16
The Philippines· and the
Bell Report*
Fred Eggan **
Of all the countries of Southeast Asia the Philippines
would seem to have had the best opportunity to develop into
an independent and prosperous nation-in fact, before the
war they were well on their way to that goal. Yet only a
few months ago the Bell Mission returned from a two
months' economic survey of the Philippines with the conclu-
sion "that the Quirino Government was in such a critical
condition that only the most far-reaching program of reform
and self-help, supported by technical and economic assistance
from this country, could save the Philippines from total
collapse."! So serious was the situation reported to be that
even the large sum proposed-$250,000,000 in loans and
gifts over a five-year period-would merely provide a favor-
able environment for the solution of the problems facing them.
Who was primarily to blame for the impending bankruptcy
and the constant threat of revolution which hung over the
land? The United States with its policy of political freedom
and economic dependence, the war with its destruction and
dislocation, or the Filipino politicians themselves? And are
the recommendations of the Bell Report adequate to remedy
the situation?
Since the majority of the countries of Southeast Asia face
similar problems in even more acute form, and since the
Technical Assistance Program proposed by President Truman
is designed to remedy these situations so that prosperous and
*This paper was originally presented in brief form by the author
at a symposium of the Society for Applied Anthropology on "Inter-
national Perspectives in Anthropology," held in connection with the
annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association at
Berkeley, December 27-30, 1950.
**Professor Eggan is Chairman, Department of Anthropology,
University of Chicago.
1. Ne'1.u York Times, October 29,1950, p. 1. The Mission was head-
ed by Daniel W. Bell, banker and former Under Secretary of the
Treasury, and included several top economists and financial experts.
The Bell Report was originally "restricted" but was later released
and is available from the Superintendent of Documents under the
title, "Report to the President of the United States by the Economic
Survey Mission to the Philippines" (Washington, D.C., October 9,
1950) .
HUMAN ORGANIZATION
stable nations may develop, it will be worthwhile to look at
the situation in the Philippines and the recommendations of
the Bell Commission with as much objectivity as possible.
Historical Outline
In historical perspective, Southeastern Asia has long been
a marginal backward area of village cultures, influenced first
by India and China and, later, by powerful commercial
nations from beyond the seas who established trading colonies
and proceeded to exploit the human and natural resources
of the region for their own advantage. The Philippines, by
right of discovery, fell to the Spaniards who ruled them for
almost four centuries. The Spanish domination stopped the
spread of Islam from the southern islands, established Chris-
tianity as the major religion over most of the region, central-
ized government controls in Manila, and laid certain of
the foundations necessary to weld diverse geographical, cul-
tural, linguistic, and racial units into a single entity. The
Spaniards also established a feudal system of land-holding,
and strengthened the nascent class system by establishing
themselves on the top. Caciquism became the expression of
exploitation without corresponding responsibility for assis-
tance, and led to major injustices and frequent revolt.
The American occupation occurred as an incidental result
of the Spanish-American war of 1898, and interrupted a
major rebellion on the part of the Filipinos against the
Spaniards. After considerable indecision, the United States
took on the task of preparing the Filipinos for eventual in-
dependence. In this process public health was greatly im-
proved, public education was widely extended and the literacy
rate increased to approximately 50 percent, control of in-
ternal affairs was turned over to an all-Filipino legislature,
economic conditions and transportation were improved, and
the population increased from around 6,000,000 at the begin-
ning of the American regime to 16,000,000 in 1939. Economic
development took the form of export crops for the American
market: sugar, coconut oil, copra, hemp, and tobacco, as well
as exploitation of mineral resources and commercial activities.
SPRING, 1951
During the 1930's Manuel Quezon, the national leader, by
allying himself with American domestic interests who op-
posed the free entry of sugar and coconut oil, secured the es-
tablishment of a 10-year Commonwealth Government with
full independence scheduled for July 4, 1946.
