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters, and although
it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each
of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders and the presence of each of
said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.

October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out in a store for surplus
materials located about ten meters away from the institute (across the street). Upon
seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted ‘Fire! Fire!’
and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of
the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down
the students, who numbered about 180 at the time. The panic, however, could not
be subdued and the students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-
escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing
stampede therein. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic
was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-
appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede.
The deceased’s five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against
Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute.

CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was however,
reversed by the CA. The CA held that petitioner was negligent and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This
finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section
491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with
in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. The alleged
violation of the ordinance consisted in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-
Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2
meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second
stairway under construction.

156
 The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of
Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring
place; (3) shouts of “Fire!, Fire!”; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6)
injuries and death. As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued,
was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there
intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained
of. According to the petitioner “the events of fire, panic and stampede were
independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the
ordinance.”

ISSUE: 
Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence.

RULING:
 It is true that the petitioner’s non-compliance with the ordinance in
question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense
that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a
continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a
specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That
situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate
the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available.
“The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if
the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very
thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.” To consider the
violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the
situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the
overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely
what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways
instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the
principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.

157
 URBANO V. IAC

157 SCRA 1

FACTS:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his
ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming
from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what
happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier
admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano
hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the
bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano
paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was
rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the
condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his
palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was
found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano
filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who
stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on
November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of
the latter’s death.

RULING:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And
more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event

158
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by

tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have
been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six
days. Javier, however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more
credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign
to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may
have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such
prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances

159
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act
or condition is the proximate cause."

PICART VS. SMITH, JR.

G.R. NO. L-12219

MARCH 15, 1918

FACTS: 
On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite
direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman
on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course
and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule
of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled
the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not
have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached,
Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the
machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of
veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape
hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to
the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit
by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.

ISSUE: 
Whether Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done.

160
RULING:
 The judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here
rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as
to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a

result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to
be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we
think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position
of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the
horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for
he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible.
It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is

161
that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails
to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.

162
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL
PILAR AND EDILBERTO MONTESIANO

G.R. NO. 89880

FEBRUARY 6, 1991

FACTS:

At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between
a gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with
Motor No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259 along the national road at Calibuyo,
Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck
sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from
the driver’s seat to the last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the
bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained.

The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or

combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of
the passengers. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was only the
negligent act of one of them which was the proximate cause of the collision. In
view of this, the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be
solidary. The Court of Appealsruled on the contrary, it held that the bus driver had
the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in
proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.

RULING:

The principle of “last clear chance” applies “in a suit between the owners

and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would
be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the
ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” Furthermore, as
between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint
tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured
person by reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as

163
between defendantsconcurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent
actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action
which could have avoided the injury.The Court is convinced that the respondent
Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as
between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners
and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased
passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the
respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from
liability.

164
 PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION V. IAC

FACTS:

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo

Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He
was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck
parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early
warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a
regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left,
but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown.
Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance.
Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own
negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while
intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private
respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or
by respondent’s own negligence

RULING:

The Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the
wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words,
the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the
dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners

would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the

165
defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage
possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important
part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active
forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter
are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily
affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the
decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any
validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by
the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new
force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause"
and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of
the intervening cause.

The court believes, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from
being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient
cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of
injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created
this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's
negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and
therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent
cause.

166
 GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND HARDWARE ET AL VS. IAC ET AL

G.R. NO. 70493

MAY 18, 1989

FACTS: 
Engineer Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep, with Calibo at the
wheel, as it approached a bridge going towards the direction of Davao City. At
about that time, the cargo truck,  Zacarias coming from the opposite direction of
Davao City had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the
bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer
Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was
unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged
while the left side of the jeep,\ was extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep
fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the
truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road.
A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the
late Engineer Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo truck with the CFI
of Bohol. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint “for insufficiency of
evidence”. The Court of Appeals saw things differently. It rendered judgment 9 on
the plaintiffs’ appeal, reversing the decision of the Trial Court. It found Zacarias to
be negligent and his negligence “gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the
part of his employer, and their liability is both primary and solidary.” It therefore
ordered “the defendants jointly and solidarily to indemnify the plaintiffs

ISSUE:

Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case.

RULING:

Yes. Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the part

of Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in
failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was, the
physical facts would still absolve the latter of any actionable responsibility for the
accident under the rule of the last clear chance.

167
 Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each
other’s vehicle from a distance of 150 meters. The truck had been brought to a stop
while the jeep was still thirty meters away.  From these facts the logical conclusion
emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately
called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of
thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away
from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a
speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to
seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect
the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918
case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar state of facts.
Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his employer
(and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the evidence
supports the latter’s additional defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and wig not be undertaken. The
fact is that there is such evidence in the record which has not been controverted.

168
 PHILIIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V. CA

269 SCRA 695

FACTS:

May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC
funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for
the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC). They were not credited to RMC's account
but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband,
Bienvenido Cotas. Romeo Lipana  never checked their monthly statements of
account reposing complete trust and confidence on PBC. Irene Yabut's modus
operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and both are always validated
and stamped by the teller Azucena Mabayad. The original showed the name of her
husband as depositor and his current account number - retained by the bank. The
duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the
account holder was left blank. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name
of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account
number to RMC's account number. This went on in a span of more than 1 year
without private respondent's knowledge. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds,
RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money and later on filed in the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to
avoid the injury by not exercising the proper validation procedure.

RULING:

Yes. The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the
bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the PBC of responsibility. The odd
circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information (Name of
the account holder) should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Negligence
here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself
in its lack in selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. Mr. Romeo Bonifacio,
then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-
President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he

169
never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the
bank's validation procedures until 7 years later. The last clear chance/supervening
negligence/discovered peril. Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one
who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so
is chargeable with the consequences thereof Antecedent negligence of a person
does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or
bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair
chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence. Here, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, yet it cannot be denied that PBC bank, thru its teller, had the
last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self-imposed validation procedure.Art. 1173. The fault or
negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or
contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance,
that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.  In the case of
banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father
of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their
depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their client.

170
 SPOUSES ONG VS. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT

G.R. NO. L-7664

AUGUST 29, 1958

FACTS: 

Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its

Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a
nominal fee is charged . 14 year old Dominador Ong drowned while swimming in
one of those pools.Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs’ son was drowned in
one of its swimming pools but avers that his death was caused by his own
negligence or by unavoidable accident. Defendant also avers that it had exercised
due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its employees and that it
had observed the diligence required by law under the circumstances.After trial, the
lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the
complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal
directly to this Court because the amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.

ISSUE:

Whether the doctrine of last clear chance could be used against the
respondent

RULING:

No. There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all
necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident
which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of
appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator
and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so
as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the
area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs
six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and
were issued certificates of proficiency. …There is a male nurse and a sanitary
inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security
guards who are available always in case of emergency.

171
 The court do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record
does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing
the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was
going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on
nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The
doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the
latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or, “As the doctrine
usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding
an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of
a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.”

172
 ANURAN V. BUNO

GR NO. L-21353

MAY 20, 1966

FACTS:

January 12, 1958 noon: passenger jeepney owned by Pedro Gahol and Luisa
Alcantara and driven by Pepito Buño overloaded with (14-16 passengers) was
parked on the road to Taal, Batangas when a speeding motor truck owned
by Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Aro driven by Guillermo Razon negligently
bumped it from behind, with such violence that three passengers died and two
others suffered injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital
for many days. Jeepney was parked to let a passanger alight in such a way that 1/2
of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the
other half, on the right shoulder of the road. Suits were instituted by the
representatives of the dead and of the injured, to recover consequently damages
against the driver and the owners of the truck and also against the driver and the
owners of the jeepney.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance can apply so that truck
driver guilty of greater negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision
will be solely liable

RULING:

No. The three defendants last mentioned are required to pay solidarily with
the other defendants-respondents the amounts fixed by the appealed decision.New
Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are
"presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756)Principle about the "last
clear chance" would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers
of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would
be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the
ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.

173
174
 RAYNERA V HICETA

G.R. No. 120027.

APRIL 21, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioners herein are heirs of Reynaldo Raynera who was killed by an

accident on his way home at about 2:00 A.M. Respondents, Freddie Hiceta and
Jimmy Orpilla were owner and driver, respectively, of an Isuzu truck trailer which
was involved in the said accident. On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the
morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle
traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The
Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. 4 The
truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on
the left and three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about
35 watts each, on both sides of the metal plates. 5 The asphalt road was not well
lighted. At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into
the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the
collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo 6
rushed him to the Parañaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the
attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, 7 pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on
arrival. 
At time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department,
Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation. The heirs of the deceased demanded from
respondents' payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo as a result of
the vehicular accident. The respondents refused to pay the claims. Petitioners,
hence, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila a complaint for damages against
respondents' owner and driver of the Isuzu truck. Petitioners sought recovery of the
damages caused by the negligent operation of the truck- trailer at nighttime on the
highway, without tail the lights. 

ISSUE:

Whether the trick is responsible for the accident

175
RULING:

Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents' truck was
visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to
30 kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because
the cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance
with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136)" 25
respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicle's
cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof. 

It has been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another
vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other
evidence." The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear
vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle
in front of him. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid
the collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle.
Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was
the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last
clear chance of avoiding the accident.

CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORP. V. CA

GR NO. 169457

OCTOBER 19, 2015

FACTS:

LC Diaz professional partnership engaged in accounting opened a savings

account with Solidbank. LC Diaz's cashier, Macaraya, filled up two savings
deposit slips, and she gave them passbook to messenger Calapre and instructed him
to deposit the money with Solidbank. Calapre presented the deposit slips and
passbook to the teller. He left the passbook with Solidbank first as he had to make
another deposit at Allied Bank, but when he returned, he was informed that

176
somebody got the passbook. Calapre reported this to Macaraya. Calapre went back
to Solidbank with a deposit slip (P200k check). When Macaraya asked about the
passbook, the teller said that someone shorter than Calapre got it. Macaraya
reported this matter.
The following day, CEO Diaz called Solidbank to stop any transaction using the
passbook until the company could open a new account. It was found out that
learned that P300k was withdrawn from the account the previous day. The
withdrawal slip bore the signatures of two authorized signatories of LC Diaz but
they denied signing it. Noel Tamayo received this sum of money.

An information for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document

was filed against one of their messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola (first
time they appeared in the case discussion), but the RTC dismissed the criminal
case. LC Diaz demanded the return of their money from Solidbank, but the latter
refused and a complaint for recovery of a sum of money was filed against them.
However, Solidbank was absolved.

RTC applied rules on savings account written on the passbook ["Possession

of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or
payments made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein
of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor
personally."] RTC said that the burden of proof shifted to LC Diaz to prove that the
signatures are not forged. Also, they applied the rule that the holder of the passport
is presumed to be the owner. It was also held that Solidbank did not have
any participation in the custody and care of the passbook and as such, their act of
allowing the withdrawal was not the proximate cause of the loss. The proximate
cause was LC Diaz’ negligence. As regards the contention that LC Diaz and
Solidbank had precautionary procedures (like a secret handshake of sorts)
whenever the former withdrew a large sum, RTC pointed out that LC Diaz
disregarded this in the past withdrawal.

CA, on the other hand, said that the proximate cause of the unauthorized
withdrawal is Solidbank's negligence, applying NCC 2176. CA said the 3 elements
of QD are present [damages; fault or negligence; connection of cause and
effect]. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn was
significant. Proximate cause is teller's failure to call LC Diaz. CA ruled that
while LC Diaz was negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its
messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller, Solidbank could not
escape liability because of the doctrine of “last clear chance.” Solidbank could
have averted the injury had it called up LC Diaz to verify the withdrawal.
177
178
 CANLAS V. CA

GR NO. 112160

FEBRUARY 28, 2000

FACTS: 

August, 1982: Osmundo S. Canlas executed a Special Power of Attorney

authorizing Vicente Mañosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land situated in BF Homes
Paranaque in the name of his wife Angelina Canlas. Subsequently, Osmundo
Canlas agreed to sell the lands to Mañosca for P850K, P500K payable within 1
week, and the balance serves as his investment in the business.  Mañosca issued 2
checks P40K and P460K.  The P460K lacked sufficient funds. September 3, 1982:
Mañosca mortgage to Atty. Manuel Magno the parcels of lands for P100K with the
help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the Spouses Canlas.
September 29, 1982: Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings
Bank (ASB) for P500K with the parcels of land as security and with the help of the
same impostors.  The loan was left unpaid resulting in a extrajudicially foreclosure
on the lots. January 15, 1983: Canlas wrote a letter informing ASB that the
mortgage was without their authority.  He also requested the sheriff Contreras to
hold or cancel the auction.  Both parties refused. The spouses Canlas filed a
case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled to restrain the sheriff from issuing
a Certificate of Sheriff’s Sale and annulled the mortgage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ASB had was negligent due to the doctrine of last clear
chance

RULING:

Yes.Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the

omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply. The degree of diligence required of banks is more than
that of a good father of a family. Not even a single identification card was
exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity. It acted simply on the
179
basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the
signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to Atty. Magno. Previous deed
of mortgage did not bear the tax account number of the spouses as well as the
Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas. The doctrine of last clear chance 
provides where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed
to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom The antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence Antecedent Negligence:
Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Mañosca the opportunity to
perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting him the owner's copy of the transfer certificates
of title of subject parcels of land. Supervening Negligence: Failing to perform the
simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to
ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them - ASB bears the loss.
Canlas went to ASB with Mañosca and he was introduced as Leonardo Rey.  He
didn't correct Mañosca.  However, he did not know that the lots were being used as
a security for he was there to make sure that Mañosca pays his debt so he cannot be
estopped from assailing the validity of the mortgage.

180
 PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL AND AGUSTIN VESTIL V.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. NO. 74431

NOVEMBER 6, 1989

FACTS:

On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a
child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita
Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General
Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead"  and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was
discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of
saliva."  The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death
was certified as broncho-pneumonia.

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable
to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their
daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one
had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:

In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of
the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned
and there are other heirs to the property.

RULING:

Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would
be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's

181
heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession
of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the
ownership of the dog or of the house.

Article 2183 reads as follows:The possessor of an animal or whoever may make

use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should
come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole,  a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to

death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The
complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent
the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.

While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of
Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in
Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only
six kilometers from her own house.  Moreover, there is evidence showing that she
and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at
least one witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own
daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by
the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente
Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also
noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization
expenses

182
 DINGCONG VS. KANAAN

72 PHIL. 14; G.R. NO. L-47033

APRIL 25, 1941

FACTS:
The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the house of Emilia Saenz (in
Jose Ma. Basa Street of the City of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel.
Among the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria, paying P30 a month, and
occupying room no. 10 of said hotel. Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the
ground floor of the hotel and established his "American Bazaar" dedicated to the
purchase and sale of articles and merchandise. Around 11pm of 19 September
1933, Echevarria, when retiring to bed, carelessly left the faucet open that with
only an ordinary basin without drainage. That time, the pipes of the hotel were
under repair; the water run off the pipes and spilled to the ground, wetting the
articles and merchandise of the "American Bazaar," causing a loss which the CFI
sets at P1,089.61. The Kanaans (Halim, Nasri and Michael), representing the
establishment "American Bazaar," thereafter filed this complaint for damages
against Loreto Dingcong, Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria. CFI held
Francisco Echevarria liable, and acquitted Jose Dingcong. CA reversed and
declared Jose Dingcong responsible, sentencing him to pay the plaintiffs damages.

ISSUE

Whether or not Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for
damages.

183
RULING:
Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who
directly, by his negligence in leaving open the faucet, caused the water to spill to
the ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs. Jose Dingcong,
being a co-renter and manager of the hotel, with complete possession of the house,
must also be responsible for the damages caused. He failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these damages, despite his
power and authority to cause the repair of the pipes. Appealed decision is affirmed,
with the costs against apellant.

184
 AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY

58 PHIL 14

MARCH 6, 1933

FACTS:

Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine

Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the
City of Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the
records of the company. One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while
riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and
Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. It
appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. in Manila without
notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home
after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. According to the
practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were
required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning. The
widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from
the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812, P100
for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation. Plaintiffs' complaint was
subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act
No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial
expenses. Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at
the time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his death was violating an
ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday; and that Act No.
3428, as amended, is unconstitutional and void because it denies the defendant the
equal protection of the law, and impairs the obligation of the contract between the
defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan, and deprives the Courts of First Instance
of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons and nullifies
Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and XXXIV of the Civil Code
Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the employer is liable to pay the employee’s heirs.

185
RULING:

As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16, 1930

and Act No. 3812 was not approved until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the
law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23 of which reads as
follows:When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in
the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such
employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.

The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in
pursuance of his employment. At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo
Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant
corporation, but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day
and had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections for the
defendant. The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which
might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a
general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting
from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of
employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his
employment. The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act
No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of".

If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San
Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would
undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover. In the case at bar the
deceased was going from work in his own conveyance. Furthermore, it appears
that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal
from San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the company did not know that
he was living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the defendant company
did not require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents
to use bicycles. These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not
due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit
to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use
a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant
company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made
collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his

186
employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him.The decision appealed
from was affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.

187
 COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA (GERONIMO)
227 SCRA 292

OCTOBER 18, 1993

FACTS:

Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to
children in the Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan. On August
12, 1989, a group of parents complained that they found fibrous material in the
bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from Geronimo’s store.
Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found that there were indeed
fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the
Department of Health office in their region and was informed that the soda samples
she sent were adulterated. Because of this, Geronimo’s sales plummeted with her
regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3 cases. Her losses amounted
to P200 to P300 a day which later on forced her to close down her business on
December 12, 1989. She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff Coca-Cola
but the latter did not accede to her demands. The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-
Cola, stating that the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasi-delict
because of pre-existing relation between the parties. Thus the complaint should
have been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold. The trial court
however annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct
further proceedings in the civil case. According to the CA: “the allegations in the
complaint plainly show that it is an action for damages arising from respondent’s
act of recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to
be sol for public consumption.” It also noted that the availability of an action for
breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods.

Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. Since the complaint is for breach
of warranty (under Article 1561, CC), it should have been brought within 6 months
from the delivery of the goods. Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for
damages which does not involve an administrative action. Her cause of action is

188
based on an injury to plaintiff’s right which can be brought within 4 years (based
on Article 1146, CC).

ISSUE

Whether the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and pursuant to Article

1146(12), CC,

HELD

The action prescribes in 4 years.The vendee’s remedies against a vendor

with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the
thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567. The vendee may also
ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the
ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. Under American law, the liabilities
of the manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on
negligence, breach of warranty, tort or other grounds.The instant petition is denied
for lack of merit.

189
 GILCHRIST V CUDDY

29 PHIL 542

FEBRUARY 18, 1915

FACTS:

Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. Gilchrist was the owner of a
theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist
the Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. Cuddy returned the
money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that he can lease
the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the
same period. Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo
and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for
interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.

ISSUE

Whether Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract
between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the
parties

HELD

Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and
causing its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual
obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. Article 1902 of
the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage
done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the
liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he
causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may
recover for the damages suffered. Judgment affirmed

190
 SO PING BUN VS CA (TEK HUA)
GR NO. 120554

SEPTEMBER 21, 1999

FACTS:

In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok,
entered into a lease agreement with D.C. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo.
The contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of the same, they
continued on a month to month basis. In 1976, Tek Hua was dissolved with the
original members forming a new corporation, Tek Hua Enterprises with Manuel
Tiong as one of the incorporators. So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So
Pek Giok, occupied the same stalls under the business name, Trendsetter
Marketing. In 1989, the lessor, DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a
25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989. A further rent increase of 30%
effective January 1, 1990 was implemented. Enclosed in both letters were new
lease contracts for signing. While the letters contained a statement that the leases
will be terminated if the contracts were not signed, the same were not rescinded. In
1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls as
the same were going to be used by them. Instead of vacating the stalls, So was able
to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan. Tek Hua filed an injunction and an
action for nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and DC Chuan. The
lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua. The CA, on appeal, upheld the trial court.
Both the trial court and the CA awarded legal fees only.

ISSUE:

Whether So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract.

191
RULING:

A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of
others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful
interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. In
the case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts
in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latter’s property
right. Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damges are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes
liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest
in the private use and enjoyment of asset if a) the other has property rights and
privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is
substantial; c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; d) the
invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable
under the general negligence rules. On the other hand, the elemts of tort
interference are a) existence of a valid contract; b) knowledge on the part of the
third party of its existence; c) interference of the third party is without legal
justification or excuse. Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua
and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. The
action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor
was unlawful interference. The SC handled the question of whether the
interference may be justified considering that So acted solely for the purpose of
furthering his own financial or economic interest. It stated that it is sufficient that
the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record
imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. Hence the lack of
malice precludes the award of damages. The provision in the Civil Code with
regard tortuous interference is Article 1314 which states that “ any third party who
induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party”. The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is in the
concept of actual or compensatory damages as provided in Article 2208 of the
Civil Code. In this casse, due to defendant’s action of interference, plaintiff was
forced to seek relief through the Court snd thereby incur expenses to protect his
interests. The Court, however, found the award exorbitant. It was reduced to Pesos
192
100,000.00. Petition denied. CA decision affirmed subject to the modified award of
attorney’s fees.

GUILATCO V CITY OF DAGUPAN

171 SCRA 382

MAR 21, 1989

FACTS:

On July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, accidentally fell

into a manhole while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at
Perez Blvd. Her right leg was fractured, due to which she was hospitalized,
operated on, and confined. She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain,
and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She has not yet reported for duty as court
interpreter (at the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income. She also lost
weight, and she is no longer her former jovial self. Moreover, she has been unable
to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she used to do prior to
the incident. Police confirmed existence of the manhole, which was partially
covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½
feet wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep. City Engineer of Dagupan
Alfredo Tangco admitted that the manhole is owned by the National Government
and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the
National Government. He said that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes
and sees to it that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his
subordinates. Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual, moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees. CA reversed the lower court’s ruling on
the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that City of Dagupan had
control or supervision over Perez Blvd. City contends that Perez Blvd is a national
road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no
liability should attach to the city.

193
ISSUE:

Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of

Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance
with article 2189 CC.

RULING:

The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered
by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code
as follows: Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.

It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the
province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In this
case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer.The charter only lays down general rules
regulating that liability of the city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in
particular to the liability arising from “defective streets, public buildings and other
public works.”

Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of P8053.65. The

trial court should not have rounded off the amount. The court can not rely on
“speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the amount. Moral damages of
P150000 is excessive and is reduced to P20000. Guilatco’s handicap was not
permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year.
Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000. Award of P7420 as lost income
for one year, plus P450 bonus remain the same. P3000 as attorney’s fees remain

194
the same. Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside, decision of trial
court reinstated with modification.

195
 WORCESTER V OCAMPO
22 PHIL 42

FEB. 27, 1912

FACTS:

Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of the Civil Commission of the

Philippines and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government commenced an
action against defendants Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos, Reyes, Aguilar, Liquete, Palma,
Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto and Cansipit (owners, directors, writers, editors
and administrators of a certain newspaper known as “El Renacimiento” or “Muling
Pagsilang”) for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged
libelous publication. The editorial “Birds of Prey” was alleged to have incited the
Filipino people into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person,
unworthy of the position which he held. The said editorial alluded to him as an
eagle that surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten
meat, an owl that affects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the
blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. After hearing the evidence adduced
during trial, the judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, holding
all the defendants (except for Reyes, Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be
editors but in a subordinate position and found to have merely acted under the
direction of their superiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on
account of petitioner’s wounded feelings, mental suffering and injuries to his
standing and reputation in the sum of P35,000 as well as P25,000 as punitive
damages. This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the SC, claiming that
the CFI committed several errors in rendering said judgment among which was
that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and
severally against the defendants.

196
ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants, regardless of their participation in the

commission of the actual tort, may be held jointly and severally liable as joint
tortfeasors.

RULING:

Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort,
or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Joint tortfeasors are
jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. They are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the
wrongful act themselves. ***If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff
or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of
them separately, because tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual.
Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. They fail
to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only individually
liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his
tortfeasors. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of
the tort. They might have sued jointly and severally, as they were. It is not
necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. **note: Ponente
used examples of torts as held under common law** (In a case of assault and
battery committed by various persons, under the common law, all are principals).
So also is the person who counsels, aids, or assists in any way the commission of a
wrong. Under the common law, he who aided, assisted or counseled, in any way
the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or
committed the actual tort. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the
tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or any number
less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and altogether
jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the
others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants;
nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as
compared with that of the others. The courts during the trial may find that some of

197
the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may
release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort. And
this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. However, in this
case, the lower court, committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment
against the defendants. As recognized by Section 6 of Act 277 of the Philippine
Commission: “Every author, editor, or proprietor * * * is chargeable with the
publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each newspaper, as fully
as if he were the author of the same. Judgment of the lower court modified.
Ocampo, Kalaw, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit held
jointly and severally liable for the sum of P25, 000 with interest at 6%. Santos
absolved from any liability.

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 CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD
27 PHIL 374

MARCH 28, 1914

FACTS:

The plaintiff-appellant, Chapman, desired to board a certain "San

Marcelino" car coming from Sta. Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by his
friend that the car was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly,
passed into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car
was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear platform. Plaintiff
attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not reach it without
extra exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited
for it to come abreast of him in order to board. While in this position he was struck
from behind and run over by the defendant's (Underwood) automobile. The
defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by
his chauffeur, a competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to Sta. Ana
being immediately in front of him, he followed along behind it. Just before
reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following took the
switch (there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran, with
occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other)- that is, went off the
main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. Thereupon
the defendant either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the
right. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound
in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going. When the front
of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in front of the defendant's automobile,
defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff.
The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.

ISSUE:

199
 Whether Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver.

RULING:

An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle, and permits his driver
to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he
has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease
therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. On the other hand, if the
driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present herein at5 the time the
act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefore. The
act complained of must be continued in the presence or the owner for such a length
of time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes his driver’s act his own.
Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff.
He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff needed only to
watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law
permitted to pass upon that side of the street car. In the case of Johnson vs. David,
the driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art.1903 of the Civil Code for
whose acts the defendant would be responsible. Although in the David case the
owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were
committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless
the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the
owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist
therefrom. It appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to
meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not
to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver. The
judgment appealed from is affirmed.

200
 CAEDO v. YU KHE THAI

GR No. L-20392

DECEMBER 18, 1968

FACTS:

Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon
City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for
Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from
the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael
Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack.
The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of
the road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour,
and the Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers. Their headlights were
mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same
direction, was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was
towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post
on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista. Rafael
Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him,
only eight meters away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. The
carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should have
given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did
not notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway
have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in
the beam of his headlights for a considerable while. In the meantime the Mercury
was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of
slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear,
veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear
bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying
it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the
oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he
slackened his speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded
that the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble
— beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela, or
else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and
the risk should have been quite obvious. It was already too late to apply the brakes

201
when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had
to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite
lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was
insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela
and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to
avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was
unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his
car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not, defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the accident.

2. If yes, whether his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, is solidarily liable
with him.

RULING:

1. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael
Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by
the plaintiffs.

2. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the
vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the
mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The basis of the master's liability in civil
law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The
theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to
correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. The test of imputed negligence
under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective.
Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are
professional drivers. The law does not require that a person must possess a certain
measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the
observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which
the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed
by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may
appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a
uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car
owners who, by -their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would
202
be effectively proscribed. Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic
laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be
imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought
in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to
detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of
the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such
negligence may be imputed. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed.
The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was
no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely
on the skill and experience of his driver. The time element was such that there was
no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn
the driver accordingly. Judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of
declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is otherwise
affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.

203
 RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA)
135 SCRA 242

FEBRUARY 28, 1985

FACTS:

Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a vehicular collision (between

Luna, driving a gokart, and Luis dela Rosa, 13 years old, driving a Toyota car
without a license) at a gokart practice area. Heirs of Luna brought a suit for
damages against Luis and his father, which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas,
awarding P1,650,000 as unearned net earnings of Luna, P12,000 compensatory
damages, and P50,000 for loss of his companionship (come on!!), with legal
interest from date of the decision, and attorney’s fees of P50,000 (no interest
mentioned). (Note: father and son solidarily liable for damages.) The Dela Rosas
appealed in the CA, which affirmed in toto the RTC. In a MFR filed by the Dela
Rosas, the CA modified the decision, this time reducing the unearned income to
P450,000. Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC. Petition of the
Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. The instant petition is the one filed by
Lunas, contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income,
and that the award for atty’s fees should include legal interest. Pending the
decision, the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas, in the interest
of justice (since the death took place in 1970, and 15 years after the process of
litigation is still not over), to pay the Lunas P450,000 for unearned net earnings,
P12,000 compensatory damages, P50,000 for loss of companionship, all with legal
interest, and atty’s fees of P50,000, within 30 days. The Dela Rosas failed to pay
the amounts, saying that they had no cash money. The writ of execution produced
only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis is already of age, married, with 2
kids, and living in Spain but only causally employed (“His compensation is hardly
enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as yet”).

ISSUE:
204
 Whether or not the CA erred in reducing the unearned income.

RULING:

The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis, thus is
void. The RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors: life
expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years, and an annual net income of
P55,000 (P75,000 gross income less P20,000 personal expenses). In coming out
with the life expectancy, RTC considered the age and health of the deceased.
However, the CA modified this by factoring in the “engagement of Luna in car
racing,” thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years. WRT to the gross
income, RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his
death, and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years, thus coming
up with a potential gross income of P75,000. However, the CA increased the
annual personal expenses to P30,000, due to the escalating gasoline expenses, thus
lowering the net annual unearned income to P45,000. CA erred in ruling that the
engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy. There is nothing on record
that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity
tending to shorten his life expectancy. “That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is
the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous
sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly
larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the
CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously
affirmed.”Also, it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the
gross income. “It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should
increase because of the ‘escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in
Roberto R. Luna's social standing’ [a statement which lacks complete basis], it
would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase
considering the manifold sources thereof”

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 LIBI V. IAC

G.R NO. 70890

SEPTEMBER 18, 1992

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until Julie Ann broke
up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and
irresponsible. Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation
but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats
against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend.
Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the
same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner
Cresencio Libi.Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances
surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the contending parties
herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of
circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical
facts. As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed in the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising
from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Are the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability?

RULING:

Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor
children is imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which covers
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The parents'
liability as being primary and not subsidiary and liability shall ceased if the parents
can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father to prevent damage.
In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the
activities of their son. It was only at the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly
discovered that he was drug informant of CANU and that the gun used in the
shooting incident was missing from the safety deposit box. Having been grossly
negligent in preventing Wendell from having access to said gun, the Libis are

206
subsidiary liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who
was living in their company.

207
 TAMARGO V. CA

G.R NO. 85044

JUNE 3, 1992

FACTS:

Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo

with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Vigan, Ilocos Sur
by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses
Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses
Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at
the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto
Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability
on the ground that he bad acted without discernment. the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc This petition for
adoption was grunted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent
spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents claimed that not they, but rather the
adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the
adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually
living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been
relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial
court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of
Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. In the present
Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses
Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts
of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.

ISSUE:

Will the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may

be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable
parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the
latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents?

208
RULING:

No. The principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently

designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under
Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by
himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a
natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their
parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of
the child.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living
with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil
Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child
living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of
the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only
presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle
occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses,
the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural
parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the
period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such
trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or
bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual
custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

209
 CUADRA V. MONFORT

G.R. NO. L-24101

SEPTEMBER 30, 1970

FACTS:

Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates.
Their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the
grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a
plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their
hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to
frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter
turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the
pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day,
the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her
parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical
operation twice. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra
completely lost the sight of her right eye. The parents instituted a case in behalf of
their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father.

ISSUE:

Is Alfonso Monfort liable for an act of his minor child which causes damage
to another?

RULING:

No. The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault
or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or
intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for
whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article
2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the
mother. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article
2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may
therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn
from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated

210
of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the
defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that
he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to
foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at
school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to
expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act
which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual
among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would
reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed
to her parents.

211
 MERCADO V. CA

G.R. NO. L-14342

MAY 30, 1960

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-plaintiff-

appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the
son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and
Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon,
Quezon City. A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be described
as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956,
Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a
result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor. The
facts of record clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who started the
aggression. Undeniably, the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it
to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was
not aware that the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto, because right after Benedicto
gave it to him, Benedicto ran away to get a basket ball with which they could play.
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the "pitogo" belonged to
Augusto. He thought it was the "pitogo" of Benedicto P. Lim, so that when
Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo" from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do
so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the "pitogo".
However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.'s remark and he aggresively pushed the
latter. The fight started then. After Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr.,
and the latter was clutching his stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto's anger,
Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position, cut him on the right
check with a piece of razor.

ISSUE:

Should the School be held responsible for the incident?

RULING:

No. ART. 2180. . . .Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and

trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

212
It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody,"
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such
that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and
actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so
would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear
in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go
back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation
contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does
paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children. The claim of petitioner that responsibility
should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without merit.

PALISOC V. BRILLANTES

G.R. NO. L-29025

OCTOBER 4, 1971

FACTS:

The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were
classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three
o'clock, they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the
laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in
recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while
Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the
effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc
slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong
flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach.
Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and
both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him
to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered
to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never
regained consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing is the substance of the
testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident." The trial court
found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the
Manila Technical Institute. There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and
213
boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. These
defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant
Daffon.

ISSUE:

Did the the trial court err in absolving the defendants-school officials instead
of holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon,
for the damages awarded them as a result of their son's death?

RULING:

Yes. The Court holds that under Article 2180, defendants head and teacher
of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue, respectively)
are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of
the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory
room. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the
school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it
has not been properly impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so
implead it, by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single
proprietor, the lower court found that it had been incorporated since August 2,
1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been
brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding that
Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request for admission
had expressly manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C. Brillantes
is not the registered owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a
corporation and is not owned by any individual person."
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious
acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that
they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and
are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
child."This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil
Code. In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of
the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide
proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that
would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves
may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
214
As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in
Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is
some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the
child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent,
should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for
the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the
school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is
under instruction." The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or
negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on
the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the
student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and
boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school.

215
 AMADORA V. CA

G.R. NO. L-47745

APRIL 15,1988

FACTS:

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of
his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were
scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and
deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the
auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito
Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his
life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. Daffon was convicted of
homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the
victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two
other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students
was later dropped. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was
reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved, the respondent court
found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also
held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the
incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of
the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary
diligence in preventing the injury.

ISSUE:

Should Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos be held liable?

RULING:

No. The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the
authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the
incident happened.  It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish
his physics requirement.  What was important is that he was there for a legitimate
216
purpose.  On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in
the provision.  Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and
not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of
particular classes.In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should
probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed
gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to the higher authorities.  Though it was clear negligence on
his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting
incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision
because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible
for the damage caused by the student.  Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of
the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to
his death.

217
 PASCO V. CFI

G.R. NO. L-54357

APRIL 25, 1988

FACTS:

Petitioner, together with two companions, while walking inside the campus
of the private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said
university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul
Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were also students of the Araneta
University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he
was hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he
underwent surgery to save his life. Petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco,
filed a complaint for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private
respondent Gregorio Araneta University. Said school was impleaded as a party
defendant based Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Is Article 2180 of the Civil Code equally applicable to academic

institutions?

RULING:

No. We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to

educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for the issue in
this petition is actually whether or not, under the article, the school or the
university itself (as distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable. We find the
answer in the negative, for surely the provision concerned speaks only of "teachers
or heads."

