NOTES
Castes, Communities and
Parties in Uttar Pradesh
Christophe Jaffrelot, Gilles Verniers
A profiling of the caste
backgrounds of candidates
fielded by the four main political
parties in Uttar Pradesh in the
assembly elections, the elected
legislators and ministers reveals
some interesting trends. There is
a stable presence of upper caste
candidates from all major parties,
with the Bharatiya Janata Party
and the Congress continuing to
field them predominantly, while
the Samajwadi Party and the
Bahujan Samaj Party have
become more of “catch-all”
parties, similar yet very different
from the Congress Party of the
past. The study of ministers and
MLAs reveals a more complex
picture of upper caste strength
in representation.
The data set used in this article is part of a
research project piloted by Sciences Po, KII and
JNU on political representation and the study
of legislators.
Christophe Jaffrelot (Christophe.jaffrelot@
sciences-po.fr) is research director at CNRS,
Paris and teaches various courses on South Asia
at Sciences Po, Paris and at King’s India Institute,
London. Gilles Verniers (gilles.verniers@
sciences-po.fr) is a doctoral candidate at Sciences
Po, affiliated with the Centre de Sciences
Humaines, New Delhi.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW august 11, 2012
T
he succession of two single-
majority backed governments in
Uttar Pradesh – unprecedented
since 1985 – marks the advent of inclusive-
ness as a key strategy to win power in
the state. While the Congress succeeded
in winning repeatedly the largest state of
India on its own in the period between
1950 and 1980, this time, for the second
consecutive occasion, this performance
has been achieved by a state-based party.
These state-based parties, which were
born from the claim for power of socially
and economically marginalised groups,
have opened their doors to the very groups
they initially opposed. The “rainbow
coalitions” of the 2000s have generated
the hope that social divisions would be
assuaged and that inclusive policies that
benefit people on the basis of their needs
rather than on their ascriptive identity
would be encouraged. We wish to argue
here that these parties have been in fact
less exclusive than it seems in the past
and that the social cleavages on which
the political competition is based have
not lost their salience, quite the contrary.
Caste is a central notion in the defini-
tion of parties’ strategic choice, less in
terms of political discourse than in polit-
ical practices at the time of elections. It
is an important factor in the selection
of candidates and parties do take into
account the local balance of power and the
relative numbers of each caste groups as
chief among other variables. The insistence
on caste by parties has, in turn, an impact
on the voter’s choice.
With this as background, we examine
some of the long-term trends in caste
groups’ representation in the Uttar Pradesh
(UP) state assembly and evolutions of
parties’ strategies, considering the socio-
logical profile of candidates (for the
years 2007 and 2012), the Members
of Legislative Assembly (MLA s) (since
vol xlvii no 32
Independence), and the cabinet members
(since 1982).
Contextualisation and Trends
An old trend can easily be identified and
quantified, once we cross the Election
Commission data with the UP state
assembly legislators data set.1 The ero-
sion of the upper castes’ representation,
in terms of seat share, is a continuing
process, though the decline has rela-
tively stabilised after the 1993 state elec-
tions. Contrary to common perception,
they remain the highest caste group rep-
resented in the assembly and the only
group represented beyond their demo-
graphic weight (Figure 1, p 90).2
If the decline of the upper castes in
the state assembly was linked to the
decline of the national parties that were
– and still are – biased in their favour,
the stabilisation comes from the fact that
all effective parties – without exception
– have been distributing large numbers
of tickets among them (see tables), thus
ensuring their global over-representation.
The Centre for the Study of Develop-
ing Societies’ (CSDS) data3 on the aggre-
gate voting pattern show that the upper
castes do not form an exclusive or pref-
erential vote bank for any party, even
though both the Congress and Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) still depend largely
on their support. This is certainly not a
new phenomenon but the evolution is
that, as the upper castes tend to split
their vote between parties according to
their chance of seeing upper caste candi-
dates elected locally, the two state-based
dominant parties have been the recipi-
ents of a growing part of their support.
The academic discourse on the decline
of upper caste representation usually
comes with commentaries on the rise of
backwards groups. In this regard, two
new trends can be observed.
First, there is an erosion of the repre-
sentation of Other Backward Classes
(OBCs), usually cast as the driving force
behind the success of the Samajwadi
Party (SP). Between 1993 and 2007, they
lost altogether 8% in representation,
with a light rebound in 2012. If we look
more into details of specific OBC caste
89
NOTES

Figure 1: Representation of Major Caste Groups in the Uttar Pradesh State Assembly (1952-2012) castes from the BJP to the two state-
(in %) based parties account for their recent
70
performances.
