The Catch-22 of UNSCR 2242: Investigating

the Discursive and Institutional Complexities

of Integrating Women, Peace and Security
and Countering Violent Extremism

Lucy McDermott

Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Politics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
University of Surrey

Supervisors:
Professor Roberta Guerrina
Dr Ciaran Gillespie

© Lucy McDermott 2021

Declaration

This thesis and the work to which it refers are the results of my own efforts. Any ideas, data,
images or text resulting from the work of others (whether published or unpublished) are fully
identified as such within the work and attributed to their originator in the text, bibliography or
in footnotes. This thesis has not been submitted in whole or in part for any other academic
degree or professional qualification. I agree that the University has the right to submit my work
to the plagiarism detection service TurnitinUK for originality checks. Whether or not drafts have
been so-assessed, the University reserves the right to require an electronic version of the final
document (as submitted) for assessment as above.

Signature:

Date: 24/12/2021

2
Abstract
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2242 (2015) called for the greater
integration of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda with efforts to counter terrorism
and violent extremism. The integration of WPS with an approach to security that has been
heavily critiqued for its securitising, racialised and gendered logic raises concerns for many
feminists. This thesis takes this nexus as a point of departure to investigate ‘does the UK’s
interpretation and institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 represent transformative
change or instrumental co-optation of the WPS agenda?’. This thesis draws on Feminist
Security Studies, Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist Institutionalism to develop a
framework for analysing the discursive and institutional complexities of the UK’s integration of
WPS and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) and the challenges of gender
mainstreaming in security policy and practice. A Critical Frame Analysis (CFA) of policy
documents was used to destabilise the naturalness of the UK’s interpretation of WPS and
P/CVE and elite interviews were conducted to highlight the institutional factors that shaped
this particular interpretation. The findings reveal that the UK’s approach to WPS has limited
transformative potential and there are institutional obstacles that constrain this. Moreover, the
UK’s integration of P/CVE with WPS is heavily linked to enhancing the operational
effectiveness of P/CVE efforts, reflects wider security objectives and, in some cases,
reproduces gendered and racialised hierarchies, which suggests a co-optation of the WPS
agenda and a contradiction with much of its normative ambitions. Nevertheless, the decision
to integrate WPS with P/CVE is complex, as without engagement between the agendas any
potential feminist influence is forfeited, however, partaking in this space may result in
concessions, co-optation and the removal of an option to reject the basic premises of P/CVE.
This is the ‘Catch-22’ of UNSCR 2242.

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Acknowledgements
Writing this thesis has been a real privilege and I am so thankful that I have had the opportunity
to undertake this challenge. It has been such a rewarding and intellectually stimulating
(although arduous) experience and the disruption of a global pandemic certainly provided
some extra adversity. While my perseverance is something I am immensely proud of, it goes
without saying that this thesis would not have been possible without the support from a number
of people, whom I would like to extend my thanks to.

I would like to start by thanking my supervisors, Professor Roberta Guerrina and Dr Ciaran
Gillespie. I thank them for their intellectual guidance, advice and calm reassurance. They have
not only helped illuminate the path this research has taken but also allowed me to find my own
academic feet. I would like to thank Roberta, in particular, for her continued mentorship and
supervision as I have progressed through my BSc, MSc and PhD, and for all the opportunities
she has encouraged me to take. Without your guidance and friendship, my academic life would
have been in no way as enriched nor enjoyable and for that I really do thank you.

My gratitude also extends to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Surrey
for their funding for this research; this thesis would not have been possible without it. I would
also like to thank my PhD colleagues, Graziella Piga and Olga Franczak, for their
companionship throughout the PhD, for all the makeshift virtual writing retreats during
lockdown and for making me feel less isolated in this process.

I am deeply thankful for all the interviewees who gave up their time to speak with me and for
taking the time to introduce me to others. I cannot name them due to my duty in protecting
their anonymity; however, they formed a large part of this research, and I am so grateful for
their contributions. I would also like to take the time to thank all those who work tirelessly and
bravely in advocating for women’s rights and gender equality globally and to all the remarkable
feminist scholars whose work this thesis builds upon.

To all my family and friends, who have been so supportive and understanding of my PhD
journey and were really there for me when life took some difficult turns, thank you.

In particular, I would like to thank my long-suffering parents, Carol and James. I am immensely
fortunate to have such supportive, kind and encouraging parents; you have both always made
me feel so loved. Mum, I am so grateful for the chats, walks, hugs, and coffee… and for getting
me to gain some vital perspective when I needed it. Dad, thank you for always having a
solution for any of the problems I throw at you and no matter the circumstances, I know I can
always count on you.

To my sister, Kate, I do not know how people navigate the world without having a best friend
and sister rolled into one, I know I am so fortunate to have you. Thank you for your no-
nonsense approach to life, for being the person who makes me really laugh and for always
being my number one cheerleader.

To Jack, my love, I will forever be grateful for your kindness, calmness and resolute support
throughout this PhD, its completion is a testament to our teamwork and yes… we did ‘get
through it together’.

Carol, James, Kate and Jack, this thesis is dedicated to you with love and appreciation.

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................................. 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................................. 4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................................... 7
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES .................................................................................................................................... 8
1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 9
1.1 THE RESEARCH PUZZLE....................................................................................................................................... 9
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 12
1.3 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE .......................................................................................................................... 14
1.3.1 An Emerging International Policy Framework on Gender and P/CVE ................................................ 17
1.4 THESIS ROADMAP ........................................................................................................................................... 22
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS ............................................................................................................................................. 28
1.6 CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................................. 29
2.0 THE FEMINIST CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATING WOMEN WITH PEACE AND SECURITY .............................. 31
2.1 WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY: A TRANSFORMATIVE AGENDA? ............................................................................. 33
2.1.1 Transforming or Sustaining ‘Security’ ................................................................................................ 33
2.1.2 Gender, Peace and Security? .............................................................................................................. 35
2.1.3 National Action Plans and the Reproduction of Global Racialised Hierarchies .................................. 37
2.1.4 Institutional Approaches to the Analysis of WPS ............................................................................... 39
2.2 WOMEN, GENDER AND RACE IN COUNTER TERRORISM/COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM ......................................... 41
2.2.1 Gendered and Racialised Narratives in CT and P/CVE........................................................................ 42
2.2.3 Where are the Women? Perpetrators, Victims and Preventers ......................................................... 46
2.2.4 Gender Perspectives and P/CVE ......................................................................................................... 51
2.3 WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM ................................................................... 56
2.3.1 A Debate of Pessimism and Optimism ............................................................................................... 57
2.3.2 The Challenges of Implementing WPS and P/CVE .............................................................................. 59
2.4 CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................................. 62
3.0 THEORISING AT THE NEXUS OF WPS AND P/CVE .................................................................................... 64
3.1 FEMINIST SECURITY STUDIES ............................................................................................................................. 65
3.1.1 Addressing the Limitations of Critical Approaches to Security ........................................................... 66
3.1.2 Conceptualising Security as Narrative................................................................................................ 69
3.1.3 Gendered Hierarchies in International Security ................................................................................. 70
3.1.4 Gender as a Transformative Force in Security? .................................................................................. 72
3.2 POST-COLONIAL FEMINISM ............................................................................................................................... 72
3.2.1 Global Racial Hierarchies: Representations of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ in Security .......................... 73
3.2.2 The Problem of Colonial Amnesia ...................................................................................................... 76
3.3 FEMINIST INSTITUTIONALISM ............................................................................................................................. 77
3.3.1 Feminist Institutionalism and Security Institutions ............................................................................ 78
3.3.2 Gender Mainstreaming: Tinker, Tailor, Transformation? .................................................................. 80
3.3.3 Gender Expertise and Feminist Triangles ........................................................................................... 84
3.3.4 The Risks of Co-optation and Agenda Hijacking................................................................................. 85
3.4 BRIDGING THE THEORIES .................................................................................................................................. 89
3.5 CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................................. 92
4.0 RESEARCHING WPS AND P/CVE .............................................................................................................. 94
4.1 THE RESEARCH PARADIGM: FEMINIST ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY .............................................. 95
4.2 REFLEXIVITY: THE SITUATED KNOWER ................................................................................................................. 97
4.3 CASE SELECTION: THE UNITED KINGDOM ............................................................................................................ 98
4.4 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION: DOCUMENTS AND ELITE INTERVIEWS................................................................... 100
4.4.1 Documents ....................................................................................................................................... 101
4.4.2 Elite Interviews ................................................................................................................................. 103
4.4.3 Research Ethics and Interview Style ................................................................................................. 106
4.4.4 Data Management ........................................................................................................................... 109

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 4.5 METHOD OF ANALYSIS: CRITICAL FRAME ANALYSIS.............................................................................................. 110
4.5.1 Operationalising Critical Frame Analysis for Investigating the Discursive and Institutional
Complexities of Women, Peace and Security ............................................................................................ 114
4.6 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................ 120
5.0 CONTEXTUALISING AND MAPPING THE UK’S FORMALISED ADOPTION OF UNSCR 1325 AND 2242 ....... 122
5.1 THE UK’S WPS INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES...................................................................................................... 123
5.1.1 Introducing the Key Actors ............................................................................................................... 123
5.1.2 The UK’s Women, Peace and Security ‘Feminist Triangle’ ............................................................... 129
5.2 A WOMEN-FRIENDLY STATE? THE UK’S COMMITMENTS TO GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS ....................... 137
5.3 THE UK’S APPROACH TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM ................................................................................ 141
5.4 MAPPING THE UK’S POLICY ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY ............................................................................ 146
5.4.1 A Framework for Implementation: National Action Plans, Annual Reports and Guidance Notes .... 147
5.4.2 Championing Women, Peace and Security Internationally .............................................................. 152
5.5 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................ 157
6.0 THE UK’S INTERPRETATION OF UNSCR 1325 AND 2242 ......................................................................... 159
6.1 WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY: WHAT IS THE PROBLEM REPRESENTED TO BE? ........................................................ 160
6.1.1 The Problem Holders (and the Problem Solvers) .............................................................................. 161
6.1.2 Participation and Protection: A Problem of Women’s Exclusion and Vulnerability.......................... 166
6.1.3 Minor Frames: Women’s Needs, Access to Justice and Prevention.................................................. 179
6.1.4 The Meaning of ‘Gender’ in Women, Peace and Security ................................................................ 181
6.1.5 2018 – 2022 National Action Plan: The ‘Gender Inequality’ Diagnostic Frame? .............................. 185
6.2 INTEGRATING COUNTERING AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UK’S INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN, PEACE AND
SECURITY .......................................................................................................................................................... 188
6.2.1 Women’s Invisibility in P/CVE ........................................................................................................... 189
6.3 THE GUIDANCE NOTE: THE PROBLEM OF GENDER-BLIND P/CVE ........................................................................... 197
6.4 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................ 206
7.0 THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITIES OF UNSCR 1325 AND 2242 ............................................................ 209
7.1 INTERROGATING THE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS TO GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN SECURITY .................................... 210
7.1.1 Narrow Visions of WPS..................................................................................................................... 211
7.1.2 Baby Steps and Small Victories: Misunderstanding or Resistance? ................................................. 213
7.1.3 Women, Peace and Security and the Ministry of Defence: Fighting its way into military thinking.. 216
7.2 THE P/CVE TURN: A TOP-DOWN PROCESS ....................................................................................................... 219
7.2.1 P/CVE Policy Drivers ......................................................................................................................... 220
7.2.2 Cautionary Counternarratives .......................................................................................................... 224
7.3 THE CHALLENGES OF GENDERING P/CVE .......................................................................................................... 232
7.3.1 Leaving the Door Open for Co-optation: Policy Contradiction, Silences and Ambiguity .................. 232
7.3.2 Securitising Feminism or Feminising Security? ................................................................................. 236
7.3.3 The Opportunities and Challenges of Engaging with Civil Society, Grassroots and Women’s Rights
Organisations ............................................................................................................................................ 239
7.4 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................ 241
8.0 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: THE CATCH-22 OF UNSCR 2242? ......................................................... 244
8.1 THESIS SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS ............................................................................................................... 244
8.2 DISCUSSION: THE CATCH-22 OF UNSCR 2242 .................................................................................................. 250
8.3 THESIS IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................... 252
8.4 CONTRIBUTIONS ........................................................................................................................................... 254
8.5 LIMITATIONS AND AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH.................................................................................................. 256
8.6 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................ 257
9.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... 259

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List of Abbreviations

AAPG All Party Parliamentary Group

CAAC Children and Armed Conflict
CAQDAS Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CFA Critical Frame Analysis
CHODS Chief of Defence Staff Network
CONTEST UK’s Counter Terrorism Strategy
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CSSF Conflict Stability and Security Fund
CT Counter Terrorism
DFID Department for International Development
FCAS Fragile and Conflict Affected States
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FSS Feminist Security Studies
FI Feminist Institutionalism
GAPS Gender Action for Peace and Security
GBV Gender-Based Violence
IR International Relations
JICTU Joint International Counter Terrorism Unit
JSP Joint Services Publication
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MOD Ministry of Defence
NAP National Action Plan
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA Official Development Assistance
P/CVE Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism
PSVI Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative
RAP Regional Action Plan
SDG Sustainable Development Goals
SEA Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SU Stabilisation Unit
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UN CTC United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee
UN CTED United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
VAWG Violence Against Women and Girls
VE Violent Extremism
VEO Violent Extremist Organisation
WHRDs Women Human Rights Defenders
WoT War on Terror
WPS Women, Peace and Security
WPR What’s the Problem Represented to be? Approach
XRW Extreme Right Wing

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List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: References to Violent Extremism and/or Terrorism in UNSCR’s on WPS 18

Table 2: Theorising Gender Mainstreaming 83
Table 3: Data Collection Summary 101
Table 4: The UK’s National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security 148
Table 5: UK National Action Plan Implementation and Focus Countries 163
Table 6: Code Frequency of Framing of 'Men' and 'Women' in the UK NAPs 168
Table 7: Word Frequencies of ‘men/women and children’, ‘women and girls’, ‘men and boys’
in UK WPS Policy Documents 183
Table 8: Word Frequencies of ‘Women’ ‘Men’ ‘Female’ ‘Male’ ‘Girl/s’ and ‘Boy/s’ in UK WPS
Policy Documents 183
Table 9: Word Frequencies of 'Gender', 'Masculinity/ies' and 'Femininity/ies' in the UK's WPS
Policy Documents 184

Figure 1: New Security Issues in WPS National Action Plans 2005 – 2019 19
Figure 2: Theory Triangulation Diagram 90
Figure 3: The UK's Feminist Triangle 130
Figure 4: Ministry of Defence WPS Organisational Chart 132
Figure 5: Imagery of Women in UK WPS Policy Documents 169
Figure 6: Imagery of Women with Children in UK WPS Policy Documents 170
Figure 7: Imagery of Women in the Military in the UK WPS Policy Documents 173
Figure 8: Imagery of Women as Victims in the UK's WPS Policy Documents 176
Figure 9: UK NAP on WPS 2018 - 2022: Guidance Note - Implementing Strategic Outcome
3: Gender-Based Violence Cover Page 177
Figure 10: 'Men' and 'Boys' Framing in UK National Action Plans on WPS 177
Figure 11: Code Frequencies of 'Gender Equality' and 'Gender Inequality/ies' in UK National
Action Plans on WPS 186
Figure 12: UK NAP Image on Strategic Outcome 6 190
Figure 13: UK NAP 2018 – 2022: Strategic Outcome 6 Indicators 193
Figure 14: Annual Report to Parliament 2019: Strategic Outcome 6 Indicators 194
Figure 15: Annual Report to Parliament 2020: Strategic Outcome 6 Indicators 195
Figure 16: Guidance Note on Implementing Strategic Outcome 6 Across the Programme
Cycle Diagram 203
Figure 17: The Catch-22 of Feminism and P/CVE 251

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1.0 Introduction

1.1 The Research Puzzle

In 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2242 (UNSCR 2242), which
called on member states to work towards the greater integration of the Women, Peace and
Security (WPS) agenda with efforts to counter-terrorism (CT) and violent extremism (VE). This
rapprochement of the agendas reflects the changing priorities in the global security context,
which establishes terrorism and violent extremism as one of the greatest threats to peace and
security in present times. Although the policy shift to integrate CT and VE into the UN WPS
agenda begins to address the exclusion of women, and gender, from areas of security
traditionally dominated by men and masculinised perspectives, it is also potentially dangerous.
Whilst it is evident that women and girls can be victims, perpetrators and preventers of
terrorism and VE (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2011; Cook, 2019; Gordon and True, 2019; Pearson,
Winterbotham and Brown, 2020) and gender perspectives are an integral feature of
understanding VE as a phenomenon and therefore how to counter it (Ezekilov, 2017;
Johnston, Iqbal and True, 2020; Phelan, 2020; True and Eddyono, 2021), concerns have been
raised regarding the instrumentalisation, co-optation and agenda-hijacking of WPS for
P/CVE/CT efforts which can result in significant gendered security harms (Allison, 2013; Pratt,
2013a; Ní Aoláin, 2016; Giscard D’Estaing, 2017; Heathcote, 2018; Eddyono and Davies,
2019; Asante and Shepherd, 2020). Security and development institutions and their
approaches to P/CVE/CT are informed by ‘gendered assumptions, gendered labels and
gendered hierarchies’ that impact how actors behave, determine policy priorities and
approaches to security (Sjoberg, 2018: 46) and in turn they can adversely (re)produce
gendered assumptions and hierarchies and impact persons of different genders differently
(Huckerby, 2020). Additionally, conceptually and in practice, security and P/CVE/CT strategies
are permeated with underlying assumptions, narratives and discourses that can produce and
reproduce racialised hierarchies and securitising logics (Doty, 1996; Bilgin, 2010; Pratt, 2013a;
Achilleos-Sarll, 2018 and Ali, 2020).

On the other hand, the UN WPS agenda, which has been forged through ten UNSC
resolutions to date, is ‘a product of women activists’ and their struggles for peace and in
addressing the ‘significant violence and inequality that characterises conflict and war’ and
affects women and children disproportionately (Tickner and True, 2018: 225). Consequently,
there are conceptual and practical tensions in attempts to integrate WPS and P/CVE, as WPS
was initially built on feminist principles of peace and equality, whereas P/CVE has emerged

9
from a highly securitised, racialised and gendered CT agenda, and this is the initial puzzle that
drives this thesis. The decision for WPS, and feminists more broadly, to engage with
P/CVE/CT is complex, as Ní Aoláin (2016) highlights that self-exclusion from this space results
in a forfeit of any influence on it, but on the other hand, partaking in this space may mean high
levels of compromise, concessions, potential co-optation and the removal of an option to reject
the basic premises of P/CVE/CT. This is the ‘Catch-22’ of UNSCR 2242.

In order to interrogate this puzzle, it is necessary to comprehend the nature of the UNSCR’s
on WPS as a thematic area. UNSCR 1325 is one of the most significant global normative
frameworks that aims at addressing the gender-specific impacts of conflict on women and
girls, through a promotion of their participation in peace and security processes, protection
against sexual and gender-based violence and in supporting their roles in the prevention of
conflict. Many UN member states formally express their commitment to gender mainstreaming
into their peace and security processes and practice through their support of WPS (Joachim
and Schneiker, 2012) and based on this normative framework, adopt National Action Plans
(NAPs) to guide their state practice on WPS (True, 2016). NAPs can be regarded as
exemplary of a states norm interpretation and implementation. However, the ‘vague and
illusive’ nature of international norms, like WPS, means that it can be interpreted and
reinterpreted in divergent and dissonant ways by different actors (Van Kersbergen and
Verbeek, 2007). Therefore, as WPS goes through a process of policy diffusion it may transition
and adjust as it moves from one institution to another, so that it makes sense in that context
(Kronsell and Svedberg, 2012:11) which could be considered a ‘localisation’ of WPS (George
and Shepherd, 2016). Indeed, UNSCR 2242 has high levels of abstraction and little
specification for how to mainstream gender into P/CVE/CT.

As UNSCR 1325 and 2242 are diffused from the UN level to member states and further into
departments and their work ‘on the ground’, there is a process of identification and meaning
given to mainstreaming gender into P/CVE as a policy problem. This process does not occur
in a vacuum, rather it is situated within a wider context of political and institutional dynamics
and competing priorities that influence this process. This process and its results are significant
as the representational and institutional practices of how gender is integrated into P/CVE
approaches by member states is what gives meaning and significance to international norm
commitments and thus illuminates the value of UNSCR1325 and 2242 in transforming
approaches to P/CVE/CT. Therefore this thesis aims to expose the discursive and institutional
complexities of WPS and the subsequent policy shift to include P/CVE and CT within that. For

10
this study, discursive politics means ‘the intentional or unintentional engaging of policy actors
in conceptual disputes that result in meanings attributed to the terms and concepts employed
in specific contexts’ through policy frames (See Lombardo, Meier and Verloo, 2009: 10) and
institutionally, how those meanings and frames are constructed and constrained by institutions
that have gendered norms, rules and practices at work (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010:
573), which has a concomitant effect on the potential for political change and the
institutionalisation of particular frames. This thesis draws on UK policy documents, speeches
and press releases on WPS and P/CVE/CT, civil society consultation documentation and
interviews with civil servants and civil society actors, to investigate the UK’s interpretation and
institutionalisation of WPS and P/CVE and how UNSCR 1325 and 2242 has gone through a
form of localisation.

The UK is an interesting case to investigate as it has attempted to integrate P/CVE into its
National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS directly and subsequently produced a guidance note
aimed at providing detailed guidance on how best to undertake this work in its programming.
The UK is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and is the penholder
for the WPS thematic area (Security Council Report, 2020). Additionally, the UK has been
perceived as a norm entrepreneur in this space, based on the UK’s leadership on the WPS
Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI). Regarding P/CVE, the UK is also the
co-chair of the 2242 Informal Expert Group on WPS (PeaceWomen, 2020). Combined, these
factors situate the UK as a potential leader or role model in this space as it employs WPS as
a feature of its soft power, which means its political interpretative decisions on WPS and
P/CVE may influence other states.

Overall, as the inclusion of P/CVE in National Action Plans on WPS becomes increasingly
ubiquitous (Asante and Shepherd, 2020), this thesis provides a necessary investigation into
how this largely ambiguous norm is being diffused into state-level policy. This is significant as
it provides evidence of the discursive and institutional complexities of combining two agendas
that have seemingly inconsistent objectives. It fills an existing gap in the literature in
understanding what factors shape the interpretation of how P/CVE should be integrated with
WPS, which ultimately determines its transformative potential. In addition, it provides evidence
of the strengths and limitations of gender mainstreaming as a policy objective in this space.
Whilst much of the current feminist literature on P/CVE and WPS claims there are immense
risks of co-optation of the WPS agenda and potential to uphold securitised narratives in this
policy shift (Ní Aoláin, 2016; Heathcote, 2018; Aroussi, 2020; White, 2020), we cannot yet fully

11
account for the processes of co-optation and the institutional factors that enable or resist this.
Therefore, this thesis provides necessary and timely acumen of some of these factors, to build
feminist knowledge of how to mitigate this in the future. More broadly, it also contributes to
wider debates on what the integration of P/CVE into approaches to WPS means for the future
of the agenda, as a feminist enterprise and as a mechanism for reaching gender-just
sustainable peace. This research, therefore, has a direct relationship to, and implications for,
future WPS policy, gender mainstreaming and its integration with P/CVE.

1.2 Research Questions and Objectives

At the very crux of this thesis is the following research question ‘does the UK’s interpretation
and institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 represent transformative change or
instrumental co-optation of the WPS agenda?’. The literature reviewed in this thesis (see
chapter two) revealed how WPS and P/CVE as separate agendas and together, can
(re)produce gendered and racialised hierarchies. However, P/CVE has been particularly
criticised for its securitising and racialised logics, which revealed tensions in the integration of
WPS with efforts to P/CVE. The integration of these agendas poses an inherent risk to the
transformative potential of WPS, as feature of global gender equality norms. Consequently,
the overarching research question stems from a broader aim to consider whether the UK’s
interpretation of WPS and the subsequent policy shift to include P/CVE within that represents
transformative change or whether this is a co-optation of the WPS agenda and the language
of gender and women’s rights, in order to enhance the operational effectiveness of P/CVE. In
order to unpack this research question further, this thesis has the following further sub-
questions.

The first sub-question asks ‘what, and where, is the problem represented to be in the UK’s
interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242?’. This thesis is cognisant of the political nature of
defining policy problems, priorities and solutions offered. Therefore, it aims to destabilise the
naturalness of the UK’s approach to WPS and the policy shift to include P/CVE. By paying
attention to the ‘what’ and ‘where’ in the discursive and visual framing of the UK’s WPS policy,
this sub-question considers whether gendered and racialised structures and hierarchies and
traditional and masculine understandings of security and security institutions are disrupted or
whether this interpretation of WPS is upholding them. In particular, it zooms in on the
emergence of P/CVE as a key aspect of the UK’s approach to WPS and whether this policy
shift represents a transformative, feminist advance or whether it could be considered as a co-

12
optation of the WPS agenda for enhancing the operational effectiveness of P/CVE
programming.

The second set of sub-questions asks ‘what formal and informal institutional structures,
practices and dynamics shaped the UK’s interpretation of Women, Peace and Security
and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism?’ and ‘how and why did
Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism appear as a key feature of the UK’s approach
to Women, Peace and Security?’ In order to delve deeper into the emergence of P/CVE in
the UK’s approach to WPS, these sub-questions consider the driving forces behind this policy
shift and the formal and informal institutional practices, structures and dynamics that played a
role in its emergence and in shaping how and why P/CVE was deemed a policy issue relevant
to WPS. This thesis explores the UK government as an institution, as well as the differing
institutional cultures and practices within the departments responsible for WPS; the Ministry
of Defence (MOD), the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO). These sub-questions consider whose voices were heard,
prioritised, ignored or silenced in determining ‘what the problem was represented to be’ and
who ‘has a right to speak’ in shaping WPS policy. Furthermore, these sub-questions aim to
expose the motivations for this policy shift, for example, whether it was driven by the UK’s
wider security objectives or whether this was as a result of feminist intervention. Overall, by
considering the formal institutional structures and informal institutions, this sub-question aims
to reveal what institutional factors constrain or provide opportunities for transformative gender
mainstreaming.

The final sub-question asks, ‘what are the challenges of operationalising the UK’s
interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242, beyond its core Women, Peace and Security
cross-government policy documents?’. This question pays attention to how the UK’s cross-
government policy documents on WPS and P/CVE have been (re)interpreted into
‘mainstream’ policy and programme spaces of the MOD, DFID and FCO. By understanding
how these key actors engage with concepts of WPS, women or the language of gender, within
their approaches to P/CVE/CT across security and development contexts, this question
considers the challenges of implementing UNSCR 1325 and 2242 as it moves beyond the
UK’s core cross-government WPS policy documents (see section 7.3). This provides further
insight into the ways that those resolutions are (re)interpreted as they are diffused and how
gender mainstreaming can either be a force for positive change or can be reshaped to fit with

13
the priorities of the actors who interpret it. This sub-question illuminates some of the
challenges of gender mainstreaming and P/CVE in the UK context.

Together, these questions are analytically relevant as they destabilise the naturalness of
policy and approaches to WPS, gender mainstreaming and security. These questions sit at
the intersection of discursive and institutional analysis to reveal a detailed picture of the
various dynamics of power that shape and reshape the meanings of WPS and gender in
P/CVE. These research questions are also politically relevant, as they speak to problems that
matter beyond the confines of the ivory tower. They construct a framework for accountability
regarding how the UK engages with WPS and the policy shift to include P/CVE. These
questions uncover the ambiguities, tensions and complexities of interpreting and
institutionalising UNSCR 1325 and 2242 at the member-state level. By paying attention to how
WPS, as a norm, is translated and interpreted at the member-state level, this thesis offers
theoretical and practical insight into the constraints and opportunities for transformative
gender mainstreaming initiatives in security. This is significant as in order to be able to
overcome issues of co-optation, instrumentalisation and marginalisation of the WPS agenda;
we must first understand them.

1.3 Background and Rationale

The passing of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) in 2000
was a ‘watershed’ moment for the global feminist movement (Kirby and Shepherd, 2016: 249),
which reaffirmed the importance of the equal participation and full involvement of women in
all efforts for maintaining and promoting peace and security. It was the first time gender had
been ‘mainstreamed’ into the ‘armed conflict and security’ aspect of the UN and went further
than a passing reference of ‘women as victims’ or ‘women as a vulnerable group’ (Cohn,
2008:185). UNSCR1325 (2000) articulated the WPS agenda into four ‘pillars’ (protection,
prevention, participation and relief and recovery) and focused on the protection of women’s
rights and bodies, especially in conflict; the prevention of violence, not limited to but with a
large focus on the prevention of sexual violence in conflict; the participation of women at all
levels and in decision making in the management of security and peace and the relief and
recovery in post-conflict and conflict-affected environments. The WPS agenda now stands as
the most significant normative framework for women and security (True, 2016), despite the
activists, non–governmental organisations (NGOs), academics and UN staff who advocated
for the establishment of UNSCR1325 holding differing and varying conceptualisations of WPS
and how it should be implemented (Aoláin and Valji, 2018: 53; Wright, 2019). The past twenty

14
years has seen the accretion of the agenda through nine subsequent resolutions on WPS
(See Appendix A) which now includes the condemnation of sexual violence in armed conflict,
the protection of women’s rights, the participation of women at all levels in the prevention and
management of conflict, as well as in peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction, and
in the provision of humanitarian assistance, security and justice to meet women’s needs.
Whilst the broadening of the agenda may seem positive, questions have continuously been
raised about the dilution of feminist ambitions for the WPS agenda in terms of policy and
practice and that fundamentally, gendered power relations remain largely unchallenged by the
WPS architecture (Cohn, 2008; Otto, 2010; Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011; Davies and True,
2019b). That being said, the resolutions on the WPS thematic area are significant in that they
outline commitment to change at the UN level and inform the implementation of WPS at the
regional and state level.

Following the introduction of the UNSCRs on the WPS thematic area, the agenda has been
implemented through several distinct policy frameworks, including foreign policy, peace
negotiations and institutional mechanisms such as NAPs and Regional Action Plans (RAPs).
NAPs are regarded as a representation of the institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 by member-
states, and as of August 2019, 82 countries, which equates to 42% of states, have released
NAPs (Hamilton, Naam and Shepherd, 2020: 1). Whilst NAPs outline states commitments to
WPS, a number of scholars are concerned with the significant gap between the promise of
NAPs and their ability to create security for women and their communities (Swaine, 2009;
Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014; George and Shepherd, 2016; Jacevic, 2019). As NAPs are
a crucial indicator of the institutionalisation of WPS at the national and regional level, they are
an important area of inquiry. However, alone they do not reveal the extent to which gender is
being mainstreamed into state security practices and therefore only reveal part of the story.
Whilst WPS is a significant normative framework; it is necessary to investigate how this
agenda is (re)interpreted and institutionalised in state practices and the extent to which it can
be considered a transformative force in peace and security.

At an almost parallel time to the inception of UNSCR 1325, the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ or
the ‘War on Terror’ (WoT) emerged and has since been a critical feature of the international
security landscape. Counter-terrorism (CT) has traditionally been affiliated with ‘hard security’
approaches, military action and are defined by state-centric security goals (Jackson et al.,
2011) and became especially prominent with the US-led wars against Al-Qaeda in Iraq and
Afghanistan. CT has been heavily criticised for having negative gender and human rights

15
impacts and for its role in entrenching gendered and racialised biases (Shepherd, 2006; Hunt
and Rygiel, 2007; Huckerby and Satterthwaite, 2013), which will be explored further in section
2.2. However, in recent years, many policies and practices have moved from CT towards
‘preventing violent extremism’ (PVE) and ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE). This shift is
intended to focus on the ‘soft’ side of counter-terrorism strategies (Frazer and Nünlist, 2015;
Stephens, Sieckelinck and Boutellier, 2018), that is based on understanding the ‘social,
cultural and political drivers of violence’ (Subedi and Jenkins, 2016:14). Although this shift has
faced criticism as it transfers CT efforts into new spaces, such as education, social work and
international development (See Subedi and Jenkins, 2016; Novelli, 2017; Finch et al., 2019;
Moffat and Gerard, 2020) and in foreign policy towards a ‘security-development’ nexus which
‘binds the effectiveness of security-related measures against terrorism to social and
development policies’ (Rothermel, 2020: 4).

Whilst recognising that there is no agreed definition for CVE or PVE, this thesis broadly
understands the concept of CVE as the use of ‘non-coercive means to dissuade individuals
or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or
engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors’ (Khan, 2015) and PVE
as a strategy to address the root causes and drivers of extremism through a practice of ‘non-
violence, moderation, dialogue and cooperation’ that lead people to engage with terrorist or
violent extremist groups (UN General Assembly, 2015a: 4). That being said, the two notions
of ‘preventing’ and ‘countering’ are often brought together under the single banner of
preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and are often used interchangeably, which
makes it difficult to distinguish any conceptual distinction in its application (Stephens,
Sieckelinck and Boutellier, 2018). Additionally, based on the ambiguity of these concepts it
should be noted that these definitions can be utilised by actors in ways that do not fit the
definition provided above. Furthermore, some regard work labelled as CVE as a mostly
cosmetic improvement on often criticised CT approaches, ‘which rely on intelligence gathering
and a suppressive repertoire’ to ‘a security-focused approach to dealing with VE which uses
a myriad of tools and entry points, but remains rooted in a hard power approach’ (Aly, Balbi
and Jacques, 2015; Austin and Giessmann, 2018: iv). That being said, for some, this shift to
‘human security’ rather than ‘state-centric’ goals provides a possible opening for the
meaningful integration of gender into P/CVE approaches (White, 2020). The passing of
UNSCR 2242 made an explicit link between the WPS agenda and P/CVE, or as the resolution
refers to it as ‘countering violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism’ (United
Nations Security Council, 2015). Since then, there has been an emerging global normative

16
framework on integrating gender perspectives into P/CVE approaches, and international
organisations, policy-makers, civil society actors and academics have tried to grapple with
what an integration of ‘gender’ into P/CVE should look like and how to pursue such a complex
and multifaceted policy shift. This thesis, therefore, is a timely and significant contribution to
this theoretical and practical conundrum.

1.3.1 An Emerging International Policy Framework on Gender and P/CVE

Since 2013, there has been increasing international policy awareness of the need to
understand the gender dynamics of violent extremism, to recognise the gendered impacts of
both violent extremism and the measures to counter it, and the need to engage women, as
well as men, in preventing and countering violent extremism efforts (Gordon and True, 2019).
This has been directly related to WPS and, more broadly, in policy formulation and analysis
of P/CVE and CT. This emerging international policy framework on gender and P/CVE
provides context to the UK’s integration of P/CVE into its approach to WPS and gender into
its mainstream P/CVE/CT policy.

Integrating Women, Peace and Security and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism

As outlined in Table One below, UNSCR 1325 (2000) and the subsequent five resolutions
under the WPS thematic area made no specific intentions to integrate WPS with violent
extremism or terrorism. Although UNSCR 1889 (2009) does mention a concern of the rise of
extremist or fanatical views on women, the first resolution to mention terrorism was UNSCR
2122 (2013) which called for the greater attention to women’s leadership and participation in
conflict resolution and peacebuilding but also briefly called for the greater integration of WPS,
CT and CVE. UNSCR 2242 (2015) was the first resolution to explicitly attempt to integrate
CT/CVE and WPS agendas of member states and the UN.

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Table 1: References to Violent Extremism and/or Terrorism in UNSCR’s on WPS

Resolution Year Reference to violent extremism or terrorism?

1325 2000 No specific reference
1820 2008 No specific reference
1888 2009 No specific reference
1889 2009 Minor mention regarding the concern of ‘the rise of extremist or
fanatical views on women’
1960 2010 No specific reference
2106 2013 No specific reference
2122 2013 Minor mention in that it expresses intention to increase its attention
to WPS issues in all relevant thematic areas including ‘threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts’
2242 2015 Specific reference – calls for the greater integration of women, peace
and security, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism
which can be conducive to terrorism
2467 2019 Specific reference – recognises sexual violence being used as a
tactic of war and as a tactic of terrorism
2493 2019 No particular reference

UNSCR 2242 (2015) noted ‘the changing global context of peace and security, in particular
relating to rising violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism’ amongst some other
issues, such as refugees, climate change and health pandemics, and UNSCR 2242’s key
objective was to integrate WPS into counter-terrorism work, as a ‘cross-cutting’ issue (UNSCR
2242, preamble). UNSCR 2242 recognised ‘the differential impact on the human rights of
women and girls of violent extremism’ in relation to health, education and participation in public
life, but also expressed deep concern for ‘acts of sexual and gender-based violence’ as ‘part
of the strategic objectives and ideology of certain terrorist groups, used as a tactic of terrorism’
(UNSCR 2242, preamble) and also refers to the Global Counter-terrorism Forum’s ‘Good
Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism’ (2015). In addressing this core
theme, UNSCR 2242 advocates for the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to integrate gender within its
activities and for them to hold further consultation with women and women’s organisations to
inform their work, as well as encouraging the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
(CTITF) to do the same (UNSCR 2242, para 11).

UNSCR 2242 outlines the need for gender-sensitive research and data collection on the
drivers of radicalisation for women and the impact of CT strategies on women’s human rights
and women’s organisations, to ensure that policy and programming responses are evidence-
based and targeted (UNSCR 2242, para 12). Additionally, it advocates for gender expertise
to ensure that monitoring and assessment mechanisms and processes are well informed to

18
fulfil their mandates (UNSCR 2242, para 12). UNSCR 2242 urges the participation and
leadership of women and women’s organisations in the development of CT and CVE
strategies, including in counter-narratives, countering incitement to terrorism and
empowerment of women, youth, religious and cultural leaders to address ‘the conditions
conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism which can be conducive to
terrorism’ (UNSCR 2242, para 13). This is linked to the United Nations Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy, and ‘the increasing focus on inclusive upstream prevention efforts’.
Overall, UNSCR 2242 has made a significant contribution to the international policy framework
on WPS by outlining the necessity for CVE and CT measures to better integrate with the
principles of ‘WPS’ by enhancing the participation of women and women’s organisations,
ensuring that gender-sensitive research and gender expertise are a feature of CVE and CT
policy and programming.

The Diffusion of UNSCR 2242 into National and Regional Action Plans on WPS
The UNSCR’s on the WPS thematic area provide insight into the strategic direction of the
agenda at the highest level. However, this may remain mere rhetoric without the commitment
of UN member-states to apply it to their policies and activities. The simplest way to understand
whether the WPS norm is being implemented at state level is by paying attention to National
Action Plans (NAPs). Hamilton, Naam and Shepherd's (2020) database of 128 WPS NAPs
(which does include multiple NAPs per country over time) highlights the inclusion of ‘new
security issues’ in the NAPs. As illustrated in the figure below,
terrorism/extremism/radicalisation has rapidly and widely emerged as a feature of NAPs, since
2015, which coincides with the release of UNSCR 2242.

Figure 1: New Security Issues in WPS National Action Plans 2005 – 2019

(weighted, n=128)
(Hamilton, Naam and Shepherd, 2020: 11)

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This trend has also been demonstrated in Regional Action Plans (RAPs). For example, the
European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) include countering
violent extremism in their regional action plans (NATO and EAPC, 2018; Council of the
European Union, 2019). The African Union’s Continental Results Framework on WPS, also
makes a small reference to violent extremism (African Union, 2018). The League of Arab
State’s Executive Action Plan (2015 – 2030) makes firm reference to terrorism (League of
Arab States, 2015). It is clear that the normative policy framework outlined in UNSCR 2242,
which links P/CVE/CT efforts to the WPS agenda, has been diffused into a large proportion of
member states and regional organisations plans or strategies on WPS.

Towards a Gender Sensitive or Gendered Approach to Counter-Terrorism?

Whilst terrorism has long been a controversial topic at the UN, with member states unable to
agree on a definition of terrorism, violent extremism and terrorism have nevertheless been a
key feature of the international agenda since 9/11. The UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy was adopted by the UN’s General Assembly in September 2006, establishing the
core framework and policy guidance on counter-terrorism for the UN system. Since then,
several reviews have attempted to update the strategy (See Appendix B), which has resulted
in a gradual discursive shift from the use of the language of “terrorism” to “countering and
preventing violent extremism”. By subsuming the counter-terrorism agenda under ‘less
ominous-sounding concepts’, this proved to be less divisive (Karlsrud, 2018: 155). This shift
is also evidenced in Ban-Ki Moon’s ‘Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism’, which
highlighted the ‘need to take a more comprehensive approach which encompasses not only
ongoing, essential security-based counter-terrorism measures, but also systematic preventive
measures which directly address the drivers of violent extremism’ (UN General Assembly,
2015b: 2).

This shift towards a broader, whole-of-society approach to addressing the root causes of
violent extremism or terrorism moves CVE work to the security-development nexus and ‘binds
the effectiveness of security-related measures against terrorism to social and development
policies’ (Rothermel, 2020: 723). Whilst this raises issues in itself, this shift has provided an
opening for the integration of gender into its approaches to CT and CVE. Initially, the UN’s
Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006), and review resolutions, were gender-blind (See
Appendix B). However, since 2014, the role of women and the need for gender analysis to
uncover the gendered dynamics of violent extremism, terrorism and efforts to counter it has

20
become an increasingly dominant feature of the UN’s strategy. The Secretary General’s Plan
of Action (UN General Assembly, 2015b) included gender equality and the empowerment of
women as a priority area and provided some recommendations. The plan recommended that
gender be mainstreamed into P/CVE efforts, gender-sensitive research be invested in, and
women and other underrepresented groups be included in national law enforcement and
security agencies, including CT prevention and responses. It recommends capacity building
of women and CSOs to engage in prevention and response of CT and that a portion of all
funds to address violent extremism should be committed to women’s empowerment and
addressing women’s specific needs (UN General Assembly, 2015b: 18). This plan made a
concerted effort to begin to integrate gender equality and women’s empowerment into UN and
member states approaches to CVE and CT.

Similarly, a number of security council resolutions on threats to peace and security by terrorist
acts, reiterate a need to link the WPS agenda to this work and to integrate gender perspectives
(See Appendix C). These resolutions are non-WPS focused but demonstrate the further
integration of WPS and P/CVE into the mainstream and are a feature of the emerging
international policy framework in this area. Additionally, a growing number of documents
released by UN Offices and programmes explore the gender dimensions of P/CVE and CT
and some provide practical recommendations on the inclusion of women and in gender
mainstreaming processes (See Appendix D), a key example of this is the UN Women (2019)
guidance note on ‘Gender Mainstreaming, Principles, Dimension and Priorities for PVE’.
These documents have emerged from UN Women, CTED, the Office on Drugs and Crime and
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which highlights how this policy
framework is diffusing into the work of multiple actors with multiple focuses, at the UN level.
Whilst the conceptions of gender vary across UN entities (Rothermel, 2020), it is clear that
gender mainstreaming in the area of P/CVE is continually emerging as an international policy
framework.

In addition to the work of the UN, a number of handbooks, recommendations and guidance
on women and/or gender in P/CVE/CT from other policy actors have been published to
facilitate the integration of a gender dimension (See Appendix E). For example, the Global
Counter Terrorism Forum produced a ‘Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent
Extremism’ (2015) and subsequent addendum (2019) that focused further on gender
mainstreaming. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also
produced guidance for law enforcement. Alongside this, several resources that provide

21
guidance on gender and P/CVE have been released from non-governmental organisations,
consultancies, think tanks and university research centres that explore gendered dimensions
of P/CVE policy. For example, The Global Centre on Cooperative Security and Hedayah
(Chowdhury Fink, Zeiger and Bhulai, 2016) International Alert (Holdaway and Simpson, 2018;
Laruni, 2018), Berghof Foundation (Naraghi-Anderlini, 2018), Tony Blair Institute for Global
Change (Winterbotham, 2018), the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
(GSDRC) (Idris and Abdelaziz, 2017), the Global Center on Cooperative Security (Praxl-
Tabuchi, 2019) and the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (Peters and
Saeed, 2017). Evidently, this area of policy has multiple and intersecting influences and
stakeholders, who are all trying to grapple with how best to take a gendered approach to
P/CVE and this thesis aims to contribute to this growing body of work. The emerging policy
framework on gender and P/CVE/CT is a significant development; however, there is a clear
need for critical feminist scholarship to ensure that the inclusion of gender in P/CVE measures
does not bring further harm to women, (re)produce gendered and racialised hierarchies nor
co-opt the WPS agenda and language of women’s rights and gender equality.

1.4 Thesis Roadmap

Before providing a roadmap to this thesis, I will briefly address the core feminist theoretical
underpinnings of the thesis that guides the path that the research has taken. The very bedrock
of this thesis rests upon a problematisation of mainstream or ‘malestream’ International
Relations (IR), which ‘bases its assumptions and explanations almost entirely on the activities
and experiences of men’ (Tickner, 1992: 5), which perpetuates ‘a distorted and partial world
view that reflects the disproportionate power or control and influence that men hold’ (Youngs,
2004: 76). Feminist IR destabilises the focus of IR as a discipline by explicitly engaging
analytically with women and gender in international politics, war and conflict and in questioning
traditional notions of ‘security’ (Elshtain, 1987; Enloe, 1989; Peterson, 1992; Tickner, 1992,
1995; Sylvester, 1994). Whilst Feminist IR promotes the value in studying those who are often
marginalised in international politics, this thesis also sees value in investigating where the
power is located, to disrupt it. Cohn (2011) argues that for feminist researchers in the United
States and Europe, it is important to recognise ‘the responsibilities and access that come from
being located in the epicentre of the exercise of military/political/economic power’ and to, in
the words of Nader (1972), ‘study up’. This involves asking questions such as ‘how and why
the masculinist institutions at the heart of this exercise of power function’ but also to be
motivated by the question of ‘which research projects are most likely to be useful to women’s
civil society organisations and women peace builders’ (Cohn, 2011: 585). This research aims

22
to be a valuable intervention for resisting co-optation and agenda hijacking and promoting
transformative change through WPS.

This thesis recognises P/CVE/CT as a male-dominated and masculinised space in practice

and theory; thus any attempt to integrate women, or gender perspectives within it, must be
approached with this in mind. This thesis rejects the positivist and ‘objective’ assumptions
about IR as a discipline, rather the analysis presented here seeks to uncover or reveal the
importance of gendered relations, hierarchies and patriarchal structures at play within the
working of international relations (Cohn and Enloe, 2003: 1193). These relations and
structures are examples of power. Feminist gender analysis allows us to illuminate and
problematise them by asking questions such as ‘what forms does power take? Who wields it?
How are some gendered wielding’s of power camouflaged, so they do not even look like
power?’ ‘Who gains what from wielding a particular form of gender-infused power? What do
challenges to those wielding’s of that form of power look like? When do those challenges
succeed? When are they stymied?’ (Enloe, 2014: 8 - 9). By paying attention to the ways in
which ‘gender makes the world go round’ with sensitivity to masculinity and femininity, feminist
IR reconsiders what international relations is all about (Enloe, 2014). It is both ‘deconstructive’
and ‘reconstructive’ as it focuses on revealing, through critique ‘the masculinist limitations of
mainstream approaches, but also, crucially, going beyond those limitations and investigating
political and economic process in which women and men are engaged’ (Youngs, 2004: 77).
Despite numerous feminisms, all have a common goal of critically unpacking gender
inequalities in the global order and challenging the privileges, power hierarchies and gendered
institutions within it (Aggestam, Bergman Rosamond and Kronsell, 2019). These questions
and ideas about power and how they relate to gender and women in international relations
provide the foundations to this research and the system in which P/CVE and WPS operates.
Based on these ontological and epistemological foundations, this thesis proceeds in the
following way.

The structure of the thesis follows a somewhat conventional research template, which allows
an exploration of the debates within the literature, theories, methodologies and how they are
reconceptualised and operationalised to play a role in this research. These chapters that form
the first half of the thesis are deeply interconnected, and together they constitute the
foundations of the research process. Following a comprehensive outline of the theoretical and
methodological choices and approaches taken, the second half of the thesis then turns to a

23
detailed discussion and analysis of the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of P/CVE
and WPS.

Chapter two opens the first section of this thesis by looking at the growing literature on
P/CVE/CT and WPS as separate and integrated policy areas. Specifically, it outlines the key
debates and identifies gaps and omissions in the existing literature. This chapter begins by
focusing on the literature on WPS discourses and architecture, such as NAPs, which
introduces a number of critiques, such as its essentialist language, its limits in enacting real-
world transformation and its potential complicity in reproducing gendered and racialised
hierarchies. This literature exposes how academic scholarship on WPS has largely utilised
discursive analytical approaches, although increasingly attention is paid to the institutional
dynamics that constrain or provide opportunities for transformative WPS implementation.
Following this, the literature on CT and P/CVE narratives and approaches is examined and
the analyses show CVE/CT as a state-centric masculinised security practice, that has been
complicit in the (re)production of racialised and gendered hierarchies. Particular attention is
then given to the literature that emphasises women’s roles as preventers, perpetrators and
victims of violent extremism and terrorism before exploring the literature that shows the
gendered nature of violent extremism and the need for gender-sensitivity and gender-
responsiveness in P/CVE efforts. As security actors have begun to acknowledge the important
role that women and gender play within this phenomenon, this raises important questions
about whether P/CVE, as a concept and practice, can be integrated in a way that does not co-
opt the language of gender equality, instrumentalise women and (re)produce racialised
hierarchies. The final section thus pulls the two agendas together and outlines the current
scholarly works on P/CVE and WPS. This literature can roughly be divided into two
perspectives regarding the integration of P/CVE and WPS, one that is profoundly cautious
and concerned about the impact of this shift, and the other, is far more receptive and optimistic.
Overall, this chapter exposes the tensions that have emerged from the greater enmeshing of
WPS with P/CVE. Based on the puzzle that this review of the literature presents, it argues that
a detailed investigation into the interpretation and institutionalisation of WPS and P/CVE by a
nation-state in the minority world1 will reveal more about the challenges, risks and
opportunities of this policy shift.

1 I choose to use the distinction of ‘minority world’ and ‘majority world’ within this thesis to capture where
the majority of the world’s population live (Africa, Asia, South and Central America and the Caribbean)
and the minority live (Europe, North America, Australia). This is an alternative term to the
developed/developing world or the global North/South, which I find to be more problematic and divisive
distinctions. See Shepherd (2016).

24
Chapter three introduces the theoretical framework developed for this thesis. This chapter
outlines how insights from Feminist Institutionalism, Feminist Security Studies and Post-
Colonial Feminism are combined to produce the most suitable lens for addressing the
research questions. The current literature on WPS is often discursively focused, and thus far,
there has been less engagement with the institutional dynamics that account for particular
interpretations of the agenda. Therefore, this thesis draws upon Feminist Institutionalism and
enhances its analytical potential by bridging it with Feminist Security Studies and Post-
Colonial Feminism. As this research investigates P/CVE/CT, Feminist Security Studies
provides the tools to critically engage with traditional notions of (in)security that are built upon
a militarist, securitising and masculine logic. It asks questions of what security is, who is
securitised and who is impacted by security policies and practices and sees the answers to
those questions as performances of power. Furthermore, based on the criticisms of CVE/CT
and WPS found in the previous chapter, Post-Colonial Feminism then provides the tools to
challenge the dominant western-centric focus of security, the construction of the majority world
in a subordinate position to the minority world and the reproduction of gendered and racialised
hierarchies. Overall, the framework outlined in this chapter, that bridges Feminist Security
Studies, Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist Institutionalism, provides a set of tools for the
investigation of the interpretation and institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 that is
attuned to how WPS and P/CVE are politicised narratives, constructed within institutions that
have gendered, and racialised, norms, values, cultures and practices.

Chapter four then outlines and justifies the methodological choices and research design for
this project. This chapter begins with a consideration of the epistemological and ontological
foundations of this feminist research and its role in the research design. It rejects objective
research and acknowledges that the researcher’s position is significant in the research
process. Following this, the research design is delineated and the choice of elite interviews
and documents as the most appropriate data for this investigation based on the research
questions is explained. The following section then demonstrates how a Critical Frame Analysis
(CFA) approach and Bacchi's (2009) ‘What is the Problem Represented to Be’ questions were
adapted for this projects data analysis. A set of sensitising questions were developed that
pays attention to power in the problem definition and proposed solution, of the integration of
WPS and P/CVE. This thesis also builds on the analytical potential of CFA by introducing elite
interviews with civil society organisations and UK civil servants to further expose the
institutional power dynamics behind the represented problem definitions and solutions offered.
The use of interviews allows insight into the voices heard in the policy formulation process

25
and the challenges for practitioners in operationalising the policy solutions, regarding WPS
and P/CVE, into their work. Overall, the research design outlined in this chapter, allows insight
into the discursive and institutional complexities of the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325
and 2242. Chapter four concludes the first half of the thesis. Following this, the second half of
the thesis then maps and analyses the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of UNSCR
1325 and 2242.

Chapter five provides the contextual background and information required to understand the
preconditions of the emergence of P/CVE as a feature of WPS, in the UK. Firstly, this chapter
introduces and discusses the key departments and actors relevant to this thesis before going
into greater detail regarding the actors who play a role in interpreting and implementing WPS.
These are divided into the ‘insiders’, such as the UK’s WPS cross-government working group
and the ‘outsiders’, such as the civil society networks and epistemic communities. Together,
these actors make up the UK’s WPS ‘feminist triangle’ (Woodward, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell
and Wright, 2018) and are exemplary of the UK’s institutionalisation of WPS. That being said,
the existence of this ‘feminist triangle’ does not necessarily mean that civil society and
epistemic communities are able to have a considerable influence on the trajectory or
interpretation of WPS in the UK and, therefore, a deeper consideration of whose voices were
heard in the P/CVE WPS policy shift is uncovered in chapter seven. Secondly, this chapter
maps and interrogates the UK’s commitments to gender equality and women’s rights in order
to reveal its identity as a ‘women-friendly’ state, although some of its crucial limitations are
also highlighted here. Thirdly, the UK’s history with terrorism and violent extremism, as well
as its P/CVE/CT policies, strategies and legislation, are presented. This provides further
understanding of the complexities of integrating WPS and PCVE but also reveals the
conditions in which P/CVE was able to be integrated with WPS. Finally, the chapter maps the
UK’s policy framework for the implementation of WPS and its leadership identity on WPS at
the international level to provide a detailed case study of the UK’s overarching approach and
engagement with WPS. Overall, this chapter provides a contextual understanding of WPS
(and the subsequent integration of P/CVE) and is significant for understanding the values,
norms, cultures and rules that shape the UK’s interpretation of WPS and the institutions that
give WPS (and P/CVE) meaning.

Chapter six offers unique insight into the UK’s approach to gender mainstreaming in security
policy by undertaking a Critical Frame Analysis of its key WPS policy documents. This chapter
firstly analyses the UK’s interpretation of WPS more broadly before it then turns to uncover

26
how P/CVE has been discursively integrated with WPS. The findings in this chapter reveal
that the UK prioritises issues of women’s exclusion in security and vulnerability in conflict and
frames these as the primary ‘problems’ that WPS should address. Whilst this provides some
opportunity to destabilise the invisibility of women in peace and security, this limited
engagement with the concept of gender constrains the approach to gender mainstreaming as
about the ‘integration’ of women and in recognising ‘difference’ in experiences between men
and women. This approach does not meaningfully tackle the gendered structures of security
and conflict, which would be more transformative. The ‘problem holders’ are also framed as
women in the majority world, whereas the UK narrates itself as a ‘problem solver’, which
overlooks (in)security in the domestic sphere and reproduces global racial hierarchies. The
second half of the chapter then focuses on the integration of P/CVE into the UK’s WPS
approach. Firstly, the inclusion of P/CVE in the 2018 – 2022 NAP is analysed, which highlights
a problematisation of the invisibility of women in this space and offers a solution of enhanced
the leadership and participation of women in P/CVE. However, the inclusion of P/CVE was
largely underdeveloped, as illustrated in its inability to present any indicators of success for
this strategic outcome. Secondly, this chapter turns to explore the ‘Implementing Strategic
Outcome Six: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’ guidance note, released in 2019.
The analysis here reveals a far more cognizant understanding of the gendered dynamics of
P/CVE. However, considerable risks remain in that there is a strong emphasis on the inclusion
of women, and gender perspectives, for enhancing operational effectiveness and less as a
result of feminist principles.

Chapter seven then pays attention to the voices of those involved in the UK’s interpretation of
P/CVE and WPS to explore the complex relationship between the policies produced and the
institutional dynamics that shape the particular interpretation of WPS and P/CVE discussed in
chapter six. Firstly, it starts off with a broad investigation into the dynamics that influence how
WPS is interpreted. It makes visible, destabilises and problematises the informal and formal
rules, norms, and practices that constrain a more transformative interpretation of WPS.
Secondly, it uncovers the policy drivers behind the UK’s integration of P/CVE within WPS. It
exposes this as a top-down process as the key policy drivers were senior leadership, the
prioritised place of P/CVE on the UK’s security agenda and the UK’s leadership identity. This
section then examines the civil society organisation (CSO) voices heard in the policy
formulation process, which uncovers limited meaningful formal engagement on this policy shift
and the strategic amplification of certain voices to justify the inclusion of P/CVE. Finally, the
chapter then captures some of the practical challenges of gendering P/CVE. It demonstrates

27
the challenges of working on an ambiguous and somewhat fluid policy area and exposes the
difficulty for P/CVE practitioners to reconcile feminist objectives with operational effectiveness
and ensure that CSO and grassroots organisations can contribute to P/CVE efforts without
putting them at risk.

The final chapter of this thesis, chapter 8, is a discussion and conclusion. This chapter
provides a brief overview of the thesis before linking the key findings to the research questions,
theoretical framework and key debates within the literature on WPS and P/CVE. The chapter
then outlines how this thesis has understood the integration of WPS and P/CVE as a ‘Catch-
22’ for feminists. Following this, the implications of this thesis for scholars of WPS are provided
before the broader implications of the integration of WPS and P/CVE are considered, in regard
to the WPS agenda as a feminist project. The key contributions of the thesis are reiterated
before the chapter closes with some proposals for future areas of study.

1.5 Contributions
This section now briefly outlines the three key contributions of this thesis. The first contribution
is theoretical, as this thesis offers a unique bridging of three theoretical perspectives; Feminist
Security Studies, Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist Institutionalism. This thesis argues
that alone these theories are inadequate for understanding the complex dynamics in which
the interpretation and institutionalisation of P/CVE and WPS occurs. Feminist Security Studies
offers the theoretical lenses to challenge traditional conceptualisations of security and reveal
the militarist, securitising and masculine logic embedded in those conceptions of security.
However, without integrating this with Post-Colonial Feminism, the ability to unveil racialised
and colonial logics of the UK’s security narratives is limited. Whilst links between Feminist
Security Studies and Post-Colonial Feminism have been made, there has been little
integration with Feminist Institutionalism. I argue that it is a considerable oversight of Feminist
Institutionalism to have not yet engaged with Post-Colonial Feminist concepts and insights in
its work. Chapter three therefore offers a novel theoretical approach to the study of the
gendered and racialised rules, norms, practices and discourses of security institutions and
how provides insight into how this can be applied to the analysis of WPS and gender
mainstreaming strategies in security spaces.

The second contribution is methodological. This thesis has advanced the value of a Critical
Frame Analysis (CFA) approach for analysing gender mainstreaming in security policy. CFA
has mostly been utilised in investigations of social policy, particularly in Europe and as a

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result the CFA approach needed to be adapted in order to make it appropriate for this study.
Building upon existing CFA studies, this thesis developed a new set of sensitising questions,
that are aligned with the theoretical framework provided in chapter three, that could be
applied to the analysis of WPS and P/CVE policy documents. Additionally, to overcome
some of the limitations of CFA in understanding why certain policy frames are prioritised or
silenced over others and in paying attention to the role of voice and institutional dynamics in
the policy process, elite interviews were introduced into the data collection process. By
providing a clear outline of how CFA was applied, this approach could be replicated by other
scholars in the analysis of gender mainstreaming in security policy or WPS in other contexts.

The third and final contribution of the thesis is empirical. This thesis provides a detailed
empirical investigation into the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of WPS and P/CVE,
which has not been done before. The empirics presented contribute to the body of literature
that explores the P/CVE/WPS nexus and the debates that surround it (Ní Aoláin, 2016;
Chowdhury Fink and Davidan, 2018; Heathcote, 2018; Eddyono and Davies, 2019;
Rothermel, 2020; White, 2020). The findings of this thesis provides substantial evidence of
the discursive and institutional challenges of integrating WPS and P/CVE in the UK context
that has relevance for wider understandings of the WPS agenda. Not only are the findings
empirically rich, but the thesis also provides an archive of key documents related to WPS from
the UK context (See Appendix F), that other researchers could utilise in the future.

1.6 Conclusion
Taken together, the chapters in this thesis weave a complex story about the way in which
WPS has, and has not fostered discursive and institutional change in regards to P/CVE. The
inclusion of P/CVE into the UK’s approach to WPS has been a largely top-down process, that
did not reflect the voices of the women who are at the receiving end of the UK’s WPS policies.
Whilst WPS has opened conversations about women, and gender, in P/CVE, the securitising
and global hierarchical nature of this thematic area limits how far WPS can go in criticising the
security practices of the state. The opportunities created by this integration rely heavily upon
departmental interpretation and implementation and the institutional actors who operate within
those power structures. The interpreted goals of P/CVE differ across departments and it is
difficult for those tasked with WPS to ensure this work remains true to the feminist foundations
of WPS. Feminist activists and scholars should have a greater ability to engage with formal
institutions, such as the UK government, in order to analyse and engage with WPS
developments. As it stands the integration of P/CVE into the UK’s approach to WPS does not

29
represent a large proportion of CSO’s concerns and ambitions for WPS and it does not go far
enough in listening to the voices of the people this policy will impact. This thesis also provides
evidence of how the inclusion of women and gender perspectives with P/CVE can either be
ignored, shifted or morphed to suit the implementing department. Overall, the integration of
P/CVE, in its current form, is counterproductive to the feminist ambitions of the WPS agenda
and is far more of a co-optation of the agenda than it is a transformative advancement. Whilst
the UK’s integration of P/CVE and WPS shows burgeoning refinement since its first inclusion
in the NAP, this remains disjointed from the ‘mainstream’ approaches to P/CVE and
fundamentally does not represent transformative change. The findings of this thesis, regarding
the challenges of interpreting and institutionalising UNSCR 1325 and 2242 in the UK context,
also have implications for understanding the difficulties and risks of gender mainstreaming in
security more broadly.

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2.0 The Feminist Challenges of Integrating Women with Peace and
Security

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has provided a space for discussions at the
national and transnational level about the gendered impacts of security. Since the adoption of
UNSCR 1325 in 2000, a growing body of literature has explored the nature of the WPS
agenda, its strengths and weaknesses and its transformative potential. The passing of
UNSCR 2242, which aims at integrating WPS with approaches to countering violent
extremism (CVE), has sparked further debate on whether this integration could be understood
as a positive move or whether it signifies a co-optation and hijacking of the agenda. What is
essential to understand is the complex relationship between gender (as a structure of power),
WPS (as an approach to mainstream gender in security) and P/CVE (as a state approach and
its impact on the process of Othering). This chapter is therefore structured around an initial
exploration of the current state of the literature in which this thesis contributes to: Women,
Peace and Security, Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism
(P/CVE/CT) and finally, the limited but growing body of literature that sits at the intersection of
WPS and P/CVE/CT. It reviews existing debates, points to key arguments and particular
limitations of current research. Whilst WPS and P/CVE/CT may initially seem disconnected
from one another, these two bodies of literature are essential in understanding how National
Action Plans (NAPs) provide the juncture where these two (potentially) competing agendas
cross over.

The argument proceeds in three steps. Firstly, some of the key criticisms of WPS are
evaluated, which exposes how gendered and racialised hierarchies and securitising dynamics
are potentially (re)produced by the WPS agenda. Feminist scholars have often considered the
extent to which WPS is a force for transformative, and at worst, potentially causes further harm
to women by upholding dominant security discourses. Similarly, the extent to which NAPs are
the most suitable mechanism for WPS diffusion is also highlighted. What is particularly salient
in reviewing the research on WPS is the use of discourse or textual analytical approaches,
which are valuable in uncovering the focus and interpretation of WPS at the international and
state level. However, this restricts the analysis by overlooking the institutions and their power
dynamics in determining how WPS is interpreted, implemented and institutionalised. Whilst
there is a small body of literature on WPS and security institutions, there are apparent gaps in
understanding the institutional dynamics of the interpretation and institutionalisation of NAPs,
at the state level. This thesis finds that a combined methodological approach, that pays

31
attention to both texts and institutions, would make a valuable contribution to the literature on
WPS. As this allows insight into what is being prioritised, why, by who and for what reasons
in state level interpretations of WPS and why certain WPS discourses are deployed over
others. Additionally, it would help reveal the factors that shape how WPS (re)interpreted into
the mainstream, which provides deeper insight into whether WPS is transformative than
textual analysis alone.

Secondly, the policy shift to integrate P/CVE with WPS sits at a complex nexus. In order to
delve deeper into this, the literature on P/CVE is then explored. Several key themes emerge,
such as how P/CVE/CT labelling has been both ill-defined and infused with gendered and
racialised narratives that ‘Others’ and securitises the targets of P/CVE/CT, in War on Terror
discourses and the UK’s approach to P/CVE/CT. Additionally, there has been a clear shift in
research on P/CVE/CT that increasingly pays attention to the role of women and ‘gender’ in
these spaces. Whilst this research draws attention to the gendered nature of P/CVE/CT; I
argue that there is a need to pay further attention to the dimensions of power in narrating and
framing women, and gender, in this space by actors and institutions who would not be typically
described as ‘feminist’. Whilst some research emphasises the need and value of gender-
sensitive and gender-responsive P/CVE/CT; questions are raised as to whether the basic
premises of P/CVE/CT can be integrated with the feminist principles of WPS, without co-
optation. Together, the first and second bodies of literature reviewed highlight the necessity in
taking a theoretical approach to this research that considers gender and race in narrations of
P/CVE and WPS and how P/CVE is a narration of a security threat constructed within
masculinised security institutions.

Finally, attention is explicitly turned to the literature that explores the broadening of WPS to
include P/CVE/CT. This literature fundamentally exposes an unresolved tension amongst
feminist researchers as they grapple with integrating two agendas that seemingly have
different, and in some ways contradictory, ambitions and goals. Whilst this research has begun
to identify the challenges of this integration, theoretically and practically, there is a gap in the
literature that aims to understand the deeper complexities of the interpretation and
institutionalisation of WPS and P/CVE, at the state level. Overall, by addressing the lacunae
outlined in this chapter, a richer account of the drivers, risks, challenges and complexities of
this policy shift will be advanced. This thesis directly contributes to the body of literature that
explores whether UNSCR 1325 and 2242 are being interpreted and institutionalised in ways

32
that stay true to the foundational feminist principles of WPS or whether this signals a co-
optation or hijacking of the WPS agenda.

2.1 Women, Peace and Security: A Transformative Agenda?

The formation of UNSCR 1325, and the WPS agenda more broadly, has received high levels
of attention from academic scholars. This literature is extensive and crosses numerous
themes, locations and perspectives (See Davies and True, 2019a; Basu, Kirby and Shepherd,
2020), such as the analysis of the texts of WPS (Shepherd, 2008, 2011; Puechguirbal, 2010;
Pratt, 2013a; Jansson and Eduards, 2016; Duncanson, 2019; Martín de la Rosa and Lázaro,
2019), the diffusion of WPS as a norm (True and Wiener, 2019) and its institutionalisation and
implementation (George, 2016; Guerrina and Wright, 2016; Wright, 2016; Deiana and
McDonagh, 2018a, 2018b; Haastrup, 2018; Hurley, 2018; Thomson, 2019; Lyytikäinen and
Yadav, 2021). Whilst there are numerous approaches to studying WPS, at the crux of the
literature on WPS is a fundamental question regarding whether the UNSCRs on WPS are
ultimately transformative. Despite UNSCR 1325 being seen as a radical document that has
the potential to transform how we conceive ‘security’ and the UN system (Cohn, 2004, 2008;
Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings, 2004; Sylvester, 2009; Hudson, 2010), and has been
commended for the way that WPS has become a normative agenda that UN member states
cannot avoid (Tryggestad, 2009), there is concern about the large disconnect between ‘the
great expectations of WPS advocates and the inadequate progress made by powerful
institutions in meeting those expectations enshrined in Resolution 1325’ (Davies and True,
2019: 3). This predicament has validated the need for investigation into the UNSCRs on the
WPS thematic area and their diffusion to expose the conceptual, textual and institutional
complexities of WPS, which will now be explored in greater detail.