218
 YLARDE V. AQUINO

G.R NO. L-33722

JULY 29, 1988

FACTS:

Soriano is the school principal; Aquino and Banez were teachers in this
school. Novelito Ylarde is a student [deceased] & Federico is his father. Gabaldon
Primary School, an academic school, was littered with several huge concrete
blocks [around one ton each] which were remnants of an old school shop which
was destroyed in WWII. Banez [teacher] realized that these stones were huge
hazards so he started burying them, and he was able to bury 10 blocks by himself.
A fellow teacher Aquino decided to help, so he gathered 18 students and ordered
them to dig a  hole where a 1-ton stone could be buried. The following day, he
called 4 of these students to continue digging. When the hole was 1m 40cm deep,
Aquino alone continued digging while the students remained inside the pit,
throwing out loose soil. They got out of the hole when the depth was right. Aquino
left the children to level the loose soil around the hole because he went to see
Banez (who was 30 meters away) to get a key to the school workroom to get rope.
He allegedly told the children not to touch the stone. After Aquino left, 3/4 kids
jumped inside the pit, Ylarde included. The remaining kid jumped on top of the
block, causing it to slide downwards. 2 were able to get out but Ylarde wasn’t able
to do so, and so the block pinned him to the wall in a standing position. He
sustained injuries and three days later, Ylarde died. His parents filed a suit for
damages against Aquino and Soriano [principal], but the RTC dismissed the
complaint for the following reasons:a.) Digging done is in line with Work
Education subject; b) Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person; c) Ylarde’s death was due to his own reckless imprudence.
CA affirmed RTC. Petitioners base their action against Aquino [teacher] on
NCC 2176 for his alleged negligence that caused Ylarde’s death, while the action
against the principal was based on NCC 2180.

ISSUE:
Can both Aquino and Soriano be held liable?

RULING:
No. Only Aquino (Teacher) can be held liable.

219
The principal cannot be held liable because he is a head of an academic school, not
a school of arts and trade. SC cited Amadora v. CA wherein it was held NCC 2180
says that in an academic school, it is only the teacher who should be answerable
for torts committed by their students, and in a school of arts and trades, it is only
the school head who can be held liable. [LegMeth lesson: reddendo singula
singulis — “refers only to the last”]. Also, as admitted by Aquino himself, the
principal did not give any instruction regarding the digging. Now, here’s the twist:
Aquino can be held liable under NCC 2180 as the teacher-in-charge. HOWEVER,
petitioners base Aquino’s alleged liability on NCC 2176. Therefore, the question is
WON there were acts and omissions on Aquino’s part amounting to fault or
negligence which have direct causal relation to Ylarde’s death, and the answer is
YES. Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by
Aquino. He acted with fault and gross negligence when he: a) Failed to avail
himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils to make
an excavation near a 1 ton concrete stone which he knew to be a hazardous task;b)
Required the children to remain inside the pit even after they finished digging,
knowing that the block was nearby; c)Ordered them to level the soil when it was
apparent that the stone was on the brink of falling; d)Went to a place where he
would not be able to check on the students’ safety; e) Left the children close to the
excavation, an attractive nuisance.
It’s totally ridiculous how the lower court found Aquino to have exercised utmost
diligence of a very cautious person. The simple warning “not to touch the stone” is
of no use, considering the age of these children. He should have made sure that the
children are protected from all harm while they are in his company, since he
stands in loco parentis to his students. Also ridiculous is the claim that the digging
work is part of Work Education. For one, Aquino himself said that the principal
made no instructions requiring what students were to do. Also, it’s not in the lesson
plan, since Aquino decided all by himself to help Banez. Also, this activity should
not be placed alongside relatively lighter activities such as school gardening, tree
planting which could be legitimately part of the Work Education subject because
these do not expose the children to such risk.
Supreme Court does not agree with lower court that the injuries which led to
Ylarde’s death were caused by his own reckless imprudence. The degree of care
required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to
care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult,
but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons his
age and experience. (Left by themselves and tired from the strenuous digging, it
was natural that they would play around. Also note that it was not only Ylarde who
jumped into the hole.) Hence, Ylarde cannot be charged with reckless imprudence.

220
221
 SALVOSA V. IAC
G.R. NO. L-70458
OCTOBER 5, 1988

FACTS:

Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is also

an institution of arts and trade because BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational
department offering Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses
as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio Colleges
Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer.  As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the
AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the
AFP,  as well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also
a commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy
B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of
the BCF.  As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted
for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide. Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon
Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon and the BCF .

ISSUE:

Is Baguio Colleges Foundation subsidiarily liable?

RULING:

No. Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for “damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.” The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the
custody of a teacher, the latter “stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the
student and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the student.” Likewise, “the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — ‘so long as (the students)
remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long
as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.” Jimmy B. Abon
cannot be considered to have been “at attendance in the school,” or in the custody
222
of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidary liable with Jimmy B. Abon for
damages resulting from his acts.

223
 ST. FRANCIS V. CA

G.R NO. 82465

FEBRUARY 25, 1991

FACTS:

Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School,

wanted to join a school picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo
Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to
join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the
directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of
persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the
picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students,
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand
himself who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against
petitioner and some of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but
dismissed complaint against the school.

ISSUE:
Are petitioner school and teachers liable?

RULING:

No. Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his
employee, the act or omission which caused damage must have occurred while an
employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the
teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks.
What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not have permit
from the school since it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge by
petitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to the
holding of the same.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the
award of damages to the respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section
where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who
joined the picnic.

224
 PSBA V. CA

G.R. NO. 8469X

FEBRUARY 4, 1992

FACTS:

Carlitos Bautista is a junior college student enrolled in the Philippine School of

Business Administration (PSBA). Unfortunately, he was killed in a stabbing
incident that occurred inside the school premises. The assailant is an outsider to the
school.The present case was brought by the parents of the deceased before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila against the school and its officers for damages for
the death of their son. The suit impleaded the school and various school officials.
The parents of Carlitos Bautista alleged that the defendants were negligent and did
not provide adequate security measures to protect their students. Defendants
argued, however, that they are not covered by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code,
under which they are sued. They asserted that the cause of action is hinged on
quasi-delict, which requires that there be no contract between the parties. However,
their son’s enrollment in the school evinces the existence of a contract. Therefore,
they sought to dismiss the petition, which was denied by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals (CA).Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is PSBA civilly liable under Art. 2180?

RULING:

No. The present case cannot be tried under Art. 2180.

Art. 2180 governs quasi-delicts. Quasi-delicts are extra-contractual; that is, it only
arises when there is no prior contract between the parties of the case. The Court
explained that the deceased, upon enrolling the academic institution, entered into a
contract with them: “When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On
the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Institutions of learning must

225
also meet the implicit or “built-in” obligation of providing their students with an
atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or
higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets
are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises
and to prevent the breakdown thereof.”
Thus, the CA was correct in dismissing PSBA’s petition, but it erred by grounding
its decision on this article.

226
 SOLIMAN V. TUAZON

G.R NO. 66207

MAY 18, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against private
respondent Republic Central Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc.
and one Jimmy Solomon, a security guard, as defendants. The complaint alleged
that Jimmy Solomon a duly appointed security guard under the employment,
supervision and control of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY,
INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with
a .38 Caliber Revolver. The plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles Medical
Center, Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff may not be able to
attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his
usual work for a duration of from three to four months before his wounds would be
completely healed.
Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the
complaint stated no cause of action against it. Private respondent argued that it is
free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason
that private respondent school was not the employer of the security guard charged,
Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon.
Private respondent school further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the
Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil,
student or apprentice of the school.

ISSUE:

Can Republic Central Colleges be held liable for the acts or omissions of
Jimmy Solomon?

RULING:

No. The employer of Jimmy Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc.,
while the school was the client or customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is
settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work
227
of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or
watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards
attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such
agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in
selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the
agency shall be assigned to it, the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be
demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by the security
guards. The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the
security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or
omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests
commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security
agency. There being no employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and
Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose vicarious liability upon the
Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an
apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security
Agency Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
similarly not available for imposing liability upon the Republic Central Colleges
for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.

228
 ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS

G.R NO. 143363,

FEBRUARY 6, 2002

FACTS:

February 13 to 20, 1995, defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of

Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet
of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective
enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos
was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin,
along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old
and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of
the injuries he sustained from the accident. Spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia
Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr.
and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys
Academy before the Regional Trial Court. St. Marys academy appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals. St. Marys Academy filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos?

RULING:

No. The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code,
pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not
having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. Under Article 218 of
the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all
authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions
229
and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if
the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In this case, the
respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of
petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and
control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a
minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be
pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys
Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and
the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

230
 PHILIPPINE RABBIT V. PHIL AMERICAN

G.R. NO. L-25142

MARCH 25, 1975

FACTS:

Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American

Forwarders] along the national highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the
PRBL bus driven by Pangalangan. As a result, Pangalangan suffered injuries and
the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of
earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders.
PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American
Forwarders, Balingit, and Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda’s
employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the
ground that PRBL and Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFI
dismissed the complaint against Balingit, on the ground that he is not the manager
of an establishment as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Are the terms “employers” and “owners and managers of an establishment

or enterprise” embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless
operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the
damage arose?

RULING:

No. Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be

gathered from the context of Article 2180 of the Civil code that the term
“manager” (“director” in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of “employer”.
Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be imposed on Balingit as
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, in connection with the vehicular accident
in question, because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of
Phil-American Forwarders.

231
 PHILTRANCO V. CA

G.R NO. 120553,

JUNE 17, 1997

FACTS:

Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez
Street of Calbayog City. Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. driven by defendant
Rogasiones Manilhig y Dolira was being pushed by some persons in order to start
its engine. Some of the persons who were pushing the bus were on its back, while
the others were on the sides. As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the
bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A.
Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. As
the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly, its running motion
was also enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby the subject bus bumped
on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell and, thereafter, was
run over by the said bus.

ISSUE:
Is Philtranco’s liability solidary (jointly & severally) with Manilhig?

RULING:
Yes. It had been consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of
a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco,  for damages arising from the
tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with
the driver.  As to solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides: Art. 2194. The
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Since the employer’s liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if
the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its
employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action
based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 2181. Whoever
pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the
latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

232
 CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ

G.R. NO. 132266

DECEMBER 21, 1999

FACTS:

Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña

Rotunda. He was traveling without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also
only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand,
Benjamin Abad, manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered
owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. Abad drove the said company car out of a
parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña Rotunda he made a short cut
against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or
to Belvic St. In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad
collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his
vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu
Doctors Hospital. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It was there that
Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party wherein he agreed to pay
whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez
may incur.
Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed
for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages was commenced by
Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So
Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. The
trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez.
CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held
that the liability of the latter is only vicarious and not solidary with the former.
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:

May an employer be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the
negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle?

RULING:

233
 No. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in
any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish
the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to
hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the
employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee. It is undisputed that ABAD was a
Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence.

234
 FILAMER V. IAC

G.R NO. 75112

1992

FACTS:

Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. He is also employed as a janitor. The president

of FCI is Agustin Masa. Agustin has a son, Allan, who is the school bus (bus na
jeepney) driver. Allan lives with his dad. Funtecha also lives in the president’s
house free of charge while a student at FCI. It is the practice of the driver (Allan)
after classes to bring the kids home, then go back to the school, then go home in
the school jeep. He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning he’s
supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school. One night, Funtecha wanted to
drive home. He has a student license. After a dangerous curb, and seeing that the
road was clear, Allan let Funtecha drive. Then there was a fast moving truck
(opposite direction) with glaring lights. Funtecha swerved right and hit the
pedestrian Kapunan. Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against
vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). The
jeep had only one functioning headlight that night. TC and CA ruled in favor of
Kapunan. SC reversed, saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by
Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts
the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable.

ISSUE:

Can the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep be held liable?

RULING:

Yes. Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where
both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the
petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he
can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. It is indubitable
under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was
routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the
school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's
license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in
his classrooms. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the

235
direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not, having a joy ride Funtecha
was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school.
The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in
behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.
The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at
the time of the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee
driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a
presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of
whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of his master's business. Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI.
He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the
petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient
that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the
petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not
acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the
burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its
part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him.
The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by
persons other than the driver. There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI
over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep. The petitioner, thus, has an
obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which
Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its
employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of
its employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and
solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent
employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.

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 NPC V. CA

G.R. NO. 119121

FACTS:

On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National
Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City. Unfortunately,
enroute to its destination, one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a
head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of
three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to
seventeen other passengers. The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages
against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC with the
main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects, but in this
case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks). The trial court rendered a
decision absolving NPC of any liability. PHESCO appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which reversed the trial court's judgment absolving PHESCO and
sentencing NPC to pay damages.

ISSUE:

Should NPC, the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dump truck be solidarily
liable for the damages to the victims?

RULING:

Yes. In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into

by PHESCO and NPC, we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor
only" contracting. In a "labor only" contract, the person acting as contractor is
considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible
to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been
directly employed by him. Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor
is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between
the owner (principal contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor, including the
latter's workers. Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: "Employers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry." In this regard, NPC's liability is direct,
primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the

237
judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse against PHESCO and
the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action.

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 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT V. NAVIDAD

G.R. NO. 145804

FACTS:
14 Oct 1993, about 730pm, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA
LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While
Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an
altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman,
was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously. Marjorie Navidad (Nicanor’s widow), along with their children,
filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and
a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability
and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its security guards. The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent
and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that
Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. TC:
Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito
Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; 2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; b) Moral
damages of P50,000.00; c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000; d) Costs of suit. TC:
dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of
merit. Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA: exonerated Prudent from any
liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and
Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts: a) P44,830.00 as
actual damages; b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages; c) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and e)
P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees. CA ratiocinated that while the deceased
might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had
already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed
to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In
exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link
the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that

239
Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established
the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned
and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court
faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact
that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train. CA
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.

ISSUE:

1. Is LRTA liable for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr.

2. Is Rodolfo Roman, Employee of LRTA Liable for the death of Navidad?

RULING:

1. No. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason
of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may
choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. PRUDENT could
also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 12 and
related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the Civil Code. (But there
wasn’t any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this
case- SC) The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault
on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then
be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer
failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of
its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has
not been shown. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the
same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the
other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 14 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches
the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no
contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached
by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

240
 2. Yes. There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability as Prudent is.
Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a
juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable
only for his own fault or negligence. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common
carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is
burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers. The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death
of or injury to its passengers, provides "Article 1755. A common carrier is bound
to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances. "Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
articles 1733 and 1755." "Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of
or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. "This liability of the
common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger
on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if
the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission." The law
requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a
common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during
the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and
where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory
provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a)
through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is
relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to
an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation
by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which LRTA and Roman, according

241
to the CA, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,
an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.

242
 CASTILEX VS. VASQUEZ

G.R. NO. 132266

DECEMBER 21, 1999
FACTS:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Benjamin Abad
(Abad) was driving a company-issued car when he collided with the vehicle driven
by Romeo So Vasquez (Vasquez) which caused the latter’s death. Abad was a
manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation (Castilex.) Abad was then
leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends
after having done overtime work for the petitioner when the incident happened.
The trial court held that Abad and Castilex are jointly and solidarily liable. The
Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court and held that Castilex is
only vicariously liable and not solidarily liable with Abad.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving
by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks
regardless of the time and circumstances.

ISSUE:
Is the employer, Castilex, liable for the negligent acts of its employee,
Abad, who was then driving the company-issued car?

RULING:
No. The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the
negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the
vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.
To the mind of this Court, Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in
a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond
the normal working hours. Abad’s working day had ended; his overtime work had
already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known
as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had no connection

243
to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a
manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form
of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that Abad was acting within the scope of the
functions entrusted to him, petitioner Castilex had no duty to show that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in providing Abad with a service
vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious
liability for the consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle.

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 FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE VS. IAC

G.R. NO. 75112

AUGUST 17, 1992

FACTS:
Kapunan, Sr. an 82-year-old retired teacher, was struck by a jeepney owned
by Filamer Christian Institute and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha.
Kapunan was hospitalized for 20 days. He thus instituted a criminal case against
Funtecha alone, who was convicted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence.
Thereafter, pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan instituted a civil case for
damages against Funtecha and Filamer and its president. The RTC and the CA
found Filamer, the school, liable for damages. Hence, this petition.
Filamer contends that it is not civilly liable because Funtecha was not its
employee, as he was only a working scholar assigned to clean the school premises
for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. Filamer anchors its
contention on Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the Labor Code, which excludes
working scholars from the employment coverage as far as substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned.

ISSUE: Is Funtecha an employee of Filamer?

RULING:
YES. It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time
janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an
employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2)
hours in the morning of each school day.

245
 In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan’s house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not
driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a “frolic of his own” but ultimately,
for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. Therefore,
the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the
steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done
beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on
which the petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the
provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of
Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor
Secretary shall be exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained and
preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars from, and
inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance
with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and
wages, is concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the
substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for
damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a
working student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a
claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts
of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on
the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor
cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive
provisions of the Civil Code.

246
247
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 119121;

AUGUST 14, 1998

FACTS:

In 1979, a dump truck owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) and
driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota
Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three (3) persons riding in the
Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.

On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages
against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO) before the CFI of Lanao del
Norte, Marawi City. When defendant PHESCO filed its answer to the complaint it
contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the
Toyota Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of
NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's
projects. On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and countered that the driver
of the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO. Granting, however, that NPC is
the employer of Ilumba, it claims that its liability shall only be limited to violations
of the Labor Code and not quasi-delicts.

The trial court absolved NPC of any liability. On appeal, the CA reversed
the trial court’s decision and held that Phesco is not liable for the tort of driver
Ilumba, as there was no employment relationship between Phesco and driver
Ilumba. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to hold the employer liable for torts
committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned task, there must
exist an employer-employee relationship.

ISSUES:
1.) What is the relationship of NPC and PHESCO?
2.) Who between NPC and PHESCO is the employer of Ilumba and should then
be liable for damages to the victims?

248
RULING:
1.) PHESCO was engaged in "labor-only" contracting vis-à-vis NPC and as
such, it is considered merely an agent of the latter. In labor-only contracting, an
employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the
employees of the "labor-only" contractor is created. Accordingly, the principal
employer is responsible to the employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if such
employees had been directly employed by the principal employer.
2.) Since PHESCO is only a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it supplied
to NPC, including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be considered as
employees of NPC. After all, it is axiomatic that any person (the principal
employer) who enters into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the
performance of a specified work or for the supply of manpower, assumes
responsibility over the employees of the latter.
With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article 2180 of
the Civil Code explicitly provides that: “[e]mployers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO
and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall
have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence
which gave rise to the action.

249
 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT V. NAVIDAD

G.R. NO. 145804,

FEBRUARY 6, 2003

FACTS:

Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He
got into an altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell
onto the tracks and was killed when a train came and ran over him.The Heirs of
Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver (Roman),
the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, and Prudent Security Agency
(Prudent). The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable
for damages to the heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA
and the train driver Roan jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award
for compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal damages.
The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed
between Navidad and LRTA (by virtue of his having purchased train tickets and
the liability was caused by the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the
train being managed by the LRTA and operated by Roman. The CA also blamed
LRTA for not having presented expert evidence showing that the emergency
brakes could not have stopped the train on time.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
2. Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
3. Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory
damages.
RULING:
1. Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of a common carrier. A
common carrier is required by the Civil Code to use utmost diligence in carrying
passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only
250
during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its
premises where they ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.Art. 1763
renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the
negligence or willful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of
the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees
and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure.
2. Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art.
2176 of the New Civil Code. If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort
under Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee
Escartin is established, the employer, Prudent, would be held liable on the
presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of its employees. How then must the liability of the
common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other
hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached
by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can
well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is
that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes
a breach of ontract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to
have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
3. No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist
with compensatory damages. The award of nominal damages in addition to actual
damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated
or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.

251
MCKEE VS. IAC
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
FACTS:

Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong
Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando,
Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck,
Loadstar, owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford
Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh,
Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee,
Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford
Escort.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with
two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling
southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for
Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from
San Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side
of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth,
unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew
the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then
switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted
to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The
collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said
bridge.

The trial court found that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless
imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the law
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), as
employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was further
asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the
said employee.
ISSUE:
Are the respondents as employers of the negligent driver, also liable for the
resulting damages?

252
RULING:

Yes. it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to
avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As
employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The
presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee.
That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure.  Their only
possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage. The diligence of a good father referred to means the
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.  The answers of the
private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this
defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.

253
 VALENZUELA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 115024
FEBRUARY 7, 1996
FACTS:

On June 24, 1990 at 2 am while driving from her restaurant at Araneta

avenue towards the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she
had a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away. She placed
her emergency lights and sought help. While she was pointing her tools to the man
who will help her fix the tires, she was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer
driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated and she slammed across his windshield
and fell to the ground. She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days while
her leg was amputated and was replaced with an artificial one.
The RTC found Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code while Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s
employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180.The
CA ruled that there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but
absolved Li's employer.
ISSUE: 

Should Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer, be held liable?

RULING:

Yes. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of

the Civil Code, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the
damage caused by the accident. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting
its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company
took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and
history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having
been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of
liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle
of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for
the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

254
 MERRITT VS. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. NO. L-11154
MARCH 21, 1916

FACTS:
Plaintiff E. Meritt, a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital
Ambulance which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any
whistle or horn. Merrit was severely injured. His condition had undergone
depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor was affected. The plaintiff is seeking
a certain amount for permanent injuries and the loss of wages during he was
incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. In order for Merritt to recover
damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized the plaintiff to
bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said
suit.

ISSUE:
Is the Government liable for the negligence of the ambulance driver?
RULING:
No. Art. 1903, Par. 5 of the Civil Code reads that “[t]he state is liable in this
sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed,
in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.’ The
responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special
agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim.

It is, therefore, evident that the State is only liable, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.

255
 INOCENCIO ROSETE, VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL,

G.R. NO. L-1120

AUGUST 31, 1948

FACTS:

Appellant Rosete, is claiming that his building were destroyed by fire that
came from the contiguous warehouse of the Emergency Control Administration,
ECA, located at No. 2262 Azcarraga, due to the negligence of a certain Jose
Frayno y Panlilio in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter near a five gallon drum
into which gasoline was being drained, and of the officers of the said ECA, which
is an office or agency of the Government, in storing gasoline in said warehouse
contrary to the provisions of Ordinances of the City of Manila.

The claimant contends that the Auditor General erred in not finding that the
government agency or instrumentality known as the Emergency Control
Administration or the officers thereof, were guilty of negligence in storing a highly
combustible and inflammable substance in its warehouse on bodega in Manila in
violation of City Ordinances, and therefore the government is liable for the
damages sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of the Civil Code

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Government is liable for the damages sustained by

claimant.

RULING:

The Government is not liable. The responsibility of the state is limited by

article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent. a special agent, in
the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is
a special official. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of
256
law, is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the public
service and the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all
foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves
the general weal and that of private persons interested in its operation

257
 MARCOS MENDOZA, VS. FRANCISCO DE LEON, ET AL.,

G.R. NO. L-9596

FEBRUARY 11, 1916

FACTS:

Action for damages is filed against the individual members of the municipal
council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease
of an exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of
Act No. 1643 of the Philippine Commission. After use of a little more than one
year, the plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted
by the herein defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another
person.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the members of the municipal council personally liable.

RULING:

The defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by
the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in
question.A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance
of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its
patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so
far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts,
validly entered into, may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the
torts of its officers or agents within the scope of their employment in precisely the
same manner and to the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals.
As to such matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these
purposes that the municipality is made liable to suits in the courts. Municipal
corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort.

The superior or employer must answer civilly of the negligence or want of

skill of his agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which

258
another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations,
under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and
are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of
liability coexist. To create such liability, it is fundamentally necessary that the act
done which is injurious to others must be within the scope of the corporate powers
as prescribed by charter or positive enactment; in other words, it must not be ultra
vires in the sense that it is not within the power or authority of the corporation to
act in reference to it under any circumstances.

259
 FONTANILLA VS. MALIAMAN

G.R. NO. L-55963

DECEMBER 1, 1989

FACTS:
A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven
officially by its regular driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco
Fontanilla, which resulted in the latter's death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit
for damages against Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's employer. After trial, the
court awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages to Spouses Fontanilla. NIA
appealed. The Solicitor General contends that the NIA does not perform solely and
primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with
governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver
Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.
ISSUE:
May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused by
the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent?

RULING:
Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a
corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable
for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special
agent.Section 1 of RA No. 3601 tells us that NIA is a government agency invested
with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is
governed by the Corporation Law. Section 2, subsection f of PD 552 provides that
NIA also has its own assets and liabilities and has corporate powers to be exercised
by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection b of PD 552 provides that NIA may
sue and be sued in court..Of equal importance is the case of National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA
766, which propounds the thesis that "the NAWASA is not an agency performing
governmental functions; rather it performs proprietary functions . . . ." The
functions of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere
optional functions of government even though the service rendered caters to the
community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society.
260
 Like the NAWASA, the National Irrigation Administration was not created
for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was
essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest
and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a
"government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of
"constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation
systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects."
Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the
services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal
aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.

261
 CITY OF MANILA VS. TEOTICO

G.R. NO. L-23052

JANUARY 29, 1968

FACTS:

In 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and
P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a
jeepney. When a jeepney came along to a stop, he stepped down from the curb to
board the jeepney but he fell inside an uncovered manhole. Due to the fall, his head
hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces
thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Several persons pulled him out of the manhole and
one of them brought him to the hospital, where his injuries were treated.
Thereafter, he sued for damages, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, the City of
Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer, and
the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against him but the CA, on appeal, ruled that
the City of Manila should pay damages. The City of Manila assailed the decision
of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable
for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter;
that the charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a
general law; and that the accident happened in national highway.

ISSUE:

Is the City of Manila liable?

RULING:

Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general
law and that the charter of Manila is a special law while the Civil Code is a general
law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the
charter of Manila establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of
Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of"
city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance,
or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." There is no particular
exemption but merely a general exemption. Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of
the Civil Code provides a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any

262
person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or
supervision." In other words, said section 4 of the charter of Manila refers to
liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular.
Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road,
said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only
raised for the first time in the City’s motion for reconsideration in the Court of
Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a
national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is
national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the City’s control and
supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective
conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have control and
supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been
doing constant and regular inspection of the city’s roads, P. Burgos included.

263
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. HON. PERFECTO R. PALACIO,
ET AL.

G.R. NO. L-20322

MAY 29, 1968

FACTS:

Ildefnso Ortiz instituted a civil action against the Handog Irrigation

Association, Inc., a corporation, and the irrigation Service Unit, an office under the
Department of Public Works and Communications to reover possession, with
damages, a 958 sqm lot which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered and
occupied. For failure to answer, the defendants were declared in default.

The Republic through the Solicitor General, moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the Irrigation Service Unit has no juridical entity to
sue and be sued. The motion was denied on the gorund that defendant is engaged
in the business of selling irrigation pumps on installment plan. A writ of execution
was issued and later on a writ of garnishment was issued against the deposit/trust
fund of the Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank. The Solicitor
General moved for the lifting of the order on the ground that the trust fund is a
public fund exempt from garnishment. On appeal, the CA sustained the validity of
the writ.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Irrigation Service Unit may be sued and the trust fund be
the subject of garnishment.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the Irrigation Service Unit is a government engaged in
the administration of irrigation system to promote an economic policy of sustaining
development and growth in agriculture. Aside from being an agency of the
government pursuing a governmental function, the fact that is collecting payment
for irrigation pumps will not make the Irrigation Service Unit one engaged in

264
business. The installment payment being collected is not for profit but merely for
the purpose of financing the cost of the pump and its maintenance and
administration.

In addition, although the State allowed its self to be sued, the trust fund may
not be automatically the subject of garnishment due to the fact that it is a public
fund. Being a public fund, it may only be appropriated by law and may not be use
for garnishment at the expense of the public.

265
 ARANETA VS. JOYA
G.R. NO. L-25172
MAY 24, 1974
FACTS:

Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager of the

Ace Advertising, proposed to the board of directors that an employee, Ricardo
Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up special studies in television but the
board failed to act on the proposal. Still, respondent sent Taylor abroad, on
September 1953, and assured J. Antonio Araneta, company director, that the trip
will be funded by other parties, as respondent later confirmed in a memorandum.
From September 1, 1953 to March 15, 1954, Taylor continued receiving his
salaries while abroad. His salaries were ordered and approved by the respondent
and were included in the semi-monthly payroll checks of the corporation
employees. Three of the checks were signed by the company treasurer, who also
put up part of the bill connected with Taylor’s trip and handed him letters for
delivery in the US. A total of P5,043.20 was disbursed by Ace Advertising for
Taylor’s travel and studies. The company filed a complaint for recovery of sum,
with the court of first instance in Manila, alleging they had no knowledge of the
engagement neither they authorized nor ratified it. The respondent denied all
charges, also alleging that it was for the company’s benefit. A 3rd-party complaint
was filed against Vicente Araneta, company treasurer, for signing the checks, and
Ricardo Taylor. Vicente Araneta and respondent claimed they signed the
documents in good faith.

The trial court ordered the respondent to pay the sum disbursed by Ace
Advertising, P5,043.20, and dismissed the third-party complaint. The respondent
appealed and the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision but reversed the judgment
on the 3rd-party case stating that Vicente Araneta and Taylor were complicit in the
unauthorized disbursement of corporate moneys jointly with the appellant.

ISSUE:

Is Antonio De Joya guilty of a quasi-delict?

RULING:

266
 Yes. The Court upheld the decision of the CA. The Court agrees that the
respondent neglected to perform his duties properly, to the damage of the firm of
which he was an officer and affirmed that the acts of the respondent, Vicente
Araneta, and Ricardo Taylor affirm their guilt of unauthorized disbursement of
corporate moneys, without evidence to prove otherwise. And as it was an
unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds, and it was these three without
whose acts the same could not have happened, the juridical situation was a simple
quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation, for which solidary liability
should have been imposed upon all in the first place, Art. 2194, New Civil Code;
and only De Joya having been sued and made liable by the corporation, it was the
right of the latter to ask that his two joint tortfeasors be made to shoulder their
proportional responsibility.

267
 FELIX LANUZO VS. SY BON PING AND SALVADOR MENDOZA

G.R. NO. L-53064

SEPTEMBER 25, 1980

FACTS:

A Complaint for damages was instituted in the Court of First Instance of

Camarines Sur by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and
operator of a freight truck and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. The complaint
averred that at about five o'clock in the afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Salvador
Mendoza was driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San
Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, he rammed
into the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store
were completely razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the total
amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred that by reason thereof he became destitute
as he lost his means of livelihood from the store which used to give him a monthly
income of P300.00. The RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff and ordered the defendants
to pay jointly and severally the amount of damages awarded by the court. On
appeal, the CA certified the case to to this instance on pure questions of law.

ISSUE:

Is the employer, Sy Bon Ping, solidarily liable with Salvador Mendoza, his
driver?

RULING:

Yes. For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and
operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of his employer, Sy
Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the same Code, which
explicitly provides that: [e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his
negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, 8 he is likewise
responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver)
Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary.

268
 But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for
damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for
whatever amount the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the
latter's claim.

269
 VILUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NOS. L-21477-81

APRIL 29, 1966

FACTS:

Seven persons were killed and thirteen others were injured in Bangar, La
Union, on February 16, 1958, when a passenger bus on which they were riding
caught fire after hitting a post and crashing against a tree. The bus, owned by
petitioner Viluan and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino, came from San Fernando,
La Union and was on its way to Candon, Ilocos Sur. As the bus neared the gate of
the Gabaldon school building in the municipality of Bangar, another passenger bus
owned by Patricio Hufana and driven by Gregorio Hufana tried to overtake it but
that instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of his bus and raced with
the overtaking bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a result of which it hit a post,
crashed against a tree and then burst into flames.

After trial, the court found that the accident was due to the concurrent
negligence of the drivers of the two buses and held both, together with their
respective employers, jointly and severally liable for damages. The CA held that
only petitioner Francisca Viluan, as operator of the bus, is liable for breach of
contract of carriage. The driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, cannot be made jointly and
severally liable with petitioner because he is merely the latter's employee and is in
no way a party to the contract of carriage. Neither may respondents Patricio
Hufana and Gregorio Hufana be held liable in the opinion of the appellate court
because the plaintiffs did not amend complaints in the main action so as to assert a
claim against the respondents as third party defendants.

ISSUE:

Should the respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana be held liable
although the plaintiffs did not amend complaints in the main action so as to assert a
claim against the respondents as third party defendants?

270
RULING:

Yes. In this case the third-party complaints filed by petitioner and her driver
charged respondents with direct liability to the plaintiffs. It was contended that the
accident was due "to the fault, negligence, carelessness and imprudence of the third
party defendant Gregorio Hufana" and, in petitioner's motion for leave to file a
third party complaint, it was stated that "Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana
were not made parties to this action, although the defendants are entitled to
indemnity and/or subrogation against them in respect of plaintiff's claim."

It should make no difference therefore whether the respondents were brought in as

principal defendants or as third-party defendants. As Chief Justice Moran points
out, since the liability of the third-party defendant is already asserted in the third-
party complaint, the amendment of the complaint to assert such liability is merely a
matter of form, to insist on which would not be in keeping with the liberal spirit of
the Rules of Court.

Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner springs from
contract while that of respondents arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we
already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a
passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and
of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two
vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.

271
 LIM V. DE LEON

G.R. NO. L-22554

AUGUST 29, 1975

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor

launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto
Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan
alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from
him. After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon,
in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and
Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco
Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac,
Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the
detachment commander in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor
launch.

Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to

impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party,
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the
same. Upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando
Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch
"SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. Plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but
the latter refused. Likewise, Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations
with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to plaintiff-appellant
Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was the
subject of a criminal offense.

272
ISSUES:

1. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order

the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure
even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime

2. WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for

damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch
was unlawful

RULING:

1. NO. Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered

the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not armed
with a search warrant; that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the
absence of and without the consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question that
without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. And
since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a
warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against
unreasonable search and seizure.

2. YES. Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32

and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows: "ART. 32. Any
public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages. Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional
rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from
the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary
damages may also be awarded. Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of
P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in addition,
P750.00 for attorney's fees.

273
274
 ABERCA V. VER

G.R. NO. L-69866

APRIL 15, 1988

FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other
violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered
by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to
sow disturbances in Metro Manila,"
Plaintiffs’ allegations: That complying with said order of Ver, elements of
the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial
search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party
confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some
period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that
plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that
military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and
in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were
part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them,
said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants. Plaintiffs
sought actual/compensatory damages of P39,030; moral damages of at least P150K
each or a total of P3M; exemplary damages of at least P150K each or a total of
P3M; and attorney's fees not less than P200K.
Respondents’ contentions: A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants,
through their counsel, then Sol-Gen. Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs
may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the
guise of a damage suit because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants
are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties;
and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.

275
ISSUES:

1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and
other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.
2. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be
answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person
whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.
3. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to (dome
of the) plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR of
the court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to dismiss

HELD:
1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does
not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is
merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of
habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. [a] The purpose Art. 32
CC is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined
in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred
rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress,
when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of
law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are
immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of
the ruling power. [b] The invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit
totally misplaced. It cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving
commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress
upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by
the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all
officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all
times. [c] Art. 32 of CC which renders any public officer or employee or any
private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and
liberties of another does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only
judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or
omissions do not constitute a violation of the RPC or other penal statute. [d] Even
assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends
petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not
and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because
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of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right
to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

2. NO. Although the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the

case, as contended by respondents, the decisive factor in this case is the language
of Art. 32 CC. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or
"indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must
answer for damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to
answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. [a] The doctrine of
respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and
agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such
relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
But in this case, Art. 32 governs. [b] By this provision, the principle of
accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning
and acquires a larger dimension. A superior have to answer for the transgressions
of his subordinates against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the
citizen. Hence, Art. 32 of CC makes the persons who are directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. [c] To determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no
others, should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. [d] So, under
the above principles, it is difficult to justify the TC’s dismissal for lack of cause of
action the complaint against all the defendants, except Maj.Aguinaldo and MSgt.
Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if
admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action
against all of them under Art. 32 of CC.

3. NO. The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was
filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding
of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he
furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all
the lawyers of plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the resolution, the signing
attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to
do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be
assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party

277
concerned, which was never done in this case. Petition granted. Case remanded to
the respondent court for further proceedings.

278
 MHP GARMENTS, INC. V. CA

22 SEPTEMBER 1994

FACTS:

MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the
exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation
was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in
court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies."
Sometime in October 1983, MHP received information that private respondents
Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy
Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. De Guzman, an employee of
petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to
make a report of the Philippine Constabulary (PC).

