The Pacific Review, 2016

Vol. 29, No. 4, 549 572, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1022589

ASEAN’s norm adherence and its

unintended consequences in HADR and
SAR operations

Dylan Ming Hui Loh

Abstract This paper examines the effects and expressions of norm compliance in
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ‘unintended
consequences’ arising from such compliance. This is done through an analysis of
ASEAN’s responses in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts
in the Typhoon Haiyan disaster and in the search for missing flight MH370. It argues
that the lethargic ASEAN responses in the Haiyan disaster and the uncoordinated
search efforts for missing flight MH370 are unintended outcomes arising from norm
adherence specifically to the norms of ‘respect for sovereignty’ and ‘consensual
decision-making’ which constrained the range of ASEAN responses.

Keywords: ASEAN norms; Typhoon Haiyan; MH370; HADR; SAR operations.

Introduction
For the past decade, 8 out of 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) member countries experienced major disasters resulting in over
500,000 fatalities; reconstruction costs of more than USD $12 billion; and
affected the lives of more than 17 million people (Kamal 2010). Why has
ASEAN not been able to respond more effectively and swiftly despite the
recurrence of disaster events? Despite the presence of political will,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) capabilities and
ASEAN legal obligations, what has prevented ASEAN from playing a
more central role in disaster/search and rescue (SAR) events in the region?
This research will investigate two empirical cases in HADR efforts in
ASEAN the Typhoon Haiyan operations and the initial SAR phase of
Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 (MH370). Typhoon Haiyan was selected as

Dylan M.H. Loh is a research analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
(RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Block S4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798.
His research interests include ASEAN, Chinese foreign policy and sociological international
relations.
Address: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Block S4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798. Tel: Phone: C65 67904751. Email:
dylanlmh@gmail.com, ismhloh@ntu.edu.sg

Ó 2015 Taylor & Francis

550 The Pacific Review

one of the case examples for two main reasons. First, given the history of
disasters in ASEAN, and accumulated knowledge, lessons and experience,
this should have been an example where ASEAN should have performed
more creditably. Second, the events took place after the Cyclone Nargis
and right after the first major ASEAN-led HADR exercise in Brunei. In
other words, Typhoon Haiyan should have been ASEAN’s ‘Katrina
Moment’ (Graham 2013: 3). Investigating the Typhoon Haiyan case can
help surface the reasons for ASEAN’s poor showing despite the body of
accumulated experience and presence of political will.
The search for MH370, on the other hand, was an unprecedented event.
It was selected for three reasons. First, it was an event that no one expected
nor could reasonably foresee. However, some scholars have observed that
it is precisely in times of emergencies that regional cooperation and author-
ity increase (Haas and Schmitter 1964: 716; Adler and Barnett 1998;
Langenhove 2011) a prediction that did not actualize. Second, while this
was an extraordinary event, ASEAN is, nonetheless, mandated to help
under the 1972 ‘Agreement for the Facilitation of Search of Aircrafts and
Rescue of Survivors of Aircraft Accidents’ of which all ASEAN countries
acceded to. Article 4 of the agreement is of particular significance:

Subject to the control of their own authorities, the Contracting Par-

ties shall make arrangements to ensure entry without delay into their
territories on a temporary basis of qualified personnel required for
search and rescue in connection with aircraft in distress.
(ASEAN 1972)

Similarly, Articles 6 and 7 of the agreement also oblige members to coop-

erate with each other and grant permission for any aircraft, vehicle or per-
sonnel for the purposes of SAR. However, the agreement (and the spirit of
the agreement) was certainly not upheld in the MH370 example. Third,
search efforts in this case example ‘crossed over’ into the security domain
making it a complementary and important case to compare and contrast
against the Typhoon Haiyan example which was a ‘pure’ HADR exercise.

Comparing Typhoon Haiyan and search for missing flight MH370

The two cases present a similar and yet different examples of HADR/SAR
ASEAN efforts that have floundered. They are similar because in both
instances, there was a dependency on extra-regional powers; scepticism of
ASEAN mechanisms; and strong presence of bilateralism instead of multi-
lateralism. In both cases, it produced negative, self-contrary results. On the
other hand, the cases had a key qualitative difference: the Typhoon Haiyan
was an example of a ‘pure’ humanitarian case, while the MH370 search was
not.
 D.M.H. Loh: ASEAN’s Norm Adherence 551

Typhoon Haiyan was one of the worst disasters in Southeast Asia in

recent memory it devastated the Philippines on 8 November 2013, caus-
ing an estimated 6300 deaths with over 1000 people reported missing.
Offers of extra-regional bilateral help, such as the US, Japan and the
United Kingdom, came swiftly. However, the response of ASEAN was
underwhelming. Indeed, in the aftermath of the disaster, ASEAN’s poor
performance drew criticisms leading one scholar to ask: ‘Where is
ASEAN?’ (Graham 2013: 2). On 8 March 2014, Malaysian flight MH370
lost contact with air traffic control. What was termed as the ‘largest multi-
national search’ and rescue effort was subsequently undertaken. Help for
Malaysia was forthcoming; however, in a case of the ‘dog that didn’t bark’,
it was initially met, largely, with silence from ASEAN and its HADR
organs.
It is worth noting that the sluggish efforts of ASEAN in both instances
were not down to a lack of HADR support instruments, for there are sev-
eral such mechanisms. These include the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for
Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre),
ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, the ASEAN Agreement
on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, ASEAN Regional
Program on Disaster, ASEAN-Emergency Rapid Assessment team
(ASEAN-ERAT), the 2005 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management
and Emergency Responses (AADMER) amongst many other such initia-
tives, agreements and workshops.1