60 UC The second noticeable trend and the
one that makes the 2012 elections truly
50
OBCs
remarkable is the rise of Muslim repre-
40 sentation, from a mere 5.4% of the seats
SCs in 1991 to 17% in 2012. For the first time
30
since Independence, there is a propor-
20 tionate representation of Muslims in
Muslims the UP assembly. It counts 68 Muslim
10
MLAs, 41 being elected on a SP ticket. We
0 should not deduce from this performance
1952 1957 1962 1967 1969 1974 1977 1980 1985 1989 1991 1993 1996 2002 2007 2012
that Muslims have supported the SP en
Source: Gilles Verniers. Uttar Pradesh State Assembly Legislators’ data set. Adapted from Jaffrelot and Kumar (2009),
“The Rise of Plebeians”. masse. Quite the contrary, the Muslims’
support for the SP has actually decreased
Table 1: Representation of Major Caste Groups within Parties (1993-2012)
Caste group 1993 1996 2002 2007 2012
from 47% to 39% between 2007 and
BSP UC 2 (2.9) 9 (13.4) 21 (21.9) 60 (29.1) 17 (21.3) 2012 (Verma, A K 2012). The increase in
OBC 30 (42.9) 28 (41.8) 36 (37.5) 53 (25.7) 28 (35.0) the number of Muslim MLAs did not
SC 26 (37.1) 19 (28.4) 26 (27.1) 62 (30.1) 16 (20.0) come necessarily from an increase in the
Muslims 12 (17.1) 11 (16.4) 13 (13.5) 30 (14.6) 15 (18.8) number of tickets allotted to them. Even
Unidentified 0 0 0 1 4 (5.0) if there was a small increase in the
Total 70 (100.0) 67 (100.0) 96 (100.0) 206 (100.0) 80 (100.0) number of tickets distributed by main-
SP UC 19 (17.4) 24 (21.8) 33 (23.1) 30 (30.9) 61 (27.5) stream parties (234 in 2012 against 201
OBC 55 (50.5) 42 (38.2) 50 (35.0) 34 (35.1) 58 (26.1) in 2007), these numbers are below what
SC 23 (21.1) 20 (18.2) 38 (26.6) 12 (12.4) 58 (26.1) they used to be throughout the 1990s,
Muslims 12 (11.0) 22 (20.0) 22 (15.4) 21 (21.6) 43 (19.4) when the level of representation of
Unidentified 0 2 (1.8) 0 0 2 (0.9) Muslims was around a third or less than
Total 109 (100.0) 110 (100.0) 143 (100.0) 97 (100.0) 222 (100.0) what it is today.
INC UC 11 (50.0) 19 (57.6) 14 (56.0) 13 (59.1) 14 (51.9)
The cohesiveness of the Muslim vote
OBC 6 (27.3) 8 (24.2) 6 (24.0) 4 (18.2) 4 (14.8)
at the constituency level might provide
SC 4 (18.2) 3 (9.1) 2 (8.0) 5 (22.7) 4 (14.8)
an explanation for the success of Muslim
Muslims 1 (4.5) 3 (9.1) 3 (12.0) 0 4 (14.8)
candidates. A rapid cartography of the
Unidentified 0 0 0 0 1 (3.7)
Muslim MLAs shows that most Muslim
Total 22 (100.0) 33 (100.0) 25 (100.0) 22 (100.0) 27 (100.0)
BJP UC 92 (51.7) 81 (46.6) 56 (62.9) 29 (56.9) 28 (57.1)
candidates were – as they were before –
OBC 48 (27.0) 50 (28.7) 16 (18.0) 15 (29.4) 15 (30.6)
elected in constituencies with a sizeable
SC 36 (20.2) 38 (21.8) 17 (19.1) 7 (13.7) 4 (8.2) share of Muslim voters. However, some
Muslims 1 (0.6) 0 0 0 0 Muslim candidates also succeeded in
Unidentified 1 (0.6) 5 (2.9) 0 0 2 (4.1) getting elected with the support of other
Total 178 (100.0) 174 (100.0) 89 (100.0) 51 (100.0) 49 (100.0) voters, possibly as an adhesion vote for
Figures in brackets are in per cent. the SP (or rejection vote against the BSP).