2.1.1 Transforming or Sustaining ‘Security’

The need to address the historical marginalisation of women and gender in peace and security
processes and institutions are central to the UNSCR’s on the WPS thematic area. However,
a key criticism against the WPS agenda has been its lack of commitment to anti-militarism
and its complicity in upholding dominant security discourses and practices. Several scholars
have raised concerns regarding the dilution of the feminist ambitions for the WPS agenda in
terms of policy and practice (Cohn, 2008; Otto, 2010; Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011) and
argue that gendered power relations remain largely unchallenged by the WPS architecture.
Feminist scholars have critiqued the WPS agenda for focusing too extensively on ‘adding
women’ into security structures or ‘‘making war safe for women’’ (Weiss, 2011; Shepherd,

33
2016) rather than challenging gendered power relations and preventing war and militarism.
Although women’s greater inclusion and participation in decision making roles has been
central to the WPS agenda, there is a question as to what extent the inclusion of women leads
to positive gendered change. This criticism of WPS sits within a broader feminist debate about
women’s engagement with and within security and military organisations and whether women
should participate in military life (Duncanson and Woodward, 2016). On the one hand, some
feminists argue that women should not be prevented from military participation as their simple
presence disrupts essentialised gender roles and the protected vs the protector binary and is
ultimately a feature of equal rights (Snyder, 1991; Peach, 1994; Stiehm, 1996). On the other
hand, anti-militarist feminists argue that increasing women’s military participation only serves
to legitimise institutions that uphold militarism and is adverse to the very goals of feminism,
does not necessarily enhance women’s equality and serves to consolidate western imperial
ambitions (Enloe, 1983; Ruddick, 1983; Eisenstein, 2007; Runyan and Spike Peterson, 2014).
This thesis recognises the risks in increasing the number of women within military and security
spaces when there is no challenge to masculinised and traditional understandings of security.

Another key theme regarding the UNSCRs on WPS considers how they contributed to a
specific understanding of gender and security (Wibben, 2011). There has been clear interest
in WPS’s value as a mechanism for a feminist contestation of security narratives, by
introducing women’s vulnerability and gender equality to the work of the Security Council. For
example, Jansson and Eduards (2016: 600-601) find that the UNSC resolutions on WPS do
present this opportunity, although they argue that this should be approached with caution as
speaking in favour of securitisation, as a feminist strategy, within a context that is ingrained
with gender power, where threats to security are conceptualised as conflict and solved by
military means is somewhat dangerous as there is a risk that the UNSCRs on the WPS
thematic area may be appropriated for violent purposes. Heathcote (2018: 387) expands on
this by highlighting that the UNSCRs on WPS are formulated within the United Nations
Security Council, which has faced criticism for its use of violence, in counter terror for example,
which does not sit well with feminist actors who aim to develop alternative strategies in
achieving security, that does not use military violence. Whilst the UNSCRs on WPS are
founded on feminist principles, this literature has highlighted the need to consider how
(in)security is narrated and how women and the concept of gender are interpreted and
conceptualised within WPS discourses, as this can reveal whether security is being sustained
or transformed.

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2.1.2 Gender, Peace and Security?
This section now turns to the existing literature that has critiqued the WPS agenda for
(re)producing essentialist framings of women and its intense focus on women’s victimhood,
particularly concerning conflict-related sexual violence and the need for the protection of
women (Otto and Heathcote, 2014). Aroussi (2011) problematises WPS discourses that fixate
on women as victims of wartime rape and not on a holistic approach to tackling the gendered
dynamics of rape as a weapon of war and the accountability of perpetrators, which ultimately
limits how WPS can transform the structural environments that permit or maintain the
prevalence of sexual violence in conflict. Likewise, El Bushra (2007) argues that the
essentialist language of WPS which affiliates women with their roles as mothers, wives, nurses
discourages their inclusion as active decision-makers. These narratives uphold sexist
stereotypes of women’s agency that limits their possibility of other roles in peace and security.
Furthermore, Otto and Heathcote (2014) argue that a focus on victimhood in UNSCRs on
WPS is exemplary of resistance to challenging the gendered underpinnings of the Security
Council and the workings of international peace and security. This literature highlights how
UNSCR 1325 and subsequent WPS resolutions sit within a UN system that functions
according to well-grounded masculine norms and an imbalance of power built within its
institutional structures, which ultimately makes introducing disruptions to essentialist
understandings of women difficult. It highlights how the narratives around women’s victimhood
can contribute to the perpetuation of gender stereotypes and could also justify further violence
and encourage exceptional military responses (Young, 2003b). Whilst the WPS agenda can
draw attention to and promote the myriad of ways that women are involved in peace and
security, it is clear that there is a risk of discursively reproducing gender stereotypes and
invoking protectionist discourses that promote masculinist militarised intervention.

Another key criticism raised in the literature on UNSCR’s on WPS has been the discursive
interchangeability of the word ‘gender’ with ‘women’, which has hindered the ability of the UN
to ‘de-gender’ peace and security (Shepherd, 2008; Puechguirbal, 2010; Basu and Confortini,
2017). Although ‘women’ and their equality and advancement are central to UNSCR 1325, the
terminology of ‘women’ in WPS is contested (Kirby and Shepherd, 2016: 252). A number of
scholars have empirically demonstrated how UNSCR 1325 and subsequent WPS resolutions
have used the terms women and gender synonymously and in ways that link gender to
stereotypical ‘women’s issues’ (Hagen, 2016; Duriesmith, 2019; Myrttinen, 2019). As a result,
a separate body of scholarly work has paid closer attention to the absence of men and
masculinities within this agenda and calls for a ‘gender, peace and security’ agenda. For

35
example, Myrttinen (2019) examined where men and boys appear in WPS key texts, such as
the UNSCRs, and found that men and boys rarely appear, and where they do it is in a positive
light, rather than challenging male perpetrators and the gendered dynamics that underpin
violence. Such narrow emphasis on men’s roles has also meant that the impact of
masculinities on violence, conflict and post-conflict societies is often overlooked (Cockburn,
2013; Pankhurst, 2016) and renders men as the norm rather than as gendered actors
themselves. The focus of policy action is thus on women’s empowerment, which arguably
burdens women with resolving peace and security issues rather than problematising those
perpetrating crimes and discriminating against women (Watson, 2015:46). Additionally,
Hagen’s (2016) work exposes the silences about homophobic and transphobic violence
targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender and queer (LGBTQ) individuals within
conflict-related contexts, reflecting the heteronormative assumptions in the framing of the
WPS agenda.

Some scholars have gone even further beyond a ‘gender peace and security’ agenda to
explore the idea of a ‘men, peace and security’ agenda, that argues that the inclusion of ‘men’
will make masculinity more visible in a space that has been deeply motivated by the gendered
insecurities of women (Watson, 2015b; Duriesmith, 2019). However, whilst Wright (2019: 3,
16) actively supports the need for a masculinities perspective (as an analytical approach that
pays attention to masculinities and how this is gender-relational) and highlights the potential
benefits of designing security policies that are based on ‘contextual understanding of
masculinities and femininities, and their intersections with other structures of oppression’,
Wright warn of the risks associated with this as the agenda is situated within the masculinist
context of international politics. Therefore, using masculinities to bring men on board may
allow masculinised institutions to operationalise these concepts in ways that do not support
feminist goals. Where Wright’s (2019) work goes beyond much of the discursive analysis of
WPS documents is that it draws on interviews with UK officials to explore why a masculinities
perspective has not been integrated into the UK’s approach to WPS. This research is far more
curious of the institutional dynamics in which resistance to the use of gender as a critical
framework occurs and what factors limit the radical potential of WPS. It is also some of the
only work that explores the UK’s interpretation of WPS beyond a discursive analysis. Overall,
this body of literature draws attention to the value of discursive analysis of women and gender
in WPS, which is vital in understanding how WPS is constructed as a gender mainstreaming
mechanism. Although there are limitations in that it does not explore why certain
conceptualisations of ‘gender’ and ‘women’ are utilised.

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2.1.3 National Action Plans and the Reproduction of Global Racialised Hierarchies
National Action Plans (NAPs) are a crucial piece of the WPS architecture and are ‘not just a
proxy for WPS commitment and implementation; they mark a key phase in the policy diffusion
of WPS from the international to the national’ (True, 2016: 310). As a result, many scholars
have questioned the role and value of NAPs as mechanisms in guiding state practice in the
implementation of WPS (Swaine, 2009; Fritz, Doering and Gumru, 2011; Miller, Pournik and
Swaine, 2014; Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic, 2015; Barrow, 2016; Basini and Ryan,
2016; George and Shepherd, 2016; Lee-Koo, 2016; Aroussi, 2017; Hudson, 2017; Lee-Koo
and Trojanowska, 2017; Martin De Almagro, 2018; Motoyama, 2018; Jacevic, 2019; Myrttinen,
Shepherd and Wright, 2020; Yadav, 2020). This body of literature often applies discourse and
content analytical methodological approaches to investigating NAPs, to reveal where and who
formulates them, what thematic issues they cover, what approach to gender they take and to
a lesser extent, why this international policy diffusion happens. For Hunt and Wairimu Nderitu
(2019: 84), NAPs are reassuring indicators of the development of the WPS cause and
demonstrate a transition of WPS from individual activists and civil society groups to newly
educated allies, such as civil servants who negotiate and implement the plans and political
leaders. However, others are far more pessimistic of the value of NAPs, as they have limited
worth as vehicles for transformation and perpetuate the flaws of the WPS UNSCRs (Björkdahl
and Mannergren Selimovic, 2015) and Jacevic (2019: 276) argues that no NAPs thus far have
been ‘high impact’.

Whilst the ineffectiveness of NAPs is problematic, research has also critiqued how NAPs
constructed in the minority world can be complicit in reproducing global racialised hierarchies.
Two types of NAPs have emerged: outward-looking plans, mainly from ‘developed countries’,
and the other being inward-looking plans, mainly from ‘developing countries’ (Miller, Pournik
and Swaine, 2014). As NAPs constructed in the minority world have traditionally been
outward-facing (Swaine, 2017) and Western European countries have been leaders in the
development of NAPs (Thomson and Pierson, 2018: 351), there is a level of power involved
in determining ‘who the WPS agenda is about and who it is for’ (Haastrup and Hagen, 2020:
133). Haastrup & Hagen (2020) analyse 22 NAPs from the ‘global North’ in order to expose
how narratives of racialised dominance are reproduced through the WPS agenda by paying
attention to where funding is applied, the value attributed to civil society and how WPS is
applied as a form of foreign policy within those NAPs. In addition, they examine the imagery
of the’ global South’ in ‘global North’ NAPs and find recurrent imagery of women of colour

37
located in the ‘global South’, which exposes the target of the plans. Similarly, Achilleos-Sarll
(2020: 1663) turns towards the visual politics of WPS by analysing the imagery of the UK’s
NAPs and annual reports to parliament and found that the imagery reproduces ‘particular
gendered, racialised and colonial logics and hierarchies’. Whilst this imagery shifts over time,
from focusing on women’s victimhood to agency, this type of agency is found to be deeply
linked to the support of the international community. Correspondingly, Shepherd (2017: 148)
argues that the NAPs perpetuate an idea that women in the majority world and women who
are ‘Othered’ require protection from the discrimination and violence by men who are also
‘Othered’, this ultimately removes the agency of majority world women and positions minority
world men as non-violent and inclusive. Together, this research is significant in considering
how WPS can be counterproductive through its perpetuation of imperialist, ‘Othering’ and
gendered and racialised hierarchical narratives and logics.

Furthermore, researchers have also illuminated silences around insecurity in the minority
world in WPS NAPs. For example, Shepherd (2016) considers the articulation of space and
location of insecurity in her analysis of the USA, UK and Australian NAPs and found that the
‘outward facing’ NAPs tend to articulate that problems occur ‘elsewhere’ and therefore
produce particular gendered and racialised logics of peace and security. Similarly, Aroussi
(2017: 29) argues that NAPs make the mistaken assumption that Western states have
achieved gender security, sustaining racialised and imperialistic narratives. Furthermore,
Aroussi (2017) claims that NAPs have become a vehicle for Western States to pursue foreign
policy abroad through an almost exclusive focus on conflict-affected societies in the majority
world. Holvikivi and Reeves (2020: 135) demonstrate this further by highlighting the dominant
tendency of European approaches to WPS to exclude refugees, which reaffirms a ‘fantasy of
Europe as peaceful and secure for women’, ‘obscures European states’ complicity in fuelling
insecurity at their borders’ and contributes to an ethos of coloniality around WPS. Particularly
related to this thesis is Hoewer's (2013) work that draws attention to the absence of WPS in
Northern Ireland, a post-conflict environment, which is illustrative of the complexities in
implementing WPS ‘at home’ and the oversight of a ‘foreign affairs’ approach to WPS.
Although this research is now somewhat outdated, it raises important questions about the
UK’s inability to consider insecurity and the application of WPS within its borders, even in
regards to ‘traditionally’ defined militarised post-conflict spaces.

Despite much of the current literature on NAPs being somewhat pessimistic about the value
of these documents/programmes of action as a tool for transformation, this research provides

38
a valuable critical engagement for the continual evolution and reworking of WPS. Some of the
most significant research on NAPs explores ‘who’ constructs and ‘where’ WPS is applied and
reveals that there is a whiteness and white privilege that is reflected in the practices and
narratives of the WPS agenda, which can be alarmingly counterproductive for the ambitions
of Post-Colonial feminists (Parashar, 2019; Haastrup and Hagen, 2020; Holvikivi and Reeves,
2020). Together, this body of research exposes the absolute necessity to consider
articulations of space and location, racialised hierarchies and Post-Colonialism in the analysis
of NAPs and WPS documents. It also highlights the value in analysing imagery in NAPs and
WPS documents, as this can also expose the reproduction of gendered and racialised
hierarchical narratives.

2.1.4 Institutional Approaches to the Analysis of WPS

As outlined in the previous sections, methodologically, a considerable proportion of the
literature on WPS has focused on language and the textual content of the WPS resolutions.
Articulations of the aims, targets, approaches, as well as conceptualisations of gender and
(in) security are a valuable site for inquiry as they demonstrate whether hegemonic discourses
are being disrupted or sustained by WPS and how WPS itself is being interpreted as a
mechanism of gender mainstreaming. However, in recent years there has been a shift to
investigate the wider situational context of the adoption, formulation and implementation of
NAPs and RAPs. For example, True (2016: 319) investigated how and what factors influence
how WPS as an international norm is diffused and found that a countries ‘decree of
democratisation’, ‘prior normative commitments to women’s rights, shown through unreserved
ratification of the UN CEDAW treaty’ are likely to increase the chances of the development of
a WPS NAP. Whilst significant, True (2016: 319) also draws attention to the need for further
research ‘to increase our understanding of the factors promoting diffusion with respect to the
implementation of NAPs across government policies and institutions’.

There is a small but growing body of work that takes a Feminist Institutionalist approach in
exploring how institutions interpret and institutionalise WPS; this has covered a number of
contexts, such as NATO (Wright, 2016), the European Union (Guerrina and Wright, 2016;
Deiana and McDonagh, 2018b; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018; Haastrup, 2018), the
Czech Republic (O’Sullivan and Krulišová, 2020) and the Pacific Islands (George, 2016), for
example. This work on the institutional dynamics of WPS provides interesting insight into the
constraints and barriers to its successful implementation. O’Sullivan and Krulišová (2020)
innovatively pay attention to how the ‘gender-hostile institutional environment’ in the Czech

39
Republic shaped its NAP on WPS and has constrained how it is implemented. This research
is far more revealing than a discourse analysis methodological approach in understanding the
dynamics that limit or promote the WPS agenda’s transformative potential. Similarly, George
(2016) utilises Feminist Institutionalism to explore the ‘formal and informal institutional
interplays’ which have shaped the regional action plan (RAP) on WPS in the Pacific Islands
Forum (PIF). This research has revealed how women have advanced debate in some areas
whilst remaining limited in others. It also highlighted how ‘prominence to women’s
‘participation’ is only present ‘insofar as this activity converges with the PIF’s own crisis
management ambitions’ (George, 2016: 385). More recently, Thomson (2019) has specifically
outlined a need for a research agenda that utilises Feminist Institutionalism in the analysis of
WPS, with a particular emphasis on post-conflict institutions, as the current scholarship on
WPS has largely overlooked the institutions responsible for creating and implementing the
WPS agenda. Institutions are a significant piece of the puzzle, and a detailed inquiry into these
actors is necessary to fully understand the agenda at work in terms of policy-making and
institutional practice (Thomson, 2019). It is clear that whilst discursive and textual analysis of
WPS provides interesting insight into commitments, or non-commitment, made regarding the
agenda, exploring how and why particular interpretations of WPS are formulated, how these
interpretations create opportunities for, or constrain, its transformative potential is also of
significant importance and is still an underdeveloped research area. Additionally, current
approaches within the Feminist Institutionalism research on WPS have not yet made a link to
Post-Colonialism and integrating race into institutional analyses of WPS interpretation and
institutionalisation in a considerable way, which is a clear oversight, given the criticism that
WPS has faced in reproducing globalised racialised hierarchies. As a result, this thesis aims
at filling this gap in its theoretical and methodological approach outlined in the following
chapters.

Overall, ongoing research on WPS has highlighted several key criticisms of the agenda itself.
Such as its role in sustaining ‘traditional’ conceptualisations of security and thus its lack of
transformative potential, for reproducing essentialist understandings of women, for
overlooking gender as a power structure but instead presenting it as synonymous with women
and for overlooking the role and place of men and masculinities in conflict. Furthermore,
current literature on NAPs has raised questions regarding their value as a mechanism for
implementing gender mainstreaming in security policy. Post-Colonial scholars have also
critiqued minority world approaches to WPS for their complicity in reproducing gendered and
racialised hierarchies. This review of the literature has revealed that much of the research on

40
WPS utilises textual and discursive analysis, which is an essential feature of understanding
and identifying the dominant discourses of WPS, which have implications for its
implementation but ‘cannot by itself explain why certain discourses are invoked and others
avoided’ (Carpenter, 2005: 301). Documents are ultimately statements of consensus and of
intent that may or may not be implemented. As a result, there has been a recent shift to
consider institutions and institutional dynamics in interpretations of WPS. This is a growing
body of work that provides a far more detailed explanation of WPS. However, the lack of
attention paid to race, alongside gender, as a feature of informal and formal institutional
interplays in interpreting, implementing and institutionalising WPS is a problematic oversight.
Overall, it is clear that NAP adoption, design, formulation, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation is a process with many factors that influence how WPS is interpreted and
institutionalised and therefore should be treated as such. Additionally, there is a clear rationale
for a greater linkage of the discursive and institutional approaches to WPS analysis.

2.2 Women, Gender and Race in Counter Terrorism/Countering Violent Extremism

As this thesis sits at the nexus of WPS and Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Preventing and
Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), this chapter now turns to the body of literature that
considers the securitised, gendered and racialised logics embedded within P/CVE/CT
concepts and approaches. It also highlights and disrupts the often women-blind and gender-
blind nature of P/CVE/CT. A survey of this research is necessary for understanding the
complexities of UNSCR 2242 and how there are competing priorities between the P/CVE/CT
and the WPS agendas. This section begins by considering the literature that critiques how the
War on Terror (WoT) and the UK’s approaches to P/CVE/CT have been constructed and
narrated in gendered and racialised ways. Subsequently, the literature highlighting how
women’s roles in terrorism/violent extremism and P/CVE and the need for gender-sensitive
and gender-responsive approaches to P/CVE is explored. This recent shift to acknowledge
the roles of women and ‘gender perspectives’ within this policy area by academics, as well as
security actors, raises important questions about whether P/CVE, as a concept and practice,
can be integrated with WPS in a way that does not co-opt the language of gender equality,
instrumentalise women and (re)produce racialised hierarchies. Whilst this section may have
initially seemed like a sharp pivot from the past section on WPS, the literature on women,
gender, and P/CVE/CT is a fundamental feature of understanding the convergence of WPS
and P/CVE (initially through UNSCR 2242) and the complexities of this integration. A specific
investigation into the current research on UNSCR 2242 will follow in section 2.3.

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2.2.1 Gendered and Racialised Narratives in CT and P/CVE
Since 9/11, CT and P/CVE has emerged as a key feature of national security strategies and
of academic debate. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, recently, there has been a shift
from language centred on CT to P/CVE, although this often remains conceptually blurred and
has faced criticism for being a primarily cosmetic improvement on often criticised hard and
militarised CT approaches (Aly, Balbi and Jacques, 2015; Austin and Giessmann, 2018: iv).
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) scholars have paid particular attention to the labelling of
terrorism/violent extremism and terrorists/violent extremists and argue that it is a subjective
endeavour, has normative connotations, is often used to delegitimise the people that it labels
and legitimises and shapes responses to it (Jackson, 2005; Gentry and Sjoberg, 2016).
Despite markers of terrorism often being articulated as apolitical and pragmatic, interpretations
of violence as terrorism are a sign of political agency, as they are stories told by political agents
and are an interpretation of events, which has political, economic and military implications
(Turk, 2004; Homolar and A. Rodríguez-Merino, 2019). Feminist scholars have further
developed this body of work to reveal the gendered nature of CT narratives, by drawing
attention to the ways that it reflects masculinised understandings of insecurity (Brown, 2019).
As well as exposing how the language of ‘terrorism can be used to feminise politically violent
actors, perpetuating the notion that masculinised states are (by definition) legitimate actors
and feminised non-state actors are (by definition) less legitimate’ (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2016:
146). Interestingly, feminists have also drawn parallels between domestic violence and
terrorism and argue that the intimate and structural dynamics of terrorism experienced in the
home reflects the violence of the international arena but also has similar foundations and direct
points of connection (Johnson, 2008; Ortbals and Poloni-Staudinger, 2014; Pain, 2014;
Sjoberg and Gentry, 2015). However, conceptualisations of terrorism that include domestic
violence remain a peripheral feature of mainstream understandings. This literature
demonstrates that who and what counts as violent extremism is political and gendered and
therefore dynamics of power should be at the forefront of any investigation into P/CVE/CT.

Since 9/11, the racialised and gendered underpinnings of War on Terror (WoT) discourses
and practices have received a significant amount of academic attention. Several scholars have
analysed political speeches to reveal how WoT narratives shaped socio-political reality and
rationalised, normalised and reified the practices of the WoT (Jackson, 2005; Hodges, 2011;
Holland, 2012). Holland (2012: 82), for example, draws attention to the way that Tony Blair
articulated ‘a natural leadership role for the UK, pursuing a moral and yet rational foreign
policy’ and an ‘us vs them’ narrative that constructed Britain as a superior to an ‘Other’, that

42
justified British involvement in the WoT. Whilst this research provides interesting insight into
how ‘Othering’ narratives justified the WoT, it largely overlooks the role of gender and how it
interplays with race in WoT discourses. Feminist literature, on the other hand, exposes how
highly gendered and racialised narratives were utilised in order to conjure support for the WoT
under the guise of feminism (Klaus and Kassel, 2005; Stabile and Kumar, 2005; Shepherd,
2006; Hunt and Rygiel, 2007; Zine, 2007; Bhattacharyya, 2008; Khalid, 2011). Hunt and Rygiel
(2007: 2) illuminate the use of gendered narratives that evoke women’s rights to justify post
9/11 CT interventions. Additionally, Hunt and Rygiel (2007) reveal gendered and racialised
representations of Muslim and Arab women in the Bush administration’s discourses to
construct the idea of ‘victimised women to be rescued’ from ‘cowardly oppressors’ by their
‘hyper-masculine rescuers’. By ‘embedding feminism’ into the war in Afghanistan, the Bush
administration was able to favourably shape the public perception that this was a war of
liberation and gain strong support for the project of ‘civilising’ Afghanistan (Hunt and Rygiel,
2007:9).

Zine (2007) provides an additional critical layer of engagement by arguing that the WoT re-
inscribed the ideological rhetoric of ‘the Crusades’. Zine (2007: 29) found a resurgence of
racialised discourses and tropes that frame Muslims in the majority world as ‘uncivilised and
barbaric’ and ties this to imperial legacies. Along a similar vein, Khalid’s (2011:15) research
identifies a number of binaries used in official and non-official WoT discourses to narrate, and
therefore situate, the West in opposition to the East. These being ‘good vs. evil, civilised vs.
barbaric, rational vs irrational, progressive vs. backward’. Khalid (2011:15) brings to light how
these discourses harness differences in ‘gender, gender roles and sexuality, along racial
lines’. Nayak (2006) and Phillips (2008) also draw attention to these narratives’ impact on
women in the West. As Nayak (2006) argues that narratives of ‘‘fear/loathing/paternalism’ of
the ‘Other’ abroad have implications for the ‘Other’ woman situated within the West. Phillips
(2008), on the other hand, draws attention to how the WoT was prioritised over women’s
domestic and private security. Together this body of literature exposes how governments in
the minority world situated themselves as masculine protectors of national security against a
potential threat of terrorism from abroad, rather than one to protect women from harm in the
domestic, or private sphere, from everyday intimate forms of violence.

The literature reviewed reveals a salience of highly gendered and racialised narratives in CT
discourses, that entrenched binaries and posited the ‘West’ in a superior masculinised heroic
position in comparison to a barbaric, feminised enemy in the ‘East’ and anchored women’s

43
rights to CT efforts in order to justify military intervention. This reveals how women’s bodies,
and their gendered identities, became the cultural bearers of national identities and were used
to uphold the key values of conflicting sides (Parashar, 2009). The question that then naturally
arises from this literature is that if at a fundamental level CT discourses are steeped in
gendered and racialised hierarchies, which co-opted the language of women’s rights and
protection in order to justify military intervention, can an attempt to integrate P/CVE into WPS
resist these narratives and the militarising and securitising logics in which it is established
from.

Similarly, the UK’s domestic approach to P/CVE, known as ‘Prevent’, which is part of its
broader approach to Countering Terrorism (the CONTEST strategy), has also received
widespread criticism within academic literature. At its most basic level, Prevent has been
critiqued for its loose conceptualisations of violent extremism, which ‘allows the policy to be
implemented selectively and arbitrarily, and draws on and strengthens ideas of the ‘Other’
already existing in society’ (Skoczylis and Andrews, 2020: 351 - 352). More critically, Sabir
(2017: 202) argues that there are fundamental problems with Prevent as it is situated within
the UK’s CONTEST strategy, which is based on ‘a framework of counterinsurgency, a military
doctrine used against non-state actors’ historically by the UK in colonial warfare and
problematises the liberal claims of Prevent as about ‘social inclusivity’ and ‘safeguarding’. At
a broader level, Walker (2018:725) labels the UK’s approach to Prevent and Counter
Extremism as a ‘policy spiral’ which is a policy that ‘lacks clear initial purpose or subsequent
direction, progression, control and reflection’ which makes it ‘susceptible to unresolved
contradictions or gaps, dramatic direction changes, and uncertain outcomes’ that arise from
‘inexact and contested meanings, objectives, and mechanisms’ that ‘generate dynamics of
suspicion as much as persuasion’. Ultimately, a considerable proportion of the literature on
the UK’s Prevent strategy deems it as having a negative impact on civil liberties and human
rights (Fenwick and Fenwick, 2019) based on a claim that ‘stringent, restrictive and invasive
measures are necessary to ensure…citizens security from terrorist attack’ (Bentley, 2018).

More specifically, a number of researchers have drawn attention to the overt focus on Islamic
terrorism/violent extremism in the UK’s approach to P/CVE, which has resulted in construction
of the Muslim community as a ‘risky’ community or ‘suspect community’ (Mythen, Walklate
and Khan, 2009; Awan, 2012; Taylor, 2020) and this securitisation and alienation of the Muslim
community has potentially served to undermine national security rather than enhance it
(Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). The surveillance of Muslim communities has also been

44
critiqued for securitising relations with local authorities (Qurashi, 2018). Furthermore, the
Prevent strategy has faced criticism for enmeshing security and integration policies, which has
increased the regulation of Muslim conduct in the UK, despite the strategy being
problematically contradictory, incoherent, and contested practice (O’Toole et al., 2016).
Similarly, Richards (2011: 143) argues that the Prevent strategy confusingly oscillates
‘between tackling violent extremism in particular and promoting community cohesion and
‘shared values’ on the other’. Of particular interest for this thesis is Ali's (2020) work which
draws attention to the ways in which the racism of Prevent is left largely ‘unseen’, as it is
predicated on structures of white ignorance linked to colonial amnesia that make secret its
racial logics and reproduces these through racialised bordering. This research is important as
it highlights the value in paying attention to ‘silences’ in policy documents as well as in
considering the racialised logic within policy priorities.

A substantial amount of literature has also problematised the UK’s approach to P/CVE as it
has shifted CT into the community and public sector in the name of ‘safeguarding’ vulnerable
individuals. For example, Prevent has faced criticism for engaging schools and teachers in
counter-extremism practices (Ragazzi, 2018; Winter et al., 2021) and the ‘routinisation of
professional practices of monitoring, surveillance and ‘disciplining’ of Muslim children and
young people ‘in their best interests’, on behalf of the state’, which has implications for Muslim
children and young people’s right’s (Coppock, 2014: 123; Sian, 2015). Others, such as
McKendrick and Finch (2017), have argued that Prevent is a securitised approach to
addressing modern social problems which impacts social work practices. Similarly, another
body of literature has focused on the securitisation of the health care sector in the name of
Prevent (Goldberg, Jadhav and Younis, 2017; Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2019: 91) and how
psychiatrists have been made complicit in ‘spying and scapegoating’ on predominantly Muslim
patients and is critiqued for corroding the doctor-patient relationship (Summerfield, 2016:87).

Several scholars have also paid attention to both gender and race in the UK’s domestic
counter-terror policy and programming. For example, Brown (2008: 487) finds that the UK’s
approach to CT has reproduced stereotypes, such as that women are more peaceful than
men, by typecasting women as ‘civilising’ influences on their communities (Brown, 2008: 487).
Much like the narratives revealed in the literature on the WoT, UK CT initiatives have been
critiqued for ‘Othering’ Muslim women and their portrayal as being in need of saving and
placed in generalised inferior positions to the patriarchy of Muslim men (Rashid, 2014).
Through the analysis of the UK’s Prevent Tragedies campaign, Andrews (2020) finds that

45
whilst women were recognised as potential subjects of radicalisation, they tended to be
attributed limited agency in their decision to join terrorist organisations and were heavily linked
to their positions as mothers. Ortbals and Poloni-Staudinger's (2018: 297) research revealed
that whilst the UK government aimed to empower Muslim women’s voices, through
government advisory boards such as the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group
(NMWAG), they found the group to be somewhat of a ‘political fad’ or ‘tick-box exercise’ and
failed to help Muslim women in the way that ministers promised. Furthermore, Rashid (2014:
601) highlights how those women or women’s groups, ‘who were more amenable to the
Prevent agenda were more readily engaged with’ and were able to access funding and political
capital and highlights the risks of instrumentalisation in the linkage of resources and power to
P/CVE/CT efforts.

Overall, a large proportion of the literature that explores WoT narratives and the UK’s
approach to CT and P/CVE reveals harmful gendered and racialised stereotypes and
hierarchies embedded within them. Despite claims that Muslim women would be empowered
through P/CVE/CT, there is a clear risk of the ‘instrumentalisation of women’s rights that
prioritises the needs of the state over those of women, and threatens the security of women
in pursuit of state CT agendas’ (Brown, 2019:10). Therefore, it is an interesting paradox that
the UK would integrate its approach to P/CVE, which has been highly criticised for having a
negative impact on women’s rights and gender equality, with WPS which aims to do the
opposite. Based on this critical research, questions are raised about how these agendas can
be integrated without WPS being co-opted or complicit in the (re)production of negative
gendered and racialised narratives and hierarchies that securitises communities.

2.2.3 Where are the Women? Perpetrators, Victims and Preventers

Moving beyond P/CVE/CT narratives, a separate stream of literature has aimed at disrupting
the assumption that violent extremism, and efforts to counter it, are predominantly male
spaces. This literature draws attention to the multitude of ways that women are involved in,
and affected by, violent extremism and terrorism, and in efforts to prevent and counter it, which
has attempted to address the ‘gender blindness’ of much critical terrorism work (Satterthwaite,
2013: 82). Gender analysis has typically been overlooked in studies on terrorism and political
violence, where there has been a greater focus on the political, ideological, cultural,
socioeconomic and religious factors that shape an individual’s participation in violent
extremism and terrorism (Phelan, 2020). As a result, this section now briefly explores the
literature on women and violent extremism and terrorism, which are roughly divided into three

46
key types: perpetrators, victims and preventers. However, it is worth mentioning that these
roles are not exclusive and there can be interconnectedness and blurring between them
(Moser and Clark, 2001; Argomaniz and Lynch, 2018). Whilst the literature reviewed here
draws attention to women specifically, as they have been an overlooked aspect of this area of
security, it provides an initial impetus for further exploration into gender-sensitivity, and
gender-responsiveness in P/CVE practices discussed later in the chapter.

Perpetrators
Dominant narratives surrounding terrorism, in academia and practice, tend to play into
understandings of women and femininity that see women as peaceful, unable to commit acts
of terror and results in their roles being downplayed in terror organisations (Sjoberg, 2009).
Women’s involvement in terrorist organisations and committing acts of terror is not a new nor
isolated phenomenon, yet research has often focused on women as subjects rather than as
agents of violence (Alexander, 2019). There is now an established body of literature that draws
attention to women engaging in the acts of violent extremism, terrorism and political violence
in domestic and international organisations that spans the globe. For example, women in the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Domestic and International Latin American, Irish
Republican Army (IRA), American right-wing, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Chechen and Al
Qaeda groups (Cunningham, 2003; Alison, 2004, 2009; Von Knop, 2007; Speckhard, 2008;
Gonzalez-Perez, 2008; Parashar, 2009; Cragin and Daly, 2009; Jacques and Taylor, 2009;
Sjoberg and Gentry, 2011, 2016; Bloom, 2011; Gentry and Sjoberg, 2016; Bloom and
Lokmanoglu, 2020; Jadoon et al., 2020). This literature has a number of sub focuses, that
explores women’s motivations and drivers for joining these groups, as well as in unpacking
their roles within them, such as sympathisers, spies, combatants, leaders, logistics, suicide
bombers, participation growth and in conducting terror or violent extremist attacks (Jacques
and Taylor, 2009).

This research broadly exposes that the invisibility of women does not necessarily equate to
passivity or powerlessness (Cunningham, 2003: 187) and refutes the underlying assumption
of women’s participation in terrorism, is that ‘a man made her do it’, but rather aims to expose
the intricate and multi layered motivations for doing so (Bloom, 2011) and the myriad of ways
in which they engage. Women who are perpetrators of violent extremism or terrorism fall
outside the traditional idea of femininity and what it means to be a woman, which often results
in women framed as ‘mothers, monsters or whores’, in an attempt to make sense of this
phenomenon (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007). However, this gendered framing denies the agency

47
of women in perpetrating acts of violence and ‘reflect and reinforce deep-seated societal
attitudes’ (Nacos, 2005). In recent years, a wealth of research has focused on women in the
‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS). This has provided evidence of the complex ways in
which women have been involved within ISIS specifically, such as in logistics, recruitment, as
state-builders, medical support, maintaining order within the ISIS network of women and
committing acts of violence (Hoyle, Bradford and Frenett, 2015; Chatterjee, 2016; Spencer,
2016; Van Leuven, Mazurana and Gordon, 2016; Lahoud, 2017; Khelghat-Doost, 2019).
Particular focus has also been given to the phenomenon of western women joining, or making
hijrah, to ISIS (Perešin, 2015; Shapiro and Maras, 2019). This has been highly
sensationalised, as women’s involvement disrupts the orientalist War on Terror narratives that
see Muslim women as helpless victims, ‘whose plight justifies imperialist intervention’ (Laster
and Erez, 2015: 95).

Research has begun to unpack how this has been reconciled with societal attitudes through
investigations into framing. For example, Martini (2018) draws attention to the narrative of the
‘Jihadi bride’ that has been a common occurrence in recent years. Drawing on critical
discourse analysis of British broadsheets, Martini presents, deconstructs and problematises
the depictions of ISIS women jihadis and their framing, which reconciles their actions with
gender and neo-orientalist constructions which often circulate in western societies. This
framing results in women’s radicalisation being different to men’s, linked to men’s agency and
enforces an understanding of women as naïve. This type of narrative and stereotypes have
material consequences, for example, Jackson (2019) argues that policy-makers in the UK
became ‘indifferent’ to the fate of the women, which enhanced relaxed attitudes towards extra
judicial assassination of British subjects and international law. In addition, these types of
framings are also inaccurate as Nuraniyah (2018: 900) and Schmidt (2020b) demonstrate that
women’s radicalisation is highly ideologically motivated, and in some cases to a greater extent
than men. In addition, motivations can be deeply intertwined with intersecting identities and
personal experiences, that are often overlooked, such as marginalisation and social exclusion
(Pearson, 2016). Furthermore, much of the recent research on women in violent extremism
organisations has been orientated around the analysis of social media accounts in order to
unpack the motivations of western women for joining ISIS (Loken and Zelenz, 2018), how ISIS
use social media to recruit and radicalise women (Perešin and Cervone, 2015; Pearson, 2018;
Windsor, 2020), women’s roles in ISIS (Huey, Inch and Peladeau, 2019). This recent use of
social media in academic research has provided some interesting and highly relevant insight
into women’s involvement in violent extremism and terrorism and thus efforts to counter it.

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Overall, it is clear from this body of literature on women’s perpetration and involvement in
violent extremism and terrorism that women form a large and complex part of this
phenomenon and there is clear rationale for P/CVE and CT practices to recognise this.

Victims
Whilst women can be perpetrators of violent extremism and terrorism; their bodies are often
‘weaponised’ in asymmetrical warfare. Research has also shown that terrorist and extremist
organisations often target women as a strategic tactic; for example, through sexual violence
and slavery, forced marriage or being used as human shields (Ahram, 2015; Oriola, 2017;
Sverdlov, 2017; Al-Ali, 2018; Tschantret, 2018; Kaya, 2020). ISIS’ persecution of the Yazidi
population and mass enslavement of Yazidi women and in Nigeria, Boko Haram’s systematic
targeting and abduction of women and school girls, are examples of particular significance in
recent times (Sverdlov, 2017). To further unpack this, Bloom and Lokmanoglu (2020) expose
how Boko Haram and ISIS have emerged with explicitly gendered strategies that sit within a
patriarchal and misogynistic Salafi-jihadist culture. This research highlights the use of gender-
based violence and exploitation of women as an incentive for male fighters to participate in
these groups. ISIS’ revival of an antiquated interpretation of the Islamic distribution of the
spoils of war through ‘sexual slavery, war booty, and concubinage’, is used as an example of
this (Bloom and Lokmanoglu, 2020: 7). ISIS’ use of sexual violence is also used to construct
a ‘hyper masculine’ Islamic state, which it uses to subordinate and degrade those it seems its
enemies, whilst also reinforcing bonds within ISIS (Ahram, 2015; Kaya, 2020). In addition, the
rape of Yazidi women was used as a form of ethnic cleansing based on rules of religious
patrilineality (Kaya, 2020). However, Al-Ali (2018:10) argues that this sexual violence cannot
be seen in isolation of ‘macro-structural configurations of power pertaining to imperialism,
neoliberalism and globalisation on the one hand, and localised expressions of patriarchy,
religious interpretations and practices and cultural norms on the other’. What is clear is that it
is impossible to tackle women’s victimisation by violent extremist organisations without
considering the broader power structures at play in the contexts in which this occurs. It is only
by paying greater attention to exposing the concomitant nature of patriarchal, socio-political
and cultural dynamics that are often the backdrop to these groups (Oriola, 2017) that a deeper
engagement with the gendered nature of this phenomenon can be exposed. Women are not
the only target of gender-based violence (GBV), the LGBT community, including men, has
also been targeted thus drawing attention to how GBV can be used as a strategic mechanism
to assert power (Tschantret, 2018), which reflects toxic masculinity. This analysis reveals the
link between misogyny and violent extremism, which will be explored in greater depth in

49
section 2.2.4. The literature reviewed here has drawn attention to women’s (and men’s)
victimisation by violent extremist and terrorist organisations. However, it is necessary to go
beyond essentialised understandings of women as victims by understanding this phenomenon
as reflective of wider gendered hierarchical structures in society and conflict.

Preventers
The final body of literature under exploration in this section now focuses on how women can,
and do, play significant roles in preventing and countering violent extremism, despite
stereotypical and essentialised understandings of women’s participation being commonplace
in P/CVE practices (Giscard D’Estaing, 2017; Ní Aoláin and Huckerby, 2018a, 2018b). On the
one hand, some scholars have argued that women can sometimes act as ‘early warning
systems’ for radicalisation or have ‘certain qualities associated with women as mothers and
wives that have the potential to help counter the growing threat of radicalisation and violence
extremism at home, in communities and at-risk areas’ (Majoran, 2015). This approach may be
seen as “useful” for those involved in implementing P/CVE policies; however, it is somewhat
problematic in so far as it reproduces and entrenches gender stereotypes whereby women’s
inclusion in security and P/CVE is a by-product of their role as carers within domestic settings.
In other words, it operationalises motherhood and presents women as more peaceful,
ultimately limiting women’s contributions, roles and capacities (Ní Aoláin, 2015; Gordon and
True, 2019). This approach also co-opts and instrumentalises the private realm, as it shifts
responsibility from the state to women as mothers and wives to prevent violent extremism
(Giscard D’Estaing, 2017; Winterbotham, 2018; Auchter, 2020).

The risk of marginalisation and exclusion of women from their communities can also occur
when ‘the state and communal understandings of the intervention and its meaning and value
are different’ (Ní Aoláin, 2015), such as mothers protecting their sons vs the state protecting
all citizens. It subjects mothers to scrutiny externally and internally because the state has a
‘utilitarian interest in harnessing the ‘motherhood’ card to its own political ends (Ní Aoláin,
2015). Winterbotham and Pearson (2016) carried out fieldwork with Muslim communities in
five countries (Canada, UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands); they found that aspects
of CVE approaches that aim to empower women and prevent radicalisation exacerbated
community tensions and did ‘not reflect the changing norms of Muslim communities in the
West’ (2016: 54). This was especially the case when there was an explicit focus on women’s
maternalistic logic and roles as peaceful agents. In response to the issues raised here, other
researchers have drawn attention to how the participation of women in PVE can be carried

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out in a more empowering and less risky way. For example, Nwangwu and Ezeibe (2019)
draw on fieldwork, policy appraisal and secondary data to examine ‘women-led civil society
organisations’ in ‘countering violent extremism’ in Nigeria and found that the institutionalisation
of women-led CSOs not only played a central role in countering terrorism and VE, it has the
potential to enhance women’s participation in the public sphere more generally. What emerges
from this analysis is a tension between the interests of the state, to co-opt minoritized women
in P/CVE efforts, and the interests of women in those communities. The literature reviewed
here examined the socio-political implications of the strategic co-optation of women for P/CVE.
This body of work is clear about the risks of instrumentalisation, marginalisation, exclusion
and the reproduction of gender stereotypes that can actually contribute to women’s insecurity
by placing them on the “frontline”. Instead, this work points to the need to develop empowering
and inclusive approaches to women’s participation in prevention that reflects the voices and
interests of women from marginalised communities in the development and implementation of
those policies and programmes.

2.2.4 Gender Perspectives and P/CVE

In recent years, there has been a growing body of literature that unpacks the gendered
dimensions of VE and terrorism and considers, analyses and promotes gender-sensitive and
gender-responsive approaches to P/CVE. This section first considers the literature that aims
to understand the gender drivers, relations and dynamics of violent extremism, which provides
a far more detailed understanding of the work that gender is doing in this space. Secondly,
this section then considers the literature that has begun to promote a ‘gender-sensitive’ and
‘gender-responsive’ approach to P/CVE. This literature uncovers the value of gender lenses
in understanding violent extremism and efforts to counter it by recognising that the
phenomenon is embedded within wider structural inequalities that contribute to radicalisation
and recognises the role that masculinities and femininities can play in this space. What is also
made particularly clear is that there are risks of linking gender equality to P/CVE efforts.

Understanding the Gender Drivers, Dynamics and Relations in Violent Extremism

Research that pays attention to gender in analysing the drivers of radicalisation and early-
warning signs of violent extremism provides a far more detailed understanding of violent
extremism than research that is gender blind. For example, True and Eddyono’s (2021)
research outlines some of the gender-specific warning signs of extremism in Indonesia, such
as a shifting use of the hijab, constraints on women’s mobility, social naming and ‘hate crimes’
and threats or acts of gender-based violence. This research is significant as it provides specific

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examples of the gendered dimensions of violent extremism and how to address them. Along
similar lines, Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown (2020) draw upon around 250 interviews and
focus groups across five countries to explore the gendered underpinnings of men and
women’s radicalisation. Their findings are noteworthy in that they cover different types of
extremism and contribute further understanding of radicalisations gendered power dynamics
and thus how to counter it. Concomitantly to these works, Johnston, Iqbal and True's (2020)
research into the messaging of Indonesian extremist groups online provides evidence of the
gendered nature of recruitment messaging and strategy as well as the gendered ideological
underpinnings of Indonesian violent extremism. Together, these works provide novel insight
into the ways that gender is a central dimension in radicalisation processes. This goes beyond
focusing on ‘where the women are’, as explored in the previous section, but recognises that
gender is a feature of both men and women’s engagement with violent extremism and
highlights the need to be gender-sensitive in approaches to prevent or counter-extremism.

Connected to this, scholars have paid particular attention to the role of masculinities in violent
extremism and in recognising men as gendered beings in this space (Ezekilov, 2017). For
example, there are gendered drivers of violent extremism specifically for men, such as push
factors of social marginalisation, lack of marriage prospects and economic opportunities or
pull factors such as a sense of belonging, a defence of identity or the search for respect
(Ezekilov, 2017: 3-5). As evidence of gendered ideology in extremist violence, Phelan,
Johnston and True (2020) expose the significant ‘misogynist, racist, bigoted, and homophobic
grievances’ in the Christchurch mosque attacker’s manifesto. By uncovering the racialised and
gendered ideology that underpinned this violence, this research fortifies the need for gender
analysis in this space by understanding ‘the factors that can facilitate, sustain, and spread
violent extremism’. Akin to this, is an approach that focuses on the links between misogyny
and violent extremism that mainstream research has often overlooked. This research pays
greater attention to patriarchal structures and harmful performances of masculinity, as
evidenced by Brown et al.'s (2020) study on violent extremism in Asia. More specifically,
Castillo Díaz and Valji (2019) utilise data to expose a correlation between misogyny and
violent extremism and problematise the way in which misogynist violence is often treated as
an issue of the private sphere, rather than a public security concern. Along similar lines,
Johnston and True (2019) found that hostile sexism and support for violence against women
was a significant factor associated with support for violent extremism at an individual level in
a number of countries. It is clear from this research that misogyny and gender binaries are
often present in the ideological underpinnings of extremist groups and how these may, or may

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not, operate in practice. This links to the previously mentioned research that exposes the ways
in which women (Bloom and Lokmanoglu, 2020) and the LGBT community, or sexual
minorities, (Tschantret, 2018) are often strategically targeted by extremist organisations.

Related to the aforementioned literature, there is also growing scholarly work that explores
gender equality and women’s rights as a feature of P/CVE. It has been claimed that societies
that have higher levels of respect for women and their rights are less prone to extremism
(Coomaraswamy, 2015: 222); thus, research has begun to show that the promotion of gender
equality can indirectly contribute to the easing of tensions that may lead to violent extremism
(True et al., 2019). That being said, caution is given to this approach as women’s rights are
an end in themselves and should not be instrumentalised for the success of P/CVE initiatives
(UN Women, 2015). Brown et al. (2020) problematise the ways that security-oriented
approaches to addressing violent extremism and terrorism can end up securitising women’s
rights by attempting to justify problematic interventions in order to protect women, without
examining the reasons as to why women are disproportionately targeted in the first place,
which links back to past discussions on WoT narratives. This research, in combination with
the research on women in VE and P/CVE, has exposed how gender and violent extremism is
intertwined in complex and multifaceted ways and without broadening understandings and
engagement with gender in P/CVE and CT, academics and policy-makers alike will have an
incomplete picture of extremist violence. A gendered perspective is essential in understanding
the drivers of violent extremism and the diverse roles and strategies needed to prevent it (True
and Eddyono, 2021: 64). However, there are clear questions raised about how gender can be
operationalised by mainstream security actors, if the ultimate goal is state security rather than
human security. Similarly, how can it be ensured that women and their rights will not be utilised
for operational effectiveness, which creates risks of greater harm befalling upon them. The
following section now addresses the research that analyses and attempts to integrate gender
into P/CVE policy and programmes.

Gender-sensitive and Gender-responsive Approaches to P/CVE

The previous section highlights the need for gender-sensitivity in P/CVE programming and
policy that takes into account the gendered dimensions of radicalisation, recruitment and
ideology (Phelan, Johnston and True, 2020). This follows the Global Counterterrorism Forum
Good Practice on Women and Countering Violent Extremism and its subsequent addendum
on gender mainstreaming (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2015; 2019) and the global
normative framework on the gender and P/CVE discussed in this introduction to this thesis.

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The previous section highlighted that violent extremism as a phenomenon is deeply gendered,
yet research has also turned to expose how P/CVE policy and practices are gendered
themselves. For example, Brown (2019) argues that masculinity is embedded in approaches
to P/CVE. Drawing on interviews with CVE practitioners and youth workers, Brown (2019)
exposes how the state can mobilise and produce specific types of masculinity, such as ‘the
chivalric protector’ or as father figures to counter frail masculinity of ‘suspect terrorists’ as part
of its counter radicalisation efforts. This, in combination with the previously mentioned
research on WoT and CT gendered and racialised discourses, means that efforts to integrate
gender perspectives into P/CVE should be approached with caution as P/CVE appear to
reproduce some of the criticisms of CT efforts. Closer attention has also been paid to where
and how gender is being included in P/CVE policy and approaches, to consider the
consequential impact this may have. For some, the absence of gender-sensitivity results in a
risk of potential to harm women, but also it can be operationally ineffective (Schmidt, 2020).
For example, Schmidt (2020) draws on interviews with UK experts on CT and CVE to expose
how gender stereotypes and biases remain a significant issue within this context. Schmidt
(2020) found that stereotypes such as women as victims, mothers and monsters remain
embedded in this space, which limits the effectiveness of P/CVE policy. Whilst this is piece of
literature is significant, this research aims to justify gender-sensitivity in P/CVE for operational
effectiveness, rather than fundamentally aiming to promote gender equality which are two
seemingly different starting points.

Other research has focused more specifically on the ways gender has been included in P/CVE
policy and programming. For example, Skjelsbæk, Hansen and Lorentzen (2020) engage in
a critical investigation of how gender is conceptualised in policy documents from a range of
intergovernmental organisations and a state on P/CVE. This research revealed two ways in
which gender was made relevant in the documents, firstly in relation to preventing women
from being radicalised, and secondly, in the context of gendered roles as preventative
mechanisms in communities and families. This demonstrates a limited engagement with
gender by key policy actors, which may be reflective of the challenges of integrating gender
and P/CVE more broadly. Similarly, Patel and Westermann (2018) analysed Australia’s
approach to gender in CVE strategies, and found that they do not adequately integrate gender
perspectives and found that women were not included throughout the design, implementation,
operation and evaluation of P/CVE which reveals a fundamental limitation of its policy and
practices. Davis (2019) also found that the European Union’s Counter Terrorism Strategy
(2005) is gender blind and the more recent European Commission Communication on

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supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism does not mention
gender, men or boys and identifies empowering women as a way to tackle underlying root
causes of radicalisation and women as an audience for “violence inciting’’ ideologies, which
is troubling, as this illustrates the lack of progress and meaningful integration of gender into
mainstream P/CVE (Davis, 2019: 98). Along a similar line of analysis, Gordon and True (2019:
74) provide a framework for the analysis of P/CVE policy and programmes by conceptualising
approaches as gender blind, gender stereotyped and gender responsive. For Gordon and
True (2019) ‘gender blind’ P/CVE means that there is no recognition or mention of gender,
‘gender stereotyped’ is the integration of gender stereotypes and normative assumptions
about the roles and skill sets of men and women and ‘gender-responsive’ is that P/CVE
approaches are ‘informed by gender-sensitive analysis of the inequalities and differences
between men and women, how they can sustain and exacerbate violent extremism and other
forms of violence, and whether they are cognisant of and responsive to the gender dynamics
of violent extremism and societal gender relations in practice’ (Gordon and True, 2019: 77).
This conceptual framework is a valuable mechanism to problematise inadequate and
potentially harmful engagements of gender in P/CVE practices.

Furthermore, Gordon and True (2019: 78 - 79) expand understandings of what gender-
responsive policy and programming looks like in their investigation into P/CVE in Bangladesh
and Indonesia. Their criteria includes attention paid to sensitivity to gender dynamics of VE,
gender specific drivers of recruitment, gendered messages, propaganda and punishments,
appreciation of how gender equality may support VE narratives, awareness to the gendered
indicators of intolerance and extremism, provisions for men and women to report warning
signs (and recognition that they may be different), the role of families, communities and civil
society in P/CVE and space provided for their engagement with government and security
actors, the development of partnerships with CSOs that include women and are women led
and finally, a commitment to investigating the gendered impact of VE for women, men and
people of diverse gender and sexual identities. The findings for Indonesia and Bangladesh
reveal that due to the complexities of trying to achieve gender sensitivity in P/CVE strategies
policies and programmes, states can sometimes reinforce gender stereotypes and are
ultimately ineffective in preventing and countering threats (Gordon and True, 2019: 74). This
literature is significant for this thesis as it introduces a framework for understanding the ways
in which gender is included in P/CVE policy and how ineffective gender-sensitivity and
silences on this criteria may indicate harmful and ineffective programming or policy.

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It is clear that research is beginning to demonstrate how P/CVE efforts can challenge, maintain
or even reinforce gender inequalities. Whilst there is no consensus on how to formulate
effective gender-sensitive and gender-responsive P/CVE policy and programming, research
has shown that gender can be included in ways that prioritise the operational effectiveness of
P/CVE and entrench harmful stereotypes and practices that put women at risk. Feminist
scholars have emphasized the danger of essentialising, instrumentalising, and securitising
representations of women in P/CVE programming, which could trigger further marginalization
and disempowerment (Giscard D’Estaing, 2017). There is a bifurcation of this research and
practice, that on the one hand pays attention to women as a means to enhance the operational
effectiveness of P/CVE or CT programming and strategy and on the other hand, promotes
gender-sensitive and gender-responsive P/CVE programming in order to unpack and disrupt
the gender power dynamics at the heart of VE and P/CVE responses. The extant research on
gender in P/CVE policy thus far has a reasonably bleak disposition on its successful
interpretation and implementation. This is, of course, problematic for scholars working on the
WPS agenda, who have considered the increased focus on counterterrorism and P/CVE as a
potential danger, by threatening to override stand-alone goals of gender equality for (national)
security considerations (Shepherd, 2017; Heathcote, 2018). Therefore the next section of this
chapter, details the current scholarly debates on the opportunities and constraints of the
integration of WPS and P/CVE.

2.3 Women, Peace and Security and Countering Violent Extremism

The two previous sections in this chapter have, firstly, evidenced the complicated and
sometimes problematic nature of WPS and secondly, exposed some of the gendered and
racialised underpinnings of CT narratives, as well as the myriad of ways in which women, and
gender, are and should be considered a core feature of VE and P/CVE. A review of the extant
literature has justified the need for gender-sensitive approaches to P/CVE, but has also
highlighted the need for caution in doing so as there are risks of the instrumentalisation and
stereotyping of women and a co-optation of the language of ‘gender’. Therefore this section
explores the literature at the nexus of these two research areas. In light of the passing of
UNSCR 2242, many feminist scholars have debated the integration of the WPS and P/CVE
agendas. The debate can be divided into two amorphous perspectives, those who are
optimistic about this integration and those who are pessimistic. Thus far, most literature on
UNSCR 1325 and 2242 is built upon theoretical debates. This will be addressed first before
moving on to the literature that explores evidence-based research and the practical aspects
of this integration.

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2.3.1 A Debate of Pessimism and Optimism
As mentioned previously in this chapter, the WPS agenda has faced criticism for being
essentialising (Carpenter, 2005; El Bushra, 2007; Otto and Heathcote, 2014) and a dilution of
the feminist ambitions set out at the outset of the WPS project (Cohn, 2008; Otto, 2010; Pratt
and Richter-Devroe, 2011). The idea that the WPS agenda is ‘making war safe for women’
(Weiss, 2011; Shepherd, 2016) is of particular concern in the post 9/11 world, as Pratt (2013a)
argues that although UNSCR1325 has challenged the gendered boundaries of international
security, it tends to works in tandem with dominant security practices and discourses,
particularly in the post 9/11 world. Concerns regarding the co-optation of WPS seem to have
intensified, ‘based on the sheer malleability of the War on Terror discourse’ (Allison, 2013).
The realm of CT and CVE has been criticised for having negative gender and human rights
impacts and in securitising government activity in areas that are often ‘safe havens’ for the
rights of women and girls, such as development assistance (Huckerby and Satterthwaite,
2013: 3). Despite international organisations, such as the EU and the UN, upholding human
rights mandates, they often end up legitimising problematic approaches to CVE by adopting
them uncritically (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018: 3). Whilst some scholars have argued that
feminist theory and counter-terrorism debates are ‘unlikely bedfellows’ as they not too
dissimilar, as they challenge the classical dichotomy of the public/private spheres and
recognise the ubiquity of security threats (Johnstone, 2009: 1). Others, such as Ní Aoláin
(2013: 1087) and Meger (2018) argue that despite this, most CT/CVE strategies return to a
position of reinforcing this dichotomy and effectively turn their back on women’s rights to
uphold state interests.

A core concern with trying to intersect the WPS agenda and CVE strategies is that although
P/CVE is aimed less so at military force or coercion than CT, it is still largely upheld by
masculinised security institutions or states that construct and label who and what violent
extremism is and enable the securitised responses and resources in order to do so, which
brings risks of ‘greater insecurity and gender essentialism’ (Ní Aoláin, 2016: 276). In direct
response to UNSCR 2242, Ní Aoláin (2016) urges ‘cautionary restraint on the enthusiasm’ of
the resolution as while it promotes widening of the WPS agenda’s applicability to other
insecure settings, it brings ‘real risks of greater insecurity and gender essentialism’. For Ní
Aoláin (2016: 278), this integration signifies a shift in language and priorities as WPS is
increasingly ‘bolted on’ to the actions of states in delegitimising and countering terrorism.
Whilst Ní Aoláin (2016: 278) recognises the real harm that terrorism and counterterrorism can
cause for women in many parts of the world, serious consideration is given to the potential

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harms of WPS being harnessed for the pursuit of broader ideological and military goals. Ní
Aoláin (2016: 278) therefore argues that the decision for feminists to be within or outside of
this space is a form of ‘Hobson’s choice’ for feminist activists. Borrowing Diane Otto’s concept
of ‘exile of inclusion’ (Otto, 2009), Ní Aoláin (2016: 278) argues that by partaking in the
integration of WPS and P/CVE, feminists are forced to compromise, give concessions and
requires an understanding that you may forego the option of objection to many of the basic
premises of the collective security system. However, the alternative is to not be engaged in
the conversation, which results in a forfeit in exercising any influence on the decisions and
actions of P/CVE at all. The conundrum articulated here by Ní Aoláin (2016) is one of the most
significant puzzles in this area of research and is core to this thesis.

For Heathcote (2018: 387), the expansion of the WPS agenda into CT and P/CVE is not only
problematic in upholding securitised narratives and actions, but also there is a significant risk
of it being ‘co-opted into the civilising tropes that surround the work of countering terrorism
and violent extremism’. Heathcote (2018) analyses eight UNSCR resolutions on WPS, up to
UNSCR 2242 and finds that UNSCR 2242 makes developments in terms of appearing
sensitive to the language of women’s rights and untying women’s participation and
consultation from ‘women’s issues’. However, through detailed critical engagement with
UNSCR 2242 and its link to counter-terrorism, Heathcote (2018: 375) finds that the linkage
‘underlines the reality that the Security Council cannot and does not function as a space of
feminist law making’. Heathcote (2018) argues that whilst the integration of WPS and CT/CVE
need not be a negative one, the focus on ‘women’s participation, leadership and
empowerment as a tool to counter terrorism’, in paragraph 13 of the resolution, is illustrative
of the risk of co-optation of the WPS agenda. Furthermore, Heathcote (2018: 387) draws
attention to the role of the Security Council in developing the WPS framework due to being
driven by wider security approaches and the use of military violence, which is of deep concern
to feminist actors committed to alternative strategies. Whilst Heathcote’s analysis of the UNSC
resolutions provides a critical engagement with the discursive aspects of CT and WPS and
the power of the Security Council, and has well-grounded assumptions about the risks of this,
there is still considerable ambiguity in the interpretation of this by member states, and how
this plays out in different contexts.

On the other hand, some scholars are more receptive and optimistic about this integration.
For example, Chowdhury Fink and Davidan (2018: 157 - 158) find far more complementarity
and convergence than there is dissonance between the agendas. Interestingly, this chapter

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focuses on ‘counterterrorism’ as an overarching agenda rather than only ‘P/CVE’, which
follows some of the language of the UNSCRs. This contrasts to much feminist work that
argues CT is a far too militarised and securitised concept for feminist engagement, whereas
P/CVE provides a more amenable link to feminist work, as it is more holistic. Furthermore,
Chowdhury Fink and Davidan (2018: 167) justify the link between WPS and CT by arguing
that attention to terrorism and violent extremism will not abate and therefore, it is essential
that responses are taken that apply the principles of WPS agenda in order to continue efforts
to empower women and ensure an inclusive and sustainable peace. For Chowdhury Fink and
Davidan (2018), in order to mitigate the risks of ‘marginalisation, instrumentalisation and
securitisation’ of WPS in this space, a gender perspective must be integrated fully into CT and
CVE efforts. Whilst they do acknowledge that the resolutions will only be as good as the
political will and commitments that underpin them, their argument overlooks the practical
implementation of the agendas and the complexities of doing so without co-option and
ensuring that the political will exists. This literature also overlooks the issue of neo-colonialism
and the racialised hierarchical interactions that are exacerbated by CT efforts, as seen in the
WoT narratives. Whilst these debates are important, it is clear that a more systematic and
theoretical analysis is required that considers the racialised and gendered institutions that
interpret and implement UNSCR 2242 and whether the integration has been introduced in a
way that is not instrumentalising or securitising the WPS agenda and does not reproduce
gendered and racialised hierarchies.

2.3.2 The Challenges of Implementing WPS and P/CVE

A key feature of the success of the UNSCRs on WPS is how they are engaged with and
implemented by the UN outside of the WPS stream and by member states and international
organisations. Eddyono and Davies (2019) explore the Security Council’s engagement and
attempts to integrate the ideas of empowerment, leadership and participation, associated with
the WPS agenda, into P/CVE. They draw upon UN Security Council documents; UNSCR 2178
(2014), UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and the Fifth
Review on the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. These documents refer to WPS
resolutions, UNSCR 1325 and 2242, but are heavily CT/CVE focused, providing an interesting
site of inquiry. They argue that there has been ‘significant progress in conceptualising an
empowered and inclusive WPS agenda into P/CVE’, however, they go on to acknowledge
potential instrumentalisation risks and inadequacy of detailed plans for implementation at
regional and local levels (Eddyono and Davies, 2019: 684). Whilst this research provides a
top-level discursive analysis of integrating WPS and P/CVE at the Security Council, it is limited

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in exposing how these ‘discourses’ are interpreted, how (or if) they are utilised, and in what
ways, by which actors. Whilst they acknowledge the potential risk factors of supporting
women’s roles in P/CVE, they conclude that the integration has been ‘a crucial and welcome
development for CVE response’ and ‘progress needs to be maintained’ (Eddyono and Davies,
2019: 687). Overall, this research takes an optimistic view that these strategies can be easily
implemented into masculinised and militarised spaces. Similarly, Rothermel (2020) analyses
the UN’s Plan of Action and P/CVE agenda, drawing heavily on a more transparent and
systematic discourse analytical approach than Eddyono and Davies, to expose
representations of gender. A key contribution by Rothermel (2020: 2) is that they pay attention
to how P/CVE, as a more holistic approach to violent extremism, sits at a security-
development-gender nexus. This research is significant as it demonstrates the tensions,
continuities and discontinuities in the representations of women and gender in P/CVE, as it
sits within security and development spaces, thus providing a more nuanced understanding
of gender and P/CVE.

Another particularly relevant piece of literature for this thesis is Asante and Shepherd's (2020)
discourse analysis of 38 NAPS which explores how gender roles and identities are
represented in relation to CT and CVE. Their findings suggest that in many NAPS women are
fixed in subordinate and passive subject positions and men are presumed to be inherently
violent and extremist. Asante and Shepherd (2020: 3) argue that this does not take into
account the existing body of literature on the problematic consequences of conventional
gender stereotypes, nor does it reflect that the WPS agenda is, at a minimum, an agenda that
seeks to transform the governance of peace and security, and maximally transform the
militarist international system. They find that the move towards integrating CT/CVE and WPS
in NAPs demonstrates ‘a return to negative gendered assumptions that limit women’s agency
and preclude their meaningful political participation’ (Asante and Shepherd, 2020:3). This
analysis provides a broad inspection of where and how P/CVE has been used in NAPs and
demonstrates an emerging global trend on including CT/CVE in WPS NAPS. Whilst this
research provides a top-level understanding of WPS and P/CVE in practice; it does not engage
more deeply into why NAPS have interpreted and developed approaches to P/CVE and CT in
this way and how they might or might not influence spaces outside of the NAP.

Moving from discourse-based analyses to the evaluation of the implementation of policy, there
is a very small amount of literature that examines the integration of P/CVE and WPS in P/CVE
and CT programmes. Additionally, much of this work is limited to the African context. For

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example, White (2020) explores the conceptual and practical challenges of meaningful
inclusion of gender and WPS in security, in the analysis of a CVE programme, STRIVE, in the
Horn of Africa. White uses a feminist constructivist approach to examine the socially
constructed nature of gender roles and how that impacts security. White's (2020) findings
suggest that whilst there are normative commitments to uphold the principles of human rights
and equality, by implementing governments, as part of CT/CVE programming, there is a lack
of commitment in implementing gender-sensitive programming that focuses on equal inclusion
of all genders. This stems from a lack of understanding of the meaning of gender and its
widespread effects in this space, which means programming is unsuccessful. Furthermore,
White makes a linkage between UNSCR 1325 and P/CVE programming, by arguing that
implementing governments tend to try to show commitment to the agenda by adding a
component of women’s empowerment, however, this does not lead to meaningful inclusion of
gender, rather gendered dynamics are oversimplified, which correlates with a failure of these
initiatives.

Similarly, Aroussi (2020) contributes to the debate by adding supporting evidence from field
work and research interviews in Kenya, to explore the association of WPS and P/CVE.
Aroussi’s (2020: 4) findings suggest that in the Kenyan context, this integration has failed to
‘change the country’s androcentric, militaristic, racialized, elitist and top-down approach to
conceptualising and responding to violent extremism’ and has not challenged the ‘sources of
extremism and insecurity in the lives of women’. Furthermore, the ‘policy shift has exacerbated
discrimination against women of Muslim minorities, redirected funding to peacebuilding and
development-focused projects, and increased the insecurity experienced by local
communities’ (Aroussi, 2020: 4). Aroussi (2020: 27) critiques the policy shift as it ‘is
dangerously about aligning the WPS’s agenda with the rest of the security council’s work’ and
reducing it to a mere tool for counterterrorism. Correspondingly, Lorentzen (2021) examines
how civil society and government officials have translated WPS and P/CVE into the Malian
context which reveals that it often has universalising tendencies and contradicts many of the
normative aspirations of the WPS agenda. This research, alongside White's (2020) and
Aroussi's (2020) research are the most significant pieces of literature that explores the
integration of WPS and P/CVE, and the risks associated with it, at a practical level. White
(2020), Aroussi (2020) and Lorentzen (2021) provide a valuable contribution to the literature
on WPS and P/CVE, and all find that the integration of these agendas has been a failure to
some degree. Where no literature yet exists is in the in-depth analysis of a minority world
government’s interpretation of UNSCR 2242. Additionally, these three pieces of literature

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focus on the specifics of on the ground implementation of WPS and P/CVE and do not explore
the wider institutional complexities that shapes its interpretation.