De Guzman, Peñafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction
Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market.
Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits
on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed
private respondents. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to
petitioner corporation for safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair competition
was then filed against private respondents. After a preliminary investigation, the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private
respondents. He also ordered the return of the seized items which was not
immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents had to go personally
to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized
items were turned. The other items returned were of inferior quality. Private
respondent then filed a Civil Case against the petitioners for sums of money and
damages. The trial court ruled for the private respondents. The decision was
appealed to the respondent court. It affirmed the decision with modification. MHP
filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.

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ISSUE:

WON the search and seizure was legal

RULING:

No. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of
private respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private
respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October
1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the
parties. De Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents.
They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid
was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were
seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid
of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners
and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of
time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents.
In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be
proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and
seizure. The search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause
for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched." These facts and circumstances
were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and
seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the
seized goods.

280
 MARCIA V. CA (PAJE)

205 PHIL 147

JANUARY 27, 1983

FACTS:

Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus. His bus collided with the jeep driven
by Clemente Marcia, causing the latter’s death and physical injuries to herein
petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Paje was charged with homicide and
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. A civil case was also instituted
against him by herein petitioners for reckless imprudence and negligence in driving
the passenger bus. He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC. However, he
was acquitted in the CA. The CA ruled that criminal negligence is wanting and that
Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence, for the case was of pure accident. The
defendants presented the copy of said criminal case to the court handling the civil
case against them. The civil case was dismissed.

ISSUE:

WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a dismissal in the
civil case

RULING:

YES. The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not
necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Petitioner also
relies on Art 33 CC. However, the said article speaks only of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the
result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no
independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.
Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to

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be non-existent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability

282
 MADEJA V. CARO

211 PHIL 469

DECEMBER 21, 1983

FACTS:

Dr. Eva A. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for

the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the
widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The
offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action
for damages." The criminal case still pending, Madeja sued Dr. Japzon for
damages in the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross
negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss which invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
reads: "Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. - In all cases not included
in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and
civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after
the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.". . .

ISSUE:

WON an independent civil action may be filed during the pendency of the
criminal case

RULING:

YES. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of

the Civil Code is the applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted herein
below: "Sec, 2. Independent civil action. - … an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required
in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the

283
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence". "Art.
33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

284
 ARAFILES V. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC

MARCH 25, 2004

FACTS:

Respondent Morales wrote an article for People’s Journal Tonight based on

the sworn statement in the police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig where
Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month before then attempted to rape
her the night she filed a complaint. Morales attempted to contact Arafiles but since
the latter’s office was still closed at that time (past 12mn – he works for NIAS-
PAGASA), he was not able to do so. About a year following the published article,
Arafiles filed action for damages based on the alleged “grossly malicious and
overly sensationalized” report by Morales which cast aspersions on his character,
being the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed
stalker and serial rapist. RTC: in favor of Arafiles CA: in favor of Morales, et. al.
based on doctrine of fair comment

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not
attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages

RULING:

NO. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and
reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of
this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The
newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the
preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their
deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be
held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in

285
the choice of words. First discussed applicable provisions (A33, 19, 21 NCC):
Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely
unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case.A civil action for libel under this
article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by
preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the
institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the
provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing
the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.

Then discussed how to determine if a published work is libelous: In actions

for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.Then discussed the
petitioner’s allegation that the news item as a “malicious sensationalization” failed:
even though the police blotter only shows 1 count of abduction and rape,
respondent was present when Emelita executed her sworn-statement where she
reported an abduction with rape and an abduction incident (where no rape
occurred, but was about to happen) – so respondent’s article was not maliciously
sensationalized. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint
may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. Respondents
could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the
headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a
certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by
Emelita.

The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and complainant Emelita

were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the
narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police
headquarters. Then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be given such
leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform
their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters
and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good
faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

286
287
 DISINI JR. ET. AL, V. SEC. OF JUSTICE

G.R. NO. 203335

FEBRUARY 14, 2004

FACTS:

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that
links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:

1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that
he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for
the general public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or
friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and
payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government
agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies,
public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail
address or telephone.

This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of

simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The
cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information
and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not
filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace
technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself
of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting
defamatory statements against him that people can read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications

from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by
hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or

288
defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace,
too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children
who have access to the internet. For this reason, the government has a legitimate
right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.

Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or
cause havoc to the computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly
useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of
innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual
dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and
memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these
tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime
Prevention Act.But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law
for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to
reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent
hurtful attacks on the system.

Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on

February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining
order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged provision in Cybrecrime Law are constitutional.

RULING:

The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime Prevention Act of

2012 for the purpose of regulating access to and use of cyberspace.  Several
sections of the law define relevant cyber crimes and enable the government to track
down and penalize violators.
Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and
19 of the Act as unconstitutional.  Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of
unsolicited commercial electronic communications, commonly known as spams,
that seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale of products and services unless the

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recipient affirmatively consents, or when the purpose of the communication is for
service or administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users, or
“when the following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic
communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject
receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same
source; (bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely
disguise the source of the electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of
the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.”
The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications
amount to both nuisance and trespass because they tend to interfere with the
enjoyment of using online services and that they enter the recipient’s domain
without prior permission.The Court first noted that spams are a category
of commercial speech, which does not receive the same level of protection as other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression ,”but is nonetheless entitled to
protection.”   It ruled that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited
communications “would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.”   Accordingly, the Court declared
Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional. Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law
enforcement without a court warrant “to collect or record traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer
system.”  Traffic data under this Section includes the origin, destination, route,
size, date, and duration of the communication, but not its content nor the identity of
users.The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails their civil
liberties and set the stage for abuse of discretion by the government.  They also
claimed that this provision violates the right to privacy and protection from the
government’s intrusion into online communications.According to the Court, since
Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private communications, it must survive the
rational basis standard of whether it is narrowly tailored towards serving a
government’s compelling interest.  The Court found that the government did have
a compelling interest in preventing cyber crimes by monitoring real-time traffic
data.

As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first

recognized that the right at stake concerned informational privacy, defined as “the
right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without

290
surveillance and intrusion.”  In determining whether a communication is entitled to
the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the person
claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy over the communication,
and (2) whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively
reasonable in the society.

The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of
privacy over their communications transmitted online.  However, it did not find the
expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent through internet
“does not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the
sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.”Even
though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not enjoy
the objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data may
reveal the personal information of its sender or recipient, against which the Section
fails to provide sufficient safeguard.  The Court viewed the law as “virtually
limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,”
choosing whatever specified communication they want.”

Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and
definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.Section 19 authorizes the
Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a computer data found to be in
violation of the Act.  The Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right
to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.The Court first recognized that computer data
constitutes a personal property, entitled to protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.  Also, the Philippines’ Constitution requires the government to secure
a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal property or to block a
form of expression.   Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the
Court found it unconstitutional.

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 MVRS v. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL

G.R. No. 135306,

JANUARY 28, 2003

FACTS:

The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL (IDCP), a local

federation of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs, and some individual Muslims
filed in the RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class
suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS
PUBLICATIONS, et.al. Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGAR
was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as
the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with
intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam; that on
account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Phil
but the entire Muslim world, esp. every Muslim individual in non-Muslim
countries. MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of belief/opinion and was
published without malice. Also, it did not mention respondents as object of the
article, hence, were not entitled to damages. RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to
establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article
were not specifically identified. CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed
article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of Islamic faith.”

ISSUES:

1. WON elements of libel exist

2. WON the cause of action should rise from an intentional tortuous act
causing mental distress

RULING:

1. NO. Defamation means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame

or reputation through false and malicious statements. Words which are merely
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insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general
abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken,
do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an
allegation for special damages.

2. NO. The cause of action is libel. Action arising from an intentional

tortuous act causing mental distress cannot be sustained in this case, for such
action is personal in nature, and since no particular individual was identified in the
disputed article, such cause of action cannot be sustained.

Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION An "emotional

distress" tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed by an individual to
assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his
character. The purported damage caused by the published article falls under
principle of relational harm - which includes harm to social relationships in the
community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of
reactive harm - which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the
form of an infliction of emotional distress. The present case falls within the
application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation. To
recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a) conduct of the defendant was
intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiff; (b) conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (c) causal connection between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
mental distress; and, (d) the plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.

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 SALTA V. DE VEYRA

202 PHIL 527

SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

FACTS:

Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by two judges in a manner
directly in opposition of each other. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively
settle this regrettable conflict of opinion, the two cases have been consolidated for
a single decision. Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the
Malolos' branch. His duty was to grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of
loans, depending on the amount of the loan applied for. In disregard of the
pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, Salta
indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB,
in manner characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and upon
securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. PNB filed two civil
actions to recover losses the bank suffered (Civil Case No. 79583, Civil Case No.
88343). With this the bank filed a criminal action against Salta, for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Salta was acquitted in the criminal case, and
filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases. It is in the resolution of the
motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took
diametrically opposing views, the former denying the motion, the latter granting it.

ISSUE:

WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate

civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

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RULING:

NO. The civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the
criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless
of the result of the latter." Acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for
the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that
even civilly, the accused would not be liable. ART 33. In cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.

The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is
fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The
criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is
fraud, one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based on
the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly
alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in
the complaints. The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike
other offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil
action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis
of action. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling, a specie of an offense
committed by means of fraud, where the civil case may be filed separately and
proceed independently of the criminal case, regardless of the result of the latter.
That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans
which rendered him liable for his acts, which fraud is positively and easily
identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned.

295
 CAPUNO V. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. L-26737

APRIL 30, 1965

FACTS:

The case arose from a vehicular collision. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola

delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The
collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses
Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. Elordi was charged with triple homicide
through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. The information was
subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three
victims. While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan
spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in the CFI of Tarlac
against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi.
Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00
allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of
were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney
Ricardo Y. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan. In
view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the
appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for the
motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned, they no longer had any
interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received
compensation for the death of their decedent; and (2) that on the part of the Estate
of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action.
The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was
disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an
amending order. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders. The parties in
the civil case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the
Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement
of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the
Workmen's Compensation Act." The Court approved the compromise and
accordingly dismissed the case. At that time the criminal case was still pending;
judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges
against him. Prior thereto, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages
against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This
296
is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in
its order of February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been taken.
The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the
Court found to be "well taken" were; (1) that the action had already prescribed; and
(2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue
of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be recovered by
the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in
their compromise.

ISSUE:

Whether the action had already prescribed.

RULING:

YES. There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of
damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4)
years (Article 1146, Civil Code). Appellants originally sought to enforce their
claim ex-delicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code, when they
intervened in the criminal case against Jon Elordi. The information therein, it may
be recalled, was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages
suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being
prosecuted. But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did
not appeal from the Court's order to the effect. And when they commenced the
civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing
that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for
otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have
been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. In
filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely
independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil
Code, which read: ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter. ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

297
 CORPUS V. PAJE

28 SCRA 1062

JULY 31, 1969

FACTS:

December 23, 1956 – Felardo Paje was driving a Victory Liner bus. It
collided with a jeepney driven by Clemente Marcia in Lubao, Pampanga. As a
result of the collision, Marcia died while two other people were physically injured.
An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed against Paje. Marcia’s heirs reserved their right to institute a
separate civil action against Paje. Paje was later found guilty on November 7,
1960. November 21, 1961 – Pending Paje’s appeal, the window and children of
Marcia instituted the separate civil action for damages arising from the accident
against Paje and Victory Liner, praying that the defendants be jointly and severally
liable. November 9, 1962 – Paje was acquitted by the appellate court, saying that
the collision was purely an accident. December 29, 1962 – Paje filed a motion to
dismiss the civil action on the ground that his acquittal barred the said action but
the motion was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the civil action against Paje can still prosper despite his acquittal.

RULING:

No. Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution
of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution
and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. The article mentions
only the crimes of defamation, fraud, (estafa) and physical injuries. Although in
the case of Dyogi vs. Yatco this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in
Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, it is to be borne in mind that the
charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and

298
not for homicide and physical injuries. In People vs. Buan, the Court ruled that the
“offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies
in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof.” Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence
comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal
action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act
notwithstanding that the injured party reserved. With regard to the issue of
prescription, the Court ruled that the action had indeed prescribed because the
prescription period was pegged at 4 years (A1146, CC) and began to run on the
day the quasi-delict was committed.

299
 MADEJA V. CARO

211 PHIL 469

DECEMBER 21, 1983

FACTS:

DR. EVA A. JAPZON was accused of homicide through reckless

imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. In the
information, the offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserved her right to file a
separate civil action for damages. The criminal case still pending, Carmen L.
Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages, alleging that her husband died
because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss, which the respondent judge granted on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

WON a civil action for damages may be instituted pending the resolution of
a criminal case

RULING:

YES. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of

the Civil Code is the applicable provision. Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In
the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Art. 33. In
cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
300
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)

301
 DULAY V. CA (SAFEGUARD, SUPERGUARD)

243 SCRA 220

APRIL 3, 1995

FACTS:

Benigno Torzuela, a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang,"

and Atty. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. Dulay.
Maria Benita Dulay, widow of Dulay, filed an action for damages against Torzuela
and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or
Superguard Security Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers of defendant
Torzuela.

Respondent: That Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope
of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed w/
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC. That
a complaint for damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by
petitioners) cannot lie, since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to quasi-
offenses under Art 365 of the RPC. That petitioners' filing of the complaint is
premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a
condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. That Article 33 of
the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v CA)

Petitioner: The incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants. Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge
of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD
was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of
its employee to avoid the injury. That their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180. That quasi-delicts are not
limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary,
citing Andamo v. IAC. Thus, Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-

302
delict actionable under Art 2176. That Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also
actionable under Art 33 and Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action

RULING:

YES. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: "Sec 1.

Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right
to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused." It is well-settled
that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement
of an express reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this
case. The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to
include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co;
Carandang v. Santiago). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro). Although in the Marcia case,
it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the
crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela,
the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless
imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.

303
 VELAYO V. SHELL CO OF THE PHILS

100 PHIL 186

OCTOBER 31, 1956

FACTS:

Since the start of Commercial Air Line, Inc’s (CALI) operations, its fuel
needs were all supplied by Shell Company of the P.I., Ltd, (Shell). Desmond
Fitzgerald, Shell’s Credit Manager was in charge of collecting payment. Any
extensions of term of payment, however, had to be decided by Stephen Crawford
and later by Wildred Wooding. As of August 1948, Shell’s books showed a
balance of P170,162.58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI. Shell
had reasons to believe that the financial condition of Shell was far from being
satisfactory. Alfonso Sycip, CALI”s President of Board of Directors, offered to
Fitzgerald CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane, which was then in California. The offer
was declined by Crawford. Aug 6, 1948, management of CALI informally
convened its principal creditors in a luncheon, and informed them that CALI was
in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation. Alexander Sycip, Secretary of
the Board of Directors of CALI, explained the memorandum agreement executed
by CALI with Phil Air Lines Inc on Aug 4, regarding the proposed sale to PAL of
the aviation equipment of CALI. Alfredo Velayo, Auditor of CALI, discussed the
balance sheets of CALI.

The balance sheet made mention of the Douglas C-54 plane. There was a
general understanding among all creditors present on the desirability of
consummating the sale in favor of PAL. Then followed a discussion on the
payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the accounts due to
employees, the Government, and the National Airports Corp. The other creditors
disputed such contention of preference. No understanding was reached on the
matter of preference of payment and it was then generally agreed that the matter be
further studied by a working committee to be formed. Mr. Fitzgerald of Shell, Atty.
Agcaoili of National Airports Corp., and Atty. Alexander Sycip were appointed to
the working committee. Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous

304
opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against CALI but to
strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets. The management of CALI announced
that in case of non-agreement of the creditors, it would file insolvency
proceedings. Aug 9, 1948, working committee discussed methods of achieving
objectives, which were to preserve the assets of CALI and to study the way of
making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors. However, negotiation
on the division of assets was left pending. On the same day (Aug 9), Shell effected
a telegraphic transfer of all its credit against CALI to the American Corporation
Shell Oil Co., Inc., assigning its credit amounting to $79,440. This was followed
on Aug 10 by a deed of assignment of credit amounting to $85,081.29.

Aug 12, 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint against CALI in the
Superior Court of the State of California, USA, for the collection of assigned credit
of $79,440, and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued against a C-54
plane. Sept 17, 1948 an amended complaint was filed to recover assigned credit of
$85,081.29 and a supplemental attachment for a higher sum against the C-54 plane,
plus miscellaneous personal properties. Unaware of Shell’s assignment of credit,
CALI on Aug 12, 1948 approved the memorandum agreement of sale to PAL, and
noted that “the Board had been trying to reach an agreement with creditors… to
prevent insolvency proceedings, but so far no definite agreement had been
reached.” First week of Sept 1948, National Airports Corp learned of Shell’s action
in the US and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against CALI in
the CFI of Manila.

Oct 7, 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency. An order of

insolvency was issued by the court on the same day. Mr. Alfredo Velayo was
appointed Assignee in the proceedings. Velayo instituted case against Shell for the
purpose of securing writ of injunction restraining Shell from prosecuting against
CALI, and as an alternative, that Shell be ordered to pay damages double the value
of the plane if the case in the US will defeat the procurement of CALI of its plane.
Dec 22, 1948, Court denied petition because whether the conveyance of Shell’s
credit was fraudulent or not, the Phil court would not be in a position to enforce its
orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc., which is outside the
jurisdiction of the Phils. Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of damages
against Shell. Lower court dismissed the case.

305
Defendant’s Comments: Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was for
valuable consideration and made in accordance with established commercial
practices. It has no interest in the case instituted by American Shell, as they are
separate and distinct corporations. Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheon-
meeting, without knowing the purpose for which it was called. Fitzgerald could not
have officially represented Shell because authority resides on Crawford.

ISSUES:

1. WON Shell Co., of the P.I. Ltd, taking advantage of its knowledge of the
existence of CALI’s airplane C-54 at California, USA, acted in bad faith and
betrayed the confidence and trust of other creditors of CALI present in said
meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American
corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., thus defeating the purpose of the informal
meetings of CALI’s principal creditors and depriving the plaintiff of the means of
obtaining the plane, or its value, to the detriment and prejudice of other CALI
creditors who were consequently deprived of their share in the distribution of said
value

2. WON by reason of said betrayal of confidence and trust, Shell may be

made to answer for the damages, and if so, the amount of such damages

RULING:

1. YES, Shell acted in bad faith. It is evident that Shell, upon learning the
precarious economic situation of CALI and that will all probability, it could not get
much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred claims of other creditors,
entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets. The telegraphic transfer made
without knowledge and at the back of other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd
and surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost all if not the entire amount
of its credit, but the Court of Justice (SC) cannot countenance such attitude at all,
and much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of Philippine

306
Government and local business. Shell’s transfer of credit would have been justified
only if Fitzgerald had declined to take part in the working committee and frankly
and honestly informed the other creditors present that he had no authority to bind
his principal and that the latter was to be left free to collect its credit from CALI by
whatever means his principal deemed wise and were available to it. But then, such
information would have dissolved all attempts to come to an amicable conciliation
and would have precipitated the filing of CALI’s voluntary insolvency proceedings
and nullified the intended transfer of Shell’s credit to American Shell.

2. YES, Shell must answer for damages. Section 37 of the Insolvency Law
states, Sec 37. If any person, before the assignment is made, having notice of the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, or having reason to believe that
insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced, embezzles or disposes of ay
money, goods, chattels, or effects of the insolvent, he is chargeable therewith, and
liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be
embezzled or disposed of, to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate.
There are doubts, however, as to the applicability of this provision, as it is
contented that what Shell really disposed of was its own credit and not CALI’s
property, although this was practically the effect and result of the scheme. The
same result, however, may be achieved in applying the provisions of the Civil
Code.

307
 SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA

297 SCRA 469

OCTOBER 8, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner

Company. During a stop-over in Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow
crew members Thamer and Allah and had breakfast in their hotel room. While
there, Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She was saved by hotel security
personnel who heard her cries for help. She later filed a case against them. The two
were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When Morada returned to Jeddah (the
base of operations of petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the
release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. She
was eventually allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The
Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men, through the intercession of
the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of detention. They were put back in service while
respondent Morada was transferred to Manila.

2 years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief
Legal Officer of Saudi Air, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police
station where her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta
incident. Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case
against the two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her
passport and allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah. A year and a half
later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain
Khalid of Saudi Air brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. She was told that it was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, she signed a document to appear
before the court a week later. When the date of appearance came, she complied
but only after being assured by Saudi Air Manila manager that the investigation
was routinely and posed no danger to her. She was brought before the court and

308
was interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go, however, just as she was about to
board a plane home, she was told that she had been forbidden to take flight. She
was later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again confiscated.

A few days later, she was again brought before the same court where the
Saudi judge, to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months
imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had
tried her, together with Thamer and Allah for what happened in Jakarta. The court
found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco, dancing and listening to music in
violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition. Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner
Saudi Air but she was denied assistance of any kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy
to help her. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah
dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly
before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by Saudi Air
without being informed of the cause. She then filed a complaint for damages
against Saudi Air and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudi Air filed a
motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether or not Philippine Law or Saudi Arabia Law should govern

RULING:

Philippine Law: Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
involving torts, the connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or
places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts
principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of
the tort. This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived

309
private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had
honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and
good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or
parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in
our view, what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality
of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged according to the private respondent. All told, it is not
without basis to identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort.

310
 GLOBE MACKAY V CA

176 SCRA 778

AUGUST 25, 1989

FACTS:

Respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay

Cable and Radio Corporation as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to
the engineering operations manager. GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of
pesos. According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the
anomalies and reported them to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to
petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive VP and General
Manager of GLOBE MACKAY. The Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of
participation in the anomalies. Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners
hired a private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty.

This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be
conducted. Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending Tobias from work
preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him. The Police Chief
Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged
anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report reiterating his
previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the
checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those
of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of
which were for estafa while the fifth was for of Art.290 of' RPC which is
Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence. All of the 6 criminal
complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. In the meantime, Tobias received a notice
from petitioners that his employment has been terminated. Whereupon, Tobias
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners'
appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision and dismissed
the complaint. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of

311
the President. Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic
Telephone Company. However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by
GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias filed a civil case for damages
anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent

RULING:

Yes. Art.19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle

of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards
are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on
all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right
is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. One of the more notable
innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles
that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for
the stability of the social order." Foremost among these principles is that
pronounced in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.

312
 ALBENSON V CA

JANUARY 11, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries,

Inc. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof,
Albenson was given a check in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the
account of E.L. Woodworks. When presented for payment, the check was
dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." From the records of the SEC,
Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid
mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson
was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single
proprietorship business, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao".

In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Albenson was advised
that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio
Baltao." After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson made an
extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao to replace and/or
make good the dishonored check. However, private respondent has a namesake, his
son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks,
with the very same business address as Guaranteed. Assistant Fiscal Ricardo
Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of BP 22. In
filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S.
Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so
and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right. Baltao, claiming ignorance of
the complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a
motion for reinvestigation. He found that the signature on the check is not the
signature of Eugenio S. Baltao.

Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him,

respondent Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against herein
petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona,
its employee. In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn

313
against the account of "E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which
plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had
ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975.The possibility is that it was with Gene
Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of plaintiff, that the defendants may have been
dealing with . . ."

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious
prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the CC.

RULING:

No.The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable
provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. The elements of an
abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether
willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to
another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals
with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act
which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. There is a common element
under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional.

314
 AMONOY V GUTIERREZ

351 SCRA 731

2001

FACTS:

Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos,

Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. He won the case for them and charged
P27600 as attorney’s fees. As they were not able to pay, his clients executed real
estate mortgages on their lands and the house thereon. Asuncion Pasamba died on
24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. Among the
heirs of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. Because
his attorney’s fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid, on 21 January 1970
Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal. The heirs
opposed, contending that the attorney’s fees charged were unconscionable and that
the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was
rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the
P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the harvests, and
P9,645.00 as another round of attorney’s fees. Failing in that, the two (2) lots
would be sold at public auction.

They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots were foreclosed.
Amonoy was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale. The heirs sought the
annulment of the auction sale. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November
1977, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981. Thereafter,
the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice
to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On Amonoy’s motion of 24 April 1986,
the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of
structures in the said lots, including the house of the Gutierrez spouses. The
Gutierrez spouses sought a restraining order from the Supreme Court, which was
granted by the same. Upon a judgment on merits later on, Amonoy was ordered to
return said properties to the rightful owners. But by the time the Supreme Court
promulgated the above-mentioned Decision, respondents house had already been

315
destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the
lower court. Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of
their house was filed by respondents against petitioner before the RTC on
December 15, 1989. In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed
respondents’ suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower court’s ruling and ordered
petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque injuria in this
case since at the time of the demolition he had color of authority over said
properties

RULING:

No. Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a person who claims to
exercise a right but does so in an abusive manner violative of Article 19 of the
Civil Code. Indeed, in the availment of one’s rights. Petitioner invokes this legal
precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents’ house.
He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition
ordered by the RTC.

Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case. Yes, petitioner

commenced the demolition of respondent’s house on May 30, 1986 under the
authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondent’s
house, was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found,
based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server, that a
copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.

316
 UE V JADER

325 SCRA 804

FEBRUARY 17, 2000

FACTS:

Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. He

failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was
given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law
student. He filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade but got a
grade of five (5). In the meantime, his name appeared in the Tentative List of
Candidates for graduation with an annotation regarding his deficiencies. His name
also appeared in the invitation for the graduation as one of the candidates for
graduation. At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared
however an annotation saying that it was a tentative list and that degrees will be
conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated
in the University Bulletin. Jader attended the graduation and brought his family
with him. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave
of absence without pay from his job and enrolled at the pre-bar review class. Jader
later learned of the deficiency and he dropped his review class and was not able to
take the bar examination.

Consequently, he sued UE for damages. UE denied liability arguing that it

never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor
of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating
students.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an educational institution may be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements
for graduation when such is not the case

317
RULING:

YES. UE had a contractual obligation to inform his students as to whether or

not they have met all the requirements for the conferment of a degree. Thus, UE in
belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar
exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be
sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit
for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an
honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though
the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information
or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. Considering that
the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal
education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more
specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code. Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own
negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of
two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must
bear it. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where
there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in
one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more
reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected
only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

318
 GARCIANO V CA

212 SCRA 436

AUGUST 10, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. On January 13, 1982,
or before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of absence
because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed.
The application was recommended for approval by the school principal, Emerito
O. Labajo, and approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors. On
June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her
husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad), informing her of the decision
of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the president of the
Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty, to terminate her services as a
member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of
employment between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the
difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would
accept the position without a written contract. Upon her return from Austria in the
later part of June, 1982, she received the letter informing her that her services at
the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. She made inquiries
from the school about the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the members of the Board of
Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a letter
notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as
Classroom Teacher effective July 5, 1982," and that "any letter or notice of
termination received by you before this date has no sanction or authority by the
Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it is declared null and void." On
July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and three members of the
Board of Directors, out of a membership of nine (9), resigned their positions from
the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's

319
deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F. Garciano, thereby questioning
the integrity of the Board's decision".

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants prevented the petitioner from reporting to the
school and thus making them liable for damages.

RULING:

No. The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's

discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. While the respondents
admittedly wanted her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically
prevent her from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of
Directors. That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's
decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse,
even if true, did not make them liable to her for damages. They were simply
exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the Board's
decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public
policy. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her
prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not
comply with that order. Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the
form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.

320
 BARONS MARKETING V CA

286 SCRA 96

FEBRUARY 9, 1998

FACTS:

Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical

wires and cables. As such dealer, Barons was given 60 days credit for its purchases
of Phelps’s products. From Dec1986 to Aug1987, Barons purchased on credit
wires and cables worth P4.1m, which it in turn supplied to MERALCO. In the
sales invoice, it was stipulated that an interest of 12% would be imposed, plus 25%
for attorney’s fees and collection. On Sept1987, Barons paid P300k (thereby
leaving an unpaid account of P3.8m). Phelps sent several demands, but Barons still
did not pay. It instead wrote Phelps requesting if it could pay the outstanding
account in monthly installments of P500k plus 1% interest. Phelps, instead of
responding to the request of Barons, filed a complaint for recovery of the P3.8m
plus interest, and prayed for atty’s fees of 25% of the amt, and exemplary damages
amounting to P100k. Barons admitted the purchase of the wires and cables, but
disputed the amt claimed by Phelps. The RTC rendered decision in favor of Phelps,
ordering Barons to pay the debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as atty’s
fees.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was creditors’ abuse of rights in this case.

RULING:

NO, there is no abuse of rights when there is no bad faith nor intent to
prejudice another. Also, the mere exercise of a right cannot be said to be an abuse
of right. the law prescribes a "primordial limitation on all rights" by setting certain
standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. Thus, the inclusion of
321
Art.19 in the CC: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. To constitute abuse of rights, there must be bad faith or
intent to prejudice the plaintiff.

322
 BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA
296 SCRA 260
SEPTEMBER 25, 1998

FACTS:
Atty. Ricardo J. Marasigan’s credit card was dishonored, the bill amounting
to P735.32, by Cafe Adriatico when the he entertained some guests. One of his
guests, Mary Ellen Ringler, paid the bill by using her own credit card a Unibank
card. Marasigan was a complimentary member of BECC from February 1988 to
February 1989 and was issued Credit Card with a credit limit of P3,000.00 and
with a monthly billing every 27th of the month His membership was renewed for
another year or until February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to
P5,000.00. Marasigan oftentimes exceeded his credit limits but this was never
taken against him by BPI and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in check
was tolerated. A statement amounting to P8,987.84 was not paid in due time.
Marasigan admitted having failed to pay his account because he was in Quezon
attending to some professional and personal commitments. He was informed that
bpi was demanding immediate payment of his outstanding account, was requiring
him to issue a check for P15,000.00 which would include his future bills, and was
threatening to suspend his credit card. Marasigan issued Far East Bank Check of
P15,000.00, postdated December 15, 1989 which was received on November 23,
1989 by Tess Lorenzo, an employee of the defendant who in turn gave to Jeng
Angeles, a co-employee who handles the account of the plaintiff. The check
remained in the custody of Jeng Angeles. Mr. Roberto Maniquiz, head of the
collection department of defendant was formally informed of the postdated check
about a week later. November 28, 2989 - BPI served Marasigan a letter by ordinary
mail informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card
and the inclusion of his account number in their Caution List. He was also told to
refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any
inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his outstanding account
with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his membership will be
permanently cancelled. On March 12, 1990, Marasigan sent another letter
reminding the manager of FEBTC that he had long rescinded and cancelled
whatever arrangement he entered into with BPI and requesting for his correct
billing, less the improper charges and penalties, and for an explanation within five
(5) days from receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8, 1989
despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge, otherwise the
necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for the
humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him.

323
ISSUE:
Whether BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card.

RULING:
NO. The agreement was for the immediate payment of the outstanding
account. A check is not considered as cash especially when it is postdated sent to
BPI. Thus, the issuance of the postdated check was not effective payment. BPI
was therefore justified in suspending his credit card. BPI did not capriciously and
arbitrarily cancel the use of the card. Under the terms and conditions of the credit
card, signed by MARASIGAN, any card with outstanding balances after thirty
days from original billing/statement shall automatically be suspended. Any card
with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty days from original billing/statement
date shall automatically be suspended and those with accounts unpaid after sixty
(60) days from said original billing/statement date shall automatically be cancelled
without prejudice to BECC's right to suspend or cancel any CARD any time and
for whatever reason. By his own admission Marasigan made no payment within 30
days for his billing/statement dated 27 September 1989. Neither did he make
payment for his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. Consequently, as
early as 28 October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of his billing dated 27
September 1989, BPI could automatically suspend his credit card.

324
 NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN V. ROBERTO REYES, A.K.A.
"AMAY BISAYA,"

G.R. NO. 154259

FEBRUARY 28, 2005

FACTS:

The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under
the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Respondent Reyes’
Version: Mrs. Filart invited and assured that she can vouched for him in the
birthday party of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu at the penthouse. When the
buffet dinner was ready, Reyes lined up but, to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, he was stopped by Lim (Exec. Sec. of Nikko Hotel), and in a loud
voice w/in the presence and hearing of the other guests, told him to leave the party.
Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, but the latter completely
ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after, policemen
approached him and asked him to step out of the hotel. He now claims P1M for
actual damages, P1M moral and/or exemplary damages and P200k for atty’s
freesia’s version: At the party she noticed Reyes at the bar counter ordering a
drink. Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party intimate, she
approached the captain waiter to inquire as to the presence of Reyes who was
uninvited. The waiter said that he saw Reyes came in w/ the group of Dr. Filart.
Lim inquired Dr Filart’s sister about Reyes and the sister said the latter was not
invited by Dr. Filart. Lim requested the sister to tell Reyes to leave but the latter
just lingered. The same happened when one Capt. Batung asked Reyes to leave.
When Lim spotted Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as
there were no guest in the immediate vicinity. However, as Reyes was already
helping himself to the food, she decided to wait.When Reyes went to a corner and
started to eat, Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayodapat
nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at
pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalisna kayo."

325
 She then turned around trusting that Reyes would show enough decency to
leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even
threatened to dump food on herd. Filart’s version: According to her, it was Reyes
who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was
likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. When
they reached the penthouse, she reminded Reyes to go down as he was not properly
dressed and was not invitedAll the while, she thought that Reyes already left the
place. Then there was a commotion and she saw Reyes shouting.

On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier

decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and
passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim
contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not applying the Doctrine of
Volenti Non-Fit Injuria considering that by its own findings, Reyes was a great
crasher.

ISSUE:

Whether the Doctrine of Volenti Non-Fit Injuria is applicable in the case at bar.

RULING:

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in
the process) as he was a "gate-crasher." The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria "to
which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury" refers to self-inflicted
injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one
who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not
find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the
risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the
New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to
expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.

326
327
 RUIZ V SECRETARY

1963

FACTS:

Enrique Ruiz and Jose Herrera, both shareholders of Allied Technilogists,

Inc. filed an action against the Secretary of National Defense and also against their
own company (together with Pablo Panlilio who is also a shareholder of the
company) in connection with the 15% retention fund withheld by the DND relating
to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. It turned out that said retention was
already released by the DND to the Company. The Court then proceeded with the
other cause of action which was deemed to be the controversy between Ruiz and
Panlilio over the said 15%. As it turned out, the real issue was the credit as to the
architects of the building were. Under the contract and all other documents relating
to the construction of the Veterans Hospital, the named architect was only Panlilio.
Ruiz and Herrera want to be recognized as architects of the building also citing
Article 21 of the Civil Code as their base for the cause of action. The amended
complaint of appellants claimed that the non-inclusion of their names as architects
resulted in their professional prestige and standing being seriously impaired.
Hence, they claim that even if the retention fund was in act released, their pleas for
recognition as architects should have been heard by the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the case

RULING:

NO. The sole object of the appellants was to secure for themselves
recognition that they were co-architects of the Veterans Hospital, together with
Panlilio, so as to enhance their standing and prestige. If this is so, there is no need
or necessity for a judicial declaration. Prestige and recognition are bestowed on the

328
deserving even if there is no judicial declaration. On the other hand, no amount of
declaration will help an incompetent person achieve prestige and recognition.
While the word injury may also refer to honor or credit, the article envisions a
situation where a person has a legal right which was violated by another in a
manner contrary to morals, good custom, or public policy. Hence it presupposes
losses or injuries which are suffered as a result of said violation. The pleadings in
this case do not show damages were ever asked or alleged. - And under the facts
and circumstances obtaining, one cannot sustain the contention that the failure or
refusal to extend recognition was an act contrary to morals, good custom, or public
policy.

329
 BEATRIZ P. WASSMER V. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ,.

FACTS:

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise

of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. But 2
days before the wedding, Francisco left. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was
he heard from again.Beatriz sued Francisco for damages, Velez filed no answer
and was declared in default. The Judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the costs. The defendant filed a
“petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial
and reconsideration.” Plaintiff moved to strike it cut.