ASEAN’s HADR experience and capabilities

And while it is certainly true that ASEAN’s HADR capabilities are imper-
fect, unequally distributed and lags behind many countries in the West
it, nevertheless, has the requisite material capability and capacity to
address HADR issues in the region. The manifestation of these capabilities
are especially clear when the disasters happen outside ASEAN or substan-
tially affects non-ASEAN countries in situations where ASEAN norms
are not as prominent than it would have been if it were an ‘exclusively’
Southeast Asia disaster situation.
For example, when the Indian Ocean tsunami struck on 24 December
2004 (and affected four ASEAN States: Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand
and Malaysia and other non-ASEAN countries such as India, Sri Lanka
and Somalia), it was met with swift responses. Singapore sent over 1200
military and Civil Defence Force personnel and three endurance class ves-
sels off the coast of Meulaboh which was one of the worst hit areas (Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs 2004; Naval Today 2014). Malaysia dispatched a
‘Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team’; sent at least 300
soldiers to Aceh and was the first to arrive at the scene (Gentner 2005:6).
In another example, when a massive tsunami struck the coast of Japan on
552 The Pacific Review

11 March 2011, it drew a quick and generous response from Southeast

Asia. Tellingly, half of ASEAN made it to the list of the top 20 donating
countries: Thailand at third with $20.8 million; Vietnam at seventh with
$7.9 million; Malaysia at twelfth with $5.2 million; Singapore at sixteenth
with $3.1 million; and the Philippines at nineteenth with $2.9 million
(Westlake 2013). Additionally, Indonesia sent a SAR team and a medical
team to the affected area; Malaysia sent a 15-member SAR team, with
medical officers and tracker dogs on two C130 aircraft (Star Online, The
2011); the Philippines made ready to deploy a joint rescue mission com-
posed of 41 members to be accompanied by a Philippine Air Force C-130
cargo plane (Pazzibugan 2011); and Thailand sent a 35-men specialist med-
ical team proficient in Japanese together with sniffer dogs (Thailand Times
2011). The countries’ response to Typhoon Haiyan pales in comparison to
the above example Indonesia donated $2 million (with $1 million in
goods and logistics); Malaysia contributed $1 million; Singapore donated
$200,000; and Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar each provided $100,000.
The speed in which the sums were disbursed was also slower than in the
Japan Tsunami example (Lee 2014).
It is clear from the examples above that member countries of ASEAN
had the material resources, the money and the ability to muster credible
responses to disasters. However, in the two case studies presented here,
individual Southeast Asian nations and ASEAN’s institutional response
was found wanting. Some might argue that individual members’ capabili-
ties do not necessarily accrue collectively to an ASEAN capability. How-
ever, there is countervailing evidence that show otherwise. These include
the large number of ASEAN HADR/SAR exercises which involve pooled
HADR resources from member countries; and the various legal and formal
mechanisms that guide HADR/SAR activities, some of which necessitates
an ASEAN response to disaster events in Southeast Asia. Significantly,
even if one were to compare individual Southeast Asian countries’
response to extra-regional disasters versus its individual responses to disas-
ters within Southeast Asia, it is clear that countries were more generous
and much swifter in extra-regional disasters than in intra-regional disasters
even though they have the necessary resources to muster a better showing.
Institutionally, ASEAN with its experienced and pooled capabilities could
have given a better account of it, but failed to do so.
How ‘good’ is good enough then? Four benchmark indicators arise if one
looks at Southeast Asian nation’s forays into the 2011 Japan Tsunami and
the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami: speed of response, monetary aid, provi-
sion of supplies and absence of criticism. In the above two examples,
ASEAN states were able to deliver and deploy assets and supplies within a
matter of days. The monetary sum contributed by member countries was
also substantial as illustrated in the 2011 Japan Tsunami example. This has
added significance if one compares the considerably smaller amounts
donated to the Philippines during Typhoon Haiyan. Moreover, the
 D.M.H. Loh: ASEAN’s Norm Adherence 553

presence of public and self-criticisms in both Typhoon Haiyan and the

search for missing flight MH370 was telling.

‘Norms’ scholarship in ASEAN

An important sub-focus of the constructivist scholarship has been on norms
building, norms diffusion and how norms affect state’s behaviour (Conteh-
Morgan 2005: 73 5; Eaton and Stubbs 2006: 144). In recent decades,
ASEAN norms have come under increasing study and Acharya’s (2001)
‘Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia’ is widely recog-
nized as catalyzing constructivist and norms literature on the region. To
that end, many contemporary ASEAN norms scholarships concern them-
selves with norm diffusion, violation and adoption.
Capie (2008) traced the diffusion of small arms norms in ASEAN and
how member states’ local resistance to the norms prevented norm adop-
tion. Narine (2012) provided a functionalist explanation of ASEAN norm
adoption and argued that ASEAN’s willingness to introduce an ASEAN
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights was an attempt to reha-
bilitate its international image rather than an authentic attempt to initiate
substantive human rights reforms and norms. In a similar vein, Davies
(2013) focused on ASEAN human rights norm violations and account for
these violations as rational and deliberated actor agency choices to achieve
specified goals. Poole (2007) mapped out the evolution of ASEAN’s nor-
mative terrain from 1997 to around 2005 and showed how the evolving nor-
mative landscape is concurrently shaping and shaped by states’ behaviour.
Many scholars have pointed out how norms constrain efforts at greater
regional integration (Acharya 2001; Teh 2004: 90) and cooperation on
issues such as trans-boundary haze (Ramcharan 2000: 68 70). Arggarwal
and Chow’s study is one example that shows how norms (or ‘meta-regimes’
as they termed it) such as non-interference undermined ASEAN’s ability
to tackle key issues such as trade liberalization and haze pollution (2010:
283) as does Elliot (2003) in her exposition of the ideational normative
constraints (in addition to material constraints) to greater ASEAN envi-
ronmental cooperation. Amador’s (2009) scholarship on Cyclone Nargis is
the clearest example of a research examining how norms specifically the
principle of ‘non-interference’ prevented a more robust and timely
ASEAN HADR response. However, he neglects the role of norm adher-
ence, conflates the norms of ‘non-interference’ and ‘consensus-seeking’
and does not sufficiently account for the expressions and effects of norms
on state’s behaviour.
Outside of ASEAN, there have been several studies looking at the
dynamic between norms and disaster relief. More relevantly, these studies
have shown how norms can prevent ideal disaster relief outcomes an
observation which this study shares. For instance, Dhungel and Ojha’s
554 The Pacific Review