2.4 Conclusion
This chapter identified the problematic dimensions of the WPS agenda and P/CVE/CT as
separate and integrated agendas were identified. The literature revealed a number of key
criticisms of WPS, such as a limited ability to transform the peace and security sphere due to
its ‘add women and stir’ approach, its essentialising language on women and for utilising a
concept of gender that is synonymous with women and tends to overlook men and
masculinities in any meaningful way. Furthermore, literature has considered NAPs as a
potentially ineffective mechanism for WPS implementation, which have also been criticised
for the way in which minority world government NAPs can be complicit in the (re)production
of gendered and racialised hierarchies. This literature ultimately raises questions about the
transformative value of WPS and NAPs as an approach to gender mainstreaming in security,
and worse so, about WPS’ complicity in entrenching gendered and racial hierarchies and
bolstering harmful and militarised approaches to security. Research in this area often utilises
discourse and textual analyses, although this chapter acknowledges a developing research
stream that offers an alternate theoretical and methodological approach that considers the
wider complexities of WPS norm diffusion and the institutional dynamics that shape it. As a
result, this thesis finds that a combined discursive and institutional analytical approach is likely
to provide a more comprehensive and useful analysis of WPS, than either of these alone.

Following the review of WPS focused literature, this chapter then shifted to exploring the
research on P/CVE and CT. It found an abundance of research that demonstrated that the
concepts of P/CVE/CT are politicised and securitised and are not ‘natural’ or ‘neutral’
reflections of world. A pattern of research was uncovered that employs narrative analytical
approaches to the WoT and CT discourses to exposes the deployment of highly racialised
and gendered narratives and the instrumentalization of women’s rights to justify militarised CT
responses. A separate but connected body of literature then exposed the myriad of ways that
women are involved in and affected by violent extremism and terrorism, as well as in efforts
to prevent and counter this phenomena. This literature challenges the perceived masculine
and male-dominated understandings of terrorism, violent extremism and P/CVE/CT
approaches. Finally, I draw attention to the role of gender in violent extremism and the
necessity for gender-sensitive and gender-responsive approaches to P/CVE efforts, but also
some of the difficulties in introducing the concept of gender in this space. The extant literature

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highlights P/CVE/CT discourses, policy and programming as complicated and often
problematic for its securitising nature and its role in the reproduction of gendered and
racialised hierarchies. In particular, this body of work exposes the challenges of integrating
feminist principles within this space.

Finally, this chapter has attempted to bind these two research areas together by investigating
the existing scholarship on WPS and P/CVE, and UNSCR 2242. This literature reveals a
theoretical divide in the feminist literature on the potential for this integration to occur without
co-optation, instrumentalisation or complicity in the reproduction of gendered and racialised
hierarchies. This raises fundamental questions about whether feminists can, or should,
engage or remove themselves from this type of security work. What was particularly striking
from the literature reviewed on UNSCR 2242 was that an institutional approach had not yet
been utilised to understand how P/CVE is negotiated into WPS policy at the state level, what
factors shape this (re)interpretation. Additionally, little attention has been paid to minority world
governments’ interpretation and institutionalisation of WPS and P/CVE specifically. Overall,
this chapter has contributed to the construction of this thesis’ research agenda and research
priorities and has carved out a gap in the literature that the overarching research question of
‘does the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 represent
transformative change or instrumental co-optation of the WPS agenda?’ will aim to address.
The following chapter will now build a theoretical and conceptual framework informed by this
literature review, that will guide the analysis.

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3.0 Theorising at the Nexus of WPS and P/CVE

‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox, 1981:128)

This research is feminist, and therefore social and political transformation is at the heart of this
thesis (True, 2012). The purpose of the theoretical framework, outlined in this chapter, is to
provide the lens through which it actively seeks to illuminate inequality and the structures that
sustain it, in order to disrupt them. This thesis proceeds from the position that ‘represented
problems’ (Bacchi, 2012), such as P/CVE and how it links to WPS, are not only political but
have constitutive effects. An investigation into the political underpinning of the representation
of problems centres the importance of voices, narratives and framing in the production of
knowledge, as well as asks questions about what the problem is, how it is represented, the
solution offered and who confronts it, whilst also identifying who is empowered and
disempowered by those frames (Bustelo and Verloo, 2009). The thesis is guided by a research
question that investigates the UK government’s interpretation and institutionalisation of P/CVE
and WPS and whether this represents transformative change or whether it is merely a co-
optation of the WPS agenda. As identified in the previous chapter, the research problem is
situated within globalised gendered and racialised hierarchies and institutions. Therefore, to
unpack the framing of WPS and P/CVE and the institutions that play a role in its interpretation
and implementation, this thesis bridges three theoretical approaches; Feminist Security
Studies (FSS), Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist Institutionalism. This is one of the key
contributions of this thesis, as the bridging of Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist
Institutionalism remains largely under-theorised and unexplored.

Each of these approaches provides a valuable and essential dimension to the analytical
approach of this research. This chapter proceeds firstly by demonstrating the value of Feminist
Security Studies for exposing P/CVE as a response to a ‘represented’ security problem that
sits within a ‘traditional’ conceptualisation of (in)security, which is both ‘ambiguous’ and
‘gendered’ in order to challenge its relevance and reveal its limits (Wibben, 2009; Shepherd,
2013; Wibben, 2018). As explored in the previous chapter, CT, and hence the foundations of
P/CVE, have been exposed as highly racialised and Othering, highlighting the importance of
gender not being the only focus of analysis. Therefore, the following section outlines the
importance of Post-Colonial Feminism in drawing attention to intersecting identities such as
race and religion, as well as ongoing colonial and imperial relations, in combination with
gender, in order to expose how these can reproduce the subordination of women of colour
(Mohanty, 1984; Crenshaw, 1991). Thirdly, as this thesis examines the UK government’s

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interpretation and institutionalisation of WPS and P/CVE, Feminist Institutionalism is drawn
upon to expose how institutions, such as the UK government and its different departments
reflect and reproduce social structures and hierarchies, and how the gendered norms, rules
and practices that are at work in institutions affect what options, paths and choices are
available (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010; Krook and Mackay, 2011). Feminist
Institutionalism also offers a significant contribution by providing a conceptual framework to
directly engage with issues of gender mainstreaming (Jahan, 1995; Rees, 1998, 2002;
Squires, 1999, 2005; Walby, 2005; Verloo and Lombardo, 2007; True, 2009, 2014; Krook and
True, 2010; Joachim and Schneiker, 2012; Cavaghan, 2017), and issues such as co-optation
and agenda hijacking as feminist goals are translated into ‘mainstream’ institutions and norms
(Baden and Goetz, 1997; Gallagher, 1997; True, 2003; Stratigaki, 2004; Otto, 2009; Reeves,
2012; Ní Aoláin, 2016; Korteweg, 2017). This approach also provides a model for unpacking
relationships between governmental and inter-governmental institutions, civil society and
epistemic communities in the form of a ‘feminist triangle’ (Woodward, 2003; Holli, 2008;
Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018). This chapter concludes with a discussion of the need
to bridge these three theories and how together they build a robust critical theoretical approach
that provides the lenses to uncover the explicit and implicit ways in which P/CVE and WPS is
shaped by and shapes gendered and racialised structures of power and institutions.

3.1 Feminist Security Studies

‘Feminist security scholars need to take traditional conceptions of security seriously because
they have serious implications, but they also need to challenge their relevance and reveal
their limit(s)’ (Wibben, 2011: 594)

As Wibben’s quote reveals, traditional conceptions of security, such as violent extremism and
terrorism, must be taken seriously because they can have profound implications. Feminist IR
provides the starting point for this investigation, as it understands women and gender as
foundational components for gaining a deeper and more complete picture of international
politics. More specifically for this thesis, Feminist Security Studies provides the tools to
challenge the militarist, securitising and masculine logic embedded in conceptions of security
that are currently employed by security studies scholars, as well as ‘traditional’ or dominant
security actors, such as the UK government (Wibben, 2018). Feminist Security Studies takes
the approach that ‘gender is conceptually, empirically and normatively essential to studying
international security’ and gender should not be considered a subsection of Security Studies,

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to be compartmentalised (Sjoberg, 2010: 2). Feminist Security Studies is a growing body of
work that explicitly draws upon feminist research questions, approaches and politics and
signals a ‘commitment to feminism as a reflexive, many-faceted and expansive field of inquiry
and ethico-politics that is intertwined with the interrogation of security’ (Stern and Wibben,
2014). Feminist Security Studies is not a fixed or well-defined field of research or practice; it
is an ambiguous label that also spans disciplines such as history, peace studies, development
studies and IR, to name a few. However, Wibben (2011) argues that Feminist Security Studies
does have basic commitments, such as the need to remain committed to feminism as a
political project that is deeply tied to emancipation, empowerment and social justice, and
asserts that reflexivity and being an ‘empathetic listener’ are central to the tasks of feminist
security scholars as well as the need for Feminist Security Studies to be ‘absolutely feminist
– and anti-imperialist’. Feminist Security Studies, much like feminist IR, has been confined to
the periphery of mainstream approaches and has often lacked in serious engagement
(Tickner, 1997). This is despite feminist scholars having been interested in security since the
inception of feminist theorising, in both the traditional sense (war, conflict, terrorism), as well
as broadly defined (personal safety, physical security, economic security) (Sjoberg, 2018: 46).

Whilst Feminist Security Studies remains marginal in regards to the wider IR discipline, it
continues to etch out a place for itself (See: Sjoberg, 2009; Lobasz and Sjoberg, 2011), and
much scholarship has been dedicated to musing the epistemological foundations, the
definition, labelling and possible parameters of Feminist Security Studies as a ‘subfield’ (Cohn,
2011; Hudson, 2011; Tickner, 2011). For Hudson (2011), the flexibility of its parameters is one
of the most important contributions in gaining an inclusive and varied understanding of
international security. Whilst the emergence of Feminist Security Studies has been significant
and continues to grow and evolve; it has faced some criticism for its limitations in being
situated with and dominated by Western scholars (Parashar, 2013; Shepherd, 2013). Whilst
not perfect, Feminist Security Studies provides a number of significant theoretical
contributions that shape the approach taken in this thesis. This section now explores the value
of Feminist Security Studies in analysing the UK’s P/CVE and WPS policy and its formulation.

3.1.1 Addressing the Limitations of Critical Approaches to Security

Traditional IR theorists tend to associate security with war and military, often at the level of
nation-states, within a system of self-interested and sovereign states (Nye and Lynn-Jones,
1988; Walt, 1991). The purpose of theory building in conventional IR is to generate testable
propositions that help to understand and explain the security seeking behaviour of states; for

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Cox (1981: 128), this would be a problem-solving theory that ‘takes the world as it finds it, with
the prevailing social and power relationships and institutions in which they are organised, the
given framework for action’. On the other hand, critical theory ‘does not take institutions and
social power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their
origin and how and whether they might be in the process of changing’ (1981: 129). Wibben
(2011b: 66) argues that ‘dominant approaches to security in IR tend to leave out critical
questions, instead assuming a fairly closed narrative structure consisting of four main
elements: threats locating danger, referents to be secured, agents to provide security, and
means to contain danger’.

For example, for the Copenhagen School, ‘security means survival in the face of existential
threat’ to a ‘referent object’ (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 27, 36) and this process of
securitisation is upheld through ‘speech acts’, which are utterances that understand and
represent a phenomenon as security, which results in legitimising of extraordinary measures
(Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 26). However, this understanding of security has been
critiqued for being a ‘generative principle of formation for the production of political order’ which
is exclusionary (Dillon, 1996: 127), and this logic is based on ‘the assumption that meanings
are clearly identifiable and a hierarchy of meanings can be established’ (Wibben, 2011b: 38).
Furthermore, referent objects are constituted by securitising actors and are part of a
securitising process as ‘they do not exist independently of discursive articulation, it is through
discourse that security is defined and where actors successfully manifest their position and
capacity’ (Hansen, 2000: 288). The Copenhagen School overlooks the idea of ‘security as
silence’ which refers to ‘a situation where the potential subject of security has no, or limited,
possibility of speaking its security problem’ which results in gender insecurities being silenced
(Hansen, 2000: 294). For example, if P/CVE is defined as a security threat by male-dominated
and masculinised institutions, how do we know that this is a significant security threat for
women if we do not ask them. Rather, they may prioritise other forms of insecurity, such as
domestic violence, which is often not deemed a traditional ‘security’ threat. What feminist
critique of the Copenhagen school can theoretically provide us with, is understanding that
speech acts matter in defining what a security issue is, but acknowledge they are far too limited
in challenging who holds power in ‘speech acts’ and how and why this process of securitisation
has occurred and how discursive practices seek to silence (gendered) subjects. Feminist
Security Studies goes beyond a silence/speech dichotomy, as these are not binary, but aims
to address the larger series of concepts and signs that support them (Hansen, 2019). In
addition, traditional approaches to security can play a role in upholding racialised hierarchies

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by focusing on how definitions of (in)security are constructed in Europe, or ‘the West’ and
‘constructs a methodologically and normatively white framework’ which prioritises order over
justices and positions securitisation theorists as ‘the defender of (white) ‘civilised politics’
against (racialised) ‘primal anarchy’ (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 3). These problem
definitions often overlook gender insecurity in the minority world, reflect a Western-centric bias
and can evoke Orientalist imagery.

On the other hand, the foundations of the Welsh School (Booth, 1991a, 1991b, 1997, 2005;
Wyn Jones, 1999, 2005) shares a similar understanding of security to feminist scholarship, in
its emancipatory praxis (See: Tickner, 1992, 1995; Blanchard, 2003; Hudson, 2005). For
Booth (1991: 319), emancipation is security, as ‘emancipation is the freeing of people (as
individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying
out what they would freely choose to do’ which includes war and threats of war but also
constraints such as poverty, political oppression, poor education for example, which means
that security and emancipation are ‘two sides of the same coin’ as emancipation, not power
or order, produces true security. Feminist Security Studies takes a similar perspective; for
example, Basu (2013: 456) argues that prior to the idea of security being ‘co-opted as the
motivation for hyper-masculine political conduct marked by aggression and self-interest, was
– and continues to be in everyday vocabulary – about a sense of well-being’. For feminists,
emancipation, empowerment and social change are central to research on security and at the
heart of analysis is the motivation for political and social transformation (True, 2012). However,
feminists have been cautious of engaging too deeply with the Welsh Schools’
conceptualisation of emancipation. As although the school challenges the positivist
assumptions of IR and security, it remains problematic in that contrary to their ‘expressed
political commitment to emancipation and challenging the status quo (instead of leaving power
to work as is), there is the potential to support a particular order by using the same narrative
framework as those they are seeking to challenge (McCormack, 2010; Wibben, 2011b).
Feminist research goes beyond this to make sense differently, ‘to unmake common sense, to
create ruptures and dissonances that make us think anew’ and provoke discussion (Åhäll,
2016: 159). Although there are convergences epistemologically and methodologically
between the Welsh School and Feminist Security Studies, there is no guarantee that gender
is routinely included as a category of analysis for the Welsh School, whereas feminists will
always do so (Hudson, 2005: 161). Feminist Security Studies thus pursues an emancipatory
agenda based on problematising the social construction of gendered and racialised

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hierarchies and provides the lenses to overcome the limitations of the Copenhagen and Welsh
Schools.

3.1.2 Conceptualising Security as Narrative

Feminist Security Studies challenges the very understanding of what security is, who is
securitised and who is impacted by security policies and practices. Feminist Security Studies
scholars approach their research with the premise that the term ‘security’ is an ambiguous,
contested concept and deeply gendered whilst also acknowledging that the personal, local,
national and global are all deeply interconnected and important in the study of security (See
Shepherd, 2013). Feminist scholars go beyond a narrow conception of security and
problematise the naturalness of ‘security’ by asking questions of ‘who is being secured by
security policies?’ (Blanchard, 2003: 1290). By drawing upon feminist insights, we are able to
challenge the very assumption of what counts as a security concern or what causes insecurity
(Cohn, 2011). Gender insecurities have often been overlooked or pushed to the realm of ‘low
security’ (See Miller, 2010). As mentioned in the previous section, this addresses the lack of
an expansion of logic surrounding emancipation and critical security research and opens
space for making obvious the insecurities that women face and that they do not always come
from traditional military threats, such as guns and bombs, but from inadequate access to
healthcare, birth control or nutrition, for example (Cohn, 2013).

The concept of P/CVE and CT are responses to constructed security threats that have been
prioritised in national security agendas in recent years. As definitions of (in)security are
fundamentally political, by acknowledging the politics of security enables us to contest the
meaning of security that are currently assigned within narrative frameworks. The prioritisation
of the need to combat the threat of terrorism or violent extremism has been a political choice
and a Feminist Security Studies perspective provides the tools to problematise the naturalness
of this narrated security threat. Wibben (2011: 65) argues that narratives limit how we can
think security, whose security matters, and how it might be achieved. Whilst P/CVE/CT could
be considered over studied compared to other security threats or social harms; there are
constitutive effects to its problem definition and the attention paid to it by security actors. By
politicising this problem definition, a Feminist Security Studies perspective can critically
evaluate those processes and challenge the efficacy of existing attention and resources given
to the problem area. Thus the focus on P/CVE in this thesis remains an important focus of
inquiry for Feminist Security Studies scholars as by unpacking how security issues gain
traction, for and by who and space can be made to consider alternative realities.

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This means that it is less important to try to define security or even a feminist notion of security,
but it is about exploring the processes in which security is narrated and its effects.
Furthermore, by understanding that narratives and their subjects ‘that do not fit the confines
of this order are relegated to the margins by authorised narratives that conform to and confirm
the dominant social, symbolic, political and economic order’ (Wibben, 2011: 39), gives us the
theoretical tools to explore what dominant and authorised narratives are present and why
others may not fit and are therefore silenced or forgotten. Why this is an essential feature of
the research is that ‘making the politics of security and the power relations that shape them
visible is the key to a transformative agenda’ (Wibben, 2016: 137), and by understanding that
security is made, we can ask ‘what frames are enacted, how, by whom, when, where, and to
what end, as well as the relations of power involved in this process.’ (Wibben, 2016: 138). As
explored in the previous chapter, gendered and racialised narratives were a key aspect of
justifying the ‘War on Terror(ism)’(Jackson, 2005) and in narrating what and who is deemed a
‘terrorist’ or ‘violent extremism’ threat. These narrations of security had real implications for
violence and war. As P/CVE has emerged from these narrations of security, it is essential to
pay attention to who controls this narrative, who is securitised and who it is for. As P/CVE
becomes linked to WPS, there are two different ‘problem’ narratives that are linked to security
that need to be disentangled. By paying attention to changes and continuity in narratives, we
are able to see how WPS may or may not be transformative in this space.

3.1.3 Gendered Hierarchies in International Security

Feminist Security Studies also provides insight into ‘the gendered nature of the values prized
in the realm of international security’ (Sjoberg, 2010: 5). In regards to the gendered power
structures in international relations, feminist scholars have made a conscious move to expose
what Connell (1987) refers to as ‘hegemonic masculinity’, which is an analytical instrument for
challenging a gender order where certain forms of masculinity are perceived and
unquestioned as dominant over feminine gender identities and characteristics, entrench men’s
dominant position over women in society. Particularly in regards to violence, conflict and
security, stereotypical gender images and gender roles are even more apparent. In the case
of war and security, women tend to be narrated as victims, peaceful or in need of protection,
yet feminist scholars have challenged these essentialist narratives that frame women as
‘beautiful souls’ in need of saving by men who are ‘just warriors’ (Elshtain, 1987). Feminist
Security Studies does not have one position on whether or not women are inherently peaceful,
what constitutes women’s subordination or the best way to overcome it is. Burguieres (1990:3)

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argues that some ‘accept the male and female stereotypes, but try to subvert them to a
feminist purpose’, for example, by promoting the idea of women as peacebuilders. Some
‘reject the female stereotype’, by rejecting women as peaceful and seek for women to be equal
by being more like men, for example, through access to combat positions and some ‘reject
both the male and female stereotype’, by questioning and rejecting the assumptions that
underpin the two previous perspectives, and would argue that both reinforce a militarised and
patriarchal society (Burguieres, 1990: 3). This thesis takes the position that all stereotypes
should be rejected.

Nevertheless, gendered discourses and narratives do have material implications. Discourses

that perpetuate the idea of the protector and the protected leave women vulnerable, as
subjects rather than agents, and the protected are left dependent on the protector to decide
what the threat is and how to respond to it (Stiehm, 1982; Elshtain, 1987; Peterson, 1992;
Young, 2003a; Wibben, 2009). This ‘logic of masculinist protection’ extends beyond conflict
locations but ‘illuminates the meaning and effective appeal of a security state that wages war
abroad and expects obedience and loyalty at home’ (Young, 2003b). Therefore, experiences
of security and insecurity are inseparable from the logics of gendered hierarchy, that privilege
masculinities and devalue those who are feminised (Sjoberg, 2016). Understandings of
gender and gender roles are so closely tied to war and conflict and the protector/protected
narrative, therefore ‘it is only possible to fully understand gender in the context of war and
conflict and that it is only possible to fully understand war and conflict considering their
gendered aspects’ (Sjoberg, 2014: 5). Furthermore, gender has been a core feature in
structuring and developing ideas about citizenship; many groups struggle to attain or are
ostracised from citizenship based on colour of their skin or gender (Hartsock, 1984). Therefore
investigating masculinity, and the men who wage war is also a key feature of feminist research
(Cohn and Enloe, 2003). The hierarchy and privileging of masculinity and males in security
spaces and the subordination of feminine associated values and behaviours are in a self-
sustaining cycle as they continue to frame and interpret international security issues and
control the narratives (Sjoberg, 2010), such as that of P/CVE and WPS. Thus, Feminist
Security Studies provides the lenses to pay attention to where women and gender are included
in P/CVE and in what ways, but also how they are omitted in narrating (in)security, alongside
exposing the dominance of men and masculinities in security spaces, which has shaped how
envisioned security threats, such as P/CVE, are defined and engaged with.

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3.1.4 Gender as a Transformative Force in Security?
Feminist Security Studies, and its engagement with gender, provides not only the necessary
conceptual tools to challenge what security is, how it is defined and how gendered hierarchies
shape it, it is also able to analyse causes, predict outcomes and think about solutions and
promote positive change in the security realm (Sjoberg, 2011). This is an essential component
of this research, as it aims to bring about social change as it practically considers what factors
have shaped the policy shift to included P/CVE with WPS, as well as how this should progress,
in order to better work for women and gender equality. By making clear how security threats,
such as terrorism and violent extremism, can be guided by identities that are associated with
masculinities and ‘manliness’ (Hooper, 2001) and how gender hierarchies operate in
international security, a Feminist Security Studies perspective has the potential to foster a
normative re-envisioning of security, that begins with thinking about individual women’s lives
and prioritises peace. This research draws on Feminist Security Studies to expose how P/CVE
is conceptualised and acted on in gendered and racialised ways, both implicitly and explicitly.
The proposed recommendations offered at the end of this thesis aim to ensure individual
women’s lives and gender equality is at the heart of the UK’s approach to WPS.

3.2 Post-Colonial Feminism

Feminist Security Studies provides essential tools for analysing the gendered hierarchical
nature of P/CVE and WPS, and the international system it is embedded within. However,
insights from Post-Colonial Feminism strengthen its analytical potential by paying attention to
how colonial relations of domination and subordination that were established under
imperialism continue to be reflected in gender relations, by international actors, and between
feminists in academic work and global politics (Sjoberg, 2010). Building on the work of
Crenshaw, this work recognises that ‘the failure of feminism to interrogate race means that
the resistance strategies of feminism will often replicate and reinforce the subordination of
people of colour’ (Crenshaw, 1991: 1252). Feminist work is not only about tackling gender
equality; it should also be explicitly anti-racist and anti-imperialist. As discussed in the previous
chapter, whilst WPS has feminist foundations it has a tendency to be complicit in the
reproduction of racialised hierarchies (Parashar, 2019; Haastrup and Hagen, 2020).
Therefore, this research needs to pay attention not only to how gender and women are
(re)produced in WPS policy, but it must also pay attention to other intersecting inequalities
and the (re)production of racialised hierarchies. While examining the case of the UK, it is
necessary to understand that much of its history, culture and wealth has been built upon

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empire and the colonisation of a significant portion of the world, which fundamentally has
shaped its identity and approach to foreign policy.

A Post-Colonial Feminist perspective provides the tools to explore how ‘gender comes into
existence in and through relation to (race, class and sexuality)- if in contradictory and
conflictual ways’ (McClintock, 1995: 5) and aims to expose how gender subordination is only
one form of oppression, and there are numerous other intersecting forms that women face.
Post-Colonial feminists draw upon insights from Post-Colonial scholarship into race and
‘subalternity’ but read these through the analytical lens of gender (Ling, 2007: 141).
Furthermore, Post-Colonial Feminists have drawn attention to the ways in which Western
(liberal) feminists are often guilty of ‘bad theorising’, as they can play a part in reproducing ‘the
axioms of imperialism’ (Spivak, 1985), for writing about ‘third world’ women as an oppressed
group, which is a colonialising move and situates western feminists as the ‘’subjects’’ of
counter history, whereas third world women remain in an ‘object’ status (Mohanty, 1984: 351).
For Mohanty (1984), when the ‘oppression of women’ is combined with ‘oppression of third
world women’, there is the added intersection of ‘third world’, which has added paternalistic
attitudes towards those women. Thus Post-Colonial Feminism provides the lenses to
approach ‘feminism’ with caution when the target of policy or narratives is about women in the
majority world, as ultimately this can reproduce racialised hierarchies and could be construed
as a form of cultural imperialism that overlooks indigenous feminisms throughout the colonised
world (Sa’ar, 2005).

3.2.1 Global Racial Hierarchies: Representations of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ in Security
Of particular relevance for this thesis is paying attention to how minority/majority world
relations are political and constructed, and the identities of these entities are built through
representations of global binary opposites. Represented binary oppositions of the
‘developed/underdeveloped, ‘first world’/ ‘third world’, ‘core/periphery’, ‘metropolis/satellite’,
‘global North/South’ are often drawn upon to frame our thinking, despite the fact that they are
neither natural nor inevitable. Broadly, these representations can be understood as a way to
construct a distinction between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. Discursive representations of the
‘South’ by policy-makers, scholars, journalists and others in the ‘North’ does not necessarily
equate to a ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’ about the ‘South’, but exposes who is able to produce ‘truth’
or ‘knowledge’ (Doty, 1996: 2). At an international level, the process of Othering and the use
of simplified binaries, such as good vs evil, civilised vs barbaric, rational vs irrational,
progressive vs backward (Khalid, 2011: 15) situate ‘Western’ states in positions of ‘masculine’

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authority and power and places those at the margins in a ‘feminised’ subordinate position to
the ‘Self’ group identity. These divisive binaries are upheld and reproduced through the idea
of ‘geographical segregations’, which are based on imagined ‘homogenous and static
constructions of geography’, that are built upon histories of segregation and are projected as
‘natural’ and therefore entrench the conditions that regulate power (Agathangelou and
Turcotte, 2015: 37). For Hall (1992), the simple dichotomy of ‘the West and the Rest’ is a
system of representation built on crude and simplistic distinctions. For example, the West
contains many internal differences – between nations, cultures and peoples and contains
internal ‘Others’, such as Western women’s representations as inferior to Western men. There
are the same simplifications in narratives about ‘the Rest’, which overlooks huge historical,
cultural and economic distinctions. That being said, the constructs of ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’
enable the world to be divided into categories and these discourses have material
consequences. These geopolitical, historical and cultural divisions are significant features of
foreign policy, as how ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’ are articulated within foreign policy are ‘a
specific sort of boundary producing political performance’ that ‘makes foreign certain events
and actors’ and locating threats ‘in an external realm has to be understood as serving a
particular interpretive and political function’ (Campbell, 1998: 61- 63). Attentiveness to these
gendered and racialised binaries and their productive power provides the tools to destabilise
the naturalness of masculinised Western states as beacons of morality, civilisation and
modernity in opposition to a feminised weak, primitive ‘Other’ (Ali, 2007; Young, 2016). The
duality of the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ is an important framework to explore how the labelling and
defining of the ‘Other’ and ‘Othering’ is a mechanism for ordering things into a hierarchy.

This work builds on Edward Said’s (1978) theory of ‘Orientalism’, which draws attention to the
discursive and textual production of racial distinctions between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’,
which produces a position superiority of Europeans over backward ‘Others’. This represented
relationship between the Occident (us) and the Orient (them) is one of power and domination,
and is a sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient than it is as a veridic discourse about
the Orient’ (1978: 6). Drawing on Gramsci’s idea of hegemony, Said asserts that Orientalism
is cultural hegemony at work, placing European culture and ideas as superior to Others (1978:
7). These Orientalist narratives are deeply related to Foucauldian theories of power and
knowledge and aim to expose processes in producing knowledge and the impact of
constructing the ‘West’ as superior in expertise and knowledge. Whilst Orientalism can be
critiqued for being overly simplistic and overlooks difference within Western geographies and
temporalities (Gandhi, 1998: 77; Parashar, 2016), the concept of Orientalism is valuable in

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that it draws attention to broader narratives and discourses and how they impact on positions
of power and knowledge creation in state structures and practices. It allows post-colonial
national identities to be understood as ‘constructed in opposition to European ones’, and how
this has the potential to shape relations between the post-colonial world and the West
(Chowdhry and Nair, 2002:2).

Orientalism has been used as a critical lens by feminist scholars to explore the racialised and
gendered power constructs between the minority and majority world (Lewis, 1996; Yegenoglu,
1998; Abu-Lughod, 2001) and as an analytical tool to critically engage with orientalist and
gendered state discourses in order to unravel and destabilise them (Khalid, 2011). Hale (2005:
3) draws attention to ‘gendered Orientalism’ in narrations of Arab or Muslim women as an
Other that are often ‘reduced, exaggerated, exoticized, eroticized, romanticized, truncated,
and always decontextualized’ and Middle Eastern women are ‘totalised, with no religious,
regional, ethnic/national or class differences taken into account’ but ‘treated as if they are
encapsulated in defined and bounded groups or categories’. Paying attention to these types
of narratives and how gendered or cultural traits are ascribed to actors is essential in
(de)constructing power hierarchies, inequalities and gendered dynamics at play between
states, as well as representations of the men and women within them. For example, Spivak’s
(1988), ‘Can the subaltern speak’, drew attention to colonial narratives of ‘white men saving
brown women from brown men’. Although this work is not directly speaking to Orientalism, it
demonstrates how white or ‘western’ men are often framed as civilised heroes and Middle
Eastern men as barbaric and a threat to oppressed brown women in need of liberation.
Narratives of ‘liberation’ appear to be feminist in that they recognise women’s oppression;
however, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, it should be approached with caution, as
it can be a co-optation of a feminist agenda that essentially works to uphold the patriarchal
and oppressive nature of colonialism itself (Khalid, 2011: 18).

These divisive and racialised narratives can be perpetuated in the field of international
security. Post-Colonialism scholars problematise the western-centric focus of security as this
has shaped and continues to shape security practices and the theory of security in non-
western settings (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Bilgin, 2010). Dominant security practices and
theory places ‘the developing world as an object of security, not a subject – something that
needs to be secured to serve the purposes of outsiders (and their local allies), but not
necessarily local peoples and social groups’ (Bilgin, 2010: 19). Bertrand's (2018) question of
‘can the subaltern securitise?’ exposes how the ‘subaltern’ are structurally excluded from the

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concept of security, are already securitised and spoken for, as in the case of ‘well-intentioned
intellectuals’ (Maggio, 2007). This demonstrates the need for Feminist Security Studies to be
linked to Post-Colonial Feminism in order to pay attention to the ways that discourses and
practices of security are enmeshed with gendered and racialised logics and binary
representations. Regardless of whether you see foreign assistance or interventions, on the
one hand, as an instrumental tool for the promotion of self-interests of national security or
economic interests or, on the other hand, a result of the humanitarian concerns of poverty,
development and the promotion of democracy, it gives ‘power numerous places to hide’ (Doty,
1996: 128 - 129). Therefore, it is significant to illuminate the structures of power that are
embedded explicitly and implicitly within the UK’s approach to WPS and its approach to
P/CVE.

3.2.2 The Problem of Colonial Amnesia

An exploration into foreign and security policy, particularly one of a past coloniser, needs to
address the ongoing and fluctuating relations and dynamics of that legacy. However, foreign
policy often suffers from ‘colonial amnesia’, that is an attempt to ‘superficially foster a temporal
divide between the end of colonialism and the post-colonial world order, as well as the artificial,
and racialised, distinction set up between the ‘foreign’ and the ‘domestic’, which ignores the
ways in which both spatial domains are intimately connected’ (Achilleos-Sarll, 2018: 43).
Foreign policy that seeks to institutionalise feminism is approached with caution by Post-
Colonial feminists, on the basis that it is established through gendered, racialised and
sexualised hierarchies and ‘spatialised configurations due to the asymmetries of power of
states, nations and groups’ (Achilleos-Sarll, 2018: 43). This approach also provides a
framework to engage critically with ‘gender mainstreaming’ in practice and academia by
querying the ‘ways in which logics and practices of mainstreaming reproduce colonial, racist
and gender asymmetrical relations are often overlooked’ (Agathangelou and Turcotte, 2015:
45). For example, the inclusion of more women into position of powers, although helpful, can
be limited in that it does not necessarily signify a power shift in gender or racialised hierarchies
(Eisenstein, 2007: 94) if women in the majority world remain excluded from the ‘security’
process. The link between Post-Colonial Feminism and the analysis of institutions and
institutional practices will be expanded on later in this chapter.

Overall, Post-Colonial Feminism provides an essential contribution to this thesis’ theoretical

framework as it helps uncover how dominant security discourses and practices are both
gendered and racialised and can reinscribe racial and sexual hierarchies (Pratt, 2013a). This

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allows for a far more complete picture of ‘security’ than Feminist Security Studies alone and
provides an explicit anti-racist and anti-imperialist dimension to this work. As highlighted in the
previous chapter, narrations and justification of the War on Terror were both gendered and
racialised (Klaus and Kassel, 2005; Shepherd, 2006; Hunt and Rygiel, 2007; Zine, 2007;
Bhattacharyya, 2008; Khalid, 2011) and the WPS agenda has also been critiqued for
reproducing globalised and racialised hierarchies (Parashar, 2019; Achilleos-Sarll, 2020;
Haastrup and Hagen, 2020). Furthermore, the UK state’s approach to P/CVE/CT has been
critiqued for operationalising racialised security narratives into its institutional practices and
socialising behaviour and for constructing ’racialised borders’ (Ali, 2020). Therefore, it would
be inadequate to analyse the P/CVE and WPS policy shift without utilising a Post-Colonial
Feminist lens and the key concepts of (gendered) ‘Othering’, ‘Orientalism’ and ‘colonial
amnesia’ that are essential in rendering visible and (de)constructing power hierarchies,
inequalities and gendered and racialised dynamics at play in WPS and P/CVE.

3.3 Feminist Institutionalism

Feminist Security Studies and Post-Colonial Feminism theories provide the lenses to
investigate how gendered and racialised narratives are enmeshed within approaches to
security. However, they lack the tools in which to study the institutions that construct and
reconstruct these approaches. Institutions are deeply implicated in the reproduction and
construction of hegemonic gender identities and differences through their practices (True,
2009: 197). As UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions on the WPS thematic area are
meant to alter practices within mainstream institutional structures, such as the UK
government, how these institutions interpret the agenda based on their values, culture and
histories is an important focus of analysis. Therefore, this thesis bridges Feminist Security
Studies and Post-Colonial Feminism with Feminist Institutionalism to expose how gendered
and racialised hierarchies are embedded within the norms, rules and practices of the UK as a
security institution. This section will now delineate the value of Feminist Institutionalism in
helping to overcome some of the methodological challenges of capturing the gendered
character and gendering effects of institutions (Kenny, 2014). This theoretical approach
provides the tools to map the formal architecture and consider institutions informal rules,
norms and practices. This is significant for unpacking how particular approaches to policy,
such as WPS, are shaped by institutional gendered and racialised norms and practices and
how this could impact the potential for transformative change. This section firstly explores the
value of Feminist Institutionalism for analysing security institutions. It then conceptualises
different approaches to gender mainstreaming and how these have an impact on

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transformative change. It presents the concept of ‘feminist triangles’ to uncover the
relationships and power dimensions in feminist policy-making. Lastly, it introduces the
concepts of co-optation and agenda hijacking, which can be used to expose the challenges
faced by feminist agendas as they are (re)interpreted in securitised spaces.

3.3.1 Feminist Institutionalism and Security Institutions

Institutions have been a key focus of political analysis for a considerable time. New
Institutionalism (NI) emerged in response to the behavioural revolution in the 1960s and was
founded on the premise that institutions ‘matter’ and ‘the organisation of political life makes a
difference’ (March and Olsen, 1984: 747). NI rejects ‘old’ descriptive institutionalism
approaches by paying attention to informal conventions in political life as much as formal
constitutions and political structures and the way in which institutions embody values and
power relationships (Lowndes, 2018: 55). New Institutionalists are not only concerned with the
impact of institutions but also with the interactions between individuals and institutions. This
work on institutions has developed a more nuanced and sophisticated engagement with
politics and political science, which are sensitive to how institutions shape and are shaped by
political, economic and social forces.

NI traditionally encompasses three differing approaches: Rational Choice, Historical and

Sociological. These three types of NI: ‘(1) Rational Choice Institutionalism, which focuses on
the institutional constraints on the rational action of individual behaviour; (2) Historical
Institutionalism which focuses on how institutions structure and mediate conflict between
collective actors; (3) Sociological Institutionalism which focuses on how interests, rationalities
and information are socially constructed within institutional frameworks’ (Torfing, 2001: 280).
These different analytical approaches aim to uncover the relationship between political actions
and their institutional context. There are several concepts provided by these approaches to NI
that are particularly relevant to this thesis. Firstly, Historical Institutionalism offers the concept
of ‘path dependence’ to uncover how the historical context matters in political analysis
(Mahoney and Schensul, 2008) and secondly, Sociological Institutionalism offers the concept
of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ which guides the behaviour of actors through a process of
systematic reasoning (March, 1994: 57). Whilst NI and these analytical concepts are sensitive
to different factors that influence change and stability in political life, ‘the development and
impact of policies and laws, and the relationship between social movement actors and formal
political institutions’ (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 579), which is valuable to this thesis,

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the NI school of thought has largely been gender blind and the relationship between gender
and institutions was largely overlooked.

The emergence of Feminist Institutionalism (FI) aimed to address the oversights of NI and
drew attention to the importance of applying a gender lens in analysing institutions. FI asks
more profound questions about how the ‘rules of the game’ are gendered and by what
processes and mechanisms are institutions produced, by reflecting and reproducing social
structures and hierarchies, including gendered power relations (Krook and Mackay, 2011: 1).
FI, much like NI, recognises that institutions are constrained by actors, ideas and interests
which have implications for what options, paths and choices are available. However, FI pays
greater attention to the gendered norms, rules and practices that are at work within institutions
and the concomitant effect they have on political change and outcomes provides compelling
insight into power dynamics at play (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 573).. FI provides a
theoretical framework to investigate how gendered norms and identities, such as those that
were problematised in the previous theoretical sections, are at the crux of gendered state
institutions and practices. When connected to security institutions and practices, FI allows
insight into how actions, approaches and priorities are connected to the gender roles of those
institutions. Deeper gendered investigation into institutions is made possible by paying
attention to informal rules, alongside and in concurrence with formal institutions to shape
actors’ choices and institutional outcomes (Chappell, 2014: 184). Informal institutions, as
defined by Helme and Levitsky (2004: 727) are ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that
are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’. When
considered through a feminist lens, these informal rules become a ‘logic of appropriateness’
that constrain certain types of behaviour while encouraging others and are often gendered
and prescribe (and proscribe) acceptable masculine and feminine forms of behaviour, rule
and values for both men and women within institutions (Chappell, 2006: 225 - 226). Another
key concept is ‘path dependency’ that underlines the significance of initial events in shaping
institutional development over time (Pierson, 2004; Minto and Mergaert, 2018) and influences
what options are acceptable, available and appropriate over time. Methodologically, FI
encourages research on WPS to go beyond discourse and textual analysis to more
participatory research, which can be helpful in unveiling what is going on behind the formal,
stated record (Thomson, 2019).

Particularly relevant to this thesis is the theoretical lens provided by FI for investigating security
institutions. Kronsell (2005) draws attention to the way in which security-related organisations,

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which are historically masculine and male-dominated, are institutions of hegemonic
masculinity. Those institutions’ norms, values, practices and cultures are then produced and
recreated in association with masculinity. Investigating the complex terrain of those embedded
within institutions working on security issues, such as P/CVE, as well as those who are
outsiders and engaging with institutions of hegemonic masculinity, are valuable for gathering
knowledge on the gendered power structures and practices at play in this field. FI recognises
that rules, values, behaviours and culture are not always tangible and it is important to
recognise that particular sets of behaviours can become established as the norm for what is
appropriate conduct within a given institution and this ‘normativity’ of practices becomes
difficult to critique as it appears natural and beyond discussion (Kronsell, 2005: 282). Feminist
theorising then becomes about challenging what we take for granted as ‘natural’, or based on
‘tradition’ or that something has ‘always’ been done in a certain way and investigating how
those things came to be (Enloe, 2004: 1-2). This allows a lens to uncover what is not always
contained within text or immediately apparent by looking at what is ‘written between the lines’
(Kronsell, 2005: 283). This approach enables an investigation into silences, into what may be
hidden and embedded and often disguised as standard. This also includes making men
gendered beings by asking the ‘man question’ by problematising masculinities and the
hegemony of men, whilst also paying attention to women and femininity (Zalewski and Parpart,
2008), which enables us to expose how men and masculine norms are constructed and
normalised within institutions. Challenging and exposing gendered practices within institutions
is part of the emancipatory praxis of this research, as it enables institutions to become aware
of how they shape and are shaped by masculinity and male-dominated practices.

3.3.2 Gender Mainstreaming: Tinker, Tailor, Transformation?

The concept of gender mainstreaming primarily emerged as a result of the 1995 Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action (United Nations Conference, 1995), which pushed for
gender perspectives to be incorporated into all programs and policies. However, gender
mainstreaming is an ‘essentially contested concept and practice’ and whilst some, like Walby
(2005), see it as ‘a process to promote gender equality’, others see it as a strategy or an
outcome (Joachim and Schneiker, 2012). Although gender mainstreaming may seem like a
feminist agenda, feminist scholars question ‘how mainstreaming policies and procedures are
adopted and implemented in specific organisational contexts’ and explore ‘gendered national
politics and their intersection with global norms purported by international institutions such as
the UN’ (True, 2009:189). How governments understand gender mainstreaming is a political
process; how gender mainstreaming is interpreted, reinterpreted and implemented is situated

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within institutions that already have gendered meanings, assumptions, practices and
processes, as well as boundaries and institutional constraints (Cavaghan, 2017).

Whilst gender mainstreaming and WPS are seemingly consensual norms, and norms can be
understood as the collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given
identity (Katzenstein, 1996: 7), they are in fact interpreted and implemented in particular and
differing ways by different states and institutions (Joachim and Schneiker, 2012). Despite
international norms being accepted by states, there is always a battle over their precise
meaning, especially when norms are illusive or vague (Van Kersbergen and Verbeek, 2007).
In some cases, the vagueness or impreciseness of norms means they are more likely to be
accepted (Wiener, 2004). This is possibly because detail is ‘vulnerable to the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius (to express one thing is to exclude the other’ (Chayes and Chayes,
1993: 189), and would limit who would agree to, and how this could be, implemented.
Furthermore, consensus requires agreement and when ‘issues that are foreseen often cannot
be resolved at the time of treaty negotiation’ they can be ‘swept under the rug with a formula
that can mean what each party wants it to mean’ (Chayes and Chayes, 1993: 188). For
example, Joachim and Schneiker (2012: 555) argue that as UNSCR 1325 is illusive and has
a vague definition of gender mainstreaming this has meant that ‘even the most profoundly
‘male institution’, the military’ is able to embrace the resolution. Actors, therefore, interpret and
implement international norms, such as UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 2242, in different ways,
for different reasons and with different outcomes. Paying attention to the ways in which norms
are translated and interpreted at a domestic level offers insight into the constraints and
opportunities for gender mainstreaming initiatives to make transformative change. Drawing on
Krook and True's (2010: 109) work on the life cycles of international norms, this thesis argues
that there are ‘‘internal’ and ‘external’ sources of dynamism in norm life cycles’ that ‘interact
to shape the origins and subsequent development of individual norms’. The environment in
which the norms are situated may inspire multiple or alternative interpretations, based on a
struggle by supporters and opponents to interpret the content of norms. Krook and True (2010:
109) find that whilst dynamism can promote the creation of new norms, it also enhances the
potential for ‘advocates to ‘lose control’ over their meanings and, in turn, over how new norms
are implemented’. The consequences of this will be explored later in this section.

However, in order to unpack the UK’s approach to gender mainstreaming in the context of
WPS and P/CVE, different approaches to gender mainstreaming must be conceptualised.
Gender mainstreaming is not a homogenous concept; within feminism, there are a number of

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different arguments on how best to achieve a society that is free from gender domination and
oppression. These approaches can be articulated in at least three different visions of gender
equality – that can be translated into political strategies and institutional approaches and
practices. Table 2 below demonstrates these three key approaches. For example, gender
equality can be seen as a problem of achieving equality as sameness (which can be linked to
strategies of equal opportunities), or of affirming difference from the male norm (which can be
linked to positive actions, or finally, transformation which requires transforming the norms and
standards of what it is/ or should be to be male or female (a strategy of gender mainstreaming
is often linked to this)(Rees, 1998; Walby, 2005; Verloo and Lombardo, 2006: 23) or as
Squires (1999) labels it ‘inclusion, reversal, and displacement’ or as Rees (1998) labels it,
‘tinkering’, ‘tailoring’ or ‘transforming’. For Squires (2005:368), ‘the strategy of inclusion seeks
gender-neutrality; the strategy of reversal seeks recognition for a specifically female gendered
identity; and the strategy of displacement seeks to deconstruct those discursive regimes that
engender the subject’.

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Table 2: Theorising Gender Mainstreaming
Aim Integrationist/
Sameness Approach
(inclusion, tinkering)
Problem Women have been
excluded from the political
and the unequal treatment
of women and men is the
source of discrimination.
Strategy/ Equal opportunity and
Solution treatment
Offer equal access,
opportunity and treatment
of women and men.
Issues Assimilation does not go
far enough in challenging
gendered power
structures. Aspires to a
gender neutral world.
Does not lead to
fundamental changes in
policy, it rebrands existing
policies and is sold as a
way of making them more
effective. Whilst it may be
less likely to be rejected, it
is less likely to be
substantial. Makes equal
treatment the strategy to
solve the disadvantages
women face.
Increasing complexity
(Jahan, 1995; Rees, 1998; Squires, 1999; Rees, 2002; Squires, 2005; Walby, 2005; Verloo
and Lombardo, 2007; Krook and True, 2010; Joachim and Schneiker, 2012)
Agenda Setting/ Transformation
Difference (reversal, (displacement)
tailoring)
Problematises the The gendered world is
existence of unquestioned problematised, not just
male norms and the idea the exclusion of women
that women should imitate and the unquestioned
these norms. male norm.
Positive action (Women Gender mainstreaming
focused) (Gender perspective)
Recognition that women’s Moves beyond the idea
voices and experiences of equality vs difference
are distinctive and need by deconstructing
to be recognised through political discourses that
special programmes. engender the subject
Non-hegemonic identities and by adopting
should be treated as diversity politics.
different from the male Systemic incorporation
norm. of gender issues
Positive action would throughout all
recommend the government institutions
participation of women in and policies. Identifies
decision making how existing systems
institutions. and structures cause
indirect discrimination
and therefore redesigns
or alters them.
Does not challenge Challenges existing
existing gender power power structures, (such
structures. Maintains a as cultures and power
dualism of men and relations) which can be
women. hard to do – particularly
in military and security
contexts.
If gender equality
becomes a responsibility
for all, this may remove
the need for equality
specialists.
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Beyond differing understandings and approaches to gender mainstreaming, there are a
number of problems that can influence the extent to which gender mainstreaming becomes
an effective tool. Elgström (2000: 457) argues that new gender norms have to ‘fight their way
into institutional thinking’, in competition with traditional established norms. Whilst these norms
may not be in direct opposition to gender equality, they may be prioritised. For example, norms
relating to traditional security threats may be prioritised rather than tackling the societal
inequalities that lead to women being victims of domestic violence. In the case of P/CVE, that
stems from CT practices that prioritises state security, shifting thinking from the state onto
human security, or women as individuals, or on the role of gender may be difficult. The
conceptualisation of this dualism, between gender equality and the mainstream can be
analysed through the policy frames and what is prioritised.

3.3.3 Gender Expertise and Feminist Triangles

Feminist institutionalism allows attention to be paid to the role of ‘voice’ in gender
mainstreaming and who should have a say in the political debate surrounding the problem of
gender inequality and how it could be solved (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007), which is deeply
connected to power. How governments draw upon gender knowledge and gender expertise
is also a highly political process (Kunz and Prügl, 2019). Gender experts can sometimes be
the ‘insiders’; those who operate within the institutions in pursuit of feminist strategies and are
sometimes referred to as ‘femocrats’ (Chappell, 2002; Holli, 2008). They face contradictory
demands from their position in government and their relationship to feminism and feminist
movements, and often have to act as a ‘trojan horse’ (Prügl, 2015). Additionally, gender
experts, who are ‘outsiders’ to the institution, such as academics and civil society actors, can
have a role in this interpretation and influence the policy process. These experts are part of a
‘feminist triangle’ between the femocrats, academics and civil society or women’s movements,
and how institutions engage with these ‘feminist triangles’ of knowledge can influence how
transformative a project can be (Woodward, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018).
Academics and civil society actors can play crucial roles as feminist ‘critical friends’ who are
external to the process but provide expertise, have a willingness to play devil’s advocate,
challenge assumptions and speak hard truths constructively (Chappell and Mackay, 2020).
Together, they populate the ‘machineries’ that advance the feminist agenda within
governments (Goetz, 1997).

Nevertheless, there are diversities in opinion on how gender mainstreaming should be

implemented; as Rai (2003) conceptualises, gender mainstreaming can be seen as a process

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of gender democratisation, in that women’s perspectives, experiences, interests are
incorporated into the normally privileged policy-making processes. A number of processes
and practices can do this, although there is particular value attributed to national gender
machineries within states and their relationships with civil society organisations and academic
communities. This relationship with non-governmental organisations and women’s rights
organisations and groups can hold the national machineries to account and are an essential
feature of effective gender mainstreaming (Walby, 2005). On the other hand, there is an
argument that gender mainstreaming should be carried out by ‘normal policy actors’ and is a
technical process that politicians and bureaucrats carry out (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007), in
order for it to be mainstreamed. However, this can also be problematic, as this approach to
gender mainstreaming has been critiqued for disrupting the ‘feminist triangle’ by spreading
responsibility around and reducing ‘gender concerns’ (Moser and Moser, 2005; Jacquot,
2015). Feminist institutionalism allows us to explore whose voices are heard in the policy
process and how they can influence and impact the policy; it allows gender mainstreaming to
be investigated as a political process.

3.3.4 The Risks of Co-optation and Agenda Hijacking

The integration of gender perspectives and gender mainstreaming into military or security
organisations is a fundamental tension for anti-militarist feminists. Feminists are cautious of
how global gender norms, such as the WPS agenda, are implemented by security institutions
as they are adopting policies that may be seen to run counter to the common security practices
of organisations. For example, the WPS agenda has been critiqued being used to enhance
military and operational effectiveness, which upholds the patriarchal war system, rather than
dismantling or transforming it (Heathcote, 2011; Egnell, 2013). Feminist scholars are therefore
vigilant about the potential co-optation of feminism, which is the ‘appropriation, dilution and
reinterpretation of feminist discourses, and practices by non-feminist actors for their purposes’
(de Jong and Kimm, 2017: 187) and ‘its initial meaning is transformed and used in policy
discourse for a different purpose than the original one’ (Stratigaki, 2004: 36). Security
practices risk co-opting the WPS agenda for the broader goal of conflict resolution rather than
being transformative by challenging the gendered conditions that lead to violence. For Ní
Aoláin (2016: 277) there is a particular risk of ‘agenda-hijacking’ in the instance of anchoring
WPS to traditional security threats. Co-optation can transform feminist ideas by merging
women’s rights and gender equality with other discourses, such as those on war, security,
democracy or human rights. These transformations may gradually deteriorate the potential

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policy impact of gender equality and gender-sensitive agendas and ultimately, produce
counter or adverse effects (Stratigaki, 2004: 36).

Linking back to the discussion on Post-Colonial Feminism, the tying of Western

understandings of women’s agency and experiences to the WPS agenda, may be used to
‘constrain alternatives to liberal democratic models or frames’ (von der Lippe, 2012). Co-
optation and agenda hijacking is problematic, as bureaucratic machineries become
responsible for implementing feminist work, have the potential to normalise certain racialised
and gendered identities as well as being used to justify military intervention in the post-colonial
world, thus enhancing marginalities rather than challenging them (Reeves, 2012: 348). In
addition, co-optation works against mobilisation and the advocacy of interested parties, as the
original, as well as transformed concept, can be used as an alibi that prevents mobilisation
against it, as it appears to be one’s ‘own’ despite it no longer being used as what one intended
(Stratigaki, 2004: 36). Commitments to gender mainstreaming and gender sensitivity should
not be taken at face value, as Chappell and Guerrina (2020: 263) argue that there is a
difference between ‘normative gender actors’ (those that actively promote gender equality
principles and mainstreaming) and ‘gendered normative actors’ (those that only strategically
deploy gender narratives).

Korteweg (2017: 218) draws attention to the ‘what’ and the ‘who’ of theorising co-optation and
argues that fixing the idea of pre-transformed concepts (such as those at the foundations of
WPS) as liberating is problematic. The ‘what’ of co-optation is then ‘a political process that
reduces the liberatory potentialities rooted in our conceptualisations of freedom and practice’
and the ‘who’ of co-optation should start with ‘there being no priori liberated subject’ and focus
on the interaction of actors that reiterate, redefine and reinforce being, belonging and
participation through those processes are what ultimately makes some more free to act than
others. For Korteweg (2017: 218), co-optation ‘results from the power gradient between
political actors where those less free to imagine or to enact their imagination of liberation are
more likely to have their discursive practices mimicked and transformed by those more
powerful’. The role of political actors in defining objects in need of ‘liberating’ are subjective
and are shaped by the structural contexts in which they are located. Therefore paying attention
to the voices heard within processes of implementing strategies, such as WPS agenda, are
important for determining who gets to shape meaning of liberation but also peace, security
and insecurity. Furthermore, where WPS policy interpretation and formulation is situated
within institutional contexts that are linked to historical colonisation and neo-colonialism, the

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structural context must be taken into account as ‘people draw on gendered, heteronormative,
classed, raced and colonial discourses to undertake activities in organisations, make changes,
justify action or inaction and make sense of the things that happen in organisational life’
(Baines, 2010:120). If WPS policies are implemented by states that have demonstrable
histories of racially targeted security policies and governmentality, the broader political
function of the institutions could have a significant impact on the co-optation of the agenda.
As sexual orientation, class and race are intertwined with gender, when these intersections
are overlooked, organisational policies can exacerbate ‘gender injustice and re-establish
unequal relations of class, race and sexual orientation at home and abroad’ (Baines,
2010:142). As institutions play a key role in shaping the interpretation of WPS, these dynamics
need uncovering as they impact how political actors determine what is important and who is
the focus of policies, which ultimately shapes the interpretation and implementation of gender
mainstreaming policies and strategies.

Whilst gender mainstreaming at the UN level, and through its system, has created
opportunities for normative and institutional change, there remains a level of pessimism
regarding the extent to which it is making substantive change. A number of feminist scholars
have drawn attention to the problem of feminist goals losing their radical potential and
substantive political content as they translate into international institutions and norms (Baden
and Goetz, 1997; Gallagher, 1997). Charlesworth (2011: 17) rejects Halley's (2006) argument
that feminism has come to exercise considerable power in international law and institutions,
but rather feminist conversation with the mainstream is one-sided and is often a ‘monologue
rather than a dialogue’. Otto (2009: 20) considers this a potential ‘exile of inclusion’;
whilst engagement with feminist ideas and actors is significant in opening space for serious
challenge there are a number of problems such as the ‘selective engagement with feminist
ideas as institutions employ them to serve institutional agendas which may not bear any
relation to feminist goals’, that ‘gender mainstreaming commitments and policies are adept at
avoiding accountability mechanisms, which helps to explain why they have made little
difference in practice’. However, True (2003: 368) asks a significant question regarding co-
optation that considers not just ‘how feminist scholars and activists can avoid co-optation by
powerful institutions, but whether we can afford not to engage with such institutions, when the
application of gender analysis in their policy-making is clearly having political effects beyond
academic and feminist communities’. This thesis thus contributes to the debates on gender
mainstreaming and recognises that the further feminist commitments spread, there is a greater
chance that feminist goals could lose their radical potential and substantive political content

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and feminists then find themselves in a new form of exile. This thesis recognises these
challenges regarding gender mainstreaming and argues that this represents a ‘Catch-22’ for
feminists. A Feminist Institutionalist lens thus enables questions to be asked of how gender
mainstreaming is translated into policy, who is involved in the process, to what extent does
gender mainstreaming make transformative change and what institutional factors constrain or
create boundaries for effective mainstreaming.

As discussed in the previous chapter, much feminist scholarship on WPS has focused on
discourse. Whilst discourses are a significant feature of understanding WPS at a policy level;
it does not go far enough in unpacking the gendered norms, rules and practices that are at
work within institutions, how they are constrained by actors, ideas and interests which have
implications for what options, paths and choices are available (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell,
2010; Krook and Mackay, 2011). Therefore, Feminist Institutionalism provides the lenses to
query how the institutions who interpret WPS and P/CVE are constrained by gendered and
racialised, norms, values, practices and cultures. Ultimately, this theoretical lens provides the
tools to politicise the UK’s discursive interpretation and institutionalisation of the WPS agenda.
Institutionalist and discursive approaches are complementary in gaining insights into the
processes and implementation of gender mainstreaming (Cohn, 2008:194). Discursive
analyses considers ‘how mainstreaming produces new forms of power through the diffusion
of strategic language and framing processes that change the meaning of women, men and
gender equality in myriad contexts’ (True, 2009: 189). Institutional analyses complements this
by questioning how gender mainstreaming is translated into policy, who is involved in the
process, to what extent does gender mainstreaming makes transformative change and what
institutional factors constrain or create boundaries for effective mainstreaming. Therefore,
Feminist Institutionalism provides a number of insights for this thesis. Firstly, for illuminating
how different institutional contexts, such as military, security or development, and their
different institutional dynamics shape WPS (re)interpretations. Secondly, that Feminist
Institutionalism pays attention to whose voices are heard in the interpretation process and
how institutional agendas can shape the impact, trajectory, or co-optation of the WPS agenda
through the ‘feminist triangle’ model (Holli, 2008; Woodward, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell and
Wright, 2018). Thirdly, as outlined in the previous chapter, as P/CVE/CT environments can be
deeply problematic for women rights, in essentialising the roles of women and in evoking
racialised discourses (Huckerby, 2015; Gaudry Haynie and De Jonge Oudraat, 2017), this
lens allows attention to paid to how embedded institutional norms regarding gender and race

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are disrupted, or not, as P/CVE is linked to WPS and the extent to which this represents
transformative change.

3.4 Bridging the Theories

A synergy of the theoretical approaches outlined in this chapter, Feminist Security Studies,
Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist Institutionalism provides the most valuable lens to
investigate the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242. The
theoretical framework introduced here offers a novel approach to the study of WPS, which is
one of the key contributions of this thesis. Figure 2 below provides an overview of the
theoretical framework.

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Figure 2: Theory Triangulation Diagram

Feminist
Security Studies
- Challenges the naturalness of
traditional conceptions of security and
its militarist, masculine and securitising
logics.

- Problematises the gendered nature of

international security and the
subordination of feminine associated
values and behaviours.

Post-Colonial Feminist
Feminism Institutionalism

- Exposes racialised and gendered - Security institutions have gendered

hierarchies within security conceptions
and practices.
- Problematises the framing of the
‘Other’ woman as an object of security
policy and state practices of ‘colonial
amnesia’.
norms, rules, values, cultures and
practices which influence how gender is
mainstreamed (sameness, difference,
transformation).
- Highlights risks of co-optation and
agenda hijacking of gender
mainstreaming initiatives by
security institutions

The three theoretical perspectives outlined here each provide valuable additions to
the critical lenses that are used to analyse the UK’s interpretation and
institutionalisation of P/CVE and WPS. Together, they are able to mitigate the
shortcomings of each of the theories alone.

- What and who is defined as a security threat or (in)secure, and how to respond to
security threats is a product of the gendered norms, rules, values, cultures, histories and
practices of security institutions and is not natural nor a given. Security narrations and
practices are both racialised and gendered and can be complicit in reproducing colonial
logics and gendered and racialised hierarchies.

- P/CVE therefore should be considered as narrated security threat and how this
intertwines with WPS is a particular interpretation and prioritisation of a ‘represented’
problem that is defined by the UK government, which is an institution embedded with
gendered and racialised security logics.

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Feminist Security Studies provides the theoretical lenses to challenge traditional
conceptualisations of security and reveal the militarist, securitising and masculine logic
embedded in those conceptions of security. This is significant for this thesis as security
conceptualisations, such as P/CVE that are employed by traditional and dominant security
actors, such as the UK government, are narrations of security rather than facts (Wibben,
2018). Labelling work as P/CVE work is defining violent extremism as a security threat. Yet
what is defined as ‘security’, ‘insecurity’, ‘security threats’, who should be ‘securitised’ and who
should be ‘secured’ is an inherently political process. These ambiguous and contested
concepts are deeply gendered (Shepherd, 2013), but have very real-world implications
(Wibben, 2018). Feminist Security Studies provides the lens to unpack how security is defined
and narrated, however alone it does not go far enough in unpacking the racialised gender
hierarchies present within narrations of security. Understandings of the UK’s foreign and
security policies, such as P/CVE and CT, cannot be fully analysed without considering the
colonial past of the UK and their current global position. Additionally, the literature reviewed in
the previous chapter exposed how gendered and racialised logics are embedded within
conceptions and practices of P/CVE/CT, such as the War on Terror (Klaus and Kassel, 2005;
Shepherd, 2006; Hunt and Rygiel, 2007; Zine, 2007; Bhattacharyya, 2008; Khalid, 2011). By
integrating a Post-Colonial Feminist lens with Feminist Security Studies, the analysis in this
thesis can expose how narrations of (in)security and violent extremism can be gendered and
racialised and the potential to reinscribe racial and sexual hierarchies within international
security (Pratt, 2013a). Furthermore, Post-Colonial Feminism provides insight into how
Western (liberal) feminism, although potentially well-intentioned, can play a role in reducing
‘Other’ women as objects of security policy and reproducing stereotypes of women in the
global South (Mohanty, 1984; Spivak, 1985). The WPS agenda has been critiqued for this
‘Othering’ and racialised dynamic (Shepherd, 2017; Martin De Almagro, 2018; Haastrup and
Hagen, 2020), and the integration of WPS and P/CVE has been considered problematic in
terms of embedding racialised logics, as well as exacerbating the insecurity of women
(Aroussi, 2020). Therefore, Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist Security Studies together
provide a lens to expose the ways in which the discursive construction of P/CVE and WPS
may reproduce gendered and racialised hierarchies.

Whilst Feminist Security Studies and Post-Colonial Feminism are useful in unpacking the
ways in which P/CVE and WPS may reproduce gendered and racialised hierarchies; they offer
limited insight into how those narrations are constructed within institutions that have gendered
and racialised norms, rules and practices. They cannot explain why certain discourses on

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P/CVE and WPS are invoked, whilst others have been avoided (Carpenter, 2005:301).
Feminist Security Studies and Feminist Institutionalism have therefore been linked, to uncover
how WPS policies and practices are shaped by the dynamics of the institutions that create
them (See Kronsell, 2005). A Feminist Institutionalism approach to WPS research (See:
George, 2016; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018; Haastrup, 2018; Holmes et al., 2019;
Thomson, 2019; O’Sullivan and Krulišová, 2020) remains a small but growing body of
literature and this theoretical lens has not yet been applied to UNSCR 2242. Therefore, this
thesis provides novel insight into the institutional dynamics of WPS and P/CVE. As the concept
of P/CVE has been formulated within highly securitised and masculine institutions, it is
essential to pay attention to how a feminist agenda, such as WPS, can be integrated with
P/CVE without co-optation and instrumentalization and what are the institutional factors that
shape its interpretation. More importantly, Feminist Institutionalism has yet to engage with
Post-Colonial Feminist concepts and insights in its work, which I argue is a considerable
oversight. A Post-Colonial Feminist lens contributes a vital aspect of this thesis’ theoretical
framework, as it can expose the gendered and racialised rules, norms, practices of institutions
and how this can shape WPS and P/CVE policies and practices.

3.5 Conclusion
To conclude, this chapter has outlined conceptual tools from several theoretical perspectives
that are utilised to investigate the research puzzle and questions outlined in chapter one. This
new synthesis of Feminist Security Studies, Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist
Institutionalism approaches, provides a set of tools for the investigation of integrating WPS
and P/CVE at the nation-state level which could be replicated in future research projects. The
previous chapter reviewed the extant literature on WPS, P/CVE/CT and the intersection of
these agendas and exposed limitations in understanding this integrations discursive and
institutional complexities. It also revealed P/CVE/CT as highly gendered and racialised
securitised concepts, and therefore, this thesis argues that they should be analysed as such.
As a result of the lacuna in discursive and institutional knowledge regarding WPS and P/CVE,
this thesis’ theoretical lens operationalises conceptual tools drawn from Feminist Security
Studies, Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist Institutionalism to uncover how (in)security
(and P/CVE) are politicised narratives embedded with gendered and racialised logics,
constructed within institutions that have gendered, and racialised, norms, values, cultures and
practices. These factors shape interpretations of P/CVE and WPS, and determine how gender
mainstreaming is conceptualised and operationalised discursively and institutionally, which
has implications for potential co-optation and agenda hijacking.

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This is the theoretical framework used to analyse the overarching research question of ‘does
the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 represent
transformative change or instrumental co-optation of the WPS agenda?’ hangs from.
Additionally, the sub research question of ‘what, and where, is the problem represented to be
in the UK’s interpretation of WPS and P/CVE?’ is approached with sensitivity to gendered and
racialised institutional norms, rules and practices that constrain this interpretation. This also
links to the sub research question that asks ‘what formal and informal institutional structures,
practices and dynamics shaped the UK’s interpretation of Women, Peace and Security and
Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism?’. Furthermore, in uncovering ‘how and why did
Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism appear as a key feature of the UK’s approach to
Women, Peace and Security?’ this thesis uses a lens that pays attention to the UK government
as an institution with its own priorities, history, values and cultures, that enhances the potential
for co-optation and agenda hijacking. The final sub research question of ‘what are the
challenges of operationalising the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242, beyond its
core Women, Peace and Security cross-government policy documents?’ pays attention to the
different institutional contexts in which UNSCR 1325 and 2242 are (re)interpreted in. The
complexities and dynamics in those spaces provide opportunities and constraints for the
transformative potential of this policy shift, but also the potential for co-optation and agenda
hijacking. Further discussion relating to how this theoretical framework has been
operationalised in the research design and empirical analysis in this thesis is discussed in the
next chapter.

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4.0 Researching WPS and P/CVE

‘Feminist research is amoeba- like; it goes everywhere, in every direction. It reaches into all
the disciplines and uses all the methods, sometimes singly and sometimes in combinations.
The amoeba is fed by the women's movement. The women's movement, in turn, is fed by
women's outrage and hope.’