The court ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on
August 23, 1955 for an amicable settlement. It added that should any of them fail
to appear the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed
submitted for resolution. The defendant failed to appear three times for amicable
settlement. The forth chance for amicable settlement however, defendant’s counsel
informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.The
defendant petitioned in the court that he has a good and valid defense against
plaintiff’s cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having
been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the breach of promise to marry is contrary to morals, good

customs or public policy.

330
RULING:

A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to

formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

331
 CONRADO BUNAG, JR, V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and ZENAIDA
B. CIRILO

FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, he invited her to take
their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila, to which plaintiff obliged.
But instead to Aristocrat he brought plaintiff to a motel or hotel where he raped
her. Later that evening, defendant brought plaintiff to the house of his grandmother
Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as
husband and wife for 21 days.

Defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective

applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Bacoor, Cavite. October 1, 1973 Defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit
withdrawing his application for a marriage license.Defendant Bunag, Jr. left and
never returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her parents.
Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of
the deception done against her by defendants-appellants. Petitioner filed a
complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry.The trial court ruled
in favor of the plaintiff and against petitioner, but absolved his father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure to comply with the promise of marriage of the
defendant considered contrary to morals, good custom or public policy.

RULING:

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an

action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of
such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not

332
actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

333
 AMELITA CONSTANTINO AND MICHAEL CONSTANTINO

VS.

IVAN MENDEZ AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 57227

MAY 14, 1992

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the

Court of Appeals which dismissed petitioner’s complaint and set aside the
resolution of the then Court of First Instance of Davao, ordering private
respondent: (1) to acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate
child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay
complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral
damages; and (4) to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.

Petitioner filed with the then CFI of Davao an action for acknowledgment,
support and damages against private respondent in June 1975. Petitioner alleges,
that sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met respondent at Tony’s
Restaurant, where she worked as a waitress; the following day respondent invited
petitioner to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; on the pretext of
getting something, respondent brought petitioner inside his hotel room and through
a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter and
repeated whenever respondent is in Manila even after respondent confessed that he
is a married man after their first sexual contact. In respondent’s answer in August
1975, Ivan admitted that he met petitioner at Tony’s Cocktail Lounge but denied
having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court rendered a decision, in favor of petitioner. Respondent is to

pay for actual and moral damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. Both
parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Respondent anchored his
motion on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by evidence.

334
Petitioner sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as
the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.

The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal the
amended decision was set aside and the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this
petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to claim for damages based on articles 19 and
21

RULING:

No, petitioner cannot claim for damages based on articles 19 and 21.
According to Article 19, “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.”

In the case at bar petitioner was already 28 years old and she admitted that
she was attracted to respondent. Petitioner’s attraction to respondent is the reason
why she surrendered her womanhood. Had petitioner been induced or deceived
because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately ended her relation
with respondent when she knew that respondent was a married man after their first
sexual contact. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and
November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion
and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her
submit herself to respondent. The Supreme Court said “Damages could only be
awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire”
therefore petitioner is not entitled to claim for damages based on articles 19 & 21

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.

335
 QUIMIGUING VS ICAO

34 SCRA 132

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were
neighbors in Dapitan City. Despite the defendant being married, he had carnal
intercourse with the plaintiff. Quimging became pregnant and claimed for support
and damages but the case was dismissed. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint
that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled
that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause
of action.”

ISSUE:

Does the plaintiff have a right to claim damages?

RULING:

YES. As provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “A

conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality
of its own for all purposes favorable to it. The conceive child may also receive
donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they
were already born.”

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man
forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear
violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the
damage caused.

336
 PE vs PE
5 SCRA 200

FACTS:

The defendant, Alfonso Pe, was a married man. He was treated like a son by
Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and
was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old
single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita
sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove that
Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection. The case on
moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral,

good custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.

RULING:

YES. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to

morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil
code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the
praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by
Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.

337
 LAO VS CA

325 SCRA 694

FACTS:

The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation entered into a

“Contract of Sales Agent “ with Andres Lao. Under the contract, Lao agrees to sell
cigarettes manufactured and shipped by the corporation and would in turn remit the
sales. Esteban Co, the Vice president and general manager of the Corporation
summoned Lao for accounting. It was then established that there was Lao’s
liability. Lao encountered difficulties in complying with these obligations. The
corporation sent Ngo Kheng to supervise Lao’s sales operation. Ngo Kheng
discovered that contrary to Lao’s allegation that he still had huge collectibles from
his customers, nothing was due the Corporation from Lao’s clients.

From then on, Lao no longer received shipments. Lao brought a complaint
for accounting and damages against the corporation. During the pendency of the
said civil case, Esteban co, representing the corporation as its new vice-president
filed an estafa case against Lao. Without awaiting the termination of the criminal
case, Lao lodged a complaint for malicious prosecution. The court ruled in favor of
Lao declaring that the estafa case was filed without probable cause and with malice
and orders the corporation and Esteban Co to jointly and severally pay the Lao’s.

ISSUE:

Can petitioner Co be held solidarily liable with the Corporation for whatever
damages would be imposed upon them?

RULING:

NO. A perusal of Lao’s affidavit-complaint reveals that at the time he filed

the same petitioner Co was the vice-president of the Corporation. As a corporate
officer, his power to bind the Corporation as its agent must be sought from statute,
charter, by-laws, a delegation of authority to a corporate officer, or from the acts of
the board of directors formally expressed or implied from a habit or custom of

338
doing business. In this case, no such sources of petitioner’s authority from which to
deduce whether or not he was acting beyond the scope of his responsibilities as
corporate vice-president are mentioned, much less proven.

Also, failure of the corporation to interpose petitioner Co’s lack of authority to

bind the corporation in a contract could only mean that the filing of the affidavit-
complaint by petitioner Co was with the consent and authority of the Corporation.
Thus, it is logical to conclude that the board of directors or by-laws of the
corporation vested petitioner Co with certain executive duties one of which is a
case for the Corporation.

339
 MAGTANGGOL QUE vs IAC and ANTONIO NICOLAS

169 SCRA 137

FACTS:

Antonio Nicolas ordered from Magtanggol Que canvass strollers, and

Nicolas issued to Que 5 post-dated checks with a total face value of P7,600.00.
Nicolas ordered a "stop payment" because of defects in the articles sold which Que
had not corrected, so Que was unable to encash the checks. Que filed a complaint
for estafa against Nicolas but it was dismissed for lack of merit.

In 1976, Nicolas filed his own complaint for damages against Que for
malicious prosecution. Que averred that Nicolas had maliciously filed the
complaint in Bulacan although he was a resident of Caloocan City, and Nicolas
was indebted to him and that it was he, Que, who suffered damages due to the
unwarranted suit.

Judge Puno held in favor of Nicolas, finding that Que acted maliciously in
filing the estafa charge and in alleging that Nicolas issued the dishonored checks
with deceit. Que’s motion for reconsideration was denied. A 2nd motion for
reconsideration was filed, and Que averred the mere dismissal of the charge in the
fiscal's office was not a ground for damages nor did it constitute an actionable
wrong. The trial court reversed the original decision, so Que won. IAC reinstated
the original decision of Judge Puno, so Nicolas won.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Que is guilty of malicious prosecution

RULING:

NO. To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the

prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it
was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and

340
groundless. The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution
does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.

One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a

prosecution where he acted with probable cause. The presence of probable cause
signifies as a legal consequence the absence of malice. Considering that the checks
could not be encashed and the supposedly defective goods had not been returned,
Que had reason to believe that Nicolas intended to deceive him. Que was not
motivated by ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his rights.

However, SC denied both parties their respective claims for damages

because of insufficient rebuttable evidence. Therefore, neither of them is guilty of
malice.

341
 FRANKLIN M. DRILON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107019

FACTS:

In a letter-complaint to then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, General

Renato de Villa, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, requested the Department of Justice to order the investigation of
several individuals named therein, including herein private respondent Homobono
Adaza, for their alleged participation in the failed December 1989 coup d'etat.

The letter-complaint was referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special

Composite Team of Prosecutors. Petitioner then Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Aurelio Trampe, the Team Leader, finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry,
issued a subpoena to the individuals named in the letter-complaint, Adaza
included, and assigned the case for preliminary investigation to a panel of
investigators.

Based on the findings, an information was filed charging private respondent

with the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. Feeling aggrieved,
private respondent Adaza filed a complaint for damages, charging petitioners with
engaging in a deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by filing against
him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when
petitioners, according to Adaza, were fully aware of the non-existence of such
crime in the statute books.

ISSUE:

Is there malicious prosecution in this case?

RULING:

342
 The Court ruled in the negative. To constitute malicious prosecution, there
must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting
a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. Thus, in order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff
must prove three (3) elements: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact
that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated
with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without
probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. All these requisites must concur.

Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza against the
herein petitioners, none of the foregoing requisites have been alleged therein, thus
rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action under Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In the case under consideration, the decision of the Special Team of

Prosecutors to file the information cannot be dismissed as the mere product of
whim or caprice on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the preliminary
investigation. Said decision was fully justified in an eighteen-page Resolution.
While it is true that the petitioners were fully aware of the prevailing jurisprudence
enunciated in People v. Hernandez, which proscribes the complexing of murder
and other common crimes with rebellion, petitioners were of the honest conviction
that the Hernandez Case can be differentiated from the present case.

343
 RAFAEL PATRICIO vs HON. OSCAR LEVISTE

G.R. No. L-51832

FACTS:

During a benefit dance in celebration of the town fiesta Rafael Patricio, an

ordained Catholic priest together with 2 policemen were posted near the gate of the
public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. Bienvenido
Bacalocos, President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan who was in the state of drunkenness was also
at the same gate struck a bottle of beer on the table which injured and caused his
own hand to bleed.

Bacalocos then approached Patricio and asked him if he has seen his
wounded hand and before Patricio could respond he hit Patricio's face with his
bloodied hand. Patricio filed a criminal case charging Bacalocos for Slander by
Deed but it was dismissed so he filed for damages in the court a quo. Court
reconsidered moral and exemplary damages, in order to merit, the plaintiff ought to
have proven actual or compensatory damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Patricio should be entitled to moral damages.

RULING:

YES. Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code, "Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Patricio,
being slapped in public causing him physical suffering and social humiliation,
entitles him to moral damages. Actual and compensatory damages need not be
proven.

344
345
 GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC vs ESPINO

G.R. L-48250

FACTS:

Espino, his wife and their two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket
owned by Grand Union in Makati. While his wife was shopping for groceries, he
went around the store and found a cylindrical “rat tail” file that he had wanted to
buy for his hobby. Because it was small, he didn’t put it in the grocery cart because
it might fall and get lost. He instead held it in his hand. While still shopping, he
and his wife ran into his aunt’s maid. While they were talking he stuck the file in
his breast pocket, with a good part of the merchandise exposed.

He paid for the items in his wife’s cart, but he forgot about the file in his
pocket. On their way out, the guard stopped him and told him he hadn’t paid for
the file. He apologized and said he had forgotten. He started towards the cashier to
pay; but the guard stopped him and said they were to go to the back of the
supermarket. There, a report was made. He was then brought to the front of the
grocery, near the cashiers to a Mrs. Fandino. Fandino read the report and
remarked: “Ano, nakaw na naman ito.”With other customers and onlookers staring
at him, he was directed to get in line at the cashier to pay for the file. He was
totally embarrassed. After paying, he and his wife walked out quickly. CA awarded
him damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliation he

experienced at the supermarket

RULING:

YES. The false accusation charged against the private respondent after
detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner
346
in which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening
to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the
Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment,
sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in
relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

However, the whole incident that befell respondent had arisen in such a
manner that was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay for the file.
It was his forgetfulness in checking out the item and paying for it that started the
chain of events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing
him mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. Yet, private
respondent’s act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and
such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private
respondent may recover.

347
 SINGAPORE AIRLINES VS HON. ERNANI CRUZ PANO

G.R. NO. L-47739

FACTS:

Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment by Singapore Airlines Limited for 5

years. Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on
leave without approval of the application during the second year, Singapore
Airlines filed suit for damages against Cruz and his surety, Villanueva, for
violation of the terms and conditions

The RTC dismissed the complaint, counterclaim and cross-claim for lack of
jurisdiction

ISSUE:

Whether or not case is cognizable by Courts of justice and not by the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission.

RULING:

YES. Records are hereby ordered to the proper Branch of the Regional Trial
Court. Jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the civil
Courts . Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130
provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship are
cognizable by Labor Arbiters petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the
"wanton failure and refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report
for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his
application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further
averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and
conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner
removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code.

348
 ERNESTO MEDINA, et. al vs HON. FLORELIANA CASTRO-
BARTOLOME

G.R. L-59825

FACTS:

Ernesto Medina and Jose G. Ong filed a civil case against Cosme de Aboitiz
and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines,Inc. The defendant corporation,
acting through its President, Cosme de Aboitiz, dismissed and slandered the
plaintiffs in the presence of their subordinate employees although this could have
been done in private. Because of the anti-social manner by which the plaintiffs
were dismissed from their employment and the embarrassment and degradation
they experienced in the hands of the defendants, the plaintiffs have suffered and
will continue to suffer wounded feelings, sleepless nights, mental torture,
besmirched reputation and other similar injuries. A motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed by the defendants. The
trial court denied the motion. The defendants filed a second motion to dismiss the
complaint because of amendments to the Labor Code immediately prior thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the
plaintiffs.

RULING:

NO. It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any
unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts
allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute
is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code.

349
 CORNELIO AMARO, et al vs. AMBROSIO SUMANGUIT

G.R. No. L-14986

FACTS:
Appellants filed suit for damages in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental against the chief of police of the City of Silay. Although not
specifically alleged in the complaint, it is admitted by both parties, as shown in
their respective briefs, that the action is predicated on Articles 21 and/or 27 of the
Civil Code.

Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of
Silay; that the following day he, together with his father (Cornelio Amaro) and his
witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance
to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized;" that in view thereof they
"gave up and renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the
crime . . . .;" that upon advice of the City Mayor given to appellee an investigation
(of said crime) was conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about
to file or had already filed an information for illegal discharge of firearm against
the assailant; and that "having finished the investigation of the crime complained
of, the defendant chief of police is now harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work,
ordering them thru his police to appear in his office when he is absent, and he is
about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared
affidavits exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in their case against
the perpetrator of the crime."

ISSUE:
Is there dereliction of duty in this case?

RULING:

The Court is of the opinion that the facts set out constitute an actionable
dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. That
appellants were "harassed and terrorized" may be a conclusion of law and hence
350
improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of
harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance,
which was his duty to do as an officer of the law. The requirement under the
aforesaid provision that such refusal must be "without just cause" is implicit in the
context of the allegation. The statement of appellee's dereliction is repeated in a
subsequent paragraph of the complaint, where it is alleged that "he is about to
order the arrest of the plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of exculpation in
favor of the policemen.

351
 ST. LOUIS REALTY CORP. vs CA

133 SCRA 179

FACTS:

Dr. Conrado Aramil seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in

the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr.
Arcadio. St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where
the heart is” which was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the
house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the
company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr
Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an
explanation but no rectification or apology was published. This prompted Dr.
Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18,
1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on
the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages
on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.

ISSUE:

Whether or not St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.

RULING:

YES. St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely

circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification.”

352
 RODRIGO CONCEPCION vs COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR
NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS

G.R. No. 120706

FACTS:

Spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at Pasig City, in an

apartment leased to them by the owner Florence “Bing” Concepcion, who also
resided in the same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas
was then engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private
entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures. Florence Concepcion
joined this venture. Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of
Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and accused him of
conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence.

Rodrigo threatened Florence over the telephone that should something

happen to his sick mother; in case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill
Florence. As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment
and shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Consequently,
he was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of
damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas
spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages. The Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of Nestor Nicolas, hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting damages to Nestor Nicolas and his
spouse.

RULING:

YES. There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered

mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as
a proximate result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous and insulting language.
According to petitioner, private respondents’ evidence is inconsistent as to time,

353
place and persons who heard the alleged defamatory statement. The Court finds
this to be a gratuitous observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for the
respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident happened in the afternoon
at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the presence of some
friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation being repeated in the
presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house.

All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of
damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents.

354
 STI DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, et al. VS CA

G.R. 143196

FACTS:
The petitioner drivers formed STI Drivers Association filed a petition for
certification election. On June 13, 1994, Med-arbiter Brigada Fadrigon issued an
order dismissing the petition. On appeal to the DOLE, Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma affirmed the said order.

Pending resolution of the appeal to the DOLE, however, petitioner drivers

Salvador Caranza, Mariano Tan, Amado Evangelista, Manuel Rudolfo, Johnny
Bumatay and Eusebio Tabulod, Jr. were dismissed by respondent STI for violation
of the "Union Security Clause" provided for in respondent’s Collective Bargaining
Agreement with the Federation of Democratic Trade Unions- STI Workers Union
Chapter. Subsequently, the concerned petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, unfair labor practice and payment of damages against the respondents
before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. On the same day, the
petitioner drivers also filed a complaint for underpayment of their vacation leave,
sick leave and 13th month pay against the respondents.

The petitioners pray that the case be remanded to the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC on the ground that they were denied due process for being
represented by an impostor lawyer who was negligent in attending to their case
from the moment it was filed up to its dismissal by the appellate court.

ISSUE:
Is there legal malpractice in this case?

RULING:
The court ruled in the negative. The SC held that the petitioners were duly
represented by a bona-fide lawyer and the latter’s failure to file the required
position papers before the Labor Arbiter or to appeal on time to the NLRC is not a
ground to declare the proceedings a quo null and void. We have ruled time and
355
again that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied
authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or
negligence of petitioners’ counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable
judgment against them. Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by this
Court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process of law, or when its application "results in the outright deprivation of
one’s property through a technicality." None of these exceptions has been
sufficiently shown in the instant case.

356
 REYES vs SISTERS OF MERCY

G.R. 130547

FACTS:
Jorge Reyes has been suffering from recurring fever with chills for around
days.
Home medication afforded him no relief so he went to Mercy Community Clinic.
He was then attended by Dr. Marlyn Rico. A Widal test was performed and he was
found positive for typhoid. Dr. Marlyn Rico endorsed Jorge Reyes to Dr. Marvie
Blanes. Who ordered that Jorge be tested for compatibility with chloromycetin, an
antibiotic. Such test was conducted by Nurse Pagente.

As there was no adverse reaction, Dr. Blanes administered 500 mg of the

antibiotic. Another dose was given 3 hours later. Subsequently, Jorge Reyes
developed high fever and experienced vomiting and convulsions. He then turned
blue due to deficiency in oxygen – cyanosis – and died. The cause of death was
stated to be “ventricular arrhythmia secondary to hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.”
The heirs of Reyes filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against Sisters of
Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. Blanes, Dr. Rico and Mercy Community Clinic
contending that the death of Jorge was due to the wrongful administration of
chloromycetin.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was medical malpractice.

RULING:

NO. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that
the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent
physician or surgeon would have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure
or action caused injury to the patient.

357
There is nothing unusual about the death of Jorge Reyes. In this case, while it is
true that the patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance was
rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death. Prior to
his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills for five days
unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by his wife. This
shows that he had been suffering from a serious illness and professional medical
help came too late for him.

358
 GARCIA-RUEDA VS. PASCASIO

G.R. NO. 118141

SEPTEMBER 5, 1997

FACTS:

Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent

surgical operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his
ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while
Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery,
however, Florencio died of complications of "unknown cause," according to
officials of the UST Hospital. Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital,
petitioner requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an
autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that Florencio's death
was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia.
Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr.
Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence
before the Office of the City Prosecutor. During the preliminary investigation,
what transpired was a confounding series of events which we shall try to
disentangle. The case was initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who
had to inhibit himself because he was related to the counsel of one of the doctors.
As a result, the case was re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono who was,
however, disqualified on motion of the petitioner since he disregarded prevailing
laws and jurisprudence regarding preliminary investigation. The case was then
referred to Prosecutor Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending
that only Dr. Reyes be held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr.
Antonio be dismissed. The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City
Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson, in the "interest of justice and peace of mind of
the parties," recommended that the case be re-raffled on the ground that Prosecutor
Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was transferred to Prosecutor
Leoncia R. Dimagiba, where a volte face occurred again with the endorsement
that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and instead, a corresponding
information be filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, questioning the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba. Pending the
resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor
Dimagiba's resolution, the investigative "pingpong" continued when the case
was again assigned to another prosecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who
359
recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the criminal information of Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto
was pending, the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A.
Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing, a resolution
which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City
Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero. Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against Prosecutors
Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes
before the Office of the Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman
issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence. In
fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman
to review the recommendations of the
government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same. Petitioner faults
the Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to find that
there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE:

Whether or not expert testimony is necessary to prove the negligent act of

the respondent.

RULING:

In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed

training and skill possessed by physicians
and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and
skill in the treatment of his patients.
He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other
reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is
essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that
the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard.
Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that
expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of
any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other
physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's
expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr.
360
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause
of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of
care that
petitioner should have exercised. The better and more logical remedy under the
circumstances would have been to appeal the resolution of the City Prosecutors
dismissing the criminal complaint to the Secretary of Justice under the Department
of Justice's Order No. 223, otherwise known as the "1993 Revised Rules on
Appeals From Resolutions In Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations," as
amended by Department Order No. 359, Section 1 of which provides: Sec. 1.
What May Be Appealed. — Only resolutions of the Chief State
Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a
criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice
except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.

What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of
Order No. 223 states: "The Secretary of Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the
appealed resolution." On the other hand, "He may motu proprio or on motion of the
appellee, dismiss outright the appeal on specified grounds." In exercising his
discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted within his power and
authority in dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and this Court will
not interfere with the same.
Petition is dismissed.

361
 LI VS SPOUSES SOLIMAN

GR NO. 165279

JUNE 7, 2011

FACTS:

 On July 7, 1993, respondents 11 year old daughter, Angelica Soliman

underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes
Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was suffering from
osteosaucoma, ostiobiostic type, a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the
bone which usually affects teenage children. Following this diagnosis, Angelica’s
right leg was amputated by Dr. Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As a
adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells, and hence minimizing
the chances of recurrence and prevent the decease from spreading to other parts of
the patient’s body, chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo and referred
Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical
oncologist.

On July 23, 1993, petitioner saw the respondents at the hospital after
Angelica’s surgery and discussed with them Angelica’s condition. Petitioner told
respondents that Angelica should be given 2-3 weeks to recover from the operation
before starting the chemotherapy. Respondents were apprehensive due to financial
constraints as Reynaldo earns only from P70,000-150,000 a year from his jewelry
and watching repair business. Petitioner, however, assured them not to worry about
her professional fee and told them to just save up for medicines to be used.

As the chemotherapy session started, day by day, Angelica experience

worsening condition and other physical effect on the body such as discoloration,
nausea, and vomiting.

Petitioner claimed, that she explained to respondents that even when a tumor
is removed, there are still small lesions undetectable to the naked eye and that

362
adjuvant chemotherapy is needed to clean out the small lesions in order to lessen
the chance of cancer to recur. She did not give the respondents any assurance that
chemotherapy will cure Angelica’s cancer. During these consultations with
respondents, she explained the following side effects of chemotherapy treatment to
respondents: 1.) Falling hair; 2.) nausea and vomiting; 3.) loss of appetite; 4.) low
count of WBC, RBC, and platelets; 5.) possible sterility due to the effects on
Angelica’s ovary; 6.) Damage to kidney and heart; 7.) darkening of the skin
especially when exposed to sunlight. She actually talked to the respondents four
times, once at the hospital after the surgery, twice at her clinic and fourth when
Angelica’s mother called her through long distance. This was disputed by
respondents who countered that petitioner gave them assurance that there is 95%
chance of healing for Angelica if she undergoes chemotherapy and that the only
side effects were nausea, vomiting and hair loss. Those were the only side effects
of chemotherapy mentioned by petitioner.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not petitioner committed medical malpractice.

RULING:

No. The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or more
appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has
available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional
which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such claim, a patient
must prove that a health care provider in most cases a physician, either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done or
that he or she did something that a reasonably health care provider would not have
done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.

Medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses

belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert
opinion of qualified physicians stems from the former’s realization that the latter

363
possess unusual technical skills which layman in most instances are incapable of
intelligently evaluating, hence the indispensability of expert testimonies.

The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient

relationships goes as far back into english common law. As early as 1767, doctors
were charged with the tort of battery if they have not gained the consent of their
patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure. In the United States, the
seminal case was Schoendorff vs Society of New York Hospital which involved
unwanted treatment performed by a doctor. Justice Bejamin Cardozo oft-quoted
opinion upheld the basic right of a patient to give consent to any medical procedure
or treatment; every human being of adult year and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages. From a purely ethical norm, informed consent evolved into a general
principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent
physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would
disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risk of injury might be incurred from a
proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for her
own welfare and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, as
alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgement by
reasonably balancing the probable risk against the probable benefits.

There are four essential elements a plaintiff must proved in a malpractice action
based upon the doctrine of informed consent: 1.) the physician had a duty to
disclose material risks; 2.) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those
risks; 3.) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient
consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and 4.) plaintiff
was injured by the proposed treatment. The gravamen in an informed consent
requires the plaintiff to point to significant undisclosed information relating to the
treatment which could have altered her decision to undergo it.

Examining the evidence, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material
risks inherent in chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of
Angelica’s parents. Respondents could not have been unaware in the course of
initial treatment and amputation of Angelica’s lower extremity that her immune
system was already weak on  account of the malignant tumor in her knee. When

364
petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy
which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood
platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable
expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents understood very well that
the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the
procedure. In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patients reaction
to the chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely
determined by the physician. That death can possibly result from complications of
the treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the
administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with
most other major medical procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably
drawn from the general side effects of chemotherapy already disclosed.

365
 RAMOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 124354.

DECEMBER 29, 1999.

FACTS:

Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her

gall bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the
surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that
he would find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr.
Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist
“botched” the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma
and suffer brain damage. The botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz,
sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.

The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the
anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing
that Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising
reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist
saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang
tiyan.” Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to
undergo surgery.The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due
care in intubating the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a
“good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for
the negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the surgeon
failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all
held jointly and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the
decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUES: 

Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused
the comatose condition of Ramos.

366
RULING:

Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the
damages. Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of
the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit
an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima
facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation,
where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present
expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was negligent.This doctrine
finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already
surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive
control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound
and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa
loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself!

Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption

of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to
tell whether or not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here].
The Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the
first time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient
and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.The head surgeon, Dr.
Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as the
“captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper
protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.The hospital failed to adduce
evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in
hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since
they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of their “consultants”. While
these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the
selection and termination of doctors who work there which is one of the hallmarks
of an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in
the liability

367
 NOEL CASUMPANG v. NELSON CORTEJO,
GR No. 171127
2015-03-11

FACTS:
Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer Cortejo (Edmer), to
the Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of
difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, and... fever. Dr. Ramoncito Livelo
(Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined Edmer.Based on these initial
examinations and the chest x-ray test that followed, Dr. Livelo diagnosed Edmer
with "bronchopneumonia."[7] Edmer's blood was also taken for testing, typing, and
for purposes of administering antibiotics. Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave Edmer an
antibiotic medication to lessen his fever and to loosen his phlegm.Mrs. Cortejo did
not know any doctor at SJDH..She used her Fortune Care cardShe was thereafter
assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang (Dr. Casumpang), a pediatrician also accredited
with Fortune Care. At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang for
the first time examined Edmer in his room. Using only a stethoscope, he confirmed
the initial diagnosis of "Bronchopneumonia."Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining
doubts on the doctor's diagnosis. She immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that
Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or cough[10] but Dr. Casumpang merely
told her that her son's "bloodpressure is just... being active,"[11] and remarked that
"that's the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm."Dr. Casumpang next
visited and examined Edmer at 9:00 in the morning the following day.Mrs. Cortejo
also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in Edmer's sputum. Despite
these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang simply nodded, inquired if
Edmer has an asthma, and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer's illness is...
bronchopneumonia.At around 11:30 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer
vomited "phlegm with blood streak"[15] prompting the respondent (Edmer's
father) to request for a doctor at the nurses' station.Forty-five minutes later, Dr.
Ruby Sanga-Miranda (Dr. Miranda), one of the resident physicians of SJDH,
arrived. She claimed that although aware that Edmer had vomited "phlegm with
blood streak," she failed to examine the blood specimen because the respondent
washed it... away. She then advised the respondent to preserve the specimen for
examination.

368
 Dr. Miranda conducted a physical check-up covering Edmer's head, eyes,
nose, throat, lungs, skin and abdomen; and found that Edmer had a low-grade non-
continuing fever, and rashes that were not typical of dengue fever.
At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Upon seeing Dr.
Miranda, the respondent showed her Edmer's blood specimen, and reported that
Edmer had complained of severe stomach pain and difficulty in moving his right
leg.Dr. Miranda then examined Edmer's "sputum with blood" and noted that he
was bleeding. Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue, she inserted a
plastic tube in his nose, drained the liquid from his stomach with ice cold normal
saline solution, and gave an... instruction not to pull out the tube, or give the
patient any oral medication.thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out
to be negative... ordered the monitoring of the patient's blood pressure and some
blood tests. Edmer's blood pressure was later found to be normal.At 4:40 in the
afternoon, Dr. Miranda called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told him about
Edmer's condition.Dr. Casumpang ordered several procedures done including:
hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood typing, blood transfusion... and tourniquet tests.The
blood test results came at about 6:00 in the evening.Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's
parents that the blood test results showed that Edmer was suffering from "Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever."Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer's room and he
recommended his transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), to which the
respondent... consented. Since the ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to
the respondent that they hire a private nurse. The respondent, however, insisted on
transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.After the respondent had signed the
waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the last time, checked Edmer's condition, found that
his blood pressure was stable, and noted that he was "comfortable."The respondent
requested for an ambulance but he was informed that the driver was nowhere to
be... found. This prompted him to hire a private ambulance that cost him
P600.00.At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr.
Casumpang, was transferred to Makati Medical Center.
Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the patient's
clinical history and laboratory exam results. Upon examination, the attending
physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was already in its irreversible
stage.Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988.[24] His Death
Certificate indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic
shock;" "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV."... the respondent instituted an
action for damages against SJDH, and its attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang and
Dr. Miranda (collectively referred to as the "petitioners")... before the RTC of
Makati City.the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent... the RTC found untenable
the petitioning doctors' contention that Edmer's initial symptoms did not indicate

369
dengue fever. It faulted them for heavily relying on the chest x-ray result and for
not considering the other... manifestations that Edmer's parents had relayed. held
SJDH solidarity liable with the petitioning doctors... as consultant, is an ostensible
agent of SJDH
Dr. Miranda, as resident physician, is an employee of SJDH... the CA
affirmed en toto the RTC's rulingThe CA found the petitioning doctors' failure to
read even the most basic signs of "dengue fever" expected of an ordinary doctor as
medical negligence.
On SJDH's solidary liability, the CA ruled that the hospital's liability is
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in diagnosing and in treating the patient.

RULING:
The claim for damages is based on the petitioning doctors' negligence in
diagnosing and treating the deceased Edmer, the child of the respondent. It is
a medical malpractice suit, an action available to victims to redress a wrong
committed by medical professionals who caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a
patient. As the term is used, the suit is brought whenever a medical practitioner or
health care provider fails to meet the standards demanded by his profession, or
deviates from this standard, and causes injury to the patient.
To successfully pursue a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in this case, the
deceased patient's heir) must prove that the doctor either failed to do what a
reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or did what a reasonably prudent
doctor would not have done; and the act or omission had caused injury to the
patient.34 The patient's heir/s bears the burden of proving his/her cause of action.
The Elements of a Medical Malpractice Suit
The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation.

Duty refers to the standard of behavior that imposes restrictions on one's

conduct. It requires proof of professional relationship between the physician and
the patient. Without the professional relationship, a physician owes no duty to the
patient, and cannot therefore incur any liability.
A physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages the services of a
370
physician, and the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient.The
establishment of this relationship is consensual, and the acceptance by the
physician essential. The mere fact that an individual approaches a physician and
seeks diagnosis, advice or treatment does not create the duty of care unless the
physician agrees. The consent needed to create the relationship does not always
need to be express. In the absence of an express agreement, a physician-patient
relationship may be implied from the physician's affirmative action to diagnose
and/or treat a patient, or in his participation in such diagnosis and/or treatment. The
usual illustration would be the case of a patient who goes to a hospital or a clinic,
and is examined and treated by the doctor. In this case, we can infer, based on the
established and customary practice in the medical community that a patient-
physician relationship exists.

Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the legal duty of care

follows. The doctor accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at least the same
standard of care that a reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a medical
condition under similar circumstances.
Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly
performs his duties under professional standards. This determination is both factual
and legal, and is specific to each individual case.

If the patient, as a result of the breach of duty, is injured in body or in

health, actionable malpractice is committed, entitling the patient to damages.
To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal relation
between the negligence and the injury. This connection must be direct, natural, and
should be unbroken by any intervening efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. The injury or damage is
proximately caused by the physician's negligence when it appears, based on the
evidence and the expert testimony, that the negligence played an integral part in
causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct
result, or a reasonably probable consequence of the physician's negligence.

371
 PROFESSIONAL SERVICES v. CA and NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE
AGANA,

GR No. 126297

2008-02-11

FACTS:

Natividad Agana was admitted at the Medical City General Hospital (Medical
City) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal dischargeDr.
Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."Dr. Ampil,...
assisted by the medical staff[1] of Medical City, performed an anterior resection
surgery upon her.he found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to
her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it.obtained the
consent of Atty. Enrique Agana, Natividad's husband, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes,
respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to perform hysterectomy upon NatividadDr.
Fuentes performed and completed the hysterectomy. Afterwards, Dr. Ampil took
over, completed the operation and closed the incision. However, the operation
appeared to be flawed.sponge count lacking After a couple of days, Natividad
complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil
and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence
of the surgical operation performed upon her. Dr. Ampil recommended that
Natividad... consult an oncologistNatividad, accompanied by her husband, went to
the United States to seek further treatment. After four (4) months of consultations
and laboratory examinations, Natividad was told that she was free of
cancer.Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two (2)
weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her
vagina.Dr. Ampil was immediately informed. He proceeded to Natividad's house
where he managed to extract by... hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in
width.the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the
Polymedic General Hospital. While confined thereat, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez
detected the presence of a foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in... width. The gauze had badly infected her vaginal vault...
forced stool to excrete through the vagina.Natividad underwent another...
surgery.Natividad and her husband filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,
Quezon City a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.

372
 On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above case, Natividad
died.the trial court rendered judgment in favor of spouses Agana... the Court of
Appeals, in its Decision dated September 6, 1996, affirmed the assailed judgment...
the complaint against Dr. Fuentes was dismissed.

ISSUES:

1.Whether "an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between

hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians for the purpose of
apportioning responsibility"... the doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by
estoppel cannot apply because spouses Agana failed to establish one requisite of
the doctrine, i.e., that Natividad relied on the representation of the hospital in
engaging the services of Dr. Ampil.

2.Whether that the doctrine of corporate negligence is misplaced because the

proximate cause of Natividad's injury was Dr. Ampil's negligence... whether or not
respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner's
condition.

RULING:

1. an employer-employee relationship "in effect" exists between the

Medical City and Dr. Ampil. Consequently, both are jointly and severally liable to
the Aganas.The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist
staff with attending and visiting "consultants," who are allegedly not hospital
employees, presents problems in... apportioning responsibility for negligence in
medical malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more apparent than
real.hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and
in the conduct of their work within the hospital premisesDoctors who apply for
"consultant" slots, visiting or attending, are required to submit proof of...
completion of residency, their educational qualificationsThese requirements are
carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or... by a review
committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. This is
particularly true with respondent hospital.In other words, private hospitals hire, fire
and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. he is
normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside
rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand rounds and patient audits
and perform other tasks and... responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to
maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into
the hospital... the physician's performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by

373
a peer review... committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and
feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents... remiss in his duties, or a
consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the
hospital or its peer review committee,... is normally politely terminated.