meticulous research on female victims’ disaster relief needs in Nepal

highlighted how social norms increased their vulnerability and prevented
access to agencies offering help (2012: 311 2). Studying the case of the
super-cyclone in 1999 in Odisha, India, Chhotray (2014) argues that disas-
ter relief norms and practices in India caused victimhood to become the
moral content of citizenry’s engagement with the state. He further detailed
how the state’s obligation to assist is hedged by norms that would safeguard
against ‘excessive giving’ to ‘undeserving’ recipients.
Schneider (1992) observes that a successful governmental response to
disasters lies not in the nature of the disaster nor on the structure of the
government reaction but rather to the relationship between ‘bureaucratic
norms’ and ‘emergent norms’. Through her case studies of disaster events
in Carolina, Schneider concludes that what determines a ‘successful’ or
‘failed’ response is directly related to the gap between bureaucratic norms
(bureaucratic politics and organizational procedures) and emergent norms
(the incipient search for meaning and expectations after a disaster event).
In essence, the closer the gap, the higher the chances of a government
response being viewed as ‘successful’. These norms HADR studies are
important in understanding the interface between norms and disaster
relief. However, they largely fall under a sociological level of analysis as
opposed to an international, inter-organizational perspective of norms
vis-

a-vis HADR/SAR activities as this study attempts to do.
Existing literature on ASEAN norms also tend to focus on deliberative
behavioural effects. That is to say, actors choose to adopt, reject or
‘localize’ (Acharya 2004) certain norms based on deliberative strategic cal-
culation or normative fit. In Arggarwal and Chow’s research, they noted
that ‘Yet while meta-regimes influence regimes, and these in turn affect
national actions and interactions, we showed how each of these elements is
also driven by political and economic causal factors’ (2010: 283), indicating
a rational, deliberative actor-agency association. Consequentially, the out-
comes of norms on state’s behaviour are seen either as considered choices,
driven by (political, economic) interests, or as a result of the tension
between regional norms and local norms.
Finally, a large portion of the norms scholarship agenda in ASEAN con-
centrates on norm violation as opposed to norm adherence leaving it
largely unexplored. Norm adherence is operationally conceptualized here
as the inclination of member states, largely by default and regardless of
willingness, to adhere and follow existing norms in the ASEAN system. To
be sure, norm violation is easily observable and usually public, making it
much easier to study. Other scholars have also pointed out deliberate viola-
tions of ASEAN norms such as, inter alia, the Vietnam invasion of Cambo-
dia in 1978 and the incessant meddling of Burma’s internal affairs (Jones
2009: 2 3; Khoo 2004: 39; Moller 1998: 1089 92). It is noted that violations
and challenges do not indicate the absence, failure or fragility of the norms
(Ba 2005: 259). Rather, the high visibility in these norm violations simply
 D.M.H. Loh: ASEAN’s Norm Adherence 555

underscores the infrequent nature of infringements and, in turn, highlights

how norms scholarship privileges the study of norm violation instead of
norm adherence.
Ba stressed that:

. . . most instances of norm compliance have tended to be invisible

precisely because they are uncontentious. In fact, the existence of a
norm is often clearest when it has been broken: we see interference
precisely because non-interference is a norm [. . .] At the very least,
the attention given to these periods of crisis seems to be at the
expense of the equally important discussion about more ‘ordinary’
interactions and non-events.
(Ba 2005: 260)

The examples above provide a general contour of the focus of existing

contemporary norms scholarship. These are important contributions help-
ing us understand how norms govern and affect state’s behaviour and also
add to our understanding of a very complex regional institution. However,
it is important to note that norms constrain state’s actions precisely
because countries, generally, adhere to them (Finnemore and Sikkink
1998: 891; Kim and Lee 2011). Furthermore, compliance to ASEAN norms
has been observed to ‘exacerbate challenges or threats to regional security’
(Haacke 2003: 219). Therefore, the study of norm adherence is critical in
understanding how norms constrain and affect state’s behaviour and how it
can produce negative outcomes. Yet, it is clear that scholarship on norm
adherence and their injurious effect, especially in the field on HADR in
ASEAN, is understudied. Given the importance placed on the HADR/
SAR agenda by ASEAN and the frequent reoccurrence of natural disas-
ters in Southeast Asia, this paucity in norms HADR scholarship needs to
be addressed.
According to Robert Merton (1936), unintended consequences can be
grouped under three categories: a positive unintended benefit; a negative
unintended detriment; and a perverse self-contrary effect. This study
argues that the third and most severe type of unintended consequence
arose out of ASEAN’s norm adherence in its HADR and SAR efforts.
This paper also responds to some critics of constructivist scholarship on
ASEAN who question or even reject the validity and relevance of con-
structivism (Jones 2009; Davies 2013: 224 5) by demonstrating the central-
ity of constructivism in understanding ASEAN.
The case study method has been described as the most appropriate to
address descriptive and explanatory question the ‘what’ and the ‘why’
(Yin 2012: 5). Indeed, this research addresses the what ‘what are the
forms and expressions of norm adherence in ASEAN HADR/SAR
efforts?’ and also the why ‘how has norm adherence affected ASEAN’s
and individual states’ responses to HADR and SAR efforts?’, amongst
556 The Pacific Review

others. As such, the case study method would be most suitable in answering
those questions.