(Reinharz, 1992: 243)

As this quote by Reinharz highlights, feminists situate themselves along various points of an
epistemological and methodological spectrum. However, what all feminist researchers share
is a goal to challenge gendered norms and hierarchies and bring about transformative change.
Feminist critical methodologies ‘not only help us to clarify the struggles for social justice in our
globalising age, but also enable us to do better scholarship and, as theorists, to live up to the
goal of informing and transforming practice in order to improve human well-being globally’
(Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006:15). Not all research that focuses on gender and inequality is
feminist; feminist research does, however, encompass a set of characteristics that ensure it
produces ‘theoretically informed, methodologically rigorous, ethically sound and politically
useful research’ (Kelly, 2019: 1 - 2). Therefore, this chapter builds upon the literature reviewed
and the theoretical framework constructed previously in this thesis to demonstrate a suitable
and effective research design that considers these key characteristics. This thesis is driven
by a ‘feminist curiosity’ (Enloe, 2004) about the practical and conceptual tensions of integrating
WPS and P/CVE, as WPS is an agenda built on feminist principles and P/CVE, which has
emerged from a highly securitised, racialised and gendered ‘Counter Terrorism’ agenda. This
thesis is interested in the ways that this integration is discursively and institutionally
constructed and the factors that shape this particular interpretation of this integration.
Therefore, this chapter begins with a discussion of the feminist ontological, epistemological
and methodological foundations of this research. Following this, the research design is
outlined, demonstrating that documents and elite interviews are contextually suitable data for
this research, before insight into how the data was collected is then summarised.
Subsequently, the use of Critical Frame Analysis is justified as the most valuable method for
analysing the data collected and in investigating the research puzzle questions formulated in
chapter one and how this was carried out is detailed. This thesis builds on Critical Frame
Analysis, by integrating this approach with elite interviews, to uncover why key frames are
utilised.

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4.1 The Research Paradigm: Feminist Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology
This research’s ontological and epistemological foundations are inherently feminist and thus
aims to challenge and rethink what we mean by ‘knowledge’ (Tickner, 2005:4). This research
draws on an ontology of social relations that understands that individuals are embedded in,
and constituted by, historically unequal social, political and economic structures, rather than
an ontology that depicts states as individualistic, autonomous actors (Tickner, 2006: 24). It
recognises that gendered attributes of states (and their citizens and leaders) are not a given
or fixed but are constructed and reconstructed based on gendered power relations (Maruska,
2010). It understands research subjects are relational (rather than autonomous) and that the
world is constantly changing (rather than static)(Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006: 7). This critical
ontology is useful in unveiling how things came to be and how realities came to be understood
as social facts, institutions and norms, whilst examining the gendered power relations
unpinning these. It recognises that the social world is constructed and can, therefore,
potentially be reconstructed in emancipatory and transformative ways. This thesis rejects
mainstream or ‘malestream’ International Relations perspectives that promote ‘the
appearance of a predominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning
and end of investigation and knowledge building’ (Youngs, 2004: 77). As acknowledged
throughout this thesis, this research begins with the fundamental assumption, as well as a
normative and empirical concern, that global politics is gender-hierarchical which can be
revealed and analysed through scholarly evaluation (Sjoberg, 2009) by paying attention to
gender as well as women (Zalewski, 1995). Definitions of (in)security, terrorism and violent
extremism are political (Turk, 2004; Jackson, 2005) and are dominated by male and
masculinised perspectives that have shaped how we know and what we know about the
phenomenon and how women and gender fits within that constructed reality (Gentry and
Sjoberg, 2016; Brown, 2019). This thesis’ fundamental research puzzle aims to destabilise
this by unpacking how WPS, and the turn to include P/CVE, is part of an interpretive process
carried out by a traditionally masculine institution that is embedded with gendered and
racialised norms and hierarchies. It requires attention to be paid to how knowledge is produced
about women, gender and P/CVE and what power relations are shaping it, to consider how
things could be thought of differently.

Furthermore, epistemology is not only concerned with what constitutes knowledge and reality,
but is also concerned with how we ‘consciously and unconsciously understand / analyse /
construct / apply / justify / theorise / critique / validate these knowledges’ (Wickramasinghe,
2010: 39 - 40). There is no one objective truth as researchers will always, to some degree, go

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through a process of abstraction. Abstraction is an inescapable feature of knowledge
production and enables knowledge practices to happen, as without abstraction, the infinity of
reality would be overwhelming. Abstraction is not a neutral process as researchers decide
what to bring into ‘sharp focus’ and ‘what aspects are, literally, left out of the picture’ and
therefore the production of knowledge is also one of concealment (Krishna, 2001: 403). For
this thesis, the decision to focus on the UK government’s interpretation of the WPS agenda,
the documents I collected, who I interviewed and the theoretical focus of the analysis means
I chose not to produce knowledge on other countries, data and perspectives. However, by
acknowledging this I recognise that I hold power in producing knowledge about this topic, that
is limited to a particular research context that I have constructed boundaries for. This does not
mean that this research is not valuable but recognises that knowledge production is co-
constituted between the research subject and the researcher. Feminist work is normative and
part of a political project that is driven by feminist praxis and is therefore always going to be,
in some way, subjective.

Building on the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of this thesis, this section now
considers how I am able to acquire knowledge regarding the UK’s interpretation and
institutionalisation of WPS and P/CVE using a feminist methodology. Based on the research
puzzle, questions, gaps in the literature identified and the theoretical framework constructed,
this research requires methods that can unmask the workings of gender and race,
intersectional inequalities, capture silences, evaluate the knowledge claims produced in the
UK’s interpretation of WPS and P/CVE and consider the material and social realities of the
institutional structures, practices and norms that influence it. In addition, the research methods
and analytical methods also had to be harmonious with the researchers’ (my) feminist politics
and ethics. This research therefore utilises a qualitative, politically-sensitive interpretivist
research style. Thus, key documents and elite interviews provide the data necessary to
undertake this investigation. Whilst the data selected is significant, how I analyse and interpret
this data is also a methodological choice. A largely positivist, quantitative analysis of the data
would restrict the interpretation of this data to testing a hypothesis, which, of course, does not
align with this work's ontological and epistemological groundings. That is not to say that
quantitative methods cannot add value to this research; for example, I draw upon word
frequencies as indicators for the emergence of trends across the UK’s interpretation of the
WPS, such as regarding P/CVE and masculinities and femininities. However, the dominant
approach is a qualitative one that asks questions of the texts (documents and interview
transcriptions) and sees policy as a creative process (Bacchi and Eveline, 2010), embedded

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within institutions that are constrained by actors, ideas and interests that have implications for
the options, paths and choices available in policy formulation. Therefore, a Critical Frame
Analysis method was utilised in the analysis of the data collected. This section has justified
the methodological choices made in the research design. However, sections 4.4 and 4.5 will
explain and justify the data collection and analytical methods in greater detail and provide
details of how they were conducted.

4.2 Reflexivity: The Situated Knower

Before moving to the research design, this section will now discuss the position of the
researcher and the necessity of reflexivity in feminist research. The researcher’s personal
experiences and voice are a valuable asset in feminist research, despite this being largely
ignored in mainstream research due to the fear that this contaminates research objectivity
(Reinharz, 1992: 258). As discussed previously, the researcher ‘participates in the projection
of power through knowledge claims’ and thus a research ethic is an essential tool in carrying
out this research that is reflective of the normative concerns of feminist work (Ackerly and
True, 2008), which goes some way to repair a projects pseudo-objectivity (Reinharz, 1992:
258). Reflexivity is key as I am ‘wrestling with politics while (I) study it’ (Ackerly, 2009: 434).
The decisions I make and how I face dilemmas in research, such as how my subjectivities,
research subjects and power relations impact the research process, can condition my
research and knowledge and impact the research methods selected and the analysis of the
data collected. Acknowledging my situatedness as a researcher is essential in pulling apart
some of those ethical questions and dilemmas. Acknowledging this and reassessing my role
in the research throughout the project requires conscious self-analytical scrutiny and
introspection and is an important aspect of rigour in qualitative research. Reflexivity is not only
about reflections on methods and methodology; it is also about how I ‘write myself’ into the
text, ‘the audiences’ reaction to and reflections on the meaning of the research, the social
location of the researcher, and the analysis of disciplines as sites of knowledge production’
(Fonow and Cook, 2005: 2219). It is about how researchers are positioned to a particular
object of study and how researchers and those being researched are situated within particular
power structures and dynamics (Daley, 2010). Reflexivity encourages critical engagement
with latent dimensions of power and how emotions, identities, values and acknowledging the
ongoing mutual shaping between researcher and research.

To ‘write myself into the text’, I needed to consider my social positioning and experiences that
led to this piece of research. I want to summarise my socio-political location, I am a white

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atheist woman, born and raised in London, United Kingdom. I have no connections or direct
links to CVE policy formulation or organisations that analyse CVE strategy. Throughout my
time at university, I gained and enhanced my feminist understanding and outlook on world
politics and International Relations. I also began to query the male-dominated nature of
security in the UK and began to explore, in greater detail, the WPS agenda. All of these factors
led me to pursue the subject of this thesis. Although delineating my position in relation to this
research is important, I needed to engage with this critically. This research is fundamentally
feminist, which reflects my personal values and motivations. As a white woman, I have not
had a direct racialised experience of P/CVE/CT work. I am aware of the complicity of white
‘western’ feminism in reproducing racialised and gendered narratives in support of militarism
and CT measures and find this highly problematic. I aim to use my privileged position as a
PhD researcher to challenge the workings of the UK government and to enhance the UK’s
understanding of what it means to integrate feminist principles in its security work, both at
home and abroad. I aim to destabilise racialised understandings of violent extremism and
terrorism by drawing attention to the silences around terrorism and extremism carried out by
white, western actors. Therefore, I recognise that my political views have implications for the
direction, boundaries and approach to the research and my position as a researcher has had
an impact on the data collection and analytical process.

4.3 Case Selection: The United Kingdom

This thesis uses the UK as a case study to explore how WPS and P/CVE are framed in policy
and what problems this policy aims to address, as well as understanding the voices heard in
the policy formulation process and how this is (re)interpreted into UK governmental
departments policy and practice. Lewis (2003: 52) defines a case study as being a ‘multiplicity
of perspectives which are rooted in a specific context (or in a number of specific contexts if
the study involves more than one case)’. Whilst I recognise criticisms of the use of a single
case study, such as issues of generalisability and validity, as well as the influence and
subjectivity of the researcher (Simons, 2009: 24), I do not see them as limitations for this study
and its findings. Although a multi-case approach has value in understanding
issues across multiple situations, and this can reveal contrasts, similarities and
generalisations and Swanborn (2010: 46) argues it increases reliability, this is not the only
way to create knowledge and the criticism of generalisability is of little relevance when the aim
is particularisation (Simons, 2009: 24). There has been a large n-number study conducted
that reveals trends in the inclusion of P/CVE into WPS NAPs (See Asante and Shepherd,
2020), however, this research builds on this by undertaking an empirically-rich, context-

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specific study to investigate why and how this integration occurred and why certain
interpretations of this integration have been promoted in a particular context.

This thesis aims to expand and enrich understandings of the gendered and racialised
dynamics present in gender mainstreaming in security and provide a more sophisticated
understanding of the challenges of interpreting and implementing WPS (and P/CVE), therefore
one very detailed case is sufficient to provide insights and contributions in this research area.
The research time spent on more than one case would mean less time and resources could
be spent on understanding the full details of the UK case. To overcome potential criticisms of
validity and methodological rigour this chapter presents a clear and detailed explanation of the
research design and data used, that can be replicated. Whilst the subjectivity of the researcher
is inevitable, I appropriately monitor my input through reflexivity and transparency, as
explained in the previous section. Whilst this is one case study, I utilise different types of
evidence, such as policy documents, policy consultations and interviews and ensure multiple
perspectives within the case are considered (UK government level, departmental levels and
civil society actors) and thus this research builds a very detailed, in-depth understanding within
and across the UK context. Furthermore, this case study approach allows the UK’s specific
socio-politico-historical context to be considered influential and constraining in the
interpretation and institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242.

The case of the UK specifically has particular significance in this research area, as it was an
early adopter of WPS, has demonstrated a leadership role in WPS and has mobilised WPS
as a mechanism of its soft power, illustrated in the fact it is pen-holder at the UNSC on this
topic and has sought to construct an image of itself as a global ‘leader’ and ‘expert’ (Achilleos-
Sarll, 2020: 1650), all of which are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. In
addition, as discussed in chapter two, the UK’s approach to P/CVE has been heavily critiqued
for its gendered, racialised and securitising logic (Rashid, 2014; Sabir, 2017; Bentley, 2018;
Ortbals and Poloni-Staudinger, 2018; Brown, 2019; Ali, 2020; Andrews, 2020) and thus is an
excellent case for investigating this particular research puzzle. Furthermore, the UK could
arguably be seen as an archetype of minority world states, as Doty (1996: 13) argues that
‘Great Britain’ and the ‘US’ seem to stand out as exemplars of the “first world”, and in many
respects, their narratives exemplify the representational practices that continue to frame our
understanding and knowledge of the “third world”. The case of the UK may shed light on the
broader population of states in the minority world who are interpreting and institutionalising
WPS and P/CVE. By investigating in detail, the case of the UK, this research is not aimed at

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analysing the ‘broader’ trends in P/CVE and WPS (See: Asante and Shepherd, 2020), but
rather it provides detail on how and why interpretation and institutionalisation occurs in a
particular way, considering the decisions, motivations, beliefs, policies and processes that
have shaped this, which could not be revealed through a larger (n) number quantitative study.
The aim here is not to be comparative, but rather to reveal the discursive and institutional
complexities of integrating WPS and P/CVE to provide insight for the wider WPS and P/CVE
community this integration and the growing trends of integrating ’gender’ in P/CVE work.

As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, I recognise the value of listening to marginalised
voices and that this is a necessary and core feature of feminist IR research. However, elite-
centred security policy is still of interest for feminists IR researchers, as this has implications
for women’s lives. Through a consideration of ‘which research projects are most likely to be
useful to women’s civil society organisations and women peace builders’ (Cohn, 2011: 585), I
argue that in ‘studying up’ (Nader, 1972), and in the challenge of, an institution at the ‘epicentre
of the exercise of military/political/economic power’ this research has the potential to bring
about change through critique and awareness-raising (Cohn, 2011: 585). I have a
responsibility to do so, as I am located in a position to access and conduct this research (Cohn,
2011). This research project and its focus on the UK government remains valuable in its
advocacy for an approach to WPS and P/CVE that resists co-optation and agenda hijacking
and exposes what factors may contribute to this, thus aiming to have policy impact.

4.4 Methods of Data Collection: Documents and Elite Interviews

The selection and collection of data is not a neutral exercise; rather it is a process of exercising
judgment. I will now provide the details of the exercise in judgement undertaken in selecting
and collecting data to enhance the credibility of this research and demonstrate its rigour. As
mentioned in the methodology outlined above, documents and elite interviews are drawn on
as suitable data for exploring the research questions. The table below provides an overarching
summary of the data collected, which will be explained in the following sections.

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Table 3: Data Collection Summary

Data Type Actor Focus Document Type

Documents UK UK Government wide on Policy documents on WPS (National
Government Women, Peace and Action Plans, guidance notes,
Security (including in country level implementation plans,
relation to P/CVE) annual reports), speeches and press
releases
Security and development Policy documents
department/unit level
documents on WPS and/or
P/CVE/CT

Civil Society Official civil society Consultation proceedings and

consultation documents on reports
WPS NAP 2018 – 22

Academic Official academic Consultation report

consultation on WPS and
P/CVE
Elite UK Interviews with civil Semi-structured interview transcripts
Interviews Government servants in Foreign and
Officials/ Commonwealth Office,
Civil Department for
Servants International Development
and Ministry of Defence

Civil Society UK based civil society Semi-structured interview transcripts

Actors actors on WPS

4.4.1 Documents
The primary documents initially collected for this research focused on the UK’s policy
documents on Women Peace and Security, the National Action Plans and other guidance
documents, speeches at the UN and press releases on the gov.uk website. These documents
were obtained through searches on the gov.uk website. Whilst every effort was made to get
all the documents that were publicly available on gov.uk website, there is always a chance
that there might be some that were missed, particularly as the UK’s implementation of WPS
began in 2006, which is the year that the UK released its first Nation Action Plan on WPS.
However, the aim was to collect enough documents to understand how the UK has interpreted
WPS since then, which I would argue has been fulfilled. These documents also allow an
investigation into when and how P/CVE/CT emerged into the WPS corpus. The 60 documents
are listed in the appendix (See Appendix F) and this archive is another contribution of this
thesis, as researchers who may want to investigate the UK’s approach to WPS will be able to
draw upon this database. Specifically for this thesis, the UK’s NAPs are central to

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understanding the UK’s interpretation of WPS. Whilst the debate regarding the value of NAPS
and their ability as a guide for states to implement WPS has been discussed in chapter two,
they are the highest level document that explains WPS at the state level and underlines the
priorities of action. They are also a mechanism for civil society to hold states to account, where
their WPS commitments have been limited, and they often provide a platform for
recommendations (Achilleos-Sarll, 2020: 1650). Therefore they form a particularly valuable
part of the data for this research. In addition, the UK’s annual reports on WPS, which are
delivered to parliament, also provide interesting insight into how successful WPS work is
measured and how WPS is implemented.

Linking back to the theoretical framework, this research is also interested in the role that civil
society and academics played in shaping the 2018 – 2022 National Action Plan and the shift
to include P/CVE, as part of the UK’s ‘feminist triangle’ (Woodward, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell
and Wright, 2018). Therefore I also gathered the formal reports and consultation documents
(See Appendix F). The aim here was not to gather all civil society organisations or academic
perspectives on P/CVE and WPS, as this would be another project in itself. The aim was to
analyse the official civil society consultation reports released by Gender Action for Peace and
Security (GAPs) network, which has a formal relationship with the UK government and
whereby some of this consultation was directly funded by the UK government. Similarly, the
LSE Centre of WPS provided an official consultation document, again in partnership with the
UK government, that was created in collaboration with a number of academics from different
institutions regarding the integration of P/CVE and WPS. These documents were analysed to
understand how P/CVE was included, excluded or framed.

The final collection of documents was less easily ringfenced, as they were documents that
have a focus on the departmental implementation of WPS and/or P/CVE/CT. These
documents were produced by government departments or units within them (See Appendix
F). These documents can be considered to be representative of official narratives and
doctrine. This level of documents is not the core focus of this thesis, but are used to provide
insight into how WPS and P/CVE is being diffused beyond NAPs. This is reveals the
‘processes whereby feminist thinking from one place goes through transitions and adjustments
on its way to make sense and become valuable tools’ in new spaces and provides evidence
of how WPS is (re)interpreted by different actors with different institutional priorities (Kronsell
and Svedberg, 2012:11). The documents were again collected on the gov.uk website, except
for the ‘Joint International Counter Terrorism Unit’ (JICTU) ‘Gender Sensitivity and Counter-

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Terrorism: A Guidance Note’, which was provided by a civil servant as this document was not
a publicly available document, although it is not classified.

These policy and consultation documents were collected from February 2019 until May 2021.
This allowed the latest annual reports on WPS to be included in the research that discussed
the UK’s P/CVE and WPS work. The full list of documents collected for this thesis can be
found in Appendix F. Whilst not all of these documents were individually discussed in detail in
the analysis, they demonstrated silences surrounding particular topics and approaches which
was valuable in itself. Overall, these documents provided insight into a number of levels:
official government interpretation of WPS and P/CVE and insight into the framing, articulation
and understanding of these issues to an external audience, the framing and silences of CSOs
and academics on the WPS and P/CVE shift and finally, how this ‘represented problem’ is
defined at the cross-government level and (re)interpreted in other areas of the UK
government. However, this data only tells part of the story, it does not provide an explanation
for why particular interpretations of WPS and P/CVE have been prioritised and by who. As a
result, elite interviews were also drawn upon to fill this gap.

4.4.2 Elite Interviews

Elite interviews are useful in gaining perspectives of those at the centre of political debates
(Richards, 1996) and allow researchers to trace the policy process that underpins political
events (Tansey, 2007). Interviews are a suitable data collection method for this thesis, as it
acknowledges the complexity of human talk, the power in language, subtle meanings within
nuances of speech, the particular vocabulary of settings and groups and the way that silences
also mean something (Devault and Gross, 2014: 206). This thesis understands that the
departments within the UK government are made up of individuals embedded within an
institution that is shaped by history, culture, norms, values and gender hierarchies. Therefore,
this aspect of the research goes beyond exploring the dominant frames presented in the
documents and investigates the experiences of those working in the UK government, and
those working within civil society on WPS and/or P/CVE. This enables insight into ‘how the
world looks and works according to those who actually, rather than theoretically, face forces
of international relations’ (Sylvester, 2013: 619). The purpose of the interviews is to gain a
deeper understanding of how this policy shift came to be, whose voices are heard in the policy
formulation process, what are the priorities and how WPS policies are received, interpreted
and applied in different contexts, which also provides detail on why institutional change occurs
and why it sometimes does not.

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In order to delve deeper into the processes, discussions and experiences of those involved in
the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 2242, this research utilised elite
interviews with actors within the UK government and in civil society organisations. Defining
interviewees as elite is part of a wider power dynamic and is a subjective process, however
for this research I draw upon Leech’s (2002: 663) understanding that argues that the term elite
interviews ‘can be used whenever it is appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert at the
topic at hand’. The individuals interviewed from civil society I deem as experts on the topic
and are also part of the government strategy and policy-making process through consultation,
despite not being within government. Therefore, this research classifies civil society
participants as elites, alongside civil servants. The reason for this dual-pronged approach to
interviewing was that information gathered from government officials is likely to be different to
hearing the experiences and perspectives of civil society organisations, as their experiences
would differ as outsiders trying to influence the government and their priorities are different.
By interviewing these two different groupings, I was able to gather both dominant as well as
counter-discourses on the topic and unpack the dynamics at play as the UK consults civil
society in its interpretation of WPS. The foundations of the WPS agenda at the UN was heavily
influenced by civil society, and continuing to recognise and investigate its inclusion in this
process is also an important feature of the research. Academic interviews were not conducted,
as the majority of consultation was provided through the GAPs network, not academia and the
literature review presented academic perspectives on P/CVE and WPS.

The Interview Sample

A total of 20 elite interviews were carried out between April 2019 and June 2020, an
anonymised list of participants can be found in the appendix (See Appendix G). Elite interviews
in the UK government were conducted with individuals working on WPS, and those less
involved with WPS but were working on P/CVE. The interviewees were from the MoD, FCO
and DFID, with some based in Whitehall and some based internationally. This variance
captured differing knowledge, experiences and perspectives across UK Government
departments and from policy-making to implementation. It provided insight into institutional
practices, norms and cultures across departments as well as within them. Interviews with
those who worked specifically on WPS were useful in gaining insight into the challenges of
working on WPS across government, and although this group remains relatively small, it was
clear that the number of civil servants who work on gender is increasing. In addition, interviews
with those who worked on P/CVE provided an interesting account of the challenges of

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combining WPS and P/CVE in a practical sense. During the interview process, I found that
many of the civil servants that were working on WPS had recently internally moved to this
policy area, whereas actors in civil society could provide more detailed knowledge on WPS
since its adoption in the UK, as they had been part of those conversations throughout. The
civil society organisations I approached for this research were women’s rights, and gender
equality focused, were based in the UK and had some sort of relationship with the UK
government in regards to WPS. Many of the civil society interviewees had been part of the
NAP consultation process, either directly or through the Gender Action for Peace and Security
(GAPS) network who act as a membership organisation for other NGOs and experts that feeds
consultation responses to the government. The civil society organisations that the participants
worked for were peace and security-focused in one way or another and had produced
documents and recommendations related to WPS, women, gender and P/CVE. A more
detailed explanation of the key UK Government departments for this thesis and the role of
GAPs will be outlined in the following chapter.

Of the 20 interviews conducted, 18 were women, and two were men and the interviewees
were largely white women, which of course excludes a large segment of experiences and
knowledge on P/CVE and WPS. However, the purpose of this research is not necessarily
about their classed, gendered or ethnicised knowledge; rather it is about their experiences of
engaging within, or with, an institution of hegemonic masculinity. I did not actively choose to
carry out the majority of interviews with women, however, the majority of people working on
women’s rights and WPS appeared to be women. This is interesting in itself, as it
demonstrates that these issues are still principally deemed as ‘women’s’ jobs and men are
still largely not involved in the WPS policy process, despite security being a male-dominated
area. It is important to state that the intention of the interviews was not to create an entirely
representative sample of those who work in government or civil society. Rather these
interviews were used to capture experiences, knowledge and insights from the people working
on WPS and P/CVE that could explain the rationale of the policies and its formulation and
indicate what institutional dynamics may have impacted this. The interview participants were
found using a snowball method and by contacting organisations or participants through
publicly available email addresses. A snowball method is ‘a technique for gathering research
subjects through the identification of an initial subject who is used to provide the names of
other actors’(Atkinson and Flint, 2011), this method of sampling was appropriate for this
research as I aimed to generate informants through networks (Ackerly & True, 2008: 697),
particularly those who worked on the specific policy area of WPS and P/CVE. This was a

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useful method for recruiting participants in government, as they do not tend to publicise who
works on which policy issue, so they can remain quite easily ‘hidden-by-choice’ (Noy, 2008:
331). In a secretive and securitised area such a P/CVE or CT, this was also even more the
case. In addition, the snowball method proved useful as participants ‘vouched’ for my research
to others within their network which proved more successful than ‘cold-emailing’ participants.

Gaining access to ‘elite participants’ can be challenging, as these individuals occupy positions
and spaces where barriers can be produced to resist research scrutiny (Mikecz, 2012). It was
clear that some people I contacted within the government did not want to be interviewed.
Despite numerous emails, I did not get replies, even though they were mentioned many times
by other civil servants as someone relevant to talk to. I had to accept that some people did
not have the time or want to answer questions about their work, some may have thought that
this research was irrelevant to them. Within the civil service, it became very clear very quickly
that people move departments, units or locations rapidly. Many people I spoke with said that
they had moved on to another role for example. I made sure to encourage people who did
work on the 2018 – 2022 NAP or had worked on WPS and CVE to still be interviewed despite
this, as they possibly could add more detailed reflections once they had moved on. In addition,
I also faced issues with recruiting participants within civil society as many civil society
organisations did not reply to my emails, although some did respond saying that they did not
have the resources to speak with doctoral students. I was often put in the direction of
documents published on their websites, which were useful, however this was limited in gaining
perspectives of relationships with the UK Government, or the implementation of WPS and its
integration with P/CVE more deeply. Although I cannot say for certain, I expect the
organisations who did not respond at all had a resource and funding problem, rather than that
they were uninterested in the topic, as they had produced reports on this topic, they also may
have been contacted by many academics or researchers and may have had a level of
‘research fatigue’ and could not spare the time.

4.4.3 Research Ethics and Interview Style

This research was given ethical approval by the University of Surrey. Prior to the interviews,
each participant was given an information sheet and consent form by email, but also in hard
copy, if it was a face-to-face interview (See Appendix H). This information sheet outlined what
the research project was about, the research aims and the type of participant I was inviting to
be part of the research. The information sheet provided the participants with enough
information about the research so that they could decide whether or not they wished to

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participate beforehand. The consent form outlined that the audio would be transcribed or they
could not be recorded if they did not want to. Participants could ask to see a transcription of
their interview and could withdraw from the research, up to one month after the interview date.
The consent form was signed and emailed to me, or I would take the hard copy and scan it,
and I retained a hard copy and digital copy of all of these documents. All interviews were audio
recorded with permission, except one, who expressed a wish to not be recorded but allowed
detailed notes to be taken. The interviews audio was recorded on a handheld audio recorder,
which was also used during the telephone and video calls. The transcriptions took a significant
amount of time but proved exceptionally valuable.

The interviews were conducted under an agreement of confidentiality. Confidentiality means

‘(1) not discussing information provided by an individual with others and (2) presenting findings
in ways that ensure individuals cannot be identified (chiefly through anonymisation)’(Wiles et
al., 2008: 417 - 418). I found that the number of participants who worked on WPS and gender
within the UK Government is quite limited, but enough that each person would not be identified
individually. Maintaining confidentiality was important, as there were ongoing relationships
between participants and whilst the participants were not conceptualised as vulnerable,
disclosure of information by the participants could potentially have compromised or damaged
their relationships with others (Lancaster, 2017). Many of the participants from civil society
organisations rely on a good working relationship with the UK Government and may have felt
less inclined to speak freely if they were identified as an individual or by their organisation.
Participants were asked for their opinions and experiences within the institution that they work
for and other people and departments within government; sometimes the comments made
were critical and delved into detail about experiences that were quite personal to them. For
these reasons, participants had the potential to be made professionally vulnerable based on
their responses. For these reasons, I chose not to identify each person specifically, and if
anything was said that might identify them as an individual, I did not include this in the thesis.
Making the participants identifiable did not add any value to the research and would have
compromised the ethics of the study. Therefore interviewees were only identified based on
whether they were a UK government civil servant or if they worked for a civil society
organisation.

The interviews followed a semi-structured format, this enabled a guided focus but also the
flexibility for the interview to feel more like a conversation between the subject-participant and
the researchers (Ackerly and True, 2020: 158). This was useful as it allowed the participant to

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give answers that did not conform to my own expectations and enabled me to dig deeper into
particular aspects of their answers. I was also reflexive in my interview questions based on
information I had received from previous research. An example of an interview schedule can
be seen in Appendix I. Prior to conducting the elite interviews, I was aware that power
imbalances between researcher and participant in interview settings are inevitable. Feminist
researchers do not see this as necessarily a drawback of the research method; rather they
see it as an invitation to be ‘reflexive about their research practices by recognising, debating
and working with these power differentials’ (Doucet and Mauthner, 2012:43). Harvey (2011:
439) argues that ‘elites will often try and control an interview and be more particular about the
questions they are willing to answer than other interview subjects’, for these , I needed to be
reflexive about the questions I asked, to whom and how I framed them. In addition, there were
other factors that may have impacted the power dynamic such as location, audio-recording
and demographic characteristics.

The setting of the research interview is an important aspect of the data collection. The
interviews with UK Government staff were conducted in Whitehall, at the Foreign Office, the
Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development buildings. Some
interviews were carried out over the telephone as the participants were posted abroad at that
time, and I was unable to travel to their location based on time and funding restraints.
Interviews with civil society were carried out either at the office buildings of the civil society
organisation, at a mutually convenient location in the UK or over video call. In early 2020, the
COVID-19 global pandemic occurred, which resulted in a UK wide ‘lockdown’ which meant
that I was unable to travel to meet any participants for the rest of my research. Unfortunately,
some interviews were cancelled, whereas some agreed to rearrange via video call or over the
phone. Although some researchers emphasise the limitations of video or phone calls for
research (Seitz, 2016; Weller, 2017), others find that carrying out interviews in person or
through phone/video is seen to be a somewhat personal preference and found that there are
not significant differences in the length or quality of information gained from interviews (Jenner
and Myers, 2019). I found that the shift to online interviews did not seem to negatively impact
their value.

I also acknowledge that my gender, race, age and religious identity impacts how interview
participants may have engaged with me and my research. For example, it is likely that I may
have had different responses in my semi-structured interviews, were I visibly Muslim or a male.
I also recognised that I was visibly younger than most of my participants, which may have had

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an impact on how they interacted with me, as they may have associated this with less
experience. Many of the interviews I carried out were with people who were the same race
and gender as me, which may have helped them feel more open to sharing their thoughts and
ideas. I also found that the power dynamics felt different when interviewing civil society actors
in comparison to civil servants. The interviews with civil society actors were more friendly and
relaxed, whereas civil servants tended to form more rigid boundaries on what they were willing
to discuss. I kept a reflexive diary during the interview process and an excerpt is included in
the appendix (See Appendix J).

4.4.4 Data Management

The documents collected and the transcriptions of the interviews, the consent forms, and the
researcher notes were all digitally stored. All data is backed up and stored electronically for
a minimum of ten years in an encrypted and password-protected format. In addition, the
computers this is stored on have sufficient security and anti-virus software installed. All data
will be backed up regularly and any confidential or sensitive data will be encrypted. This
archive includes the following:

1. Project Documents: University of Surrey research ethics and research code of

practice, data management plan, information for participants, participant consent
forms, interview questions, code book, and bibliography.

2. Primary Sources: UK Government strategy and policy documents, speeches, press

releases, UN documents, civil society consultation documents.

3. Collected Data: Interview recordings, transcripts and notes, researcher diary and
notes

4. Data Analysis: These documents will be analysed and stored on NVIVO, but also
Microsoft Excel and Word.

Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) was used for this thesis.
Broadly, CAQDAS enables a number of activities such as integrating, organising, exploring,
reflecting upon and interrogating data (Silver and Lewins, 2014: 44-45). However, there are
two dimensions of benefits of using CAQDAS. Firstly, CAQDAS performs well in assisting with
the management of data as well as analysing it (Jackon & Bazeley, 2019: 54). Secondly, the
software enables the quick retrieval of data on specific themes, and allows a quick assessment
of overlapping or interrelated concepts (Brinkmann et al., 2014: 37). It can also quickly identify
patterns, relationships, anomalies within the data and also compare subsets and cases. This
research initially used MAXQDA software, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I shifted to

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utilising the software NVIVO as this is what I was able to access during lockdown. Both
software’s were suitable for managing the data as well as provided added efficacy and
organisation when conducting the analytical method of Critical Frame Analysis, which will be
explained in greater detail in the following section.

Broadly speaking, NVIVO allowed the data to be explored efficiently and effectively at a
surface level, looking at language and the overarching theme of the material. Additionally, I
was able to easily make links and comparisons between data and integrate the collected data
by combining materials, as this software enables different materials to be analysed alongside
each other. For example, the National Action Plans (NAPs) and WPS NAP annual reports had
imagery that I was able to analyse alongside texts such as transcriptions and policy
documents. In addition, NVIVO also enabled integration of qualitative and quantitative
approaches. For example, NVIVO can produce numerical data on frequencies of particular
terms or words and where they are within a body of text, which provides a top-level indicator
of particular themes or priorities. The use of software in this research was not to create a
quantitative research project; rather it was to enhance rigour, increase the scope of documents
covered and benefit from the enhanced flexibility in analysing data compared to manual
methods.

NVIVO helped to organise the data collected by creating structures related to the research
objectives. For example, through organising ideas through conceptualisation and associations
of themes within the data and attaching codes and nodes to the data. In addition, I was able
to divide the materials into government and CSO data in order to compare these. In addition,
NVIVO enabled an exploration of the structure of materials, for example, in the security-
focused documents, where women or gender appeared, whether it was a priority or whether
it was buried. NVIVO also helped with the reflective process (Woods, Macklin and Lewis,
2016) as I could attach notes to the data as I coded it and write memos about how I interpreted
results within the software. In addition, I was able to map connections between and within data
in a clear and easily accessible way through the use of notes. Overall, NVIVO was a useful
tool for research transparency, replicability, reliability and enables a clear picture of the
research process.

4.5 Method of Analysis: Critical Frame Analysis

This section now turns to the analytical method employed in this study. Critical Frame Analysis
(CFA) provides the bridge between the data and the wider theoretical approach of this thesis.

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This section makes a particular methodological contribution in that it specifies how CFA can
be operationalised in the analysis of WPS and P/CVE policies, and gender mainstreaming in
security institutions more broadly, which has not been done before. A CFA can be used to
understand the flexibility of these agendas and explicate the way that the UK government has
organised and understood these concepts. Therefore, this section is divided into two parts,
firstly, CFA as a method and its value are discussed, then, secondly, the specificities of how
it was operationalised in this study is explored with a particular consideration given to how this
method has been developed, to pay attention to securitised, gendered and racialised
narratives produced by security institutions.

Framing is considered to be that when an individual recognises a particular event they tend to
employ ‘one or more frameworks or schemata of interpretation’ which ‘is seen as rendering
what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful’
(Goffman, 1974: 21) and a frame analysis method pays attention to the workings of these
frames. As with most methods, this has since been modified, added to and developed by
researchers to expand its analytical potential and applicability of this research method to new
areas (Hill, 2014). Of particular interest for this thesis has been the emergence of a particular
approach to frame analysis, Critical Frame Analysis, which emerged for the analysis of social
policy and in uncovering how European states address gender inequality (Verloo, 2006;
Verloo and Lombardo, 2007; Meier, 2008; Lombardo, Meier and Verloo, 2009). CFA combines
elements of social movements and policy theory, communication research, discourse analysis
and gender theory (Van Der Haar & Verloo, 2016: 4; Verloo & Maloutas, 2016: 1) and was
developed to address and analyse the discursive power dynamics of policy-making (Verloo,
2005). The value of this method is in its potential for ‘mapping the different ways an issue is
framed’ (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007:37). CFA allows texts to be systematically analysed for
the ways in which gender issues are framed, and ‘focuses on the creative process of
construction, analysing what gets constructed how and by whom’ and is a particularly useful
tool in considering how political goals such as ‘gender equality’ can be ‘stretched’, ‘bent’, ‘fixed’
or ‘shrunk in translation’ into policy (Meier, 2008: 157; Lombardo, Meier and Verloo, 2009: 1).
What makes CFA different from frame analysis is that the ‘critical’ stands for ‘explicitly paying
attention to the voice of actors (authors of texts and references in texts) and to their varying
power in diagnosis, prognosis, and call for action’ (Van Der Haar and Verloo, 2016).

This thesis draws upon Verloo’s (2005: 20) conceptualisation of policy frames that defines
them as ‘an organising principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a

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structured and meaningful policy problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly
enclosed’. Furthermore, policy frames are not only schemata for understanding reality but also
‘represent normative assumptions of which actors are often unaware’ (Choudhry, 2016: 410)
and are ‘specific constructions that give meaning to reality and shape the understanding of
reality’ (Verloo, 2005: 20). CFA understands that the creation of frames usually have two key
elements: the ‘diagnosis’, which is the ‘implicit or explicit interpretations of a policy problem
that emerge in the representations that socio-political actors offer of the problem’ and the
‘prognosis’, which are the solutions offered to that problem (Meier, 2008: 156). At its most
basic level, CFA, therefore, asks the following central questions:

1. What is diagnosed as the problem being addressed by the policy?

2. What is proposed as the solution in the policy?
3. Who are the actors involved and what is their relationship to the diagnosis
and prognosis?
4. Who defined this diagnosis and prognosis?

(Verloo, 2005)

As mentioned, a key feature of CFA’s value comes in its attention paid to the actors involved
in defining the diagnosis and prognosis of the framed problem, as this considers the power
dimensions at play in policy formulation. Therefore, the UK’s interpretation of the WPS agenda
and P/CVE policy can be seen as a response to constructed problems by an actor within a
particular context rather than as a purely pragmatic response to a given problem. By
unpacking the texts using a CFA, there is the potential for uncovering the influences that may
have led to a policy being framed in a particular way. The deconstruction of texts and
discourses that emerge from institutions of hegemonic masculinity is not only about what is
visible but it also about ‘’reading’’ what is not written, or what is ‘’between the lines’’ or what is
expressed as ‘symbols and in procedures’ (Kronsell, 2006: 109) and a CFA is a useful
analytical method for this. By recognising that hegemonic discourses are often the overarching
frames that steer actors shaping of an issue (Bacchi, 2009), are what produce and determine
the ‘truth’ that is available to us (Foucault, 1980) they are then what restrict alternative
solutions to problems. Furthermore, CFA allows particular attention to be paid to how actors
understand the concept of gender when framing a policy issue. Particularly for this thesis,
where gender is being mainstreamed, it is essential to apply a critical lens in order to unmask,
politicise and transform the systematic reproduction of asymmetrical power relations that
engender gender inequality (Jalušič, 2009: 59).

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Although CFA pays attention to the role of voice in policy texts, this thesis argues that without
combining the policy texts with elite interviews, only a partial account of the story is being told.
Framing does not occur in a vacuum, and therefore existing organisational structures and
interests should be considered (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo, 2009). However, I argue that
CFA in its current form is somewhat limited as a method in unpacking organisational or
institutional structures and dynamics. Verloo and Lombardo (2007: 40) acknowledge this
limitation of CFA by arguing that whilst it is useful in mapping policy discourses on gender, ‘it
is not equally useful for understanding why the existing frames have emerged in the form in
which they appear to the researcher’. This thesis builds upon CFA by paying attention to the
voices and experiences of those in the process of constructing and interpreting the frames. It
also draws on interviews to uncover some of the complexities of institutionalising those frames
beyond the key policy documents. The interview transcripts were not part of establishing the
policy frames (diagnosis, prognosis and call to action), that formulated the discursive analysis,
however, they were drawn upon to expose the voices of those included (and in some cases
excluded) in the policy framing process and contribute to the institutional analysis. That being
said, I do not attribute any specific intentions or bad faith by the actors involved in this policy
area themselves, but read the texts as being interlinked with wider discourses and
representational and institutional practices, that are what give them meaning and significance
(Doty, 1996: 147).

This thesis pays attention to institutional politics to determine the processes and influences
that have contributed to the construction of policy frames in specific ways and the complexities
of institutionalising those frames beyond the documents, which is beyond the current reach of
CFA. By investigating how and why those policy frames exist as they do, who was involved,
how they felt about it, and what prevented alternative constructions of the policy, this approach
provides a far more comprehensive understanding of the policy. In addition, how frames are
interpreted by the actors involved in the implementation of policies are also an essential
feature of determining the real impact of frames. A CFA, therefore, provides not only a rich
description of the content of policies, which can be analysed to identify the frames (implicit or
explicit) internal logic, it is also a useful analytical tool to expose policy inclusion and exclusion
and the roles and voices of actors within the framing process and in the representation of a
problem and its solution (Bustelo & Verloo, 2009: 162).

Overall, CFA is a valuable feminist analytical method and is becoming increasingly popular
amongst scholars studying gender. For example, Choudhry (2016) uses CFA in investigating

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the Council of Europe’s framing of violence against women, Leek (2018) in researching men’s
changing role in gender equality policies and Degani and Ghanem (2020) in exploring the
EU’s framing of migrant women. Yates (2018) uses CFA in their analysis of the framing of
family violence. More similar to this study, Krook and True (2010) use CFA to research gender
mainstreaming and gender-balanced decision-making and to understand norms as
processes, rather than as static. Also, of particular value for this research is Erikson's (2017)
work which begins to innovatively merge Feminist Institutionalism with frame analysis and the
tracing of institutional change in Swedish prostitution policy. This thesis builds on the linkage
of frame analysis with feminist institutionalism, specifically for the study of security policy.
Much of the current use of CFA is discussed in journal articles, which provide limited
explanation as to how the CFA was carried out. This thesis aims to add clarity on the
application of CFA in its application to the new area of ‘security policy’, and particularly WPS
and P/CVE, which has not been done before.

4.5.1 Operationalising Critical Frame Analysis for Investigating the Discursive and
Institutional Complexities of Women, Peace and Security

This section now turns to outline how CFA has been explicitly operationalised for this study.
In order to investigate the overarching research question of ‘does the UK’s interpretation and
institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 represent transformative change or instrumental
co-optation of the WPS agenda?’ this study has developed, altered and strengthened the CFA
approach to make it applicable to this question and research topic. The overarching analytical
process is outlined below, demonstrating the key aims at each stage of the analysis.

1. Analysing the key frames

a. Analysing the construction of a represented problem and solution offered in
regards to WPS. That pays attention to the prioritisation of specific issues,
problem holders and how you can measure a ‘successful’ policy intervention.
Considers how this is situated within a wider socio-political context. Pays
attention to policy changes (such as the shift to include P/CVE).
b. Considers how gender is understood and whether consideration is given to
intersectionality.
c. What approach to ‘gender mainstreaming’ is utilised

Critical Frame Analysis of key policy documents, speeches and press releases.

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 2. Understanding the drivers, and voices heard, in policy formulation processes
a. Investigating why the policy/policy shift occurred, what and who were the
drivers.
b. Considers the role of voice in defining policy problems (does civil society,
grassroots or the ‘problem holders’ have a voice in defining ‘problems’ and
proposing ‘solutions’.

Analysis of civil society and academic consultation reports and civil servant and
civil society actor interview responses.

3. Investigating the institutionalisation of frames

a. Investigates the influence of the cross-government problem and solution
framing and approach as it is (re) interpreted into departmental policy.
b. Considers the complexities of gender mainstreaming within security institutions
and the prioritisation of ‘problems’.

Analysis of MOD, FCO and DFID and HO selected policy documents and interview
responses.

4. Considering the intended and unintended consequences of framing

a. Analysing how framing sits within a wider system of gendered and racialised
hierarchies and narratives.
b. Reflects on the processes in which gender mainstreaming may be co-opted by
security institutions.

Discusses the findings in relation to the wider socio-political context, through the
theoretical lens constructed in chapter three.

This section now provides further detail about how the CFA of documents was conducted.
Firstly, the documents were inputted into NVIVO and organised into the three groupings
outlined above; (1) the UK’s governmental policy documents, speeches and press releases
regarding WPS (See Appendix F, section a), (2) civil society consultation and academic
reports and documents (See Appendix F, section b) and (3) the UK non-cross governmental

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mainstream documents related to WPS and or P/CVE (see Appendix F, section c). Then the
documents were analysed using a CFA and this section will explain the process of analysing
these documents in detail. This thesis built upon existing CFA practices in order to ensure that
the most appropriate method was employed to answer the research questions and the
theoretical framework was considered throughout the analytical process.

In order to analyse the ‘formal’ or ‘privileged’ story about WPS and the subsequent shift to
include P/CVE within that, the first steps were to undertake a broad level reading of the policy
documents, speeches and press releases on WPS which not only indicated some dominant
framings of WPS but also signified how and where the shift to include P/CVE was located.
The findings of this initial reading and analysis provided significant background data that was
used to begin the contextualisation and mapping of the UK’s engagement with WPS outlined
in chapter five. Then, in order to provide in-depth insight into the policy priorities and how WPS
and P/CVE is understood in this context a CFA was utilised on these documents. Following
the analysis of the UK’s overarching WPS approach, civil society and academic consultation
reports were analysed to determine where and how P/CVE is framed in the context of WPS,
in combination with interview data. It should be made clear that this did not form part of the
analysis of the UK’s policy problem definition, rather the aim was to highlight similarities and
differences between the problem defined by the UK government and that of civil society in this
space. Thirdly, an investigation into how the frames outlined in the first section have been
(re)interpreted into mainstream departmental policies and practices was conducted, again in
combination with interview data. Finally, the data analysis revealed in the three stages was
considered together and further analysed in correspondence with the theoretical framework
constructed in the previous chapter.

Sensitising Questions and Super-text

For the diagnostic aspect of the analysis of the UK’s policy, this thesis drew upon Bacchi’s
(1999, 2009) ‘what is the problem represented to be’ (WPR)? approach to the analysis of
policy documents. The underlying premise of Bacchi’s approach is that we need to ‘rethink
policy as a creative (productive or constitutive) process’ and ‘the underlying proposition in
thinking about policies as productive, or as constitutive, is that policies and policy proposals
give shape and meaning to the ‘problems’ they purport to ‘address’ (Bacchi and Eveline,
2010). Bacchi emphasises the necessity to unpack how and why particular constructions of
problems are framed in particular ways, and the impact this has on potential or possible policy
outcomes. By asking questions, such as, ‘how do public policies, through their problem

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representations, constitute the targets of policy, the general population and policymakers as
particular kinds of political subjects? How do they influence people’s conceptions of
themselves and of others? How do they influence and shape people’s embodied existence?
How would different forms of problematisation – other ways of representing the ‘problem’ –
create other kinds of political subjects and other futures? ‘(Bacchi & Eveline, 2010: 119 -120).
Therefore, the following questions by Bacchi provide structure to this analytical approach;

- What’s the ‘problem’ (for example, of ‘problem gamblers’, ‘drug use/abuse’, ‘gender
inequality’, ‘domestic violence’, ‘global warming’, ‘sexual harassment’, etc.)
represented to be in a specific policy or policy proposal?
- What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the ‘problem’?
- How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?
- What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences?
Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently?
- What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’?
- How/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, disseminated
and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, disrupted and replaced?

(Bacchi, 2012: 22)

Whilst these questions are essential in unpacking the diagnostic elements of the CFA, they
do not consider other critical elements related to the role of voice and the solutions offered.
The MAGEEQ CFA super-text template applies some of Bachhi’s sensitising questions in the
diagnostic dimension but also asks questions relating to prognosis, voice and how gender is
framed and is therefore considered one of the best examples of the utilisation of this analytical
method (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007) and thus provided the core structure of the sensitising
questions used for this study. For clarity, a ‘super-text’ is ‘diametrically opposed to the concept
of a “subtext”, enables the hidden significance of a text to be made explicit according to the
dimensions listed in the “sensitising questions” (Lombardo and Meier, 2008: 107) and allows
texts to undergo an in-depth analysis that results in disclosure of different dimensions of policy
frames.

A set of ‘sensitising questions’ were constructed to open code the documents (Bustelo &
Verloo, 2009: 162) and facilitate the identification of the general elements of a policy frame
(such as the diagnosis and prognosis), as well as the specific elements that allow a description
of the theoretical assumptions underneath policies. The sensitising questions/ super-text were

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formulated from Bacchi's (2009) 'what is the problem represented to be?' approach, Verloo
and Lombardo's (2007) Critical Frame Analysis and the reviewed literature and theoretical
framework; this can be seen in Appendix K. These sensitising questions are central to
uncovering how the discourses and frames in the UK’s policy documents more or less implicitly
express particular representations of problems that the WPS and P/CVE agendas are trying
to fix and what the solutions could be.

Coding and the Code Book

These sensitising questions were applied to each document and in order to manage and make
sense of the responses to the questions, I used a process of coding. The coding was both
inductive and deductive. Induction refers to the collection of data in order to strengthen or
problematise well-established theory, whereas deduction refers to specific observations that
are already based on existing theory or literature (Tavory and Timmermans, 2014: 5). A
combination of both is referred to as abductive analysis, which provides a ‘coherent
epistemological position that is centred on the relationship among theory, method and
observation’ (Tavory and Timmermans, 2014: 6). This ensured that the theoretical framework
presented in chapter three was considered throughout the analytical process.

By using a process of coding in the CFA, I was able to not only manage particular responses
to questions, such as ‘what is the problem’ or ‘why is it seen as a problem’, I was able to also
attribute these to particular frames and sub-frames. The codebook in Appendix L outlines the
key overarching frames (feminist transformative or gendered post-colonial), which helped
answer the overarching research question that asks does the UK’s interpretation and
institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 represent transformative change or instrumental
co-optation of the WPS agenda?. It is acknowledged that this research explores gendered
and racialised hierarchies and that this can appear in texts less explicitly and are often
intertwined within the grammars of politics. Gender and race are not always ostensibly
apparent in discussions of security strategy, yet hierarchies can be re-established through
ideas of self/other, protector/protected, secure/insecure, civilised/barbaric, for example, and
therefore it was important to code these as such. For example, when the question ‘where the
problem was presented to be?’ was asked of documents, it meant documents could be coded
as part of a self/other frame when documents predominantly considered insecurity as a
problem in countries other than the UK. Understanding and organising the responses to the
sensitising questions in this way helped the research uncover the wider representational and
institutional practices at play and apply the theoretical framework to the ‘answers’ to the

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sensitising questions. The full results created from the application of the sensitising questions
to the documents are not included in the thesis, as this is extensive and unnecessary, rather,
select results from the coding are included to illustrate the data in the appendix and quotes
from the documents are inserted into the empirical chapters to illustrate the key frames.

Visual Analysis
Images or visual representations are an ‘intrinsic part of political communication’ (Achilleos-
Sarll, 2020: 1643. Whilst CFA is typically applied to the wording within documents, this thesis
applied CFA to the images present in the UK’s NAPs, annual reports to parliament and
guidance notes. The first sub-question of this thesis asks ‘what, and where, is the problem
represented to be in the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242?’, whilst discourse is a
central dimension to this, due to the high numbers of images within many of the UK’s WPS
policy documents this could not be overlooked. As Bleiker (2018: 12) argues ‘images are
different to words (even if they are intrinsically linked to them), yet we still need words to make
sense of them’, therefore, the sensitising questions were applied to the images as they
contributed to a depiction and construction of the policy ‘problem’, the ‘problem holders’ and
the ‘problem solvers’. Alongside this, images were coded in a similar way to the texts to
uncover how women and men were framed within the images, the findings of which can be
found in Appendix F. This approach ensured that key data that contributed to the UK’s
construction of the problem representation was not overlooked. The introduction of visual
analysis to a CFA is a somewhat novel approach to how a CFA can be conducted.

Word Frequencies
Whilst not a fundamental aspect of this thesis’ method of CFA, this thesis also utilised
computer-assisted word frequency analysis to uncover the prioritisation or omission of
particular language in the UK’s framing of WPS, related to gender and sex. Word frequencies
were used to provide further evidence of the findings of the core CFA, rather than to find
frames through an ‘objective’ text analysis (David et al, 2011: 331). However, by revealing the
prioritisation of language of ‘women’ and ‘girls’ compared to ‘men’ and ‘boys’ and a lack of the
concepts of ‘masculinities’ and ‘femininities’, for example, this thesis is able to draw attention
to a limited understanding of gender and how this might constrain the transformative potential
of the UK’s approach to WPS. The use of word frequency analysis was applied in a very
specific way to further highlight the use of language around gender and sex and was not
applied across the documents. Word frequency analysis is not a common aspect of a CFA,

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however, this thesis uses this method to support and uphold the findings of the CFA rather
than introduce new information or framings.

Combining Document Analysis with Interview Analysis

Following the analysis of the documents using the sensitising questions, the interview data
was analysed in relation to the findings of the document analysis and with the theoretical
framework in mind. This enabled issues related to the role of voice within documents and the
influence of institutional cultures, norms and hierarchies on the framing of the policy problem
to be contextualised and uncovered. As the interviews were undertaken with civil servants, as
well as civil society actors, this thesis was able to reveal whose voices were heard in framing
the WPS and P/CVE policy problems and also how policy documents were interpreted and
institutionalised outside of the texts. As mentioned previously in this chapter, the use of
interview data here enables an understanding of why existing frames have emerged and in
the way that they have to be uncovered, which a CFA without combining this with interviews
could not do. Quotes from the interviews were inserted into chapter seven to illustrate and
provide evidence for the analytical arguments being made.

In summary, this thesis utilises and develops CFA as an analytical method. This thesis
provides a developed set of sensitising questions relevant to the analysis of gender
mainstreaming in security, particularly related to WPS and P/CVE. Furthermore, the
introduction of images as a feature of the CFA and the use of word frequency analysis to
further evidence the prioritisation and omission of the particular use of language related to
gender and sex have been used to enhance the rigour and reach of a CFA approach. The
combination of a CFA of texts with interviews has allowed further comprehension of how
institutional settings shape interpretations of international norms, in this case, the WPS
agenda. Overall, this section has demonstrated how CFA can be applied to gender
mainstreaming policy documents within security that might be replicated by other scholars
working on this research topic.

4.6 Conclusion
Exposing and exploring silences, difference, absence, oppression, and the power of
epistemology to reveal the politics and power dimensions at all stages of the research process
are key features of feminist inquiry but are also what makes feminist empirical research difficult
(Ackerly and True, 2008). This chapter contributes to a growing body of work that considers
the details of feminist work and how feminist IR research is conducted which enables feminist

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scholars to learn from one another (Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006: 1 - 2). The methodology
and research design outlined in this chapter presents the bridge between the ontological and
epistemological to the empirical aspects of this thesis. This chapter has demonstrated the
deliberately feminist nature of this research and how it fits within a wider political project aimed
at challenging inequality and bringing about social change. This chapter has communicated
the choices made in the research design and data collection processes and recognises that
these were neither neutral or objective. However, I have outlined how they were appropriate
and justified mechanisms in producing empirical evidence for this thesis. The development of
a CFA approach for investigating P/CVE and WPS is a novel contribution of this thesis and is
an especially useful tool in destabilising the ‘naturalness’ of presented policy problems. By
drawing on policy documents and elite interviews, this thesis has provided a more complete
view of the discursive and institutional dynamics of the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325
and 2242 than a discourse analytical approach alone.

The conclusion of this chapter also draws to a close the first half of this thesis, which has
considered the issues and debates on WPS, P/CVE and how they interact. This literature
review chapter provided rationale for the constructed theoretical framework that draws on
Feminist Security Studies, Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist Institutionalism and how it
will be used as lens to inform the analysis. This chapter has outlined how I collected the data
for this study and rationalised the approach taken. The second half will now turn to present
the findings of the empirical investigation into the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of
UNSCR 1325 and 2242. The first chapter in the second half of this thesis presents an overview
of the context in which P/CVE emerged as a key feature of its approach to WPS and maps
the UK’s formalised adoption of WPS. The following chapters then reveal the findings of the
Critical Frame Analysis of key documents and elite interviews. Chapter 6 presents the findings
of the Critical Frame Analysis of the UK’s WPS documents and addresses the key problem
framings regarding WPS and P/CVE. Chapter 7 then, by listening to the voices of those who
work on WPS and/on P/CVE as ‘insiders’ (civil servants) or as ‘outsiders’ (civil society actors),
presents the informal and formal institutional dynamics that have shaped the UK’s approach
to WPS and whose voices were heard in this process. Before this chapter then closes with a
brief investigation into the practical challenges of gendering P/CVE as this policy is
(re)interpreted and diffused further into mainstream policy and practice. Finally, chapter 8
concludes this thesis and provides some reflections and discussion on the shift to integrate
P/CVE within WPS.

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5.0 Contextualising and Mapping the UK’s Formalised Adoption of
UNSCR 1325 and 2242

The United Kingdom’s inclusion of Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) within

its Women, Peace and Security (WPS) policy architecture did not occur in a vacuum. In order
to understand the preconditions for the institutional change in the UK’s approach to WPS, to
include P/CVE, it is necessary to situate the case within the wider context. Section 1.1.3 in
the introduction to this thesis drew attention to the emerging global policy framework on gender
and P/CVE; however, this did not go into detail regarding the UK context. Hence, this chapter
begins to reveal the backdrop to this policy ‘problem’ and its framing and places the turn to
include P/CVE, as a feature of the WPS strategy, in the context of the institutions that give it
meaning and the UK’s approach to gender equality and P/CVE and Counter-Terrorism (CT)
efforts more broadly. Detailing the UK’s macro-level context of the wider policy engagement
and sentiments in these two distinct policy areas offers valuable insight into not only why this
shift occurred but also why particular conceptualisations of WPS and P/CVE have been
deployed. Additionally, the UK’s policy architecture and evolution on WPS and interaction with
WPS at the international level is mapped. This is significant as it provides detailed evidence
of the UK’s formalised adoption and institutionalisation of WPS. As this thesis draws on a
Feminist Institutionalism, this is all relevant to understanding the values, cultures, norms and
rules that shape the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 (Mackay, Kenny and
Chappell, 2010).

This chapter, therefore, proceeds in four steps. Opening the empirically oriented part of this
thesis, this chapter firstly introduces the UK’s governmental departments and units to provide
preliminary insight into the institutional context that WPS is situated within. Before then
scrutinising the UK’s WPS ‘feminist triangle’, which highlights the key actors and differing
voices heard in the UK’s WPS policy deliberations, formulation and implementation processes
(Woodward, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018). Secondly, by tracing the UK’s
engagement with gender equality and women’s rights through its international commitments
and domestic policy, this section identifies the UK as a ‘woman friendly’ state (Aggestam and
True, 2020: 144) but also reveals some of its limitations, such as the unequal nature of equality
legislation in the domestic context, particularly regarding the devolution of power to Northern
Ireland are discussed. Nevertheless, this section highlights how the UK has exhibited high
levels of sophistication in terms of gender awareness, albeit with some limitations, that make

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it more inclined to embrace UNSCR 1325 in a far-reaching manner (Joachim and Schneiker,
2012: 554). Thirdly, a brief overview of the UK’s history and policy on P/CVE/CT exposes its
prevalent position within the UK’s security context. The aim here is not to provide a detailed
analysis of the topics mentioned previously; instead, the objective is to familiarise the reader
with the institutional and policy background relevant to this thesis. The final section of the
chapter maps the UK’s use of National Action Plans (NAPs), alongside guidance documents
and annual reports, to reveal a robust, evolving and longstanding policy architecture on WPS.
Additionally, by plotting the UK’s interactions with WPS at the international level, this section
goes some way in revealing how the UK has sought to take a leadership role on WPS,
including but not limited to its Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI). This
section contributes a detailed case study of the UK’s history, formalised adoption and
engagement with WPS which contributes to the existing feminist literature on WPS. The
subsequent chapter analyses the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 in more detail.

5.1 The UK’s WPS institutional Structures

Within the UK government, three key departments take a level of ownership over the UK’s
WPS agenda, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International
Development (DFID) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD)2. At a lower level, the Conflict,
Security and Stability Fund (CSSF) and the Stabilisation Unit (SU) also play a role in
implementing and interpreting the UK’s approach to WPS. A brief overview of these
departments and their strategic priorities is provided to familiarise the reader with the
institutional context in which WPS is embedded. This is also relevant for unpacking the norms
and cultures that may constrain, or provide opportunities for, the interpretation and
implementation of WPS. Section 5.1.2 then turns to explore the UK’s ‘feminist triangle’, that
uncovers and scrutinises the role of WPS actors in government, civil society organisations
and epistemic communities in the UK’s WPS policy deliberations and formulation processes
(Woodward, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018).

5.1.1 Introducing the Key Actors

The role of civil servants within the three key departments (FCO, DFID and MOD) have been
critical for the interpretation and implementation of the WPS agenda. It is important to note
here that the Home Office does not own any aspect of the current NAP (2018-2022) and is

2 The majority of the data collection for this thesis and the interviews were undertaken before the
merger of the FCO and DFID to create the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO),
in September 2020. As such, they are treated as separate departments.

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therefore not deemed a key actor in terms of WPS. However, the Home Office does have
ownership over the implementation and strategic direction of the UK’s counter-terrorism
strategy CONTEST abroad, through the Joint International Counter-Terrorism Unit (JICTU),
at the time of data collection (HM Government, 2018a: 71), and this is why it is also introduced.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The FCO is the lead department on the UK’s interpretation and implementation of the WPS
agenda. The FCO’s main objective is to promote ‘the United Kingdom’s interests overseas,
supporting our citizens and businesses around the globe’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
n.d). The FCO’s key responsibilities are to safeguard ‘the UK’s national security by countering
terrorism and weapons proliferation, and working to reduce conflict’, ‘build the UK’s prosperity
by increasing exports and investment, opening markets, ensuring access to resources and
promoting sustainable global growth’ and lastly, to support ‘British nationals around the world
through modern and efficient consular services’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, n.d). The
FCO’s key responsibilities of security, economic prosperity and supporting British nationals
abroad are often engaged with through diplomatic means with other states and international
institutions and through its network of embassies and consulates, which has over 14,000
people in nearly 270 diplomatic offices (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, n.d b). As the
FCO is the leading department in the UK’s international relations, it is crucial to consider its
history. The FCO was created in 1968 through the merging of the ‘Foreign Office’ and the
‘Commonwealth Relations Office’ (CRO) in 1968, with the latter being merged with the
‘Colonial Office’ two years prior (Smith, 2018). Whilst the FCO no longer deals with ‘colonies’,
it does manage relations with the Commonwealth3 (The National Archives, n.d). The legacy
of the British empire is not easily disentangled from the UK's international identity and the
FCO, particularly as the commonwealth remains a central aspect of the department and
maintains connections to past British territories.

The FCO has made commitments to gender equality through WPS and other programmes
such as the flagship Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) (gov.uk, no date
b). In April 2017, the FCO appointed a Special Envoy for Gender Equality, Joanna Roper,
whose aim was to ‘spearhead the UK’s efforts to deliver a coherent international approach to
ensuring the rights of women and girls, working closely with Whitehall departments, civil
society, academics and other governments’ (gov.uk, 2017). However, the FCO Special Envoy

3Which is mostly made up of countries that were formerly part of the British Empire, except for
Rwanda and Mozambique.

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for Gender Equality was only in position from April 2017 until July 2020 (gov.uk, 2020b), before
being replaced in early 2021 by Alicia Herbert OBE (gov.uk, n.d c). Despite this role being
unfulfilled for a substantial period of time, this position highlights commitments to gender
equality through the FCO’s work. The FCO is the lead actor in interpreting the WPS agenda
in the UK, which is significant as it has the potential to influence where the UK’s approach to
WPS is deemed to be applicable.

The Department for International Development

DFID is the governmental department associated with promoting development overseas and
was established in 1997. DFID takes the role of leading ‘the UK’s work to end extreme poverty’
by ‘tackling the global challenges of our time including poverty and disease, mass migration,
insecurity and conflict’ (Department for International Development, n.d). This department
focuses on ‘building a safer, healthier, more prosperous world for people in developing
countries and in the UK’. This department focuses on the UK’s international commitments to
the UN Global Goals for Sustainable Development (UK Government, 2015), aid, international
development of economic growth, international development policy in fragile and conflict-
affected countries, improving the lives of girls and women through education, family planning
and ‘preventing violence against girls and women in the developing world’ and helping to
prevent climate change. Its priorities include ‘strengthening global peace, security and
governance’. That being said, international development, and DFID’s work, has not been
without criticisms based on its ties to colonial history and its securitisation (Duffield, 2005), as
DFID and its aid influence is concentrated in former British colonies (Seekings, 2020), which
ignites a neo-colonial sense of paternalism and responsibility. Whilst it is not within the scope
of this thesis to go into detail on the post-colonial nature of DFID’s work, it is important to
consider how, again, this may influence where the UK applies the WPS agenda.

DFID has made several commitments to gender equality, such as the 2011 Strategic Vision
for Women and Girls and its 2007 Gender Equality Action Plan. Additionally, the 2015 Aid
Strategy promised to continue to prioritise the needs of women and girls as ‘no country can
develop successfully if half its population is left behind’ (Department for International
Development and HM Treasury, 2015: 18). As of 2018, DFID has a core document that puts
women and girls at the centre of its development assistance called the ‘Strategic Vision for
Gender Equality: A Call to Action for Her Potential, Our Future’ (Department for International
Development, 2018). Overall, DFID, in comparison to the other departments mentioned here,

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appears to have the strongest and longest-standing commitments to gender equality and
mechanisms in place to ensure that gender equality is considered in its work.

The Ministry of Defence

The MOD is the government's military arm which is made up of permanent and casual military
and civilian personnel. The UK regular forces are composed of the Royal Navy, British Army,
Royal Air Force and Strategic Command. The MOD works for a ‘secure and prosperous’ UK
with ‘global reach and influence’, and will ‘protect our people, territories, values and interests
at home and overseas, through strong armed forces and in partnership with allies, to ensure
our security, support our national interests and safeguard our prosperity’ (Ministry of Defence,
n.d). As the most militarised and securitised department within the three key departments that
work explicitly on WPS, the MOD raises particular concerns for the instrumentalisation and
securitisation of women and women's rights in its interpretation of WPS. In recent years there
has been some headway in promoting institutional change in the MOD, such as enabling
women to apply for all roles in the military, including ground close combat roles (British Army,
2018). In 2015, the MOD introduced a diversity and inclusion strategy, and in 2018, it released
its updated Diversity and Inclusion Strategy 2018-2030 ‘A Force for Inclusion’, which
highlighted that ‘defence is increasingly challenging itself to become a more diverse and
inclusive organisation. Not just because it’s the right thing to do from a moral perspective,
there is a clear business imperative for acting: diversity and inclusion (D&I) contributes directly
to operational effectiveness’ (Ministry of Defence, 2018: 9). Whilst the MOD is aiming to
improve the diversity of its workforce; it remains one of the least representative government
departments in terms of gender and ethnic minorities (gov.uk, 2019a).

The MOD has made a number of formal institutional commitments to gender perspectives and
WPS. For example, in 2015, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff General Sir Gordon Messenger,
in his role as ‘Gender Champion’ for the MOD took formal steps to demonstrate the UK’s
leadership in implementing UNSCR 1325 into the military by launching the WPS Chief of
Defence Staff Networks (CHODS). The CHODS network is an international network of
countries working on WPS and the purpose of the network is to ‘support member states’ efforts
to implement the WPS agenda and work to build capacities and increase opportunities for
women at the local, national and regional levels’ and ‘by sharing our progress and practice
across nations, we can hold each other accountable in reprioritising this agenda to make
actual change’ (WPS CHODS Network, 2020). In 2019, the UK held several Human Security
Advisers Course associated with this network, with UK students and others from Afghanistan,

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Bangladesh, Bosnia, Canada, Ethiopia, Iraq, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone,
Somalia and the USA (WPS CHODS Network, 2019). Although the position of Chair of this
network has since been taken over by the Canadian Chief of Defence Jonathan Vance, the
UK had a significant role in establishing the network. Furthermore, in 2018, the Defence
Academy and the MOD designed and delivered its first Military Gender and Protection Adviser
(MGPA) Course, which was designed in response to UNSCR1325. The course was attended
by 28 UK officers but also nine international officers from Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda,
Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, USA and Canada (Defence Academy of the UK,
2018). The CHODs Network, CHODS human security course and the MGPA course are
illustrative of the UK’s ambitions to take a leadership role in terms of WPS and the military.