2.The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the

negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of
others based on the former's responsibility under a... relationship of partia
ptetas."consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent
hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's... condition, the
control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the
important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of
the payment of wages... the control test is... determining. Accordingly, on the basis
of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.the Court did not reverse its
ruling in Ramos. What it clarified was that the De Los Santos Medical Clinic did
not exercise control over its consultant, hence, there is no employer-employee
relationship between them.the doctrine in Ramos stays, i.e., for the purpose of
allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship exists between hospitals and their... consultants.Even assuming that
Dr. Ampil is not an employee of Medical City, but an... independent contractor,
still the said hospital is liable to the Aganas.Atty. Agana categorically testified that
one of the reasons why he chose Dr. Ampil was that he knew him to be a staff
member of Medical City, a prominent and known hospital.Clearly, PSI is estopped
from passing the blame solely to Dr. Ampil. Its act of displaying his name and
those of the other physicians in the public directory at the lobby of the hospital
amounts to holding out to the public that it offers quality medical service through
the... listed physicians. This justifies Atty. Agana's belief that Dr. Ampil was a
member of the hospital's staff.Unfortunately, PSI had been remiss in its duty. It did
not conduct an immediate investigation on the reported missing gauzes to the great
prejudice and agony of its patient.

Dr. Jocson's lack of concern for the patients. Such conduct is reflective of
the hospital's manner of supervision. Not only did PSI breach its duty to oversee or
supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls,... it also failed to take
an active step in fixing the negligence committed.there is merit in the trial court's
finding that the failure of PSI to conduct an investigation "established PSI's part in
the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes."

374
375
 ROGELIO NOGALES VS. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER ET AL.

G.R. NO. 142625

FACTS:

Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales ("Corazon"), who was then
37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada ("Dr.
Estrada") beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as December
1975. Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor
pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales ("Spouses Nogales") to see Dr.
Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate
admission to the Capitol Medical Center ("CMC"). t 6:13 a.m., Corazon started to
experience convulsionsAt 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied
low forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of
cervical tissue was allegedly torn.At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest
moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse. Corazon died at 9:15
a.m. The cause of death was "hemorrhage, post partum.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.

RULING: 

Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting "consultant" staff. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible
for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of
others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.In
general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-
physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be
liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception is
also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority”.

For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff

must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent
was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the

376
appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had
knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon
the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical
staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority
thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an employee
or agent of CMC.

377
 CANTRE VS GO

GR NO. 160889

APRIL 27, 2007

FACTS: 

Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology

at the Dr. Jesus Delgado memorial Hospital. She was the attending physician of
respondent Nora Go, who was admitted at the said hospital on April 19, 1992. At
1:30am of April 20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her fourth child, a baby boy.
However, at around 3:30am Nora suffered profuse bleeding insider her womb due
to some parts of the placenta were not completely expelled from her womb after
delivery consequently, Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her
blood pressure to 40/0. Petitioner said the assisting resident physician performed
various medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Nora’s blood
pressure. Her blood pressure was frequently monitored with the use of a
sphygmamometer. While petitioner was massaging Nora’s uterus for it to contract
and stop bleeding, she ordered a drop light to warm Nora and her baby. Nora
remained unconscious until she recovered. While in the recovery room, her
husband, respondent John David Z. Go noticed a fresh gasping wound 2 1/2″ x 3
1/2″ in the inner portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. He asked the nurses
what caused the injury. He was informed, it was a burn. An investigation was filed
by Nora’s husband and found out from the petitioner that it was caused by the
blood pressure cuff, however, this was contrary to the findings from a medico-legal
report which stated that it was indeed a burn and that a drop light when placed near
a skin for about 10mins could cause such burn. Nora was referred to a plastic
surgeon from the hospital and skin grafting was done on her and scar revision but
both still left a mark on Nora’s arm compelling the respondent spouse to file a
complaint for damages against petitioner.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not petitioner is liable for the injury referred by Nora.

378
RULING:

Yes. The Hippocratic oath mandates physicians to give primordial

consideration to the well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to his
precept, he is accountable for his acts. This is notwithstanding, courts face a unique
restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not
guardians of care and they never set out to intentionally cause injury to their
patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where
negligence exist and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to
reparation for the damage caused.

In cases, involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor allows

the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of
the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the
following requisites concur:

1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence;

2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the

defendant or defendants;

3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff

responsible is eliminated.

All of these three requisites were present in the case at bar.

Under the the captain of the ship doctrine, the surgeon in charge of the
operation is liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those
are under the surgeons control.

379
 DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR NO. 19212

MARCH 10, 2014

FACTS:

Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an

imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical
procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall,
enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.
When Gerald was three years old, he was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a
pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and
was assisted by Dr. Luceño, Dr. Valeña and Dr. Tibio. The anesthesiologists
included Dr. Abella, Dr. Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr.
Solidum). During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia , and went into a
coma. His coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a
month. He could no longer see, hear or move.

A complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries

was filed by Gerald’s parents against the team of doctors. Upon a finding of
probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr.
Solidum.

The RTC rendered Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries and ordering her to
indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant
Luz Gercayo, for damages. The CA affirmed the ruling of RTC and applied the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case.

ISSUES:

1. Whetherthe doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in the case.

2. Whether Dr. Solidum is liable for criminal negligence.

380
RULING:

1. No, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not apply in this case. The
doctrine of res ipsaloquitor means that where the thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by
defendant that the accident arose from want of care.
The doctrine is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a
layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised.For the doctrine to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent’ (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused
the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; (3) the injury
suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the
person injured.

In this case, the application of the doctrine is inappropriate. Although the

second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and
the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the
patient, being then unconscious during the operation has no contributory
negligence, the first element is wanting. Indeed, the patient experienced
bradycardia during the operation, but such fact alone did not prove that the
negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had
caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the
course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been trigerred by the
vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the patient.

2. No, Dr. Solidum is not liable for criminal negligence. Negligence is

defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. The negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury.

381
 An action upon medical negligence calls for the plaintiff to prove by
competent evidence the following elements: (a) the duty owed by the physician to
the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance
with the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of
the duty by the physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard
of care; (c) the causation, i.e, there must be a reasonably close and casual
connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and d.)
the damages suffered by the patient.

In the medical profession, specific norms on standard of care to protect the

patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set
the duty of the physician in respect of the patient. In attempting to fix a standard by
which a court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the
requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and
defense experts is required.

In this case, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical

qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard
of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible,
to determine whether the first three elements of a negligence and malpractice
action were attendant.Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for “failing to monitor
and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to Gerald and using
100% halothane and other anesthetic medications.” However, the foregoing
circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr.
Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to
Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude the probability that other
factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could not necessarily be
attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had
then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his
report, instead, that “although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and
precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did
occur.”

The Supreme Court stated that “the existence of the probability about other
factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable

382
doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries.”

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;

REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, 2010;
ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.

383
 BORROMEO VS. FAMILY CARE HOSPITAL. AND DR. INSO

G. R. 191018

JAN. 25, 2016

FACTS:

Borromeo brought his wife to the family care hospital becaus eof acute pain
at the lower stomach area and fever for 2 days, he was admitted in said hospital
and placed under the care of Dr. Inso. Dr. Inso conducted the surgery and by then
he confirmed his hypothesis that Lillian has an acute appendicitis. The operation
was succesfully done however after 16 hours, Lilian was returned to her room
where she start to become restless and dropped her blood pressure, she was not
even responded to blood transfusion hence the tube connected to oxygen tank was
inserted by dr. Inso into Lilian and order her to put into in an Intensive care unit.
Though being a secondary hospotal, it does not. Have. An icu, dr. Inso arranged
with other hospital with icu and transfer there lililan. Unfortunately lilian passed
away there despite of trying to resuscitate her. In his autopsy report, dr. Reyes
concluded thay lilia died due to hemorrhage and concluded that the internal
bleeding was caused by .5 x .5 cm opening in tge repair site. Further, he opined
that it could be avoided if the site was repaired with double suturing instead of the
single continuing suture repair that he found.

Hence the petitioner filed a complaint against family care hospital and dr.
Inso for. Medical malpractice basing it to the autopsy report made by reyes and
pursue the case with having reyes as the winess. Rtc ruled in favor of the
petitioner, believing in the theory of Dr. Reyes on the. 5x. 5cm. And applied the
docyrine of resipsa loquitor. And ordered the respondents to pay for damages,
death indemnity, moral and exemplary, loss of earning payment, Atty.’s Fees, cost
of suit When the respondents appealed, Ca reversed.Hence this petition for
certitorari of carlos boromeo

ISSUE:

Whether respondents are guilty of medical malpractice and that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor can be applied in the case.

384
RULING:

No. The basic legal principle that equally applies to both civil and criminal
cases that whiever alleges the fact has the burden of proof. Petitiiner's failure to
present expert witnesses resulted in his failure to prove petitioners' negligence.
During the investigation ryes found to be not an expert in the subject matter having
no training residency in pathology or in surgery after he passed the medical board
exam. On the other hand the repondent shows as a witness Dr. Ramos. Dr. Ramos
graduated from the Far Eastern University, Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation, in
1975. He took up his post-graduate internship at the Quezon Memorial Hospital in
Lucena City, before taking the board exams. After obtaining his professional
license, he underwent residency training in pathology at the Jose R. Reyes
Memorial Center from 1977 to 1980. He passed the examination in Anatomic,
Clinical, and Physical Pathology in 1980 and was inducted in 1981. He also took
the examination in anatomic pathology in 1981 and was inducted in 1982.At the
time of his testimony, Dr. Ramos is a practicing pathologist with over 20 years of
experience. He is an associate professor at the Department of Surgery of the
Fatima Medical Center, the Manila Central University, and the Perpetual Help
Medical Center. He is a Fellow of the Philippine College of Surgeons, a Diplomate
of the Philippine Board of Surgery, and a Fellow of the Philippine Society of
General Surgeons. He also headed the Perpetual Help General Hospital Pathology
department as well as the Batangas General Hospital. In deed becoming an expert
in the subject matter, the testimony of Dr. Ramos carry greater than od Dr. Reyes.
Dr. Ramos discredited Dr. Reyes' theory that the 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening at the repair
site caused Lilian's internal bleeding. According to Dr. Ramos, appendical vessels
measure only 0.1 to 0.15 cm, a claim that was not refuted by the petitioner. If the
0.5 x 0.5 cm opening had caused Lilian's hemorrhage, she would not have survived
for over 16 hours; she would have died immediately, within 20 to 30 minutes, after
surgery. Dr. Ramos submitted that the cause of Lilian's death was hemorrhage due
to DIC, a blood disorder that leads to the failure of the blood to clot; Dr. Ramos
considered the abundant petechial hemorrhage in the myocardic sections and the
hemorrhagic right lung; the multiple bleeding points indicate that Lilian was
afflicted with DIC.The court deny the petition for lack of merit

385
 MENDOZA VS. CASUMPANG

G.R. NO. 197987

MARCH 19, 2012

FACTS:

Josephine Casumpang, who died before the trial could end, was substituted
by herrespondent, husband, Adriano and their children Jennifer and John, filed an
action fordamages against petitioner Dr. Mendoza in 1993 before the Regional
Trial Court of IloiloCity. Josephine underwent hysterectomy and myomectomy
that Dr. Mendoza performed and after operation, Josephine experienced recurring
fever, nausea and vomiting. Three months after the operation when she noticed
something protruding from her genital while taking a bath and she went to see
Dr. Jamandre-Guban since Dr. Mendoza was unavailable. Dr.Jamandre-Guban
extracted a foul smelling, partially expelled rolled gauze from her cervix. The RTC
rendered judgment, finding Dr. Mendoza guilty of neglect and reinstated by the
Court of Appeals, thus, prompted her to file the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a gross negligence on the part of the petitioner,
Dr. MariterMendoza.

RULING:

Yes, the petitioner is guilty of gross negligence.Gross negligence is a

flagrant failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise. A surgical operation is the responsibility of surgeon performing it.He
must personally ascertain that the counts of instruments and materials used before
thesurgery and prior to the sewing the patient up has been correctly done.

Policy In this kind of jurisprudence, it will provide an example to the medical

profession and to stress the need for constant vigilance in attending to patient’s
health.

386
 PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS

285 SCRA 438

JANUARY 29, 1998

FACTS:

The information alleged that the accused with the use of firearms caused the
death of Eduardo Tolentino Sr. and Jerry Agliam and inflicted gunshot wounds to
Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino. The Supreme
Court upheld the RTC’s decision as to the guilt of the three accused, FELIPE
BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and ALVIN BULUSAN. This digest will focus
on the RTC’s award of damages which is relevant to our recitation.- As to
damages, the RTC further sentenced them to pay jointly and solidarily:. The heirs
of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000, moral damages
in the amount of P20,000, and actual damages in the amount of P35,755, with
interest;The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the
amount of P50,000, moral damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual damages
in the total amount of P61,785, with interest;Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in
the amount of P2,003.40, and moral damages in the amount of P10,000, with
interest; Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in
the amount of P5,000 each, with interest.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in the award of damages to the victims’ heirs

RULING:

No Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or

satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation
of some right. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction
of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be
invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety,
physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these

387
were the proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or omission. In granting
actual or compensatory damages, the party making a claim for such must present
the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as corroborated
by his testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is
not controverted, the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated
by them and presented to the court. Therefore, the award of actual damages is
proper. However, the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry
Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of
this Court, the amount of P50,000 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of
indemnity, and not as compensatory damages.

As regards moral damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and

injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable, may be determined
by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as
to this matter.

Decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with modification. No

pronouncement as to cost.

388
 SPOUSES CUSTODIO VS. CA

GR NO. 116100

FEBRUARY 9, 1996

FACTS:

Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is

surrounded by other immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were
tenants who were occupying the property. One of the tenants vacated the land.
Mabasa saw that thhere had been built an adobe fence in the apartment in the first
passageway that made it narrower. The fence was constructed by the Santoses.
Morato constructed her fence and extended it to the entire passageway, therefore,
the passageay was enclosed. The case was broguth to the trial court and ordered the
custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to the
punlic street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way

RULING:

Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right
to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for
all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule,
therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own
property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause
damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum
absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and
ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the
same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the
inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life

389
 ALGARRA V SANDEJAS

27 PHIL 284

MARCH 24, 1914

FACTS:

The accident occurred on July 9, 1912.Because of injuries, plaintiff spent 10

days in the hospital. The first 4-5 days he couldn’t leave his bed. After being
discharged, he received medical attention from a private practitioner for several
days.Plaintiff testified that he had down no work since the accident, that his
earning capacity was P50/monthHe described himself as being well at the end of
July; the trial took place September 19Plaintiff sold distillery products and had
about 20 regular customers who purchased in small quantities, necessitating
regular, frequent deliveriesIt took him about 4 years to build up the business he had
at the time of the accident, and since the accident, he only kept 4 of his regular
customers.The lower court refused to allow him any compensation for injury to his
business due to his enforced absence therefrom.

ISSUE:

How to determine the amount of damages to award plaintiff

RULING:

Actions for damages such as the case at bar are based upon article 1902 of
the Civil Code: "A person who, by act or omission, causes damage to another
where there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done."
Of this article, the supreme court of Spain, in considering the indemnity imposed
by it, said: "It is undisputed that said reparation, to be efficacious and substantial,
must rationally include the generic idea of complete indemnity, such as is defined
and explained in article 1106 of the said (Civil) Code."

Art 1106. Indemnity for losses and damages includes not only the amount of
the loss which may have been suffered, but also that of the profit which the
creditor may have failed to realize, reserving the provisions contained in the

390
following articles. Art 1107. The losses and damages for which a debtor in good
faith is liable, are those foreseen or which may have been foreseen, at the time of
constituting the obligation, and which may be a necessary consequence of its
nonfulfillment.The rules for the measure of damages, once that liability is
determined: The Civil Code requires that the defendant repair the damage caused
by his fault or negligence. No distinction is made therein between damage caused
maliciously and intentionally and damages caused through mere negligence in so
far as the civil liability of the wrongdoer in concerned. Nor is the defendant
required to do more than repair the damage done, or, in other words, to put the
plaintiff in the same position, so far as pecuniary compensation can do so, that he
would have been in had the damage not been inflicted. In this respect there is a
notable difference between the two systems. Under the Anglo-SAxon law, when
malicious or willful intention to cause the damage is an element of the defendant's
act, it is quite generally regarded as an aggravating circumstance for which the
plaintiff is entitled to more than mere compensation for the injury inflicted. These
are called exemplary or punitive damages, and no provision is made for them in
article 1902 of the Civil Code.

article 1902 of the Civil Code requires that the defendant repair the damage
done. There is, however, a world of difficulty in carrying out the legislative will in
this particular. The measure of damages is an ultimate fact, to be determined from
the evidence submitted to the court. The complexity of human affairs is such that
two cases are seldom exactly alike, a thorough discussion of each case may permit
of their more or less definite classification, and develop leading principles which
will be of great assistance to a court in determining the question, not only of
damages, but of the prior one of negligence. As the Code is so indefinite (even
though from necessity) on the subject of damages arising from fault or negligence,
the bench and bar should have access to and avail themselves of those great,
underlying principles which have been gradually and conservatively developed and
thoroughly tested in Anglo-Saxon courts. A careful and intelligent application of
these principles should have a tendency to prevent mistakes in the rulings of the
court on the evidence offered, and should assist in determining damages, generally,
with some degree of uniformity

The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the plaintiff for two months,
and loss of the greater portion of his business. As to the damages resulting from the
391
actual incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his business there is no question. They
are, of course, to be allowed on the basis of his earning capacity, which in this
case, is P50 per month. the difficult question in the present case is to determine the
damage which has results to his business through his enforced absence. In Sanz vs.
Lavin Bros. (6 Phil. Rep., 299), this court, citing numerous decisions of the
supreme court of Spain, held that evidence of damages "must rest upon satisfactory
proof of the existence in reality of the damages alleged to have been suffered." But,
while certainty is an essential element of an award of damages, it need not be a
mathematical certainty. That this is true is adduced not only from the personal
injury cases from the supreme court of Spain which we have discussed above, but
by many cases decided by this court, reference to which has already been made. As
stated in Joyce on Damages, section 75, "But to deny the injured party the right to
recover any actual damages in cases f torts because they are of such a nature a
cannot be thus certainly measured, would be to enable parties to profit by and
speculate upon their own wrongs; such is not the law."

As to the elements to be considered in estimating the damage done to

plaintiff's business by reason of his accident, this same author, citing numerous
authorities, has the following to say: It is proper to consider the business the
plaintiff is engaged in, the nature and extent of such business, the importance of his
personal oversight and superintendence in conducting it, and the consequent loss
arising from his inability to prosecure it.

The business of the present plaintiff required his immediate supervision. All
the profits derived therefrom were wholly due to his own exertions. Nor are his
damages confined to the actual time during which he was physically incapacitated
for work, as is the case of a person working for a stipulated daily or monthly or
yearly salary. As to persons whose labor is thus compensated and who completely
recover from their injuries, the rule may be said to be that their damages are
confined to the duration of their enforced absence from their occupation. But the
present plaintiff could not resume his work at the same profit he was making when
the accident occurred. He had built up an establishing business which included
some twenty regular customers. These customers represented to him a regular
income. In addition to this he made sales to other people who were not so regular
in their purchases. - But he could figure on making at least some sales each month
to others besides his regular customers. Taken as a whole his average monthly
392
income from his business was about P50. As a result of the accident, he lost all but
four of his regular customers and his receipts dwindled down to practically
nothing. Other agents had invaded his territory, and upon becoming physically able
to attend to his business, he found that would be necessary to start with practically
no regular trade, and either win back his old customers from his competitors or else
secure others. During this process of reestablishing his patronage his income would
necessarily be less than he was making at the time of the accident and would
continue to be so for some time. Of course, if it could be mathematically
determined how much less he will earn during this rebuilding process than he
would have earned if the accident had not occurred, that would be the amount he
would be entitled to in this action. But manifestly this ideal compensation cannot
be ascertained. The question therefore resolves itself into whether this damage to
his business can be so nearly ascertained as to justify a court in awarding any
amount whatever.

When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going concern with a fairly

steady average profit on the investment, it may be assumed that had the
interruption to the business through defendant's wrongful act not occurred, it would
have continued producing this average income "so long as is usual with things of
that nature." When in addition to the previous average income of the business it is
further shown what the reduced receipts of the business are immediately after the
cause of the interruption has been removed, there can be no manner of doubt that a
loss of profits has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant. In the present
case, we not only have the value of plaintiff's business to him just prior to the
accident, but we also have its value to him after the accident. At the trial, he
testified that his wife had earned about fifteen pesos during the two months that he
was disabled. That this almost total destruction of his business was directly
chargeable to defendant's wrongful act, there can be no manner of doubt; and the
mere fact that the loss can not be ascertained with absolute accuracy, is no reason
for denying plaintiff's claim altogether. As stated in one case, it would be a
reproach to the law if he could not recover damages at all. (Baldwin vs. Marquez,
91 Ga., 404)

We are of the opinion that the lower court had before it sufficient evidence
of the damage to plaintiff's business in the way of prospective loss of profits to
justify it in calculating his damages as to his item. That evidence has been properly
393
elevated to this court of review. Under section 496 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
we are authorized to enter final judgment or direct a new trial, as may best
subserve the ends of justice. We are of the opinion that the evidence presented as
to the damage done to plaintiff's business is credible and that it is sufficient and
clear enough upon which to base a judgment for damages. Plaintiff having had four
years' experience in selling goods on commission, it must be presumed that he will
be able to rebuild his business to its former proportions; so that at some time in the
future his commissions will equal those he was receiving when the accident
occurred. Aided by his experience, he should be able to rebuild this business to its
former proportions in much less time than it took to establish it as it stood just
prior to the accident. One year should be sufficient time in which to do this. The
profits which plaintiff will receive from the business in the course of its
reconstruction will gradually increase. The injury to plaintiff's business begins
where these profits leave off, and, as a corollary, there is where defendant's
liability begins. Upon this basis, we fix the damages to plaintiff's business at P250.

The judgment of the lower court is set aside, and the plaintiff is awarded the
following damages; ten pesos for medical expenses; one hundred pesos for the two
months of his enforced absence from his business; and two hundred and fifty pesos
for the damage done to his business in the way of loss of profits, or a total of three
hundred and sixty pesos. No costs will be allowed in this instance.

394
 HEIRS OF BORLADO V. VDA. DE BULAN

G.R. 114118

AUGUST 28, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioners are the heirs of Simeon whose parents were Serapio and Balbina
Borlado, the original owners of lots in question. Serapio sold the subject land to
Francisco Bacero. After the latter’s death, his widow sold the lot to Sps.
Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon. Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale,
actual possession of the lot. Salvacion and herCo-defendants-appellees’ possession
of the lot was continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive until
November4, 1972, when petitioners forcibly entered and wrested physical
possession thereof from them.

Respondents filed with the Municipal Court of Maayon, Capiz a complaint

for ejectment against petitioners. The ejectment case was decided in favor of the
respondents whereby the petitioners, their agents, tenants, privies and members of
their families were ordered to vacate Lot No. 2079 and deliver possession to the
respondents together with all improvements and standing crops; to pay said
respondents One Hundred (100) cavans of palay annually from 1972 to the present
or in the total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay; and
to pay the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as reimbursement for the
amount respondents had paid their lawyer to protect their rights; and the costs of
suit.

Subsequently, instead of appealing to the RTC, petitioners filed a civil

action which was subsequently dismissed due to lack ofcause of action. RTC
ordered petitioners to vacate. Upon appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed in toto the
judgment of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Was the award to respondents of cavan of palay as a form of damages

proper?

RULING:

395
 No, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
holding petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred(100) cavans of palay
every year from 1972 until they vacate the premises of the land in question.

The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. We cannot
sustain the award. “Palay” is not legal tender currency in the Philippines.

396
 FRANCISCO L. LAZATIN VS. TWAÑO

G.R. NO. L-12736

JULY 31, 1961

FACTS:

Angel C. Twaño and Gregorio T. Castro filed for the recovery of P35,000

plus interest against F. L. Lazatin, et al. for their purchase from the U.S.
government of 225 auto-trucks. After trial, the CFI of Manila dismissed the
complaint as well as the intervention. The order of dismissal was taken to the Court
of Appeals which rendered judgment reversing the said order and declaring that
Twaño and Castro are co-owners in the business of buying and selling
surplus auto-trucks, andordered the Lazatin to pay P10K so it was levied on his
properties and was subsequently sold at the publicauction where Twaño and Castro
were the purchasers.

Before the expiration of the redemption period, Lazatin deposited the redem
ption price. Lazatin filed to recover from Twaño and Castro the balance of
P19,676.09 representing the proceeds of auto-trucks sold directly to the purchasers
by Twaño and Castro. Petitioners also secured a writ of attachment alleging that
there was no security whatsoever for the payment claimed in the complaint and
that they are removing or are about to remove or dispose of their property with
intent to defraud their creditors and that the sheriff refused to deliver the amount
deposited.
On May 9, 1953, plaintiff Lazatin died and on March 10, 1954, Gil Gotiangco was
appointed and qualified as administrator of plaintiff's estate. On October 28, 1955,
the trial court rendered judgment, ordering the estate of Lazatin to pay the
defendants therein the following sums:
(1) P3,000.00 for the fees of Attorney Manuel O. Chan;
(2) P,500.00 for moral damages to each of the defendants;
(3) Six percent (6%) interest on the amount of P13,849.88 from August 6,
1952 until said amount is actually delivered to and receipted by the
defendants; and
(4) To pay the costs.
Judgment is also rendered against the Central Surety and Insurance Co.,
which is solidarily liable with the Estate of the deceased plaintiff Francisco
L. Lazatin on its bond for the sum of P20,000.00, filed by said Company for

397
 the issuance on the writ of attachment for the amounts mentioned in Nos. (2)
and (3) of the dispositive part of this decision.

ISSUE:

Is Lazatin liable for the damages?

RULING:

Yes.The law on damages is found on Title XVII of the Civil Code (Arts.
2195 to 2235). The rules governing damages laid down in other laws, and the
principles of the general law on damages are adopted in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the Code (Arts. 2196 and 2198). Article 2197 mentions the kind
of damages recoverable, among which are (1) actual or compensatory; and (2)
moral Article 2219 provides that moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases . . . (3) malicious prosecution

There is an abundance of case holding that the action to recover damages

from the attachment plaintiff, for the wrongful issuance and levy of an attachment
(malicious attachment) is identical or is analogous to the ordinary action for
malicious prosecution. Based on jurisprudence, it may logically be inferred that in
order that moral damages may be recovered in connection with the writ of
attachment under consideration, malice is an essential ingredient thereof. Here, the
court did not make any finding that the said petition was maliciously sued out
therefore not entitled to moral damages

398
 BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS vs. HEIRS OF KALAW

G.R. No. L-18805

AUGUST 14, 1967

FACTS:

The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) was chartered as a non-

profit governmental organization on avowedly for the protection, preservation and
development of the coconut industry in the Philippines. On August 1, 1946,
NACOCO's charter was amended [Republic Act 5] to grant that corporation the
express power to buy and sell copra. The charter amendment was enacted to
stabilize copra prices, to serve coconut producers by securing advantageous prices
for them, to cut down to a minimum, if not altogether eliminate, the margin of
middlemen, mostly aliens. General manager and board chairman was Maximo M.
Kalaw; defendants Juan Bocar and Casimiro Garcia were members of the Board;
defendant Leonor Moll became director only on December 22, 1947. NACOCO,
after the passage of Republic Act 5, embarked on copra trading activities. 

An unhappy chain of events conspired to deter NACOCO from fulfilling the

contracts it entered into. Nature supervened. Four devastating typhoons visited the
Philippines in 1947. When it became clear that the contracts would be unprofitable,
Kalaw submitted them to the board for approval. It was not until December 22,
1947 when the membership was completed. Defendant Moll took her oath on that
date. A meeting was then held. Kalaw made a full disclosure of the situation,
apprised the board of the impending heavy losses. No action was first taken on the
contracts but not long thereafter, that is, on January 30, 1948, the board met again
with Kalaw, Bocar, Garcia and Moll in attendance. They unanimously approved
the contracts hereinbefore enumerated. 

As was to be expected, NACOCO but partially performed the contracts. The

buyers threatened damage suits, some of which were settled. But one buyer, Louis
Dreyfus & Go. (Overseas) Ltd., did in fact sue before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The cases culminated in an out-of- court amicable settlement when the
Kalaw management was already out. 

With particular reference to the Dreyfus claims, NACOCO put up the

defenses that: (1) the contracts were void because Louis Dreyfus & Co. (Overseas)

399
Ltd. did not have license to do business here; and (2) failure to deliver was due
to force majeure, the typhoons. All the settlements sum up to P1,343,274.52.

In this suit started in February, 1949, NACOCO seeks to recover the above
sum of P1,343,274.52 from general manager and board chairman Maximo M.
Kalaw, and directors Juan Bocar, Casimiro Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges
Kalaw with negligence under Article 1902 of the old Civil Code (now Article
2176, new Civil Code); and defendant board members, including Kalaw, with bad
faith and/or breach of trust for having approved the contracts. By Executive Order
372, dated November 24, 1950, NACOCO, together with other government-owned
corporations, was abolished, and the Board of Liquidators was entrusted with the
function of settling and closing its affairs. The CFI-Manila dismissed the complaint
and ordered the plaintiff to pay the heirs of Maximo Kalaw the sum of P2,601.94
for unpaid salaries and cash deposit due the deceased Kalaw from NACOCO. 

ISSUE:

Should damages be awarded? 

RULING:

No.This is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and

wrong is here absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the
other is wanting. Of course, Kalaw could not have been an insurer of profits. He
could not be expected to predict the coming of unpredictable typhoons. And even
as typhoons supervened Kalaw was not remissed in his duty. He exerted efforts to
stave off losses. That Kalaw cannot be tagged with crassa negligentia or as much
as simple negligence, would seem to be supported by the fact that even as the
contracts were being questioned in Congress and in the NACOCO board itself,
President Roxas defended the actuations of Kalaw. It is a well known rule of law
that questions of policy of management are left solely to the honest decision of
officers and directors of a corporation, and the court is without authority to
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the board of directors; the board is the
business manager of the corporation, and so long as it acts in good faith its orders
are not reviewable by the courts."

400
 CUSTODIO vs COURT OF APPEALS

253 SCRA 483

FACTS:

The respondent (Pacifico Mabasa) owns a parcel of  land with a two-

door apartment erected there on situated at Interior P. Burgos St.,
Palingon, Tipas,Tagig, Metro Manila. Said property may be describedto be
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to respondents herein. As an access to
P. Burgos Street from respondent’s property, there are two possible
passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide
a n d   i s   a b o u t   2 0   m e t e r s   d i s t a n t   f r o m   M a b a s a ' s residence to P. Burgos
Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses of
the petitioners. The second passageway is about 3meters in width and length from
Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said
passageway, a less than a meter wide path t hr o u g h   t h e s e p t i c   t a n k   a n d
w i t h   5 - 6 m e t e r s   i n length, has to be traversed.When said property was
purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who were
acknowledged by Mabasa as tenant.

However, one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when Mabasa went
to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first
passageway making it narrower in with. Said adobe fence was first constructed by
the Petitioners Santoses along their property which is also along the first passage
way. Petitioner Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence
in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. And it was then that the
remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Petitioner Ma. Cristina
Santos testified that she constructed said fence because of some other
inconveniences of having at the front of her house pathway such as when
some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows.

The Trial Court rendered a decision ordering the petitioners Custodios and
Santoses to give Respondent Mabasa permanent access ingress and egress, to the
public street and Mabasa to pay the former the sum of P8,000 as indemnity for the
permanent use of the passageway. Respondent Mabasa went to the CA raising the
sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in
their favor. The CA rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial
court.

401
ISSUE:

Was the award for damages proper?

RULING:

No. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award of
damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Mabasa, incurred
losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased
premises by reason of the closure of the passageway. However, the mere fact that
the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the

illegal invasion of a legal right while damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury. Also damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damaged suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty (damnum asbsque injuria). In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for
the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of
the injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The
act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. At
the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes.
There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by
law or by contract.

402
 ALGARRA V. SANDEJAS

G.R. NO. L-8385

MARCH 24, 1914

FACTS:

Lucio Algarra filed a civil action for personal injuries received from a car
collision due to the negligence of Sixto Sandejas causing him to be hospitalized for
10 days, four of five days of which he could not leave his bed. After being
discharged, he still continued to receive medical treatment and that he had done no
work since he was not yet entirely recovered. He also spent to pay the doctor P8
and medicine P2, the expense totalling to P110.

Algarra sells the products of a distillery and earns 10% commission which
averages to P50/month. He had around 20 regular customers which took him 4
years to build who order in small quantities and require regular and frequent
deliveries.  Since his accident, his wife tried to keep up with the business but only
4 regular customers remained. 

The lower court refused to allow him anything for his injury on the ground
that the doctrine of Marcelo vs. Velasco is opposed to such allowance and Viada
which does not pertain to personal injuries.

ISSUE:

Can damage to the business be awarded by the court?

RULING:
Actual damages is given to repair the wrong that has been done to
compensate or the injury inflicted and not to impose penalty. They are
compensatory only which simply make good or replace the loss caused by the
wrong. Compensatory damages are awarded to compensate the injured party for
injury caused by the wrong and must be only such as make just and fair
compensation and are due when the wrong is established, whether it was
committed maliciously or not. The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the
plaintiff for two months, and loss of the greater portion of his business. As to the
damages resulting from the actual incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his
business, there is no question.
403
404
 PNOC V. CA

G.R. NO. 107518

OCTOBER 8, 1998

FACTS:

In the early morning on September 21, 1977, M/V Maria Efigenia XV,

owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation was on its way to Navotas, Metro
Manila and collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by the Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation (LSC). Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard
Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro found Petroparcel to be at fault. Maria Efigenia
sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award
of P692,680.00 representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and
cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV  with interest at the legal rate plus 25% as
attorney’s fees and later on amended to add the lost value of the hull  less the
P200K insurance and unrealized profits and lost business opportunities. During the
pendency of the case, PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be
substituted in place of LSC as it acquired Petroparcel. The Lower Court ruled
against PNOC ordering it to pay P6,438,048 value of the fishing boat with interest
plus P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit.

ISSUE:
Was the damage adequately proven?

RULING:

No. The Court affirmed the decision with modification of the actual

damages of P6,438,048.00 to P2M nominal damages for lack of evidentiary bases
therefor.
in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or
incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places
them beyond the consideration of the court.  If they are thereafter found relevant or
competent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding or ignoring them two
kinds of actual or compensatory damages: loss of what a person already possesses
(daño emergente).failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to
405
him.in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of
the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this
means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending
engagementsIf the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case
virtually certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value
in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate
the plaintiff twice over.if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future
engagements and only in the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be
necessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or
other engagement which it was unable to fulfill.damages cannot be presumed and
courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis
for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borneproven
through sole testimony of general manager without objection from
LSCAdmissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at all. On the other hand, the probative
value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issueHearsay
evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.In the absence of
competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent is `entitled to
nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered.awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where
property right has been invaded.damages in name only and not in fact .amount to
be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the
injury sustained by private respondent considering the concept and purpose of such
damages.Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total
value of the vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint considering that
such payment is causally related to the loss for which it claimed compensation..Its
failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages
under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the
lower court’s jurisdiction since the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a
lien on the judgment

406
407
 INTEGRATED PACKING vs. CA

333 SCRA 402

FACTS:

On May 5, 1978, the Integrated Packaging Corp agreed to deliver to Fil-

Anchor Paper Co., Inc. 3,450 reams of printing paper. Materials were to be paid
within 30-90 days. On June 7, 1978, the Integrated entered into a contract with
Philippine Appliance Corporation (Philacor) to print three volumes of "Philacor
Cultural Books". On July 30, 1979, only 1,097 out of the 3,450 had been delivered
so it wrote to Fil-anchor that delay will prejudice them. July 23, 1981: Fil-anchor
delivered amounting to P766,101.70 of printing paper. Integrated
paid P97,200.00 which was applied to its back accounts covered by delivery
invoices dated September 29-30, 1980 and October 1-2, 1980.