Typhoon Haiyan and the ‘consensus-seeking’ norm

Typhoon Haiyan was one of the most lethal typhoons ever in the Philip-
pines’ recorded history. The official death toll from Typhoon Haiyan
stands at more than 6000 people dead, over 1000 people missing and
approximately USD $2 billion in damages (National Disaster Risk 2014).
Offers of humanitarian assistance from around the world were swift. It is
noteworthy that the largest contributors of monetary aid came from out-
side ASEAN with the United Kingdom leading the list with £73 million in
public donations and £60 million in government funds (McElroy 2013).
Other substantial donors include the United States with USD $86.7 million
(USAID 2014); Australia with A$40 million (Department of Foreign
Affairs 2013); South Korea with USD $20 million (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2013) and Japan with USD $52 million (GMA News 2013).
In contrast, Southeast Asia’s richest country Singapore gave about
USD $200,000 dollars (Channel News Asia 2013). The most any Southeast
Asian country donated was Indonesia with USD $2 million in supplies and
cash (Primanita 2013). ASEAN countries were amongst the lowest contrib-
utors of monetary aid to the Philippines. While an ASEAN-ERAT team
was deployed to Manila and Tacloban under the auspices of ASEAN
(ASEAN 2013a), substantive relief efforts from ASEAN was found lacking
with HADR assistance from Japan, the US and the United Kingdom being
the most substantial. Typhoon Haiyan certainly ranks as one of the largest-
scale disasters in Southeast Asia but it is not without precedent. Cyclone
Nargis, for instance, resulted in at least 78,000 fatalities in 2008 (BBC
News 2008). It is also not entirely true that ASEAN did not have the capac-
ity to help in Typhoon Haiyan because there were substantial increases,
politically and materially, in cooperative and collective HADR activities
post-Nargis.
These activities include the convening of an ARF Disaster Relief Exercise
(DiREx) in Thailand on 7 11 May 2013 and a large-scale HADR and mili-
tary medicine exercise that was successfully conducted from 17 to 20 June
2013 before Typhoon Haiyan struck. This particular exercise involved all
the ADMMC countries with over 3200 personnel, 15 helicopters, 7 ships
and multiple SAR assets. It was the first and the largest joint HADR
ASEAN/ADMMC exercise (Sieff 2013) to date. The exercise simulated a
Typhoon (Typhoon Simpur) devastating Brunei which overwhelms local
HADR forces, causing an activation of the AHA Centre for assistance
(Norjidi 2013). Just three months later, Typhoon Haiyan stuck the Philip-
pines. Additionally, there have been several other ASEAN HADR exer-
cises and initiatives of various kinds post-Cyclone Nargis (Graham 2013).
 D.M.H. Loh: ASEAN’s Norm Adherence 557

The Chairman’s statement of the 22nd ASEAN Summit stated: ‘We

agreed that disaster preparedness is crucial as ASEAN Member States
continue to face challenges of increasing global temperatures, more severe
floods and droughts, as well as rising sea levels’ (ASEAN Summit 2013a).
In the same year during the 23rd ASEAN Summit, these sentiments were
echoed: ‘We encouraged the holding of regular disaster relief exercises, in
order to improve our capacity in disaster preparedness. . .’ (ASEAN
Summit 2013b). Evidently, there was political will, recognition of the need
for greater preparedness, and, most importantly, concrete steps taken to
build ASEAN cooperation, interoperability and capacities. Moreover, as
highlighted in the Introduction section, ASEAN has shown that it pos-
sesses the material capabilities to respond quickly and noticeably to disas-
ter situations. Why then has ASEAN not featured prominently in
Typhoon Haiyan?
Besides the utilization of a team of 13 to monitor and disseminate infor-
mation on the ground and the deployment of one staff member to Tacloban
(Zyck et al. 2014), there is little in ASEAN’s contribution of note in the
relief efforts. It was the naval assets of America (USS George Washington),
the UK (HMS Daring and HMS Illustrious) and Japan’s deployment of
1000 Self-Defence Forces to the Philippines (Tsukimori 2013) that were the
first responders.
As is part of the ‘ASEAN Way’, consensus on any major decision would
need to be sought before action can be undertaken (Collins 2013: 32).
Accordingly, any major relief effort that needs to be commenced would
entail ASEAN’s consensus. While this mode of operation can be helpful in
building resilience and consensus on issues, even sensitive ones, over a
long term (Ba 2009: 98 100), it is most unhelpful when an event demands
immediate response. This normative constrain of ‘consensus-seeking’ sur-
faced during Cyclone Nargis: it was not until after several days after the
cyclone struck before a Foreign Ministers meeting was held on 19 May and
even then, it was merely ‘. . .to discuss how we should assist Myanmar in
the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis’ (ASEAN 2008).
Furthermore, much of the delicate negotiations with the then Junta gov-
ernment was led by Surin Pitsuwan himself and it is debatable, if not for
Pitsuwan, whether the government would open up for aid. A period of
close to 6 years has passed since Cylcone Nargis. This period of time
afforded ASEAN the opportunity to strengthen its HADR capacities and
to build on the Cyclone Nargis experience. However, several years on,
Typhoon Haiyan showed how, once again, the norm of ‘consensus-seeking’
endured.
During Typhoon Haiyan, the ASEAN Secretary General, Le Luong
Minh, in his capacity as the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordina-
tor, said that ‘he is ready to facilitate ASEAN cooperation and coordina-
tion through the AHA Centre’ (ASEAN 2013a). The vagueness in the
offer of help and the unspecified terms of help is an example of how
558 The Pacific Review