The Home Office

As previously mentioned, the Home Office is not a key actor in terms of WPS, as it does not
have ownership over the NAP or WPS strategic direction. However, it is worth introducing this
department as the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy is owned by the Home Office. The Home
Office is the lead government department for ‘immigration and passports, drugs policy, crime,
fire, counter-terrorism and police’ and ‘plays a fundamental role in the security and economic
prosperity of the United Kingdom’ (Home Office, no date). Their single departmental plan
outlines within its objectives to ‘reduce extremism and the harm it causes’ and ‘reduce
terrorism’ which includes to ‘stop terrorist attacks in this country and against UK interests
overseas by disrupting those who wish to engage in terrorist activity (contributes to SDG 16)’
(Home Office, 2019). As mentioned previously, the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST
guides its approach to counter-terrorism abroad through the Joint International Counter-
Terrorism Unit (JICTU) (HM Government, 2018a: 71). As the Home Office plays a key role in
determining the UK's approach to CVE and CT both at home and overseas, it is interesting
that the Home Office was not included as a key actor in the latest NAP, as it now includes the
P/CVE.

The Conflict, Stability and Stabilisation Fund and The Stabilisation Unit
The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) was launched in April 2015 and is a cross-
government funding instrument that uses both Official Development Assistance (ODA) and
non-ODA funding (HM Government, 2019: 8). The CSSF aims to support and deliver activity
to tackle instability and prevent conflicts that threaten UK interests (Conflict Stability and
Security Fund, no date) and is an important driver of the ‘Fusion Doctrine’ outlined in
the National Security Capability Review. The ‘Fusion Doctrine’ is a ‘collective approach to

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national security’ based on the principles of deploying ‘security, economic and influence
capabilities to protect, promote and project the UK’s national security, economic and influence
goals (HM Government, 2018). The CSSF operates in over 70 countries, delivering 90
programmes (HM Government, 2019: 8) which have to adhere to the International
Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014 (HM Government, 2019: 3). The CSSF has been
used as a funding mechanism to support WPS objectives outlined in the NAP. For example,
in May 2020, the CSSF sought bids for research projects that aimed to explore how best to
support civil society and women’s rights organisations delivering WPS objectives in fragile and
conflict-affected states in Africa (specifically Nigeria, South Sudan and Somalia) (CSSF,
2020). In May 2021, the CSSF announced a specific gender, peace and security funding
stream, which aims to address emerging trends and gaps within the WPS agenda (UK
Government, 2021). The shift to using the language of ‘gender, peace and security’ rather
than WPS is interesting and coincides with the increasing use of the language of 'gender' in
WPS documents, which will be explored in the following chapter. Furthermore, the creation of
a specific funding stream is a promising development for the future of WPS work. All CSSF
funding, whether ODA or non-ODA, needs to comply with the International Development Act
(2014) on gender equality.

Another key actor is the Stabilisation Unit (SU). This cross-government civil-military-police unit
is funded through the CSSF and provides expertise to ‘build stability, prevent conflict and meet
security challenges internationally’, the unit supports the ‘integrated co-ordination of UK
government activities in fragile and conflict-affected states by being a centre of expertise on
conflict, stabilisation, security and justice’ (Stabilisation Unit, n.d). This unit draws on civilians
who are members of the Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG) and permanent staff. The SU
supported the creation of the latest NAP (2018 – 2022). Overall, these units are exemplary of
the UK institutionalising at the security-development nexus. Development actors are involved
in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction in collaboration with the security efforts
of FCO. Whilst a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention is important, this integration
can increase the risk of co-optation of development for security purposes.

This section has briefly introduced the key actors who play a central role in interpreting,
implementing and institutionalising UNSCR 1325 and 2242. Whilst the aim here was not to
fully analyse their engagement with WPS, it was to consider these departments and units’
macro-level strategic objectives and priorities, differing policy focuses, histories, and
institutional dynamics that may affect how they understand the WPS agenda and thus

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influence how they engage with it (Thomson, 2017). This helps to uncover the ‘logic’ of political
institutions (Krook and Mackay, 2011). This contextualisation has highlighted some of the
institutional complexities of the UK’s engagement with WPS, such as its colonial history, the
MOD’s potential to securitise the WPS agenda, the centrality of CT approaches within the
Home Office and an increasingly interconnected security-development approach by the CSSF
and the Stabilisation Unit. The institutional context provided here allows rudimentary insight
into the complex terrain WPS travels through as it gets (re)interpreted and implemented
beyond the NAPs.

5.1.2 The UK’s Women, Peace and Security ‘Feminist Triangle’

This section now turns to explore the actors within the UK’s ‘feminist triangle’; this concept is
utilised to scrutinise the differing voices heard in the UK’s WPS policy deliberations and
formulation processes (Woodward, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018). As
mentioned in the theoretical framework of this thesis, how institutions engage with ‘feminist
triangles’ of knowledge, such as ‘femocrats’, civil society actors and academics, can influence
how transformative a gender mainstreaming project can be (Woodward, 2015; Guerrina,
Chappell and Wright, 2018). This section examines and maps the ‘insiders’, who are the civil
servants, including ‘femocrats’ and gender experts and the ‘outsiders’, the civil society actors
and feminist academics or epistemic communities (O’Sullivan and Krulišová, 2020) who
influence WPS, in the UK context. Figure 3 below provides an overarching diagram of the
main actors involved in shaping the UK’s approach to WPS, they of course have differing
levels of power and influence over the process.

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Figure 3: The UK's Feminist Triangle

UK Government WPS Actors

- Cross-government working
group on WPS
- Ministers
- Baronesses, Lords and MPs
- All Party Parliamentary Group
(AAPG) on WPS
- WPS Champions and Gender
Advisors

The UK’s
Feminist
Triangle on
WPS

Civil Society Organisations Epistemic Community

- Gender Action for Peace and - London School of Economics
Security Network (network for the (Centre for Women, Peace and
UK but also includes international Security)
members) - Kings College London
- Other organisations who are - Other feminist academics,
consulted more informally scholarship and expertise

The leading ‘insiders’ on WPS policy are a group of civil servants from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID) and the
Ministry of Defence (MOD) who are clearly identifiable, WPS-dedicated members of staff.
They populate the cross-government working group on WPS. This small group is responsible
for driving the formulation of the National Action Plan and its implementation into departmental
policy and programming, evaluating its progress and reporting this to senior ministers. The
group meets across the year to approach WPS in a cohesive way across departments.

The FCO is the main ‘owner’ of WPS policy in the UK, the decision for FCO to be the leading
department is a political choice, and as the diplomatic arm of the government, this
demonstrates an affiliation of WPS with diplomacy, global influence and international affairs.
Nevertheless, the WPS working group promotes implementation across security, defence,
diplomacy and development. Within each of the departments, the WPS actors sit institutionally
with different areas of policy. Within the FCO, WPS sits under the Gender Equality Unit,
although interviews revealed that the WPS team was deemed small compared to what needed
to be done (UKGO-04). The FCO also has a small but growing number of gender advisors ,

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although interviews suggested that they were thinly spread across the vast number of
locations in which FCO operates (UKGO-09). These gender advisors aim to ensure that
minimum standards (on gender equality) are being met, that programmes are compliant with
legislation and that they are doing no harm. If possible, they try to promote gender
transformative programming, but interviews revealed that this was deemed much harder to
do, and in practice what they can do remains more at the micro-level. Within DFID, WPS is
associated with the conflict, security and justice team (this is rather than the inclusive society
and gender team). Although DFID is primarily a development-focused department, this
highlights a more securitised and conflict-related understanding of WPS. Whilst DFID has
specific WPS actors in Whitehall, there are also Social Development Advisors (SDAs) who,
amongst other objectives, promote gender perspectives in DFID programming and activity.

Within the MOD, WPS sits structurally under the ‘Human Security’ unit, a small team that
promotes WPS amongst other strategic objectives such as children in armed conflict (CAAC),
Protection of Civilians (POC) and human trafficking. The implications of UNSCR 1325 being
linked to human security will be explored further in chapter seven. The MOD also has an
explicit network of WPS ‘champions’ and military gender and protection advisors (MGPA) and
focal points (MGPFP) across its department which can be seen in figure 4 below. These actors
are not formally considered as part of the WPS ‘feminist triangle’ as they are not responsible
for the UK’s cross-government understanding of WPS and the NAP, yet they are significant
for its diffusion and implementation within the MOD. Interviews revealed, however, that as the
MOD has limitations on how many people it can have in the British Army by law if they want
more fulltime gender advisors they have to give up other jobs. To overcome this, people
become ‘double-hatted’ as gender advisors and another role which highlights a somewhat
limited value attributed to having fulltime gender advisors. The Stabilisation Unit (SU) also has
a small number of gender and conflict advisors and the SU runs a gender, conflict and stability
course to enhance knowledge on issues such as WPS in fragile and conflict affected states
(FCAS). Together, these actors liaise with other civil servants, senior leadership, country
offices to encourage them to engage with WPS in their work, programming and operations.
They demonstrate a strong institutional commitment to gender and WPS and are a feature of
the UK’s ‘feminist constellation’ (Woodward, 2003, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright,
2018).

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Figure 4: Ministry of Defence WPS Organisational Chart

(UK MOD, 2019: 7)

Turning our attention back towards the WPS cross-government working group, it comes
together to try to align the work across departments. That being said, the departments (FCO,
MOD and DFID) have different strategic objectives and approach WPS in differing ways. For
example, one interviewee highlighted that the departments ‘have different political priorities
and the framework of those departments work really differently, so trying to align that, that’s
the main challenge’ (UKGO-13). Thus, ensuring a consistent and mutual approach to WPS is
complex depending on which departments the actors are embedded within. The positioning
of WPS actors across these three departments creates space for negotiation and enhances
the potential to integrate WPS into the everyday practices within them. In this instance, as the
WPS actors are embedded within departments that have their own institutional complexities
and strategic priorities, they are able to tailor their efforts to those spaces and work with
‘mainstream’ colleagues from within the department. They are able to ensure that the WPS
NAP is (re)interpreted and institutionalised into their departments in ways that are relevant
and practical. That being said, the WPS working group is institutionally siloed rather than being
embedded within the UK’s broader conflict policy and peacebuilding work. This speaks to

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broader debates regarding how best to gender mainstream, whether it should be done by
‘normal policy actors’ (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007) or whether this would disrupt the
emergence of a ‘feminist triangle’ by spreading responsibility across institutions (Moser and
Moser, 2005; Jacquot, 2015). Whilst it is not within the scope of this thesis to examine the
effectiveness of the positioning of the actors within the cross-government working group on
WPS and make a judgement on where they should be embedded, their existence indicates a
robust level of WPS institutionalisation.

The working group is also responsible for producing the annual reports to parliament that
evaluates the progress of the NAP over the course of its implementation period. These reports
are an important way to monitor and evaluate the work of the UK government on WPS and
provide detail as to how the plan is implemented. These will be discussed in more detail in
section 5.4. The working group is also influenced and led by ministers, such as Lord Ahmad
of Wimbledon, the UN and Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Preventing Sexual
Violence in Conflict, who was mentioned in the interviews as a ‘great senior leader’ and
‘brilliant advocate’ (UKCS-04). The special representative is for PSVI, not WPS specifically,
and as will be explored later in this chapter, the UK has a strong leadership role in PSVI at the
international level and this approach to leadership is seemingly stemming from this.
Interestingly, senior leadership on WPS within the UK has largely been led by males, as
another example, William Hague (Foreign Secretary William Hague, 2012b, 2012a). Similarly,
within the MOD, an interview highlighted that there are strong male champions within the
network that are important actors for implementation, but getting people on board is still a
struggle. The leadership of males in WPS or ‘male champions’ of WPS can potentially increase
the credibility of WPS and work to normalise male advocacy in this space and highlight that
WPS is not only a women’s issue. Within the FCO, interviews made it clear that senior
leadership, such as ambassadors, high commissioners and ministers are able to provide a
different level of influence to that of the working group and are a significant feature of WPS
diffusion. Additionally, since 2019, HRH The Countess of Wessex has played a role in
championing ‘WPS and PSVI’ (royal.uk, n.d) which has involved meeting with women
peacebuilders and survivors of sexual violence in conflict. This is significant as it marks a new
era in WPS diplomacy in the UK after William Hague’s high profile PSVI initiative with Angelina
Jolie (gov.uk, n.d. b) and is a feature of the UK’s global ‘leadership’ identity on WPS.

The staffing of the working group is also significant for providing opportunities and constraints
for the institutionalisation of WPS. A core constraint revealed by the interview process was
that there is a high level of turnover within the working group, resulting in the loss of

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institutional memory and challenges for incoming staff inheriting policy and strategic direction
that they have less ownership of. A high turnover of staff is not unusual for the UK civil service
but is an institutional constraint to successful implementation of WPS. This was particularly
apparent when I was investigating the policy shift to integrate WPS with P/CVE, as a number
of interviewees could not discuss the WPS P/CVE policy formulation process as they were not
in their positions at that time. Along a similar line, one interviewee discussed that the
development of relationships with ‘mainstream’ actors is a fundamental aspect of WPS
success. This would allow WPS to align with mainstream strategies (UKGO-04), however, this
process of relationship building is constrained by changing actors. A number of respondents
suggested that the working group has a really strong working relationship, which made
working on WPS easier. Although, the constraints of limited human resources in this area
inhibits macro-level change. One additional consideration relates to the gender balance of the
working group. When the interviews took place, the cross-government working group on WPS
was wholly made up of women and an interviewee stated that they thought this was ‘definitely
a symptom of the interest levels of across government’ (UKGO-05). Despite male leadership
in this area, this exposes how WPS remains affiliated with women and ‘women’s issue’ and
reproduces narrow understandings of the agenda in practice.

It should also be made clear that whilst I argue that those working on WPS could be
considered ‘femocrats’, in that they are operating within the governmental institution in pursuit
of feminist strategies (Chappell, 2002; Holli, 2008), they are not necessarily feminists. One
interview (UKGO-02) indicated that the majority of the members of the working group were
generalists and did not have a background in WPS. This reflects wider institutional cultures
within the UK’s civil service that deem expertise in a specific area of policy not necessarily a
requirement for successful policy-making. That being said, in order for WPS to be
transformative, it should be led by feminist actors who are advocating for gender equality and
are prepared to engage with the wider debates, complexities and challenges of gender
mainstreaming in security spaces and this should not be over-simplified (Cohn, 2004, 2008;
Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings, 2004; Sylvester, 2009; Hudson, 2010). Similarly, it should also
be acknowledged here that gender experts who support WPS work are not necessarily
‘feminist’ either. Whilst they may push for gender perspectives, this is not necessarily about
gender equality. Overall, the staffing of the WPS working group offers some opportunities but
the high turnover of staff and lack of prior gender expertise may be constraining its potential.

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A more informal feature of the UK’s WPS institutional architecture is the All-Party
Parliamentary Group (AAPG) on Women, Peace and Security. All-Party Parliamentary Groups
are ‘informal cross-party groups that have no official status within parliament. They are run by
and for Members of the Commons and Lords, though may choose to involve individuals and
organisations from outside parliament in their administration and activities’ (UK Parliament,
n.d). The formal membership of the AAPG is made up of 14 MPs of which one is male, and
30 members of the House of Lords, of which 3 are Lords (male) and 27 are Baronesses
(female) (See Appendix M). This demographic data once again exposes a limited
institutionalisation of WPS that it is about women’s issues rather than about the gendered
structures of peace and security that requires male and female leadership and policy
development. This group provides a platform for the discussion and analysis of WPS issues
in the UK, and brings together parliamentarians, policymakers, civil society actors and some
academics. For example, the AAPG on WPS hosted a meeting with these stakeholders to
inform the UK’s position on the high-level review of UNSCR 1325 in 2015 (Foreign &
Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development, et al., 2015). It also hosts
events related to thematic WPS issues such as COVID-19 and country and regional specific
WPS issues such as Yemen and the Middle East (GAPS, 2021b). Additionally, the AAPG
hosts the release of the UK annual reports to parliament on WPS, whilst also enabling the
CSO network Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS) to present its shadow report on
the UK’s work on WPS for the last year, which provides a crucial tool in holding the UK
government to account (GAPS, 2021a). This AAPG indicates a broader commitment to the
implementation of WPS, outside of the cross-government working group on WPS.

Moving on to the ‘outsiders’, the cross-government working group on WPS undertakes

systematic and consistent consultation with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on matters
related to WPS. The locus of civil society consultation on WPS is channelled through the
Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS) network by the UK government. The network
was established in 2006, at the same time as the UK’s first NAP and acts as a membership
organisation for other CSOs, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and experts and
works to undertake collaborative advocacy, campaigning and research. GAPS is composed
of 19 members (See Appendix N) and acts as a critical friend to the government. Interviews
revealed that GAPS has a strong and positive working relationship with the UK government.
The UK government funds GAPS to consult with UK-based and international CSOs and
grassroots organisations internationally, although the extent to which this consultation is
representative of the women who are the ‘targets’ of the UK’s WPS policy remains unclear.

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GAPS draws legitimacy from its representative capacity by amalgamating numerous voices
to reflect a broad consensus amongst their members and presents this to the UK government.
GAPS produces yearly ‘shadow reports’, usually released at the same time as the working
group reports to parliament, that analyses and provides recommendations for the UK’s work
on WPS. A list of shadow reports, consultation documents and recommendations can be
found in Appendix F. These documents provide valuable critical engagement, although, due
to their close relationship with the UK government, their ability to strongly criticise may be
somewhat limited. Whilst the top-level engagement with CSO’s on WPS is through GAPS, the
UK government also occasionally consults with individual organisations on specific thematic
areas, although these relationships are seemingly less formal. GAPS is an explicitly feminist
organisation that works across development, security and peace-building and the consistent
consultation with CSOs through this network during NAP formulation and throughout its
implementation demonstrates how CSOs play an embedded role in the UK’s ‘feminist triangle’
and play a role in holding the ‘national machineries’ to account (Walby, 2005). However, whilst
GAPS are systematically consulted, this does not necessarily equate to advocacy efficacy.
This will be explored in greater detail in chapter seven, through an investigation into the voices
heard in the P/CVE WPS policy shift.

The UK government and the cross-government working group on WPS also has a consultative
relationship with feminist academics and experts, who can be regarded as an epistemic
community. The London School of Economics (LSE) Women, Peace and Security Centre is a
leading academic centre for WPS in the UK. It was launched in 2015, with the support of the
UK government as a feature of the UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative,
(Hague et al., 2015). The centre has received substantial funding from the UK government
amongst other funders (LSE Centre for Women Peace and Security, no date; Baroness
Verma, 2015). The WPS centre produces research into the WPS agenda and policy. Of
particular relevance to this thesis, the WPS Centre contributed recommendations to the
development of the 2018-22 NAP based submissions by members of the centre and academic
colleagues (LSE Centre for Women Peace and Security, 2017b) and facilitated a workshop in
partnership with GAPS to explore the relationship between P/CVE and WPS that brought
together participants from civil society, UK government officials, international governmental
and non-governmental organisation representatives, researchers and academics (LSE Centre
for Women Peace and Security, 2017a). Interviews also revealed that King’s College London
also has an influential relationshop with the WPS working group (UKGO-02). This, alongside
a wealth of research on WPS carried out by academics not affiliated to the LSE WPS Centre,

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provides another critical dimension to the work of the UK government and are the final piece
of the UK’s ‘feminist triangle’.

Overall, this section has mapped the ‘feminist triangle’ or the actors who populate the ‘feminist
constellations’ (Woodward, 2003, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018) that aim to
institutionalise WPS in the context of the UK. The UK’s cross-government working group has
a number of institutional constraints, such as its high levels of female staff, high turnover staff,
lack of resources and potentially their marginalised position within departments. However, the
cross-government approach allows a coordinated approach to WPS, that can then be applied
into their own departmental contexts in a relevant and useful way. That being said, there is a
risk that they may interpret and operationalise WPS in ways that may lead to co-optation due
to those departments' institutional biases and structures. The analysis reveals a small number
of gender advisors (or advisors whose role includes gender) across the departments at the
programming or operational level, indicating an opportunity for enhanced gender
mainstreaming at these levels. The analysis of senior leadership on WPS reveals that this
tends to be male-dominated, but there is a solid commitment being made to push this agenda
from the top. Regarding civil society and epistemic community engagement, there is evidence
of strong commitment by the UK in providing platforms for engagement with ‘outsiders’ in WPS
decision-making. However, the extent that CSOs voices and academic input is reflected in the
UK’s WPS documents and overall approach to WPS remains unclear. Particularly as security
and defence remains a challenging space for public scrutiny due to its secretive nature and
governments tend to play a much stronger role in agenda-setting in these locations (Guerrina,
Chappell and Wright, 2018: 1040). The analysis presented here demonstrates a robust and
well-populated feminist triangle that provides significant opportunities for the feminist triangle
model to push for institutional change. It finds that there are a number of institutionalised
practices for WPS and is ‘a normalised and stable part of the decision making process, with
the quality of this practice being maintained through the investment of resources (human and
financial) and consistent monitoring’ (Minto and Mergaert, 2018: 209). Although, it is still
unclear as to how far the UK’s commitments are translated into practice.

5.2 A Women-Friendly State? The UK’s Commitments to Gender Equality and

Women’s Rights
Before analysing the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242,
this section draws attention to the UK, as a ‘women-friendly state’ regarding its promotion of
gender equality globally (Aggestam and True, 2020:144). This section thus explores the UK’s

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wider international and domestic commitments to gender equality and women’s rights to
expose the context in which its approach to WPS has emerged, whilst also highlighting some
of the UK’s gender equality blind spots.

Whilst gender equality was made part of international human rights law as far back as 1948,
through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly, 1948),
the next milestone in the international gender equality framework was the 1979 Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW provided
a comprehensive framework to guide all rights-based action for gender equality and equality
in outcomes, rather than an equality in opportunities (United Nations General Assembly,
1979). In 2013, General Recommendation no 30. (GR30) on women in conflict prevention,
conflict and post-conflict situations was adopted, which ensured the applicability of CEDAW
before, during and after conflict and affirmed its links to WPS. The UK ratified CEDAW in 1986,
which committed it to its articles, rights, and procedures. However, the UK has faced criticism
for complacency in its record on sex-based discrimination and for its significant silences on
CEDAW (Chinkin and Gordon, 2011). Whilst commitments such as CEDAW are illustrative
of the UK’s international commitments to gender; it does not always necessarily translate into
substantive implementation and change (Chinkin and Gordon, 2011), such as in Northern
Ireland, which will be explored in more detail later in this section. Following CEDAW, in 1995,
the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (PFA) (United Nations, 1995) resulted in pivotal
commitments and objectives for women's rights and promoted the establishment of national
machineries for women and gender mainstreaming. The UK again reaffirmed its commitments
to gender equality by supporting this declaration.

Following this, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were introduced in
2000, which were eight goals that UN member states agreed to achieve by 2015. These goals
included eradicating poverty and hunger, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health,
and establishing measurable objectives for these. However, the MDGs applied only to
'developing countries'. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have since superseded
the MDGs. Interestingly, the UK narrates itself as one of the leaders in creating the 2030 SDGs
in 2015, as it stated that ‘the UK was at the forefront of negotiating the SDGs and will be at
the forefront of delivering them. The UK lobbied hard to make sure the SDGs support the
continuation of work undertaken through the MDGs’ (gov.uk, 2019c). In particular, the UK
‘strongly advocated for the inclusion of Sustainable Development Goal 5 (SDG5), which aims
to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls by 2030’ (Women and

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Equalities Committee, 2017). In Theresa May’s first speech to the UN, she made reference to
the UK’s role in the implementation of the SDGs and specifically in continuing to ‘champion
the rights of women and girls’, in regards to education and tackling female genital mutilation
and sexual violence in conflict (May, 2016). In this instance, not only did the UK affirm its
commitments to the SDGs, but it also proudly narrated itself as a leader with a particular
emphasis on gender equality. Regionally, the 2011 Council of Europe Convention on
Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, better known as
‘the Istanbul Convention’, established a legal framework to protect, prevent, prosecute and
eliminate violence against women and domestic violence. Whilst the UK signed this
convention in 2012, it did not ratify it. However, the UK does report on its progress towards
ratification and 'reaffirms' its ‘strong commitment to tackling VAWG’ (Home Office, 2020). After
almost ten years, the lack of ratification is illustrative of a lack of commitment to legal action in
this area. Nevertheless, together these commitments mean that the UK can be considered a
strong advocate for gender equality at the international level, despite some limitations.

As touched upon in the section on DFID, the UK also has mechanisms to ensure that its
development work overseas considers gender equality. In 2014, the UK passed legislation
International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014, which is an act to promote gender
equality in the UK’s development and humanitarian assistance to countries outside the UK
and demonstrates a commitment to considering gender equality through all UK aid spending
(‘International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014 (c.9)’, 2014). The UK has made
commitments to spending 0.7 percent of Gross National Income on aid each year
(‘International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act 2015 (c. 12)’, 2015).
This Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding is the governments ‘overseas aid budget’
used to support and deliver four strategic objectives from the UK’s 2015 aid strategy: to
strengthen global peace, security and governance, strengthen resilience and response to
crises, to promote global prosperity and to tackle extreme poverty and to help the world’s most
vulnerable (HM Government, 2020). The International Development (Gender Equality) Act
2014 made it a legal requirement for gender equality to be considered in all ODA funding,
which is a significant measurable commitment.

Domestically, whilst the UK has legislation on gender equality, there is no constitution to

enshrine its principles. The 2010 Equality Act is the central legal instrument for equality in the
UK that bans unfair treatment and helps to achieve equal opportunities in the workplace and
wider society (Equality Act 2010). It expands gender equality to a concept of equality that

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encompasses all dimensions of discrimination. The 2011 Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED),
which replaced the Gender Equality Duty 2006, consists of a gender duty and specific duties
for England, Scotland and Wales that ensure that public bodies have to consider all individuals
when carrying out their day to day work (Public Sector Equality Duty 2011). The UK’s domestic
gender equality machinery is comprised of the Government Equalities Office (GEO) and the
independent Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC). The GEO is the institutional
mechanism for overseeing and promoting the UK's delivery on its commitments to CEDAW.
However, the GEO asserts that they work across government, particularly with The Home
Office, Department for Education, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government,
Department for Work and Pensions, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy,
Department for Transport, HM Treasury, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and
the Ministry of Justice (Government Equalities Office, 2021). It is clear that the GEO is a
domestic facing office and does not work closely with the FCO, MOD or DFID. However, the
GEO narrates the UK as an ‘international trailblazer and exceeding our international
commitments by’ ‘leading on gender equality developments globally’ (Government Equalities
Office, 2019:5).

Interestingly, the political context of devolution of power in the UK influences the applicability
of gender equality policy and legislative matters across the UK. The devolved governments of
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are responsible for a range of policy and legislative
matters and whilst the UK government is responsible for national policy, equality legislation is
generally a reserved matter. The 2010 Equality Act applies in Wales and Scotland, although
they also have their own mainstreaming arrangements. The 2010 Equality Act does not extend
to Northern Ireland as it has its own separate equality legislation, the ‘Northern Ireland Gender
Equality Strategy 2006 – 2016’, for which the Northern Ireland Executive is responsible (UK
Government, 2011: 64; Department for Communities, 2021). Disappointingly, this has not
been updated since its timeframe lapsed. Northern Ireland’s other notable arrangement on
gender and equality mainstreaming is the Statutory Duty on Equality, mandated in Section 75
of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. As the 2010 Equality Act does not extend to Northern Ireland,
the eighth periodic CEDAW report of the UK recommended that the UK ‘revise its legislation
in Northern Ireland to ensure that it affords protection to women there on an equal basis with
women in other administrations of the State party’, as currently, the protections of women in
Northern Ireland are not on the same footing as those in other parts of the UK (Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2019). Under the convention, the UK has
an obligation to ensure the effective application of CEDAW to all of its state regardless of

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devolution agreements, yet this is complex. This is significant also for the application of WPS
to Northern Ireland, which will be explored further in the following chapters.

Overall, the UK has demonstrated a clear commitment to formal institutional change regarding
gender equality through its interactions with the global policy framework on gender equality
and domestic equality legislation. These international, regional and domestic commitments
play a role in shaping the UK’s identity as a global leader on gender equality. Despite key
limitations such as its failure to ratify the Istanbul Convention or the weakness of domestic
equality legislation, particularly in Northern Ireland, it has a strong self-narrative as a global
leader in promoting gender equality. This section has provided the context for the challenges
of the domestic application of WPS, particularly the effects of devolution on gender
mainstreaming initiatives, particularly in Northern Ireland. Overall, the UK can arguably be
seen as a ‘women-friendly state’, as it has taken global leadership in promoting gender
equality in global affairs (Aggestam and True, 2020:144). This makes the UK an interesting
site of inquiry, as its interpretation of UNSR1325 and 2242 could be deemed as an extension
of its ‘women friendly’ practices.

5.3 The UK’s Approach to Countering Violent Extremism

Again, as this thesis is particularly concerned with the P/CVE shift within the UK’s approach
to WPS, this section provides a brief overview of the UK’s interactions with violent extremism
and terrorism and its policies, strategies and legislation taken to counter these threats. This
section thus pays attention to the conditions in which P/CVE was able to be integrated with
WPS. 'Terrorism' and 'violent extremism' have been narrated as a significant threat to the UK's
security; for example, the MI5 website states that ‘terrorism is the biggest national security
threat that the UK currently faces’ (MI5, 2020), which has firmly placed P/CVE/CT as a
predominant feature of the UK’s security strategy and priorities. However, the UK has a long
and complex history with ‘terrorism’. Between 1969 and 1998, over 3,500 people died in the
UK as a result of Irish-related terrorism (HM Government, 2009: 10). Additionally, there have
been transnational terror attacks on the UK and its citizens, such as the bombing of Pan Am
flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988 and the 9/11 attacks that killed 67 British citizens in the US
in 2001 (UK Government, 2009). In particular, 9/11 became a pivotal moment for counter-
terrorism in the global North (Staniforth and Sampson, 2013: 10). As a result, efforts to prevent
and counter any future attacks increased, particularly from Islamic extremism, including the
UK’s commitment as an ally in the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2003, the Joint
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) was established to analyse and assess threats to

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international terrorism at home and overseas and amalgamates counter-terror expertise from
numerous government departments, agencies, and the police (Joint Terrorism Analysis
Centre, n.d).

Since 9/11, there have been many more terror attacks as well as terror plots foiled. However,
some of the most notable (or most publicised) terrorism events in the UK and targeted at
British citizens, affiliated with Islamic extremism, have been the 7/7 attacks on the London
transport network in 2005 (British Transport Police, 2015). In 2014, the rise of the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, ISIL, IS, Daesh) in Iraq and Syria was seen to pose a threat to the
UK’s national security based on the high number of people radicalised and recruited to join
the organisation in Iraq and Syria (gov.uk, no date d). In 2015, 30 British citizens were killed
on a beach in Tunisia in a terrorist attack (gov.uk, 2020a). In 2017, three separate key terror
attacks occurred in the UK (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2017). Firstly,
a ‘lone wolf’ style attack on Westminster Bridge killing five. Secondly, the bombing of an Ariana
Grande concert at Manchester Arena, killing 22 including children and teenagers. Lastly, an
attack at London Bridge carried out by three perpetrators killed eight. Whilst Islamic extremism
receives high levels of media and policy attention, the threat of terrorist acts in and related to
Northern Ireland has not disappeared. For example, in September 2020, JTAC reported that
the threat level from terrorism in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland is substantial,
whereas the threat to Northern Ireland from Northern Ireland related terrorism is at a higher
level of severe (gov.uk, 2020c). Additionally, in recent years there has been increased
recognition of the threats of far-right extremism in the UK. For example, the murder of MP Jo
Cox in 2016 and the murder of a Muslim worshipper near a north London Mosque. Following
incidents such as these, the Met assistant commissioner, Neil Basu, revealed that ‘a third of
plots foiled by police and security services relate to right-wing ideology’ and is the ‘fastest-
growing threat’ (Dodd and Grierson, 2019). Nevertheless, all of these incidents, and the
attention paid to them, has resulted in terrorism and violent extremism being a central feature
of political and public discourse on security in the UK.

As a result, numerous pieces of legislation have been introduced to counter and prevent such
terror threats or acts. For example, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001), which
allowed for detention without trial (later overturned by the courts); the Prevention of Terrorism
Act (2005), introducing the “control order” (also overturned); the Terrorism Act (2006), that
extended the detention of suspects without charge from 14 to 28 days; the Terrorism Order
(2006), enabling the Treasury to freeze the assets of suspects; the Counter-Terrorism Act

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(2008), under which police were permitted to continue questioning suspects after charge; the
Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act (2010); the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures
Act (2011), the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) and the Counter Terrorism and
Border Security Act (2019). For Innes, Roberts and Lowe (2017: 257) new legislation has
become ‘an almost ritualised part of the societal response to major terrorist attacks’ and has
been highly reflexive. Alongside this legislation, the UK government introduced its CONTEST
(derived from COuNter TErrorism STrategy (Omand, 2010: 86) strategy in 2003, a counter-
terrorism strategy separated into four workstreams: Protect, Prepare, Prevent and Pursue.
The details of this strategy were not made public until 2006, and revised versions were
released in 2009, 2011 and 2018. The four key workstreams objectives are defined as follows
in the 2009 CONTEST document;

• Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks

• Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism
• Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack
• Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact

(HM Government, 2009: 13)

The CONTEST strategy remains the central statement and vision of the UK’s efforts to counter
terrorism and violent extremism. It provides a broad framework for who and what is deemed
a threat and the best course of action to minimise that threat and ultimately serves as a
platform for action, which affects lives in the UK and abroad. The drafting of this strategy and
its inception sparked high levels of debate across public, academic, civil society, and politics
about its nature and its consequences, particularly for marginalised communities, as
mentioned in chapter two. Alongside the UK’s domestic CT framework, the UK has engaged
in international cooperation on the matter, such as by signing 18 of the 19 international legal
instruments in dealing with terrorism (UNODC, no date; United Nations Office of Counter
Terrorism, 2020) (See Appendix O). Additionally, the UK also works with regional and sub-
regional organisations on combatting terrorism, such as the European Union (EU), the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE)(Pierce, 2019).

Prevent
However, of particular interest for this thesis is the UK’s ‘Prevent ‘strategy. This strategy was
deemed one of the first practical examples of CVE in 2005 (Frazer and Nünlist, 2015) and the
UK arguably represented something of a ‘market leader’ in counter-terrorism laws, as Roach

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(2011: 309) argues Australia borrowed heavily from British counter-terrorism responses. The
UK’s approach to Prevent has been revised over the years. In 2006, the strategy focused on
‘tackling the radicalisation of individuals’ (UK Government, 2006) and focused on Islamic
extremism. It aimed to do this by attempting to address the ‘structural problems in the UK and
overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities and discrimination’, to
deter terrorists and those who encourage others to become terrorists by ‘changing the
environment in which the extremists and those radicalising others can operate’ and finally, by
‘engaging in the battle of ideas – challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify
the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so’
(UK Government, 2006, 1 - 2). In 2009, the strategy aimed to ‘challenge the ideology behind
violent extremism and support mainstream voices, disrupt those who promote violent
extremism and support the places where they operate, support individuals who are vulnerable
to recruitment by violent extremists, increase the resilience of communities to violent
extremism and address the grievances which ideologies are exploiting’ (HM Government,
2009: 83). This strategy again focused heavily on Islamic extremism by arguing that ‘the
greatest terrorist threat we currently face is from terrorists who claim to act in the name of
Islam and who seek to recruit people to their cause from Muslim communities around the
world’ and ‘at this stage much Prevent activity takes place with Muslim communities. But the
principles which are the basis for this work can apply to different contexts too’ (UK
Government, 2009). It is clear that the foundations of the UK Prevent strategy are implicitly
focused on Muslim communities, which has resulted in much controversy and critique of the
initiative, as outlined in chapter two.

The Prevent dimension of the 2009 CONTEST strategy made clear an intention to apply this
policy abroad. The rationale being that ‘the inspiration for much of the terrorist ideology are
overseas’ and ‘terrorists from or resident in the UK have at times been radicalised as well as
trained overseas and some communities here are closely connected to their countries of
origin’ and states that the government will ‘engage more with diaspora communities in the UK,
to better understand the links with their countries of origin’ (UK Government, 2009). Also, this
Prevent strategy made explicit that the FCO ‘will lead international Prevent work with other
countries, notably Pakistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the US’ (UK Government,
2009). Despite the controversies and critiques to ‘Prevent’ domestically, this strategy applies
the same principles to CONTEST abroad. Additionally, the complicated nature of P/CVE and
the work of DFID was discussed here as it was stated that ‘the primary purpose of DFID’s
work is poverty reduction’ which is ‘not formally part of CONTEST’ (HM Government, 2009:

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85). Although, the strategy claims that DFID’s work can contribute to the aims of CONTEST
by ‘addressing the underlying social and economic grievances that can make communities
vulnerable to extremist messages’ (HM Government, 2009: 85). In 2011, the Prevent strategy
was again updated. This document stated that ‘the Prevent programme we inherited from the
last Government was flawed. It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote
integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist
ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation,
funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that Prevent should have
been confronting’ (UK Government, 2011a). Whilst this appears to be reflexive of the
problematic aspects of past Prevent strategies, the 2011 Prevent strategy was not without its
own problematic features. The 2011 strategy aimed to ‘respond to the ideological challenge
of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it’, to ‘prevent people from being
drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support’ and ‘work
with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address’
(UK Government, 2011a). Which did not appear to be a radical shift from past strategies.
Additionally, the 2011 strategy explicitly defined extremism as ‘the active opposition to
fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the
mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (UK Government, 2011a). This
strategy aimed to separate out the ‘community-based integration work from the more direct
counter-terrorism activities’ (Dawson and Godec, 2017).

In 2015, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 contained a duty on specific authorities
to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and as
such, extends much deeper into society. There is separate guidance for ‘England and Wales’
and for ‘Scotland’, and does not extend to Northern Ireland. The UK’s Counter-Extremism
strategy was also introduced in 2015 that focused explicitly on extremism rather than terrorism
but aimed at tackling both violent and non-violent extremism (HM Government, 2015). In 2018,
the UK introduced its latest CONTEST strategy and the Prevent strand again shifted. This
strategy deemed the purpose of Prevent ‘is at its heart to safeguard and support vulnerable
people to stop them from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’ and extended Prevent
‘to supporting the rehabilitation and disengagement of those already involved in terrorism’…
‘in a similar way to programmes designed to safeguard people from gangs, drug abuse, and
physical and sexual abuse’ (UK Government, 2018). This again was an interesting shift that
made intervention in suspected ‘violent extremists’ lives about their vulnerability and a need
to protect them as individuals. While the CONTEST strategy is largely focused on counter-

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terrorism in the domestic sphere, the UK applies its CONTEST strategy abroad and is
implemented through JICTU (the Joint International Counter Terrorism Unit). As the 2018
strategy outlines that the UK government now ‘bring together expertise from across
government in the Joint International Counter-Terrorism Unit (JICTU), a joint Home Office and
Foreign and Commonwealth Office unit launched in April 2016, which provides strategic
direction to our work overseas’ (UK Government, 2018). This demonstrates that counter-
terrorism is approached in a cross-government way, and sits at the nexus of international and
domestic policy.

Overall, P/CVE/CT has been a dominant feature of the UK’s security agenda since 9/11. The
approach to P/CVE/CT has shifted in numerous ways in an attempt to enhance the success
of the strategies over the years. However, CONTEST and Prevent remain controversial and
embedded with racialised underpinnings, critiqued for its suspicion of the Muslim community
and for securitising social and development spaces, as outlined in chapter two. Policy on
P/CVE has been by no means unequivocal but remains a central feature of the UK’s security
landscape. This section highlights that the integration of CVE into WPS did not emerge from
nowhere and reveals that CVE efforts have been shaped by highly racialised, militarised and
securitised norms that are not necessarily conducive to gender mainstreaming. The aim of
this section was not to conduct an examination of the UK’s approach to P/CVE, but was to
provide background knowledge of this policy space and how P/CVE sits within the UK’s
broader approach to security.

5.4 Mapping the UK’s Policy on Women, Peace and Security

As explained earlier in this chapter, the UK can be seen as a ‘women-friendly’ state in that it
has made a number of international, regional and domestic commitments to gender equality.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that the UK has been a long-standing advocate for WPS at the
international level and has developed four NAPs on WPS since 2006. This section of the
chapter contributes a detailed mapping of the UK’s cross-government policy architecture on
WPS and its interactions of WPS at the international level, before the following chapter utilises
a Critical Frame Analysis to unpack the UK’s framing of WPS in the documents and speeches
outlined here.

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5.4.1 A Framework for Implementation: National Action Plans, Annual Reports and
Guidance Notes
Whilst the UK’s first official NAP on WPS was released in 2006, the UK’s first attempt at
introducing a gender mainstreaming approach to its foreign policy was made in 2004. The
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) released the policy paper ‘Inclusive Government:
Gender Mainstreaming into Foreign Policy’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2004), which
made an explicit reference to UNSCR 1325 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2004: 5).
Jack Straw introduced the document and highlighted that mainstreaming gender was a key
component for improving policy-making. However, this document has been critiqued for
endorsing a ‘highly utilitarian approach to the inclusion of equality into the external relations
agenda’ (Guerrina, 2012). Nevertheless, this could be considered as the beginning of the UK’s
formal policy relationship with UNSCR 1325. In 2006, the UK released its first ‘National Action
Plan’ on WPS, which has been claimed to have been in response to Kofi Annan’s report on
UNSCR 1325 in 2004 in which he called for full implementation of the resolution at the national
level, as well as a result of pressure from UK civil society experts and activists for a formal
implementation framework (Joachim and Schneiker, 2012: 539 - 540). The UK has since
evolved through three more iterations of NAPs, which can be seen in table 4 below.

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Table 4: The UK’s National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security

NAP Key Framework/ Strategic Focus Key Actors Time

Outcomes Countries Period
NAP I Five key areas 0 HMG (does not N/A
(2006) • UK support to the United Nations determine which
(Influence at UN Security Council departments,
and UN operations) except MoD is
• Training and Policy within HMG mentioned in
(Gender training, female training and
personnel on missions but only policy)
for conflict locations)
• Gender Justice including Gender
Based Violence (Post-conflict)
• Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration
• Working with Non-Government
Organisations

NAP II Four levels of action 3 Implementation 4

(2010 – • National action (not domestic but Afghanistan, of the NAP by years
2013, implementation at an international Democratic FCO, MOD, HO,
2012 level) Republic of the DFID and
revision) • Bilateral action (conflict or post Congo (DRC) Stabilisation Unit
conflict countries) and Nepal.
• Regional Action (MENA region) Plus Regional
• Multilateral action (multilateral Action in MENA
and regional bodies, such as UN)

NAP III Four pillars plus building national 6 FCO, DFID and 4
(2014 – capacity Afghanistan, MOD joint years
2017) • Participation of women in peace Myanmar, the ownership with
processes Democratic Stabilisation Unit
• Prevention of conflict and Republic of and other
violence against women and girls Congo, Libya, government
• Protecting the human rights of Somalia and departments
women and girls Syria. regularly
• Addressing women’s and girl’s consulted.
needs in Relief and Recovery
• Building National Capacity

NAP IIII Seven Strategic Outcomes 9 FCO, DFID and 5

(2018 – • Decision-making Afghanistan, MOD joint years
2022) • Peacekeeping Myanmar, ownership with
• Gender-based violence Democratic support from
• Humanitarian Response Republic of Stabilisation Unit
• Security and justice Congo, Iraq,
• Preventing and countering violent Libya, Nigeria,
extremism Somalia, South
• UK capabilities Sudan and
Syria.

The first NAP signified the formal adoption of UNSCR 1325, and whilst it was a short
document, only two pages long, it was a strong statement of intent (Guerrina, 2012). The first

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half of this document focuses heavily on how the UK could support the UN Security Council’s
work, and the second half turns to the UK’s capabilities in foreign contexts and ensuring that
the MOD has gender awareness and training and emphasises the need for women in decision
making. This document focused on five key areas, outlined in 12 bullet points and did not have
any focus countries. This first NAP utilised language of ‘gender perspectives’ and ‘gender
justice’, although this can be considered as essentially synonymous with women and 'women’s
issues', as there was no mention of men in any aspect of the document (UK NAP, 2006). The
dominant framing of the problem was the lack of women’s participation, although this was
primarily ‘top-down’ as it focused more on UN operations and the UK’s military and security
actors. Whilst there was a small mention of working with non-governmental organisations, this
was limited. Women in conflict spaces were also narrated mainly as victims rather than active
agents. The first NAP had limited guidance for implementation and was an approach to gender
mainstreaming that appeared to be highly integrationist.

Following this NAP, a second iteration was released in 2010 that covered the years 2010 –
2013. This NAP was revised in 2012, to ‘reflect new challenges on Women, Peace and
Security, in particular following the Arab Spring' and the NAP was 'expanded to include, for
the first time, a Regional Action plan for the Middle East and North Africa’ (UK Government
2012 – News Story). The 2010 – 2013 NAP (2012 revision) was far more detailed than the
2006 NAP and divided its commitments into four sections of action; national, bilateral, regional,
and multilateral. Additionally, this NAP introduces specific bilateral action for the countries of
Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nepal that appear to be a precursor to
the label of ‘focus countries’ used in later NAPs. The purpose of this NAP was ‘to strengthen
our ability to reduce the impact of conflict on women and girls, and to promote their inclusion
in conflict resolution’ (UK NAP, 2012: 4). The dominant approach to WPS set out in this NAP
was about enhancing the participation of women and the protection of women, particularly
from sexual violence in conflict, which is, again, a primarily integrationist approach to gender
mainstreaming. However, it hints at a ‘difference’ approach in recognising women’s particular
vulnerability to sexual violence in conflict. This NAP also introduced the concept of
‘prevention’, although this was mostly constrained to publicly challenging sexual and gender-
based violence and in a minor way strengthening women’s NGOs and supporting Nepal’s
implementation of WPS (UK NAP, 2012: 46 – 47). Whilst this NAP is structured around
location, domestic action was again largely limited to the UK government’s work in
international spaces and the problem location was confined to conflict spaces in the majority
world. This NAP is the only NAP that refers to the Home Office regarding the Home Office-led

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strategy on ‘Violence Against Women and Girls’ (UK NAP, 2012: 13). During this NAPs
implementation period, much of the UK’s WPS efforts focused on the Preventing Sexual
Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI), which will be explored in more detail later in this section.

Following this, the UK government released the third iteration of its NAP on WPS in 2014. This
NAP ran from 2014 to 2017 and was published alongside a ‘Country-Level Implementation
Plan’ that outlined how the UK would implement the NAP in six focus countries Afghanistan,
Burma, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Libya, Somalia and Syria. This NAP serves
‘to ensure that women and girls are at the centre of all our efforts to prevent, resolve and
respond to conflict’ (UK NAP, 2014: 1). Again, this was not a transformative approach to
gender mainstreaming as it focuses on integrating women and girls into existing security
structures and practices, with some recognition of their distinct experiences. This NAP’s
strategy was structured around the four WPS pillars; participation, prevention, protection and
relief and recovery, as well as ‘building national capacity’. This shift in approach demonstrates
a reflexive approach to WPS and its expanding reach to new ‘focus countries’. It was also the
first NAP to make reference to men and boys as perpetrators, allies and victims, which
highlights an expansion of the WPS as a framework, which will be explored in more detail in
chapter six.

During this NAP implementation period, in 2015, Baroness Verma made a statement at the
UN that outlined eight new UK commitments to WPS and made the UK's first explicit link
between countering violent extremism and WPS. The speech explained that ‘the UK will
ensure that our overseas work to counter violent extremism includes upstream activity
targeted specifically at women. Women will be at the centre in the delivery of programming of
overseas extremism work, both nationally and locally’ (Baroness Verma, 2015). The other
commitments included elevating the voices of women in conflict and ensuring their active
participation, funding commitments including $800,000 additional funding to support research
at the Centre for Women, Peace and Security at the LSE, to enhance gender sensitivity and
to provide WPS training for UK military and to increase the number of gender advisors in the
UK military, ensure gender-sensitivity in all early warning and joint conflict analysis and
assessment tools by September 2016, to drive the PSVI initiative, to champion the Roadmap
to Action to Protect Women and Girls in emergencies and to continue to provide technical
support to other governments to develop, implement and measure the impact of their own
Action Plans on WPS and will help Iraq and Afghanistan implement their action plans. These

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commitments provide a broader understanding of the UK’s WPS approach, which goes
beyond the NAP policy documents.

The fourth iteration of the UK’s NAP on WPS was introduced in 2018 for the implementation
period of 2018 - 2022. This NAP states that it ‘sets out how the UK Government will integrate
a gender perspective into its work to build security and stability overseas, protect the human
rights of women and girls, and promote their meaningful participation in conflict prevention
and resolution’ (UK NAP, 2018: 3). This NAP thus introduces a ‘gender perspective’ as a more
fundamental approach to WPS, alongside its commitments to ensuring women’s participation
and protection. This NAP also demonstrates a shift as it makes a clear link to gender equality
as an essential feature of building lasting peace and security (UK NAP, 2018: 3). This indicates
a subtle shift in the UK’s approach to gender mainstreaming as it acknowledges gender as a
power structure. This will be explored in more detail in chapter six. Furthermore, unlike the
previous two NAPs this NAP runs for five years rather than four. Additionally, the format of this
NAP focused on ‘Strategic Outcomes’ rather than the pillar structure. There are seven
strategic outcomes; decision-making, peacekeeping, gender-based violence, humanitarian
response, security and justice, preventing and countering violent extremism and UK
capabilities. This NAP was the first NAP to reference CVE as a feature of the UK’s WPS
strategy, and it was dedicated its own strategic outcome. During this NAP timeframe, the UK
government also introduced guidance notes on implementing some of the strategic outcomes.
The first released was on 'Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism' in October 2019,
with three more released in February 2021 on 'Peacekeeping', 'Gender-based Violence' and
'Humanitarian Response'.

Alongside these NAPS, the UK has also systematically published annual reviews or reports
to parliament that provides a level of accountability of the UK’s work on WPS, indicators for
success, and an account of its work with civil society. These documents are in Appendix F
and are a key aspect of the formal policy structures that demonstrate the UK’s interpretation
of UNSCR 1325 and 2242. They also demonstrate considerable institutional investment in
monitoring and evaluating WPS at the cross-government level. A more detailed and critical
analysis of the policy framing in these documents is provided in the next chapter, chapter six.

Overall, it is clear that the UK has made a strong (at least rhetorical) commitment to the WPS
agenda since 2006. It has constructed a policy framework for its implementation, although the
extent to which this is valuable for the actors implementing WPS is yet to be considered. This

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section has demonstrated that the NAPs are not fixed and should be considered ‘living’ policy
tools in that they are able to change based on shifting priorities and influences as well as
internal and external institutional dynamics, which can be both a positive and negative for its
transformative potential (Barrow, 2016: 249). The following section now turns to explore how
the UK has interacted with WPS at the international level, to demonstrate its policy priorities
but also how WPS has become part of the UK’s ‘soft power repertoire’ (Achilleos-Sarll, 2020:
1650). This is important as it begins to consider the UK’s institutional identity regarding WPS
and how that may play a role in the level of engagement with UNSCR 1325 and subsequent
UN Security Council resolutions on the WPS thematic area.

5.4.2 Championing Women, Peace and Security Internationally

The UK has had a long history of shaping and influencing the UN, particularly as one of its
founding members (United Nations, no date). The UK’s positionality in the creation of the UN
is important for understanding sentiments of ownership and leadership in its relationship with
the organisation. However, it is also important to contextualise the UK’s role with the UN in
recent years. The UK is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5),
alongside China, Russia, France and the US and holds veto power. The UN Security Council
is responsible for ‘the maintenance of international peace and security’, it has 15 Members,
and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States
are obligated to comply with Council decisions’ (United Nations, 2015). Despite the UK holding
a significant position within the Security Council, this has not been without criticism or
questioning. For example, the UK, alongside France, has had its ‘great power’ status
questioned in recent years and therefore, its position as a permanent member was also
questioned (Mahbubani, 2016). Other members such as Japan and Germany contribute more
funds to the UN than the UK (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2020). Although the
UK is one of the largest contributors to the UN’s regular budget, in 2020, its net contribution
was $128,119663, and this equates to 4.567% of the budget, which is lower than the US at
22%, China at 12.005%, Japan at 8.564% and Germany at 6.090% (United Nations
Secretariat, 2019). Arguably, the Security Council has failed to adapt to the changing world
that has seen decolonisation and the rise of globalisation and of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa), and the MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey).
Despite these changes, members from Africa, Latin America and the Arab states remain
largely at the perimeters of the Security Council (Soderberg, 2015:40). Tardy and Zaum, argue
that the UK’s activism in the Security Council, which is demonstrated in the relatively high
number of resolutions that they draft, is a basis in which to justify their permanent position in

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the Council (Tardy and Zaum, 2016: 121). Although the UK has a somewhat lower level of
material contributions compared to some other members, the UK has a significant amount of
‘diplomatic capital’ in which it uses to detract from this deficiency (Ralph, Gifkins and Jarvis,
2020: 172) as the UK relies on its diplomatic expertise, reputation for competence and its
networks to influence the Security Council, which are of particular importance in a post-Brexit
world (Gifkins, Jarvis and Ralph, 2019:1350).

The UK has sought to construct itself as a leader and expert on WPS (Achilleos-Sarll, 2020:
1650); this section now highlights commitments to WPS beyond the core implementation
framework discussed in the previous section. The UK was the first permanent member of the
UN Security Council to adopt a NAP that was explicitly for WPS implementation and has also
co-sponsored the UNSCRs on the WPS thematic area. Additionally, UK representatives have
made a number of high-level statements at the UN Security Council to advocate for WPS
(See: Ambassador Peter Wilson, 2014, 2015; Baroness Verma, 2015; Ambassador Matthew
Rycroft, 2016, 2017; Ambassador Karen Pierce, 2018b, 2018a, 2019b, 2019a; Lord Ahmad,
2020; James Cleverly MP, 2020). The UK has also made strong financial, funding
commitments to gender mainstreaming initiatives in peace and security. It has been among
the top-five donors to UN Women since the inception of the organisation and between 2011
and 2019 it has donated an aggregate of $211.52 million USD (UN Women, no date). The UK
has also funded a number of WPS initiatives or programmes, such as a $1 million of new
funding to the creation of the UN Global Acceleration Instrument (GAI) to drive forward WPS
work (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Baroness Anelay, et al., 2015) and in 2019, the UK
pledged £800,000 to enhance local women’s perspectives in peacebuilding processes to the
UN Women’s Peace and Humanitarian fund, which is alongside the approximately $3 million
it has provided over the three years prior to that (Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Conflict
Stability and Security Fund, 2019).

In 2020, the UK announced a new UK-funded protection framework which is ‘the first
international guidance to be developed to specifically protect women peacebuilders’ and
dedicated £1 million of new funding to the Women Mediators across the Commonwealth
(WMC) Network, which is an independent group of 50 women mediators, hosted by Non-
Governmental Organisation Conciliation Resources (Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
James Cleverly MP, 2020; James Cleverly MP, 2020). Ahead of UNSCR 1325’s 20 year
anniversary in 2020, the UK and Germany invited member states, UN entities and regional
organisations to make public commitments to specific WPS actions, which resulted in sixty-

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four member states, 8 UN entities and 3 regional organisations making commitments (UN
Women, 2021). In the same year, the UK funded a new protection framework for women
peacebuilders (Foreign and Commonwealth Office and James Cleverly MP, 2020) and in a
speech by James Cleverly to the UN, committed £250,000 funding to research the gendered
impacts of COVID-19 in fragile and conflict-affected states, in collaboration with GAPS (James
Cleverly MP, 2020). In 2020, the UK also abstained on a proposed new WPS resolution, as
the adoption of this text ‘would have undermined the significant achievements made on this
critical agenda and the enduring efforts of so many women’s rights activists’, which again
highlights the UK as an advocate for WPS and uses its position to prevent the backsliding of
progress made on the agenda (Ambassador Jonathan Allen, 2020). The high-level
statements, commitments and funding provided in support for WPS at the United Nations
demonstrates the UK’s commitment to driving this agenda forward and in preventing
backsliding, at the international level.

Furthermore, the UK is the pen-holder or co-penholder for 12 country situations or thematic

matters, including the WPS thematic area (Security Council Report, 2020). The pen-holder
system is an informal way in which the P3 members (The UK, France and the US) self-appoint
and share amongst themselves country or thematic issues on the Security Council’s agenda.
Given the UK’s role as pen-holder for WPS, it situates the UK in a position to steer and interpret
the WPS agenda within the Security Council and have a key role in formulating documents on
the topic. Regarding UNSCR 2242 more specifically, the UK co-chairs, alongside Spain, the
2242 Informal Expert Group on WPS, which aims to strengthen and systematically oversee
the coordination of 2242 work (PeaceWomen, 2020). Furthermore, the UK was a key player
in preparations for the high-level review of UNSCR 1325 in 2015 that it co-hosted with
Namibia, which GAPS (2015: 5) argues ‘likely contributed to the support’ for UNSCR 2242
and the high number of member states who spoke in support of WPS at the UN Security
Council Debate. The 2015 annual report to parliament outlined that ‘the UK led on the drafting
and negotiation of the resolution adopted at the High-Level Review, SCR 2242’ and argued
that the resolution was the most comprehensive at the time (FCO, 2015: 8). As the UK holds
‘leadership’ roles at the UN level as a permanent member of the security council and as pen-
holder on WPS, it is well-positioned to shape the agenda. Particularly relevant to this thesis is
its role in the passing of UNSCR 2242 and in the Informal Expert Group, which enhances the
need for the UK to integrate P/CVE into its approach to WPS in direct response to its work at
the international level.

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The UK has also advocated for WPS at other international organisations beyond the United
Nations, in its bilateral engagement with other states. For example, the UK has promoted the
value of WPS at the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on
numerous occasions, such as by making high level statements at the OSCE Permanent
Council (UK Delegation to the OSCE and Ambassador Dominic Shroeder, 2013; Ambassador
Jonathan Allen, 2020; Ambassador Neil Bush, 2020b, 2020a, 2020c, 2021) and by sponsoring
an OSCE Security Dialogue on the theme of WPS in Vienna (UK Delegation to the OSCE,
2013). Some of the UK’s embassies have also publicly announced their bilateral work with
countries in promoting and implementing the WPS agenda, such as the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)(British Embassy Kinshasa, 2013), Japan (British Embassy Tokyo, 2017,
2019), Macedonia (British Embassy Skopje, 2016) and Lebanon (British Embassy Beirut,
2018). Furthermore, the UK also funded UN Women to support the implementation of the
Jordanian National Action Plan, through the Conflict Stability and Security Fund (Lord Ahmad,
2019b). This demonstrates that the UK draws on WPS as a feature of its soft power and
asserts itself as ‘leader’ on WPS.

Whilst it is clear that the UK has asserted itself as a leader in encouraging others to implement
WPS (Foreign Secretary William Hague, 2010; UK Government, 2010), the UK has taken a
particularly strong leadership role in regards to the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict. In
2012, the then Foreign Secretary William Hague launched the UK’s PSVI initiative (Foreign
Secretary William Hague, 2012b, 2012a) and contributed £1 million to support the UN
Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict (UK Government,
2012). The initiative can be regarded as one of the UK’s most important contributions and
examples of leadership, concerning the WPS agenda. This initiative was led largely by William
Hague and alongside the UN Special Envoy Angelina Jolie, they campaigned for ending
warzone rape and sexual violence in conflict at the UN Security Council (Foreign &
Commonwealth Office and Foreign Secretary William Hague, 2013). In 2014, Hague,
alongside Angelina Jolie co-chaired the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict,
bringing together 1700 delegates and 123 country delegations, including 79 ministers (gov.uk,
no date a). The Summit sought to introduce an international protocol for the documenting and
investigating of sexual violence in conflict to help strengthen prosecutions of rape, support
survivors of sexual violence in access to critical support, to train soldiers and peacekeepers
on preventing and protecting people from sexual violence in conflict, and to ‘produce a seismic
shift in attitudes’ towards sexual violence in conflict and ‘to debunk the myth that rape in war
is somehow inevitable or a lesser crime’ (gov.uk, n.d a). Hague was able to draw upon the

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reputation of the FCO and the profile and authority of the UK as a permanent member of the
Security Council to position itself in a way to promote this thematic issue successfully and use
its ‘great power’ diplomacy to make an impact (Davies and True, 2017: 706).

Although the summit was a highly visible manifestation of the initiative, the UK also drew upon
its diplomatic and political capital in order to support and secure declarations at a number of
forums, for example, the G8 Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict (Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, 2013), the passing of UNSCR 2106 (2013) and in the Declaration
of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict which was launched in the UN general
assembly by William Hague and the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in
Conflict, Zainab Bangura and was subsequently endorsed by two-thirds of members of the
UN (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013). Additionally, the UK released a case study of
its work with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on preventing sexual violence
against women (UK Government, 2013). Therefore, this initiative can be deemed a form of
norm entrepreneurship that drew attention to issues of sexual violence in conflict and
highlights the UK’s leadership on issues related to WPS (Davies and True, 2017). It shows
the UK’s potential in driving forward the efforts of other governments, militaries, international
organisations and civil society to establish international norms relating to WPS. PSVI
continues to feature as a significant feature of the UK’s approach to WPS, for example, in
2019, Lord Ahmad, the PM’s Special Representative for Preventing Sexual Violence, hosted
an event on WPS and PSVI With HRH The Countess of Wessex to champion WPS in light of
the 20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 (Lord Ahmad, 2019a) and announced £800,000 of UK
funding to ‘enhance local women’s involvement in preventing conflict’ (Foreign &
Commonwealth Office and Conflict Stability and Security Fund, 2019).

It is clear that the UK has played and continues to play a crucial role in advancing UNSCR
1325 and subsequent resolutions on the WPS thematic area, including UNSCR 2242. This
reaffirms the importance of the UK as a site of investigation, as its leadership has the potential
to influence others. Furthermore, the UK’s dedication to WPS at the international level is a
feature of its ‘soft power’ and highlights how the normative ideas of the agenda are also part
of wider traditional power politics, as well as an ethical decision and commitment (Aggestam,
Bergman Rosamond and Kronsell, 2019). This forms part of the ‘external’ dynamics that
influence how the UK interprets and institutionalises WPS. Overall, the UK has both a
longstanding policy framework for implementing WPS and a demonstrable international
commitment and influence in regards to the WPS agenda.

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5.5 Conclusion
The UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 sit within a broader
policy and institutional context. This chapter has provided insight into some of the dynamics
that influence the UK’s approach to WPS and the subsequent shift to integrate P/CVE within
that. It has provided the reader with familiarisation of the key departments and actors in the
UK government where WPS and P/CVE is embedded, which draws attention to some of the
potential complexities and influences (such as the UK’s colonial legacy) of WPS interpretation
and implementation beyond the cross-governmental policy documents. Using the ‘feminist
triangle’ model (Woodward, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018), this section then
mapped the actors who work specifically on WPS and their interaction with civil society and
epistemic communities. As WPS is founded upon feminist activism and paying attention to the
voices of women, this highlights a strong commitment to these principles. That being said,
further investigation in chapter seven will uncover the voices heard in the P/CVE policy shift
to reveal the extent to which these actors hold power in the UK’s interpretation of WPS. This
chapter also discussed the UK’s commitments to gender equality and women’s rights to reveal
it can be considered a ‘women-friendly’ state, although there are some crucial limitations, such
as, the lack of ratification of the Istanbul Convention and the inequality of equality between
Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. This exposes the UK’s lack of institutional mandate
to ensure women's rights in Northern Ireland and reveals potential constraints of applying
WPS within the UK’s borders. Furthermore, this chapter revealed that the UK’s history with
P/CVE/CT has been long, complex and has faced high levels of criticism for its racialised and
securitising nature. The institutional set-up that locates P/CVE/CT strategy principally within
the Home Office, which guides the UK’s P/CVE/CT work in both domestic spaces and abroad,
is also relevant for understanding how this work sits at the domestic-international nexus.
Drawing attention to the P/CVE/CT political and security context offers a fuller picture of the
conditions that allowed P/CVE to become a feature of the UK’s approach to WPS. The
subsequent mapping of the UK’s policy architecture on WPS highlighted the dynamic nature
of WPS NAPs and the longstanding commitments to WPS made by the UK. The UK’s
particularly strong leadership role at the international level was also considered, evidenced in
its bilateral and multilateral advocacy with other states, organisations and at the UN, through
its position as pen-holder for WPS and in promoting the PSVI initiative as a norm entrepreneur
(Davies and True, 2017). This reveals how WPS forms part of the UK’s institutional identity
and how WPS is a feature of its ‘soft power’ repertoire (Achilleos-Sarll, 2020).

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Overall, the way that UNSCR 1325 and 2242 has been diffused into the UK’s WPS strategy
is by no means unambiguous. This chapter has provided important insight into the wider
context that has given rise to a particular interpretation of those resolutions. By detailing the
UK’s institutions, commitments to gender equality, and approach to P/CVE, it is clear that
many complexities and dynamics may shape the UK’s interpretation of WPS and P/CVE. The
following chapter now engages in a Critical Frame Analysis to uncover ‘what the problem is
represented to be’ in the UK’s WPS policy and the framing of P/CVE within that (Bacchi, 2012),
before chapter seven then investigates how and why this particular interpretation of WPS and
P/CVE came to be and the challenges of that interpretation being (mis)understood and applied
in the UK’s ‘mainstream’ work.

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6.0 The UK’s Interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242

National Action Plans (NAPs) are the driving force for facilitating state action on the WPS
agenda (UN Women, 2015: 241) and are thus examples of state-level (re)interpretation of
UNSCR 1325 and subsequent WPS resolutions, such as UNSCR 2242. As these resolutions
are diffused they go through transitions and adjustments in order to ‘make sense’ and have
relevance in their new sites, in this case, the UK government (Kronsell and Svedberg,
2012:11). Therefore, this chapter unpacks the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242.
Based on the insights from Feminist Security Studies, Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist
Institutionalism in chapter three, the UK’s framing of WPS (and how Preventing and
Countering/Violent Extremism sits within that) is understood as part of a wider gendered and
racialised institutional context. By asking ‘what the problem is represented to be’ (Bacchi,
2009) and utilising a Critical Frame Analysis (CFA) methodological approach, the neutrality of
these policy texts is disrupted (Verloo, 2005; Verloo and Lombardo, 2007; Bustelo and Verloo,
2009).

This chapter presents the findings of a CFA on the UK’s WPS policy documents to reveal the
core problem and solution framings in the UK’s interpretation of WPS and the shift to integrate
Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) within that. The first section of this
chapter begins by unveiling how the UK frames itself as the problem solvers, for problem
holders in the majority world, which reproduces racialised global hierarchies. Then the chapter
demonstrates the main telos of the UK’s approach to WPS has been most broadly and
consistently linked with the protection of women and girls and their participation in conflict
prevention, resolution and management, reflecting a narrow approach to gender
mainstreaming. Other frames are also exposed, such as women’s needs in conflict, women’s
access to justice and ‘prevention’ more broadly, although these are minor frames compared
to ‘protection’ and ‘participation’. What was also made evident during the analysis is that
gender is predominantly synonymised with women and the concepts of masculinities and
femininities tend not to be engaged with. The final part of this section highlights a shift in the
most recent NAP (2018 – 2022) to include ‘gender inequality’ as a more salient feature of its
problem and solution framing, seemingly providing a greater opportunity for transformative
gender mainstreaming.