Preparations for Independence
Starting in 1935 the Philippine government made inten-
sive efforts to prepare itself for its coming freedom: plans
were made to develop a national language, advances were
made in health and public welfare, a program for national
defense was undertaken, laws implementing President Que-
zon's program of "social justice" were passed, and a begin-
ning was made on the tremendous problems of economic
readjustment. For the Tydings-McDuffie Act required
nothing less than the complete reorientation of Filipino eco-
nomic life within a 10-year period.
Summarizing the situation at the beginning of the war in
his monumental study of the Philippines, Professor J. R.
Hayden wrote as follows:
"Whatever the post-war approach to Philippine problems
may be, two general conclusions seem to be warranted by the
development of the Philippines and of Philippine-American
relations since 1898. The first is that the Philippines has
become a nation and although it is not yet an entirely inde-
pendent one it must be dealt with as such. The second con-
clusion is that despite the remarkable accomplishments of
the past four decades, the Philippines still need the protection
and economic support of the United States. A careful study
of every major problem with which the Commonwealth has
been confronted-national unification, racial integrity, na-
tional defense, public education, public health, economic
development, and all the rest-shows not only that the prob-
lem is far from solution, but raises the grave question as to
whether it could be solved were the Philippines actually
left to stand alone and be treated by the United States as
any other foreign state, after 1946."2
I quote Professor Hayden on these points to dispel the
illusion that the problems which face the Philippines today are
primarily the result of the war.
The war, of course, did create new problems and intensify
old ones. The economy was reduced to a subsistence basis,
except for Japanese war needs; "independence" was granted
to a puppet government under President Jose P. Laurel; and
guerrillas made the provinces unsafe for both Japanese forces
and their own countrymen. During the Liberation, :Manila
and other major centers were partially destroyed and Filipino
life was reduced to the bare essentials of existence.
Here was an opportunity for rebuilding the post-war
Philippines from the ground up on a rational economic base.
During the war the United States had promised Filipinos
their scheduled freedom and, in addition, rehabilitation from
the damage of war. But neither the Philippine government-
in-exile nor the American government had done any adequate
planning for the large-scale reconstruction of social and eco-
nomic life essential to that freedom.
2. Joseph RaIson Hayden, The Philippilles, A Study ill Natiollal
Developmellt, New York, Macmillan, 1942, pp. 803-4.
17
Post-War Period
The Commonwealth Government, when reestablished on
Philippine soil, was dominated by politicians who were intent
on saving their own fortunes rather than rebuilding their
country, and the contest between President Osmena and
lVIanuel Roxas over collaboration and other issues dominated
the last year of the Commonwealth. In the meantime Paul V.
McNutt was designated as High Commissioner and sent to
the Philippines to prepare the islands for full transfer of sov-
ereignty and responsibility, except for such matters as air
and navy bases and special privileges for Americans. Not
until independence was practically at hand did Congress pass
the Rehabilitation Act of 1946, providing for some $620,-
OOO,OOO-and even this provision was made dependent on the
acceptance of the Trade Act, which extended the period of
free trade for eight years (to 1954), and added a 20-year
period of graduated duties, or declining quotas, for sugar,
coconut oil, copra, hemp, and other products. One provision
of the Trade Act even required amendment of the Philippine
constitution to grant Americans equal rights with Filipinos
in the development of Philippine natural resources until 1974.
These provisions were designed to rebuild the Philippine
economy right back to its prewar condition of complete de-
pendence on the American market, and postpone to a later
time any rational solution of the economic problems facing
the new nation.
In the postwar period (1945-49) the United States is
estimated to have poured some $2,000,000,000 into the Phil-
ippine economy through army pay, guerrilla benefits, surplus
property gifts, war damage payments, and other activities, in
an uncoordinated and unorganized attempt to keep it afloat.
The assumption seemed to be that if enough money flowed in,
the problems would somehow solve themselves. Instead they
developed into the crisis of November, 1949, in which the
economic structure began to come apart at the seams. Ex-
cessive imports imperiled the dollar reserves, as paJ'ments for
war damage and other purposes began to taper off during
1949, and the flight of capital forced exchange as well as im-
port controls, with consequent reduction in the volume of
trade and commercial activities.