ASEAN and the AHA Centre could not act decisively without consensus.
This led to a two weeks delay before the ASEAN Secretary-General
arrived to ‘inspect’ the damage wrought by the Typhoon (Berthelsen 2013:
para 4). A Council on Foreign Relations report later stated that ASEAN’s
ineffectiveness in Typhoon Haiyan was due to a ‘. . .weak secretariat and
consensus decision-making’ (Wright 2013: para 7). This also explains how
countries, shed of its normative inhibitions and acting as individual states,
were able to do comparatively better in the 2011 Japan Tsunami and the
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.
The recurrent theme in criticisms of ASEAN response has been one that
is ‘slow’ rather than that of ineffectiveness. Certainly, it was the hesitant
and unsure nature of ASEAN’s AHA centre and overall ASEAN assis-
tance that drew the most censure. While it is unlikely that ASEAN would
have been able to match up to Western or Japanese expertise/aid, given its
history of capacity building, interoperability exercises and the cumulative
experience gleaned post-Nargis, it should have given a more creditable
showing. Ultimately, the obvious problems of generating consensus under
such tight and pressing timeline hindered any sort of final decision and pre-
vented action on ASEAN’s part leading to the unintended credibility loss.
As mentioned earlier, the presence of political will, while necessary, may
be inadequate in circumventing or substantially challenging ‘foundational’
norms such as consensus-seeking. Indeed, there was a sense of frustration
even amongst ASEAN countries for the slow response offered by ASEAN.
In a joint Thai Indonesia conference, the foreign ministers of both coun-
tries noted that cooperation in disaster mitigation is an item on the
ASEAN agenda that needs to be discussed as soon as possible, especially
quick humanitarian assistance among member countries (Global Post
2013: para 3).

Findings from the Typhoon Haiyan case study

The case study of Typhoon Haiyan reveals three things. First, the poor
record of ASEAN’s HADR efforts within ASEAN led to the mistrust in
institutional HADR efforts, which, in turn, caused the Philippines to turn
to more trusted sources of support such as the United States. Philippine
President Aquino, for instance, did not mention ASEAN or any ASEAN
HADR assistance in his first address about the relief (Keithley 2013: para
4). This caused and continues to cause a vicious cycle where countries in
ASEAN underutilize ASEAN’s HADR capabilities, stunting its develop-
ment and growth, which, in turn, causes its underutilization.
Second, the underutilization and mistrust of ASEAN’s HADR capaci-
ties compelled countries to concentrate their attention on providing bilat-
eral aid and support within Southeast Asia instead of focusing on an
ASEAN-led one further stifling ASEAN growth in this regard. Finally,
the re-surfacing of the ‘consensus-seeking’ norm and its inimical effects
 D.M.H. Loh: ASEAN’s Norm Adherence 559

indicates the strength and durability of it in HADR operations. Indeed, the

‘consensus-seeking’ norm has been described as an ‘integral feature’ that
guides ASEAN’s decision-making (Acharya 1997: 320) and has been held
as an enabler of ASEAN’s regionalism and its continued success (Nagara
2013). However, in this example, the normative pressure of ‘consensus-
seeking’ caused negative ASEAN outcomes.

Search for missing flight MH370 and ‘respect for sovereignty’

The search for flight MH370 when it went missing on 8 March 2014 could
have been an instance where ASEAN could demonstrate its HADR and
SAR capabilities (Loh 2014a). However, the (lack of) ASEAN effort has
been criticized and held as an example of lingering mistrust, mutual suspi-
cion and poor cooperation that has not been dispelled within Southeast
Asia (Bisley 2014; Hogan 2014; Nehru 2014). These characterizations of
ASEAN’s response are certainly valid but it misses out more important
underlying normative factors behind the uncooperative search efforts
factors that resulted in the surfacing of the said mistrust and mutual suspi-
cion. While Typhoon Haiyan was not without precedent, the disappear-
ance of flight MH370 was truly an unprecedented regional and global
event due to the nature of its disappearance and the international effort
commenced in the search. This case differs from Typhoon Haiyan because
issues of security contested territories, airspace and military radar data
featured in the search.
The Vietnamese were heavily involved in the initial phases of the SAR
efforts on the 8th and the 9th of March as it was presumed that its last
known location was over the Gulf of Thailand. Thailand, too, participated
in search efforts in the Gulf of Thailand and later, the Andaman Sea near
its own borders. Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore and the Philippines also con-
tributed to the unfolding search efforts with planes and naval assets. The
assistance provided in Southeast Asia, however, came bilaterally there
was no reference of the ASEAN-ERAT nor was there any concerted
response from ASEAN. As the search developed, confusion over the
plane’s location clouded the hunt for the plane in part due to the slow
release of relevant information from Malaysia. The perception that Malay-
sia had delayed or withheld information from its ASEAN neighbours
caused frustration amongst participant countries. This was especially felt
by Vietnam who scaled back operations and stopped it altogether on 12
March 2014 (Malaysian Insider, The 2014).
It is worth noting that one of the primary goals of the ASEAN-ERAT is
‘. . .to respond to disasters, and ensure rapid and collective deployment of
ASEAN’s resources following a major disaster in one or more Member
State within the ASEAN region’ (Loh 2014a: 2). There have been SAR
exercises such as the three-day SAR exercise in November 2006 (Thayer
2014) and the annual ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation
560 The Pacific Review

Exercise (ARDEX) (ASEAN 2013b). Nevertheless, to be fair, given the

lack of development in ASEAN’s SAR capacities compared to its HADR
capacities, it would be unrealistic to assume ASEAN could comprehen-
sively handle the crisis (Thayer 2014). That notwithstanding, the fact that it
did not muster a basic, initial, collective response is indicative of ASEAN’s
normative constraints more so than its material constraints in tying its
hands in the SAR efforts. Moreover, as highlighted earlier, regardless of
the ‘extraordinariness’ of the event, the ‘1972 Agreement’ mandated coun-
tries within ASEAN, legally, to recognize ASEAN as the legitimate organi-
zation to deal with air disasters. In addition to Article 4 highlighted above,
Section (b) of Article 6 states that:

. . . at the same time to grant any necessary permission for the flight of
the aircraft concerned into and over its territory, and to make the
necessary arrangements with the appropriate customs, immigration,
and other authorities to expedite the entry and transit of the aircraft,
vessel, personnel and equipment provided for the purpose of search
and rescue.
(ASEAN 1972)

As the search for MH370 crossed over to the realm of ‘security’, the
norm of ‘respect for sovereignty’ became most pronounced. The ‘respect
for sovereignty’ norm necessitates the stressing of one’s sovereign identity
and the recognition of the sovereign identity of other member states
(Narine 2004: 424; Soesilowati 2010: 9). It is not usually ‘negative’ as
mutual respect of sovereignty (together with non-interference) is a neces-
sary enabler of regional resilience and unity (Ba 2009: 94 5). However, in
the MH370 example, norm compliance created a clear emphasis on sover-
eign identity rather than the ASEAN identity. There are three key expres-
sions of this emphasis on sovereign identity.