The second section of this chapter then zooms in on the UK’s integration of P/CVE into its
2018-2022 NAP as one of seven strategic outcomes. It finds that the invisibility of women in

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P/CVE is the core problem framing, although leaves why this is a problem largely unexplained.
The proposed solution is chiefly the greater leadership and participation of women in P/CVE
efforts, which arguably means integrating women into existing securitised structures rather
than aiming at transforming the existing gendered structures that limit women’s participation
and render them largely invisible. Additionally, attention is paid to the absence of indicators
for measuring the success of the P/CVE strategic outcome and exposing that this policy shift
was largely inchoate. Attention is then turned to the UK’s guidance note ‘Implementing
Strategic Outcome Six: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’ (2019), which provides
far more detail on how to integrate WPS and P/CVE work practically. Whilst this document
introduces a far more gender-sensitive and gender-responsive approach to P/CVE, (Gordon
and True, 2019) there are significant limitations as the feminist principles of WPS are framed
as secondary to operational effectives. This highlights significant challenges of integrating
P/CVE and WPS without risking the co-optation of the agenda.

This chapter, therefore, makes an empirical contribution to the body of literature that critically
engages with WPS policy documents (Shepherd, 2008, 2011; Puechguirbal, 2010; Pratt,
2013a; Jansson and Eduards, 2016; Duncanson, 2019; Martín de la Rosa and Lázaro, 2019),
to wider debates about the transformative potential of WPS (Cohn, 2008; Otto, 2010; Pratt
and Richter-Devroe, 2011) and to feminist analysis of WPS NAPs and the complicity of
minority world states in reproducing gendered and racialised hierarchies (Miller, Pournik and
Swaine, 2014; Aroussi, 2017; Shepherd, 2017; Parashar, 2019; Haastrup and Hagen, 2020;
Holvikivi and Reeves, 2020). Furthermore, through a detailed investigation into how the UK is
interpreting UNSCR 2242 into its WPS policy documents, this chapter also makes a novel
empirical contribution to the debates regarding UNSCR 2242 and the integration of WPS and
P/CVE (Allison, 2013; Chowdhury Fink and Davidan, 2018; Heathcote, 2018; Eddyono and
Davies, 2019; Aroussi, 2020; Asante and Shepherd, 2020; Rothermel, 2020; White, 2020).

6.1 Women, Peace and Security: What is The Problem Represented to be?
The analysis in this section is orientated around three fundamental questions. The first and
second are Bacchi's (2009) question ‘what is the problem represented to be? or what is
diagnosed as the problem and the second is ‘what is the prognosis?’ (what action is
proposed)(Verloo and Lombardo, 2007). The third question asks ‘whose problem is it
represented to be’ or what roles are attributed to which actors )(Verloo and Lombardo, 2007).
Whilst it may initially seem illogical to consider the third question first, this section begins by
highlights the emphasis on problems located in the majority world and of majority world women

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as this helps to articulate and analyse the diagnosis and prognosis in greater detail. Following
this, the questions of ‘what is the problem represented to be?’ and what is the prognosis is?
are considered in section 6.1.2, which highlights two key problem framings; women’s absence,
or lack of participation, in peace and security and women’s vulnerability and victimisation.
Following this section 6.1.3 draws attention to three further minor ‘problem’ frames: lack of
understanding of women’s needs, the inability of women to access justice and the oversight
of preventative approaches to conflict and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). The
prognosis and solutions offered in the UK’s WPS policy texts are largely focused on enhancing
women’s participation and protecting women from violence, particularly sexual and gender-
based violence, which is largely an ‘integrationist’ and ‘difference’ approach to gender
mainstreaming rather than transformative (See: Jahan, 1995; Rees, 1998; Squires, 1999;
Rees, 2002; Squires, 2005; Walby, 2005; Verloo and Lombardo, 2007; Krook and True, 2010;
Joachim and Schneiker, 2012).

Following this, a more detailed examination of the conceptualisation of ‘gender’ within the UK’s
approach to WPS is presented. This exposes that gender is largely presented as synonymous
with women reflecting the limited approach to gender mainstreaming promoted. This is
unpacked further by considering the extent to which gender inequality and gender hierarchies
are considered within the problem definition. Finally, by temporally analysing the UK’s WPS
policy framing, the 2018 – 2022 National Action Plan and guidance notes reveal a potential
broadening of the UK’s approach to WPS in two key ways. Firstly, by giving greater
consideration to gender inequality and gender as a power structure and secondly, by
introducing CVE. Following this, the second half of this chapter explores the framing of P/CVE
within the UK’s approach to WPS.

6.1.1 The Problem Holders (and the Problem Solvers)

The UK’s WPS policy texts have consistently taken an approach to WPS that is outward-facing
and essentially interprets WPS as a mechanism for addressing the exclusion and vulnerability
of women in conflict and post-conflict countries, within the global South/majority world. This
spatial problem framing does not radically deviate from past scholarship on WPS NAPs
created in the global North/minority world (Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014). This section
considers in detail who the ‘problem holders’ are represented as being and how this maintains
the UK’s position as secure, ‘problem solvers’. Whilst the UK does recognise the need to
advance its own capabilities, such as by including more women in military institutions, the
core interpretation of WPS is that it is about women in conflict or post-conflict environments in

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the majority world. This reveals that the UK’s WPS policy texts include, and (re)produce,
gendered and racialised stereotypes that constrain where and what is classed as a problem
relevant to this agenda.

Where is the Problem Represented to Be?

Though the UK aims to not be ‘exclusive’ in its application of WPS (NAP 2014: 25) and the
NAPs are a vision for “what the UK wants to achieve on WPS, not a fixed country level plan”
(NAP 2018: 5), focus or implementation countries have been used to outline “areas where
there is both a high level need for WPS work, and the potential for the UK to have a substantial
impact on the situation for women and girls over the lifetime of the NAP” (NAP 2018: 3).
Therefore, the focus countries or implementation countries, provide insight into where the UK
deems most suitable for increased WPS attention, as well as increased monitoring and
evaluation as the annual reports to parliament tend to focus on these countries. Table 5 below
presents the focus countries in the UK’s four iterations of its NAP. The number of focus
countries have increased by three in each NAP. NAP II also included specific regional action
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (NAP 2010: 14). The focus countries are all
located in the majority world and have experienced traditionally defined conflict and insecurity,
rather than other insecurities, such as natural disasters. The focus countries are a political
decision, they are not natural nor a given and are also constrained by the locations where the
UK has a ‘presence’ in, which demonstrates how the wider security context and institutions
shape the WPS agenda. What constitutes the conditions for insecurity is largely tied to
traditional state-centric understandings of war and conflict, rather than the gendered insecurity
that women face globally (Cohn, 2011, 2013). Whilst the NAPs do draw attention to gendered
insecurity, such as ‘sexual violence in conflict’ it is largely limited to traditionally defined spaces
of insecurity, such as fragile and conflict-affected states.

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Table 5: UK National Action Plan Implementation and Focus Countries

NAP I NAP II NAP III NAP IIII

(2006) (2010 – 2013) (2014 – 2017) (2018 – 2022)
Afghanistan • • •
DRC • • •
Nepal •
Myanmar (Burma) • •
Libya • •
Somalia • •
Syria • •
Iraq •
Nigeria •
South Sudan •
Total 0 3 6 9

The focus countries are predominantly in locations that were former European colonies or
under considerable colonial-style political control and influence (The Democratic Republic of
Congo, Libya, Myanmar, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan and Afghanistan. Nepal
is somewhat of an outlier in that it was not ‘formally’ under British/European rule). Similarly,
by viewing the UK’s approach to WPS within the context of existing donor-recipient
relationships, based on racialised and colonial power hierarchies, it exposes how WPS can
contribute to these power structures. By upholding colonial and donor-recipient structures the
UK’s interpretation of WPS then plays a role in reproducing a certain racialised power
dynamics between ‘Us’ (the secure) vs ‘Them’ (the insecure). Silences around this colonial
history in the UK’s WPS texts are an example of the UK suffering from what Achilleos-Sarll
(2018) labels ‘colonial amnesia’, as the UK is constructing a superficial temporal divide
between the end of colonialism and the postcolonial world order, that has ongoing and
fluctuating relations and a continuing legacy whether the UK wants to admit this or not.

The Domestic Application of WPS: Key Silences and the ‘Other’ Within
Although the dominant ‘problem holder’ in the UK’s approach to WPS is women in the majority
world, the UK does recognise the need to increase women’s participation in UK security
institutions when working internationally. This frames British women in a position of agency
rather than of victimhood and as ‘saviours’ of ‘Othered’ women in conflict, and post-conflict
spaces. The framing of women’s participation will be explored in more detail later in this
chapter. However, it is clear that NAPs are about the UK’s capacity to deliver its WPS

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commitments rather than about the UK’s problems that the agenda could address.
Furthermore, by constraining WPS to conflict or post-conflict spaces, other areas are
overlooked. For example, the military can work domestically on certain issues, such as flood
control, but the gendered dynamics and how gendered populations are approached would not
come under the remit of WPS. Interestingly, there has been significant silences regarding
Northern Ireland in the WPS ‘problem holder’ framing. Despite the violence in Northern Ireland
being within the remit of ‘traditionally defined’ security threats or being framed as a post-
conflict environment, this has not been addressed in any of the UK’s four NAPs. Women’s
experiences, needs and perspectives, as well as their participation in peace processes and
peacebuilding are thus overlooked as important to WPS, which limits the potential for post-
conflict structures to be formed that are gender-sensitive and gender just (Hoewer, 2013) and
discounts the historic and current mobilisation and activism of women in Northern Ireland. The
decision to exclude Northern Ireland from the UK’s NAPs is a political one, which follows wider
high diplomacy denial that an armed conflict occurred (Hoewer, 2013). Whilst it is recognised
that Northern Ireland has a complex and unique positioning within the UK, as discussed in the
previous chapter, it demonstrates that the UK has been more comfortable with problematising
women’s exclusion and insecurity in conflict and post-conflict spaces in the rest of the world
than within its borders. This is also linked to the institutional positioning of WPS within the
UK’s international facing departments, as discussed in the previous chapter, that also plays a
role in shaping this ‘problem location’ framing.

The silences on WPS in Northern Ireland emulates the lack of commitment to women’s rights
comparatively to the rest of the UK and the ineffective application of CEDAW in this location
mentioned in the previous chapter. Interestingly there has been a recent shift in the 2019 and
2020 Annual Reports to Parliament that introduced a small section on ‘The Domestic
Application of WPS’ which makes reference to ‘violence against women and girls’, ‘gender,
terrorism and extremism’, ‘Championing women peacebuilders in Northern Ireland’ although
‘gender, terrorism and extremism’ was removed from the 2020 Annual Report to Parliament
(Annual Report to Parliament, 2019: 33; Annual Report to Parliament, 2020: 40-41). This
suggests that the FCO (now FCDO) has strengthened collaboration with the Home Office and
Northern Ireland Office on WPS and could possibly result in a shift in the UK’s approach to
WPS in the next NAP, although the extent to which the ‘problem holder’ frame change is yet
to be seen. The lack of formal or official recognition of the application of WPS to Northern
Ireland in the UK’s NAPs since 2006 is evidence of the lack of political will in translating WPS
into reality if the UK is not ready to acknowledge its domestic ‘problems’ or in ensuring the

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principles of WPS are applied to a domestic post-conflict environment. Furthermore, as
Northern Ireland’s stability fluctuates as a result of Brexit, it will be interesting to see whether
Northern Ireland features in the next UK NAP.

Despite key silences on Northern Ireland in the NAPs, the UK has not remained completely
silent on the domestic application of WPS. It has, however, introduced minor frames on the
domestic ‘problem holders’ of WPS in a way that makes it transnationally focused. For
example, the 2014 – 2017 NAP states that, ‘while this Plan’s focus is on advancing the
Women, Peace and Security agenda in conflict-affected States, it should complement UK
policy at home, as well as its work on transnational issues such as child, early and forced
marriage, child exploitation, human trafficking and female genital mutilation’ (NAP 2014 –
2017: 2). The initial connection to ‘UK policy at home’ is very vague, and none of the NAPs
tend to delineate how this work complements UK policy. The 2018 – 2022 NAP also states
that it complements domestic strategies such as “the Ending Violence Against Women and
Girls Strategy; and strategies on transnational priorities such as countering violent extremism,
migration, modern slavery, FGM/C, and child, early and forced marriage.” (NAP 2018 – 2022:
24). Defining issues as transnational is an internationalisation of the insecurity of women,
which shifts responsibility for insecurity to ‘Others’ outside of the UK who are harming ‘Others’
within. This is a particular interpretive and political function (Campbell, 1998: 61-63) which
again entrenches globalised racialised hierarchies. The application of WPS in the domestic
context is then about protecting ‘brown women’ in the UK from ‘brown men’ in the UK or abroad
(Spivak:1988). The lack of meaningful application of WPS to women in the domestic sphere
constructs ‘white’ women at home as secure, gender-equal actors, whilst brown women at
home and abroad are the ‘problem holders’. This framing contributes to broader narratives
and simplified binaries about the ‘civilised, progressive, secure’ global North/minority world in
contrast to the ‘barbaric, backward, insecure’ ‘Other’ in the global South/majority world (Khalid,
2011).

Overall, the UK predominantly situates the ‘problem holders’ of WPS as women in the majority
world in conflict and post-conflict spaces and mostly in former colonies. The UK’s articulation
of the WPS agenda, as a mechanism for addressing problems that are located in the majority
world, advances an artificial construction of the geopolitical boundaries between ‘us’ and
‘them’ that overlooks how these are deeply interconnected and plays a role in shaping what
is (in)security is and who is (in)secure. The silences on Northern Ireland and the racialised
understanding of the women’s insecurity in the domestic context through links to ‘transnational

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practices’, situates the UK as a civilised, morally superior ‘problem solver’, which could
worryingly play a role in justifying its interventions abroad. The ‘problem holder’ framing is also
problematic as it reproduces narrow state-centric and traditional understandings of (in)security
as ‘conflict’, presents a binary distinction between conflict and peace, locates the key dangers
to security as outside of the UK and overlooks other forms of insecurity in domestic and
international spaces. Whilst the recent shift to consider Northern Ireland in the 2019 and 2020
annual reports to parliament, albeit in a minor way, may be indicative of a broadening in
understanding who the ‘problem holders’ of WPS are, this is yet to be seen. Overall, this thesis
finds that through its narrow framing of ‘problem holders’, the UK’s overarching approach to
UNSCR 1325 is one that reproduces and perpetuates gendered and racialised global
hierarchies, establishes racialised boundaries to insecurity and does not go far enough in
challenging the traditional state-centric understandings of (in)security. These findings builds
on the Post-Colonial feminist literature about who WPS is for and the role of NAPs in
reproducing global racial hierarchies (Shepherd, 2017; Achilleos-Sarll, 2020; Haastrup and
Hagen, 2020).

6.1.2 Participation and Protection: A Problem of Women’s Exclusion and Vulnerability

Despite the UK’s approach to WPS evolving over time, the main telos of the agenda has been
most broadly and consistently linked with the protection of women and girls and their
participation in conflict prevention, resolution and management. The overarching diagnosis of
the UK’s WPS core policy documents is that there is a need to address the vulnerability or
victimisation of women (and girls) and the exclusion of women (and girls) from peace and
security processes. The introductory paragraphs of the second, third and fourth NAPS that
establish the goals of the NAPs reiterate this dual positioning:

“is intended to strengthen our ability to reduce the impact of conflict on women and girls, and
to promote their inclusion in conflict resolution” (UK NAP 2012: 4).

“the UK Government’s ambition is to put women and girls at the centre of all our efforts to
prevent and resolve conflict, to promote peace and stability, and to prevent and respond to
violence against women and girls’ (UK NAP 2014:1).

“sets out how the UK Government will integrate a gender perspective into its work to build
security and stability overseas, protect the human rights of women and girls, and promote their
meaningful participation in conflict prevention and resolution” (UK NAP 2018: 3).

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Additionally, this dualism is also reiterated in the annual reports to parliament (Annual Review
2013; Report to Parliament 2015; Report to Parliament 2016; Report to Parliament 2017;
Annual Report to Parliament 2018; Annual Report to Parliament 2019; Annual Report to
Parliament 2020). While the UK also works on the other pillars of ‘relief and recovery’ and
‘prevention’, protection and participation remain the most dominant frames. This dualistic
approach seems to stem from the UNSCRs on WPS which follow a similar framing in the
problem diagnosis of WPS. The 2018 – 2022 NAP has shifted slightly in its awareness of
gender equality and gender perspectives and this will be discussed later in this chapter.

Participation and protection are not mutually exclusive, and there are multiple ways in which
people can be victims and decision-makers or agents in peace and security spaces. For
example, women can be victims of violence, community leaders or deployed as troops. In
addition, women can also be perpetrators or supporters of violence, as well as victims of
violence. However, this overlapping understanding of women’s multiple positions goes largely
unrecognised. Table 6 below demonstrates the key framings of women and men/boys within
the UK’s NAPs. It is clear from this table that the focus is mainly on women’s victimhood and
women’s exclusion as decision-makers and agents in conflict and post-conflict environments.
There are minimal references to women as perpetrators or supporters of violence, despite the
abundance of literature that exposes that women often do engage in violence (Cunningham,
2003; Alison, 2004, 2009; Von Knop, 2007; Speckhard, 2008; Gonzalez-Perez, 2008; Cragin
and Daly, 2009; Parashar, 2009; Sjoberg and Gentry, 2011, 2016; Bloom, 2011; Gentry and
Sjoberg, 2016; Bloom and Lokmanoglu, 2020; Jadoon et al., 2020) which reiterates a
prevailing understanding of women as inherently peaceful passive actors (Cunningham, 2003:
187). Additionally, men and boys feature minimally in the NAPs, as allies, victims and
perpetrators, which reiterates that the problem focus is on women’s lack of participation and
victimhood rather than the gendered structures that shape and reproduce gender inequality in
peace and security.

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Table 6: Code Frequency of Framing of 'Men' and 'Women' in the UK NAPs

NAP I NAP II (2010- NAP III NAP IIII Average

(2006) 2013) (2014 – (2018 – Total
Coverage
2017) 2022) (%)
n % n % n % n % n %
Women as Victims 1 0.92% 87 5.24% 204 14.82% 117 10.80% 409 7.95%
Women as
Decision 3 5.23% 123 8.47% 180 12.8% 91 9.40% 397 8.98%
Makers/Agents
Women as
0 0.00% 6 0.38% 1 0.05% 2 0.12% 9 0.14%
Perpetrators
Men/boys as Allies 0 0.00% 1 0.06% 11 0.70% 2 0.19% 14 0.24%
Men/boys as
0 0.00% 0 0.00% 8 0.60% 5 0.46% 13 0.27%
Victims
Men/boys as
0 0.00% 1 0.06% 4 0.19% 2 0.19% 7 0.11%
Perpetrators
n = coded segment frequency
% = coverage of coded segments

The two key frames of protection and participation will now be explored in more detail to
uncover the deeper complexities of this response to the ‘represented’ problem of women’s
‘vulnerability’ and ‘exclusion’.

Participation: A problem of women’s exclusion

There is an implicit assumption in the UK’s approach to WPS that women’s participation leads
to peace and stability and will ultimately transform the security environment. Thus the lack of
women’s participation and absence from these spaces is diagnosed as a problem, this is
evidenced in table 6 above. The coding related to both the problematisation of women’s
absence and the necessity of women’s inclusion through a number of mechanisms, including
as decision-makers, civil society actors, community leaders, women’s human rights defenders
(WHRDs), politicians, voters, mediators, negotiators, security actors and in national and local
governance. However, this framing can be divided into two subframes, on the one hand
women’s absence from political, social and economic life more generally, and on the other,
women’s absence from security/military institutions and peace and security processes, such
as peacekeepers, soldiers and police. The first subframe is indicative of an awareness of the
wider social, political and economic structures of inequality that constrain women’s
participation in peace and security and thus is more transformative. The second subframe
raises more issues with the potential co-optation of women in upholding militarised
approaches to security, although, this agential framing does shift away from the traditional

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narratives of the female as a ‘subject of security’ to ‘an agent of security’ (Shepherd, 2011).
There is a particular emphasis on the need for women’s participation through civil society
organisations, politics, as community leaders, mediators and in peace processes as this
specifically helps to resolve conflict and establish stability and peace. The promotion of
women’s ‘participation’ is presented as a challenge to their structural exclusion and assumes
that participation of women in these spaces is the mechanism in which they can attain
empowerment and are expressions of agency.

The largest proportion of images in the UK’s WPS policy documents portrayed women in
conflict spaces as agential, both as security actors and political actors (See Appendix P). This
is a positive move that destabilises stereotypes of women’s as merely victims in conflict. Yet
there is a danger that participation is equated with voice, which is left unproblematic within this
framing. Shepherd (2011: 509) has previously raised concerns with this, as the very presence
of women within decision-making spaces can then legitimate the policies of the forum despite
women having been implicitly or explicitly marginalised during the discussion and contributed
very little, or not at all, to its formulation. Whilst many of the images in the WPS documents
outline women’s participation through civil society meetings or as leaders, it is unclear the
extent to which they make a change. Additionally, some of these images are problematic in
reproducing stereotypes. The images below with the captions ‘women singing and dancing at
a community meeting in Kananga, DRC’ (Report to Parliament 2016:11) and ‘Christian and
Muslim leaders dance together to show their peaceful coexistence’ (Annual Report to
Parliament 2020: 6). Whilst this can be linked to cultural practices, the reader of these policy
documents are likely to be UK civil servants and parliamentarians, and for those actors, this
framing is highly feminised and outside the traditional masculine realm of ‘security’.

Figure 5: Imagery of Women in UK WPS Policy Documents

(Report to Parliament 2016: 11; Annual Report to Parliament 2020: 6)

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Additionally, where women are framed as politically empowered they are often pictured with
children. For example, the cover page of NAP 2014 – 2017 shows women waiting to vote with
a child. This image also appears in the 2018 – 2022 NAP, rather confusingly under the UK
Capabilities section of the Plan, but shows ‘one of five women members of the District
Community Council in Nahr-e-Saraj district in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province pictured on
International Women’s Day, 10 March 2012’ (UK NAP 2018: 20). This linkage with women
and children reinforces stereotypes of women as mothers and/or caregivers and as a primary
feature of their political empowerment.

Figure 6: Imagery of Women with Children in UK WPS Policy Documents

(UK NAP 2014: coverpage; UK NAP 2018: 20)

Overall, the affiliation of women’s leadership and participation with dancing and children, in
this context, feminises their leadership and overlooks the unique challenges that women have
in becoming leaders and decision-makers within spaces that are overrepresented by men and
attribute value to qualities that are gendered masculine (Wright, Caeymaex and Buchet-
Couzy, 2020: 24 - 25). These images frame the UK’s policy solutions in a positive light and
aim at demonstrating the UK’s successful work on empowering women in the majority world.

Whilst the 2018 – 2022 NAP dedicates its first strategic outcome to ‘decision-making’ that
recognises the need for women’s ‘meaningful and representative participation in decision-
making’ (UK NAP 2018), it is limited in providing a ‘solution’ to ensuring that decision-making
is meaningful and representative. There is a small recognition given to the broader
environments, such as patriarchal views and gender, age and ethnic discrimination that create

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obstacles for this; however, recognition is not enough. The NAP is significantly limited in
delineating how to ensure women are able to exert real influence rather than as a ‘tick box’
exercise and therefore does not include this as a feature of its policy ‘solution’. The success
indicators for this strategic outcome are quantitative, yet refer to an unquantified proportion of
‘seats held by women in national parliament and local governments’ and an unquantified
‘representation of women among mediators, negotiators and technical experts in formal peace
negotiations’, as well as ‘percentage of population who believe decision-making is inclusive
and responsive, disaggregated by sex, age, disability and population group’ (UK NAP 2018:
25). As the solution offered is predominantly the need to introduce quotas and for women to
be trained to become politicians or security actors, the focus of solutions is the ‘supply’ of
women rather than the structural dynamics that constrain their potential participation. This
does not go far enough in transforming the conditions of the peace and security architecture
to ensure that women’s representation is meaningful. Furthermore, women’s participation is
linked to understanding women’s needs, as ‘without their rightful participation in the
negotiation and policy-making process, an unbalanced and unsustainable peace is secured,
which ignores the needs of half the population’ (UK NAP 2014: 3) and ‘when women
participate in political life, policymaking is more inclusive, with the needs and concerns of
women better represented’ (UK NAP 2018: 8). This framing links women with ‘women’s
issues’, as an essentialised group with a hegemonic identity and overlooks the multiple and
complex issues women face. Additionally, women are valuable for insight into ‘women’s
issues’ whereas everything else is normatively masculine or about men. Overall, this is a
limited approach to challenging issues of inequality in peace and security processes as it
constricts the problem to the physical presence of women and their ability to represent all
women rather than the structures that lead to women’s exclusion and male dominance in this
space.

The second problem and solution sub-frame is women’s absence and need for participation
within military and security institutions. This was a strong feature of the UK’s first NAP and
aimed at enhancing the UK’s ‘female personnel on operations’ (UK NAP 2006: 2). This has
been a consistent feature of subsequent NAPs, for example, NAP 2010 – 2013 promotes the
use of ‘Female Engagement Teams’ to strengthen engagement with female civilians support
of UK Battle Groups tasks/missions’ and training female Afghan recruits’ (UK NAP 2010: 22).
NAP 2014 – 2017 encourages the ‘employment of women within UK government roles,
security services and the Armed forces’ (UK NAP 2014: 11) and the need for ‘reducing the
barriers for women’s participation in defence and security institutions, specifically in the armed

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forces, NATO-led missions and operations’ (UK NAP 2014: 23). The latest NAP (UK NAP
2018) uses the increased numbers of women graduates from the Afghan National Army
Officer Academy (ANAOA), the ‘greater representation of females in the Afghan National Army
(ANA) and the ‘increased female participation in Army-led CVE activities’ (UK NAP 2018: 19)
as evidence of its successful work in Afghanistan. This frame sits within the wider debate
about enhancing women’s participation in security and military organisations (Duncanson and
Woodward, 2016). Whilst this framing destabilises essentialised gender roles of the protector
and protected, it is framed in a way that adds women into existing militarised and securitised
structures rather than trying to transform them, which does not necessarily lead to enhanced
gender equality. This is again an integrationist approach to gender mainstreaming and
enhances risks of the co-optation of the WPS agenda and instrumentalization of women in
supporting militarised approaches to security.

To unpack this framing even further, the participation of women in security and military
institutions can be separated into two further groupings. On the one hand, the UK’s
interpretation of UNSCR 1325 problematises the lack of inclusion of women in military/security
institutions in conflict or ‘insecure’ spaces and on the other, there is a problematisation of the
lack of women in British military/security spaces. The greater inclusion of women in the British
military is where the UK becomes most clear about how the WPS agenda applies to the UK,
but it is restricted largely to ‘adding women’ to enhance the UK’s capabilities in conflict spaces.
As the imagery below demonstrates, this can contribute to a framing of western women as
secure ‘white women’ saving ‘brown women’ from ‘brown men’ (Spivak, 1988; Khalid, 2011).
This solution framing in the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR1325 reproduces racialised and
gendered narratives and hierarchies in who needs saving and by whom within WPS
discourses.

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Figure 7: Imagery of Women in the Military in the UK WPS Policy Documents

(Report to Parliament 2017: cover page, 11)

The UK’s justification for the need for greater inclusion of women is linked to peace-making
more broadly rather than gender equality in itself. For example, NAP 2018 – 2022 states that
“supporting women and girls’ meaningful mobilisation and participation in political life,
mediation, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and in post-conflict processes to rebuild their
countries and communities is essential to building lasting peace and stability” (UK NAP 2018:
8). When women’s inclusion is linked to sustainable peace, rather than about dismantling
systems that perpetuate the economic, political and social inequalities and within notions of
security that are state-centric (Otto, 2006: 120), it does not go far enough in considering how
gendered identities and ideologies play a role in (re)producing and sustaining insecurity, nor
how (security) institutions legitimise social and gendered hierarchies and are gendered
institutions (Peterson, 1992). Women’s inclusion in decision-making processes and in security
institutions then is about problematising the unequal treatment of men and women and the
ways women’s ‘difference’ and ‘peacefulness’ can contribute to peace, rather than a
transformative approach that problematises the gendered structures that operate across
peace processes and security institutions. Whilst the inclusion of women is situated within the
UK’s wider commitments to human rights and gender equality, the justification remains in
creating a lasting and sustainable peace within the current security conditions. This
entrenches understandings of security that are more closely linked to ‘state-based,
masculinised and violence-prone ideas and ideals’ by integrating women into existing
structures rather than through introducing alternate understanding of how to combat insecurity
and prevent violence (Shepherd, 2020). For example, women then can become tools of

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conflict prevention, as in the 2014 – 2017 NAP they use “women and girls’ engagement in
early warning mechanisms to prevent the outbreak of conflict” (UK NAP 2014: 12) as an
indicator of the prevention of conflict and violence against women and girls. This approach
burdens women with resolving peace and security issues within the existing structures and
processes through a stereotypical premise that women are more peaceful than men.

Overall, one of the most dominant problems diagnosed in the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR
1325 is women’s lack of participation in peace and security processes. The reasons that these
issues are seen to matter are 1) the inclusion of women leads to longer-lasting peace and
stability, and 2) women are needed to represent women and their needs. This is problematic
as it frames women as inherently passive and peaceful and situates them on the ‘frontline’ of
peace-making. It also perpetuates the idea that women can represent all women, as an
essentialised hegemonic group. Whilst women do need to be integrated as agential actors in
peace and security spaces, the absence of women ultimately reflects wider societal
exclusionary practices in political and economic spaces. Although the UK does recognise this,
the solutions offered are largely the introduction of ‘quotas’ and by enhancing women’s access
to this space without destabilising or challenging the patriarchal structures that prevent
women’s participation and the norm of male dominance. The challenge of women’s
substantive representation is also not addressed, which risks making women’s participation a
tick-box exercise rather than a meaningful activity. The inclusion of women in military and
security institutions goes some way in challenging the male-dominated nature of these
spaces, yet adding women to militarised and masculine spaces without destabilising the
gendered power relations within them risks sustaining and reproducing a particular
understanding of gender and security (Wibben, 2011b). This prevents more transformative
strategies for solving the issue of women’s exclusion and highlights an approach to gender
mainstreaming that is largely integrationist.

Protection: A problem of women’s (de-gendered) vulnerability

The second key diagnosis within the UK’s approach to WPS is the vulnerability of women.
This frame associates the need for the protection of women, and girls, in conflict as they are
particularly vulnerable to violence, and particularly sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).
This is unsurprising, given the UK’s leadership role in the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative
(PSVI) discussed in the previous chapter. The framing of women’s vulnerability and
victimhood has been a key feature of the UK’s approach to WPS since 2006 and is present in
a number of UK speeches on WPS. The UK fleetingly recognises other forms of violence

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against women, such as torture and intimidation, yet most violence against women is deemed
as sexual or gender-based violence. This arguably ‘crowds out’ the other issues that women
and girls face in conflict-affected spaces, as this dominates the agenda. Whilst it is
acknowledged that women are vulnerable within conflict and many suffer from sexual violence,
framing women as universally vulnerable entrenches essentialised and stereotypical
understandings of women’s agency and the roles that they can/do play in peace and security.
The central category for this type of violence is women and girls, which creates a sentiment
that all women and girls, at all times of conflict/post-conflict, are vulnerable to SGBV.

Furthermore, as the UK is largely an outward-facing document for the majority world, this
protectionist frame focuses on ‘minoritsed women’, as discussed previously in section 6.1.1.
Within the imagery of the UK’s WPS documents, there are far less images of women as victims
as opposed to agents (See Appendix P), which goes some way in refuting stereotypes of
women as victims and in need of saving. However, the imagery of victimhood that is included
is highly racialised, and most images within the victimhood frame are of women wearing
different types of headscarves, which could be described as a symbolic marker of an ‘Other’.
It is not to say that women who wear headscarves are not victims in conflict of sexual or
gender-based violence; it is that the majority of imagery that outlines women as victims are
those who are visibly affiliated with Islam, which contributes to dominant racialised security
narratives.

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Figure 8: Imagery of Women as Victims in the UK's WPS Policy Documents

(NAP 2014 Country-Level Implementation Plan, 4; Annual Report to Parliament 2015: 19,
65; Report to Parliament 2016: cover page; NAP 2018: 18)

Additionally, ‘women’ and ‘girls’ are deemed to face similar threats. The UK includes the threat
of ‘child/early marriages’ as a dimension of this ‘protection’ frame, and images of victimisation
often also feature children. This somewhat infantilises women as they are explicitly linked to
the vulnerabilities of girls and children. For example, the Guidance Note on Strategic Outcome
3: Gender-based violence has the following image on the cover (See Figure 9 Below). This
imagery links women’s victimhood to children and again to minoritized women.

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Figure 9: UK NAP on WPS 2018 - 2022: Guidance Note - Implementing Strategic Outcome
3: Gender-Based Violence Cover Page

(Guidance Note – Implementing Strategic Outcome 3: Gender-based violence, 2021: cover

page)

Additionally, the vulnerabilities of other genders and sexual minorities to SGBV is largely
overlooked. While the 2014 – 2017 and 2018 – 2022 NAPs do make a small reference to the
victimhood of men and boys in conflict; the dominant framing focuses on women and girls.
The victimisation of men and boys is largely linked to sexual violence against them and
overlooks other forms of violence that men face, such as those traditionally found within
conflict spaces and are thus not problematised, as it is seemingly an ‘acceptable’ feature of
conflict.

Figure 10: 'Men' and 'Boys' Framing in UK National Action Plans on WPS

Men and Boys Framing in UK National Action Plans on WPS

12

10

0
NAP 2006 NAP 2010 - 2013 NAP 2014 - 2017 NAP 2018 - 2022

Men as Victims Men as Perpetrators Men as Allies

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Building on the work of Hagen (2016), significant silences were found on homophobic or
transphobic violence that targets lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ)
individuals within the NAPs, until NAP 2018 – 2022. This NAP makes reference to ‘sexual and
gender minorities’ who ‘also face high levels of discrimination and GBV worldwide’ (UK NAP
2018: 12) and ‘transitional justice and demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration
processes should account for the needs, opportunities and vulnerabilities of women, men, and
sexual and gender minorities.’ (UK NAP 2018: 16). The acknowledgement of SGBV against
men, boys and LGBT+ individuals is significant as it opens space to consider the gendered
power dynamics of SGBV that goes beyond ‘women as victims’, however, this structural
approach remains largely excluded from the diagnosis and prognosis within the UK’s
interpretation of UNSCR 1325.

The solutions offered are the immediate ‘protection’ and the training of militaries to offer
support to survivors of gender-based violence. There is also a smaller emphasis on ‘justice’
for survivors of sexual or gender-based violence. These are post-violence solutions and,
although important, they are a less likely mechanism to prevent future sexual or gender-based
violence from occurring in the future. Where the UK has attempted to offer some preventative
solutions is through mentions of tacking ‘social norms’ in wider society. For example, the 2018
– 2022 NAP is far more aware of the unequal distribution of power in society between men
and women as a precursor to GBV and how SGBV is linked to intimate partner violence,
broader trends of VAWG and gender inequality (UK NAP 2018: 12). However, the
problematisation is only a part of the framing, the proposed solutions are less about
addressing these power dynamics and more about ‘making war safe for women’ (Weiss, 2011;
Shepherd, 2016). Additionally, the victimhood and vulnerability of women and girls, and the
need to protect them, is also bolstered by silences around women’s perpetration of violence
(See Table 6 above). This entrenches the stereotypical framing of women as passive victims
in conflict, despite this not always being the case. Comparatively to frames of women’s
exclusion and vulnerability, women’s perpetration of violence or support of violence is almost
non-existent. This contributes to stereotypical and essentialised roles of women in conflict as
passive or victims rather than as active agents.

Overall, the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 problematises women’s victimhood,

particularly of sexual violence, which justifies the UK’s role in protection. The ‘protection’ or
‘victimhood’ frame can easily gain traction as it does not challenge stereotypes and

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traditionally defined gender roles and can justify intervention on the basis of ‘masculinist
protection (Young, 2003b). Whilst women and girls vulnerability to sexual violence in conflict
is a significant issue, the predominant focus on one aspect of vulnerability overshadows the
other forms of insecurity women face, the differing experiences of women based on other
intersecting identities and issues of non-conflict related sexual violence in the private sphere.
Additionally, the UK’s framing of victimhood contributes to racialised hierarchies that narrates
white women in the UK as secure and minoritised women at home and abroad as insecure.
Whilst the recognition of SGBV in conflict challenges the ‘state-centric’ focus of security and
introduces women’s vulnerabilities into understandings of security and advocates for the
immediate protection and relief and recovery for women and girls who face this violence.
However, this upholds conceptualisations of security as conflict and justifies military means
as a mechanism of protection, which links to the wider critiques of UNSCRs on WPS (Jansson
and Eduards, 2016). This section has demonstrated how the UK’s framing of women as
victims in conflict, in its interpretation of UNSCR 1325, is not about demilitarisation and in
disrupting the structures that lead to SGBV and women’s victimisation, rather it ‘makes war
safe for women’ (Weiss, 2011; Shepherd, 2016), reproduces gendered and racialised
hierarchies and essentialised understandings of women. Whilst there are signs of improving
awareness of the wider structural complexities of gender-based violence, as it stands, this
interpretation is not currently transformative.

6.1.3 Minor Frames: Women’s Needs, Access to Justice and Prevention

The analysed policy documents also include other problem definitions that do not occur as
frequently or as comprehensively as the ‘absence/exclusion’ and ‘victimhood/vulnerability’
frames. These frames introduce further alternate problem definitions and solutions of issues
relating to women and gender in peace and security, although there is considerable overlap
with the absence and victimhood diagnostic frames.

Firstly, there is a diagnostic framing that women have specific needs in relief and recovery,
seemingly beyond their need for protection from sexual and gender-based violence. This
framing recognises their need for access to public services based on their domestic and care
responsibilities, as well as their sexual and reproductive health needs and make up the vast
majority of displaced and vulnerable populations, and ‘displaced women and children are
particularly vulnerable to hunger, disease, sexual and gender-based violence and forced
prostitution’ (UK NAP, 2017:6). Whilst this diagnostic framing aims at broadening the needs
of women, it is in practice heavily linked again to sexual and gender-based violence. As

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mentioned previously, this overt focus on SGBV goes some way in crowding out other issues
and sees women as universally vulnerable to sexual violence. Additionally, the solutions
offered primarily focus on peacekeeping and the military in delivering humanitarian and relief
programmes, which upholds securitised responses and ‘makes war safe for women’ within the
context of traditionally defined times of insecurity (Weiss, 2011; Shepherd, 2016). This framing
does not substantially problematise why women have specific gendered vulnerabilities and
needs in times of violence, based on their exclusion and victimisation within gendered power
structures and why these needs have previously been marginalised in dominant security
approaches, which entrenches men as the norm group within peace and security. Whilst the
needs of women are significant, this framing is about ‘making war safe for women’ rather than
transforming the conditions that result in women having specific conflict-related needs that
have been overlooked. Furthermore, as the solutions to this problem are provided by
peacekeeping or military forces, there is limited potential to challenge securitising and
militarised practice; rather this justifies them.

Secondly, another diagnostic framing is that women do not have adequate access to justice,
and if they did this may prevent conflict in the future. The solutions proposed in the 2018 -
2022 NAP are that the UK ‘will support the improved provision of defence, security and justice
for girls and women, particularly in relation to GBV; increased recruitment, retention and
promotion of women in the security sector; and the building of institutions that are able and
willing to identify and formulate responses to gender-specific gaps and inequality in security
provision’ (UK NAP, 2018: 16). Whilst the ‘access to justice’ diagnostic framing goes beyond
mere protection, it does not meaningfully disrupt the broader framing of women as vulnerable
in conflict to sexual violence and situates women as tools to prevent or solve conflict problems.
In addition, this promotion of women’s justice is not necessarily because it is the right thing to
do, rather that it is because it operationally enhances the prevention of conflict and promotes
stability. It also seemingly links women’s access to justice with women’s participation and thus
makes it a ‘women’s issue’, rather than a normative one. That being said, this framing offers
a potential opening for a more transformative shift if it does work to build institutions that
promote gender-equality and gender-sensitivity, as discussed in the 2018 – 2022 NAP,
however this solution framing is limited as the policy documents do not then consider how this
would be implemented.

Thirdly, another minor diagnostic framing is ‘prevention’, which focuses on both the prevention
of conflict and the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls

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specifically. These issues have been touched on before in this chapter, but this framing
explicitly focuses on prevention, as a pre-emptive solution to the problem of conflict and
SGBV. This prevention framing has the potential to be transformative as it is linked to the
conditions in which these problems are created. However, the diagnostic framing here is
related primarily to women’s participation and not to the gendered drivers of conflict, which
includes understanding the role of men and boys and masculinities in conflict and insecurity.
The UK interprets prevention as enhancing women’s participation in all conflict prevention
activities, in order to ‘help create stable and peaceful societies’ (UK NAP 2017: 12). This
understanding of prevention is understood through a logic of security and militarism rather
than of peace, which constrains how prevention work may be done, as it is situated within
security-focused institutions. The UK interprets the preventative pillar of WPS as also
preventing ‘all forms of structural and physical violence against women and girls, including
sexual and gender-based violence’ (UK NAP, 2018: 7), as well as conflict prevention. Whilst
this initially seems like a transformative turn in understanding structural violence, the spaces
in which the prevention of SGBV is applied are fundamentally constrained by the parameters
of the NAP more widely and its application to traditionally defined conflict spaces. Similarly,
the solutions offered to this are limited in challenging the gendered structures of power that
create the conditions for conflict and why SGBV is prevalent in traditionally defined conflict
spaces, based on a deeper understanding of the wider structures of inequality and
discrimination globally, inside and outside of traditionally defined conflict. Ultimately, whilst
there are small attempts to challenge the structural conditions of conflict and SGBV the
predominant solutions offered to these problem are through women’s empowerment in peace
and security and in society more broadly (UK NAP 2017: 6). This again shifts responsibility for
peace onto women and may also legitimise securitised and militarised initiatives in order to
‘prevent’ conflict or SGBV. While this preventative frame may offer a more transformative
approach to WPS, it is unlikely to have much value for sustainable peace in its current
configuration. This finding endorses Shepherd's (2020) argument that the WPS agendas
articulation of prevention more broadly makes transformation unlikely, if not impossible,
without being reconstructed.

6.1.4 The Meaning of ‘Gender’ in Women, Peace and Security

The meanings that are attributed to gender in the UK’s interpretation of WPS are important for
understanding its transformative potential. In most policy documents, women are seen as a
homogenous group with similar interests, needs, potential and characteristics and gender is
attributed to their biological sex. This is present across the diagnosis and prognosis frames.

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For example, when the diagnosis frame is a lack of representation and participation in peace
and security spaces, the texts mainly take into account the sex of women and their physical
presence, and the provided solutions aim to increase the ‘number’ of women in those spaces.
Similarly, women’s vulnerability is also linked to their ‘vulnerable’ sexed bodies, and the
solution is the need to protect those bodies. Although, within the participation problem, there
is a minor ‘difference’ frame, as women’s qualities and characteristics are deemed to
contribute to ‘long lasting peace’. However, this relies on essentialist understandings of
women and an idea that ‘women’ are representative of all women and notably different to men
and their characteristics. Gender is thus represented as a fixed dichotomous category of
‘women’, which is opposed to ‘men’. Thus the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 is
predominantly integrationist, with a smaller hint of ‘difference’. Women are often conflated with
the concept of gender, and a clear example of this framing is in the 2010 – 2013 NAP, that
outlines how the UK ‘will work to mainstream gender considerations into core working
practices (e.g. the deployment of Female Engagement Officers in support of UK battle groups,
to improve military engagement with female Afghan civilians)’ (NAP 2010-2013: 5). This
entrenches the idea that gender is about women and ‘women’s issues’ and also hinders the
potential for peace and security to be ‘de-gendered’ and to destabilise the masculine and male
dominance of this space, which fits with wider criticisms of the UNSCR’s on WPS (Shepherd,
2008; Puechguirbal, 2010; Basu and Confortini, 2017).

Women are not ‘internally’ differentiated in any substantial way, such by their class, ethnicity,
social status or age. There are hints at the need for an intersectional approach, however this
remains underdeveloped and is only occasionally mentioned. Whilst past scholarship has
problematised the linkage of women with children (Enloe, 2014: 25), the UK often links women
with girls. Table 7 below demonstrates the word frequencies for ‘women and children’, ‘women
and girls’, ‘men and boys’ and ‘men and children’ in the UK’s WPS policy documents and
reveals that women are less often linked to children, but are more often linked to ‘girls’.
Appendix R illustrates these code frequencies in more detail. By framing women and girls as
largely having interchangeable identities, this infantilises women and narrows complex
differences between children and adults. It raises question about whether ‘women and children
inevitably share concerns and experiences of oppression that are best addressed together?’
(Rosen and Twamley, 2018: 1) but this framing also entrenches narratives of women as
caregivers and mothers. Language of ‘men and boys’ is also included, although to a much
lesser extent than women and girls, which also compresses the complexities of men and boys
concerns, needs and identities into one.

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Table 7: Word Frequencies of ‘men/women and children’, ‘women and girls’, ‘men and boys’
in UK WPS Policy Documents

“women
"women and "men and "men and
and
girls" boys" children"
children”

n % n % n % n %
Total (n) /Average Coverage (%) 51 0.04% 1131 0.42% 107 0.03% 1 0.00%

n= frequency, % = coverage

Furthermore, as the policy documents tend to focus on women in both the diagnosis and
prognosis, it is far less about men’s perpetration of violence or their overrepresentation in
peace and security spaces. As outlined in table 8 below, the analysis of the documents
revealed that references to ‘men’, ‘males’ and ‘boys’ are not a core feature of the UK’s
interpretation of UNSCR1325. Appendix S demonstrates these code frequencies in more
detail. The UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 is predominantly about ‘women’,
‘females’ and ‘girls’, which does not destabilise the framing of men, boys and masculine
behaviour as a natural, normal and immutable feature of peace and security. As discussed
previously, men’s victimhood, role as allies and perpetrators, are minor frames (See table 6
above). While this highlights an awareness of the roles men play within peace and security,
the dominant solutions offered are not in problematising or destabilising them as the norm
group. The framing of men and boys as allies does not necessarily mean there is an attempt
to challenge the gendered power structures that underpin their dominance in security and
conflict.

Table 8: Word Frequencies of ‘Women’ ‘Men’ ‘Female’ ‘Male’ ‘Girl/s’ and ‘Boy/s’ in UK WPS
Policy Documents

“women” "men" "female" "male" “girl/s” “boy/s”

n % n % n % n % n % n %
Total (n) /Average
6106 0.90% 407 0.03% 558 0.10% 79 0.01% 1494 0.21% 149 0.02%
Coverage (%)
n = word frequency, % = coverage

As the UK essentially frames gender as synonymous with women and linked to biology, there
are silences surrounding the performative aspects of gender as the UK’s WPS documents do
not engage with masculinities and femininities. The concept of gender can be used as a lens
to uncover the systematic structures that institutionalise male power over women, however,

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this is not how ‘gender’ is conceptualised in the UK’s approach to WPS. As outlined in the
table below, throughout the UK’s WPS documents, ‘femininity’ or ‘femininities’ was mentioned
once, and ‘masculine’ or ‘masculinities’ was mentioned seventeen times. Ten of those
occurrences of ‘masculinity’ or ‘masculinities’ are in the Guidance Note on Strategic Outcome
6 on P/CVE and the significance of this will be explored in more detail in section 6.3 of this
chapter. Although the inclusion of ‘masculinities’ and ‘men and boys’ does not necessarily
translate into transformative behaviour. As Wright (2019: 14) has argued, it can be used
selectively for promoting minority-world governments progressive masculinities vs ‘aberrant
masculinities of racialised men joining non-state armed groups’ or where it is translated as
engaging men and boys in ways that do not challenge structural inequality or ‘reshape
masculine norms’. Therefore, without a nuanced understanding of the performative aspects
of gender, that men and boys are gendered beings and that WPS is situated within a system
of structural gender inequality and power structures, there are constraints in the UK’s
interpretation of UNSCR 1325 for transformative change.

Table 9: Word Frequencies of 'Gender', 'Masculinity/ies' and 'Femininity/ies' in the UK's WPS
Policy Documents

"masculinity/ “femininity/
“gender”
ies" ies”
n % n % n %
NAP I (2006) 26 1.80% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
NAP II ( 2010 – 2013) 94 0.31% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Annual Review 2013 132 0.32% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%

NAP III (2014 – 2017) 131 0.38% 1 0.01% 0 0.00%

NAP III– Country Level Implementation Plan 161 0.35% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%

Report to Parliament 2015 178 0.32% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%

Report to Parliament 2016 42 0.51% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%

Report to Parliament 2017 112 0.56% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
NAP IIII (2018 – 2022) 148 0.54% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Annual Report to Parliament 2018 160 0.50% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Guidance Note: SO6 P/CVE 393 0.87% 10 0.04% 1 0.01%
Annual Report to Parliament 2019 190 0.42% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Guidance Note: SO2 Peacekeeping 221 0.78% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Guidance Note: SO3 Gender-based Violence 154 0.42% 3 0.02% 0 0.00%
Guidance Note: SO4 Humanitarian Response 312 0.93% 3 0.02% 0 0.00%
Annual Report to Parliament 2020 190 0.42% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%

Total (n) /Average Coverage (%) 2644 0.59% 17 0.01% 1 0.00%

n = word frequency, % = coverage

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The 2018 – 2022 NAP attempts to address the overarching focus on women by stating that
“because systemic gender inequality disadvantages women and girls, they are the focus of
our work on WPS. However we also recognise the need to work with men and boys, who may
be opponents of or advocates for gender equality, as well as survivors of gender-based
violence” (NAP 2018 – 2022: 5). Whilst the 2018 – 2022 NAP recognises systemic gender
inequality, which will be explored in more detail in the following section, the UK’s overarching
framing remains mainly on women and girls and it is not about destabilising the structures that
sustain gender inequality, rather it shifts the ‘problem’ of inequality onto women and girls to
solve. This is an integrationist approach to gender mainstreaming rather than transformative.

Whilst the UK’s reference to gender in relation to peace and security could be seen as
progressive, if the concept of ‘gender’ means ‘women’, there is a constraint on what can be
‘imagined’ or ‘implemented’ through WPS as a policy agenda. An enhanced understanding of
the concept of gender as a power structure would enable far more radical policy solutions in
overcoming women’s deprivilege. The language of gender should not be used to ‘sidestep a
focus on “women”’ (Razavi and Miller, 1995: 41) and their priorities and preferences, but
should open up understandings of how women’s priorities and preferences have been
marginalised and thus introduce solutions to destabilise hegemonic masculinity and male
dominance in peace and security. If language such as ‘gender mainstreaming’, ‘gender
considerations’, a ‘gender dimension’ and ‘gender equality’ are synonymous with ‘women’, are
utilised in the UK WPS policies, as the policies are diffused from the cross-government level
into the departmental level, this narrow understanding of gender will be perpetuated. Overall,
the UK’s WPS policy documents do not take into account the socially constructed dimension
of gender in any meaningful way in the diagnostic framing of women’s exclusion and
vulnerability and how this is gender relational. Thus the UK’s approach to gender
mainstreaming in its interpretation of UNSCR 1325 is predominantly ‘integrationist’ and, in
some areas, ‘gender difference’, but it is not transformative.

6.1.5 2018 – 2022 National Action Plan: The ‘Gender Inequality’ Diagnostic Frame?
The UK’s approach to WPS has primarily been focused on problematising the exclusion and
vulnerability of women in conflict, which, as just mentioned, is not a very transformative
approach. However, the 2018 – 2022 NAP demonstrated somewhat of a shift in framing as it
introduced ‘gender inequality’ as a diagnostic frame in a much more significant way than
previous NAPs. The introduction of gender equality as an ‘objective’ contrasts to past framing
of gender inequality as a de facto reality. Although the NAPs are different lengths, the code

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frequencies outlined in Figure 11 below, evidence the lack of references to gender equality
and gender inequality in earlier iterations of the NAP and an increase in the 2018 - 2022 NAP.
Not only has the code frequency increased, the commitment to gender equality has been more
of a foundational dimension of the NAP, as it aims at putting “women and girls at the heart of
our work to prevent and resolve conflict” as “we do this because of our commitment to gender
equality, and because we understand that this is an essential part of building lasting peace
and security” (UK NAP, 2018: 1). Whilst there is still the dominant link to WPS as a mechanism
for building lasting peace and security, the UK is explicitly linking WPS to the long term project
of gender equality. The UK is indicating a shift in its approach by making WPS part of a wider
project about social change, rather than the previous ‘integrationist’ and ‘difference’
approaches to gender mainstreaming. At a surface level, this is potentially transformative, yet
in reality how the UK intends on bringing about gender equality needs to be investigated, as
the meaning of ‘gender equality’ can be ‘stretched, shrunk and bent’ (Lombardo, Meier and
Verloo, 2009).

Figure 11: Code Frequencies of 'Gender Equality' and 'Gender Inequality/ies' in UK National
Action Plans on WPS

Code Frequencies of 'Gender Equality' and 'Gender Inequality/ies' in

UK National Action Plans on WPS
50
40
30
20
10
0
NAP 2006 NAP 2010 - 2013 NAP 2014 - 2017 NAP 2018 - 2022
Gender Equality Gender Inequality/Inequalities

An example of this more transformative approach being included in the NAP is that it
recognises that the ‘social upheaval in conflict and post-conflict contexts offers an opportunity
to address the root causes of gender inequality and enhance opportunities for women to play
an increased role in political decision-making’ (UK NAP, 2018: 8). That being said, this ‘gender
equality’ framing is still a minor frame within the NAP and it still lacks a more broad
commitment to social change and challenging structures of inequality throughout the plan. The
indicators at the end of the document remain limited and there are silences around how the
UK intends on implementing this social change and measuring the impact of this. The NAP

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currently misses an opportunity to widen the scope of WPS to consider gender equality more
broadly and how the UK can promote gender equality in its ‘security’ interventions and
institutions beyond adding more women. It appears a potential opening for a more
‘transformative’ interpretation of WPS has been created, yet as it is currently configured, it
does not go far enough in recognising and destabilising gendered power structures. The
diagnosis of women’s lack of participation and need for protection in security contexts has at
least shifted to also consider wider social, political and economic inequalities between men
and women that result in their exclusion and victimisation, albeit in a minor way.

Additionally, the UK intends on integrating a ‘gender perspective’ which in this interpretation

‘means making the concerns and experiences of both women, men, boys and girls an integral
dimension of the design, implementation, review and evaluation of policies, programmes and
military operations, including monitoring and verification’ (UK NAP, 2018: 10). Whilst this
certainly goes beyond understanding gender as synonymous with women, this understanding
of gender is limited to biological differences between men and women and does not consider
masculinities or femininities or the gendered norms, structures and hierarchies that construct,
constrain and shape the way that men and women experience conflict and security and the
realm of ‘security’ more broadly. Thus the UK’s ‘gender perspective’ highlights difference in
the ‘concerns and experiences’ of women, men, boys and girls rather than challenging the
structures that shape them. Whilst I identify occasional moments of a broader understanding
of gendered hierarchies, structures and male dominance, such as ‘in Nigeria, men dominate
and control social, economic and political life, and women and girls often experience
discrimination under traditional and religious practices’ (UK NAP, 2018: 22), this does not
feature across the documents nor do the dominant ‘solutions’ proposed aim to meaningfully
disrupt these power dynamics.

The UK’s 2018 – 2022 NAP problematises gender inequality and supports gender equality to
a greater extent than in previous iterations of NAPs and WPS policy documents. However, it
currently does not go far enough in offering solutions that aim at disrupting gendered power
structures rather the core focus remains on enhancing the participation and protection of
women in conflict spaces. As this section has revealed, the greater inclusion of the concept of
‘gender’ and ‘gender equality’ does not necessarily equate to a transformative approach to
WPS, as it has been interpreted in ways that largely diagnoses issues of inequality of
opportunity or access and in illuminating biological differences in experiences (Bacchi et al.,
2010). Understanding gender equality as a mechanism for enhancing peace and preventing

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conflict is also potentially problematic in practice, as it ties equality to dominant understandings
of conflict and (in)security rather than gender equality in itself. What is also of particular interest
is that this NAP introduced P/CVE as a diagnostic frame for the first time, which will be
explored in greater detail in the following section.

6.2 Integrating Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism in the UK’s

Interpretation of Women, Peace and Security

The UK began to make links between violent extremism and the WPS agenda in 2015,
following the adoption of UNSCR 2242 in 2014. The UK did make reference to ‘terrorism’ as
a harmful practice in NAP III (2014: 31), however, there was no clear plan of action or further
explanation of this. In 2015, Baroness Verma, the UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State,
made a statement at the UN Security Council Open Debate on Women Peace and Security
that highlighted eight UK commitments to WPS. The eighth commitment stated that

‘the UK will ensure that our overseas work to counter violent extremism includes upstream
activity targeted specifically at women. Women will be at the centre in the delivery of
programming of overseas extremism work, both nationally and locally.’

(Baroness Verma, 2015).

Following this, under the remit of its multilateral work, the 2015 Report to Parliament stated
that ‘the UK led on the drafting and negotiation of the resolution adopted at the High-Level
Review, 2242’ and references Baroness Verma’s speech and the commitment to make
‘Countering Violent Extremism activity more gender-sensitive’ (UK Report to Parliament, 2015:
8). The 2016 Report to Parliament reiterated this commitment and stated that there had been
progress as ‘the FCO has increased its focus on gender and Countering Violent extremism
since October 2015’ and that they had allocated £500,000 in 2016-17 to develop ‘our
understanding of women as victims, perpetrators and preventers of violent extremism. The
aim is to strengthen our partnerships with both global and grassroots women’s organisations
in this field’ (UK Report to Parliament, 2016: 6). Under ‘thematic progress’, the 2017 Report
to Parliament recognised that the evidence base of women in CVE was still emerging.
Nevertheless it outlined the work the UK had been doing on this, such as, holding a roundtable
with experts, co-sponsoring the establishment of a CVE unit within the Commonwealth
Secretariat, which will support women’s leadership in this area at local and national levels’,
contributing to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) to see

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‘what works’ in PVE and fund grassroots community initiatives (UK Report to Parliament,
2017: 12) and its funding of P/CVE projects in Africa, South Asia, MENA and the Western
Balkans, including through ‘enhancing civil society efforts towards the prevention of radicalism
and extremism involving women and girls’. The ‘progress’ outlined here is heavily focused on
funding P/CVE projects, to build knowledge on this matter and put women in position to
participate in P/CVE. This report also outlined that P/CVE would be a strategic outcome in the
next NAP.

The 2018-2022 NAP was structured around seven strategic outcomes, and P/CVE was
‘Strategic Outcome Six’. This strategic outcome was somewhat underdeveloped, as it had no
indicators for success. As a result, the UK government released a guidance note on
‘Implementing Strategic Outcome Six: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’ in
October 2019, almost two years after the NAP was released in January 2018. The UK’s 2018
– 2022 NAP and subsequent guidance note represents the UK’s attempts to integrate the
WPS agenda and P/CVE at its highest level, as the NAP sits at the apex of its strategy on
interpreting UNSCR 1325 and 2242.

6.2.1 Women’s Invisibility in P/CVE

The commitments made at the High-Level Review ultimately focused on the UK’s work on
upstream activity and women’s leadership and participation in CVE efforts. The 2018 – 2022
NAP provided further detail about the represented problem that this policy shift aimed to solve.
The NAP recognised that women and girls could be perpetrators, preventers and victims of
violent extremism, however their roles are often less visible to men and boys. Additionally, the
2018 – 2022 NAP stated that ‘the role of gender is increasingly recognised in contributory
factors’, of violent extremism and ‘the drivers of radicalisation for both men and women can
include (but are not limited to) political and socio-economic factors such as governance deficit,
state failure and individual grievances and gender issues for women specifically’ (UK NAP,
2018: 18). Thus the problem is represented to be, or the key diagnostic frame, is women’s
invisibility in understandings of violent extremism and P/CVE, as well as a limited integration
of gender perspectives into P/CVE programming and in understanding the drivers of
radicalisation. However, it is an acknowledgement of women-blindness of P/CVE and less so
about a problem of gender-blindness as the focus is on women’s experiences and their
‘gender issues’. By stating ‘gender issues for women specifically’ (UK NAP, 2018: 18), this
obviates men as gendered beings with ‘gender issues’ and reinforces men as the norm group
in this policy space.

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Similar to the analysis of the ‘problem holders’ in the UK’s approach to WPS, this strategic
outcome places this problem ‘overseas’ and not in the domestic sphere. The image (See
Figure 12) below is the only image on the Strategic Outcome Six page in the 2018 – 2022
NAP. Despite the victimhood of women being only a minor frame in the discursive problem
representation, the image presented here shows a grandmother and grandchild as victims of
ISIL. The image reinforces common War on Terror tropes of ‘brown women in need of saving
from brown men’ (Spivak, 1988) and invokes narratives of the UK as a civilised protector,
responsible for action and legitimises ‘P/CVE’ intervention on these grounds. This image is
also highly stereotypical as it presents women as victims and women as carers of children.

Figure 12: UK NAP Image on Strategic Outcome 6

(UK NAP, 2018: 18)

Furthermore, what is left unproblematic in this problem representation is that there is no

definition of what violent extremism or what P/CVE is. There is a lot that remains unclear, such
as what is violent extremism, what can be considered as P/CVE, what is not P/CVE, what is
the difference between ‘preventing’ and ‘countering’ violent extremism, how is P/CVE different
to other kinds of development work and what are the boundaries between P/CVE and Counter-
Terrorism. It fails to recognise who is primarily responsible for undertaking this work, such as
whether it is security or development actors. This vagueness is highly problematic as the link
between WPS and P/CVE is very much open to interpretation. P/CVE is also presented as a
normatively good thing, despite the considerable criticisms that have been levied against it (as
outlined in section 2.2.1). There is limited evidence presented to justify the integration of
P/CVE and WPS, and it acknowledges that ‘more evidence is needed on how efforts to prevent
or counter violent extremism can effectively integrate gender perspective’ (UK NAP, 2018:
18). This strategic outcome (and the proposed solution which will be explored in more detail
subsequently) is explicitly linked to UNSCR 2242, the UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action

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to Prevent Violent Extremism and the UK’s commitments at the High Level Review made in
2015, in the NAP. The decision to reference these documents, rather than civil society
consultations, for example, is exemplary of the voice’s prioritised in defining the represented
problem and the drivers behind this strategic outcome and reveals a seemingly top-down
approach.

The leading solution offered for women’s invisibility and ‘gender blindness’ is to ‘ensure the
participation and leadership of women in developing strategies to prevent and counter violent
extremism’ (UK NAP, 2018: 18) and that ‘women will be at the centre in the delivery of
programming of overseas violent extremism work, both nationally and locally’ (Baroness
Verma, 2015). Interestingly, the UK placed P/CVE under the ‘participation pillar’ rather than
the prevention pillar (See Appendix Q). The recognition that women (and girls) play a myriad
of roles in this space and are actively being promoted as leaders in this space can be seen as
progress from the often women-blind nature of P/CVE. From a Feminist Security Studies
perspective, this is a noteworthy disruption of P/CVE as an inherently masculine and male-
dominated space. However, placing women at the centre of P/CVE work has considerable
risks of instrumentalisation. Based on the narrated problem, this approach justifies women’s
empowerment for increased peace and stability and for revealing ‘women’s issues’ related to
VE and P/CVE and the drivers of women’s radicalisation, rather than for equality in itself. This
again links women to ‘peace’ and women’s participation as representative of women’s issues.
Interestingly, the NAP does acknowledge the potential instrumentalisation of women and
argues that this ‘should be considered and avoided when designing and implementing
strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism, which should also explicitly consider
wider UK goals on gender equality’ (UK NAP, 2018: 18). Whilst the recognition of the
instrumentalisation of women is significant; there is little comprehension of what this means
or how to practically avoid this. Furthermore, there is little explanation provided as to why there
is a need to focus on women’s participation in P/CVE specifically and how this is different to
the UK’s push to enhance women’s participation and leadership in peace and security more
broadly.

Within the 2018 – 2022 NAP, there are seven case studies that link the UK’s work in the focus
countries with the first six strategic outcomes. Only one of these case studies makes a link to
the P/CVE strategic outcome, and this is on the UK’s work in Afghanistan and cites ‘increased
female participation in Army-led CVE activities’ (NAP 2018: 19) as an example of the outcome
in practice. As the only practical example used in the NAP of the P/CVE Strategic Outcome,

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this is particularly worrying as it merely fits women into existing militarised procedures (note it
is army-led CVE, not PVE), rather than considering the social conditions that create
insecurities. This is an example of ‘adding and stirring’ of women into military CVE activity and
mechanisms that have statist priorities and is ultimately about enhancing the operational
effectiveness of CVE efforts. It demonstrates how easy it is for this strategic outcome to be
co-opted and for women to be instrumentalised. It also raises questions about the NAP as a
mainstreaming mechanism, as this sets a precedent for acceptable methods of integrating
women into P/CVE that are problematic.

The second key solution offered is ‘mainstreaming gender across programming to prevent
and counter violent extremism’ (UK NAP, 2018: 18). However, much like the analysis of the
UK’s approach to WPS explored previously, the understanding of gender presented here is
deeply linked to biological sex and differences in experiences between men and women.
Furthermore, the strategic outcome states that ‘programmes and approaches can take a
variety of forms according to need, but should incorporate an increasing sensitivity to the rights
and priorities for women and girls and engage with women on the design and delivery of
strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism, which should also explicitly consider
wider UK goals on gender equality’ (UK NAP, 2018: 18). The focus on women’s rights and
priorities appears to be making ‘war safe for women’ and the inclusion of women in the design
and delivery is ‘adding women and stirring’ (Weiss, 2011; Shepherd, 2016). Again, this
approach to gender mainstreaming is thus about integration and difference and is not
transformative. Furthermore, by stating that ‘activities to tackle radicalisation can span a wide
range of social, economic and political fields; all of which can impact on, and contribute to, the
rights, priorities, autonomy and leadership of women and girls’ (UK NAP, 2018: 8), makes an
inadvertent link to enhancing women’s rights, priorities and socio-political-economic position,
although as a secondary outcome of P/CVE not necessarily as a priority, which goes some
way in attempting to justify P/CVE efforts more broadly. Overall, this P/CVE strategic
outcomes diagnostic and prognostic framing is vague and the fundamental aims of this
outcome are unclear.

An Inchoate Outcome?
The NAP does not offer explicit clarity regarding what the strategic outcome aims to achieve
beyond women's greater participation and leadership in P/CVE efforts (which is a solution).
The problematisation of women’s invisibility, ‘gender-blindness’ and the integrationist
solutions offered indicate that without considering women (or gender) the operational

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effectiveness of P/CVE programmes is compromised. Comparatively to the other strategic
outcomes in this NAP, this strategic outcome appears particularly inchoate. This is evidenced
in Figure 13 below, as unlike all the other strategic outcomes in the NAP, strategic outcome 6
did not have any developed indicators. This demonstrates an incognizance and confusion as
to how to measure successful work on P/CVE and WPS.

Figure 13: UK NAP 2018 – 2022: Strategic Outcome 6 Indicators

(UK NAP, 2018: 26)

Whilst indicators can be problematic in that they provide information that appears to be
‘objective, scientific and transparent’ and they seemingly ‘claim to stand above politics,
offering rational, technical knowledge that is disinterested and the product of expertise’ (Merry,
2016: 3 - 4), the lack of understanding as to what meaningful work may look like is deeply
problematic. The NAP was published prior to the details being worked out of what the inclusion
of CVE meant, how to do it and what the aims were. This is possibly a by-product of this
strategic outcome being included in a top-down way, which will be explored in the following
chapter. This suggests that the inclusion of P/CVE was not about fixing specific problems
raised by civil society or grassroots, rather it is an enmeshing of P/CVE to WPS, as it is a
security priority. Furthermore, this lack of understanding also means that there is likely to be
uneven and competing understandings of how to carry out this work and potential
contradictions with other policy outcomes. Whilst the UK uses the phrase ‘strategic outcomes’
to organise its work on WPS, there is no real understanding of what the end goal or ‘outcome’
should be in this work on P/CVE. Despite this, P/CVE was still deemed a significant enough
issue for its inclusion in the NAP and as a standalone strategic outcome. The failure to truly
conceptualise the issues at stake is highly problematic and indicates a particularly ‘top-down’
problematisation. For Cavaghan (2017:52), in order to overcome barriers to gender
mainstreaming implementation, ‘rhetorical policy commitments must be translated into clearly
stipulated processes’, which Strategic Outcome 6 in NAP does not do.