Contributing to the situation were the November elections
in which Elpidio Quirino, determined to remain in the office
to which he had succeeded on the death of President Roxas,
was reported to have utilized all the worst practices of Amer-
ican politicians to win the presidency over Jose P. Laurel,
the arch collaborator, and Jose Avelino, an open advocate
of the spoils system. Rebellion, the traditional form of Filipino
protest against injustice, broke out in Batangas province, and
the Hukbalahaps intensified their war against the government.
The Bell Mission
It was following this crisis that President Truman, at the
somewhat reluctant request of President Quirino, sent the
Economic Survey Mission headed by Daniel W. Bell. The
summary and recommendations of the Bell Report were pub-
lished in the New York Times and the report was published
in full by most of the Manila newspapers. As we have noted,
large sums were to be made available over a period of five
18
years, if basic reforms were carried out with regard to eco-
nomic activities, fiscal practices, and land tenure.
That the sums are adequate, despite post-war inflation, is
probable, since $50,000,000 per year is only slightly less than
the last annual prewar budgets, which included heavy de-
fense items. The important question is whether the diagnosis
of the Bell Mission is an accurate portrayal of the basic
problems besetting the Philippines, and whether the prescrip-
tion offered is a treatment of basic causes or amelioration of
symptoms. The terms of reference directed the lVlission to
a consideration of all aspects of the Philippine economy, in-
cluding agriculture, industry, finance, foreign trade, and
public administration, with special attention to the problem
of raising living standards. The Bell Report recognizes that
these problems are interrelated but it does not take into ac-
count sufficiently the fact that Filipino social structure and
Filipino cultural values are very different from our own,
and that these differences will make many of the remedies
proposed rather difficult to apply.
To take but one example, the strength and significance
of the Filipino class system has never been properly appraised,
since we have been under the illusion that we have broken it
down through democratic processes and the public school
system. Yet the correlation between the political, social, and
economic elite is exceedingly high, and is maintained and
strengthened by marriage, kinship, and compadre relation-
ships. In few places in the world is there as close a relation-
ship between prestige and wealth as there is in the Philippines.
N or has there been as much progress as we like to think in
raising the values attached to manual labor, or in shifting
primary loyalties from the family and region to the nation,
or in developing the moral integrity that distinguishes a
statesman from a politician.
Mission's Recommendations
I. FINANCIAL REFORM
Turning now to the recommendations of the Bell Mission,
they find that the basic economic problem in the Philippines
is inefficient production and very low incomes, and propose
six series of measures to improve economic conditions. The
first recommendation is for financial reform to avoid further
inflation and to meet necessary governmental expenditures.
The remedies suggested are a revision of the tax structure
to increase the proportion collected from high incomes and
large estates, and an overhauling of the tax collecting machin-
ery to collect a greater percentage of taxes due, plus better
credit and investment policies. Tax reforms are long overdue
in the Philippines since tax collections cover only about 60
percent of the current expenditures. Further, taxes are ex-
tremely low and designed primarily for foreign firms and
commercial transactions, and avoidance of the present tax
laws is extreme-a competent Filipino businessman estimates
that only 25 percent of taxes due are collected, part of which
is said to be siphoned off before reaching the Treasury. Yet
when the November, 1949, crisis loomed, the government
preferred to raise the rates rather than increase the percentage
of collections. It is probable that the government will be will-
ing to raise the rates still further-the crucial problem is
whether the present legislature will enforce collections against
HUMAN ORGANIZATION
the top economic group which it represents. Its record in col-
lecting taxes on excess profits on war and surplus property
transactions is not encouraging, and the vision of large sums
in loans and gifts will make it considerably easier to put off
the day of tax reckoning.
II. AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENTS
The second major recommendation is concerned with the
improvement in agricultural production which is an important
problem everywhere in the Far East. Crop yields are to be
increased through experimental stations and extension serv-
ices, rural credit facilities are to be set up to reduce the
excessive interest rates charged by landlords and usurers,
new lands are to be opened for homesteading, and large
estates are to be purchased and resold to the tenants. But all
of these have been tried before and the necessary laws are
already mainly on the books. In most instances, the failures
are due to social and cultural factors rather than to lack of
technical knowledge and skills.