Integrated entered into an additional printing contract with Philacor but it

failed to comply so Philacor demanded compensation for the delay and damage it
suffered on account of Integrated's failure. Fil-anchor filed a collection suit
of P766,101.70 against Integrated representing unpaid purchase price of printing
paper bought on credit. By way of counterclaim, Fil-anchor alleged the delivery
was short of 2,875 reams so it suffered actual damages and failed to realize
expected profits and that complaint was prematurely filed.

The RTC ordered Integrated to pay Fil-anchor P27,222.60 as compensatory

and actual damages after deducting P763,101.70 for the value of materials
received, P100K as moral damages, P30K for attorney's fees and cost of suit.
However, the counterclaim is also meritorious - Integrated could have sold books
to Philacor and realized profit of P790,324.30 for which the award of moral
damages was justified.The CA reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial
court ordered to pay Fil-anchor P763,101.70 for unpaid printing paper and deleted
the award of P790,324.30 as compensatory damages as well as the award of moral
damages and attorney's fees, for lack of factual and legal basis.

ISSUE:

Should Integrated be awarded compensatory and moral damages?

408
RULING:
Yes. Suspension of its deliveries to Integrated whenever the latter failed to
pay on time, as in this case, is legally justified under the second paragraph of
Article 1583 of the Civil Code hence the Fil-anchor did not violate the order
agreement. Indemnification for damages comprehends not only the loss suffered,
that is to say actual damages (damnum emergens), but also profits which the
obligee failed to obtain, referred to as compensatory damages (lucrum cessans).
However, to justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is necessary to
prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and
on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of loss.

Deletion of the award of moral damages is proper, since private respondent

could not be held liable for breach of contract.  Moral damages may be awarded
when in a breach of contract the defendant acted in bad faith, or was guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligation.  Finally, since the award of moral damages is eliminated, so must the
award for attorney's fees be also deleted. 

409
 DBP V. CA

G.R. NO. 118367

JANUARY 5, 1998

FACTS:

Lydia P. Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement from the

Government. Cuba obtained loans from DBP stated under promissory notes dated
September 6, 1974; August 11, 1975; and April 4, 1977 executing 2 Deeds of
Assignment of her Leasehold Rights as security. Upon failure to pay, without
foreclosure proceedings it was appropriated and DBP executed in turn a Deed of
Conditional Sale of the Leasehold Rights in her favor. Her offer to repurchase was
accepted and a new Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Food in her favor alone excluding her husband. Failing to pay her
amortizations, she entered into a temporary agreement with DBP. Soon, she was
sent a Notice of Rescission and DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights of
the fishpond. After the public bidding, DBP executed a Deed of Conditional Sale
in favor of defendant Agripina Caperal. Cuba filed against DBP since
no foreclosure proceedings were done thus, contrary to Article 2088 of the Civil
Code. The RTC favored Cuba, it being a pactum commissorium ordered the return
leasehold rights to Cuba and entitling him P1,067,500 actual
damages, P100,000 moral and P50,000 exemplary damages and P100,000
attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Should Cuba be awarded with actual and compensatory damages?

RULING:

No. The CA reversed the lower court’s decision except the P50,000 as moral
damages, remanded to the trial court for the reception of the income statement of
DBP, as well as the statement of the account of Lydia P. Cuba, and for the
determination of each party’s financial obligation to one another. Alleged loss of
personal belongings and equipment was not proved by clear evidence. Other than
the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there was no proof as to the existence of
those items before DBP took over the fishpond in question. Neither was a single

410
receipt or record of acquisition presented. The award of actual damages should,
therefore, be struck down for lack of sufficient basis.

The exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise be

awarded by way of example or correction for the public good. There being an
award of exemplary damages, attorney’s fees are also recoverable

411
 FUENTES VS. CA

323 PHIL 508

FEBRUARY 9, 1996

FACTS:

During a benefit dance at Dump Site, Alejandro Fuentes Jr. was witnessed
by Toling and Osok who knew him for quite some time to have stabbed Malaspina
in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Alejandro and his uncle Felicisimo contends
that it was Zoilo Funetes who did it and fled but it was dismissed.
The RTC found Alejandro guilty of murder qualified by treachery and
imposed him an indeterminate prison term of 10 years and 1 day of prison mayor
as minimum to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of Malaspina the amount of P50,000 and to pay P8,300 as
actual damages plus costs. The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Should the heirs of Malaspina be awarded actual damages?

RULING:
No.Affirmed with modification that the penalty imposed should be as it is
corrected to reclusion perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted. The
Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to
have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since
the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted.
 

412
 RAMOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 124354

DECEMBER 29, 1999

FACTS:

Erlinda Ramos, 47- year old robust woman underwent on an operation to the
stone at her gall bladder removed after being tested that she was fit for
“cholecystectomy” operation performed by Dr. Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee
of P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologist’s fee and which was to be
paid after the operation. He assured that he will get a good anesthesiologist who
was Dra. Gutierez. On the day of operation, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15pm
instead of 9:30 am. Herminda, Erlinda’s sister-in-law, noticing what Dra. Gutierez
was doing, saw the nail bed of Erlinda becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for
another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon. Later, Erlinda was taken to the ICU where
she stayed there for a month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she
was then comatosed. Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000.

Spouses Ramons and their minors filed a case against Dr. Hosaka and Dra.
Gutierez. The RTC favored the Ramos’ awarding P8,000 as actual monthly
expenses totaling to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100 attorney’s fees, P800,000
moral damages, P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit. The CA reversed
the decision ordering the Ramos’ to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus
interest.

ISSUE:

Are the Ramos’ entitled to damages?

RULING:

Yes. The Court favored the petitioners and held the private respondents
solidarily liable for the following: 1) P1,352,000 actual damages computed as of
the date of promulgation plus monthly payment of P8,000 up to the time that
Erlinda expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000 moral damages; 3)
P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4) P100,000 attorney’s fees; 5) and the cost of
suit.
413
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence. As borne by the records, Dra. Gutierez failed to properly intubate the
patient according to witness Herminda whose testimony was accepted by the Court
considering her clinical background as a nurse. Also, Dra. Gutierez’s act of seeing
her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure
was an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility.

414
 GATCHALIAN vs. DELIM

203 SCRA126

October 21,1991

FACTS:

Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames mini bus at Aringay, La Union bound

for Bauang, at the same province. The bus bumped a cement flower pot on the side
of the round, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Gatchalian got
injured with physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead. Mrs. Adela Delim
visited the passenger and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses.
She also gave transportation expense of P12 in going home from the hospital and
they were made to sign joint affidavit stating that ther are no longer interested to
file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said
Thames. Gatchalian filed in the CFI an action extra contractu to recover
compensatory and moral damages stating that the mishap had left her with a
conspicuous white scare measuring 1 by ½ inches on the forhead, generating
mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part. Delim averred that it was a
fortuitous event. The CFI dismissed the complaint because of the joint affidavit to
which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Is Gatchalian entitled to damages?

RULING:

Yes. The Court reversed the decisions of the CFI and the CA. A waiver to be
valid and effective must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. While reading the same, she experienced
dizziness but that seeing the other passengers who had also suffered signed the
document, she too signed without bothering to read the Affidavit in its entirely.

To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical injuries to

passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not
only that the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely independent of the human

415
will, but also that it was impossible to avoid. The driver did not stop to check if
anything had gone wrong with the bus.
QUIRANTE VS. IAC

G.R. NO. 73886

JANUARY 31, 1989

FACTS:

Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his
attorney’s fees. According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and
the late Dr. Casasola with regard his attorney’s fees, which agreement was
allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. De Casasola, and the
two daughters of the deceased, namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C Nazareno.
Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney’s fees would be
computed as follows: a) in case of recovery of the P120,000 surety bond, the
attorney’s fees of the undersigned counsel shall be P30,000; and b) in case the
Honarable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000 bond, it shall be
divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John Quirante and Atty.
Dante Cruz.

ISSUE:

Can Quirante claim for attorney’s fees?

RULING:

No.An attorney’s fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has
been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The
issue over the attorney’s fee only arises when something has been recovered from
which the fee is to be paid. Since the main case from which the petitioner’s claims
for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety
of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure
gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering
attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when
something is due to the client. The decision of the CA is affirmed.

416
417
 POSEIDON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
VS. TITO TAMALA, ET. AL.

G.R. NO. 186475

JUNE 26, 2013

FACTS:

Poseidon hired Tomala, Saurin, Bo-oc and Fernandez to man the fishing
vessel of Van Doorn and its partners. Two months after they were hired and started
to work, the operations abruptly stopped and did not resume. After six months,
before disembarking, the respondent’s immediate employer and the respondents
executed an agreement regarding the respondent’s salaries provided that the
respondents would get the full or 100% of their unpaid salaries for the unexpired
portion of their pre-terminated contract in accordance with Philippine Laws.
However, they entered into another agreement reducing the previously agreed
amount to 50% of the respondent’s unpaid salaries for the unexpired portion of
their contract. And they later on received the amount last agreed upon, signed a
waiver and quitclaim. Poseidon maintains that it did not illegally dismiss the
respondents and simply ceased its fishing operations as a business decision in the
exercise of its management prerogative.

ISSUE:

Are the respondents entitled to damages?

RULING:

Yes. While Van Doorn has a just and valid cause to terminate the
respondent’s employment, it failed to meet the requisite procedural safeguards
provided under the Labor Code. While this omission does not affect the validity of
the termination of the employment, it subjects the employer to the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages. P30,000 as indemnity for the violation
of the required statutory procedures is awarded. Poseidon shall be solidarily liable
to the respondents for the payment of these damages.

418
 CRISMINA GARMENTS V. CA

G.R. NO. 128721

MARCH 9, 1999

FACTS:

During the period from February 1979 to April 1979, Crismina Garments,
Inc. contracted the services of D’Wilmar Garments, for the sewing of 20,762
pieces of assorted girls denims for P76,410. At first, the respondent was told that
the sewing of some of the pants were defective. She offered to take them back, but
then she was later told by the petitioner’s representative that it was good already
and asked her to return for her check of P76,410. However, the petitioner failed to
pay her the aforesaid amount. This prompted her to hire the services of counsel
who, on November 12, 1979, wrote a letter to the petitioner demanding payment of
the aforesaid amount within ten days from receipt thereof.
On February 7, 1990, the petitioner’s vice-president-comptroller, wrote a
letter to respondent’s counsel, averring, inter alia, that the pairs of jeans sewn by
her, numbering 6,164 pairs, were defective and that she was liable to the petitioner
for the amount of P49,925.51 which was the value of the damaged pairs of denim
pants and demanded refund of the aforesaid amount.On January 8, 1981, the
respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner with the trial court. The RTC
rendered judgment in favor of the respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay the
sum of P76,140 with 12% interest per annum. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is proper to impose 12% interest rate per annum for an
obligation that does not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of
stipulation of the parties.

RULING:

No.The amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work,
not from a loan or forbearance of money. Hence, the legal rate of interest shall be
6% per annum, computed from the time of the filing of the Complaint in the trial
court until the finality of the judgment. If the adjudged principal and the interest

419
(or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be 12% per
annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it
is fully satisfied.

420
 CERRANO VS. TAN

38 PHIL. 392

FACTS:

On January, 1916: Tan Chuco owner of casco No. 1033 rented it to Vivencio

Cerrano for P70/month payable at the end of each month. No duration was
stipulated.Sometime in May, 1916, Tan notified Cerrano that it was necessary to
repair it at Malabon.  Cerrano was interested to rent it after the repair but Tan told
him that it was already for P80/month.A week before the end of the repair, Tan
sold it to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Siy Cong Bieng & Co. induced Santos to refuse to
take orders from the new owners. Siy Cong Bieng & Co. were obliged to bring an
action of replevin against Santos for the recovery of the possession of their casco.
The sheriff took possession of the casco under a writ of replevin, but redelivered it
to Santos upon a delivery bond and his wife as sureties.After the casco had been in
possession of Santos for some three months, the replevin suit  held that casco was
the property of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. at the time of the suit was commenced, and
that the "illegal detention" of the casco by Santos had caused damages
of  P457.98 to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Cerrano paid the judgment in favor of Siy
Cong Bieng & Co. and the attorney's fees of Santos which shows that Santos was
only a nominal defendant in the replevin suit,which was entirely controlled by
Cerrano.
The CFI ruled tha casco was rented 10 months at the rate of P60, P457.98 for
damages and P500 for attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Wheter or not the contract of rent is broken by Tan Chuco's act as proximate
cause making him liable to Cerrano for damages.

RULING:

No.Article 1581 of the Civil Code provides that when no definite agreement
has been made regarding its duration, the lease of a house is deemed to have been
made from day to day, from month to month, or from year to year, according to
whether a daily, monthly, or yearly rent is to be paid.There is reasonable
presumption that one who agrees to pay a monthly rent intends that his tenancy is
to endure for a like period, subject to indefinite tacit renewals at the end of each
month as long as the arrangement is agreeable to both parties

421
Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective profits may be
recovered as damages. Article 1107 of the same Code provides that the damages
recoverable for the breach of obligations not originating in fraud (dolo) are those
which were or might have been foreseen at the time the contract was entered
into. It is unquestionable that defendant must be deemed to have foreseen at the
time he made contract that in the event of his failure perform it, the plaintiff would
be damaged by the loss of the profit he might reasonably have expected to derive
from its use.
The general rule is that plaintiff may recover compensation for any gain
which he can make it appear with reasonable certainty the defendant's wrongful act
prevented him from acquiring. Plaintiff would have earned a net profit of P50 from
the use of the casco in the month during which he was entitled to its possession.
Damages resulting from avoidable consequences of the breach of a contract or
other legal duty are not recoverable. It is the duty of one injured by the unlawful
act of another to take such measures as prudent men usually take under such
circumstances to reduce the damages as much as possible.The burden of proof rests
upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff might have reduced the damages -
none in this case
The contract of lease or hiring does not create a right in rem in favor of the
lessee, except in the case of a recorded lease of real estate.  Santos' attempt to
retain possession of it against the lawful owners by whom he had been placed in
charge of it, was unlawful. If Cerrano is unable to recover from Santos the money
paid by him will not justify us in imposing the burden of repaying this money to
him.
Damages suffered by reason of his voluntary assumption of the liability incurred
by Santos by reason of his unlawful attempt to withhold possession of the casco
from its owners, by whom he was put in charge of it, are not attributable to
Cerrano and he is not responsible for them -NOT proximate cause (proximate
cause is Cerrano's own imprudence)

422
 KIERULF VS. CA

269 SCRA 433

FACTS:

On February 28, 1987, the Pantranco bus driven by Jose Malanum lost

control and swerved to the left flying over the center island occupying the east-
bound lane of EDSA.  The front of the bus hit the front of the Isuzu pickup driven
by Legaspi smashed to pieces and inflicting physical injury to Legaspi and his
passenger Lucila Kierulf. Both were treated at the Quezon City General Hospital.
The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA.Despite the
impact, the bus continued to move forward and its front portion rammed against a
Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing equipment
The RTC ruled that the proximate cause was the negligence of the defendant's
driver. It likewise ruled that Pantranco North Express Incorporated to
pay Lucila Kierulf, Victor Kierulf for the damages of the Isuzu pick-up
and Porfirio Legaspi
The CA Affirmed with modification by adding P25,000 attorney's fees and
to pay costs

ISSUE:

Whether or not both Lucila should be awarded moral damages

RULING:

YESThe Rodriguez case ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that
he/she is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations
to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss.  The
loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is
personal to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured
person. Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued
before Respondent Court, is not supported by the evidence on record.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding
moral damages.  There is no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude,"
no "supercilious manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference"
was given to her. It will only be awarded if he or she was subjected to
contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and
financial standing. It is therefore proper to award moral damages to Lucila for her

423
physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings.
She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs.  She lost all her teeth. 
She had to undergo several corrective operations and treatments.  Despite
treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick.  She felt that she has not
fully recovered from her injuries.  She even had to undergo a second operation on
her gums for her dentures to fit.  She suffered sleepless nights and shock as a
consequence of the vehicular accident.
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like.  While no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the
amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court it is nevertheless
essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual
basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts.  This is so because
moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an
award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of  the defendant's culpable action.
Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.  Since each case must
be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in
determining the proper amount.  The yardstick should be that the amount awarded
should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the
result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge.  Neither
should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already inflicted on
plaintiffs.

424
 MIRANDA-RIBAYA VS. CARBONELL

95 SCRA 58

FACTS:

On April 23, 1968, Mrs. Josefina Roco-Robles, agent of Mrs. Ribaya, told

her that Marino Bautista, a millionaire logger was interested to buy diamonds.
Mrs. Ribaya went to the spouses Bautista's home to sell 10 pieces of jewelry
for P224,000 which was haggled down to P222,000. As a consequence, a receipt
was signed by Marino Bautista and he issued in exchange of 2 Equitable Banking
Corporation checks of P112,000 and P110,000.  Mrs. Ribaya then issued a
voucher evidencing the check payment
Sometime in April 24, 1968, Mrs. Ribaya accompanied by Ms. Narcisa
Gosioco requested the check of P110,000 to be divided since some were owned by
her. 4 checks of Bank of America with amounts of P64,000 to Mrs. Ribaya
and P34,000 to Gosioco postdated on June 23, 1968. Mrs. Ribaya also sold 4 more
pieces of jewelry for P94,000 in exchange for four checks by Bank of America.
This was transacted at the office of Mr. Bautista at Bank of Philippine Islands
Building. Thereafter, Mrs. Ribaya wanted to replace the 3 pieces sold by her
because the owners want them back.  She left it at the Bautista's residence but
instead of returning the 3 pieces, Mr. Bautista issued her a check of P45,000 by
Bank of America since the 3 pieces were already given as gifts to bank
officers.When the maturity dates came, she tried to contact Mr. Bautista but failed
because he was on a logging concession so she deposited the checks to her account
and it was dishonored due to closed accounts.  She also discovered that her
jewelries were pawned to different pawnshops in Manila in the name of the driver,
secretary of the daughter of Bautista and a certain Balagot.  Some of which were
pawned the same day it was bought.Mrs. Ribaya was able to retrieve one-by-one
the pawn tickets of the jewelries she sold and other 3 tickets of jewelries not owned
by her.  In order to retrieve them, she had to close down her shop.  But there is still
a balance of P125,460.79 excluding those of Ms. Gosioco.  Mrs. Ribaya also
promised her attorney 25% of the unpaid obligation.

The RTC ruled in favour of Mrs. Ribaya for P125,460.79 plus 25%

attorney's fees but did not grant moral and exemplary damages. This was later on
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

425
ISSUE:

Wheter or not Mrs. Ribaya should be entitled to moral and exemplary

damages

RULING:

Yes.In awarding moral damages, there should be pleading and proof of

moral suffering, mental anguish, fright.It does not need to be the precise legal
terms or "sacramental phrases" of "mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings or moral shock" and the like

Niceta vividly portrayed in simple terms the moral shock and suffering she
underwent as a result of respondents' wanton abuse of her good faith and
confidence.Petitioners' testimonial evidence to the effect that petitioner Niceta
suffered "extremely" and that for three months she could not sleep was a clear
demonstration of her physical suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety and
similar injury, resulting from respondents' malevolent acts that show her to be
clearly entitled to moral damages.

426
 DEL ROSARIO VS. CA

267 SCRA 58

FACTS:

Metal Forming Corp.(MFC) advertised there metal shingles

as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL
TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the
strong hook action on its overlaps."  The Spouses Del Rosario through their
contractor Engineer Puno purchased believing their representation. The proper
installation procedure expressly specified in the former's brochures and
advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal tile attached to the roof panels should
be by 2 self-drilling screws for 1 metal cleat but instead what was attached
was metal cleats with only 1-inch ordinary nail each and others were fastened with
only 1 wood screw each so the roof was blown by Typhoon Ruping 2 months later.

On this instance, MFC replaced the roof free of charge, in acknowledgment

of its one-year warranty on the materials and their installation. Esteban Adjusters
and Valuers, Inc. hired by the Spouses Del Rosario determined that only with a
single wood screw or a combination of a single wood screw and a 1-inch nail was
used. The Department of Trade and Industry charged MFC administrative fine of
P10,000 otherwise its registration will be deemed suspended and its establishment
closed until the fine was fully paid which was also affirmed by the office of the
President. However, MFC is declining to concede to liability for the other damages
to its electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring
and furniture, the Spouses Del Rosario filed in the RTC for total damage
of P1,008,003 also praying for moral and exemplary damages
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Del Rosario. However, the CA reversed
holding there is no privity between the Spouses Del Rosario and MFC

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Spouses Del Rosario should be awarded damages.

RULING:

Yes. Since MFC, in bad faith and with gross negligence, infringed the express
warranty made by it to the general public in connection with the "Banawe" tiles
brought to and set up in the house of the Del Rosarios who had relied on the

427
warranty, and thereby caused them considerable injury. The identity of the
individual who actually dealt with MFC and asked the latter to make such delivery
and installation is of little moment.

Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly

proved and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. They relied only on the
report of the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc. which contains no statement
whatever of the amount of the damage therefore no evidentiary foundation upon
which to lay an award of actual damages.The law explicitly authorizes the award
of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently
or in bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psychological
and mental trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of
moral damages is warranted

428
 RAAGAS VS. TRAYA

22 SCRA 839

FACTS:

On April 9, 1958, Octavio Traya recklessly driving a truck owned

by Canciller ran over the 3-year old son of the spouses Melquiades Raagas and
Adela Laudiano Raagas causing his instantaneous death. As a consequence,
Spouses Raagas prayed for actual damages of P10,000, moral, nominal and
corrective damages, P1,000 as attorney's fees, P1,000 for expenses of litigation,
plus costs.
The RTC held Traya and Bienvenido Canciller jointly and severally liable P10,000
for the death of their child Regino Laudiano Raagas, P2,000 for moral damages,
P1,000 actual damages, P1,000 for attorney's fees, and the costs
Hence, Traya and Canciller appealed to CA, which certified the case to the SC
because the issues raised are purely of law

ISSUE:

Whether or not the damages should be proven.

RULING:

YES.It is hereby remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits. Even
if the allegations regarding the amount of damages in the complaint are not
specifically denied in the answer, such damages are not deemed admitted. An
allegation is not necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded,  but it is,
nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the
factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to defendant's acts. The
preceding disquisition points up the inescapable need of a full-blown trial on the
merits at which the parties will be afforded every opportunity to present evidence
in support of their respective contentions and defences.

429
 ENERVIDA VS. DELA TORRE

55 SCRA 339

FACTS:

Roque Enervida filed a complaint against spouses Lauro de la Torre and

Rosa de la Torre praying that the deed of sale executed by his deceased father,
Ciriaco Enervida, over a parcel of land covered by a Homestead Patent be declared
null and void for having been executed within the prohibited period of five years,
in violation of the provision, of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Law.  He further prayed that he be allowed to
repurchase said parcel of land for being the legitimate son and sole heir of his
deceased father.
The RTC dismissed the case.
The CA affirmed the dismissal saying that the sale had been made in 1948, 7 yrs
after therefore beyond the 5-year phobitive period is valid

ISSUE:

Whether or not the spouses Lauro de la Torre and Rosa de la Torre are

entitled moral and exemplary damages.

RULING:

NO.The dismissal order is hereby affirmed with the modification that only
attorney's fees in the amount of P1,500 are hereby awarded to the
respondentsArticle 2208 — In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, can not be recovered, except:In
case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff.
The case at bar is clearly an unfounded civil action, the respondents may
recover attorney's fees. It is clearly unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned
in Art. 2208 (par. 4), as justifying an award of attorney's fees, but is not included in
the enumeration of Art. 2219 in respect to moral damages

430
 PEOPLE VS. BAGAYONG

G.R. NO. 126518

DECEMBER 2, 1998

FACTS:

Alberto Cauan and Leticia Yu Cauan got married. They begot 3 children
namely Albert, Honeylet and Arlene. On 1983, Alberto and Leticia
separated, Albert and Arlene stayed with Leticia while Honeylet stayed with her
grandmother Anita Yu.Thereafter, Leticia cohabited with Rodelio Bugayong a.k.a.
“BOY” which bore a child Catherine Bugayong.

On October 15, 1994, Boy asked Arlene , 11-years old, to hold his penis and
when it was already hard and stiff placed it inside the mouth of Arlene and a white
substance came out.  This was in the presence of Catherine who was 6 years old
who was the one who told Leticia.  Leticia filed complained with the NBI.  Arlene
testified that Boy had been doing the same since she was 9 years old.  They were
times when Boy would insert his penis and when the white substance came out, he
would pull it out.

The RTC held Boy guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness committed
on October 15, 1994 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of 6 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional as maximum, and of the crime of Rape he committed in 1993 for
which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

ISSUE:

Whether or not moral damages may be awarded in a criminal

proceeding without the need for pleading or proof

RULING:
Yes..Moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the
criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for
pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice

431
 FRANCISCO VS. GSIS

7 SCRA 557

FACTS:

Trinidad J. Francisco, in consideration of a loan in the amount of

P400,000 out of which the sum of P336,100 was released to her, mortgaged in
favor of the Government Service Insurance System a parcel of land containing an
area of 18,232 square meters within 10 years in monthly installments of P3,902.41,
and with interest of 7% per annum compounded monthly.On January 6, 1959,
GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Thereafter Trinidad's father Atty.
Vicente J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of GSIS propsing to pay
P30,000 and pay the balance from the P5,000 monthly rentals less P350 for the
necessary expenses which the GSIS Board approved the request. On February 28,
1959, Atty. Francisco remitted a check for P30,000 and an official receipt was
issued. Later on, Trinidad remitted P44,121.29 and soon, P24,604.81.  All were
issued a receipt.Then the System sent 3 letters asking for a proposal for the
payment of her indebtedness since the 1-year redemption period has expired.Atty.
Francisco sent a letter of protest requesting the proper corrections since their
proposal have already commenced.

GSIS contends that for the foreclosure done, Francisco should pay attorney's
fees of P35,644.14, publication expenses, filing fee of P301.00, and surcharge of
P23.64 so remittances were not enoughGSIS filed for specific performance
The RTC ruled that Atty. Francisco's offer was unqualifiedly accepted, and was
binding which called attention to the unconscionability of defendant's charging the
attorney's fees, totalling over P35,000.00; and this point appears well-taken,
considering that the foreclosure was merely extra-judicial, and the attorneys' work
was limited to requiring the sheriff to effectuate the foreclosure

ISSUE:

Whether or not Francisco should be awarded moral damages where there is

breach of contract regarding the redemption proposal but no malicious intent.

RULING:

NO.Affirmed.There was no error in the appealed decision in denying moral

damages, not only on account of the plaintiff's failure to take the witness stand and
testify to her social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision
432
holds, but primarily because a breach of contract like that of defendant, not being
malicious or fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral damages under
Article 2220 of the Civil Code. There is no basis for awarding exemplary damages
either, because this species of damages is only allowed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages, none of which have been allowed
in this case, for reasons herein before discussed.
As to attorneys' fees, we agree with the trial court's stand that in view of the
absence of gross and evident bad faith in defendant's refusal to satisfy the
plaintiff's claim, and there being none of the other grounds enumerated in Article
2208 of the Civil Code, such absence precludes a recovery. The award of attorneys'
fees is essentially discretionary in the trial court, and no abuse of discretion has
been shown.

433
 EXPERT TRAVEL VS. CA

G.R. NO. 130030

JUNE 25, 1999

FACTS:

On 1987, Expert travel & Tours, Inc. issued to Ricardo Lo 4 round-trip plane

tickets for Hongkong with hotel accommodations and transfers
for P39,677.20.Failing to pay the amount due, Expert filed a complaint for
recovery plus damages.

The CA affirmed the ruling of RTC saying that Lo remitted the Monte de

Piedad Check for P42,175.20 to Expert's chairperson Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega who
in turn issued City Trust Check of P50,000.

ISSUE:

Whether or not moral damages for negligence or quasi-delict that did not

result to physical injury be awarded to Lo.

RULING:

NO.An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met;

to wit: (1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be a
culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219. In culpa contractual or breach of contract: moral damages
may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross
negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is
constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries.

By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil

Codemoral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results
from a breach of carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict and contracts when

434
breached by tort (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where
the defendant is guilty of intentional tort.

In culpa criminal. moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is
found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or
arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation . Malicious
prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral damages. The term "analogous
cases," referred to in Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must be
held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law. Excludes clearly unfounded
civil suit

435
 MIJARES VS. CA

G.R. NO.113558

APRIL 18, 1997

FACTS:

Spouses Editha Mijares and Glicerio T.Mijares under the business

name Aklan Drug purchased various products of P32,034.42 from Metro Drug,
Inc. Editha Mijares, aside from being the operator of Aklan Drug, was also an
officer of the Ospital Ng Maynila Consumers Cooperative, Inc.  The Cooperative
was subsequently dissolved and operations stopped. Solomon Silverio was the new
lessee of the store at Ospital ng Maynila who and received delivery  through Luz
Espares and Hilda Rodrigona  totalling P32,034.42 from Metro through Dioscoro
Lamenta. Solomon Silverio, Jr. draw a check for Metro but it was dishonored for
insufficient fund. Metro demanded payment from Aklan Drug but Editha referred
Lamenta to Silverio who manages the store at Ospital ng Maynila. Lamenta never
checked the owner of the store he was delivering to and always perceived Editha as
the owner. Metro Drug, Inc. filed with the RTC for P32,034.42, 25% attorney's
fees and cost of suit.

The RTC ruled Metro Drug, Inc. to pay P30,000 for moral

damages, P10,000 as attorney's fees and cost of suit since not delivered to Mijares
which the CA reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC made an error in awarding moral damages to Mijares

RULING:

YES.It failed to show that it was motivated by bad faith when it instituted

the action for collection. In malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases,
requires the presence of two elements, to wit: a) malice; and b) absence of probable
cause. Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately
knowing that the charge was false and baseless. For the same reasons, the award
for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must likewise be deleted

436
 DE LA PENA VS. CA

G.R. NO. L-81827

MARCH 28, 1994

FACTS:

Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of land in Sulongvale,

Sulop, Davao del Norte for which he filed Homestead Application with the Bureau
of Lands.On the other hand, Potenciano Nazaret also filed the same over the same
lot. Ciriaco transferred his possessory rights over 6 lots to Pantaleon de la Peña .
Thereafter, the Director of Lands directed Potenciano to apply for the portion
himself w/in 60 days but he did not. Ciriaco transferred his rights over another 1
1/2-hectare to Michael Doble who sold it to Ricardo Tan . Upon a survey by the
Bureau of Lands, it was found that Tan's lot was smaller than what he had bought
while De la Peña's lot was bigger than what he had bought.  Tan built a fence on
his reclaimed portion but Dela Peña keeps on destroying it.
Subsequently, Ricardo Tan then transferred the lot to Herotido Tan. Hence, Dela
Peña filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ricardo Tan amended to Herotido
Tan. The RTC and MTC favored Dela Peña. Dela Peña instituted action for
reconveyance with damages with the RTC.
The RTC rejected and a counterclaim was granted and Dela Peña was ordered to
pay P6,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, P15,000 for moral damages
and the costs of the proceedings. On appeal the CA affirmed stating that fraud and
misrepresentation was not substantiated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dela Peña should be liable for moral damages, attorney's

fees and cost of proceedings.

RULING:

NO.The award for attorney's fees and moral damages  is unfounded in the
absence of a deliberate intent to cause prejudice to the other party. The right to
litigate is so precious that a Penalty should not be charged on those who may
exercise it erroneously

437
 “J” MARKETING VS. SIA

G.R. NO. 127823

JANUARY 29, 1998

FACTS:

On 1983, J. Marketing Corporation received from Kawasaki Motors

(Phils.) brand new Kawasaki motorcycle.Unfortunately in 1987, the motorcycle
went missing and was reported to the police.J. Marketing was alleged that
the motorcycle was found to be with Felicidad Sia, Jr. who allegedly bought
from Renato Pelande, Jr. who bought from J. Marketing but with a different
model.J. Marketing filed with the RTC against Felicidad C. Sia Jr. who filed a
third party complaint against Renato Pelante Jr.
The RTC dismissed the case but awarded damages and attorney’s fees to Sia
which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not J. Marketing should be penalized for damages and attorney's

fees for litigating an unfounded suit

RULING:

NO.It cannot be said that the institution of the replevin suit was tainted with
gross and evident bad faith or was done maliciously to harass, embarrass, annoy or
ridicule private respondent.No damages can be charged on those who may exercise
such precious right in good faith, even if done erroneously. There being no bad
faith reflected in petitioner’s persistence in pursuing its case, other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of its cause, attorney’s fees cannot be
recovered as cost.

438
 COMETA VS. CA

G.R. NO. 124062

JANUARY 21, 1999

FACTS:

On 1979, the State Investment Trust, Inc (SITI), formerly State Investment

House, Inc. (SIHI) extended loans in various amounts to Guevent Industrial
Development Corp. (GIDC) which failed to pay when due.A rehabilitation plan
where GIDC mortgaged its property but it still defaulted resulting in a foreclosure
sale where SITI is the highest bidder. GIDC filed in the RTC alleging irregularities
in the foreclosure of the mortgages and the sale of properties to petitioner SITI
which ended with a compromise agreement wherein HBI offered to purchasea and
SITI agreed.The RTC AND CA compelled SITI to accept HBI's offer to purchase.
Thereafter, HBI applied to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for a
permit to develop the property submitting an affidavit by
SITI president Cometa releasing the mortgage. Unfortunately, Cometa denied
executing an affidavit as supported by the NBI's finding that it is forged.  Cometa
filed a complaint for falsification of public document against HBI president
Guevara which the RTC dismissed.
HBI filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against petitioners Cometa and
SITI alleging that it was filed with the sole intent of harassing and pressuring
Guevara, in his capacity as chairman of GIDC, to give in to their illicit and
malicious desire to appropriate the remaining unsold properties of GIDC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cometa and SITI should be penalized for malicious

prosecution

RULING:

NO.It is hardly necessary to say that to allow the present action to proceed is
not to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. For trial is still to be conducted and
liability is not automatic.
Just as it is bad to encourage the indiscriminate filing of actions for damages by
accused persons after they have been acquitted, whether correctly or incorrectly, a
blanket clearance of all who may be minded to charge others with offenses, fancied

439
or otherwise, without any chance of the aggrieved parties in the appropriate cases
of false accusation to obtain relief, is in Our Opinion short of being good law

440
 TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC V NLRC

299 SCRA 608

DECEMBER 3, 1998

FACTS

Osdana, a Filipino citizen, was recruited by Triple Eight for employment

with the latter’s principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The employment contract (originally as “food server”
but later changed to “waitress”) was executed in the Philippines but was to be
performed in Riyadh. Once in Riyadh, however, Osdana was made to perform
strenuous tasks (washing dishes, janitorial work), which were not included in her
designation as a waitress. Because of the long hours and strenuous nature of her
work, she suffered from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, for which she had to undergo
surgery. But during her weeks of confinement at the hospital for her recovery, she
was not given any salary. And after she was discharged from the hospital, GCC
suddenly dismissed her from work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not
given any separation pay nor was she paid her salaries for the periods when she
was not allowed to work. Thus, upon her return to the Philippines, she filed a
complaint against Triple Eight, praying for unpaid and underpaid salaries, among
others.

The Local Arbiter ruled in her favor, which ruling NLRC affirmed. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether Osdana was illegally dismissed.If so, whether or not she is entitled
to award for salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract.