The same statement regarding a lack of evidence and, therefore, no indicators, as seen in
Figure 11, was replicated in the 2018 Annual Report to Parliament. However, the Annual
Report to Parliament in 2019 introduced indicators for this strategic outcome and the 2020

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Annual Report to Parliament used the same indicators (See Figures 14 and 15). The first two
indicators measure whether focus countries reference female participation and leadership in
regards to CVE and whether it commits to gender-sensitive research and data collection in
their own WPS NAPs. The first indicator is particularly limited, as female participation could
be introduced in ways that instrumentalises women and women’s groups for the purposes of
CVE. It also does not measure whether women are participants, rather just that it is referenced
in the WPS NAP. WPS NAP’s are arguably often marginalised and do not necessarily become
applied in mainstream documents (Jacevic, 2019), and this indicator overlooks the difficulties
and constraints of translating NAPs into practice and makes women’s participation a
discursive tick box exercise. It does not give consideration to disrupting gendered power
relations that is required for women to participate within this space. The indicators also reveal
that three of the eight focus countries did not have WPS NAPs in the 2019 Annual Report to
Parliament (2019: 39), and alarmingly, eight of the nine focus countries did not have current
NAPS in 2020, which suggests that the UK’s efforts may be better focused on ensuring focus
countries have sufficient WPS buy-in, in the first place.

Figure 14: Annual Report to Parliament 2019: Strategic Outcome 6 Indicators

(Annual Report to Parliament 2019: 39)

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Figure 15: Annual Report to Parliament 2020: Strategic Outcome 6 Indicators

(Annual Report to Parliament 2020: 32)

The second indicator measures focus countries commitments to gender-sensitive research

and data collection, in their WPS NAPs. This indicator is significant in that it advocates for
more gender sensitivity, which is an essential component of understanding the deeper
gendered structural complexities of P/CVE. However, it does not outline what gender-sensitive
research and data collection might look like. As ‘gender’ can be interpreted in ways that make
it synonymous with women or about differences in experiences between men and women
without understanding gender as a power structure, this is limited. Also, it is possible that
gender-sensitivity can be co-opted to enhance the operational effectiveness of P/CVE rather
than in enhancing women’s security and gender equality. The third indicator considers
whether focus countries reference women or gender in their CT/CVE strategies. Again, while
this indicator may promote the integration of gender and women into CT/CVE mainstream
documents, this does not mean that these concepts will not be interpreted in a problematic
way that essentialises women, securitises them, puts them in positions of risk and reifies
gendered and racialised hierarchies (Allison, 2013; Ní Aoláin, 2016; Heathcote, 2018; Meger,
2018). Also, this indicator treats ‘women’ and ‘gender’ as seemingly synonymous. Overall, this
indicator appears to be a tick-box exercise that is seemingly as a result of an institutional
environment that privileges the use of yes/no indicators and is ‘outcome driven’, which follows
an increasingly technocratic approach to peacebuilding and conflict analysis that aims to
operate in a neutral and efficient manner, which can inspire confidence (MacGinty, 2012).
However, this is a depoliticization of problem-solving and constrains the transformative
potential of the strategic outcome. Additionally, Strategic Outcome 6 does not use the
language of counter-terror, however, this indicator makes an explicit link between counter-

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terrorism policy and WPS. This is an apparent inconsistency and contradiction and highlights
how easy it is for the strategic outcome to be shifted to uphold militarised and securitising
approaches to security. Similarly, CVE and CT are the focus of the monitoring and evaluation
indicators, rather than PVE. Whilst there is difficulty in measuring prevention, the indicators
are about a content analysis of policy documents rather than measuring the success of
P/CVE/CT, so it is unclear why PVE is excluded here.

The deeply complex and challenging nature of integrating gender perspectives into P/CVE
and understanding how gender dynamics influence violent extremism is translated into a
simple box-ticking exercise by asking whether gender-sensitive research or women’s
participation is mentioned in P/CVE documents in focus countries NAPs. These indicators
measure change within the focus countries, which reproduce the idea that this work needs to
happen outside of the UK. This is despite the criticisms that P/CVE/CT measures and
strategies have faced within the UK for (re)producing gendered and racialised hierarchies.
The use of indicators is a mechanism to ‘measure country performance against global
standards and to hold states accountable for their actions’ (Merry, 2016:3) and shifts the
responsibility of the success of this strategic outcome onto the focus countries and away from
the UK. It does not apply to the P/CVE interventions that the UK carries out internationally and
legitimises the UK as an authoritative expert actor who already successfully does these things.
The use of binary measurements of ‘yes/no’, aims to present an objective truth about ‘focus
countries’ engagement with women and gender in P/CVE by only measuring their inclusion in
NAPs or CVE strategies, which oversimplifies the complexities of experiences in and across
the countries. The use of indicators in this way makes the focus countries comparable,
highlights which focus countries are ‘compliant’ with the UK’s standards of ‘WPS and P/CVE’,
despite their different contexts, histories and experiences with violent extremism. Ultimately,
these measurement mechanisms and their logics work to depoliticise the transformative
potential of the WPS agenda by confining success to counting references to women and
undefined ‘gender-sensitive research’.

Overall, the inclusion of P/CVE into the UK’s 2018 – 2022 NAP was highly underdeveloped
when the NAP was published. This reflects the criticisms discussed in chapter two regarding
the UK’s approach to P/CVE as a ‘policy spiral’, that ‘lacks clear initial purpose or subsequent
direction, progression, control and reflection’ which makes it ‘susceptible to unresolved
contradictions or gaps, dramatic direction changes, and uncertain outcomes’ that arise from
‘inexact and contested meanings, objectives, and mechanisms’ that ‘generate dynamics of

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suspicion as much as persuasion’ (Walker, 2018: 725). The initial lack of indicators
demonstrated confusion regarding what successful P/CVE/CT practically looks like through a
WPS lens. This brings into question the drivers of this strategic outcome. The indicators that
were since produced can be understood as largely tick-box exercises that shift responsibility
and focus away from the UK and its approach to P/CVE. The indicators also presented the
concepts of ‘gender’ and ‘women’ as seemingly interchangeable, as are CT and CVE efforts.
This highlights an inadequate understanding of gender and a problematic entangling of
militarised and securitised approaches to violent extremism and terrorism with more
preventative efforts. The diagnostic focus on women’s participation is an example of adding
women into existing securitising and militarised structures, rather than in destabilising the
gendered and social power structures that underlie violence, insecurity, conflict and thus
violent extremism in the first place and women’s social economic and political positions within
that. The central focus on women’s participation wrongly suggests that male change is not
needed in order to bring about women’s participation in this space, nor is it about the male
perpetration of violent extremism and violence more generally. Additionally, women’s
participation is about being valuable for P/CVE efforts, rather than in and of itself and ‘women’s
rights’ are framed as a secondary concomitant effect. This, in the context of the emergence of
P/CVE within the 2018-2020 NAP more broadly demonstrates an approach to gender
mainstreaming that is highly integrationist.

Based on the UK’s speeches, the NAP and annual reports, this strategic outcome is not about
the prevention of violent extremism; it is about countering violent extremism. It does not focus
on societal or structural change; rather it is about trying to integrate women into efforts to
counter violent extremism or terrorism. Additionally, there is an imbalance between the
diagnostic and prognostic framings, the 2018 – 2022 NAP proposes measures to solve a
problem that is not adequately defined and fails to acknowledge the complex reality of the
‘problem’. Finally, the understanding of P/CVE and WPS within the NAP, annual reports and
the outlined indicators of successful work in this space do not attempt to destabilise or
reconfigure the problematic, racialised and securitising aspects of P/CVE, rather it upholds
them.

6.3 The Guidance Note: The Problem of Gender-Blind P/CVE

In October 2019, the UK government published a guidance note specifically on ‘Implementing
Strategic Outcome Six: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’ (UK WPS Guidance
Note on P/CVE, 2019) to provide more detail on how to integrate WPS and P/CVE in practice.

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Interviews revealed that initially, this document was not going to be made public. However,
after civil society advocacy based on the need for transparency and accountability and that
implementing partners needed to be aware of what they were delivering to, it became public.
This document made a strong attempt to address some of the limitations and
underdevelopment of strategic outcome six in the 2018 – 2022 NAP and aimed to clarify what
the strategic objectives are within this space and draws on ‘best practice examples’ to clarify
meaning.

The dominant diagnostic frame in this guidance note goes beyond the participation of women
to problematise the lack of gender-sensitivity in P/CVE approaches, which is framed as
mattering because violent extremism is a threat to peace and security. Again, like the NAP
there is no clear definition of P/CVE or VE. However, the opening section of the document
justifies the need for the integration of WPS and P/CVE because Violent Extremist
Organisations (VEOs) have ‘long recognised the importance of gender in their
communications and propaganda activities, in their recruitment methods, in how they manage
their organisations and any territory the hold; and in how they plan and undertake operations’
and use tactics of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) (UK WPS Guidance Note on
P/CVE, 2019: 5). Therefore, there is a need to ‘recognise and respond to the ways that gender
impacts on individuals identities and agency’ and ‘how this relates to grievances,
opportunities, resilience and vulnerabilities’ and the ‘multitude of roles that women and men
play in both violent extremism and P/CVE’ (UK WPS Guidance Note on P/CVE, 2019: 5). This
largely diagnoses the problem of ineffective P/CVE due to gender-blindness, which is a highly
utilitarian interest for why the integration of WPS and P/CVE matters and appears responsive
or reactionary to VEO’s ‘use’ of gender. This is justified further through the statement that;

‘Not only will this make our P/CVE work more effective and equitable, it will also help us to
avoid harm; and to build long-term peace and security by promoting gender equality and
women’s human rights’ (UK WPS NAP Guidance Note on P/CVE, 2019: 5).

This recognises the broader linkage of gender equality and women’s rights with long term
peace and security, although this is largely linked to P/CVE efficacy, rather than as a goal in
its own right. Whilst it makes sense that by paying attention to the gendered dynamics of
violent extremism (as it is embedded within gendered social, economic and political
structures), there may be positive outcomes for gender equality and women’s rights. However,
by tackling these problems as a dimension of P/CVE, there is a high risk of co-optation and

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instrumentalisation, particularly when gender equality and women’s rights are presented as
secondary to enhancing the effectiveness of P/CVE work.

Much like the NAP, the guidance note does not attempt to define violent extremism. Arguably,
this could be to not restrict its application between departments and actors. However, what
can be drawn from the NAP and guidance note is that violent extremism is represented as a
significant problem that needs addressing as it is presented as a stand-alone strategic
outcome. The problem framing remains highly ambiguous, and it is not clear why there is not
a strategic outcome that looks at prevention of violence more broadly, pathways to violence
or other warfare tactics such as insurgency and guerrilla warfare. Implicitly, this is about
disrupting violence (or terrorism/terrorist acts) that is motivated by extreme ideological or
religious views. While it would be inaccurate to say that women do not face insecurity from
this type of violence, it is unclear the extent to which this is a predominant or most pressing
issue for women’s insecurity. Or whether there are other types of (in)security (traditional and
non-traditional) that would be better placed as a strategic outcome. As discussed in chapter
two, this policy area has been heavily critiqued for its harmful impacts on marginalised
communities (Coppock, 2014; Sian, 2015; O’Toole et al., 2016; Ali, 2020; Skoczylis and
Andrews, 2020), for securitising the social sector (Summerfield, 2016; Goldberg, Jadhav and
Younis, 2017; Ragazzi, 2018; Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2019; Winter et al., 2021) and having
harmful or negative impacts for women specifically (Brown, 2008; Rashid, 2014; Ortbals and
Poloni-Staudinger, 2018). Therefore, questions are raised regarding what the added benefit
of focusing heavily on violent extremism, as separate from violent actors or violence
prevention more broadly? How can this strategic outcome not be used to contribute to
stigmatising communities and further marginalising groups? How can the challenges of
integrating women in this work without instrumentalisation be overcome? The concept of
violent extremism is a highly prevalent feature of current security discourses and is often noted
as one of the biggest threats to peace and security. Therefore, its integration within WPS plays
a role supporting and upholding predominant definitions of (in)security. By introducing gender-
sensitivity to P/CVE through the WPS agenda there is no attempt to destabilise the
fundamental problematic principles of CT or CVE. Whilst there is a focus on ‘prevention’, in
understanding the gendered structures of violent extremism, this is articulated through
securitised and militarised logics, as a mechanism to enhance operational effectiveness and
pre-emptive security practices that bolster security practices rather than in promoting peace.

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That being said, the guidance note offers a far more detailed understanding of the need for
gender-sensitive approaches to P/CVE and introduces some significant disruptions to the
problematic aspects of the UK’s past framing of WPS and P/CVE. It begins with evidencing
the gendered dimensions of violent extremism and violent extremist organisations (VEOs),
including beyond the focus countries and ‘Islamic extremism’, to include extreme right-wing
(XRW) and ethno-nationalist violent extremism groups in Central and Eastern Europe and
within the UK itself (UK WPS NAP Guidance Note on P/CVE, 2019: 9 – 10). Although this is
more of a review of VEOs than necessarily the target of the policy, this goes some way in
disrupting the typical racialised discourses of P/CVE itself and the prevailing
domestic/international, secure/insecure binaries of the UK’s approach to WPS in its NAPs.
That being said, if this understanding remains marginal and the main WPS policy documents
do not begin to consider WPS domestically in more detail, it is unclear if this discursive shift
in P/CVE approaches will be utilised by domestic actors in understanding the need for gender-
sensitivity in P/CVE within the UK context, as the Home Office does not hold any responsibility
for WPS, unlike the FCO, DFID and MOD. It is a selective approach to gender mainstreaming
that does not appear to address the UK’s approach to P/CVE domestically. Furthermore,
whilst the intersectional nature of P/CVE and VE is discussed briefly (UK WPS NAP Guidance
Note on P/CVE, 2019:12), it does not necessarily consider that typically P/CVE/CT measures
have stigmatised the Muslim community and how this can be prevented. This exposes how
this framing does not meaningfully attempt to destabilise or challenge the problematic basic
premises of P/CVE/CT.

What is particularly striking in the guidance note is that the concept of gender is broadened to
consider, although in a minor way, masculinities and femininities. This introduction of
masculinities and femininities provides both opportunities and risks for WPS. The guidance
note recognises the potential for men and women to be preventers, perpetrators and victims
and the differences in their experiences within those and reiterates that gender analysis is
about men, women, boys, girls and sexual and gender minorities. This goes beyond an
understanding of women as synonymous with gender that has been critiqued in the literature
on WPS (see Shepherd, 2008; Hagen, 2016; Basu and Confortini, 2017; Duriesmith, 2019).
That being said, the extent to which the introduction of a masculinities perspective has been
introduced is unlikely to be enough to destabilise the gendered power structures that result in
high levels of male perpetration of ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’. The guidance note does go
beyond an ‘engaging men and boys’ frame to discuss how masculinities can contribute to

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men’s participation in VE groups (UK WPS NAP Guidance Note on P/CVE, 2019: 30) and not
just in the majority world but also in the minority world.

This demonstrates how the UK government tends to be more comfortable with introducing the
concept of ‘masculinities’ when it can be invoked to challenge the ‘violent masculinities’ of
men within violent extremist organisations, but it is not necessarily comfortable with
considering masculinities in relation to militarism and militarised approaches to security used
by minority world governments to justify conflict or intervention (Wright, 2019). Despite
references to white male violent extremism within Europe, this guidance note still sits under
the UK government's WPS work, which focuses on ‘conflict’ spaces in the majority world. This
framing appears to be a nod to the global nature of violent extremism and an attempt to not
reproduce the idea that violent extremism = Islamic extremism. However, where the UK is
practically focusing on WPS, it is about Islamic extremism. This fits with wider arguments
about the ordering of masculinities into racialised hierarchies in WPS discourses, tends to
reinforce logics of white masculinist protection and problematises masculinities ‘over there’
rather than ‘here’ (Pratt, 2013a; Parashar, 2019; Wright, 2019).

However, this masculinities approach within the guidance note appears to tightly link
masculinities with the male body, but it is not only men and boys who perform masculinities,
as it can also be performed by institutions and by women (Tickner, 1992; Hutchings, 2008).
The guidance note makes it clear that ‘it is important not to problematise all masculinities’ (UK
WPS NAP Guidance Note on P/CVE, 2019: 30) and appears to implicitly frame the UK’s
government’s ‘progressive’ masculinities in comparison to those who join violent extremist
groups (Wright, 2019) and goes some way in contributing to what Duriesmith (2017) calls the
‘good men industry’. Additionally, as this document might be applied beyond WPS policy
spaces, the inclusion of masculinities may be (re)interpreted differently, which has the
potential to divert resources away from women (Duriesmith, 2017), for example, if this then
translates into programming on ‘men and boys’ rather than in using masculinities as an
analytical tool. Overall, the shift to include masculinities and femininities within the WPS
guidance note on P/CVE has the potential to introduce a more transformative approach to
gender mainstreaming in P/CVE and security more broadly. However, the current
understanding of masculinities is not necessarily about resisting ‘militarism’ and toxic and
violent masculinities more widely, it is about tackling a specific form of violent extremism.

The solution outlined in the guidance note to the represented problem that P/CVE work is
ineffective without gender, is to ensure that gender-sensitivity be integrated throughout the

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P/CVE context, programme design and delivery. This is outlined in Figure 16 below. There
are four key aspects of implementing strategic outcome six; ‘ensuring the participation and
leadership of women in strategies, designing upstream P/CVE activity targeted specifically at
women, developing gender-sensitive counter-narratives and effective gender-mainstreaming
across P/CVE activities’ (UK WPS NAP Guidance Note on P/CVE, 2019: 12). The focus is
again about adding women to P/CVE practices without defining PVE and CVE work
boundaries and how this is different from CT. As CVE is closely aligned with CT, there is a
high chance that women could be complicit in militarising and securitising practices, which
does not lead to long-term peace. Gender-sensitive counter-narratives are not necessarily
about enhancing the security of women or disrupting gendered power structures but are
responsive to VEO narratives, which is not necessarily a transformative approach. This is
particularly problematic, as a feature of this ‘tool’ in developing counter-narratives includes to
‘build on, and support women’s and girls’ roles in peer and youth networks to ensure the
campaign messages reach different groups of men and women’ (UK WPS NAP Guidance
Note on P/CVE, 2019: 19). This is an instrumentalisation of women, and girls, in delivering
P/CVE messages and efforts and has the potential to put them at risk. The guidance note
does acknowledge many of the criticisms levied against P/CVE for its gendered impacts, such
as issues of focusing on women as mothers, the shrinking space for civil society by VE and
P/CVE labelling and instrumentalisation of women and women’s rights, however, it does not
always consider how to prevent this from happening and at worst, as shown above, explicitly
promotes policy actions that are instrumental and high risk for women.

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Figure 16: Guidance Note on Implementing Strategic Outcome 6 Across the Programme
Cycle Diagram

(UK WPS NAP Guidance Note on P/CVE, 2019: 12)

Whilst the diagram above is significant as it formally introduces gender sensitivity into P/CVE
programmes and in challenging the often gender blind nature of P/CVE as a security strategy,
in reality, it may be very difficult to implement this within a highly masculinised and securitised
space without co-optation and instrumentalisation.

A fundamental problem with integrating gender and P/CVE is the lack of understanding what
‘good’ implementation looks like and how to measure it. The guidance note introduced a tool
to develop a gender-sensitive monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework and provided a
case study for examples of gender-sensitive P/CVE indicators, adapted from a UN
Development Programme and an International Alert Publication. This monitoring and
evaluation framework is useful in understanding some of the strategic priorities of this work.
The monitoring and evaluation framework introduces the following considerations: ‘gender

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equality markers’ and gender-sensitive indicators and sex-disaggregated data to uncover how
P/CVE programming outcomes differ for men and women. This attempts to introduce formal
ways in which ‘gender (in)equality’ can be monitored in P/CVE programmes. Interestingly, the
M&E framework states that ‘as most P/CVE programming is typically intensely focused on
men, it is deeply gendered, albeit not in the usual way’ (UK WPS NAP Guidance Note on
P/CVE, 2019: 24). Using the framing that men-focused P/CVE is not gendered in the ‘usual
way’ reproduces the idea that gender is about women rather than men. Furthermore, the
guidance note states that ‘there is no agreed metric for measuring what successful P/CVE
looks like’ (UK WPS NAP Guidance Note on P/CVE, 2019: 24) and thus need to be contextual
and carried out within communities. Again, this is vague and ambiguous and demonstrates
that there is still a limited understanding of how to carry out this work successfully. That being
said, a level of reflexivity is introduced within the M&E framework as it recognises that ‘M&E
is only as good as those that carry it out and data will be affected by the make-up of the
monitoring and research team’ (UK WPS NAP Guidance Note on P/CVE, 2019: 24).

That being said, it does not provide insight into how to ensure that M&E teams can
successfully ensure that they gather valuable data beyond that they need to ‘understand the
importance of gender sensitivity’ and ‘gather the views of women and men in a safe and
culturally sensitive way’ (UK WPS NAP Guidance Note on P/CVE, 2019: 24). The guidance
note highlights examples of good practice or activities but does not tend to demonstrate clear
outcomes that can be attributed to the UK’s work. This is a fundamental limitation as there is
still a lack of clear evidence as to how this positively impacts women and girls. Similarly, most
of the guidance note covers short term interventions and is unable to link this work to long
term peace and stability. As a permanent member did not write the guidance note of staff, and
as the research interviews revealed, there is no one dedicated staff member to oversee or
implement WPS and P/CVE specifically, this may be difficult to ensure in practice. Building on
the work of Aroussi (2020), who found a number of issues of implementing WPS and P/CVE
in Kenya, this guidance note fails to address a number of questions and challenges of
integrating gender perspectives into P/CVE. For example, how to manage the resistance to
ideas about gender? How to actually prevent women from being instrumentalised for
intelligence? How to overcome resistance to the inclusion of women in highly patriarchal and
unequal societies? How do you prevent only elite women’s inclusion? What should be
prioritised if gender equality and P/CVE operational effectiveness are in disharmony? The
existing literature on P/CVE/CT efforts has demonstrated that women are often overlooked
and where they have been included it has been in essentialising and instrumental ways (Davis,

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2019; Giscard D’Estaing, 2017; Schmidt, 2020), thus there is a need to radically shift
mainstream understandings of P/CVE and the role of women and the dynamics of gender
within that (Gordon and True, 2019: 78 - 79). The guidance note does not necessarily consider
how to change embedded attitudes and understandings on P/CVE (in terms of UK actors) and
also presents concepts of gender in a way that assumes that everyone understands them and
that they can easily be integrated in non-problematic ways.

A key aspect of understanding the UK’s interpretation of P/CVE and WPS is understanding
‘who has a right to speak’ about this issue. This section considers the voices referenced or
discussed in the UK’s WPS policy documents, whereas the following chapter utilises the
interviews to delve deeper into the driving forces behind the integration of P/CVE and WPS
and whose voices were heard in the UK’s interpretation of WPS and P/CVE. The NAP did not
reference gender experts and CSO’s in strategic outcome six in any meaningful way.
However, the guidance note was written primarily by a Stabilisation Unit Deployable Civilian
Expert: Senior Gender, Conflict and Stability Advisor. This was with the ‘support’ of a member
of the FCO Gender Equality Unit and a member of the Stabilisation Unit, as well as being
informed and reviewed by a ‘cross-HMG group of experts’ (UK WPS NAP Guidance Note on
P/CVE, 2019: 4). Additionally a number of HMG partner organisations were also thanked for
their inputs, including ‘RUSI, British Council, ICAN, Mercy Corps, GAPS, International Alert,
ASI, The Stabilisation Network, Aktis Strategy and UN Women’ (UK WPS NAP Guidance Note
on P/CVE, 2019: 4), although the extent to which these partner organisations influenced the
guidance note remains unclear. Unlike the NAP, this guidance note utilises gender experts
and CSO’s in the text, however, this is in the guidance note which can be regarded as a
marginalised document rather than in mainstream P/CVE/CT texts. Furthermore, the use of a
civilian expert to write this document rather than a permanent employed member of UK
government staff exposes limited commitment to ensuring that this document is created and
implemented in the correct ways.

Overall, the diagnostic framing and solutions offered in the guidance note are far more detailed
and cognisant of the difficulties in integrating WPS and P/CVE than the 2018 – 2022 NAP and
WPS annual reports. An attempt is made to promote ‘gender-sensitive’ and ‘gender-
responsive’ P/CVE policy work and ensure that interventions do not negatively impact women
(Gordon and True, 2019). That being said, there are a number of oversights in the guidance
note that have been discussed in this section, such as the predominant frame that this is to
enhance operational effectiveness rather than reflecting the feminist principles of WPS. This

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core framing is problematic as it has the potential to be (re)interpreted by P/CVE actors in
ways that co-opts or instrumentalises WPS and/ women for operational effectiveness. The
introduction of a broader understanding of gender that includes masculinities and femininities
provides opportunities for a more transformative approach to WPS. Whilst this is significant,
this interpretation of masculinities is applied to the violent masculinities of men who join
extremist organisations rather than also in challenging the harmful masculinities that shape
VE and P/CVE. While the guidance note attempts to provide guidance on how to implement
gender mainstreaming in P/CVE (albeit in a limited way), its approach to monitoring and
evaluation reflects an ongoing lack of understanding of how to carry out this work successfully.
The guidance note still does not address differences between PVE or CVE or how different
departments would implement this in practice. Fundamentally, the ‘problematic’ dimensions
of P/CVE/CT are not the problem to be solved, and P/CVE is presented as an acceptable and
unproblematic approach to attaining security; rather the focus is on integrating women and
gendered analysis into that dynamic. This reflects, again, limited transformation.

6.4 Conclusion
To conclude, this chapter has addressed the sub-research question that asks ‘what, and
where, is the problem represented to be in the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242?’.
This chapter contributes to the wider body of literature that analyses WPS policies (See:
Shepherd, 2008, 2011; Puechguirbal, 2010; Pratt, 2013; Jansson and Eduards, 2016;
Duncanson, 2019; Martín de la Rosa and Lázaro, 2019) but provides a novel technique of
analysis by utilising a Critical Frame Analysis methodological approach. The findings reveal
that the UK has most broadly and consistently presented the lack of women’s participation in
peace and security and the vulnerability and victimisation of women (particularly to sexual and
gender-based violence) as the core problem frames that WPS attempts to address. This
narrows the interpretation of, and solutions offered by, WPS to ensuring the participation and
protection of women, rather than about transforming the realm of peace and security and the
gendered hierarchies within it. This contributes to wider debates about the transformative
potential of WPS (Cohn, 2008; Otto, 2010; Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011). Whilst the UK
does introduce other minor frames, such as recognising women’s need in conflict, women’s
access to justice and the prevention of conflict, although these tend to overlap heavily with the
dominant ‘protection’ and ‘participation’ frames.

The location of the ‘problem’ is in the majority world, in traditionally-defined conflict spaces,
which reproduces masculine and state-centric narrations of security and overlooks other forms

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of insecurity. Additionally, the silences surrounding Northern Ireland as a post-conflict
environment highlights a contradictory and selective engagement with WPS. The choice of
WPS focus countries exposes a level of complicity in the (re)production of the UK’s ongoing
colonial and donor-recipient power dynamics. This work thus contributes to the work on WPS
and the production of global racialised hierarchies (See: Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014;
Aroussi, 2017; Shepherd, 2017; Parashar, 2019; Haastrup and Hagen, 2020; Holvikivi and
Reeves, 2020). The choice of imagery within the NAPs tends to also reproduce racialised
hierarchies between white ‘empowered’ women soldiers and brown women in need of saving,
which builds on the work of Achilleos-Sarll (2020). Furthermore, by undertaking an analysis of
the UK’s conceptualisation of gender, it was found that gender was mostly treated as
synonymous with women, although ‘men and boys’ were sometimes mentioned in the policy
document, ‘masculinities’ and femininities was almost always absent. This also constricts the
UK’s approach to gender mainstreaming to being about women and largely places
responsibility on women to enhance peace, without recognising the role that masculinities
plays in these spaces. Interestingly, the 2018 – 2022 NAP demonstrated somewhat of a shift
in WPS framing in that it introduced gender equality as a more foundational feature of its
understanding of peace and security, which creates an opportunity for more a transformative
interpretation of WPS. Although this remains in its infancy, it does not go far enough in
proposing solutions that aim to disrupt gendered power structures that create the conditions
for gender inequality. Nevertheless, this is a positive sign.

An analysis of the key framing of the integration of P/CVE within the UK’s approach to WPS
then revealed a number of interesting insights. In the analysis of strategic outcome six in the
2018 – 2022 NAP, the core problem framing was revealed as ‘women’s invisibility in P/CVE’
and the proposed solution was to enhance women’s leadership and participation. This
strategic outcome was largely underdeveloped in the NAP, which was reflected in the absence
of any indicators for success. This suggested that this integration was a top-down process
rather than in direct response to a specific problem that needed solving. The chapter then
explored the guidance note on P/CVE, that reflected a much more gender-sensitive and
gender-responsive approach to P/CVE, although this was greatly tied to enhancing
operational effectiveness rather than about promoting the feminist principles at the root of
WPS. This raises questions for how this strategic outcome might lead to the co-optation and
instrumentalisation of WPS, and women, beyond this document.

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This chapter thus exposes the limitations of the UK’s interpretation of WPS and its narrow
approach to gender mainstreaming in peace and security. It also demonstrates some key
concerns around the UK’s integration of P/CVE into WPS. This chapter is important because
the way that UNSCR 1325 and 2242 is interpreted at the UK cross-government level, in its
NAPs and guidance notes, has implications for how it is (re)interpreted and diffused into
P/CVE policy and programming outside of the WPS space. Linking back to chapter five, the
UK also deems itself a leader on WPS, and its interpretation of how P/CVE should be
integrated within the agenda may be replicated by other states in their NAPs. Furthermore,
this is significant for the future of the WPS agenda, as the shift to introduce P/CVE in ways
that may easily lead to co-optation and instrumentalisation signifies a potentially growing
aperture between the feminist principles of WPS and its interpretation by states.

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7.0 The Institutional Complexities of UNSCR 1325 and 2242
The UK’s Women, Peace and Security (WPS) documents analysed in the previous chapters
represent the formalised adoption and institutionalisation of WPS and the top-level
mechanisms for accountability and compliance. The analysis unveiled a particular
interpretation of WPS and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE). As this thesis
understands this interpretation as part of a political process, rather than natural or a given, this
chapter now uncovers how and why this particular interpretation of WPS and P/CVE has been
invoked. By paying close attention to the voices of the ‘insiders’ (civil servants) and ‘outsiders’
(civil society organisations and the epistemic community) who were part of the policy
formulation process, this chapter reveals the complex institutional dynamics that shaped the
UK’s interpretation of WPS and P/CVE. By also paying attention to those tasked with
operationalising the agenda, this chapter also reveals the challenges of gendering P/CVE in
practice.

This chapter makes three contributions to current research on gender, security and P/CVE.
Firstly, it contributes to the wider body of literature that examines the ways that WPS is diffused
from the international to the UN member state level {Formatting Citation}. Secondly, it draws
attention to how particular interpretations of WPS are negotiated and shaped by institutional
settings and builds on the Feminist Institutionalism body of work that analyses WPS, by
applying it to the UK context (See: George, 2016; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018;
Haastrup, 2018; Holmes et al., 2019; Thomson, 2019; O’Sullivan and Krulišová, 2020). Finally,
this chapter provides an empirical contribution to the literature on UNSCR 2242 through a
detailed analysis of institutional complexities of the UK’s attempt to integrate P/CVE into its
approach to WPS (Allison, 2013; Chowdhury Fink and Davidan, 2018; Heathcote, 2018;
Eddyono and Davies, 2019; Aroussi, 2020; Asante and Shepherd, 2020; Rothermel, 2020;
White, 2020). This is particularly novel as an analysis of the interpretation and
institutionalisation of UNSCR 2242 in a minority world state has not yet been the focus of
sustained scholarship.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: Firstly, this chapter uncovers some of the “hidden”
challenges to institutional change regarding WPS (Minto and Mergaert, 2018). This provides
insight into the factors that shape the UK’s interpretation of WPS more broadly, which exposes
some of the constraints to the UK’s potential to engage with a more transformative
conceptualisation of WPS. Additionally, this provides comprehension of the context in which
the shift to integrate P/CVE was embedded. Secondly, this chapter scrutinises the policy

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drivers and voices heard in the shift to integrate P/CVE within the UK’s approach to WPS and
its prioritised place as a stand-alone strategic outcome. This section demonstrates that the
role of senior ministerial leadership, P/CVE as a core feature of the UK’s security priorities
and the UK’s leadership identity on WPS were the primary drivers for the inclusion of P/CVE
as a strategic outcome in the 2018 – 2022 UK NAP. Following this, the chapter then pays
attention to the role of civil society actors in the policy negotiation and formulation processes.
This section further scrutinises the agency of the actors within the ‘feminist triangle’ in terms
of impacting the trajectory and interpretation of WPS and analyses the governments
engagement with civil society organisations (CSOs) at the formal and informal level. This
reveals that women’s voices from focus countries had little impact on the UK’s interpretation
of WPS and there was a seemingly selective engagement with CSOs, where certain voices
were spotlighted in the support of the UK’s wider institutional agenda. Together, this section
uncovers how the P/CVE policy shift was largely a top-down process and that there were
certain CSO voices that were amplified, in order to support the UK’s institutional agenda and
justify its approach. Finally, this chapter closes with an investigation into the opportunities and
challenges of P/CVE and WPS in policy and practice beyond the UK’s core WPS documents.
This section pays attention to the voices of practitioners and actors tasked with
operationalising this agenda. This section highlights the difficulty for P/CVE practitioners to
reconcile feminist objectives with operational effectiveness and ensure that CSO and
grassroots organisations can contribute to P/CVE efforts, without risk. To conclude, this
chapter highlights the institutional complexities of WPS and P/CVE in practice. It evidences
the practical risks of co-optation and instrumentalisation of the WPS agenda, as it is tied to
P/CVE, as the enhancing of P/CVE operational effectiveness is seemingly the prioritised goal
rather than women’s lives, needs, priorities and security.

7.1 Interrogating the Institutional Constraints to Gender Mainstreaming in Security

The problematisation and solution framing in the UK’s WPS discourses, that was explored in
the previous chapter, can be seen as an ‘assemblage’, as something that is done rather than
something that is fixed (Bacchi and Rönnblom, 2014). This section thus pays attention to the
voices of those working on WPS, in the UK context, to reveal how formal and informal
institutional norms and rules shape the processes and outcomes of policy change (Mackay,
Kenny and Chappell, 2010; Krook and Mackay, 2011). By uncovering the institutional
dynamics that constrain and enable particular interpretations of WPS, the political nature of
WPS interpretation is illuminated and allows some explanation for its lack of transformative

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potential. This section begins by investigating the institutional dynamics of WPS interpretation
at the cross-government level before turning to the departmental level. Therefore, this section
not only exposes institutional constraints to WPS but also provides insight into the institutional
context in which P/CVE, as a strategic outcome, emerged.

7.1.1 Narrow Visions of WPS

Interviews indicated that fundamentally the UK government does not tend to interpret the WPS
agenda as a feminist project, which immediately constrains its transformative potential. As one
interviewee made the point that ‘
I mean, obviously, you can argue what women, peace and security is, as an agenda.
If you see it as a more radical, kind of feminist vision for peace, then that is just absent.
It’s just not present within UK foreign policy discussions’ (UKGO-01).
This was corroborated by another respondent who, whilst they personally thought WPS is
feminist, argued that
‘working within government, it doesn’t necessarily have to be, it is a peace agenda.
You are trying to promote peace and CVE is a hundred percent part of that’ (UKGO-
02).
These two interviews highlight the implicit tension between the feminist roots of WPS and the
UK’s interpretation of this agenda. It exposes how, as WPS has been diffused, its feminist
foundational principles of peace and equality are diluted and a far narrower understanding of
WPS is then disseminated into departmental policies and practices. One civil society
interviewee linked this narrow interpretation back to the initial focus of UNSCR 1325 which
‘set off on a note that said, if you involve more women, this would be better for you. I
think the language on women’s right, and women’s rights collectively, to participate in
these processes and not just formal peace processes, but everything connected to
that, it’s her right to be protected in conflict and certainly the message on preventing
conflict in the first place through less securitised militarised means … all of that was
fairly diluted’ (CSO-01).
It appears that the initial discourses of UNSCR 1325 have heavily influenced the UK, and this
continues to constrain the potential for WPS to be a feminist agenda in practice. Similarly, the
UK’s strong association to Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) through its
flagship programme, was noted by another CSO interviewee (CSO-02) as restricting
alternative visions of WPS beyond the ‘protection’ and ‘participation’ of women in peace and
security to a more gender-sensitive and feminist envision.

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When investigating the reasons that the UK’s approach to WPS is outward focused, it became
apparent that there is a ‘hidden’ or informal rule that the WPS agenda is for international work,
not domestic. The decision to constrain its application in this way and to not integrate the
Home Office or the Northern Ireland Office into the UK’s WPS institutional structures is
political. When trying to uncover why WPS is not reflected domestically, most interviewees did
not know why or who was controlling that interpretation of WPS, and some were reasonably
happy to accept that it was just how WPS was. One interviewee thought that when the first
UK NAP was designed, it was outward-facing and that is just how it was decided it would be
and they thought that it wasn’t deemed
‘necessary otherwise it would have been done’ (UKGO-13).
This is an example of an informal rule, but also of path dependency as this initial shaping of
WPS in the earlier NAPs has influenced the focus to traditionally defined conflict spaces that
is reproduced across the subsequent NAPs (Pierson, 2004; Minto and Mergaert, 2018). That
being said, not all interviewees so readily accepted the outward-facing nature of WPS and the
silences regarding Northern Ireland, but again could not divulge as to why this was happening.
For example,
‘I’m afraid I haven’t engaged enough with the architecture of it to know where that
blockage is or why that decision was made and why that decision is being upheld’
(UKGO-09).
This interestingly highlights the normalised nature of WPS as outward-facing, as government
actors tend not to question this policy framing. Analysing this further, as the UK interprets
WPS as being about conflict and post-conflict spaces, it is unsurprising that the UK then does
not consider Northern Ireland as it is typically not recognised or framed as a post-conflict
environment by the government (Thomson, 2017b). The exclusion of Northern Ireland from
WPS is embedded with the UK’s governments broader institutional setting, which downplays
the severity of ‘The Troubles’ and overlooks insecurity within its borders. If Northern Ireland
were to be included in the UK’s approach to WPS, this would have to disrupt the wider
institutional norms and rules about how the ‘conflict’ in Northern Ireland is framed.

Along a similar vein, when investigating why certain focus countries are selected over others,
the interviews revealed the deeply political nature of these choices. For example, it is not just
about where there is conflict (as there are traditionally defined conflicts in South America and
Ukraine, for example), but the focus countries are reflective of the UK’s wider security
commitments and narratives. The analysis of interview data demonstrated a normalised
understanding that funding and resources are constrained to countries that fit with the UK’s

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foreign policy. One civil servant respondent revealed that Myanmar is seemingly
uncomfortable with being one of the UK’s WPS focus countries (UKGO-02), yet the UK has
them as one anyway. This links back to discussions about the reproduction of colonial logic in
WPS approaches (Haastrup and Hagen, 2020) and a level of paternalistic thinking that
sustains racialised and imperialistic narratives. Similarly, the respondent discussed how
consultations had pushed for women’s movements in focus countries, such as Myanmar, to
have a form of ownership over the UK NAP, which was outright rejected and the interviewee
considered it
‘a request that is like kind of naïve’
as
‘I mean they aren’t paying UK taxes’ (UKGO-02).
This is a self-imposed limitation to what the NAP could be, based on whether or not women
pay taxes in the UK, despite the NAP being specifically about women not in the UK, which has
the potential impact on those women’s lives. This demonstrates a prioritisation of minority
world voices, aims and ambitions for WPS in the UK’s NAP, despite it being about countries
in the majority world. This links to Shepherd's (2016: 325) argument that WPS has become
divergent from the foundations of WPS as a civil society project that takes seriously the
experiences and expertise of women and women’s organisations. Rather it is seen as a way
to equip minority world security experts with tools to apply to conflicts in the majority world. By
understanding WPS in this way, the UK does not have to drastically consider domestic
(in)security or wider societal inequalities and problems within its borders. The findings
presented here contribute further practical evidence to the scholarly conversations around
WPS and NAPs and their role in (re)producing globalised racial hierarchies (Miller, Pournik
and Swaine, 2014; Aroussi, 2017; Shepherd, 2017; Swaine, 2017; Haastrup and Hagen,
2020), by exposing a particular path dependency in the UK’s understanding of WPS and the
informal institutional rules and norms regarding its application.

7.1.2 Baby Steps and Small Victories: Misunderstanding or Resistance?

Whilst the previous section explored some of the top-level institutional constraints to a feminist
transformative interpretation of WPS. This section now highlights some of the challenges of
implementation as it is (re)interpreted and diffused into departmental practices. Much like the
overarching understanding of WPS as not necessarily feminist, there is seemingly a particular
resistance to the language of ‘feminism’ or ‘feminist’ within the UK government and its
approach to security. As one interviewee put it:

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 ‘I would never use the word feminist in any of my work. I’d stay well away from it, even
if what we’re trying to do is achieve gender equality, even when we talk about gender
transformation work and not just mainstreaming. I still wouldn’t use it because I think
it would create a reaction that is unwanted and actually unhelpful. There is an argument
to kind of use it to desensitise it a bit but I am certainly not in that space yet’ (UKGO-
09).
Resistance to the language of feminism and feminists exposes an institutional culture that
lacks an ability to engage with the social justice dynamics of gender inequality and politicises
feminism to the point that this language tends not to be used. Similarly, several interviewees
made the point that to get ‘mainstream’ actors on board, they needed to promote the
operational benefit of gender mainstreaming, rather than it being just about social justice. For
example, an interview revealed a need to
‘do a better job of educating our colleagues on what it means to be gender-sensitive
and that this doesn’t mean doing extra work, it means doing the job that you are doing,
but better. That’s not only because it’s about the human rights of these women but it
will make them deliver better programmes’ (UKGO-04).
Whilst a push towards greater gender-sensitivity is promising, this statement is also somewhat
problematic as it ties women, and gender equality, to the success of operations, which
ultimately deteriorates the potential of WPS to transform the security environment. This
represents a co-optation of the agenda, which validates the concerns of many feminist
scholars (Stratigaki, 2004; Reeves, 2012; de Jong and Kimm, 2017). Several interviewees felt
they needed to take ‘baby steps’ or focus on ‘small victories’ in orchestrating gender
mainstreaming. For example
‘I think there’s a lot of colleagues maybe not wanting to do it wrong, so not doing it, but
actually baby steps… if you can just do a gender analysis, then that’s better than being
perfect’ (UKGO-04).
This highlights some of the challenges of being a ‘femocrat’ in that you may have to make
concessions to gain any form of change. This reveals limited space for transformative change
in some contexts but also evidences an institutional culture where inadequate implementation
of gender-sensitivity and analysis is reasonably normal. Thus a limitation to gender
mainstreaming in the UK security is a lack of wider institutional knowledge of gender and how
this is relevant to work within conflict and violence.

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Whilst limited knowledge about gender is a constraint, there is also a misunderstanding of its
relevance to the work of individual actors and the programmes they work on. As argued by
one interviewee;
‘I think the biggest challenge is peoples understanding of gender and therefore gender
inequality’ and ‘they don’t think of gender equality as a fundamental part of the causes
and consequences of conflict and therefore they don’t perceive it as a strategic issue
in the same way we think of serious and organised crime (SOC). SOC is a fundamental
part, driver and consequence of conflict in fragile states and so is gender inequality.
But people don’t perceive it in that way, even when you present them with the evidence
that there is, there is a really strong sense that it is not’ (UKGO-09).
This quote suggests that in some areas of security work there is somewhat of a resistance to
engaging with the concept of gender and a resistance to learning about its relevance.
Correspondingly, when questioned about the challenges of translating WPS into practice,
another respondent suggested that:
‘I think people generally are really receptive to the idea of it (WPS). I think there is often
a challenge in translating what people are very happy to do in principle and then
translating that into practice if it doesn’t necessarily fit with their ideas for how they
want to design their programme or how the implementing partner has presented that
programme and how do you do it in a way that is not just an add on or a piece on the
side?’ (UKGO-12).

Although some actors are far more receptive to WPS, this does not necessarily mean it is
integrated into their practice, which constrains WPS to rhetorical commitments. It is also about
what is prioritised, and attributed value in security work. It indicates that WPS, and the insights
it promotes, is a secondary priority rather than as an integrated and fundamental part of
security practice. When probed further as to why this might be the case, the interviewee
suggested that
‘if you’re under quite a lot of pressure to deliver something and deliver it quickly, and
people just sort of have a lot of demands on their time, it can be quite a time-consuming
process to do’ (UKGO-12).
This suggests that actors can quickly side-line WPS efforts when resources, such as time, are
constrained, demonstrating an overall lack of importance to this work. Overall, it is clear that
whilst there are rhetorical commitments to WPS there is a distinct challenge in translating this
into practice that crosses misunderstanding, resistance and lack of engagement. It appears

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that WPS or gender mainstreaming becomes easier to implement when there is a link to
operational effectiveness.

7.1.3 Women, Peace and Security and the Ministry of Defence: Fighting its way into military
thinking
This section now briefly zooms in on some of the challenges of implementing WPS in the
context of the MOD. This department is the most securitised and militarised of the UK’s WPS
actors, which introduces specific challenges. For the MOD, a respondent highlighted that the
2018 – 2022 UK NAP
‘was still a bit too theoretical and didn’t quite provide enough advice on how to actually
implement it. Whilst the department agreed with it they were like… great but how?’
(UKGO-05).
As a result, in January 2019, the MOD published a Joint Service Publication (JSP1325) on
‘Human Security in Military Operations’ (gov.uk, 2019b). The use of the language of ‘human
security’ and ‘human security advisors’ was linked to the ‘move from NATO’ and a respondent
claimed that:
‘we found that it got a lot more traction with people because I think with a military
audience, and some of the ages we were trying to speak to and well, a very heavy
male audience… human security was going to have a lot more traction and its worked.
It’s a bit sad that this has happened with our internal audience, but it is to have the
same effect. There was also a bit of a misunderstanding about using Women, Peace
and Security, that then it would only be about women and also it didn’t quite capture
the fact that women could also be actors and not just passive victims of war. So instead
of gender advisors they are also human security advisors and that really empowers
them to have decision-making in theatre and when they are on operations’ (UKGO-05)
This statement, again, highlights the concessions that are made to ensure that WPS is seen
to be relevant in different contexts, particularly those that are masculinised and militarised. It
shows an apparent resistance to the language of women and gender. Interviews revealed that
the word ‘women’ was too constricting or exclusionary as it was understood as just about
women and not about human rights, children or men more generally. Thus the shift to using
‘human’ rather than ‘women’ is evidence of the military disassociating with women and
concepts of gender equality and women’s rights and is a evident dilution of the language of
gender and the feminist principles of WPS. Furthermore, the discursive shift to use language
of ‘human security’ in the MOD’s interpretation of UNSCR1325 and the UK’s 2018 – 2022
NAP to make it more palatable to a militarised and masculine audience is telling of the ease

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in which WPS is morphed or evolved into something different through, what Krook and True
(2010: 117) call ‘critical internal discussions’. It is this type of discursive normalisation that
demonstrates a constraint and opportunity of WPS, as its ‘vagueness’ has resulted in a greater
chance of it being implemented in the MOD as it can be adapted to suit the institutional context
(Joachim and Schneiker, 2012). Elgström (2000: 457) argues that new gender norms have to
‘fight their way into institutional thinking’, in competition with traditional established norms and
whilst these norms may not be in direct opposition to gender equality, they may be prioritised
(Joachim and Schneiker, 2012). This is seemingly the case for the MOD and WPS and reveals
a key tension in that WPS becomes an interpretation of a male military audience.

Furthermore, JSP 1325 is ‘a statement of policy for the implementation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and additional UNSCRs on women, peace and
security (WPS), children in armed conflict (CAAC), Protection of Civilians (POC) and human
trafficking into military activity’ (JSP1325 Guidance: ii). As the MOD also merges WPS with
children and the protection of civilians, this reinforces infantilised narratives of women and
again links them to vulnerabilities in conflict and in need of protection. It should also be noted
that the understanding of Human Security presented here is not necessarily about a
transformation of the MOD to change the referent from the nation-state to the human, but
rather is about integrating humanitarian and human rights elements into its approach to peace
and security. It should also be noted that UNSCR 1325 remains isolated from the UK’s MOD
Human Resources policy document ‘A Force for Inclusion: Defence Diversity and Inclusion
Strategy 2018 - 2030’. Whilst the ‘enhancing women’s participation’ principle of WPS may be
being applied within the MOD, the silences around UNSCR 1325 and WPS in its HR policy
document is again evident of an informal rule that WPS is an outward-facing policy, despite
the inadequate levels of diversity, including in regards to women, in the MOD.

The analysis of the interviews also revealed difficulties in soldiers understanding the relevance
of WPS to them as they are ‘war fighters’, and their understanding of security is not necessarily
expanded to the protection of women from sexual violence as an example. Shifting
understandings in the way that security can be provided is complex and how soldiers
understand what their role is, is part of the institutional history, military doctrine and the training
that military are provided with, and WPS has to ‘fight’ its way into ‘institutional thinking’
Elgström (2000: 457). In terms of implementing WPS in the MOD, one interview provided
critical insight into the difficulties with integrating concepts and ideas about gender into such

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a masculinised and militarised institution and the need to consider ‘militarised masculinity’ and
the reasons soldiers join to military. They stated,
‘you have to be careful and sensitive, and quite rightly so, in terms of how you talk
about it and also the level of pushback you might get which may be motivated by things
other than pure objective implementation of policy’ (UKGO-09).
This reveals the need for sensitivity by femocrats when disrupting these institutional norms
and values, but also highlights the high risk of pushback in this context. In the case of the
MOD, concepts such as ‘gender equality’ or ‘feminism’ can still be contentious. Another
respondent revealed that they experienced pushback and were encouraged to change the
words ‘gender equality’ in a presentation, they said they were told
‘to pick your battles and you’re going to alienate people who are reading this slide with
those words. That was gender equality not feminism or anything of the sort. I was quite
shocked actually because I’ve not experienced that really’ (UKGO-09).
This highlights how, again, those working on gender and WPS must make certain strategic
decisions to make an impact in militarised and masculinised contexts that may be resistant to
gender and highlights how the MOD audience is particularly challenging.

Overall, this section contributes to the extant research on the interpretation and
implementation of WPS and captures the complexities of the UK’s interpretation of WPS but
also evidences some of the factors that shape and constrain how it is translated into practice.
It pays attention to some of the “hidden” challenges to institutional change regarding WPS
(Minto and Mergaert, 2018). By listening to the voices of those who work on WPS, this chapter
has provided insight into and additional layers of understanding regarding how WPS is
diffused from the UNSCR’s into state-level interpretation and further into departments and
‘mainstream’ actors practices. Whilst this is not a comprehensive institutional investigation, it
has highlighted some of the key institutional constraints and complexities that actors who work
on interpreting and operationalising WPS in the UK context face. This research has further
illuminated and confirmed some of the tensions that were identified in the previous chapter on
the UK’s WPS policy.

The key findings that emerged from this part of the research are that the UK does not
necessarily see WPS as a feminist agenda, which limits its transformative potential. There has
been a particular path dependency surrounding where the UK deems WPS to be applicable
that stems back from its original interpretation, there is limited understanding by the civil
servant interviewees and they tend to accept this as an informal rule. The UK’s choice of focus

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countries was also revealed to be deeply linked to other political and strategic priorities that
reproduces colonial logics. Another key issue, as WPS is diffused again from the cross-
government level into practice, that whilst people are not necessarily resistant to WPS, there
is a misunderstanding around how the agenda and gender mainstreaming is relevant to their
work if it is not tied to enhancing operational effectiveness and it is likely to be side-lined if
actors are under resource constraints. Furthermore, by zooming into how the MOD interprets
and institutionalises WPS, this section has revealed that there has been a (re)interpretation of
WPS to suit the militarised and masculinised audience and institutional culture. By shifting the
language to ‘Human Security’, to suit this audience, the WPS agenda is morphed into
something different than its original aims. Ultimately, there are a number of concessions and
strategic decisions that those working on WPS, and as gender advisors, that have to be made
in order for impact and change. Thus the positionality and work of civil servants working on
WPS and as gender advisors is paramount to its implementation. This section has raised a
number of key issues for the interpretation and institutionalisation of WPS but also highlights
opportunities for an even deeper contextual interrogation into how ‘mainstream’ UK actors
resist, misunderstand and engage with WPS.

7.2 The P/CVE Turn: A Top-Down Process

Chapter six illustrated that the UK’s integration of P/CVE as a stand-alone strategic outcome
within its 2018 – 2022 NAP on WPS initially focused on women’s lack of participation and
leadership in P/CVE efforts. This has since evolved (in the P/CVE and WPS guidance note)
to problematise the gender-blind nature of P/CVE, primarily on the basis that this impacts
operational effectiveness. This problem framing is a part of a political process and thus should
not be treated as a natural or neutral progression in the UK’s approach to WPS. Therefore,
the sub research question being asked here is ‘how and why did Preventing/Countering
Violent Extremism appear as a key feature of the UK’s approach to Women, Peace and
Security?’. Elite interviews and desk-based research provide insight into the policy drivers and
voices heard in the policy formulation process and decision-making, which provides a nuanced
understanding of how WPS is negotiated and operationalised in practice in the UK and
exposes the micro-politics of the integration of P/CVE into WPS. This is significant as it
provides evidence for WPS practitioners, advocates and academics of the factors that
constrain and provide opportunities for the diffusion of WPS as well as its transformative
potential. This section contributes specifically to the emerging research that explores the
P/CVE/WPS nexus (Ní Aoláin, 2016; Chowdhury Fink and Davidan, 2018; Heathcote, 2018;

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Eddyono and Davies, 2019; Rothermel, 2020; White, 2020) and considers whether this policy
shift represents a co-optation and a hijacking of the agenda.

7.2.1 P/CVE Policy Drivers

Senior Leadership and Institutional Decision-Making Structures
A key insight from Feminist Institutionalism in terms of understanding stasis, change and
backsliding in terms of gender mainstreaming is the position of feminist actors (Chappell and
Mackay, 2020). Chapter five explored the positionality of the UK’s feminist actors and of those
working on WPS as ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. However, the impact of senior leadership and
institutional decision making structures on policy outcome was particularly influential in the
inclusion of P/CVE as a strategic outcome. The role of Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, who was
the minister responsible for the WPS thematic area and also the Prime Minister’s Special
Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict, was cited by a number of
respondents as the key reason for the addition of P/CVE as a strategic outcome in the 2018
– 2022 NAP. Whilst the NAP has seven strategic objectives, an interviewee stated that
‘originally there were six in the early discussions, so CVE wasn’t included and during
the consultations with civil society it was presented as these are the six. The seventh
one on CVE was brought in at quite a late stage in the development of the NAP
because the minister, Lord Ahmad, had said it needed to be there’ (UKGO-01).
CSO interviews also draw attention to the politicisation of CVE in the context of the NAP:
‘(I)t was made very clear to us that that was a ministerial priority, fairly last minute. Or
like a late addition, not last minute but a late addition’ (CSO-02).
This demonstrates the role of critical actors, in this case, political actors in shaping the
trajectory of the WPS agenda. Feminist Institutionalism draws attention specifically to the role
of actors in constraining the options, paths and choices available (Mackay, Kenny and
Chappell, 2010). As an individual, Lord Ahmad was previously the Minister for Countering
Extremism between 2015 to 2016 (gov.uk, no date e). As one interviewee put it:
‘I think my understanding was that as foreign minister with responsibility for CT and
WPS he thought these things should be connected and I suppose CT and CVE are a
very high priority for the UK government and so he felt that it should be represented’
(UKGO-01).

Previous roles and expertise of the political actors involved in the development of the NAP
thus play a key role in determining the shape and focus of the policy agenda.

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Another interviewee suggested that the minister may have other motivations for the inclusion
of P/CVE, as one CSO respondent thought that
‘the specific event was the minister’s input and you know every minister by and large
wants to have their own legacy issue’ (CSO-01).
Thus the identity of senior leadership actors and their career considerations also has the
potential to shape policy shifts regarding WPS. For example, previously, William Hague
carved out clear policy ownership and notoriety in regards to PSVI (Davies and True, 2017).
Furthermore, whilst individual actors are important, the wider institutional structures and
decision-making hierarchies enable this power dynamic. As a CSO interviewee stated:
‘decision-making in government is so top-down. The steer comes from ministers, the
detail comes from civil service and then a lot of it is down to individual people and how
willing they are to work with external people’ (CSO-01).
Whilst the position of civil society will be explored further later in this chapter; interviews made
it clear that the ministerial and senior leadership decision-making constrained and limited the
potential for an alternate approach to WPS or the removal of P/CVE as its own strategic
outcome. It is evident that individual actors (civil servants) can also constrain or provide
opportunities for deeper and more meaningful challenge to those decisions. Ultimately, this
suggests that there is an institutional structure where senior leadership is prioritised over civil
society consultation and the voices of those targeted by the UK’s approach to WPS.

P/CVE as a Security Priority

The second key driver of the UK’s shift to integrate P/CVE as a WPS strategic outcome was
the prioritisation of tackling violent extremism, as it was regarded as one of the biggest
threats to the UK’s national security. One CSO interviewee argued that in 2017, which was
during the time the NAP was being developed,
‘in the UK, there were a series of terror attacks, so that kind of heightened the political
opportunity’ (CSO-01)
and,
‘there is political interest in CVE; there is arguably more public buy in to something like
CVE. In the context of scepticism around aid and international interventions, politically,
you are able to make a stronger case for international interventions and UK domestic
security’ (CSO-01).
This is problematic as it ties the trajectory of WPS to what is politically salient at the time and
reflects certain events highly publicised and sensationalised events rather than necessarily
about the lives and priorities of those on the receiving end of the UK’s WPS strategy. Whilst it

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is acknowledged that P/CVE is gendered and applying a gender perspective is necessary, the
prioritised position within the UK’s WPS NAP was not natural or a given. At an institutional
level, the UK government is structured in a way that advantages state security and particular
ideas about security over alternate visions. The UK has a particular economic and political
investment in P/CVE/CT and much of its wider approach to security is orientated around the
fundamental principles of P/CVE/CT. As a result, the actors who shape the UK’s interpretation
of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 are embedded within an institution that understands and
(re)produces a specific type of (in)security, which has an impact on the options available to
them. Linking back to the feminist literature on P/CVE/CT and Feminist Security Studies, as
P/CVE has received high levels of attention in the UK’s security strategy and practices, in
recent years, this is not necessarily reflective of the needs of women. P/CVE is a narrated
security threat that has been largely a masculinised and state-centric understanding of
insecurity (Cohn, 2011, 2013; Ní Aoláin, 2016), which limits how we can think about security,
whose security matters and how it might be achieved (Wibben, 2011:65).

Another interviewee justified the connection to WPS based on the salience of P/CVE through
the statement:
‘it is kind of unreasonable for a peace and conflict focused strategy to not address the
changing nature of conflict’ (UKGO-02),
and ultimately,
‘if you want to be part of that conversation, you’re going to have to address that’
(UKGO-02).
From this perspective, the attachment of P/CVE offers an opportunity to boost the authority or
standing of WPS within the official/governmental agenda. In other words, it assumes that
without engaging in P/CVE the ability to shape that policy area is then constrained, which for
some may be more problematic than non-engagement at all. That being said, in this instance,
it also may reflect a shaping of the agenda in ways that is increasingly less about feminism.
This connects to the wider research puzzle of this thesis, whether or not feminists should
engage with P/CVE, which will be discussed further in the final conclusion chapter.

Following on from the previous point, this suggests that WPS gains momentum when it
operates comfortably within the UK’s particular way of thinking about peace and security
(Shepherd, 2016). Similarly, another civil servant respondent stated
‘if you have got political support then you have go with it. Because if there's any way
of getting gender on any agenda, then that’s what our team push for’ (UKGO-04).

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This further highlights the ways in which those who work on WPS or gender mainstreaming
have to make strategic decisions, or in some cases concessions, in order to make an impact.
This attitude was further corroborated by a CSO respondent who also highlighted that:
‘civil servants were saying to us ‘well it’s good to integrate WPS into this because we
can get more resources for it, because there are more resources for CVE’ (CSO-01).
However, this has implications for the long-term buy-in of WPS if funding and resource is
attached to whatever is politically popular at the time, but also negative implications for the
oversight of non-traditional or ‘feminised’ understandings of (in)security. For one CSO
interviewee,
‘it felt like a cheap offer because you’re saying surely all we care about is the money’
(CSO-01),
rather than WPS being guided by social justice and doing what they felt was the right thing.
The interviews here suggest that there is a wider institutional marginalisation or oversight of
WPS, when it is not tied to traditional understandings of security. Overall, the high status of
P/CVE on the UK’s security agenda as a driver of the integration of P/CVE as a strategic
outcome in the UK’s approach to WPS is problematic, as it ties WPS to masculinised and
traditional understanding of (in)security.

The UK’s position as the vanguard on WPS influenced the discourse on P/CVE and led to its
inclusion in the 2018–2022 NAP. As discussed in chapter five, the UK government also takes
pride in its leadership on WPS at the international level and its position as penholder for WPS
at the UN Security Council. Reflecting on the process, a civil servant recalled that these factors
resulted in a feeling
‘like we wanted to be leading the charge on this’ (UKGO-04).
It is clear that the UK, as an institution, was influenced by the need to uphold an ‘image’ or
‘reputation’ as a global leader and as ‘institutions rely heavily on their image and their
reputation in order to generate external legitimacy’ (Holmes et al., 2019: 223). Additionally,
the UK’s external relations and positionality with other states also contributed to this as
reflected on by the same interviewee,
‘a couple of other like-minded countries have CVE in their National Action Plan and we
wanted to keep with them at the forefront’ (UKGO-04).
States are socialised in norms that prescribe and proscribe appropriate behaviour (Finnemore
and Sikkink, 1998), and the international normative context sometimes influences the diffusion
of WPS (True, 2016), and in this case, this has had an impact on national-level policy-making.
The integration of P/CVE into the UK’s approach to WPS has been shaped by the emerging

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norms of international society. Furthermore, this is not only significant for policy within the UK
context, as the UK constructs itself as an expert on WPS and a champion of its principles, it
could influence or contribute to shaping other states or regional organisations interpretations
of how P/CVE and WPS can be integrated. Based on the analysis of policy documents in the
previous chapter, the UK’s approach is narrow, non-transformative and largely about
enhancing operational effectiveness, which has wider implications for the reproduction of
particular ways of thinking about WPS.

Overall, this section has highlighted three key drivers of the UK’s policy shift to integrate
P/CVE within its approach to WPS. These being 1) the role of senior leadership, 2) the
prioritised position of P/CVE on the UK’s security agenda, and 3) the leadership position of
the UK on WPS and the need to be at the forefront of WPS innovation. This highlights that the
integration of P/CVE into the UK’s approach to WPS was a top-down process. It demonstrates
how actors in senior leadership positions hold strong influential capacity for the trajectory of
the WPS agenda and the attention given to it within the upper echelons of government. Whilst
this can be beneficial for the influence, and attention garnered for WPS, it also means that
WPS can be interpreted in ways that do not necessarily reflect the needs and priorities of the
women’s lives it targets but rather is a co-optation of the agenda. The tying of WPS to
traditional, masculine and state-centric understandings of security and security threats
provides an opportunity for the further resourcing of WPS, yet it may lose its feminist potential
by doing so. Finally, the policy driver that relates to the UK’s need to be leading on WPS could
be seen as a positive indicator of the UK’s commitment to WPS. However, it raises questions
about how it may be able to influence other states to introduce P/CVE into WPS in ways that
lead to co-optation and instrumentalisation of WPS.

7.2.2 Cautionary Counternarratives

The previous section made it clear that the policy drivers for the integration of P/CVE as a
strategic outcome in the UK’s 2018 – 2022 NAP were largely top-down. Whilst the expansion
of WPS into another area of security policy might suggest the growing recognition of the
importance of WPS within peace and security, the particular case of P/CVE has proven to be
a divisive and somewhat controversial topic, as discussed in chapter two. Therefore, this
section turns its attention back towards the voices of the other two points in the ‘feminist
triangle’, civil society organisations (CSOs) and epistemic communities, to uncover their role
and position regarding this policy shift. This section begins by paying attention to the formal
consultations and submissions during the development of the NAP and the UK government-

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funded focus country consultations carried out by GAPS. The analysis reveals high levels of
caution and concern regarding the potential for co-optation and instrumentalisation due to
linkages between P/CVE and WPS. Additionally, P/CVE was not found to have been deemed
a policy area of significant priority for women in focus countries. Following this, informal
consultations undertaken with other CSOs are uncovered, which exposes how the UK aims
to listen to a ‘diversity of voices’ in the policy-making process. Yet, there is a real concern that
the UK government selectively engages with CSOs in so far as they support the UK’s
institutional agenda.

Silences and Prudence

The 2018 – 2022 NAP was published in January 2018. In the build-up to this policy document
being released, the UK formally consulted with CSOs, women’s rights organisations (WROs)
and epistemic communities regularly. It also allocated resources to in-country consultation.
On the surface, this demonstrates a strong commitment to engaging with CSOs and in hearing
women’s voices in shaping the UK’s approach to WPS. However, this section examines the
positionality of organisations, and the voices heard in the inclusion of P/CVE as a strategic
outcome.

In February 2017, the UK government put out a call for responses on the 2018 iteration of the
UK NAP. In April 2017, the GAPS network submitted a response called ‘Informing the new UK
National Action Plan’ (GAPS, 2017a). In terms of P/CVE, the GAPS network response made
a small reference to CVE under the framing of ‘policy coherence across government’, by
stating that ‘for initiatives receiving increased attention and resources, such as the Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) agenda, it is imperative that WPS objectives are integrated fully into
all policies and strategies to ensure that women and girls are not instrumentalised and that
the realisation of their human rights does not become secondary or contingent upon other
objectives’ (GAPS, 2017a: 9). This is a recognition of the concern regarding the
instrumentalisation of women and girls in CVE policies and strategies and that this is a policy
area that is problematic for women’s rights and gender equality. Yet, this was a minor aspect
of the total document rather than advocating for this to become a key dimension of the UK’s
approach to WPS. Similarly, the LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security summarised 16
academic submissions and presented a consultation response in May 2017. In regards to
P/CVE this consultation again presented a cautionary approach to its integration within the
wider WPS agenda. It stated that ‘while it is vital that CVE programmes apply a gender
perspective and that women in communities affected by violent extremism take leadership

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roles in opposing it, the WPS agenda is a human rights agenda and should be implemented
as such. The WPS agenda should not be used as a vehicle for promoting CVE objectives;
rather, the principles of WPS should be applied as a check on CVE efforts, to ensure that they
are gender-sensitive and compliant with human rights standards’ (LSE Centre for Women
Peace and Security, 2017b). What is clear from both of these submissions is a concern and
caution regarding women’s rights being instrumentalised to enhance operational
effectiveness.

Following this, in May 2017, the LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security held a workshop
in partnership with GAPS, Saferworld and International Alert to explore the relationship
between P/CVE and WPS. This workshop introduced a far more critical perspective on this
linkage and highlighted five key issues and implications of linking P/CVE with WPS. These
were (1) the risks of instrumentalisation of WPS to strengthen P/CVE efforts with negative
impacts for women’s rights (2) financial regulations and negative impact on funding
opportunities and structures for women’s rights organisations (3) the conceptual blurring of
P/CVE (4) the potential reinforcement of gender stereotypes in P/CVE contradicts the WPS
agenda that seeks to empower women and have a transformative effect (5) there is a lack of
evidence-based understanding and research (LSE Centre for Women Peace and Security,
2017a). Again, the workshop demonstrated a clear critical standpoint to the integration of WPS
and P/CVE and again that it should be approached with caution. The consultation responses
recognised and reflected upon the emerging trend of integrating P/CVE and WPS and
reiterated the need to consider how P/CVE can be integrated with WPS without harmful
impacts rather than it being a push towards integrating it as a fundamental priority for WPS.