Source: Uttar Pradesh State Assembly Legislators’ data set. Author’s fieldwork.
In any case, the fact that parties have
groups, we see that it is mostly the Most Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) gave more accepted that attracting Muslims is now
Backward Castes (MBCs) that have tickets to Kurmis (27 and 20 respectively) a condition to build majorities has cer-
decreased in representation. The com- and to non-Yadav OBC candidates (Lodhs tainly facilitated this progression. Despite
parison of candidates and MLAs’ profile in the case of the BJP), while the SP pre-campaign rumours, however, the
confirms the observation that the Yadav, leaned clearly towards the Yadavs (53 BJP did not change its stance in this
Kurmi and Lodh candidates tend to fare tickets out of 108 tickets given to OBCs). regard and fielded only a single Muslim
better than other OBC candidates. The This was already the case before. candidate.4
Yadavs for instance have a proportional What has changed within the SP and The representation of scheduled caste
representation of around 9%. the BSP has been the induction of a lot (SC) candidates remains stable due to
The OBCs obviously do not form a more upper caste candidates, hence a the fact that dalit candidates typically
cohesive group and parties try to take relative dilution of the OBC presence do not get elected in non-reserved seats.5
advantage of their divisions by distribut- among the candidates and henceforth We notice that the de-reservation of
ing tickets preferentially to some seg- among the legislators. The shift of support many constituencies after 30 years has
ments of the OBCs. Thus, the BJP and the of segments of the OBCs and the upper not produced any effect in terms of
90 august 11, 2012 vol xlvii no 32 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 NOTES

electability of dalit candidates in general Similarly, the BJP post the helsman- Table 2: Caste Groups and Communities Per Party
in the UP 2012 Elections: The BSP
seats. There was in fact a very small ship of former chief minister Kalyan
BSP Candidates Elected Runner-Up
number of dalit candidates in the de- Singh is also increasingly dominated by
Upper castes 121(30.2) 17(21.3) 65
reserved seats. the upper castes, at time when the upper
Brahmins 70 10 33
castes tend to split their vote more and Thakurs 31 6 19
Caste-Based Representation more across parties. Using Uma Bharti Banias 9 1 4
Looking at the caste group representation and Babu Singh Kushwaha as Lodh and Bhumihars 5 0 3
within parties is a useful way to detail the Kushwaha mascots, respectively, failed. Other UCs 6 0 6
trends mentioned above (Table 1, p 90). The party fared badly among the OBCs, OBCs 93(23.2) 28(35.0) 47
First and foremost, and contrary to including in areas dominated by these Yadav 8 2 5
popular perception, OBC candidates are two caste groups. Kurmi 20 6 10
not only the preserve of the SP and the The SP, with a fairly equal share of Lodh 16 4 8
Nishad 8 2 2
BJP. They have actually formed the bulk representation of the different caste
Kushwaha 8 4 4
of the BSP’s MLAs for more than 20 years, groups, is the new catch-all party. Upper
Gujjar 5 3 2
being outweighed by the upper castes castes have a significant presence among Jat 6 0 3
only in 2007. the SP MLAs since 2002. Despite a decrease Other OBCs 22 7 13
Second, the distribution of SC MLAs in support from the Yadavs, the majority SCs 85(21.2) 16(20.0) 54
has shifted tremendously, the SP win- of its OBC MLAs are still drawn from this Jatavs 57 12 34
ning a historic 56 seats in the reserved group (34 out of 58 MLAs). Pasi 12 2 9
seats. This is the second important story Valmiki 3 0 2
of these elections. The share of the BSP Caste Profile of Candidates Other SCs 13 0 9
dalit MLAs in Uttar Pradesh, both in The profiles of the BSP and SP candidates Muslims 88(21.9) 15(18.8) 88
absolute terms and in percentage, has (Tables 2 and 3) and MLAs are converg- UC Muslims 58 12 22
BC Muslims 11 3 4
never been so low (16 MLAs). It is still ing. This is not to say that there is no dif-
Unidentified Muslims 19 0 12
early to provide satisfying explanations ferentiation between their pool of candi-
Unidentified 14 (3.5) 4 (5.0) 4
for this shift and the reasons are proba- dates and MLAs. There are more Yadavs, Total 401(100) 80 258
bly very diverse. It is our sense however, Rajputs, Pasis and upper caste Muslim Source: Verniers, Gilles Uttar Pradesh State Assembly
that the split vote among the Jatavs, candidates on the SP side, while there candidates data set.