Findings from the search for flight MH370

First, countries were hesitant in sharing information that could potentially
‘threaten’ its sovereignty even if these were potentially crucial informa-
tion in the search. Data related to the flight paths that could have been
picked up by ASEAN’s military radars were being delayed, or kept
unshared. Vietnam’s deputy Minister of Transport, Pham Quy Tieu, noted
that ‘. . .five days after the plane went missing; Vietnamese authorities only
exchanged information with a Malaysian military official, who refused to
provide any information about the search mission carried out by the
Malaysian authorities’. When asked if the plane had slipped off the radar
or suddenly disappeared, Malaysia’s acting transport minister, who is also
defence minister, said the information was ‘too sensitive’ (Branigan 2014:
para 8). Indonesia, too, initially refused to give clearance to six foreign
 D.M.H. Loh: ASEAN’s Norm Adherence 561

aircraft to fly over its airspace in the international efforts to search for the
plane, causing delay in the search (Jacques and Gantan 2014).
Second, countries within ASEAN that have rendered assistance have
been quick to couch it in bilateral terms, accentuating their country-to-
country relationship rather than under an ASEAN one this despite the
fact that the 1972 Agreement placed ASEAN as the central player for such
air disasters. For example, Singapore was amongst the first countries to
offer help and its Prime Minister stressed, several times, that Singapore
was ready to commit more assets and ‘stand ready’ to help as long as
Malaysia needed them (Loh 2014b; Povera and Lee 2014) and its ready
assistance to Malaysia was hailed as an instance of strong bilateral ties
(Singh 2014). The initial search efforts by Vietnam were similarly embed-
ded in bilateral terms. This stressing of bilateralism, coupled with the non-
mentioning of ASEAN, is a clear expression of sovereign identity over
regional identity.
Third, individual criticisms were viewed as a slight on national sover-
eignty. The strong and spirited defence displayed showed the expectation
that countries had on others ASEAN countries not to interfere/criticize
their search efforts (Jakarta Post 2014). For example, in late March, Indo-
nesia chastised the Malaysian media for alleging that Jakarta had failed to
provide radar information that could have revealed the plane’s location.
Thailand also reacted with indignation when a news report claimed that
the Royal Thai Airforce took 10 days to release radar information possibly
related to the missing plane (Doksone 2014). On 2 May 2014, Malaysia’s
Civil Aviation Chief accused the Vietnamese of breaking protocol by not
reporting about the missing flight after 5 minutes of non-contact (Sul-Lyn
2014) which the Vietnamese strongly denied. This expectation of non-
interference and non-criticism stem from countries’ generally complied
and expected compliance of others to the norm of ‘respect for sovereignty’.
It prevented a critical and honest assessment of individual and collective
SAR efforts while creating hesitancy and secrecy in the SAR operations -
hindering a collective ASEAN effort.
Just like the ‘consensus-seeking’ norm, the norm of ‘respect for sover-
eignty’ is a fundamental ASEAN norm and has been described as ‘the prin-
ciple upon which the rest of the collective ASEAN identity hangs’ (Goh
2003: 114) and one of the foundational stone of the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Kraft
2000: 462 4; Haacke 2003: 7). It is worth mentioning that adherence to this
norm exerts ‘contrary’ normative pressures and obligations on states. On
the one hand, the norm allowed regional unity and obliged cooperation by
making the region free from internal meddling, but on the other hand, this
norm is predicated on national sovereignty and the fragility of intra-ASEAN
relationships (Ba 2009: 98 9). So, while ASEAN is ‘expected’ and obliged
to cooperate, it has to, first and foremost, ensure national resilience.
ASEAN elites also have had to reconcile and spirit a (necessary and
obligatory) defence of ASEAN with the reality of a lacklustre showing;
562 The Pacific Review

this resulted in contradictory signals. Singapore’s Foreign Minister K.

Shanmugam rejected criticisms of ASEAN’s response. He said: ‘I don’t
believe that and I don’t think that there’s anything on the facts that. . . sug-
gest that any of the ASEAN countries were tardy in their response in any
way’ (Xin 2014). Several days later, Member of Parliament and Govern-
ment Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Foreign Affairs of Singa-
pore, Dr Lim Wee Kiak heavily criticized ASEAN’s response saying that it
was a ‘missed opportunity’ for ASEAN to come together and that it was
‘sad’, if true, that countries hindered search efforts to hide their military
capabilities (Lim 2014). He later apologized and retracted his criticism
after Senior Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sam Tan, clari-
fied that those views were not the Government’s view (Chan 2014).
ASEAN’s defence ministers also issued a statement emphasizing the
strength of ASEAN unity and that all member countries are ‘totally
committed’ to assisting Malaysia. Nonetheless, in that same statement, the
defence ministers noted that ‘This incident stressed upon us the importance
of information and resource sharing as we strive to be in the utmost state of
readiness in mitigating potential calamities and risks. . .’ (The Borneo Post
2014: para 10). Additionally, in the Malaysia Singapore Annual Leaders’
Retreat, a joint statement was released with the two leaders agreeing to
explore ways for both sides to work more closely with other fellow ASEAN
member states in SAR domains (New Straits Times 2014b) underscoring
the strong bilateral support Singapore rendered while tacitly acknowledging
the shortcomings of an ASEAN response and of other member countries.
On November 2014, Malaysia proposed an ‘Asean Ready Group’ in an
attempt to shore up ASEAN’s disaster response readiness. Its defence min-
ister said, this group is meant for ASEAN countries to ‘be ready to face any
sort of eventualities’ and specifically referred to Typhoon Haiyan and the
search for MH370 (Rakyat Post, The 2014: para 2).
After close to five decades of trust and confidence-building, instead of
displaying unity, ASEAN states found themselves shackled by the
‘sovereignty’ norm. Instead of accentuating the ‘region’, they accentuated
the ‘individual’.
The analysis of SAR efforts revealed three things. First, the confor-
mance to the principle of ‘sovereignty’ caused detriment to ASEAN’s
image as it prevented cooperation, transparency and crucial sharing of
information and intelligence in a timely manner. Second, it caused coun-
tries to accentuate their sovereign identity, by couching their aid in entirely
bilateral terms, as opposed to regional identity, resulting in the emergence
of latent mutual suspicion and mistrust. Although ASEAN elites did try to
muster an obligatory defence of ASEAN cooperation and unity, the mixed
statements highlighted problems with this defence. Some may point out
that the ‘individual’ is accentuated because bilateral responses are more
effective than an ASEAN one. While it is possible that bilateral responses
may be faster given the administrative/logistical hurdles required for an
 D.M.H. Loh: ASEAN’s Norm Adherence 563