441
RULING:
The petition must fail. Disease as a Ground for Dismissal: Under Article
284 of the Labor Code and the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, for
disease to be a valid ground for termination, the following requisites must be
present:

1. The disease must be such that employee’s continued employment

is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the
health of his co-employees

2. There must be a certification by competent public authority that the

disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured
within a period of 6 months with proper medical treatment

In the  first place, Osdana’s continued employment despite her illness was
not  prohibited  by  law nor  was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her
co employees.  In fact, the medical report issued after her second operation stated
that “she had very good improvement of the symptoms.”  Besides, “Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.On the medical certificate requirement,
petitioner erroneously argues that “private respondent was employed in Saudi
Arabia and not here in the Philippines. Hence, there was a physical impossibility to
secure from a Philippine public health authority the alluded medical certificate that
public respondent’s illness will not be cured within a period of six months.”
Petitioner entirely misses the point, as counsel for private respondent states in the
Comment. The rule simply prescribes a “certification by a competent public health
authority” and not a “Philippine public health authority.”
If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her employer
could have easily obtained a certification to that effect from a competent public
health authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for illegal
dismissal.The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor
Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and
arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s
illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor.  As the Court
observed in Prieto v. NLRC, “The Court is not unaware of the many abuses

442
suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land where they have ventured,
usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future.  Breach of contract,
maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and
other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are
subjected by their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please
in their country. While these workers may indeed have relatively little defense
against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to
burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted
complaint.  There is no reason why, in their own land, the protection of our own
laws cannot be extended to themin full measure for the redress of their
grievances.”

Which law should apply: Lex Loci Contractus: Petitioner likewise attempts

to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending that since Osdana
was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host
country.  Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear that the labor laws of
Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a competent public health
authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.Again, petitioner’s argument
is without merit.First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the
place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction.  There is no question
that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines.
Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws
affecting labor apply in this case.  Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of
the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public
policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual
in nature.  The Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special
protection of workers.This public policy should be borne in mind in this case
because to allow foreign employers to determine for and by themselves whether an
overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness would
encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-termination of employment contracts.

Award of Salaries granted but reduced

:In the case at bar, while it would appear that the employment contract approved by
the POEA was only for a period of twelve months, Osdana’s actual stint with the
foreign principal lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months.  It may be
443
inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract for another
year.  Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of the contract should have been
US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 ½ months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not
US$2,499 as adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.

As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to US$1,076
representing seven months’ unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the
same is proper because, as correctly pointed out by Osdana, the “no work, no pay”
rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case.  In the first place, the fact
that she had not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from January
24 to April 29, 1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. 
Second, from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as food
server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was
not paid any salary for the said period.  Finally, from October 6 to October 23,
1993, she was confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason at all.

444
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V FLORENCIO PIRAME

G.R. NO. 121998

MARCH 9, 2000

FACTS:

On March 18, 1993, Cipriano Supero saw Pedro Torrenueva being held

by Florencio Perame was struck with an iron pipe by Epifanio Cleopas
and Teodorico Cleopas with a piece of wood hitting him in the forehead so he fell
on the ground dead.  He was then buried in the well near the house of Demetrio
Cleopas, father of the accused.Upon arraignment, Florencio Pirame and Teodorico
Cleopas entered a plea of not guilty. Epifanio Cleopas was not arraigned, being at
large. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The RTC held Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame guilty of the crime
of murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced
each one of them to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with
the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.  Ordering them to
indemnify surviving spouse P50,000 each and 23,214 for burial and incidental
expenses and P50,000 each for moral and exemplary damages and in all instances
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Deducting time for
preventive imprisonment.

ISSUE:

Whether the surviving spouse should be awarded moral and exemplary

damages.

RULING:

NO.  the award of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages was

deleted.The widow of the victim did not testify on any mental anguish or
emotional distress, which she suffered as a result of her husband's death. The
absence of any generic aggravating circumstance attending the crime likewise
precludes the award of exemplary damages.

445
446
 CARLOS ARCONA V COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 134784

DECEMBER 9, 2002

FACTS:

Carlos Arcona pleaded not guilty to a murder using the justifying

circumstance of self-defense. The element of unlawful aggression by the victim
was not proven. He was convicted of murder with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. In this petition, the Court affirmed CA decision but modified
the damages.Petitioner Carlos Arcona y Moban and his brother Benito Arcona y
Moban were charged with Murder and Frustrated Murder in separate informations.
Both pleaded not guilty.

At around 7:30 in the evening of June 27, 1986, Napoleon Ong and Edgardo
Talanquines were walking on their way home after coming from a birthday party.
When they were near the house of Jerry Boston, Edgardo heard a loud thud. He
turned around saw Napoleon slump to the ground. Suddenly, someone hit Edgardo
from behind with a piece of bamboo, causing him to fall. He saw no one in the
immediate premises except petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran towards the
house of Cesar Umapas to ask for help.Prosecution witness Leo Zaragoza testified
that he was standing in front of Jerry Boston’ house, about 7 meters away, when he
saw petitioner stab Napoleon. Napoleon died on the way to the hospital. The doctor
certified that the cause of death was the stab wound sustained at the stomach area
just above the waistline.

Carlos voluntarily surrendered go the police. In his defense, Carlos alleged

that he was walking alone when he met Napoleon and Edgardo . Without any
provocation, Napoleon suddenly drew his bolo and shouted, "Caloy, I will kill
you!" Napoleon swung the bolo at him twice but missed him. Petitioner then drew
out his knife and stabbed Napoleon. When he saw Edgardo rushing towards him,
he grabbed a piece of bamboo from the newly constructed culvert and hit the
former on the left arm. Edgardo ran away. Carlos also left the premises and went

447
home. On the way, he met his brother, Benito, and together they proceeded to their
house.

The trial court convicted the Carlos Arcona of homicide, with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and acquitted him of attempted homicide. He
was ordered to pay indemnity of 30k for Napoleon’s death, 10K for actual
damages, and 10K as moral damages.On the other hand, Benito Arcona was
acquitted of homicide and convicted of attempted homicide. He was made to
indemnify Edgardo the sum of 10K as actual damages. Only Carlos appealed. CA
affirmed the TC findings but increased civil liability to 50K. Hence, this petition.
He maintains that it was self-defense.

ISSUES:
1. Whether all elements of self-defense were present.

2. What are the proper damages to be rendered?

RULING:

1. NO.Unlawful aggression was not proven.When self-defense is invoked,

the defendant has the burden of proving that the killing was justified. Even if the
prosecution is weak, the case cannot be dismissed because of the open admission
of the killing.To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and
convincing evidence that:(1) he is not the unlawful aggressor;(2) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on his part; and(3) he employed reasonable means to prevent
or repel the aggression.Self-defense is a question of fact. He failed to prove that
there was unlawful aggression of the part of the victim. Although the bolo of
Napoleon was unsheathed, it does not conclude that there was unlawful aggression.
When Jerry Boston testified to hearing someone say, “ Caloy, I will kill you”, he
did not categorically say it was Napoleon; and iIt was still possible that he said it
while being assaulted by Carlos. It was not possible that Carlos escaped his alleged
ambush with out a scratch.

2. The CA was correct in increasing civil indemnity to 50K in line with

existing jurisprudence. In cases of murder, homicide, parricide and rape, civil
indemnity in the amount of 50K is automatically granted to the offended party or
448
his heirs in case of his death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of
the commission of the crime.

On the other hand, the award of moral damages (10K) must be increased to
50K. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s
family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a
loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or
brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life,
deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with
the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral
damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the
heirs’ emotional suffering.

The award of actual damages in the amount of 10K was not substantiated.
Only those expenses which are duly proven, or those that appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim, will
be recognized in court. It was deleted.

449
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V COURT OF APPEALS (FLORES)

266 SCRA 136

JAN 6, 1977

FACTS

Flores is a prominent businessman, licensed and engaged in the real estate

business, buying and selling houses and lots. Flores filed a complaint against PNB
when the appellant bank refused to honor his Manager's Checks worth P1 Million
because of the alleged shortage in appellee's payment to the effect that he had to go
back and forth the bank to encash said checks and that he lost a deal of a house for
sale in Baguio City worth P1 Million as he could not produce said amount
withheld by the appellant bank. Appellee Flores further testified as to the effect of
the incident on his integrity as a businessman.

Flores won in the suit and the LC awarded him P1M moral damages andt
P100,000.00 exemplary damages, but was later reduced by the CA to P100,000.00
and P25,000.00 respectively.

PNB appealed from the decision, believing that no or lower amount of

damages should be awarded to Flores. As a defense, PNB even attacked Flores’
character by alluding to his alleged reputation as a “gambler and big time casino
player”. PNB asserted that “Flores used the proceeds of the manager’s check on
the gaming table and not for purchase of a house.

ISSUE

Whether the moral and exemplary damages should be reduced.

RULING:

NO.The SC even increased the moral and exemplary damages awarded by

CA by 50% (P200,000.00 and P50,000.00 respectively).There is no hard and fast
rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since
each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.Article 2217 of the
Civil Code recognizes that moral damages which include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,

450
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury, are incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.
While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not
be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded.

451
 VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE V CA (CRUZ, BELARMINO)

286 SCRA 698

MARCH 23, 1998

FACTS:

Fule, a corporate secretary of the Rural Bank of Alaminos (the Bank) by

profession and jeweler on the side, acquired a 10-hectare property in Rizal. The
former owner, Jacobe, had mortgaged it to the Bank for a loan of 10k but it was
later foreclosed and offered for public auction upon his default.

Petitioner asked Dichoso and Mendoza (the Agents) to look for an interested
buyer, and found one in private respondent Dr. Cruz. At the time, petitioner had
shown interest in buying a pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings from Dr. Cruz but
never came to an agreed price. Subsequently, negotiations for the barter of the
jewelry and the property ensued; upon the request of Dr. Cruz, it was found by
Atty. Belarmino that no barter was feasible because the 1-year period of
redemption had not expired. To get over this legal impediment, petitioner executed
a deed of redemption on behalf of Jacobe.

Petitioner arrived at Belarmino’s residence with the agents to execute a deed

of absolute sale while Cruz held on to the earrings. Petitioner issued a certification
stating the actual consideration of the sale was Php200k and not Php80k as
indicated in the deed. Since the earrings were appraised at only Php160k, the
remaining 40k was to be paid later in cash. This was done apparently to minimize
the capital gains tax that petitioner would have to shoulder. Petitioner headed for
the bank to meet up with Cruz and pick up the earrings. When asked if the jewelry
was ok, petitioner nodded to express his satisfaction. Petitioner paid the agents
$300 and some pieces of jewelry, but not half of the pair of earrings in question as
previously promised.

452
 Later that evening, petitioner arrived at Belarmino’s residence complaining
the earrings were fake as confirmed by a tester. Petitioner accused the agents of
deceiving him, which they denied. He nonetheless took back the $300 and jewelry
given them. After another failed testing, the petitioner reported the matter to the
police where the agents also executed their sworn statements.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC to declare the contract of sale over
the property null and void on the ground of fraud and deceit. The lower court
denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction over the deed as they found
that the genuine pair of earrings had been delivered by Cruz. The 2 hours before
petitioner’s complaint was considered unreasonable delay, placing petitioner in
estoppel. The Court furthered that all elements of a valid contract were present,
namely a meeting of the minds, determinate subject matter, and price certain. As
the earrings had been delivered and the contract of absolute sale executed, the
contract of barter or sale had been consummated.

The Court also finds that the plaintiff acted in bad, awarding Cruz P300k as
moral damages and P100k as exemplary damages; Atty. Belarmino P250k as moral
damages and P150k as exemplary damages; and granting both P25k each as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. A petition with the CA yielded the same
result, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding damages

RULING:

NO. In the instant case, the TC awarded damages analogous to malicious

prosecution under Article 2219(8) of the NCC for the following reasons: The
malice with which petitioner filed the case is apparent. As an experienced jeweler
who thoroughly examined the earrings himself and went so far as to sketch them
earlier, it is illogical that he would fail to exert extra effort to check its genuineness
at the precise moment of the exchange. His acts thus failed to accord with what an
ordinary prudent man would have done in the same situation.

453
 As an experienced businessman and banker, he was shrewd enough to bloat
the property’s price from 25k to 75k only a few days after he had purchased it for a
far lower cost, the value of which still fell short of the diamond earrings’
price.Also, it took him 2 hours of unexplained delay before complaining the
earrings were counterfeit—a period in which anything could have happened while
petitioner was in possession of the jewelry.Given this, it would appear that the
cause of action in the instant case was contrived by the petitioner himself in hopes
of obtaining a favorable outcome in his complaint to take the real jewelry, return a
fake, and get back the property. This is plain and simple, unjust enrichment. All
that considered, the damages prayed for were reasonably proportionate to the
sufferings they underwent.Petitioner filed a malicious and unfounded case all the
while dragging down private respondents, whose reputations had been soiled by
petitioner’s coming to court with unclean hands. Because of the falsity, malice and
baseless nature of the complaint, defendants were compelled to litigate and are thus
also entitled to the awarding of attorney’s fees under Article 2208.

454
 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC V COURT OF APPELAS

275 SCRA 621

JULY 17, 1997

FACTS:

On October 23, 1988, private respondent Pantejo, then City Fiscal of

Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where
he was supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City. However, due to
typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled.

To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out
cash assistance of P100.00 and, the next day, P200.00, for their expected stay of
two days in Cebu. Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL's
expense because he did not have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused.
Thus, respondent Pantejo was forced to seek and accept the generosity of a co-
passenger, an Engr. Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a room with the latter at Sky
View Hotel with the promise to pay his share of the expenses upon reaching
Surigao.

When the flight for Surigao was resumed, Pantejo came to know that the
hotel expenses of his co-passengers were reimbursed by PAL. At this point,
Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza, PAL's Manager for Departure Services at Mactan
Airport and who was in charge of cancelled flights, that he was going to sue the
airline for discriminating against him. It was only then that Jereza offered to pay
respondent Pantejo P300 which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone,
the latter decline. Thereafter, PAntejo filed an action for damages against PAL.

The RTC of Surigao City, rendered judgment against PAL, ordering the
latter to pay Pantejo P300 for actual damages, P150,000 as moral damages,
P100,000 as exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and 6% interest
from the time of the filing of the complaint until said amounts shall have been fully
paid, plus costs of suit.

455
 On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo, but with the
exclusion of the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower courts erred in awarding damages in favor of plaintiff

RULING:

NO. It must be emphasized that a contract to transport passengers is quite

different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation, and this is because
of the relation which an air carrier sustain with the public. Its business is mainly
with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages
it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees naturally could give
ground for an action for damages.

In ruling for Pantejo, both the RTC and the CA found that PAL acted in bad
faith in refusing to provide hotel accommodations for Pantejo or to reimburse him
for hotel expenses incurred despite and in contrast to the fact that other passengers
were so favored.

Factors considered in computing damages

PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its
passengers and in discriminating against Pantejo. It was even oblivious to the fact
that PAntejo was exposed to humiliation and embarrassment especially because of
his government position and social prominence, which altogether necessarily
subjected him to ridicule, shame and anguish. It remains uncontroverted that at
the time of the incident, herein respondent was then the City Prosecutor of Surigao
City, and that he is a member of the Philippine Jaycee Senate, past Lt. Governor of
the Kiwanis Club of Surigao, a past Master of the Mount Diwata Lodge of Free
Masons of the Philippines, member of the Philippine National Red Cross, Surigao
Chapter,

456
and past Chairman of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, Surigao del Norte
Chapter.

It is likewise claimed that the moral and exemplary damages awarded to

respondent Pantejo are excessive and unwarranted on the ground that respondent is
not totally blameless because of his refusal to accept the P100 cash assistance
which was inceptively offered to him. It bears emphasis that respondent Pantejo
had every right to make such refusal since it evidently could not meet his needs
and that was all that PAL claimed it could offer.

His refusal to accept the P300 proffered as an afterthought when he

threatened suit was justified by his resentment when he belatedly found out that his
co-passengers were reimbursed for hotel expenses and he was not. Worse, he
would not even have known about it were it not for a co-passenger who verbally
told him that she was reimbursed by the airline for hotel and meal expenses. It may
even be said that the amounts, the time and the circumstances under which those
amounts were offered could not salve the moral wounds inflicted by PAL on
private respondent but even approximated insult added to injury.

The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent ineludibly makes the

former liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of
the Civil Code. Such inattention to and lack of care by petitioner airline for the
interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly
as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the
award of moral damages.

Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the

expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to allow the former to obtain
means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action and must, perforce, be
proportional to the suffering inflicted. However, substantial damages do not
translate into excessive damages. Except for attorney's fees and costs of suit, it will
be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed point by point the factual findings of
the lower court upon which the award of damages had been based. We, therefore,
see no reason to modify the award of damages made by the trial court.

457
 Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are convinced that the
awards for actual, moral and exemplary damages granted in the judgment of
respondent court, for the reasons meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained
in its decision, are just and equitable. It is high time that the travelling public is
afforded protection and that the duties of common carriers, long detailed in our
previous laws and jurisprudence and thereafter collated and specifically catalogued
in our Civil Code in 1950, be enforced through appropriate sanctions.

458
 MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA V COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 115024

FEBRUARY 7, 1996

FACTS:

At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos
highway to her home. While travelling along Aurora Blvd., she noticed something
wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by
the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her
home in that car’s condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away,
put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the
trunk.

She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to
a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987
Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown
against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then
fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant’s car. Plaintiff’s left
leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle
connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical
Memorial Center where she was found to have a “traumatic amputation, leg, left up
to distal thigh (above knee).” She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days
and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not Li was negligent.

2.) Whether or not Valenzuela was contributory negligent.

459
 3.) Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer is liable.

RULING:

1.) Yes. A witness testified that Li’s car was being driven at a “very fast”
speed, racing towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue. He also saw the car
hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant’s Mitsubishi
Lancer, from where she eventually fell under the defendant’s car. Moreover the
witness declared that he observed Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near
the sidewalk, contrary to Li’s allegation that Valenzuela’s car was close to the
center of the right lane.

2.) No. The Court held that Valenzuela was not negligent applying the
emergency rule.Under the “emergency rule,” an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.

Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency

and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances
which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The
emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was
not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable
precautions. Obviously, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on
the night of the accident.

3.) Yes. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to the Court’s

satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family
in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not
the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company
car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should
be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based
on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable

460
with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident.

Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. He admitted

that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep
normal office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the
office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company
clients. These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours
because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his
company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-
related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc.
therefore enabled both Li – as well as the corporation – to put up the front of a
highly successful entity, increasing the latter’s goodwill before its clientele. It also
facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a
convenient mode of travel.

461
 AURELIO SUMALPONG V COURT OF APPEALS (PEOPLE)

268 SCRA 764

FEBRUARY 26, 1997

FACTS:

Sumalpong shot the victim Ramos after the former slapped the latter’s wife.
Before this, Sumalpong called upon the spouses then inquired regarding the
identity of those who stoned his house, then accused Ramos of stoning his house.
Ramos’ wife, Leonarda, remarked that he should first confirm the information he
received before accusing anyone, then after this Sumalpong shot Leonarda at the
back of her head (though apparently, Leonarda was not harmed) then Ramos
rushed towards Sumalpong who then shot Ramos twice but missed. They wrestled
and in the act, Sumalpong bit on Ramos’ ear, causing its mutilation.

The trial court convicted Sumalpong of attempted homicide. Ramos was

awarded with P16,800.00 for the loss of his crops due to his failure to attend to his
farmwork because of the injuries inflicted upon him by the petitioner, P2,000.00
for hospitalization expenses, and P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.

The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, removed award for loss of
crops and hospitalization expenses, increased moral damages to P10,000.00, and
awarding nominal damages in the same amount.

ISSUE:

Whether the increase in moral damages is warranted

RULING:

YESAnent the increase in the amount of moral damages awarded, suffice it

to state that the nature of the injuries and the degree of physical suffering endured
by the complainant warrants the same. The tragic incident caused a mutilation of
complainant's left ear and a permanent scar on his right forearm. These injuries
have left indelible marks on the complainant's body and will serve as a constant
reminder of this traumatic experience. (more discussion on the modification of
462
amount of nominal damages and moral damages when it was not the issue
appealed, rationalization for deletion of actual and compensatory damages)

463
 FERNANDO LOPEZ V PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

16 SCRA 431

MARCH 30, 1966

FACTS:

Sen Fernando Lopez, his wife, his son-in-law, and his daughter made
reservations, through their agency, for first class accommodations in the Tokyo –
San Francisco flight of PAN-AM. PAN-AM's SF head office confirmed the
reservations. First class tickets were subsequently issued, with the total fare having
been fully paid before this.

As scheduled, they left Manila and as soon as they arrived in Tokyo, they
contacted PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding their accommodations. For the given
reason that the first class seats were all booked up, PAN-AM's Tokyo office
informed them that they could not go in that flight unless they took the tourist
class. Due to pressing engagements in the US, they were constrained to take PAN-
AM's flight as tourist passengers.

Sen Lopez filed suit for damages alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by
defendant out of racial prejudice against Orientals. He asked for P500T actual and
moral damages, P100T exemplary damages, P25T attorney's fees plus costs.

PAN-AM asserted that its failure to provide first class accommodations to

plaintiffs was due to honest error of its employees. It interposed a counterclaim for
atty's fees of P25T.CFI Rizal decision: in favor of plaintiff and granted (a) P100T,
moral damages; (b) P20T, exemplary damages; (c) P25T, atty's fees, and costs of
the action.Plaintiffs filed MFR asking that moral damages be increased to P400T
and for 6% interest per annum on amount to be granted.

CFI modified decision: (a) P150T, moral damages; (b) P25T, exemplary
damages; with legal interest on both from date of filing of complaint until paid; (c)
464
P25T, atty's fees; and costs of the action.Both appealed: PAN-AM contended that
there was NO bad faith; Lopez et al wanted a total of P650T as award for damages.

ISSUES:

1. Whether there was bad faith on the part of PAN-AM.

2. Whether the amount of damages should be increased.

RULING:

1. YESDefendant through its agents first cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by

mistake and thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or
their travel agent such information. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first
class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations, when in fact
they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of
having to breach its contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute
cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it turned out in this case.
Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill-
will. At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by the defendant, there would
at least be negligence so gross and reckless as to amount to malice or bad faith.

2. YES.Moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the

defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220). Exemplary or corrective
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
breach of contract where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner (Art. 2229, 2232). A written contract for an
attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138, ROC).

Factors in determining Amount for Moral Damages: The amount of

damages awarded in this appeal has been determined by adequately considering the
official, political, social, and financial standing of the offended parties on one
hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on the other. The

465
present rate of exchange and the terms at which the amount of damages awarded
would approximately be in U.S. dollars has also been considered.

(a) MORAL DAMAGES

As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with

plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety
and mental anguish. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is
humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be
expected from the contractual undertaking.Sen Lopez was then Senate President
Pro Tempore. International carriers like defendant know the prestige of such an
office. For the Senate is not only the Upper Chamber of the Philippine Congress,
but the nation's treaty-ratifying body. He was also former Vice-President of the
Philippines. (MD = P100T).Mrs. Maria Lopez, as wife of the Senator, shared his
prestige and therefore his humiliation. In addition she suffered physical discomfort
during the 13-hour trip; her reason for going to the US was actually for medical
check-up and relaxation. The fact that the seating spaces in the tourist class are
quite narrower than in first class will suffice to show that she indeed experienced
physical suffering during the trip. (MD = P50T).Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo
Montelibano, Jr., were travelling as immediate members of the family of Sen
Lopez. Even if they initially wanted to change their seat reservations from first
class to tourist class, they eventually paid for first class seats. Hence, they also
suffered social humiliation. (MD = P25T each)

(b) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to

effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other
airlines. (ED = P75T)

(c) ATTORNEY’S FEES

Record shows a written contract of services wherein plaintiffs engaged the

services of their counsel. Atty. Francisco and agreed to pay the sum of P25T upon
the termination of the case in the CFI, and another P25T if case is appealed to the
SC. This is reasonable considering the subject matter of the present controversy,
the professional standing of the attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, and the extent of
the service rendered by him.

466
 PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V COURT OF APPEALS (SPS
CHUA)

G.R. NO. 111584

SEPTEMBER 17, 2001

FACTS:

Sometime in April, 1982, respondent Salvador Chua was offered by Mr.

Jimmy Rojas, manager of Producers Bank of the Philippines, to transfer his
account from Pacific Banking Corporation to herein petitioner bank.Spouses
Slavador and Emilia Chua opened and maintained substantial savings and current
deposits with, and likewise obtained various loans from petitioner bank, one of
which was a loan for P2,000,000.00 which was secured by a real estate mortgage
and payable within a period of three (3) years or from 1982 to 1985.

On January 20, 1984, private respondents deposited with petitioner bank the
total sum of P960,000.00, which was duly entered in private respondents' savings
account passbook.Petitioner bank failed to credit this deposit due to the fact that its
Branch Manager absconded with the money of the bank's depositors.
Consequently, petitioner bank dishonored the checks drawn out by private
respondents in favor of their various creditors on the ground of insufficient funds,
despite the fact that at that time, the balance of private respondents' deposit was in
the amount of P1,051,051.19.Private respondents requested for copies of their
ledgers covering their savings and current accounts, but petitioner bank refused.
Private respondents instituted on January 30, 1984 an action for damages against
petitioner bank. On the other hand, petitioner bank filed with the City Sheriff of
Bacolod a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate. Private
respondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages, alleging that the petition
for extrajudicial foreclosure was without basis and was instituted maliciously in
order to harass private respondents.

On April 26, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision on the latter case, in
favor of the spouses Chua, awarding the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages,

467
and the sum of P250,000.00 as exemplary damages, among others.On October 31,
1991, upon appeal by petitioner bank, the Court of Appeals modified the decision
—one of the changes was the award of the sum of P500,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.Petitioner moved for a consideration but the same was denied,
hence, this petition

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner bank is liable for moral damages

RULING:

YESMoral and exemplary damages may be awarded without proof of

pecuniary loss. In awarding such damages, the court shall take into account the
circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its
discretion.As borne out by the record of this case, private respondents are engaged
in several businesses, such as rice and corn trading, cement dealership, and
gasoline proprietorship. The dishonor of private respondents' checks and the
foreclosure initiated by petitioner adversely affected the credit standing as well as
the business dealings of private respondents as their suppliers discontinued credit
lines resulting in the collapse of their businesses.In the case of Leopoldo Araneta
vs. Bank of America, it was held that: "The financial credit of a businessman is a
prized and valuable asset, it being a significant part of the foundation of his
business. Any adverse reflection thereon constitutes some financial loss to him."

The damage to private respondents' reputation and social standing entitles

them to moral damages. Article 2217, in relation to Article 2220, of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that "moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury."

Obviously, petitioner bank's wrongful act caused serious anxiety,

embarrassment, and humiliation to private respondents for which they are entitled
to recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00 which we deem to be
reasonable.

468
 EMILIO STREBEL V JOSE FIGUERAS

96 PHIL 321

DECEMBER 29, 1954

FACTS:

Strebel’s side: As a lessee of a lot situated in Santa Mesa, Manila, plaintiff

Strebel subleased part thereof to the Standard Vacuum Oil Company; that the latter
constructed thereon a Mobilgas Station which was operated by Eustaquio & Co., a
partnership organized by said plaintiff and one Primo Eustaquio, that, "out of spite
and with a view to the eventual acquisition of the said property for himself and his
men," defendant Jose Figueras "tried all he could to built a drainage through" the
aforementioned property; that, in order to accomplish this purpose, and, using his
official and political influence, defendant Figueras, then Under-Secretary of Labor,
caused. his co-defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila,
to prepare an opinion which was signed by the City Fiscal, holding that the City of
Manila has a right to construct said drainage, and, to this effect, make the
necessary excavations at the boundary line of said lot leased to Strebel and the lot
belonging to Figueras

Plaintiff Strebel also claims that defendant Figueras "by making use of his
official and political connections," was able to induce the Secretary of Justice to
transfer temporarily, from the Bureau of Immigration to the Bureau of Prisons, one
Dr. Manuel Hernandez, the husband of plaintiff's step daughter. Plaintiff asked
Secretary Nepomuceno to mediate between them and Under-Secretary of Labor to
forget about past family problems.

Plaintiff later on claims that Figueras still didn’t forget about the past and
"making use of his official and political influence," and with the cooperation of his
former secretary, defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of
Manila, as well as "in connivance with the Director of Labor" which office was
then held by defendant Felipe E. Jose, "and other employees in the Department and

469
Bureau of Labor," defendant Figueras succeeded in securing the institution, against
plaintiff Strebel, and his partner, Primo Eustaquio, of Criminal Case No. 11005 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, for allegedly compelling several employees
to work more than eight (8) hours a day, in violation of Commonwealth Act No.
444, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 303, although before the filing of the
information "the defendants collectively and singly knew that the allegations
therein are false;" that said criminal case was subsequently dismissed by the Court
of First Instance of Manila for failure of the prosecution "to establish even a prima
facie case against the accused";

Through the foregoing series of acts, the defendants have "caused moral and
mental suffering to the . . . plaintiff, his wife, and his entire family, and damage to
his business in the amount of P15,000.00 besides actual damages in the amount of
P1,500.00 paid to his attorney in defending himself from the malicious charge,"

ISSUE:

Whether Plaintiff may recover damages for moral and mental suffering

RULING:

NO.The plan to built said drainage was seemingly abandoned before

plaintiff's property rights could be violated. There was nothing wrong, either
legally or morally, in the desire of Figueras to seek an outlet for the water coming
from his property. On the contrary, it is required by the elementary principles of
health and sanitation. Besides, there is no allegation that any lot other than that of
plaintiff Strebel was better suited for the purpose.

Neither could he have any arising from the assignment of his wife's son-in-
law from the Bureau of Prisons - to which he had been previously assigned
temporarily to the Bureau of Immigration, for 1.The authority of the Secretary of
Justice to make the assignment in question and the validity thereof, under said
legal provision, are submitted. Hence, it is not claimed that said officer may be
held civilly liable for the aforementioned assignment. This being the case, how can
such responsibility be exacted from Figueras who, it is urged, merely instigated

470
said assignment? 2.Even if we assumed the act complained of to be wrong or to
have caused injury, the right of action hypotethically resulting therefrom, if any —
on which we need not, and do not, express any opinion — would have accrued in
favor of Dr. Hernandez — who is not a party in the present action — not plaintiff
herein.

As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental suffering resulting

from bodily injuries is restricted to the person who has suffered the bodily hurt,
and there can be no recovery for distress caused by sympathy for another's
suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against a third person. So the anguish of
mind arising as to the safety of others who may be in personal peril from the same
cause cannot be taken into consideration.

Damages are not recoverable for fright or shock even when sustained
as result of wilful act, unless such act was directed toward person or property or
person seeking recovery; hence plaintiff is not entitled to recover against
administratrix of sister's murderer for fright or shock caused by viewing mutilated
body of murdered sister. The rule on this point, as stated in the American
Jurisprudence, is: "Injury or Wrong to Another. — In law mental anguish is
restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or
wrong to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of mental suffering
which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering or
which arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another.
Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering
caused by his or her sympathy for the other's suffering." It should be noted that
plaintiff is not even related to Dr. Hernandez. The latter's wife is a daughter of
Mrs. Strebel by a previous marriage. Hence Dr. Hernandez is merely related by
affinity, not to Strebel, but to a relative by affinity of said plaintiff.

Another allegation made by plaintiffs in arguing their cause of action

to recover damages, they said that "with a view to further injuring" him "and
besmirching his good name in the community and waging a cleavage in the
harmonious relation between Eustaquio & Co. and its laborers," defendants Felipe
E. Jose and Cornelio S. Ruperto issued a press statement to the effect that plaintiff
Strebel and his partner, Eustaquio had flagrantly violated the provisions of the
Eight-Hour Law and that said Criminal Case had been dismissed by the court on a

471
flimsy ground; and that this statement had "caused moral and mental suffering to
the herein plaintiff and damage to his business in the amount of P5,000.00," The
Supreme Court said that this news item mentions, neither the number of the case
referred to, nor the names of the persons accused therein. Moreover, it merely
contains a criticism of the action taken by the court. The reference, therein imputed
to the Director of Labor, to the flagrant violation of the eight-hour labor law by the
accused, was a mere reiteration of the theory of the Bureau of Labor, which the
prosecution had adopted by filing the information in said case. Being a matter of
court record, which had been taken up at the hearing held publicly, and settled in a
decision already promulgated, said theory was open for public consumption, and,
hence, an allusion thereto or statement thereof, in order to justify said criticism, is
not actionable.

As regards the malicious prosecution point raised by Strebel, by

specific mandate of Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, however,
moral damages may not be recovered in cases of crime or tort, unless either results
or causes "physical injuries," which are lacking in the case at bar. Although the
same article permits recovery of said damages in cases of malicious prosecution,
this feature of said provision may not be availed of by the plaintiff herein,
inasmuch as the acts set forth in the complaint took place in 1949, or before said
Code became effective (laws shouldn’t have retroactive effect).

472
ABS-CBN V COURT OF APPEALS (REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP,
VIVA FILMS)

G.R. NO. 128690

JANUARY 21, 1999

FACTS:

ABS-CBN, by virtue of contract with VIVA, had an exclusive right to

exhibit some Viva films. ABS-CBN had a right of first refusal. VIVA gave ABS-
CBN 3 packages (36 titles) to choose from. VP for ABS Charo Santos-Concio
wrote VIVA that they are not accepting the list because there were only 10 titles
there that they could potentially purchase. ABS asked for another list, saying they
had quite an attractive offer to make.

VIVA gave ABS a new list: 52 original movie titles (never before aired on
TV) and 104 reruns. VIVA’s proposal was P60M (P30M cash, P30M TV spots) for
52 originals and 52 reruns.Del Rosario (VIVA’s rep) and Eugenio Lopez III had a
mtg re this in Tamarind Grill Restaurant. Accdg to ABSCBN, the mtg culminated
in Del Rosario accepting ABSCBN’s offer of P35M for 52 of the films VIVA was
selling for P60M plus “Maging Sino Ka Man.”

VIVA said this wasn’t their agreement and that they refuse to sell anything
less the 104-movie package for P60M. In the meantime, RBS bought the 104-film
package (which included “Maging Sino Ka Man”) for P60M. There were ads in the
newspapers for the airing of the movie on Channel 7.

ABSCBN filed a case in RTC to enjoin RBS from airing 14 VIVA films,
including Maging Sino Ka Man. RTC granted a preliminary injunction; but lifted
the same after RBS put up a counterbond. ABSCBN filed a petition in the CA to
challenge the RTC decision. CA granted TRO, but eventually dismissed

473
ABSCBN’s petition and made them pay for actual, moral and exemplary damages
and atty’s fees to RBS, and atty’s fees to VIVA.

ISSUE:

Whether RBS may recover damages from ABSCBN.

RULING:

No. Actual damages. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is

entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered
by him as he has duly proved. The indemnification shall comprehend not only the
value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits that the obligee failed to
obtain. In contracts and quasi-contracts the damages which may be awarded are
dependent on whether the obligor acted with good faith or otherwise. In case of
good faith, the damages recoverable are those which are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the parties have foreseen
or could have reasonably foreseen at the time of the constitution of the obligation.
If the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be
liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission complained of, whether or not such damages have been foreseen or
could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.

Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss or impairment of earning

capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the
plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.

474
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC

369 SCRA 629

NOVEMBER 20, 2001

FACTS:

The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for

the supply and delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas
Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers
Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to participate as one of the
bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was accepted.
NAPOCOR's acceptance was conveyed in a letter. PHIBRO sent word to
NAPOCOR that industrial disputes might soon plague Australia, the shipment's
point of origin, which could seriously hamper PHIBRO's ability to supply the
needed coal. PHIBRO again apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia,
particularly informing the latter that the ship owners therein are not willing to load
cargo unless a "strike-free" clause is incorporated in the charter party or the
contract of carriage. In order to hasten the transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to
NAPOCOR that they equally share the burden of a "strike-free" clause.
NAPOCOR refused.

Subsequently, PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR a confirmed and

workable letter of credit. Instead of delivering the coal on or before the thirtieth
day after receipt of the Letter of Credit, as agreed upon by the parties in the July
contract, PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on November 17, 1987.

Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once more advertised for the

delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this
subsequent bidding. On November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's
application for pre-qualification to bid for not meeting the minimum requirements.
Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found that the real reason for the disapproval was
its purported failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for damages due to the delay
in the delivery of the first coal shipment.

475
 This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages with application for
injunction against NAPOCOR with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati
City. In its complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's act of disqualifying it in
the October 1987 bidding and in all subsequent biddings was tainted with malice
and bad faith. PHIBRO prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.