consecutive to their relative desertion from are more brahmins, Jatavs, Kurmis and Table 3: Caste Groups and Communities Per Party
the BSP, favoured in several instances Lodhs on the BSP side. This polarisation in the UP 2012 Elections: The SP
Castes and Communities Candidates Elected Runner-Up
non-Jatav dalit candidates. An examina- of castes within their caste groups is
Upper castes 118(29.6) 61(27.5) 24
tion of the vote share of candidates in imperfectly reflected in the voting
Brahmins 45 21 8
reserved seats confirmed this intuition patterns. This is logical since MLAs are
Thakurs 51 30 10
but for a limited number of seats (12 to very rarely elected on the strength of Banias 11 5 3
15). The SP did also succeed in getting their caste alone but through local alli- Bhumihars 6 1 3
Jatav candidates elected (11 MLA s out ances as well as other broader political Other UCs 5 3 0
of 58). dynamics (party affiliation, incum- OBCs 108(27.1) 58(26.1) 28
Third, the Congress remains, despite bency, loose voters, etc). Yadav 53 34 13
everything, upper caste-oriented. Over Looking at the profile of the BJP and Kurmi 14 6 5
the last five elections, a majority of the Congress candidates (Tables 4 and 5, p 92) Lodh 13 8 4
candidates who won on Congress tickets makes their upper caste bias apparent. Nishad 5 3 2
Kushwaha 3 1 1
were from the upper castes. The induc- Nearly half of their tickets were distri-
Gujjar 5 0 1
tion of several prominent OBC candi- buted to upper castes, with poor results
Jat 4 0 0
dates – Beni Prasad Verma being chief in both cases.
Other OBCs 11 6 2
among them – did not help the Congress One could argue that winning parties SCs 84(21.1) 58(26.1) 12
to make a dent in the OBC vote share. attract votes from all segments precisely Jatavs 20 13 3
The “Mission 85”, a strategy that con- because they field candidates from dif- Pasi 23 20 2
sisted in concentrating special efforts in ferent backgrounds. As long as we do Valmiki 6 4 0
reserved seats, was a complete fiasco. not have access to the distribution of Other SCs 35 20 7
Half of the tickets were given – often at voting patterns within the state, we Muslims 83(20.8) 43(19.4) 13
the last minute – to Jatav candidates cannot know whether the votes of specific UC Muslims 70 39 11
who stood no chance against the BSP castes are distributed equally among BC Muslims 11 4 2
Unidentified Muslims 2 0 0
candidates. They did succeed though in various caste groups or not at all. It is
Unidentified 5(1.3) 2(0.9) 1
making the BSP lose about a dozen seats our perception, from years of conducting
Total 398 224 78
by splitting the Jatav vote, in favour of fieldwork and covering elections, that Source: Verniers, Gilles Uttar Pradesh State Assembly
non-Jatav SP candidates. voters determine their choice locally, candidates data set.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW august 11, 2012 vol xlvii no 32 91
NOTES

Table 4: Caste Groups and Communities Per Party according to configurations that include same trend as the assembly candidates
in the UP 2012 Elections: The BJP the caste factor, among others. The win- and MLAs: the two largest parties, the
Caste and Communities Candidates Elected Runner-Up
ners are those who benefited from the BSP and the SP tend to dilute their initial
Upper castes 195(48.9) 29(57.1) 31
cohesive support of at least one impor- caste identity in order to become
Brahmins 80 13 12
Thakurs 80 9 9
tant local caste group, and who could catch-all parties. There are however
Banias 17 5 7 also attract votes from other groups. inequalities in the distribution of types
Bhumihars 5 0 1 This does not imply a necessary kinship of portfolios, the positions of cabinet
Other UCs 13 3 2 linkage between the candidate and the minister, more powerful and prestigious,
OBCs 105(26.3) 15(29.4) 10 core group that supported him. being denied to the “subaltern” ministers,
Yadav 16 2 0 The next question is to seek whether who tend to be confined to “subaltern”
Kurmi 27 1 3 the inclusive character of parties has types of portfolios and competences
Lodh 18 3 1 developed into power sharing between (SC/ST welfare, minorities, etc). This is
Nishad 3 0 0
groups. After all, parties could very well less true of the BSP, which gave more
Kushwaha 4 1 0
provide token representation to various space to dalit ministers in 2007.