ASEAN response, it is debatable whether bilateral responses are materi-

ally ‘better’ or more ‘effective’ than an ASEAN one. That debate, notwith-
standing, is important to note that ASEAN is obliged to act. This
obligation to act stems from: (1) the various ASEAN declaratory state-
ments such as the ASEAN Chairman reports; (2) public statements by
leaders of ASEAN on the specific need for greater ASEAN response and
cooperation in HADR and SAR; (3) formal and legal obligation such as
the ‘1972 act’, the ‘Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby
Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency
Response Operations’ (SASOP) and the ‘1976 ASEAN Declaration on
Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters’; (4) the various HADR and SAR
exercises which prepare countries for disaster events; and (5) the numerous
official ASEAN meetings held every year specifically to build ASEAN’s
HADR and SAR capacities. However, despite the obligations and expecta-
tions to act, ASEAN did not do so credibly in both examples.
Finally, the significant upshot of this study shows that, while ASEAN has
substantial integration, progress and cooperation in various sectors, sover-
eignty-security linked issues even emergencies are hampered by
deeply held, strictly adhered and naturalized ASEAN norms.
While some might argue that ASEAN is deliberately kept weak to main-
tain individual state sovereignty, there is no evidence to suggest that leaders
are systematically and actively trying to weaken the institution as a whole.
This paper shows, at least in the HADR and SAR domains, ASEAN is try-
ing to foster greater cooperation and to make it an effective instrument in
the fields of HADR and SAR. However, the reality of HADR/SAR opera-
tions is such that, as the search for MH370 evidently shows, it can have
implications for sovereignty, and when that happens, leaders tend to under-
cut ASEAN cooperation. Even in instances where sovereignty is not a
major concern the Typhoon Haiyan example where it is the ‘most like-
ly’ case for ASEAN to perform creditably, it did not do so.

Conclusion
The two case studies showed how two different but related norms can bring
to bear unintended consequences in disasters-related events. In the case of
Typhoon Haiyan, the norm of ‘consensus-seeking’ prevented any con-
certed response from ASEAN, thus pushing the Philippines at a time
when it was inundated with support into primarily accepting support
from trusted sources outside the region, and bilaterally within the region.
It also showed that despite years of substantive HADR capacity, cumula-
tive experience from past disasters and the threat to regional credibility,
the norm of ‘consensus decision-making’ prevented any extensive ASEAN
response. That said, it is important to note that ASEAN norms (as with all
norms) may evolve in face of shifting geo-political and HADR landscapes.
Certainly, the accelerated attempts post-Nargis at creating stronger
564 The Pacific Review

ASEAN capabilities and giving the ASEAN Secretary-General a greater

mandate in disaster situations are attempts by ASEAN to address the
problem of ‘consensus-seeking’ in emergency situations. However, these
attempts do not erode or challenge the consensus-seeking norm, rather
they are attempts to work its way around the norm just as it did during
Cyclone Nargis (Collins 2013: 145 6). In the search for missing flight
MH370, the norm of ‘respect for sovereignty’ was most pronounced.
Beyond material and capability deficits, the evidence demonstrated how
norms were the main hindrances to a collective ASEAN response. It is
also important to add that, beyond the multiple ASEAN HADR/SAR
mechanisms already mentioned, the SASOP adopted in 2008 spells out, in
detail, the immediate steps ASEAN should undertake to ensure a quick
response (ASEAN 2009). However, in both the MH370 and the Typhoon
examples, there was no mention of SASOP. Taken on a whole, this
research reveals four things.
First, norm adherence can produce unintended negative outcomes. The
norms of ‘consensus-seeking’ and ‘respect for sovereignty’ were set up to
protect ASEAN solidarity, oblige it to cooperate, integrate deeper and to
be a creditable regional and global actor. However, in this research, I
showed how conformance to norms produced self-contrary unintended
consequences. In the Typhoon Haiyan case, ASEAN dealt its own credibil-
ity a blow by being side-lined in search efforts. In the search for MH370,
the fragility, uncooperativeness and terse nature of the search efforts
showed a lack of unity and ownership in the region. Furthermore, the
norm of ‘respect for sovereignty’ resulted in ASEAN violating the princi-
ples of the ‘1972 Agreement’ on aircraft accidents.
Second, the norms of ‘respect for sovereignty’ and ‘consensus-seeking’
hindered genuine HADR and SAR cooperation and pushed countries
towards the non-reliance of ASEAN organs even in times of emergencies
which, in turn, rust and stymie its capacities. In essence (and especially in
the case of MH370), it compelled countries to stress their sovereign iden-
tity rather than regional identity. Consequently, countries in Southeast
Asia in both disasters operated under bilateral arrangements rather than a
regional one. This reliance on bilateral relations is both a product and an
expression of norm adherence. Third, the cases highlighted the asymmetric
nature of ASEAN norms in inhibiting institutional action and behaviour.
That is to say, different norms exert different pressures and constraints
under different contextual environments. While norms forming the
‘ASEAN Way’2 are always latently present, only some norm(s) emerge
and manifest under different situations. For instance, this study indicated
that when HADR or SAR operations ‘cross over’ to the security realm,
the norm of ‘respect for sovereignty’ would be the most important norma-
tive factor. Furthermore, while norms have generally been ‘enablers’ of
unity and resilience, under certain circumstances, it can also be ‘disablers’:
hindering cooperation and challenging regional unity.
 D.M.H. Loh: ASEAN’s Norm Adherence 565