Agriculture, despite contributing over 50 percent of the
total production in the Philippines, has low social prestige,
and the government allots only a small fraction of the budget
to the improvement of agricultural production. Numerous
technical missions have surveyed agricultural activities and
made recommendations, and the Japanese have increased the
yield of rice and other crops in Japan in a phenomenal manner,
yet there has been practically no increase in the yield of rice
per hectare in the Philippines during the whole American
regime.
The resettlement programs in the Koronadal and Ala
valleys in southern lVlindanao, which were underway before
the war, have been largely stripped of funds for the benefit
of rival government corporations. Yet moderate assistance in
the form of better roads and clearance of land titles would
greatly facilitate the flow of settlement. The breaking up of
large estates began with the Friar lands in 1905, and was
revived by President Quezon before the war. That the in-
terests of the tenants are often secondary is indicated by the
history of the Buenavista estate. Originally purchased by the
Government from a Catholic hospital before the war, it was
recently repurchased through an American intermediary for
almost twice the original amount, just two days before the
Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the prewar purchase
agreement. The extra amount was paid to "unknown parties"
and the government cynically defended the transaction on
the grounds that the land was worth the extra amount and
that there would be no losses to the government, since the
cost to the tenants would be increased. The tenants, on the
other hand, believe they should get the land for nothing on
the grounds that the church illegally acquired it from their
ancestors in the first place.
Since the war a better division of the rice crop has been
attained for the tenants in areas such as central Luzon-on
paper, at least. The traditional division of the crop between
landlord and tenant was 50-50, a division that gave each
approximately the same percentage of returns on their respec-
tive investments, but which provided the average tenant with
only some 20 pesos per hectare with which to raise a family.
The postwar law providing for a 70-30 division in favor of
SPRING, 1951
the tenant, if enforced, would ameliorate the situation, but
would not solve the basic problems of overpopulation and low
productivity in central Luzon. Actually the government,
itself composed in good measure of large land owners, has
not only failed to enforce the new regulations but has tol-
erated the organization of private police and civil guards to
fight the tenants' demands.
III. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
Industrial development through diversification of the
economy, development of power, and provision for trans-
portation facilities is the third major recommendation of the
Bell :Mission. Much attention had been given to the problems
of industrial development both by the prewar Common-
wealth Government and the postwar Roxas regime, and a
number of government corporations have been established for
that purpose. The Bell Report recommends the establishment
of a Philippine Development Corporation to coordinate such
enterprises, explore natural resources, and review the laws
with reference to utilization of the public domain. Filipinos
have, in general, refused to invest their private capital in such
enterprises and American capital has been equally reluctant.
Industrialization is, in part, a technical problem involving
special knowledge and high capital investments, both of which
the United States can provide. But the basic resource which
the Philippines can supply most easily is labor, and a variety
of rural industries, geared to the seasonal labor surplus and
requiring low capital outlays, would seem important as well.
And such an approach might partly avoid the profound re-
orientation of Filipino social life and values, which indus-
trialization normally involves. The apparent social disorgan-
ization of American life, the reduction of family loyalties, the
secularization and impersonal competition, are all charac-
teristics of American life which Filipinos profess to despise,
yet they are beginning to develop in industrial centers in the
Philippines and will spread with further industrialization.
For this reason it is particularly important that the problems
of industrialization be thoroughly analyzed and presented
before final programs are adopted.
IV. TRADE CONTROLS
The fourth major recommendation provides for a further
protection of dollar reserves by an emergency tax, not to ex-
ceed a two-year period, of 25 percent on imports of all goods
except foodstuffs. Since the war, imports have been approxi-
mately double exports, a reversal of the prewar situation,
and the voluntary controls instituted in 1948 were not
effective. The demand for American goods as prestige items
is so great among the upper class, however, that it is possible
that a 25 percent tax will not result in the necessary reduc-
tion in imports, so that the recommended continuance of
import and exchange controls is a useful precaution.