Gujjar 3 1 0
caste groups and yet retain the positions Finally, another dimension remains to
Jat 12 2 2
Other OBCs 22 2 4
of influence among their core support be explored: the apparatus of parties –
SCs 83(20.8) 7(13.7) 12 group. One way to look at this question is or their leadership structure – where the
Jatavs 31 1 4 to survey the composition of the cabinet social background of the leaders prob-
Pasi 17 1 1 in government. For that purpose, we ably contributes more than any other fac-
Valmiki 8 1 1 look at the profile of the ministers as tor to associate parties to caste groups in
Other SCs 27 0 6 well as the type of portfolios distributed the voters’ psyche. Here again, we see
Muslims 1(0.25) 0 0 to various representative sections. that parties attempt to show an inclusive
UC Muslims 1 0 0 The upper castes have traditionally face. The BSP has a very limited number
BC Muslims 0 0 0
had the lion share of cabinet portfolios, of official party leaders, each indivi-
Unidentified Muslims 0 0 0
consonant with their domination of the dually representing one of the major
Unidentified 15 3 0
parties in power and of their over- support groups of the party, around
Total 399(100) 51(100) 53
Source: Verniers, Gilles Uttar Pradesh State Assembly representation in the assembly (Jaffrelot Mayawati. We know however that the
candidates data set. 2003). In the two SP and BSP cabinets party cadres of the BSP – particularly at
Table 5: Caste Groups and Communities Per Party that followed the Mandal affair, their the local level – are predominantly
in the UP 2012 Elections: The Congress representation dropped brutally (from Jatavs and that the chain of command is
Castes and Comunities Candidates Elected Runner-Up
60% in 1991 to 4% in 1993, and 6.5% in absolutely centralised. The SP also has
Upper castes 123(39.5) 14(56.0) 10
1995). From 1997 to 2002, with the general secretaries from various back-
Brahmins 45 3 2
induction of the BJP as coalition member, grounds, although a closer look at the
Thakurs 54 6 3
Banias 7 0 2
the upper castes progressively came back inner functioning of the party executive
Bhumihars 7 1 2 to the fore, with a culmination in 1999 reveals a great deal of concentration of
Other UCs 10 4 1 and 2001, when the BJP ruled alone. power in Mulayam Singh Yadav and his
OBCs 77(24.8) 6(24.0) 9 Since then, they have been included into kins’ hands. The inclusive character of
Yadav 27 0 2 the BSP fold and now the SP and are the parties has not affected their cen-
Kurmi 7 0 0 again over-represented in the cabinet. tralism nor has it encouraged parties to
Lodh 10 1 2 The 2007 BSP government gave an gear towards greater inner democracy.
Nishad 4 0 0 important share of portfolios to upper
Kushwaha 3 0 0 Conclusions
castes (30%), below however a larger
Gujjar 2 1 0
number of portfolios given to SCs (38%), It would be of course a truism to explain
Jat 5 1 1
with an equal share in terms of type of the performance of parties ex ante by their
Other OBCs 19 1 4
SCs 86(27.7) 2(8.0) 4
portfolios. The OBC, which represented strategies. These alone do not make
Jatavs 42 2 3 35% of the party’s MLAs, were under- victories but they are indicators of the way
Pasi 20 0 1 represented with only 11 ministers (22%). parties understand the rules of the game
Valmiki 4 1 0 The 2012 cabinet of the SP-led govern- and therefore contribute to modify them
Other SCs 20 1 0 ment goes a step further into equalising by adapting themselves to the new envi-
Muslims 20(6.4) 3(12.0) 3 the representation of caste groups. Mus- ronment. By doing so, they build the
UC Muslims 17 1 3 lims, OBCs and upper castes are all in a contours of the arena within which voters
BC Muslims 3 0 0 bracket of 26 to 30%, while the SCs lag are called to express their preferences.
Unidentified Muslims 0 0 0
behind at 14%. However, OBCs and This descriptive exercise does not
Unidentified 5(1.6) 0 0
upper castes share the better portfolios. intend to assert the primacy of caste
Total 311 25 26
Source: Verniers, Gilles Uttar Pradesh State Assembly
The social profile of the ministers in among any other factors, from the
candidates data set. the recent cabinets reflects roughly the selection of candidates to the voter’s
92 august 11, 2012 vol xlvii no 32 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

electoral behaviour. Many other factors
intervene – the individual qualities of
candidates, campaign resources, local
economic ties, the candidates’ economic
profile, etc. Supra-local considerations
are also moulded into the local context,
as suggested by Rahul Verma in a recent
article (Verma 2012).