In its answer, NAPOCOR averred that the strikes in Australia could not be
invoked as reason for the delay in the delivery of coal because PHIBRO itself
admitted that as of July 28, 1987 those strikes had already ceased. And, even
assuming that the strikes were still ongoing, PHIBRO should have shouldered the
burden of a "strike-free" clause because their contract was "C and F Calaca,
Batangas, Philippines," meaning, the cost and freight from the point of origin until
the point of destination would be for the account of PHIBRO. Furthermore,
NAPOCOR claimed that due to PHIBRO's failure to deliver the coal on time, it
was compelled to purchase coal from ASEA at a higher price. NAPOCOR claimed
for actual damages in the amount of P12,436,185.73, representing the increase in
the price of coal, and a claim of P500,000.00 as litigation expenses.

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court decided in favor of
PHIBRO. Unsatisfied, NAPOCOR elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in toto the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether PHIBRO is entitled to damages.

RULING:

NO.NAPOCOR was not bound under any contract to approve PHIBRO's

pre-qualification requirements. In fact, NAPOCOR had expressly reserved its right
to reject bids. And where the government as advertiser, availing itself of that right,
makes its choice in rejecting any or all bids, the losing bidder has no cause to
complain nor right to dispute that choice unless an unfairness or injustice is shown.

476
 Owing to the discretionary character of the right involved in this case, the
propriety of NAPOCOR's act should therefore be judged on the basis of the general
principles regulating human relations, the forefront provision of which is Article
19 of the Civil Code which provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith." Accordingly, a person will be protected only
when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. 3

NAPOCOR's act of disapproving PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification

to bid was without any intent to injure or a purposive motive to perpetrate damage.
Apparently, NAPOCOR acted on the strong conviction that PHIBRO had a
"seriously-impaired" track record. NAPOCOR cannot be faulted from believing so.
We cannot fault NAPOCOR if it mistook PHIBRO's unexpected offer a mere
attempt on the latter's part to undercut ASEA or an indication of PHIBRO's
inconsistency. The circumstances warrant such contemplation.

This Court has also laid down the rule that in the absence of stipulation, a
winning party may be awarded attorney's fees only in case plaintiff's action or
defendant's stand is so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. This
cannot be said of the case at bar. NAPOCOR is justified in resisting PHIBRO's
claim for damages.

477
 OSCAR VENTANILLA V GREGORIO CENTENO

G.R. NO. L-14333

JANUARY 28, 1961

FACTS:

Ventanilla instituted this action to recover damages against his lawyer, Atty.
Centeno for neglecting to perfect within the reglementary period his (V) appeal
from an adverse judgment rendered by the CFI of Manila.

Trial Court facts showed that the required appeal bond was not filed by Atty.
Centeno. The fact that the record on appeal was admitted for filing is the best
evidence that Atty. Centeno had not in fact filed any appeal bond. The record on
appeal was disapproved because it was filed out of time and no appeal bond had
been filed by the plaintiff.The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ventanilla
and ordered Centeno to pay the sum of P200 as nominal damages and the costs.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in not ordering the Centeno to pay him actual
or compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, and exemplary or corrective
damages; in ordering that only the sum of P200 be paid to him, and not P2,000 as
nominal damages; and in not ordering that the sum of P500 as attorney's fee be
paid as well.

RULING:

NO.as regards actual or compensatory damages:

V is not entitled to such damages as his basis is highly speculative.
ARTICLE 2199 NCC provides :Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.Malonzo vs. Galang: He who claims actual or compensatory damages
478
must establish and prove by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss.Ventanilla’s
allegation that by Centeno’s negligence in not paying the appeal bond of P60, V
lost his chance to recover from the defendants therein the sum of P4,000 and moral
and actual damages, which V could have recovered if the appeal had duly been
perfected, indicates that his claim for actual or compensatory damages is highly
speculative.

AS REGARDS MORAL DAMAGES:Since the VENTANILLA’S cause of

action for recovery of moral damages is not predicated upon any of those
specifically enumerated (under A2219, Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35
on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219) TC did not err in declining
to award moral damages to him.Ventanilla claims that he suffered mental anguish
upon learning that his appeal had not been perfected within the reglementary
period due to the Centeno's negligence; serious anxiety upon learning that his
adversary had won by a mere technicality; besmirched reputation for losing the
opportunity to substantiate his claim made while testifying in open court that he
was entitled to collect the sum of P4,000 and damages from the defendants in civil
No. 18833; and wounded feelings for the Centeno’s failure to remain faithful to his
client and worthy of his trust and confidence. (SEE A2217, 2219 AND 2220 NCC)
Malonzo vs. Galang:“. . .Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries," as an instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby
implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded
(Strebel vs. Figueras, G.R. L-4722, Dec. 29, 1954), excepting, of course, the
special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).

CONCERNING TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES:Considering

that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but has been awarded
nominal damages by the TC, such award precludes the recovery of temperate or
moderate damages, and so TC did not err in refusing to award temperate or
moderate damages to the Ventanilla

AS REGARDS EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES:It cannot be

recovered as a matter of right and the court will decide whether or not they should
be adjudicated, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive
or malevolent manner. TC didn’t err in not giving any.

NOMINAL DAMAGES Considering the circumstances and the degree of

negligence committed by ATTY CENTENO in not depositing on time the appeal
bond and filing the record on appeal within the extension period granted by the
479
court, which brought about the refusal by the TCto allow the record on appeal, the
amount of P200 awarded by the TC to VENTANILLA as nominal damages may
seem exiguous.Nevertheless, considering that nominal damages are not for
indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right
violated or invaded; and that even if the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been
duly perfected, it was not an assurance that the appellant would succeed in
recovering the amount he had claimed in his complaint, the amount of P2,000 the
appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is excessive.

A2221 of NCC provides:Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a

right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him.

480
 ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY V COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE AND
MILLAN

G.R. NO. L-41093

OCTOBER 30, 1978

FACTS:

Robes-Francisco Realty sold to Millan a parcel of land. Millan complied

and paid. She made repeated demands to execute final deed of sale and for
issuance to her of TCT over the lot. Parties executed deed of absolute sale. But
corp failed to cause issuance of TCT because title was included among properties
of corp mortgaged to GSIS to secure an obligation. Hence, a complaint for
specific performance and damages.

ISSUE:

Whether Robes-Francisco is liable for damages

RULING:

YES. Robes-Francisco is guilty of delay, amounting to non-performance. It

is liable for damages under Art 1170 of CC. But Robes-Francisco contends that
Millan is bound by terms of provision and can’t recover more than what is agreed
upon. This argument is devoid of merit. We would agree if the clause were to be a
penal clause. But this clause doesn’t convey any penalty.Unfortunately, vendee
submitted her case below without presenting evidence on actual damages suffered
by her. But it is obvious that right of vendee was violated by petitioner and this
entitles her at least to NOMINAL DAMAGES.

NOMINAL DAMAGES are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for
vindication or recognition of a right. NOMINAL DAMAGES are damages in name
only and not in fact, and are allowed simply in recognition of a technical
injury.The P20,000.00 is excessive. The admitted fact that petitioner corporation
failed to convey a transfer certificate of title to respondent Milian because the
481
subdivision property was mortgaged to the GSIS does not in itself show that there
was bad faith or fraud. Bad faith is not to be presumed. Moreover, there was the
expectation of the vendor that arrangements were possible for the GSIS to make
partial releases of the subdivision lots.

482
 PEOPLE V. GOPIO

346 SCRA 408

FACTS:

The offense charged was committed by Agustin Gopio, in Brgy. San

Pascual, Obando, Bulacan sometime between the months of May and June 1995.
At that time, the barangay was celebrating its fiesta. The victim stepped out of their
house around 10:00 a.m. to buy cooking oil from accused-appellant’s store.
However, it was closed. As she was about to leave the store, accused-appellant
called her. When she came near him, he suddenly seized her and brought her inside
the house. There was nobody inside the house when the victim was taken by
accused-appellant to the bedroom. The victim resisted and screamed but accused-
appellant threatened to hurt her and her family. Accused-appellant laid the victim
on the bed in such a way that her feet were dangling on the floor. Then, he
removed her underwear, bent over the victim, and started licking her vagina. Later
on, accused-appellant removed his briefs, knelt on the floor, and placed his penis in
the victim’s vagina. The victim cried in pain as accused-appellant penetrated her.
As the victim would not stop crying, accused-appellant let her go. The victim
immediately went outside accused-appellant’s house and rushed home.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the victim should be entitled to nominal damages.

RULING:

To be entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent

proof constituting evidence of the actual amount thereof, such as receipts showing
the expenses incurred on account of the rape incident. In this case, only the
laboratory fee issued by Our Lady of Salambao Hospital in Bulacan amounting
to P350.00 was duly receipted. The rest of the documents, which the prosecution
presented to prove the actual expenses incurred by the victim, were merely a
doctor’s prescription and a handwritten list of food expenses.

Nevertheless, under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that the right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. As has been

483
held, whenever there has been a violation of an ascertained legal right, although no
actual damages resulted or none are shown, the award of nominal damages is
proper. In this case, the victim’s family clearly incurred medical expenses due to
the rape committed by accused-appellant. The victim suffered from pains in her
navel which required her physical examination. An award of ₱2,000.00 as nominal
damages is thus appropriate under the circumstances.

484
 ARMOVIT V. CA

184 SCRA 476

FACTS:

In October 1981, the petitioners decided to spend their Christmas holidays

with relatives and friends in the Philippines, so they purchased from private
respondent, (Northwest Airlines, Inc.) three (3) round trip airline tickets from the
U.S. to Manila and back, plus three (3) tickets for the rest of the children, though
not involved in the suit. Each ticket of the petitioners which was in the handwriting
of private respondent's tickets sales agent contains the following entry on the
Manila to Tokyo portion of the return flight:from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002,
date 17 January, time 10:30 A.M. Status, OK.

On their return trip from Manila to the U.S. scheduled on January 17, 1982,
petitioner arrived at the check-in counter of private respondent at the Manila
International Airport at 9:15 in the morning, which is a good one (1) hour and
fifteen (15) minutes ahead of the 10:30 A.M. scheduled flight time recited in their
tickets. Petitioners were rudely informed that they cannot be accommodated
inasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a.m. was already taking off and the 10:30
A.M. flight time entered in their plane tickets was erroneous.

Previous to the said date of departure petitioners re-confirmed their

reservations through their representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally
presented the three (3) tickets at the private respondent's Roxas Boulevard
office. The departure time in the three (3) tickets of petitioners was not changed
when re-confirmed. The names of petitioners appeared in the passenger manifest
and confirmed as Passenger Nos. 306, 307, and 308, Flight 002. Herein petitioner
Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of the bump-off he will not
be able to keep his appointments with his patients in the U.S. Petitioners suffered
anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and night of January 17th until
the morning of January 18th when they were finally informed that seats will be
available for them on the flight that day.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to moral, exemplary and nominal
damages.

485
RULING:

They are entitled to moral and exemplary damages, but not nominal
damages. The gross negligence committed by private respondent in the issuance of
the tickets with entries as to the time of the flight, the failure to correct such
erroneous entries and the manner by which petitioners were rudely informed that
they were bumped off are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and establish
that private respondent committed a breach of contract which entitles petitioners to
moral damages. By the same token to provide an example for the public good, an
award of exemplary damages is also proper. Nevertheless, the deletion of the
nominal damages by the appellate court is well-taken since there is an award of
actual damages. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory
damages Petitioners had to spend for lunch, dinner, and breakfast in the sum of
P1,300.00 while waiting to be flown out of Manila. The P1,300.00 in this case
serves as actual damages that was never rebutted by the respondent..

486
 PLENO V. CA

G.R. NO. 56505

1988

FACTS:

The incident which is the basis of this complaint involves a three vehicle
collision which happened about past noon of December 21,1971 at the South Super
Highway in the portion of Taguig, Rizal. At about 12:45 in the afternoon of said
date, a snub-nosed volkswagen kombi was cruising towards Manila along the
asphalt pavement of the service road of the South Super Highway. The kombi had
two passengers, Maximo Pleno who was at the wheel, and, a New Zealander,
James Arthur Langley, who was sitting beside Mr. Pleno on the front seat. The
volkswagen was suddenly and without warning hit on its left rear corner by a red
colored cargo truck. Due to the impact, the volkswagen moved faster veering to the
right and smashing unto the right rear portion of a truck parked along the shoulder
of the road in front of the National Manpower Building. The parked truck was also
moved forward when it was hit on its back by the Volkswagen and the driver of the
parked truck, Ruben Rivera who was at that time standing in front of his parked
truck urinating was bumped by his own truck.

Having been hit from behind by the red colored cargo truck and having
smashed into the rear portion of the parked truck, the right front portion of the
volkswagen on the driver's side was reduced to a pulp. At impact, the front door on
the right side burst open and Langley, who was seated on that side, was thrown out
of the vehicle and landed on a ditch. Pleno, the driver of the volkswagen was
crushed in the driver's seat since the kombi's front portion offered no protection,
being the snub-nosed type, with the motor at the back. His legs were trapped in the
wreckage. The red cargo truck, being driven by Florante de Luna, stopped for a
while and then spead away.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Florante de Luna should pay actual, moral,

temperate and exemplary damages.

487
RULING:

Yes. To justify these awards, the Court considered the established fact that it
is beyond dispute, despite de Luna’s protestation that he did not hit the Kombi
delivery panel at the left rear corner; that he did not attempt to evade
responsibility; even knowingly realizing that he caused the accident, he merely
stopped a while and, upon seeing the extensiveness of the resulting damage and the
seriousness of the injury, left the scene of the accident and kept quiet all about it
until discovered thru police investigation — thus making it a hit and run case, pure
and simple.The medical expenses, hospital bills and doctor's fees were properly
exhibited and not rebutted by defendants. This being the case, actual expenses of
P48,244.08 may be awarded.
As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that Pleno
is an enterpreneur and the founder of his own corporation, the Mayon Ceramics
Corporation. It appears also that he is an industrious and resourceful person with
several projects in line and were it not for the incident, might have pushed them
through. On the day of the incident, Pleno was driving homeward with geologist
Langley after an ocular inspection of the site of the Mayon Ceramics
Corporation. His actual income however has not been sufficiently established so
that this Court cannot award actual damages, but, an award of temperate or
moderate damages may still be made on loss or impairment of earning capacity.
That Pleno sustained a permanent deformity due to a shortened left leg and that he
also suffers from double vision in his left eye is also established. Because of this,
he suffers from some inferiority complex and is no longer active in business as
well as in social life.

Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory

damages. In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be awarded,
trial courts are guided by our ruling that:

... There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof
of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced
that there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's
commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard
to show certainty in terms of money. Should damages be denied for
that reason? The judge should be empowered to calculate moderate
damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer,
without redress from the defendant's wrongful act.

488
 PEOPLE V. SINGH

360 SCRA 404

FACTS:

Dilbag Singh, private complainant for frustrated murder, recounts that on

November 26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning while he was cleaning his
motorbike in front of the Mendiola Apartment in Barangay Canlalay, Biñan,
Laguna, Dalvir, Balwinder, Gurmok, Jarnail, Amarjit, Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip- all
surnamed Singh-Johander Singh Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived,
shouting foul remarks in their native language and demanding Surinder Singh to
come out of the apartment.

When Surinder Singh came out of his apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab
him but Surinder Singh was able to move away. Dalvir Singh told his companions
to hold Surinder Singh as he will kill him. Thereafter, Dial Singh and Johinder
Singh each held the right and left arms of Surinder Singh, with Kuldip Singh
pushing Surinder Singh on his back. Dalvir Singh then stabbed Surinder Singh,
hitting him on the right side of his stomach, and causing him to fall on the ground.
Dial Singh remarked that Surinder Singh failed to give money and if others will
likewise refuse, the same fate will befall them. As Surinder Singh tried to get up,
Malkit Singh Dhillon and Jarnail Singh started hitting him with lead pipes all over
his body, while Johinder Singh and Dial Singh punched and kicked Surinder.
Amarjit Singh, who was holding a gun, warned everyone not to help Surinder
Singh or else he will shoot. Thereat, when all these things were going on, private
complainant Dilbag Singh tried to stop them but Balwinder Singh stabbed him on
the left side of his back. Gurmok Singh likewise stabbed him with a bolo, but he
was not hit as he was able to move to one side. After that, the ten (10) accused
Indians left.

Dilbag Singh and Surinder Singh, both injured, were brought to the
Perpetual Help Hospital, Biñan, Laguna, by Jaswinder Singh, Johinder Singh Gill,
Balwinder Singh Gill and Alwan Singh, for treatment. There, Surinder Singh was
pronounced dead on arrival.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Surinder Singh are entitled to awards for loss of
earning capacity.
489
RULING:

No, the heirs of Surinder Singh are not entitled to awards for loss of earning
capacity, however, they should be awarded temperate damages.

Awards for loss of earning capacity partake of damages which must be

proven not only by credible and satisfactory evidence, but also by unbiased
proof. The best evidence to substantiate income earned by foreigners while in the
Philippines is the payment of taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Absent
such proof, bare allegation is insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that the
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, and the fact of loss has been
established, appellants shall pay the heirs of Surinder Singh temperate damages in
the amount of P200,000.00.

490
 PEOPLE V. PLAZO

350 SCRA 433

FACTS:

On August 8, 1989, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, Leonor Fabula went out
of her house in May-anao, Tigaon, Camarines Sur to buy sugar at a nearby store.
When she reached the store, she saw appellant boxing her son Romeo Fabula and
banging his head on the post of the store, while asking him why he told the police
about his brother and the location of appellant's house. When Leonor sought to
intervene, appellant got angry at her. She became afraid and asked for help but
nobody went near them. Romeo freed himself from the hold of appellant and ran
away. Appellant chased Romeo with a small bolo known locally as "gatab."
Leonor shouted at appellant to stop but the latter did not heed her pleas. Appellant
caught up with Romeo and stabbed him at the back causing Romeo to fall on the
ground. Appellant continued to stab Romeo in the upper and lower chest area.
Leonor continued shouting for help and eventually someone came to help.
However, when she saw her son no longer moving, she told the people not to touch
or move him because she was going to the Poblacion of Tigaon to get a policeman.

When Patrolmen Virgilio Azucena and Jose Madera arrived at the scene of
the crime, they saw the fallen body of Romeo with a small bolo imbedded on his
chest and the detached handle of the bolo on the ground near his body. The
policemen brought the body to the Municipal Building where the Municipal Health
Officer, Dr. Constancio Tam, conducted an autopsy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the family of the deceased Romeo Fabula is entitled to

nominal damages in lieu of actual damages.

RULING:

Yes. Since the award of actual damages in the amount of P15,712.00 was
based solely on the bare assertions of the mother of the victim, the Court can only
grant such amount for expenses if they are supported by receipts. In the absence
thereof, no actual damages can be awarded. However, in lieu of actual damages,
temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered where it
has been shown that the victim's family suffered some pecuniary loss but the
491
amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. The Court fins the award of
P15,000.00 as temperate damages reasonable. Moral damages cannot be awarded
in the absence of any evidence to support its award.

492
 PNB V. CA

256 SCRA 44

FACTS:
On 11 July 1989, private respondent Carmelo H. Flores (Flores) purchased
from petitioner at its Manila Pavilion Hotel unit, two (2) manager's checks worth
P500,000.00 each, paying a total of P1,000,040.00, including the service charge. A
receipt for said amount was issued by the petitioner.

On 12 July 1989, Flores presented these checks at the Baguio Hyatt Casino
unit of petitioner. Petitioner refused to encash the checks but after a lengthy
discussion, it agreed to encash one (1) of the checks. However, it deferred the
payment of the other check until after Flores agreed that it be broken down to five
(5) manager's checks of P100,000.00 each. Furthermore, petitioner refused to
encash one of the five checks until after it is cleared by the Manila Pavilion Hotel
unit. Having no other option, Flores agreed to such an arrangement. However,
upon his return to Manila, he made representations to petitioner through its Malate
Branch so that the check may be encashed but to no avail. Flores, thereafter, wrote
a letter to his counsel informing the latter of the aforementioned events. A Formal
Demand was made by private respondent's counsel but petitioner persisted in its
refusal to honor the check.

Left with no other choice, Flores filed a case with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. After trial, the court rendered its decision in favor of Flores,
ordering PNB to pay the sum of P100,000.00 representing the amount of the check
dishonored with interest thereon; as well as ordering PNB to pay Flores
P1,000,000.00 moral damages, P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees and costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Is the award of P1,000,000.00 moral and exemplary damages inordinately

disproportionate and unconscionable?

RULING:

493
 Yes. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bench, we rule that the
award of moral and exemplary damages is patently excessive and should be
reduced to a reasonable amount. The award of moral damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00 is obviously not proportionate to the actual losses of P100,000.00
sustained by Flores. Moral damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss
or injury suffered. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a
complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to obviate
the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action.
Its award is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante, and it must be proportional to the suffering inflicted.

As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.
While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not
be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded.

The award of P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages in this case is far too

excessive and should likewise be reduced to an equitable level. Exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as
a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.
Therefore, based on the foregoing discussion, the award of moral damages is
reduced to P100,000.00 and the exemplary damages is likewise reduced to
P25,000.00.

494
 DEL ROSARIO V. CA

267 SCRA 158

FACTS:

Metal Forming Corp. (MFC) advertised there metal shingles

as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL
TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the
strong hook action on its overlaps."  The Spouses Del Rosario through their
contractor Engineer Puno purchased the same believing their representation.

The proper installation procedure expressly specified in the former's brochures

and advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal tile attached to the roof panels
should be by 2 self-drilling screws for 1 metal cleat but instead what was attached
was metal cleats with only 1-inch ordinary nail each and others were fastened with
only 1 wood screw each so the roof was blown by Typhoon Ruping 2 months later

MFC replaced the roof free of charge, in acknowledgment of its one-year

warranty on the materials and their installation. Esteban Adjusters and Valuers,
Inc. hired by the Spouses Del Rosario determined that only with a single wood
screw or a combination of a single wood screw and a 1-inch nail was used. MFC
however declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed by the Del
Rosario Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their home. This prompted
the Spouses Del Rosario to commence a civil action against MFC in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether the Spouses Del Rosario are entitled to exemplary damages.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court holds that exemplary damages are properly
exigible of MFC. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may
be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, While exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved,
although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded." Exemplary damages are imposed not
495
to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a
negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.

From the evidence presented, plaintiffs' sufferings have been duly and
substantially proven by the defendant's fraudulent actuation and breach of
warranty, and thereby entitled for the claim of damages and litigation costs as
enunciated by the testimony of the plaintiff... that the damages to his house caused
sufferings and feelings of shock. helplessness, fears, embarrassment and anger.

INIEGO V. HONORABLE JUDGE PURGANAN

G.R. NO. 166876

MARCH 24, 2006

FACTS:

Private respondent Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and damages

against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic
accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and
employer of Pinion. The complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident when a
freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private respondent’s jitney which
private respondent was driving at the time of the accident. Santos filed a Motion to
Declare defendant in Default allegedly for failure of the latter to file his answer
within the final extended period. Petitioner Iniego filed a Motion to Admit and a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground, among other things, that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the cause of action of the case. Public respondent J.
Purganan issued the assailed Omnibus Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the
petitioner and the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default of the private
respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are
capable of pecuniary estimation.

496
RULING:
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively
actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the
defendant’s alleged tortious acts, and are therefore capable of pecuniary
estimation. It is crystal clear from B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, that what must be determined to be capableor incapable of pecuniary
estimation is not the cause of action, but the subject matter of the action. A cause
of action is "the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in
violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff." On the other hand, the "subject
matter of the action" is "the physical facts, the thing real or personal, the money,
lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not the
delict or wrong committed by the defendant." In Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc., et
al., JBL Reyes said that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which

is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts] would
depend on the amount of the claim.

Fault or negligence, which the Court of Appeals claims is not capable of

pecuniary estimation, is not actionable by itself. For such fault or negligence to be
actionable, there must be a resulting damage to a third person. The relief available
to the offended party in such cases is for the reparation, restitution, or payment of
such damage, without which any alleged offended party has no cause of action or
relief. The fault or negligence of the defendant, therefore, is inextricably
intertwined with the claim for damages, and there can be no action based on quasi-
delict without a claim for damages.

497
 DEL ROSARIO V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.

G.R. NO. 118325

JANUARY 29, 1997

FACTS:

Metal Forming Corp. (MFC) advertised there metal shingles

as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL
TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the
strong hook action on its overlaps."  The Spouses Del Rosario through their
contractor Engineer Puno purchased the same believing their representation.

The proper installation procedure expressly specified in the former's

brochures and advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal tile attached to the
roof panels should be by 2 self-drilling screws for 1 metal cleat but instead what
was attached was metal cleats with only 1-inch ordinary nail each and others were
fastened with only 1 wood screw each so the roof was blown by Typhoon Ruping 2
months later

MFC replaced the roof free of charge, in acknowledgment of its one-year

warranty on the materials and their installation. Esteban Adjusters and Valuers,
Inc. hired by the Spouses Del Rosario determined that only with a single wood
screw or a combination of a single wood screw and a 1-inch nail was used. MFC
however declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed by the Del
Rosario Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their home. This prompted
the Spouses Del Rosario to commence a civil action against MFC in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent MFC is guilty for breach of contract.

RULING:

Yes. MFA is guilty of breach of contact. There was privity of contract

between the Del Rosarios and MFC; Engineer Puno acted as MFC's agent in the
signing of the contracts for the supply and installation of the "Banawe'' shingles;
498
hence, the contract was really between the Del Rosarios and that company. That
MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties
made to the general public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del
Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the
recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." There
being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental trauma
actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is
warranted. Over a period of about a month. they experienced "feelings of shock,
helplessness, fear, embarrassment and anger."

As reflected in the records of the case, the findings of both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court show that petitioners suffered anguish, embarrassment
and mental sufferings due to the failure of private respondent to perform its
obligation to petitioners. According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent
acted in wanton disregard of the rights of petitioners. These pronouncements lay
the basis and justification for the Court to award petitioners moral and exemplary
damages.

499
 INHELDER CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. L-52358

MAY 30, 1983

FACTS:

What commenced the instant proceedings is a case for damages instituted by

private respondent, the Panganiban’s who were residents of Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, against petitioner Inhelder Corportaion, domiciled in Mandaluyong,
Rizal, before the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro. The complaint
alleged that petitioner Inhelder had filed a collection case against the Panganiban’s
before the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, which was subsequently
dismissed. The collection case instituted by petitioner Inhelder was allegedly
unfounded, and that the respondents were entitled, as against petitioner Inhelder, to
quantified damages totalling P169,550.00.  The complaint of the Panganiban’s was
essentially for actual and compensatory damages, moral damages and exemplary
damages, based on the alleged unfounded collection case initiated by Inhelder
Corporation.

ISSUE:

Was the collection suit that was instituted by petitioner Inhelder Corporation
malicious?

RULING:

No.  The collection case was not malicious. Malicious prosecution, to be the
basis of a suit, requires the elements of malice and want of probable cause. There
must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge
was false and groundless. In the present case, there is no evidence on record,
clearly establishing these two elements. Although there may be want of probable
cause, there is no proof that petitioner deliberately initiated the collection case
knowing that the same was false and groundless.

To support an action for malicious prosecution under American law the

plaintiff must prove, in the first place, the fact of the p petition and the fact that the

500
defendant was himself the prosecutor, or that he instigated its commencement, and
that it finally terminated in his acquittal that, in bringing it, the prosecutor had
acted without probable cause, and that he was actuated by legal malice, i.e., by
improper or sinister motives. These three elements must concur; and there is no
distinction between actions for criminal prosecutions and civil suits. Both classes
require substantially the same essentials. Malice is essential to the maintenance of
an action for malicious prosecution and not merely to the recovery of exemplary
damages. But malice alone does not make one liable for malicious prosecution
where probable cause is shown, even where it appears that the suit was brought, for
the mere purpose of vexing harrassing and injuring his adversary. In other words,
malice and want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify the action.

It should also be stressed that the mere filing of a suit does 'not render a
person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful. The law could
not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.  Sound principles of
justice and public policy demand that persons shall have free resort to Courts of
law for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights without fear of later on
standing trial for damages should their actions lose ground.

501
 PEOPLE V. CATUBIG

G.R. NO. 137842

AUGUST 23, 2001

FACTS:

On November 27, 1997, at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, private

complainant Dannilyn Catubig, who was born on August 9, 1985, and her four (4)
younger siblings were watching television in the sala of their house located at
Sunlife Subdivision, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

After an hour, Dannilyn's father, herein appellant Danilo Catubig, arrived

and told Dannilyn's siblings to proceed, as in fact they did proceed, to her aunt's
house which is just located nearby. Thereafter, appellant told Dannilyn to go inside
a room and to lie down on the bed. After Dannilyn had complied, appellant
removed Dannilyn's shorts and panty, while appellant, after removing his brief and
t-shirt, [laid] on top of Dannilyn. Afraid of appellant who beat and raped her in the
past, Dannilyn was not able to resist appellant who succeeded in inserting his penis
into Dannilyn's vagina.

However, Dannilyn's aunt, who got suspicious of what appellant was doing
to Dannilyn, informed the latter's mother, Jocelyn Catubig, about the said
suspicion. Thus, when confronted by her mother, Dannilyn was forced to reveal
that she was indeed raped by appellant. The sexual assault was reported to the San
Jose del Monte Police Station where Dannilyn's sworn statement was subsequently
taken on December 3, 1997. Upon the request of the police authorities, Dannilyn
was examined on December 1, 1997 by Dr. Wilfredo E. Tiera, Medico-Legal
Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, who found out that Dannilyn's
healed laceration in the hymen was caused by sexual intercourse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not complainant Dannilyn Catubig is entitled to exemplary

damages.

502
RULING:

Yes. Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or

corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings and
as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured
or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. The terms punitive or
vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case,
these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like
him from similar conduct in the future.

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim.
The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. In fine, relative to the civil
aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

Relevantly, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, made effective on 01

December 2000, requires aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. A court would thus be
precluded from considering in its judgment the attendance of "qualifying or
aggravating circumstances" if the complaint or information is bereft of any
allegation on the presence of such circumstances.

The retroactive application of procedural rules, nevertheless, cannot

adversely affect the rights of the private offended party that have become vested
prior to the effectivity of said rules. Thus, in the case at bar, although relationship,
the aggravating circumstance present in this case, has not been alleged in the
information, the offense having been committed, however, prior to the effectivity
of the new rules, the civil liability already incurred by appellant remains unaffected
thereby.

503
 ABERCA V. CER, ET. AL.

G.R. NO. L-69866

APRIL 15, 1988

FACTS:

General Fabian Ver ordered Task Force Makabansa, an intelligent unit of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to conduct pre-emptive strikes against know
communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about
CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. Such order caused the alleged
illegal searches and seizures on petitioners and other violations of their rights and
liberties.

The said searches were done with defectively issued search warrants.
Personal items of petitioners were taken. Petitioners were arrested without the
proper arrest warrants issued by the court. During their arrest, they were not
allowed visitation by their relatives and attorneys. Petitioners were interrogated in
violation of their rights to silence and counsel. Military men who interrogated them
threatened them, and different means of torture and forms of violence were
imposed on them while trying to ask incriminating questions or confessions.
Petitioners filed a suit for damages in the Regional Trial Court, but was denied the
same on the grounds that the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them,
the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is suspended and that defendants are immune
from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel
and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.

RULING:
No. The suspension of writ of habeas corpus is not a bar for civil action for
damages. The respondents’ pursuit of preventing or suppressing lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion, and subversion cannot be construed as a blanket license to
504
transgress upon the constitutional rights and liberties of the individual. The
Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, civil or
military, owe obedience to and allegiance at all times.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention
and other violations of their constitutional rights. What is suspended is merely the
right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas
corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

505
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION
V. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORP.

G.R. NO. 175773

JUNE 17, 2013

FACTS:

The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of Mitsubishi Motors

Philippines Salaried Employees Union (MMPSEU) and Mitsubishi Motors
Philippines Corporation (MMPC) provides that the company shoulders the
hospitalizations expenses of the dependents of covered employees subject to
certain limitations and restrictions. Accordingly, covered employees pay part of the
hospitalization insurance premium through monthly salary deduction, while
MMPC pays the expenses incurred for the hospitalization of the covered
employee’s dependents. The conflict arose when MMPC refused to pay the
hospitalization expenses that were paid by the dependent’s own health insurance.
MMPSEU now insists that the covered employees are entitled to the whole and
undiminished amount of said hospital expenses.

Sought for comment, the Insurance Commission claims that the covered
employees can claim insurance benefits for a loss that had already paid by another
insurance company. The Insurance Company opined that in cases of claims for
reimbursement of medical expenses where there are two contracts providing
benefits for such, recovery may be made on both simultaneously without regard to
the amount of total benefits provided by other insurance. This, it said, is consistent
with public policy underlying the collateral source rule – that the courts have
usually concluded that the liability of a health or accident insurer is not reduced by
other possible sources of indemnification or compensation.

As a result, the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) held that the covered employees
may demand simultaneous payment from both the CBA and their dependents’
separate health insurance without resulting in double insurance, since separate
premiums were paid for each contract. The Court of Appeals, however ruled
otherwise because both had the same subject matter, interest insured, and risk or
peril insured against. Hence, the employee will benefit twice for the same loos
resulting in double insurance.

506
ISSUE:

Is MMPSEU liable to pay the whole and undiminished amount of its

employees’ hospitalization expense notwithstanding the amount paid?

RULING:

No. MMPC’s liability is only to the extent of the expenses actually incurred
by their dependents which excludes the amounts shouldered by other health
insurance companies. The employees are not entitled to the whole and
undiminished amount of their hospitalization expense.

The VA based his ruling on the opinion of Atty. Richard David C. Funk II of the
Claims Adjudication Division, applying the collateral source rule, that the
employees may recover benefits from different insurance providers without regard
to the amount of benefits paid by each. As part of American personal injury law,
the collateral source rule was originally applied to tort cases wherein the defendant
is prevented form benefitting from the plaintiff’s receipt of money from other
sources. Under this rule, if an injured person receives compensation for his injuries
from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be
deducted from the damages which he would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.
In a recent Decision by the Illinois Supreme Court, the rules has been described as
“an established exception to the general rule that damages in negligence actions
must be compensatory.” The Court went to explain that although the rule appears
to allow a double recovery, the collateral source will have a lien or subrogation
right to prevent such double recovery.

As seen, the collateral source rule applies in order to place responsibility for losses
on the party causing them. Its application is justified so that “the wrongdoer should
not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or take advantage of
contracts or other relations that may exist between the injured party and third
person.” Thus, it finds no application to cases involving no-fault insurances under
which the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance companies, regardless of
who was at fault in the incident generating the losses. Here, it is clear that MMPC
is a no-fault insurer. Hence, it cannot be obliged to pay the hospitalization
expenses of the dependents of its employees which had already been paid by
separate health insurance providers of said dependents.

507
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. IRENEO JUGUETA

G.R. NO. 202124

APRIL 5, 2016

FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant Ireneo Jugueta was charged with
Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. Jugueta allegedly shot Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old and
Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age. The crime was committed in the
dwelling of the offended party.

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and
Roger San Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder. The crime was
predicated on the appellants attempt to shoot using firearms the house occupied by
the family of Norberto Divina.

Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against

them. At said proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement
stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain “Hapon” and Gilbert
Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm
while the other two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further
stated that Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime scene. Based on the
sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case
against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel. Thus, upon motion of the
prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not civil indemnity, moral, exemplary and temperate damages

were properly awarded in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Criminal Case No. 7702-
G

RULING:

Yes. Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the
matter in detail as regards criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion
508
perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds
of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary
damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in
some instances.

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal

law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial
policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to
actual or compensatory damages in civil law. This award stems from Article 100 of
the RPC which states, “Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.” It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine;
hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. In our jurisdiction, civil
indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter
by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the
victim a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the
law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is
₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum
amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil
indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it.

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are
also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals expounded on the
nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate

one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept
of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to
compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable
of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left
to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1)
injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury
must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219
and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. x x x.
509
 The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v.
Heirs of Rey Castillon: “The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration,
within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.”

Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does
not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the
court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended
party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted
so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

Also known as “punitive” or “vindictive” damages, exemplary or corrective

damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but
not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the
sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that
has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the
defendant – associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice,
gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud – that
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to
refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish
him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded,
not only due to the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of
the offender.

510