More significant is the proposal to reexamine the present
trade agreement in the light of new conditions which have
arisen since 1946. To a greater degree than most Far Eastern
countries, the Philippines is dependent upon trade for the
maintenance of its present standards of living. Manila, which
has doubled its prewar population, is even more immediately
dependent upon commercial activities, and the import and ex-
19
change controls are already bringing about serious problems
such as unemployment and reduced wages. The extension of
the period of free trade will be strongly urged, but the evi-
dence of the past indicates that such will benefit American
interests and the Filipino upper class rather than the average
Filipino. After outlining the advances made during the Amer-
ican regime, former High Commissioner Sayre reported in
1941 that "neither a sizable independent middle class nor an
influential public opinion has developed. The bulle of the
newly created income has gone to the Government, to land-
lords, and to urban areas, and has served but little to ameli-
orate living conditions among the almost feudal peasantry
and tenantry."3
V. SOCIAL REFORMS
The fifth series of recommendations is concerned with
several social reforms designed to improve the lot of this
peasantry and the growing labor population of the urban cen-
ters. Adequate programs of health and education, better hous-
ing conditions, rights to organize free trade unions, legisla-
tion requiring direct payment of wages, and the establishment
of minimum wages for agricultural and other workers to
provide adequate subsistence standards are proposed. These
are particularly essential because since the war, health, educa-
tion, and labor have all lost ground; labor in particular is
under considerable handicaps in terms of company unions,
compulsory arbitration, and denial of the right to strike
against the government. In addition, labor leaders often re-
ceive their workers' wages in a lump sum, from which they
disburse lesser amounts. The problem of agricultural wages
is even more acute, since farm labor is paid as low as one peso
per day, an amount inadequate for bare nutrition. Even be-
fore the war, levels of living in the rice regions of central
Luzon and the Ilocos provinces compared unfavorably with
many parts of China, despite the often-made claim that the
Philippines had the highest standard of living in the Orient. 4
The failure of agricultural wages to keep pace with inflation
is an important contributing factor to the growing strength
of the dissident movement, of which the Hukbalahaps are
the best know example.
VI. GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
The final recommendation is perhaps the most crucial of
all: that public administration in the Philippines be improved
and reorganized to insure honesty and efficiency in the opera-
tion of the government. The average Filipino appears to be
ashamed of his government, and much of Hule propaganda
derives its effectiveness from the inefficiency and corruption
that is almost daily spread over the front pages of the :Manila
press. vVhile Chairman Bell, in his news conference on the
Report, emphasized "that the roots of corruption and graft
lay in the chaos and misery of the immediate postwar period,
when the Filipinos had to use their wits at the sacrifice of
their principles to get along," the roots actually go much
further back than the war period. In periods during the
3. From the Fifth Annual Report of the United States High Com-
missioner to the Philippine Islands, U.S. Government Printing Office,
\Vashington, D.C., p. 34.
4. See Horacio Lava, Levels of Living ill the !locos Region) Philip-
pine Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Manila, 1938.
20
American occupation, when Filipinos were given a relatively
free hand, situations of similar character have developed,
though on a considerably smaller scale. A civil service based
on the merit system was one of the earliest reforms introduced
and model laws are on the books, but they have been period-
ically evaded for political purposes.
Hukbalahap Influence
This program is aimed at improving economic conditions
to such an extent as to minimize the threat of communism in
general and of the Hukbalahaps in particular. Before the
war there was a strong Socialist movement in central Luzon,
led by Pedro Abad Santos who himself came from the upper
class. The factors of overpopulation, low productivity, high
rates of interest, and general lack of incentives have long
been operative in this region, and periodic rebellions have
occurred, the last of which, the Sakdalista revolt of 1935, was
suppressed with considerable loss of life.
The war changed this situation in many respects. The
landlords fled to the relative safety of lVlanila, for the most
part, and the Japanese encouraged the cultivation of all un-
used land, so that tenants achieved a temporary independence
from want. Early in the war the Hukbalahap, the People's
Army against the Japanese, was formed out of a coalition of
Socialist, Communist, labor, agricultural workers, and other
groups. They gradually collected arms and participated in
guerrilla warfare against the Japanese, but also began a
political and military program which paralleled in many
respects that of the Chinese Communists in Yenan, includ-
ing indoctrination and education of the masses and land re-
forms in areas under their control.