When countries try to be more pro-active in addressing the HADR/SAR

shortfall within ASEAN, its hands are still, ultimately, tied. Singapore, for
instance, is especially keen to push the HADR/SAR agenda in a bid to
restore ASEAN credibility. Notably, it has offered its command and con-
trol centre in Changi Airport to help facilitate and coordinate ASEAN’s
response to natural disasters in the region (Today Online 2014). Singapore
Armed Forces’ joint operations director (BG) Desmond Tan said that the
Changi Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC) is to ‘set up a per-
manent structure that will allow the militaries to have a single point of con-
tact, a focal point. . . so we can reach the disaster area faster and more
effectively’. He notes that military coordination has previously been ‘ad
hoc’ (Chow 2014: para 10).
However, even as countries take on an activist role in HADR, it is ulti-
mately subordinated to ASEAN norms and it is careful not to be seen as
challenging these norms. BG Tan stressed that the Centre ‘doesn’t com-
mand or decide what nations should provide for the affected nation. . . It’s
still the prerogative of the affected country’ (Chow 2014: para 11).
This study showed the enduring centrality of norms in understanding
ASEAN. It showed that, beyond material reasons, the main factors of
ASEAN’s poor performance in both disasters were ideational-normative
factors. In the instances where activism is practiced in the field of HADR/
SAR, its possibilities are made secondary to ASEAN norms. Finally, while
some scholars recognize the potential of disaster management issues hav-
ing a transformative effect on ASEAN norms (Collins 2013: 150 1), this
paper demonstrated the durability of foundational ASEAN norms and the
difficulty in displacing or challenging them.
Theoretically, this modest investigation into norm adherence in ASEAN
showed the value that can be derived from such scholarship by adding a
layer understanding of ASEAN in its HADR/SAR operations. This adds
to existing norms literature by mapping out the effects and expressions of
normative constraints arising from norm adherence. It further highlights
the deleterious effects of norm adherence and how institutional action is
weakened by norms.
The 24th ASEAN Summit’s Chairman’s Statement noted that ‘. . .our
region was prone to natural disasters, we supported efforts to synergize the
existing regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)
mechanism with the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and
Emergency Response (AADMER)’ and that it hoped ‘. . .this would facili-
tate the timely activation and thus effective implementation of the man-
date of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator in the event of
major disasters’ (2014). Indeed, the Chairman’s Statements from the past
5 years all make reference to HADR cooperative initiatives.3 Pertinently,
over the last two years (2012 2014), the statements reflected an increased
attention to HADR and SAR efforts.4
566 The Pacific Review

However, new HADR norms adoption and diffusion within ASEAN is a

long iterative process. It involves a complex and multi-staged process of
talking, debating, consensus-seeking and reinforcement to create new
social realities (Ba 2009). This process is especially tedious when effective
and strong ASEAN responses such as in disaster situations could
mean the weakening of its founding norms of ‘respect for sovereignty and
‘consensus-seeking’. One scholar’s description of this tension is most apt:
‘What is important to recognize is that ASEAN’s institutional imperatives
were adapted to fit or, at least, not conflict with its members’ self-inter-
ests’ (Narine 2004: 437). This research also concurs with Ba that even
major ‘shocks’ or disjunctures are insufficient to catalyze normative change
from within. As Ba observes of ASEAN ‘. . .due to ingrained habits and
thinking or vested interests- the dramatic changes characteristic of critical
junctures may be said to be quite rare’ (Ba 2009: 234). ASEAN’s solution,
thus far, has been to create new mechanism to address its HADR/SAR
shortfall. These initiatives, however, are simply stop-gap measures. A
closer scrutiny of ASEAN’s foundational norms might be in order (within
the realm of non-traditional security), especially when one considers the
negative unintended consequences these naturalized norms wrought on
ASEAN’s credibility and regional unity.

Acknowledgments
The author expresses his gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers and his
colleagues Pascal Vennesson, Alan Chong, Ralf Emmers and Sarah Teo
for their comments on the paper. Any errors are his own.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes
1. See Collins (2013: 132 217) for a comprehensive overview of ASEAN HADR
mechanisms.
2. Besides the ‘consensual seeking’ and ‘respect for sovereignty’ norms, the norms
of non-interference, renunciation of the use of force and the threat of force and
peaceful settlement of disputes form the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Rattanasevee 2014:
115).
3. A review of the Chairman’s Statements from 2010 to 2014 (the 16th 24th
ASEAN summits 2010, 2014) showed repeated references to disaster situations
and HADR efforts.
4. For example, the 16th ASEAN summit contained only one point (ASEAN Sum-
mit 2010: para 33) on HADR efforts; this is contrasted with the 20th ASEAN
Chairman Statement which had five separate points (points 29, 45, 60, 61 and
62) (ASEAN Summit 2012) reflecting the increased attention paid to HADR
cooperation and initiatives.
 D.M.H. Loh: ASEAN’s Norm Adherence 567

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