Looking at caste from the parties’
point of view reveals the prism through
which parties and politicians read poli-
tics and elections. It also reveals some of
the long-term trends – the erosion of the
upper caste representation among the
MLAs – and some of the more recent
trends – the growing inclusiveness of
low caste-oriented state-based parties. It
also reveals how well parties can equip
themselves for elections. For instance,
the two national parties, who have been
progressively marginalised – Congress
first and now the BJP as well – have been
unable to read those changes. By retain-
ing their old upper caste elitist stance,
they have been so far unable to adapt to
the new rules of the game.
On the other hand, the two state-
based parties that have developed as
exclusivist caste-oriented parties have
grown into catch-all parties, although
they retain specific features at the jati
level (the SP remain Yadav-oriented and
Making Ends Meet: Youth Enterprise at the Rural-Urban Intersections
Subaltern Urbanisation in India
Rejuvenating India’s Small Towns
The ‘North-East’ Map of Delhi
Protesting Publics in Indian Cities: The 2006 Sealing Drive and Delhi’s Traders
Enumerating the Semi-Visible: The Politics of Regularising Delhi’s Unauthorised Colonies
320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW august 11, 2012
the BSP Jatav-dominated) as far as their
past and present governments and party-
apparatuses are concerned. These “rain-
bow coalitions” differ from the Congress
“coalition of extremes” in three ways.
They are not upper caste dominated,
power distribution within the coalition is
less inequitable and, more importantly,
they do not exclude any specific caste
group, contrary to the Congress system
that was built around and at the exclu-
sion of most backward groups.
The instability of the 1990s seems to
be gone for a while, as the SP and the BSP
dominate UP’s political stage. Massive
swings of seats should not make us for-
get that both parties attract together a
majority of the votes in an intensely
fragmented electorate.
However, inclusiveness per se is no
guarantee of stability either, as illus-
trated by the BSP’s massive defeat. The
induction of other caste groups into par-
ties that have a specific caste identity has
to be seen as a necessity that sometimes
clashes with the power structures of
these parties, or generate contradictions
on the ground around the share of
power and the resources it provides
access to. These tensions are most visible
in the national parties that remain upper
caste dominated, but also present in the
REVIEW OF URBAN AFFAIRS
July 28, 2012
– Eric Denis, Partha Mukhopadhyay, Marie-Hélène Zérah
For copies write to:
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email: circulation@epw.in
vol xlvii no 32
NOTES
state-based parties that still need to rely
on their core electorates. There are
mechanisms to assuage these tensions
(distribution of tickets and portfolios,
turnover of candidates) but we observe
that the inclusion of other groups comes
at the cost of an erosion of core electorate,
in terms of vote share and representation.
Notes
1 This data set includes a set of variables such
as the MLAs’ caste identity, educational and
professional background, as well as data on
their individual’s political trajectories (number
of mandates served, party affiliation, executive
position, etc). The authors wish to thank the
Centre de Sciences Humaines for its logistical
and financial support for the data collection as
well as to Francesca Jensenius, U C Berkeley,
who provided workable ECI data.
2 20.5% according to the 1931 Census.
3 CSDS Data, Sixteenth Assembly Elections in
Uttar Pradesh, EPW, 7 April 2012.
4 There was only one Muslim BJP candidate
fielded in 2012, in Sahaswan. He lost his deposit.
5 Only two to three dalit candidates have been
elected in 2012 in general seats, including two
former MLAs. The SC population in these
constituencies is very high.
References
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Rise of the Lower Castes in North India (New
York: Columbia University Press).
Verma, A K (2012): “Why Did Mayawati Lose?”,
Economic & Political Weekly, 47(18): 17-19.
Verma, R (2012): “What Determines Electoral
Outcomes in India? Caste, Class, or Voters’
Satisfaction with Government Performance?”,
Asian Survey, 52(2): 270-97.
– Stephen Young, Craig Jeffrey
– Kalpana Sharma
– Duncan McDuie-Ra
– Diya Mehra
– Anna Zimmer
93