During the "liberation" the Huk forces aided the Filipinos
and Americans to a considerable extent. But after the war
they turned against America as an agent of imperialism and
refused to disband their organization or give up their arms.
As landlords returned to the rural regions and attempted to
regain control of their lands-and collect wartime rents as
well-conflicts broke out again. Civilian guards were or-
ganized by the landlords and the government aided with
military police. After several attempts at compromise, during
which both sides made concessions and then went back on
their agreements, the government finally decided on a policy
of extermination, and turned the constabulary loose-and
later the army and airforce. But the Huks, under the leader-
ship of Luis Taruc, a disciple of Pedro Abad Santos, have
generally held their own. Fighting guerrilla warfare in their
own territory, they have maintained the support and assistance
of the great mass of peasants in the area. The success of
the Chinese Communists has strengthened morale and has led
to some support from the Chinese population in the Philip-
pines, the extent of which is not clearly known. During the
postwar period the Communist elements in the Hukbalahap
movement have increased in strength, though their propa-
ganda is still largely nationalistic and directed against cor-
ruption and inefficiency in the Filipino government and Amer-
ican economic imperialism. That this propaganda is effective
is indicated by the considerable sympathy with which the Huk
cause is discussed by Filipinos outside central Luzon who are
also anxious for governmental reforms and who believe, in
HUMAN ORGANIZATION
many instances, that the Huks are fighting their battle
against the government. The balance of power in this situa-
tion may well be in the hands of the Chinese population in
the Philippines. The Chinese have been strong supporters of
the Nationalist Government up to now, but the necessities of
commercial life may cause them to shift their allegiance to
the Communists. Moreover, illegal immigration of Chinese
has been taking place on a large scale in the last few years,
adding an unknown factor to the situation.
Technical Assistance Problems
These few comments suggest that the problem of improv-
ing the conditions of life of the average Filipino peasant and
worker is not simply one of providing technical "know how"
and sufficient funds to get the program under way. From the
viewpoint of the social scientist, the greatest problem will
be to persuade the conservative landlord ruling class that
it is to its ultimate advantage to provide such reforms as the
Bell Mission proposes-and more. The recommendations in-
clude acceptance of an American technical mission to super-
vise the expenditures of United States funds and the coordina-
tion of the various programs proposed. This involves the
question of "face" as well as that of sovereignty, for Filipinos
do not like criticism any better than we do. The initial
reaction of the Philippine government was one of anger, but
pressure of press opinion has forced preliminary acceptance
of the offer.
The technical mission will have to look at the total social
and cultural situation in the Philippines and see the political,
social, and economic aspects in their interrelations-rather
than merely concentrating on the economic problems. Nor
can they take the surface phenomena of lVlanila life at their
face value. As Professor Hayden points out:
" . . . society in the Philippines is divided horizontally to
an extent unknown in the Occident. The breadth and depth
of the chasm existing in every Asiatic country between the
ten, fifteen and twenty percent of the population at the top
and the eighty or ninety percent at the bottom constitutes one
of the most significant of the oft-sung differences between
the East and the West. The Philippines is organized as a
political democracy; it contains no legally privileged classes;
under its liberal constitution all men are equal before the
law. Yet forty years under the Stars and Stripes and the
Filipino's own bandera de libertad have done little more
than prepare the way for social and economic, and for that
matter, genuine political equality."5
One important reason for this situation is the fact that
the growing middle class in the Philippines does not play its
historic role of absorbing important elements from top and
bottom and creating the basic values of the society. In the
past, the Chinese have represented the bulk of the middle
class, and as such are an alien wedge in Filipino society, and
frequently have served as scapegoats in past crises. The
nascent Filipino middle class is in direct economic competition
with the Chinese, which effectively inhibits its playing an im-
portant role in Filipino social life in the near future.