The UK government funded GAPS to undertake in-country consultations with focus countries,
also in the lead up to the 2018 – 2022 NAP. The adequate funding allocated allow the women
and organisations who are on the receiving end of the UK’s WPS activities, to potentially
influence and shape the UK’s approach to WPS, which is significant. The consultation was led
by GAPS and its members Amnesty International UK, Saferworld, the Women’s International
League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and Women for Women. The consultations were
with CSOs from Afghanistan, Myanmar, Somalia and Syria (GAPS, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d;
Medica Afghanistan, 2017). GAPs, in collaboration with the CSOs mentioned, produced a
further consultation summary report that gave the key findings and the priorities for women
working for peace and security in those contexts (Gender Action for Peace and Security,
2017). Whilst these consultations are a positive indicator of the UK’s institutional commitment

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to engage with women’s right organisations, they remained limited in that three of the focus
countries were not consulted. However, through an analysis of the in-country consultations
carried out, large silences were revealed around the issue of P/CVE as a priority for the
organisations. For example, the Afghan consultation did not mention extremism or terrorism
(Medica Afghanistan, 2017).

The Syrian consultation mentioned terrorism and extremism as part of the wider conflict in
Syria and included Asaad’s regime under the remit of extremism (GAPS, 2017c), which is a
broader use of the language of extremism than the traditional focus on non-state actors. The
introduction more broadly mentioned the issue of militarised CT efforts and their impact on
civilians and problematised the predominant focus on ISIS by international actors (GAPS,
2017c: 5). The greatest problem framing on P/CVE was that terrorism laws have negatively
impacted peaceful activists, protests and human rights defenders (through stopping protests,
detention or financially - through the limiting of access to resources) (Gender Action for Peace
and Security, 2017a), as part of wider abuses by the Syrian regime and that the security and
justice sector is controlled by armed men who do not recognise women’s rights, which
highlights issues with state actors, rather than (traditionally-defined) violent extremists. The
Syrian consultation gave examples of instrumentalisation and critiqued how CT and CVE
efforts have had a harmful impact on WHRDs and WROs in the country. The problem was not
represented to be a lack of women’s participation and leadership in this space (Bacchi, 2012),
which was what the core aim for strategic outcome six in the NAP attempted to address (see
chapter six, section 6.2.1). The strategic outcome in the NAP was not about challenging
militarised and securitising approaches to CVE/CT, rather it was predominantly about adding
women to existing security structures. This consultation represented the overarching problem
to be a lack of a women’s rights based approach to CT and CVE (GAPS, 2017c), which would
require a radical transformation of CT and CVE approaches, but also of the wider security
environment.

The summary document of the in-country consultations only made only a minor mention to
terrorism and extremism concerning the issues raised in the Syrian consultation, which
reflected the challenges of CT laws negatively impacting peaceful activists (Gender Action for
Peace and Security, 2017b: 8). Whilst there was not a ‘silence’ surrounding P/CVE in the
Syrian consultation, it was only mentioned as a feature of the broader conflict in Syria. P/CVE
was reflected in only one of the in-country consultations. Additionally, the problematisation is
strikingly different to how it was framed in the NAP. Interview data revealed a disappointment

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around the limited impact that the consultations had on the final NAP, not just in the area of
P/CVE but also more broadly. For example, an interviewee stated that
‘the civil society consultation is not reflected in the outcomes of the NAP. It’s not just
CVE; there are other issues that we wanted, or didn’t want in the NAP that managed
to get in there CVE was a late addition as I recall and to be blunt about it, it’s a political
decision’ (CSO-01).
This exposes a limitation to the institutional power gains seemingly made by the UK’s feminist
triangle and that civil society consultation was more of a tick-box exercise. This also suggests
that there a ‘masculine logic of protection’ in the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of
WPS and supports Young’s argument that it is difficult for ‘feminists’ (or those presenting as
feminist) in western societies to not uphold a ‘stance of superiority and paternalistic knowledge
of what the poor women of the world need’ (Young, 2003: 231). The women in those focus
countries are not deemed equal in the WPS project; rather they are recipients of the feminist
agenda. This demonstrates that there is a hierarchical structure, both gendered and culturally,
to WPS policy-making and contributes to the work on how minority world states can be
complicit in reproducing gendered and racialised hierarchies through WPS (Miller, Pournik
and Swaine, 2014; Aroussi, 2017; Shepherd, 2017; Parashar, 2019; Haastrup and Hagen,
2020; Holvikivi and Reeves, 2020).

As mentioned in the previous section, strategic outcome six on P/CVE was a late addition to
the NAP, which was heavily pushed from the ministerial level, and there was limited room to
change this. Analysis of the interview data revealed a concern for the fact that the P/CVE
strategic outcome was introduced at a very late stage after GAPS had submitted their written
submission on ‘Informing the new UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security’
in April 2017(GAPS, 2017a). There was limited room or time to then fundamentally challenge
the positioning of P/CVE as a strategic outcome. As one interviewee put it,
‘I think there are opportunities to hold the government accountable in the sense of
making some public noise about the areas that they disagree with and making
demands for different kinds of policies. I think when it comes to things like CT and
CVE, which are seen as so core to national security it’s very very difficult to affect
change in those’ (UKGO-01).
Paying attention to the voices heard in the policy-making process is important as it allows ‘the
politics of security and the power relations that shape them visible’ which ‘is the key to a
transformative agenda’ (Wibben, 2016: 137), and by understanding that security is made, we

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can ask ‘what frames are enacted, how, by whom, when, where, and to what end, as well as
the relations of power involved in this process.’ (Wibben, 2016: 138).

However, interview data did reveal that whilst CSOs and epistemic communities could not
challenge the strategic outcome at that stage; they were able to influence some of the wording
used on the strategic outcome. This included removing the language of ‘counter terrorism’,
rather using the concept of countering violent extremism instead and acknowledging the risks
of instrumentalisation. For example,
‘people were very aware of the concerns of civil society around the instrumentalisation
of women and there were lots of kind of tweaks to the wording around this stuff to try
to show that those concerns were being taken into account. So I think in that sense
civil society had an influence’ (UKGO-01).
That being said, language was still constrained by what will get ministerial or senior-leadership
sign off. As a civil society interviewee stated that there was certain language and approaches
that
‘we were told that this isn’t going to land well with ministerial decision-making or like
sign off’ (CSO-02),
which hinders the potential for more transformative approaches that look at gendered
structures and norms for example. Interviews highlighted that the wording could have been
more problematic than it was, based on the fact that it does not talk about CT. That being said,
as demonstrated in the analysis, when the indicators for strategic outcome six were revealed
in the UK’s 2019 annual report to parliament, they included the language of CT (see section
6.1.1). This again highlights the limited gains made within the wording of the strategic outcome
and the limited power of the formal consultation process on this strategic outcome.

Following the release of the NAP, GAPS published a report called ‘Prioritise Peace’ that took
a critical stance on P/CVE and its risks for the WPS agenda, for having a negative impact on
women’s rights and women’s rights organisations in conflict-affected contexts (GAPS, 2018).
That being said, this was seemingly disregarded by some government actors. For example,
an interviewee stated that
‘it seemed to be written by people who were not experts on CVE of any kind’, ‘that
report and that approach is full of conjecture and statements and not necessarily a lot
of evidence’ and ‘they (the UK government) could not use it to enter into any kind of
conversation with people in the security environment or security industry’ (UKGO-04).

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This demonstrates a ringfencing on what kind of ‘evidence’ and ‘expertise’ is relevant for WPS
and who gets to speak about P/CVE/CT practices. It also seems contradictory, as the UK
government was willing to acknowledge that they introduced the P/CVE strategic outcome
without indicators based on the fact it was an ‘emerging concern for the international
community’ and that ‘meaningful indicators have not yet been developed and data is not
gathered systematically’ (UK NAP, 2018: 26). Furthermore, it also suggests that there is an
unwillingness or inability to engage with some of the problematic and harmful dimensions of
P/CVE and women’s rights with security actors, and more broadly, with its own approaches to
CT and CVE. Finally, in terms of the guidance note, GAPS were asked to give
recommendations or evidence regarding implementation guidance and it was made clear that
this was not considered a platform to discuss the problematic nature of integrating WPS and
P/CVE. This again constrained the potential to disrupt the fundamental focus on P/CVE and
allowed CSO voice to be heard only where it was in support of the work of the UK government
and its institutional priorities. Overall, the formal consultation was not a key driver for the
integration of P/CVE and WPS in the UK context, its position as a stand-alone strategic
outcome and nor did the formal processes seem to have much influence on how the UK’s
integrated WPS and P/CVE.

A Diversity of Voices or a Selective Engagement?

The formal consultation processes were not the only way the UK government engaged with
CSOs. Several civil servant interviewees made the point that there needed to be a ‘diversity
of voices’ on the topic and therefore, other organisations were also informally consulted on
the topic. Interview data revealed that one of the main organisations informally consulted was
the ‘International Civil Society Action Network’ (ICAN), who are not a member of the GAPS
network and are a USA based organisation (ICAN, 2021). Whilst is it clear that there is a
spectrum that CSOs, WROs and grassroots groups may place themselves along in terms of
acceptance or support for the inclusion of P/CVE and WPS, ICAN is a CSO organisation that
are more willing to engage with the integration of WPS and P/CVE. As one interviewee put it
‘ICAN wasn’t always in the room because they are so often in America’ but ‘they can
give a good argument for why CVE should be included, so I kind of always refer back
to them because I’m like, they can talk the talk. So I think there’s lots of organisations
like them who feel the same’ (UKGO-04).
What is clear is that, as P/CVE became a seemingly non-negotiable element of WPS based
on decision-making at senior levels, civil servants still wanted to include CSO voices on the
matter and this was a way in which they could. It is problematic that a USA based organisation

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was able to influence or support the UK’s NAP’s strategic direction as it reflects an
interpretation and priorities of an organisation that is neither UK based or a location that is on
the receiving end of WPS. Looping back to section 7.7.1, that highlighted that women’s
organisations in Myanmar request to have ownership over the UK’s WPS policy as ‘naïve’ as
they were not UK taxpayers, seems contradictory to the ability for a non-UK based
organisations to influence the strategic direction of the UK’s WPS policy.

The UK government seemingly found a CSO that was supportive of its strategic objectives
and thus engaged with them. Whilst it is clear that not all CSOs were all engaged with at the
same time, the more informal or less publicly available interactions between the UK
government and ICAN are used to support and justify the shift to integrate P/CVE with WPS.
It is not to say that CSOs are not able to support P/CVE work. The point made here is that the
GAPS network’s (who are the UK’s foremost CSO network for WPS) concerns and
consultations were largely overlooked in this instance, in favour of elevating the voices of an
organisation that fit with and endorsed the UK’s strategic direction. It demonstrates a limitation
to the UK’s established ‘feminist triangle’ in having power over the UK’s WPS interpretation.

Overall, the integration of P/CVE appears to have been based on the UK’s selective
engagement with feminist ideas and advocacy, adopting them in so far as they promote the
UK’s institutional agenda. By paying attention to informal and formal voices heard in
consultation about the 2018 – 2022 NAP and the policy shift to integrate P/CVE with WPS,
this section has revealed the limitations for CSOs to challenge the trajectory of WPS when it
is deeply linked to the UK’s security priorities and understandings of (in)security. It is
recognised that the UK government has competing priorities and cannot always fulfil the needs
and desires of CSOs. However, the position of the GAPs network (18 members), the platform
provided by the LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security for academics and the focus
country consultations either called for cautionary restraint in this policy integration, or did not
deem it a significant enough issue for an explicit focus on it. Yet, P/CVE was still introduced
as a standalone strategic outcome that has the potential to divert resources away from other
key issues and has high risks of instrumentalisation and securitisation of WPS. Formal
consultation, in the case of P/CVE, was a largely tick box exercise that had minimal impact.
Whilst the need for a diversity of voices is undisputable, the UK’s decision to selectively
engage with organisations who support their agenda undermines commitments to women’s
and women’s rights groups participation as a feature of WPS. Furthermore, it reveals
limitations to the UK’s ‘feminist triangle’ model (Holli, 2008; Woodward, 2015; Guerrina,

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Chappell and Wright, 2018) discussed in chapter five (section 5.1.2) for challenging the
broader strategic direction of WPS as this has been revealed as heavily restricted by top-down
decision-making and institutional pressures and hierarchies that supersede the input of civil
society and women’s voices.

7.3 The Challenges of Gendering P/CVE

The previous two sections have explored the policy-formulation process of the integration of
P/CVE with WPS; this section firstly highlights some of the discursive challenges of integrating
P/CVE with WPS in the NAP and guidance note before demonstrating some of the practical
challenges of interpreting and implementing this policy in different government departments,
by paying attention to voices of those tasked with (re)interpreting it. A select number of policy
documents are also drawn upon in this section, to further illustrate the challenges of integrating
gender with P/CVE. The point here is not to undertake a Critical Frame Analysis of all the UK’s
policy documents on P/CVE/CT, as that is another research project. Rather the analysis of
certain documents is used to corroborate some of the challenges raised in the interviews. This
section again pays attention to the voices of those tasked with operationalising the WPS
agenda with P/CVE work. This section highlights the contradictory and ambiguous ways in
which gender and women are engaged with in P/CVE and CT in policy and practice. It provided
insight into how as UNSCR 1325 and 2242 is diffused in state practices and it can be
reinterpreted and easily co-opted. Therefore, this section contributes to the literature that
explores how institutions can be sites of resistance and obstruct gender-positive change
(Kenny, 2013; Thomson, 2017a) and highlights some of the specific challenges of gender
mainstreaming in security policy.

7.3.1 Leaving the Door Open for Co-optation: Policy Contradiction, Silences and Ambiguity
First and foremost, a key challenge for the UK’s integration of WPS and P/CVE in practice is
that the Home Office is not a stakeholder for the WPS agenda. The Home Office, and the
CONTEST unit within it, are responsible for the UK’s overarching domestic and international
P/CVE and CT approach. As CONTEST is the UK’s highest level policy document on P/CVE
and CT, it is interesting that the 2018 iteration only mentions women insofar as it recognises
that women have joined Daesh and minorly acknowledges that the erosion of women’s rights
is part of wider social harms caused by extremism. Interestingly, three out of the six times
women are mentioned, they are affiliated to ‘families’ or ‘young children’ (CONTEST,
2018:18). Gender is mentioned once in understanding that effective CT measures require
listening to and engaging with communities with a range of backgrounds and characteristics

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(CONTEST, 2018: 85). CONTEST sits at the apex of the UK’s approach to P/CVE/CT, yet it
is largely gender blind, reproduces stereotypes and highlights a lack of gender mainstreaming
in this space. This iteration of CONTEST was released in the same year that the 2018 – 2022
NAP was also published, so arguably, the NAP has not had time to be further diffused into the
mainstream documents. Although, as this thesis has previously highlighted the UK has made
commitments to women’s inclusion in CVE and CT (Baroness Verma, 2015) and to making
CVE activity more gender-sensitive (UK Report to Parliament, 2015: 8), as early as 2015.
Overall, gender-sensitivity cannot currently be considered a systematic concern for the UK’s
overarching P/CVE/CT approaches.

Correspondingly, a respondent indicated that there is a real chasm between the links made
concerning P/CVE and WPS in the NAP and the place of WPS within P/CVE policies and
practices;
‘I definitely think it (P/CVE) should be reflected in the NAP, but I also think women,
peace and security should be reflected in the preventing/countering violent extremism
agenda and I think that is where we could get much better and what partially spurs us
on with us inviting one of these new agendas into WPS because we know that gender
should be in these spaces, but we’re not seeing it’ (UKGO-04).
Gender is not being mainstreamed at the top-level of the UK’s strategic direction on P/CVE
and this not only demonstrates a lack of impact being made by WPS in this space but also the
lack of commitment to it beyond rhetoric. Interviewees also indicated that there are a number
of contradictory and vague policy documents and as there is not a clear definition used across
government for P/CVE/CT and as a result programme documents then tend to take their own
spin on what those different documents mean.

As the 2018 – 2022 NAP and guidance note on WPS and P/CVE also did not include
definitions of violent extremism and P/CVE, nor did it consider which actors are responsible
for the implementation of strategic outcome six. This ambiguity provides both opportunities
and constraints for its implementation. As one interviewee revealed that the rationale behind
the lack of clarity was that
‘we didn’t want anyone to close off and be like, well this isn’t what I’m working on’
(UKGO-04) and ‘it is probably more helpful than a concrete definition because we work
across departments, because we work across countries’ (UKGO-04).
Whilst broad definitions of P/CVE/CT enable gender to be mainstreamed across multiple sites;
its broadness also means some actors may misinterpret the relevance of WPS to their work.

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This lack of clarity and consensus on who is responsible for what, in regards to the
implementation of WPS and P/CVE, means it can be, as Chayes and Chayes (1993: 188) put
it, be ‘swept under the rug with a formula that can mean what each party wants it to mean’.

Between the FCO, DFID and the MOD there are differing understandings of WPS and its links
to P/CVE and who is responsible for what. For example, the MOD Joint Services Publication
on 1325 uses examples of how ‘UK Defence Activity in Support of the UK WPS National Action
Plan’ in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia contributes to P/CVE (UK MOD, 2019: 27 - 31). This
includes examples such as training the militaries of those countries to listen to women and to
support and protect women’s organisations, encouraging men to speak out on behalf of
women’s rights, to encourage religious leaders to see the treatment of women as a warning
sign of extremism, teach troops to recognise early warning indicators of religious
fundamentalism, to encourage the military to support equality between men and women (UK
MOD, 2019: 27 - 31). This is a militarised interpretation of P/CVE and demonstrates how ideas
about the promotion of women’s rights and gender equality are not necessarily an end in
themselves. Furthermore, the majority of these examples are part of a broader way in which
UK defence can advocate for women’s rights and gender equality and it is not clear why or
how the language of P/CVE being used is particularly helpful. Furthermore, as WPS in this
instance is being used to support and uphold militarised mechanisms of P/CVE, this indicates
a high risk of co-optation by the security institution.

Similarly, the UK Joint International Counter-Terrorism Unit (situated between the FCO and
Home Office) released a guidance note on ‘Gender Sensitivity & Counter Terrorism’ (2018)
that referenced the UK NAP on WPS (2018 – 2022) as part of wider domestic and
international commitments to gender and CT, despite the NAP not using the language of CT.
This document is guided by three principles, ‘Operational Effectiveness’, ‘Promote Human
Rights’ and ‘Do No Harm’ (JICTU, no date: 3). This document has a highly utilitarian
understanding of the need to understand women’s roles in terrorism but also in CT efforts.
Promoting human rights is framed as a legal requirement and related to the UK’s international
commitments to it, rather than as the right thing to do. However, in terms of doing no harm the
document states: ‘we should not undertake CT activities that perpetuate or exacerbate gender
inequalities. It is not always appropriate for CT operations to actively promote gender equality,
for example where doing so puts women at undue risk of harm, undermines operational
effectiveness or risks significantly damaging CT relationships with a partner. However, at a
minimum we should seek to ensure that CT operations do not undermine gender equality or

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reinforce gender inequality’ (JICTU, no date: 3). This document is particularly evident of the
priorities of CT and the way in which women can be instrumentalised for enhancing operational
effectiveness and that gender equality remains an under prioritised dimension of CT work in
comparison to operational effectiveness. Similarly, the fact that the promotion of gender
equality comes second to CT relationships with partners exposes how quickly this can be side-
lined.

Regarding DFID and development approaches to PVE, the interviews highlighted difficulties
in disentangling P/CVE with broader development work that aims to improve instability or post-
conflict environments. Interviews revealed that within DFID they tend not to programme on
gender and P/CVE specifically and where they do it is largely in relation to sexual and gender-
based violence,
‘I think if you looked at that programming you would sort of be like, what is this really
about? To what extent if this responding to an issue which is sexual and gender based
violence, which happens to be in an area where violent extremist organisations are
operating’ (UKGO-12).
It is then unclear as to why there is a need for PVE labelling, as the issues in this area overlap
with many of the issues they already deal with. Similarly, the interviewee raised concerns that
‘there has been a tendency to not necessarily label it as a P/CVE programme, but to
claim some level of P/CVE effect where that’s not necessarily validated through
programme theories of change and results framework’ (UKGO-12).
This implies that value is given institutionally for this type of work, despite the limited ability to
prove its efficacy. For example, there is a link between building economic opportunity and
tackling unemployment which could be a driver of violent extremism and thus it is framed as
having a P/CVE effect,
‘without actually following it through to say who is most vulnerable, is your programme
reaching those people who are most vulnerable and supporting them in the right way
to address that vulnerability’ (UKGO-12).
Overall, DFIDs work is far more focused on development and working towards women’s
empowerment, prosperity and agency, which means there are challenges with separating PVE
and non-PVE work. This builds on Rothermel's (2020) work that highlights the tensions of
P/CVE work at the security-development nexus. The analysis here shows that DFID may be
doing PVE, but in a non-linear and non-direct way but it is unclear why labelling work as P/CVE
in this context adds considerable value. This also exposes the profoundly different ways this
policy is (re)interpreted in different institutional contexts.

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Another key constraint is that there can also be fatigue regarding the high number of policy
documents and guidance for P/CVE programming, which means that documents such as the
WPS and P/CVE guidance note may not be read. For example, regarding the P/CVE WPS
guidance note, one interviewee stated that ‘
it sits within the problem that we drown in guidance notes. So we have guidance notes
for absolutely everything. So when you are doing a programme, even if it is a P/CVE
programme you’re having to think about gender, disability, impact on climate change,
fiduciary risk assessments and adaptive programming.’ (UKGO-12).
If WPS or feminist principles are not weaved into the mainstream programme documents, the
guidance note for example, may remain institutionally peripheral and lack impact.

7.3.2 Securitising Feminism or Feminising Security?

As P/CVE was integrated with WPS, there were a number of negotiations and decisions made
as to how P/CVE was going to fit within the UK’s wider WPS strategy. A core challenge with
the integration of WPS and P/CVE in the negotiation process was that there were competing
understandings of the relevance of the other agenda to their policy space. In the words of one
interviewee,
‘when you bring civil society and more hard security colleagues into the same space,
it’s really obvious to me that some civil society actors thought that we were securitising
the agenda, whereas security actors thought that we were kind of feminising the
agenda’ (UKGO-04).
This demonstrates a clear difference in the gendered identities of P/CVE/CT as masculine
and civil society and WPS as feminine and clashing of objectives.

The interviews revealed that the UK government mandates gender-sensitivity in P/CVE

programming and for the most part, civil servants are increasingly aware of the gendered
nature of violent extremism as a phenomenon and therefore the need for gender-sensitivity in
P/CVE. For example an interviewee stated
‘they are incredibly good at manipulating gender and manipulating gender roles,
stereotypes and gender narratives, playing up to senses of what it means to be a man
within a certain context and targeting particular vulnerabilities of women who are
denied agency and power. So they get that right and we don’t, we can’t speak to that’
(UKGO-12).

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That being said, whilst this is a significant shift in terms of the recognition of gender, beyond
essentialised understandings of women and silences around men, it does not necessarily
indicate that feminist principles drive this integration. This suggests a form of ‘institutional
layering’ where ‘certain elements of an institution are partially renegotiated while leaving other
existing elements in place’ (Kenny, 2007:93). In this instance, the gender blind nature of
P/CVE is being renegotiated, but it is certainly not a critical juncture where P/CVE practices
are being transformed more broadly.

Furthermore, interviews suggest that for those tasked with operationalising this policy area,
there is a real difficulty in disentangling their priorities of operational effectiveness and the
promotion of gender equality and women’s rights. One interviewee provides a sharp
assessment of the aims of the CVE programme they were working on,
‘the aim of the programme is not women’s rights, it’s not livelihoods, it’s not lifting
people out of poverty, it is purely stopping radicalisation, stopping people becoming
terrorists, stopping people falling down that path of joining a terrorist group and then
potentially committing a terrorist attack. One of the big criticisms that UK programming
has had over the years is blurring that line’ (UKGO-08).
While the UK has attempted to incorporate issues of women’s rights and to enhance the
livelihoods of people with P/CVE efforts, but in practice doing both well is seen to be difficult.
The interviews also demonstrated that the ambition of P/CVE/CT work abroad is to keep
Britain and British interests safe and whilst women’s empowerment might be a positive by-
product of it, it is not the aim of the programme. In discussing a previous programme that listed
aims to prevent violent extremism and enhance women’s empowerment, the interviewee
revealed that it was criticised for
‘listing all the things under the sun and you risk doing them all badly’ (UKGO-08)
and that P/CVE programmes
‘will absolutely be mindful of the gender element, but the focus of those programmes
will not be for women’s empowerment necessarily. They will have that gendered focus
to understand why women in particular are going to become violent extremists and
how we can best help those women, not to empower them more generally’ (UKGO-
08).
This suggests that P/CVE practitioners were receptive to the inclusion of gender, in so far as
they could see that it would enhance operational effectiveness. Additionally, this was a way in
which the UK government could get host governments on board with language of gender or
women, based on enhancing the operational effectiveness. This is a disruption to the

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masculinised and male-dominated nature of P/CVE and violent extremism as this indicates a
wider recognition of the need to understand women not just as passive actors but as active
agents in violent extremism but also in efforts to counter it. However, this highlights how
gender-sensitivity, in this instance, is still limited to trying to include ‘women’ rather than
understanding gender as a power structure. The same interviewee (UKGO-08) highlighted
that they are still trying to stress the importance in paying attention to women in this space,
both internally (in government) and externally (with partners, host countries and stakeholders).
Thus the core focus is on ensuring that women are considered as perpetrators and being
aware of the risk factors of their radicalisation, what are their grievances and what are their
drivers and the rationality behind this is that to ensure that P/CVE efforts are not
counterproductive, women need to be considered. This is a limited interpretation of gender
and gender-sensitivity and is not transformative. On the other hand, another interviewee
raised concerns that some government officials thought that a push to talk about gender was
becoming more of a politically correct exercise rather than about optimising a P/CVE
approach. This section evidences the significant practical challenges of integrating WPS with
P/CVE.

Whilst there may be references and commitments to gender equality and gender justice in
P/CVE efforts, one interviewee stated that
‘the depth of that is really a function of resources, or resource time or people’ (UKGO-
10).
This statement is an indication that the importance given to gender and gender justice is
constrained by circumstances, opportunity and resource and indicates that transformative
institutional change has not occurred, rather it seems to be an ‘institutional layering’. For
Kenny (2007, p. 93) there is a significant difference between ‘institutional layering, in which
certain elements of an institutional area are partially renegotiated while leaving other existing
elements in place, and institutional conversion, in which existing institutions are redirected to
fulfil new purposes’. But also there is a certain institutional ‘logic of appropriateness’ that has
worked to resist the institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming (WPS and gender equality)
into efforts to P/CVE (Chappell, 2006: 225 - 226), as CVE actors claim that this is something
which is not relevant to their work.

The masculinised institutional environment appears to constrain the inclusion of new norms
or limits the inclusion of or radical potential of WPS in this space. Further, despite the existence
of gender and social development advisors, the UK still lacks in its capacity to ensure gender

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inclusivity and sensitivity in its institutions. Interviews reveal that gender advisors are thought
to be a valuable resource for those who work on P/CVE, as they are able to act as ‘critical
friends’ to provide necessary challenges and play a key role in monitoring and evaluation work
in this area (Chappell and Mackay, 2020). They tend to have a far higher level of expertise
regarding gender and WPS than those working on P/CVE policy area and are able to share
knowledge in ways that can be applied to the particular context. However, it appears that the
number of gender advisors remains extremely low for the amount of P/CVE work that the UK
is involved with globally and have been a very recent addition. Similarly, another respondent
claimed that resource constraints are hindering efforts to integrate gender sensitivity in P/CVE
and because there are a
‘plethora of issues to look at, there is only so much you can do in terms of making it
(gender) the top of the agenda and trying to enable other colleagues to see the gender
lens, not just as an added on one, but rather as a frame through which one would be
viewing all the different things we’re trying to work on’ (UKGO-10).
This raises issues of rhetorical commitment to WPS and gender mainstreaming and that
fundamentally there are not enough gender advisors and feminist actors working to ensure
that it is being interpreted consistently and in ways that do not cause further harm to women
and their rights.

7.3.3 The Opportunities and Challenges of Engaging with Civil Society, Grassroots and
Women’s Rights Organisations
The leadership and participation of women is a core feature of the UK’s approach to WPS and
this was the primary aim of the strategic outcome on P/CVE. However, interview data revealed
that the engagement with civil society actors, grassroots organisations and women’s rights
organisations is difficult in practice as there are a number of constraints and challenges.
Firstly, some CSOs were resistant to being affiliated with P/CVE, when one interviewee was
asked how they work with CSOs, they stated
‘not on P/CVE, I struggle to get them to really engage’ and ‘that is kind of one of these…
not controversial topics… but kind of difficult topics when it comes to WPS and P/CVE,
is the risks that people have to take at an individual personal level to work in that
space.’ (UKGO-09).
Linking back to the civil society consultations caution and inputs regarding WPS and P/CVE
in the UK NAP, this was also highlighted as a key problem and risk. On the other hand,
interviews also considered that because P/CVE work is topical and there is a lot of resources

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for this policy area, some NGOs would badge their work as PVE despite their work being about
women’s rights or women’s empowerment and not what the interviewee would consider as
PVE, in order to get funding. However, the badging of community projects as P/CVE rather
than being targeted to those specifically at risk of violent extremism stems from a lack of
boundaries around what it means to do P/CVE work. The risks of this work were also reflected
on by interviewees as they considered the need to move away from language of CVE, due to
its highly securitised nature and would rather use the language of peacebuilding in order to
prevent CSO actors being on the wrong side of counter-terrorism regulations, being policed
and securitisation (UKGO-10). Similarly, another interviewee stated that
‘in some places we just don’t talk about CVE even if we are doing the work, we don’t
badge it as CVE because of the local context and how that can come across’ (UKGO-
04).
This interviewees statement also indicates that the language of CVE can, in some contexts,
limit and constrain the potential for WPS to be applied.

The risks of the instrumentalisation of women and women’s rights organisations were
mentioned in the UK WPS Guidance Note on P/CVE (2019) and interviews indicated that they
were aware of these risks. A respondent reflected on the challenges of resisting
instrumentalisation of WROs and went as far as to contemplate the alternative side in which
you do not engage with CSOs. They stated
‘it can be incredibly challenging to be able to get the analysis you need (for P/CVE),
by organisations working in this space and being able to work with them without co-
opting them and that agenda for P/CVE, but then is that something that you do not do?
… so applying a P/CVE lens can be quite challenging’ (UKGO-12).
This again highlights that the ‘Catch-22’ puzzle also applies to those who are engaging with
CSOs and grassroots organisations.

Funding and resource challenges were also noted as reasons for a limited direct engagement
with CSOs and grassroots organisations in this space. This was because the UK government
more broadly is not well structured to provide small grants to grassroots organisations and
there are limited mechanisms to channel smaller amounts into organisations due to the
‘management burden’ of dealing with small amounts of money that civil servants did not have
time to do, as well as there being high levels of requirements in terms of processes, due
diligence and monitoring and evaluation that means

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 ‘often the only way around that is by grassroots organisations as essentially
downstream partners of a national or international NGO or private companies to
manage that layer for us’ … ‘but it does make having direct relationships with those
groups really really challenging’ (UKGO-12).
Furthermore, other issues raised in the interviews were that it is difficult to find organisations
who are representative of the grassroots, as they tended to be English speakers, who can
communicate with donors and are able to use the language of the international development
community.

7.4 Conclusion
By paying attention to the voices of actors who give UNSCR 1325 and 2242 meaning, this
chapter has uncovered some of the less visible informal and formal rules, norms and values
that shape(d) the UK’s interpretation of WPS and P/CVE. Firstly, the UK’s informal rule that
WPS is out-ward facing and not for domestic application is made visible and destabilised. It
highlights an institution that excludes ownership of WPS from the women’s lives that are the
focus of the UK’s WPS policy and interventions. This reflects Shepherd's (2016: 325)
argument that WPS has become divergent from its foundations of WPS as a civil society
project that takes the experiences and expertise of women and women’s organisations
seriously. Furthermore, this section evidenced misunderstanding by ‘mainstream’ actors of
the relevance of WPS to their work and a limited institutional prioritisation of WPS work. This
section then outlined some of the complexities of integrating WPS with the MOD and how
WPS goes through a process of shrinking and morphing in order to fight’ its way into
‘institutional thinking’ (Elgström, 2000: 457). This exposes fundamental constraints to WPS,
as it becomes an interpretation of a male military audience.

The second section of this chapter then turned to expose how the P/CVE shift within the UK’s
approach to WPS can be seen as a top-down process. This analysis of interview data found
three key drivers for this policy shift. By illuminating the primary policy driver as senior
ministerial leadership, this contributes to the Feminist Institutionalism body of work that
explores how key actors can have an impact on the stasis, change and backsliding of gender
mainstreaming (Chappell and Mackay, 2020). Also, highlighting the prioritised place of P/CVE
policy on the UK’s security agenda as a reason for its integration with WPS indicates an
enmeshing with traditional masculine and state-centric security logics (Wibben, 2011b). The
final key driver was revealed to be the UK’s leadership position on WPS internationally, which
demonstrates how ‘institutions rely heavily on their image and their reputation in order to

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generate external legitimacy’ (Holmes et al., 2019: 223) and the international normative
context can influence the diffusion of WPS (True, 2016). This section then turned to uncover
the voices heard in the policy formulation and decision-making process. It was made clear
that the formal consultation processes were highly cautious of the risks of integrating P/CVE
and WPS. Furthermore, the UK government focus country consultations seemingly had little
impact on shaping the 2018 – 2022 NAP and the shift to prioritise P/CVE within that. This
demonstrates that there is a hierarchical structure, both gendered and culturally, to WPS
policy-making. This contributes to the work on how minority world states can reproduce
gendered and racialised hierarchies through WPS (Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014; Aroussi,
2017; Shepherd, 2017; Parashar, 2019; Haastrup and Hagen, 2020; Holvikivi and Reeves,
2020). The final aspect of this section highlighted the UK’s use of informal consultation to
strategically engage with CSOs who were more supportive of the UK’s institutional agenda
and amplified those voices. This was framed under the need to engage with a ‘diversity of
voices’, yet the formal consultation with GAPs network members, the LSE WPS centre and
the in-country consultations all indicated caution around the integration of WPS and P/CVE
rather than introducing it as a strategic outcome. This demonstrates that security is made, by
making visible ‘what frames are enacted, how, by whom, when, where, and to what end, as
well as the relations of power involved in this process’ (Wibben, 2016: 138).

The final section of this chapter highlighted the challenges of gendering P/CVE in policy and
practice in the UK context. Firstly, by paying attention to the ambiguous and sometimes
contradictory nature of P/CVE and CT definitions, approaches and policies across the UK
government, and how P/CVE and how gender sits within that, this section evidences the ease
in which gender (and women) can be instrumentalised for operational effectiveness, ignored,
or misunderstood. Furthermore, this section exposed the difficulty for P/CVE practitioners to
reconcile feminist objectives with operational effectiveness and ensure that CSO and
grassroots organisations can contribute to P/CVE efforts without putting them at risk.

This chapter contributes specifically to the emerging research that explores the P/CVE/WPS
nexus (Ní Aoláin, 2016; Chowdhury Fink and Davidan, 2018; Heathcote, 2018; Eddyono and
Davies, 2019; Rothermel, 2020; White, 2020) by providing empirical evidence of the co-
optation and hijacking of the WPS agenda for enhancing P/CVE operational effectiveness. It
builds on the Feminist Institutionalism body of work to provide insight into the ways in which
gender mainstreaming can be constrained by institutional actors, norms, formal and informal
rules and practices (Chappell, 2006; Holli, 2008; Woodward, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell and

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Wright, 2018; Chappell and Mackay, 2020) and the work that specifically investigates WPS
(See: George, 2016; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018; Haastrup, 2018; Holmes et al.,
2019; Thomson, 2019; O’Sullivan and Krulišová, 2020). Furthermore, it provides evidence of
the implicit gendered and racialised hierarchies in WPS policy-making (Miller, Pournik and
Swaine, 2014; Aroussi, 2017; Shepherd, 2017; Parashar, 2019; Haastrup and Hagen, 2020;
Holvikivi and Reeves, 2020). Overall, this chapter matters as it provides insight into the
institutional complexities that provide opportunities for, or constrain, the implementation of the
WPS agenda. It also evidences the practical risks and challenges of integrating the WPS and
P/CVE agendas in the context of an emerging policy framework on gender and P/CVE (see
section 1.3.1).

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8.0 Discussion and Conclusion: The Catch-22 of UNSCR 2242?
This thesis has examined the United Kingdom’s interpretation and institutionalisation of
UNSCR 1325 and 2242 to uncover whether or not the recent shift to integrate
Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) into its approach to Women, Peace and
Security (WPS) can be understood as a co-optation and instrumentalisation of WPS and what
this means for gender mainstreaming in UK security policy more broadly. Ultimately, this thesis
has sought to unpack the complex relationship between P/CVE efforts, as a security practice
that has been criticised for its complicity in securitising communities in gendered and racialised
ways (see section 2.2), and the WPS agenda, that was founded on feminist peace principles.
In order to address the overarching research question, this thesis explored the following:

1) The institutional and political context in which this policy shift occurred through a
mapping of the institutional actors who give this policy meaning, the UK’s policy and
historical relationship with gender equality and women’s rights on the one hand and
P/CVE/CT on the other and finally, a mapping of the UK’s formalised adoption of
UNSCR 1325 and leadership on WPS at the international level.
2) A Critical Frame Analysis (CFA) of the UK’s WPS policy documents to reveal the key
diagnostic and prognostic framings of WPS, and the integration of P/CVE within them.
3) The institutional complexities of the UK’s interpretation of WPS, the policy drivers of
the integration of P/CVE within the 2018 – 2022 NAP, the voices heard in the policy
formulation process and finally, the challenges of gendering P/CVE in policy and
practice (beyond the WPS policy documents).

This chapter firstly provides a summary of the thesis before the aforementioned points are
explored in turn, before discussing the implications of the findings of this thesis for the future
of WPS.

8.1 Thesis Summary and Key Findings

Throughout this thesis, I have constructed an approach to investigating the discursive and
institutional complexities of integrating P/CVE into the UK’s approach to WPS. In the opening
chapter, I established the gap in the literature in which this research sits by engaging with the
critical literature on the WPS agenda and on P/CVE and CT policy and practice. By locating
the small but growing body of literature that examines where these agendas intersect I found
space for an investigation into how UNSCR 1325 and 2242 is diffused into a minority world

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state actors approach to WPS, and further into departmental policy, and why particular
interpretations are prioritised and by who.

In the following chapter, I established a theoretical framework that triangulated Feminist

Security Studies, Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist Institutionalism. This theoretical
framework provided the lenses to problematise how security policies, practices, and
institutions are gendered and situated within structures of racialised and gendered hierarchies.
This chapter also conceptualised ‘transformative’ gender mainstreaming to measure the value
of the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 in bringing about social change and
gender justice. Additionally, the terms ‘co-optation’ and ‘instrumentalisation’ were
conceptualised to reveal how institutions can adopt initiatives, such as WPS, for different
purposes or interests. These initial chapters shaped the foundations of the research puzzle;
that there are conceptual and practical tensions and challenges in attempts to integrate WPS
and P/CVE, as WPS is an agenda built on feminist principles and P/CVE has emerged from
a highly securitised, racialised and gendered CT agenda, therefore any integration is at risk
of co-optation and instrumentalisation.

In order to investigate this research puzzle, I formulated a set of research questions. The
overarching question asked, ‘does the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of
UNSCR 1325 and 2242 represent transformative change or instrumental co-optation of
the WPS agenda?’. The sub-questions asked ‘what and where is the problem represented to
be in the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242?’, ‘what formal and informal
institutional, structures practices and dynamics shaped the UK’s interpretation of Women,
Peace and Security and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism?’, ‘how and why did
Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism appear as a key feature of the UK’s approach to
Women, Peace and Security?’ and finally, ‘what are the challenges of operationalising the
UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242, beyond its core Women, Peace and Security
cross-government policy documents?’. Based on these research questions and the feminist
research paradigm, I established a research design that draws on a Critical Frame Analysis
approach to analyse key policy documents and elite interviews with civil servants and civil
society actors. This research design gave consideration to both discursive and institutional
factors in understanding the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242. This chapter drew
the first half of this thesis to a close, and the thesis began its empirical engagement. The first
chapter in this section provided contextual information relevant to investigating the research

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puzzle and questions regarding the UK’s engagement with gender equality, WPS, P/CVE and
introduced the key actors and provided an overview of the UK’s WPS policy.

The Institutional and Political Context

The interpretation and institutionalisation of WPS, and P/CVE, did not occur in a vacuum. Thus
chapter five presented the key information relevant to understanding the broader institutional
and political context that WPS and P/CVE is situated within. Firstly, this chapter introduced
the key departments in which WPS is embedded, demonstrating an immediate outward-
facing/international focused interpretation of WPS. Then, by identifying and mapping the key
institutional actors who work on, or with the UK government, on WPS, this section was able
to identify a ‘feminist triangle’ (Woodward, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018). This
feminist triangle model indicated the UK has a robust and strong engagement with civil society
actors, particularly Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS) and epistemic communities.
Secondly, by examining the UK’s commitments to gender equality and women’s rights, this
thesis argued that the UK could be considered a ‘women-friendly’ state (Aggestam and True,
2020:144), although there are some crucial limitations, such as, the lack of ratification of the
Istanbul Convention and the inequality of equality between Northern Ireland and the rest of
the UK. This exposed the UK’s lack of institutional mandate in ensuring women’s rights in
Northern Ireland and revealed potential constraints to applying WPS within the UK’s borders.
Then, by observing the UK’s long, complex history with P/CVE/CT and its prioritised position
on the UK’s security agenda, this thesis revealed the security policy backdrop to the
subsequent integration of P/CVE with WPS. Additionally, this revealed the institutional
structures of the UK’s P/CVE/CT policy as located principally within the Home Office, which
guides the UK’s work in both domestic spaces and abroad, which was relevant for
understanding how this work sits at the domestic-international nexus.

Finally, the policy framework for WPS implementation was mapped in detail. The archive of
the UK’s WPS policy documents, speeches and press releases utilised in this section is one
of the empirical contributions of this thesis. An examination of the UK’s international
engagement with WPS drew attention to the UK’s position as pen-holder for WPS at the UN
and its bilateral engagement with other states and organisations, revealing the UK’s strong
leadership identity on WPS. By uncovering the broader institutional and political context in
which WPS and P/CVE sits, this thesis demonstrates the conditions in which this policy shift
became possible. It also touched upon some of the institutional dynamics that shape the

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interpretation, such as where WPS and P/CVE sit within institutional structures and the key
institutional actors responsible for WPS interpretation and implementation.

Participation, Protection and P/CVE

The UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 has implications for the transformative
potential of WPS. This thesis has demonstrated that the UK has most broadly and consistently
presented the lack of women’s participation in peace and security and the vulnerability and
victimisation of women (particularly in regards to sexual and gender-based violence) as the
core problem frames that WPS attempts to address. This narrows the interpretation of, and
solutions offered by WPS to ensuring the participation and protection of women, rather than
about transforming the realm of peace and security and the gendered hierarchies within it.
This contributes to wider debates about the transformative potential of WPS (Cohn, 2008;
Otto, 2010; Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011). Whilst the UK does introduce other minor frames,
such as recognising women’s need in conflict, women’s access to justice and the prevention
of conflict, although these tend to overlap heavily with the dominant ‘protection’ and
‘participation’ frames. The location of the problem is in the majority world, in traditionally-
defined conflict spaces, which reproduces masculine and state-centric narrations of
(in)security and overlooks other forms of insecurity. Additionally, the UK is noticeably silent
regarding Northern Ireland as a post-conflict environment, highlighting a contradictory and
selective engagement with WPS. The choice of WPS focus countries exposes a level of
complicity in the (re)production of the UK’s ongoing colonial and donor-recipient power
dynamics. This work thus contributes to the work on WPS and the production of global
racialised hierarchies (See: Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014; Aroussi, 2017; Shepherd, 2017;
Parashar, 2019; Haastrup and Hagen, 2020; Holvikivi and Reeves, 2020). An analysis of the
UK’s conceptualisation of gender also revealed that gender was mostly treated as
synonymous with women, although ‘men and boys’ were sometimes mentioned in the policy
documents, ‘masculinities’ and ‘femininities’ was almost always absent. This also constrains
the UK’s approach to gender mainstreaming, as it is about the ‘integration’ of women and of
their differences in experiences, rather than a more transformative approach that
problematises the gendered structures and hierarchies in peace and security (Jahan, 1995;
Rees, 1998; Squires, 1999; Rees, 2002; Squires, 2005; Walby, 2005; Verloo and Lombardo,
2007; Krook and True, 2010; Joachim and Schneiker, 2012).

The UK’s shift to integrate P/CVE within its WPS approach (as strategic outcome six) was
primarily framed as a problem of ‘women’s invisibility in P/CVE’, and the proposed solution

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was to enhance women’s leadership and participation. This strategic outcome was largely
underdeveloped in the NAP, which was reflected in the absence of any indicators for success,
which suggested its inclusion was as a result of a top-down process rather than in direct
response to a specific problem that needed solving. The subsequent release of the guidance
note on Implementing Strategic Outcome Six demonstrated a much more gender-sensitive
and gender-responsive approach to P/CVE. However, this was greatly tied to enhancing
operational effectiveness rather than promoting the feminist principles at the root of WPS.
Whilst the guidance note acknowledged many of the numerous concerns raised about the
enmeshing of P/CVE and WPS, it ultimately represents an instrumentalisation of the agenda
for increased gender-sensitivity for the purposes of enhancing operational effectiveness of
P/CVE, without facilitating or ensuring mechanisms are in place to guarantee women’s rights
and security, as well as gender equality, remain at the forefront of P/CVE. This raised
significant questions about how easily this WPS strategic outcome can be co-opted and
instrumentalised. This chapter contributes to the wider body of literature that analyses WPS
policies (See: Shepherd, 2008, 2011; Puechguirbal, 2010; Pratt, 2013; Jansson and Eduards,
2016; Duncanson, 2019; Martín de la Rosa and Lázaro, 2019) but also presented a novel
technique of WPS policy analysis by utilising a Critical Frame Analysis methodological
approach. Furthermore, it provided a discursive analytical contribution to the debates
regarding UNSCR 2242 (Allison, 2013; Chowdhury Fink and Davidan, 2018; Heathcote, 2018;
Eddyono and Davies, 2019; Aroussi, 2020; Asante and Shepherd, 2020; Rothermel, 2020;
White, 2020).

The Institutional Complexities of WPS and P/CVE

By paying attention to the voices of actors who give UNSCR 1325 and 2242 meaning, this
thesis uncovered some of the less visible informal and formal rules, norms and values that
shape(d) the UK’s interpretation of WPS and P/CVE. The broader institutional analysis
revealed that the outward-facing approach to WPS is an informal rule, that there are levels of
misunderstanding and resistance to WPS by mainstream actors and that WPS has to go
through a process of shrinking and morphing in order to fight’ its way into ‘institutional thinking’
Elgström (2000: 457), particularly in the MOD, which exposes fundamental constraints to
WPS, as it becomes an interpretation of a male military audience.

The thesis paid particular attention to ‘how’ and ‘why’ P/CVE became a strategic outcome in
the 2018 – 2022 NAP. The analysis revealed that there were three key drivers of this policy
shift. By illuminating the primary policy driver as senior ministerial leadership, this contributes

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to the Feminist Institutionalism body of work that explores how key actors can have an impact
on the stasis, change and backsliding of gender mainstreaming (Chappell and Mackay, 2020).
Also, highlighting the prioritised place of P/CVE policy on the UK’s security agenda as a reason
for its integration with WPS indicates an enmeshing with traditional masculine and state-
centric security logics (Wibben, 2011). The final key driver was revealed to be the UK’s
leadership position on WPS internationally, which demonstrates how ‘institutions rely heavily
on their image and their reputation in order to generate external legitimacy’ (Holmes et al.,
2019: 223) and the international normative context can influence the diffusion of WPS (True,
2016). This indicated a heavily top-down approach to policy decision-making. The following
section then paid closer attention to the voices heard in the policy formulation and decision-
making process, particularly in regard to CSOs. The analysis revealed that formal consultation
processes were highly cautious of the risks of integrating P/CVE and WPS and did not present
P/CVE as a necessary focus of a strategic outcome. Furthermore, the UK government-funded
focus country consultations seemingly had little impact on shaping the 2018 – 2022 NAP and
the shift to prioritising P/CVE within it. This demonstrates the hierarchical structure, both
gendered and culturally, to WPS policy-making. Furthermore, the interviews revealed that
informal consultations were conducted with organisations who were more supportive of the
P/CVE direction, which I argue was a selective engagement with a ‘diversity of voices’, for the
support of the UK’s institutional agenda. This section exposes the UK government as an
institution that excludes ownership of WPS from the women whose lives are the focus of the
UK’s WPS policy and interventions. It also reveals limitations of the ‘feminist triangle’ model
and contributes to an understanding of the difficulties of gender mainstreaming and security
(Chappell, 2006; Holli, 2008; Woodward, 2015; Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018;
Chappell and Mackay, 2020). Finally, this thesis demonstrates that as WPS and P/CVE is
(re)interpreted into mainstream policy and practice, there are a number of challenges that
need to be addressed. As it stands, the WPS agenda, and gender, is being utilised for
enhancing the operational effectiveness of policies and programming, which fundamentally
signifies a co-optation and instrumentalisation of the WPS agenda.

Overall, the findings of this thesis demonstrates that the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325
and 2242 has instrumentalized women, women’s rights and the WPS agenda more broadly,
for operational effectiveness. Chappell and Guerrina (2020: 263) argue that there a difference
between ‘normative gender actors’ (those that actively promote gender equality principles and
mainstreaming) and ‘gendered normative actors’ (those that only strategically deploy gender
narratives). In the case of the UK and its integration of P/CVE and WPS, this thesis argues

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that the UK is a gendered normative actor. The findings highlighted here thus deepen our
understanding of barriers to the implementation of gender mainstreaming and the steps
required for its effective implementation. It draws attention to who gets to shape WPS policies
and whose voices are heard in WPS policy-making processes that reflects gendered and
racialised hierarchies. Fundamentally these findings build on the work of Heathcote (2018),
Aroussi (2020) and Ní Aoláin (2016), who argue that this trend is risky, problematic and
overlooks the deeper complexities of integrating WPS and P/CVE.

8.2 Discussion: The Catch-22 of UNSCR 2242

This thesis contributes to two critical discussions. Firstly, a wider discussion around whether
feminists should engage with P/CVE, as integrating issues of women’s rights and gender
equality can easily be co-opted and instrumentalised in these securitised spaces and the
option to reject the basic premises of P/CVE is removed. That being said, when the alternative
is non-engagement, and being outside of decision-making in these spaces, any ability to
influence or improve them is then limited. As P/CVE and violent extremism are a core feature
of the current security sphere, this is an important decision. Secondly, this thesis contributes
to debates around what the integration of P/CVE within WPS means for the WPS agenda, as
a wider feminist project. I will now draw upon the findings of this thesis to contribute to these
debates.

A catch-22 is ‘a difficult situation or problem which cannot be resolved because the conditions
necessary for its resolution are paradoxical or conflicting’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2018). I
find that the integration of feminist principles with P/CVE efforts is a catch-22 for feminists.
Whilst the passing of UNSCR 2242 could have been a critical juncture for destabilising the
masculinised, male-dominated and racialised nature of P/CVE it also opened space for the
co-optation of feminist discourses to uphold gendered and racialised structures. Building on
the critiques of War on Terror discourses for the rhetoric use of women’s rights and
empowerment to ‘camouflage’ for imperialistic war aims of the US and its allies (Klaus and
Kassel, 2005; Shepherd, 2006; Eisenstein, 2007; Hunt and Rygiel, 2007; Zine, 2007;
Bhattacharyya, 2008; Khalid, 2011; Pratt, 2013b), the uncertainty and hesitancy surrounding
the integration of P/CVE/CT with the WPS agenda (Allison, 2013; Ní Aoláin, 2016; Heathcote,
2018; Meger, 2018) and how UNSCR 2242 has been implemented in practice (Aroussi, 2020;
White, 2020; Lorentzen, 2021) and that women’s inclusion and participation in P/CVE/CT
initiatives are often tokenistic and problematic (Ní Aoláin, 2016; Heathcote, 2018; Asante and
Shepherd, 2020), there are clear reasons for feminist hesitancy in this space.

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Whilst some argue that for feminists in European and North American metropoles employing
a ‘strategic silence’ is possibly the only way in which to resist being complicit in racialising
discourses and co-opted in the pursuit of P/CVE (Pratt, 2013b: 330). However, the ‘problem
is whether the pacifist and equality goals of women’s peace movements can best be pursued
from outside or within mainstream institutions, systems of location which carry their own
gendered dichotomies’ (Otto, 2006:117). For Ní Aoláin (2016), this is a form of ‘Hobson’s
choice’ and the ‘exile of inclusion’ forces compromise, requires concessions and entails
forgoing the option of objection to many of the basic premises of the collective security system.
Thus to remain outside is to forfeit the possibility of exercising any influence on the decisions
and actions that affect the lives of women across the globe. Figure 17 below demonstrates
the ‘Catch-22’ by highlighting how if feminists are to engage with P/CVE efforts, they cannot
fundamentally reject the basic premises of P/CVE, which are often complicit in reproducing
gendered and racialised hierarchies and in securitising communities, thus the potential for
transformation is limited. On the other hand, if feminists choose not to engage with P/CVE,
they would be removing themselves from spaces and conversations on P/CVE and thus would
again have limited influential potential for transforming P/CVE. Thus there is a choice by
feminist actors, such as academics, civil society actors and women’s human rights defenders,
WPS advocates and ‘femocrats’ about whether they should engage with P/CVE.

Figure 17: The Catch-22 of Feminism and P/CVE

To Transform P/CVE

Not Engage/ No Engage/ Integration

Integration

Limited Influential Cannot Reject P/CVE

Potential Foundational Principles

No Transformation

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Whilst I argue that there is a need for the prevailing framings of violent extremism and terrorism
that are dominant in security spaces to be challenged and a need to develop alternative
understandings and approaches, P/CVE/CT remains a central feature of the UK’s (and much
of the ‘minority worlds’ security landscape. Thus the question is not only how we can we ‘avoid
co-optation by powerful institutions’ but ‘whether we can afford not to engage with such
institutions, when the application of gender analysis in their policymaking is clearly having
political effects beyond academic and feminist communities’ (True, 2003: 368). Whilst UNSCR
2242 and the introduction of P/CVE into the UK’s approach to WPS may not do the work that
feminists would like, it is unlikely that the UN and the international community will backslide
on UNSCR 2242. However, by engaging in analysis and critique, as this thesis has done,
there is room to challenge the problematic dimensions of WPS and P/CVE and propose
alternate visions in this space. Furthermore, by engaging in this work, there is also a potential
for women to access representation, resources and protection, that they may not otherwise
have had. Nevertheless, the option to engage or not engage is seemingly paradoxical for
feminists and there is a hard decision to be made regarding engagement in this policy space
and one that should not be taken lightly.

8.3 Thesis Implications and Policy Recommendations

This thesis now considers the implications for this thesis for scholars of WPS and for the WPS
agenda as a feminist project more broadly. It also provides some recommendations for policy-
makers and practitioners of WPS to consider. Firstly, this thesis has a number of implications
for scholars of WPS. This thesis has revealed the necessity of investigating the discursive and
institutional dimensions of WPS norm diffusion and the factors that enable and restrict more
transformative approaches to WPS. Whilst the analysis of WPS discourses and policy is
important, this does not reveal why certain interpretations of WPS are prioritised over others
and whose voices are heard in the policy framing processes. By paying attention to these
spaces, scholars are able to disrupt the focus on the privileged voices often heard in WPS
research and ensure that the naturalness of WPS policy framing is disrupted. Similarly, by
paying attention to how WPS policies are diffused beyond NAPs, greater insight is provided
into what difference WPS, as a normative framework, is actually having. Finally, this thesis
has demonstrated the need for Feminist Institutionalist researchers to engage with the work
of Post-Colonial Feminists in illuminating and disrupting global racialised hierarchies in
security policy practices and institutions.

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Secondly, beyond the ‘Catch-22’ argument, this thesis also contributes to debates about the
future of the WPS agenda. I argue that this thesis demonstrates the deeply troubling trajectory
that the WPS agenda is following, which is seemingly detracting from its feminist foundational
principles. This thesis has exposed how UNSCR 2242 and the integration of P/CVE into WPS
was a co-optation of WPS for enhancing operational effectiveness and entrenches masculine
and state-centric understandings of (in)security and reproduces gendered and racialized
hierarchies. The focus on P/CVE in the UK context meant that the issues raised by civil society
consultation in the UK, and the focus countries, were overlooked or allocated relegated
importance. WPS and NAPs should be protected as a framework for achieving women’s rights
and gender equality in peace and security as a goal in its own right and not as a mechanism
to further achieve national security objectives and for enhancing operational effectiveness.
For the WPS agenda to be a feminist agenda for peace, it must go through a redux to its
feminist roots and principles that are fundamentally anti-racist, anti-militarist, anti-colonialist,
anti-imperialist, anti-exclusionary and must be about challenging inequality in all its forms. As
it currently stands, the integration of P/CVE/CT within WPS demonstrates a shift away from
those criteria. As discussed previously, there is a ‘Catch-22’ to UNSCR 2242 in that P/CVE/CT
features high on security agendas and integration with WPS is already underway, and it would
be difficult to shift back from this.

This thesis now highlights a number of key recommendations for policy-makers in this space,
to address some of the problematic findings of this thesis. Firstly, the explicit focus on
P/CVE/CT as a stand-alone strategic outcome is unnecessary and particularly risky given the
lack of real understanding of why P/CVE is important for WPS. I argue that there is no added
value for specifically advocating for WPS and P/CVE rather than conflict prevention more
broadly and enhancing women’s participation within security and peace processes more
broadly. Recognising the need for development and peacebuilding assistance in fragile and
conflict-affected states does not need to be ‘P/CVE focused’; it should be about improved
governance and the inclusion of women’s rights and civil society organisations. Secondly, the
UK should removes the language of CVE and CT and only makes a reference to PVE within
WPS policy documents, which may go some way in preventing the co-optation of women or
the language of gender in militarised, securitising and racialised CVE/CT efforts. That being
said, preventative approaches to violent extremism must be undertaken with great care and
be far more analytically attuned to the gendered dynamics of the phenomenon not for
operational effectiveness but for disrupting gendered power structures and promoting
inclusive paths to peace. While violent extremism can pose a problem for peace, women’s

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rights, and gender equality, this should be a context-specific issue. Thirdly, the UK should
open further space for the feminist challenge of the UK’s approach to WPS, which means well
resourced, long-term, meaningful engagement on WPS and accountability for government
actions. The UK should employ more feminist gender advisors and experts who work
alongside CSOs and the UK government to prevent the co-optation and instrumentalisation of
WPS, women’s rights and gender equality in peace and security spaces. Fourthly, I argue that
a shift towards a ‘gender, peace and security’ approach would enhance the transformative
potential of WPS. By placing the emphasis on gender, rather than women, issues of gender
inequality are then not only a ‘women’s issue’. By utilising the concept of gender, the wider
societal structures that establish and reproduce gender inequality are made visible and can
be disrupted. Additionally, this would lessen the responsibility of the safety, security and rights
of women, on women only and would emphasise that men and masculinities are a
fundamental feature of how gender inequality is established and entrenched and that this is
an imbalance of power that needs to be challenged. Finally, the UK should rectify its complicity
in (re)producing gendered and racialised hierarchies through its applicability of WPS beyond
traditionally defined conflict spaces and consider issues of insecurity within the UK (and not
just for women in the majority world). The UK should move past its ‘colonial amnesia’, and
recognise that the focus of WPS may reproduce colonial relations. The UK has a
responsibility as pen-holder at the UNSC on WPS and with its high levels of soft power
regarding this topic to ensure WPS remains a valuable, inclusive and feminist agenda.

8.4 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are three-fold. Firstly, this thesis has generated an original
triangulation of theories; Feminist Security Studies, Post-Colonial Feminism and Feminist
Institutionalism. Together, these perspectives provide a theoretical lens that pays attention to
the role of gendered and racialised hierarchies in security practices and institutions. Each of
the theories adds a valuable dimension to the analysis of data by raising different questions
about the gendered nature of security, Post-Colonialism and institutions. The bridging of these
theories is particularly relevant for the analysis of integrating P/CVE into WPS approaches, as
P/CVE is a particularly problematic security practice due to its racialised, gendered and
securitising counter-terrorism foundations. This triangulation of theories could be used for
future feminist research on security practices and institutions in the minority world.

Secondly, this thesis has advanced the value of a Critical Frame Analysis (CFA)
methodological approach (Verloo, 2005; Verloo and Lombardo, 2007a; Van Der Haar and

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Verloo, 2016) in the analysis of security policy through a feminist lens. This thesis has
constructed a set of sensitising questions, building on the foundational CFA approach, by
integrating this with the theoretical framework mentioned in the previous paragraph, making it
specifically valuable for this research project. In addition, this thesis has overcome some of
the limitations of CFA in understanding the institutional dynamics of interpretation and
institutionalisation by integrating elite interviews into the data collection. This allowed a far
more detailed and in-depth insight into the role of voice and institutional dynamics in the policy
process; by building on the findings of the CFA of the policy documents, this methodological
development used similar sensitising questions to consider, for example, who was involved in
the policy process, how the process could have been different, who was silenced and what
the drivers behind the P/CVE and WPS policy intervention.

Thirdly, this thesis has provided an empirical contribution through a detailed investigation into
the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of WPS and P/CVE. This thesis contributes to
the literature on WPS as a transformative agenda, as it provides evidence of how the UK’s
interpretation of UNSCR 1325 has been broadly about ‘adding women and stirring’ and
‘making war safe for women’ without fundamentally challenging or destabilising the gendered
power structures that underpin violence and women’s exclusion from peace and security. This
case is particularly significant as it demonstrates how the UK’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325,
as a member of the UN Security Council and with seemingly high levels of commitment to
WPS, remains transformatively limited. In addition, through an investigation of the UK’s WPS
policy documents and NAPS, this thesis adds empirical evidence to debates regarding the
value of NAPs as a way to transform peace and security practices and how they reproduce
global gendered and racial hierarchies.

Additionally, the analysis of the UK’s interpretation and institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325
and 2242 revealed how WPS was constrained and shaped by informal and formal institutional
structures and the drivers of integrating P/CVE within its WPS policy framework. This thesis
revealed how ministerial leadership, security priorities, its international positioning, and the
positioning of WPS within the UK’s institutional structures shaped this interpretation. This
provides novel insight into how UNSCR 1325 and 2242 are diffused and transcend from the
international to domestic governments and into the departmental level and provides acumen
of the discursive and institutional complexities of how it is interpreted and reinterpreted. This
is a contribution to the literature of WPS as well as in understanding WPS policy in practice.
Similarly, this thesis provides empirical evidence of the voices heard, or lack thereof, of civil

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society organisations and exposes the complex relationship between CSOs and the UK
government in the UK’s WPS-P/CVE policy formulation process. As a result of these
aforementioned points, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the literature on WPS,
and in particular its nexus with P/CVE, by evidencing the discursive, as well as pragmatic,
challenges of integrating P/CVE with WPS and by providing evidence of the inherent risks of
instrumentalisation and co-optation of the agenda by this policy shift. This research thus has
value for understanding the value of WPS as a transformative agenda and how the policy shift
to integrate P/CVE/CT has increased the risk of its co-optation and complicity in reproducing
gendered and racialised hierarchies. Additionally, this thesis also provides an archive of key
documents related to WPS from the UK context (Appendix F), that other researchers could
utilise in the future.

8.5 Limitations and Areas of Future Research

Research on the area of P/CVE and CT policy is always difficult, due to issues of secrecy and
academics’ limited access to classified policy and operational documents. This thesis has
drawn on mostly publicly available policy documents and speeches but recognises that there
is likely to be more P/CVE/CT documents that could be worth analysing, but they are
classified. I attempted to overcome this as far as possible by using the elite interviews with
civil servants to source documents that were not publicly available but not classified, such as
the JICTU Gender and CT Guidance Note. That being said, the core focus of this thesis has
been on WPS rather than P/CVE/CT specifically and thus, the degree to which this is a
limitation is not significant enough to not warrant the findings irrelevant. Additionally, this thesis
has carved out a manageable research project that focuses specifically on the case of the UK
and its interpretation of UNSCR 1325 and 2242 and considers who and what were the driving
factors in this process and how this is (re)interpreted in department-level policy documents.
However, although some of the interviews touched upon the practical implications of this
policy, this research does not specifically investigate how it is implemented on the ground in
operations and interventions. Although beyond the scope of this research, this would provide
deeper insight into the effects of how P/CVE and WPS is actually applied. That being said,
gaining access to this space is difficult, although further research in this area would only add
value to the findings of this thesis.

In addition to limitations and areas of future research, it is also important to acknowledge that
during the timeframe of this thesis, there have been two key events that have had a significant
impact on the UK’s security and development sphere and its future. The year 2020 marked

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twenty years since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, but it also was the year that the global
COVID-19 pandemic began. The pandemic’s effects have been deeply gendered,
exacerbated existing gender inequalities as well as conflict and insecurity (GAPS: 2021c),
which means that in the face of deeper insecurity and inequality, WPS is more meaningful
than ever. As a result of the pandemic, the UK government reduced its official development
assistance (ODA) from 0.7% to 0.5% of Gross National Income (GNI), which of course does
not meet the 0.7% figure established in the 2015 International Development Act (Loft and
Brien, 2021). This in turn raises concerning questions about future funding for WPS and work
on women’s rights and gender equality more broadly. This emerging situation is one that could
have a significant impact on the future of the UK’s WPS work, but it is currently too early to
tell. The second key event, was the UK’s decision to merge the Department for International
Development (DFID) with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to create the Foreign,
Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) as a feature of the ‘Integrated Review’. As
the majority of interviews were conducted prior to this merge and the majority of documents
were also collected prior to this event, this research has not analysed FCO and DFID as one
department. However, the integration of the development and diplomatic arms of the
government also raises concern for future WPS work, as development work may become
increasingly securitized and linked to CVE, for example. The key document that outlines the
UKs future plans, ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age: Integrated Review of Security, Defence,
Development and Foreign Policy’, only made one reference to WPS, in its work with the
African Union (HM Government, 2021: 63), which highlights the lack of value placed on this
agenda during important political decisions on security and foreign policy. The COVID-19
pandemic and the Integrated Review are both concerning events for the future of WPS, that
should be watched closely as the effects of these developments come to fruition.

8.6 Conclusion
This thesis has demonstrated that in the case of the UK, the integration of P/CVE into the
WPS agenda has failed to be transformative and has, in some ways, upheld racialised and
gendered hierarchies. It has revealed a co-optation of the WPS agenda and women’s voices,
which ultimately does not result in greater security for women. Although I identify occasional
moments of meaningful engagement with the concept of gender, gender is often presented
as synonymous with women and is not used as a lens for destabilising gendered power
structures and hierarchies that lead to women’s inequality. The findings of this thesis
contribute to wider a understanding and validation of the difficulty of mainstreaming WPS in a
transformative way, particularly within deeply securitised and masculine institutions. The

257
integration of P/CVE and WPS was instigated not by consultations with civil society actors but
rather in a top-down way, which fundamentally demonstrates a worrying policy shift in the
UK’s approach to the WPS agenda. Furthermore, as the integration of WPS and P/CVE has
been reinterpreted beyond WPS policy documents, it has become even more of a tool for
CVE, which upholds securitising logics rather than resists them. That being said, this thesis
contributes to wider discussions about whether feminists should engage with P/CVE, as
feminists need to be engaged with this policy area in order to influence it. WPS is a learning
curve and as the UK continues to redraft its NAPs, it shows growing engagement with the
concept of gender and gender inequality, beyond women’s participation and protection, which
could indicate the foundations for a more transformative WPS policy in the future.
Nevertheless, for the UK’s interpretation and implementation of WPS to become more
meaningful, it needs to move past its colonial amnesia, recognise past and current issues of
domestic insecurity and existing gendered and racial inequalities and finally, ensure the voices
of the women the NAP targets are heard and their understanding of insecurity is central in
shaping interpretations of WPS.

258
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