The Filipino elite will find it to their advantage to co-
5. J. R. Hayden, op. cit., p. 22.
SPRING, 1951
operate with the technical miSSIOn since they have been the
main beneficiaries of our economic policies in the past. But
they are likely to balk at social reforms, since the upper-class
frequently seems to consider peasants and laborers as belong-
ing to a lower order of mankind and has little interest in
improving their condition. The attitudes of the Filipino
elite towards Americans are at best ambivalent and frequently
close to real hatred, the results of their long period of political
dependence and opposition to American control, and reactions
to American complacency, and the caste-consciousness of
American businessmen and officials. Only a relatively few
intellectuals see the problems in perspective and the moderate
position has never gained political support in the Philippines.
The mass of the people at the lower end of the socio-eco-
nomic scale have few spokesmen and have benefited the least
from the American occupation-yet the real progress they
have made and the hopes held out to them make them our
best friends. If the technical mission is to accomplish the
"greatest good for the greatest number," they will need to
spend a considerable amount of their time, energy, and funds
in the provinces. For much of the program will require
face-to-face contacts in the field and the relationships estab-
lished will be crucial to the success of the entire program.
Our technical knowledge cannot be directly transplanted but
will require experimentation, pilot projects, and demonstra-
tions on a large scale. And the effects of industrialization on
rural life in their social and cultural aspects, as well as in
providing a better economic base, must be seriously considered.
Only when the Filipinos clearly understand the alternative
choices can they make intelligent decisions.
If we look for a moment at the wider sphere of Southeast
Asia we can see the same problems which face the Philippines
in even more acute form. The cultural backgrounds of the
various countries are diverse and they are generally less af-
fected by westernization than is the case with the Philippines.
And in almost all the countries of Southeast Asia the forces
of nationalism are so strong that the satisfactory settlement
of the problems of colonialism and imperialism is a necessary
prelude to any serious consideration of other problems.
In all of these countries Technical Assistance Programs
will require not only technological aid and ample funds but
all the knowledge that social science can provide, if they are
to achieve adequate results. To the problems of controlling
social and cultural change, the social scientist can contribute
a great deal-if the objectives are to assist peoples to par-
ticipate democratically in the solution of their own problems.
But the number of people trained in the understanding of
21
cultures other than their own is few, and the number of ad-
ministrators willing to utilize their special knowledge and
non-ethnocentric point of view is even fewer. Without such
cooperation the Programs can only be partially successful.
Returning to the Philippines, it is clear that no single
set of forces or factors is solely to blame for the present
crisis. American colonial policy was, in general, enlightened
and well administered in terms of the knowledge of the
period, but it failed to evaluate accurately the economic and
social realities and it succumbed too often to political expedi-
ency. Nor did American practice approximate democratic
ideals in many of the social relations between Americans and
Filipinos. The economic destruction wrought by the war was
great, but perhaps even more serious are the psychological
consequences of the Japanese occupation in terms of col-
laboration and guerrilla problems. These have not been re-
solved and will continue to affect Filipino life for another
generation. Nor has the anti-American propaganda of the
Japanese failed to leave its mark.
The failure of the resistance movement to produce any
strong leadership, left the government in the hands of the
prewar ruling group. The death of President Quezon in
1944 removed one of the few leaders who had risen above
politics to a consideration of the country as a whole. The
reconvened legislature devoted itself to personal rather than
to national interests; that practically its first act was to vote
itself three years' back pay is symbolic of its postwar behavior.
The Bell Report provides the first comprehensive and re-
alistic report on the economic problems facing the Philippines
and a prescription for their remedy. It is clearly recognized
that the proposed program is not an automatic solution for
their economic ills, but that the Filipino people must work
out their own solutions, with our help. We have tried to
point out some of the social and cultural dimensions of the
economic problem which need to be taken into consideration,
if our help is to be adequate. Already there are rumors from
the Philippines that the participation of the technical mission
will be merely nomillal. If this should happen it would be a
tragedy of the first order. The Philippines need our best as-
sistance both in money and in technical and social science
knowledge, and the Filipino people as a whole are entitled
to the best that we have to offer. We likewise need a blue-
print for assistance to other new nations of Southeast Asia
which will he mutually advantageous. If we are distracted
from these major goals by political or personal ends, and
fail to carry out our share of the task, we will sabotage one
of the few effective instruments for world stability and peace
which we possess.