A.M. No.

MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at
No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which
he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been
cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the
house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection
of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore,
he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument
with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing
of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which
was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to
the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant.
According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children
with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva
Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage
license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a
single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage
before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was
impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution
of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963.
At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer.
Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license
is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw
in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure
a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the
legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial
Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by
his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and
in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency
of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner,
vs.
CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have
up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for
(1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals2 (CA) Decision3 in CA-GR CV No. 51919
and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution4 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, as well
as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City
(Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. 94-
0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the lower court
for trial on the merits."5
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
"The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three
(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and
was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died
on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
"On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian
be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given
his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving
heir.
"On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the
provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the
complaint is now barred x x x."6
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabe’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative
father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not
acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have
been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or
deny the child’s filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in
1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.7
Issues
In her Memorandum,8 petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I
"Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate
daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative
father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
II
"Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years
from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil
Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the
applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
"Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for failure to
implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents."9
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article
285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that
the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. We do
not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:
"ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
"In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document."
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by
Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
"ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."
"ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties."
"ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within
the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former
was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance
to dispute the claim, considering that "illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in
secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent
should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she
cannot do if he or she is already dead."10
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its
enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
"ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrian’s right to an action for recognition,
which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of
the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of
which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency x x x."11 Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is
procedural in nature and that "as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from
procedural laws."12
Bustos v. Lucero13 distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:
"x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to
be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under
the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law
which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise
to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for
their invasion."14 (Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,15 the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
procedural or substantive:
"[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure
of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the
rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure." 16
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive
law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining
majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for
recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals17 is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff therein
sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On the other hand,
in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals18 the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed while the
Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code,
because the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of "natural" children.
Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the
time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each other. In other words, he is
not a natural child.
A "natural child" is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any
legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,19 the Court explained:
"A child’s parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception
for him to qualify as a ‘natural child.’"20
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this Court in the
aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their parents
were disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego
Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born
two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The two children were born
in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their
conception, the two children’s parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other. The
Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year after the death
of the presumed father. At the time of his death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,21 the Court said that the rules on voluntary
and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing
such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case are quoted
hereunder:
"The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly
known as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married
woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman
other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their filiation must be
duly proven.
"How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of
the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283
and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural
children are applicable to spurious children.
"Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of
filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural
children may be applied to spurious children.
"That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with
respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the
acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
"A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of
natural children.
"In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation
may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition
prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
"The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural
children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children."22 (Citations
omitted, italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious
ones.23 However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to
recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect
and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition
(under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age.
This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have
filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out
in his Memorandum,24 the State as parens patriae should protect a minor’s right. Born in 1981,
Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his
alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to implead
"the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents." Under Section 3, however,
the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner
to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct
procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.

TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the
complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff
declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to
support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting
her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for
about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of
the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of
her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned
the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made
similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which
just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and
deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the
plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the
home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities
established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the
consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.)
Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the
parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of
the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new
relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but
upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage
is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a
relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract
they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such
as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is
merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or
government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And
when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching
and governing the question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la
Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the
Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs.
Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the
management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his
domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve
her from this duty when the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent
specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying
the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having
the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease.
The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and
obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The
husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and
follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign
country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying
her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on
account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is
the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its
decision of December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11,
1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged
to furnish subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house
the party who is entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered
wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or
because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal of the party
enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was whether there
was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the
person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one who is
entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the
parental authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set
forth that the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to her
maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the support until, owing to
such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together
with the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother to
maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent
the exercise of the option in the present case, without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed
proper with regard to the other questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion should
be expressed at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576),
wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute."
but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which
was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that in the first the person
claiming the option was the natural father of the child and had married a woman other than the
child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already been established by a final
judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the
proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and
all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme court of
Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business
reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose
of her property. When she left him he gave her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes,
P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels,
thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being reduced in consequence to want.
Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence, for
support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and
disposal of her property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not
legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by
her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audencia Territorial wherein, after due trial, judgment
was rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the
supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are mutually
obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of
said Code which regulates the family organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated,
among which duties are those of their living together and mutually helping each other, as provided
in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse
who has property to furnish support to the one who has no property and is in need of it for
subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in accordance with law, their
separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the husband,
cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not
deprived of the management of his wife's property and of the product of the other property
belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married
persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will, thus
establishing, contrary to the legal provision contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal
status entirely incompatible with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties
inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity
with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña Adela Galindo are not legally
separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help and support; and for this reason,
it cannot be held that the former has need of support from his wife so that he may live apart from
her without the conjugal abode where it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him
to dispose even of the fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses
and, consequently, those of his own support without need of going to his wife; wherefore the
judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated the
articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the
spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are
strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal
prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each
other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested
its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of
the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband
voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is
true appears from the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the
wife brought an action for support against her husband who had willfully and voluntarily
abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the
judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been
instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal abode,
although he claims, without however proving his contention, that the person responsible for this
situation was his wife, as she turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results that
it is the wife who is party abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in
his company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the
ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in article 56
of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the
mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the spouses should
be regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three
grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is compatible and
enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation of the
court above described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of
November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case
under consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the
conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the injured one a divorce or
separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in this
jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is
in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula
are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband
and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the
complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as
adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the husband when public scandal
or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults:
violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion; the
proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their
sons or to prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the
condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only
ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive
and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive
examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal did not
affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a
divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no
change or modification of the rule has been announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and
accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or
separation, as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and
sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to
decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking.
The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate
action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other
is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage
creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not
so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal
duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state
itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife
to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and
payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but
rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the
sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity
of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit
of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its
nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such
separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it
does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in
the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment, heretofore
filed in this case, rest.
Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MORELAND, J., concurring:

I based my vote in this case upon the ground that a husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts,
relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by
wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he
cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relation and
repudiate his duties thereunder. In law and for all purposes within its purview, the wife still remains
an inmate of the conjugal domicile; for I regard it as a principle of law universally recognized that
where a person by his wrongful and illegal acts creates a condition which under ordinary
circumstances would produce the loss of rights or status pertaining to another, the law will,
whenever necessary to protect fully the rights or status of the person affected by such acts, regard
the condition by such acts created as not existing and will recur to and act upon the original
situation of the parties to determine their relative rights or the status of the person adversely
affected.
I do not believe, therefore, that the case is properly conceived by defendant, when the consideration
thereof proceeds solely on the theory that the wife is outside the domicile fixed by the husband.
Under the facts alleged in the complainant the wife is legally still within the conjugal domicile.
G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994
JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and JOSEPH
SINSAY, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and Nolasco for petitioner.
Ponciano L. Escuadra for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before
the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. 1 Bigamy carries
with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an afflictive penalty, this
crime prescribes in fifteen (15) years.2 The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . .
.3
That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted. 4 At least, it is not
expressly denied. Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is
already time-barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place from
the time the offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document
evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule
on constructive notice.
The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged
with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage with Ma.
Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained
valid and subsisting. 5
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has
been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992,
he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of
6
21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by
prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office
of the Civil Registrar in 1975,7such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus
constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had
constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run
on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for
bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment of the bigamous marriage" as
declared by the appellate court, insisting that the second marriage was publicly held at Our Lady
of Nativity Church in Marikina on
15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from the moment of registration the marriage
contract was open to inspection by any interested person.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in
criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant,8 we agree with the view
expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding
the possibility of its being more favorable to the accused. The appellate court succinctly explains
—
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice should be applied in the case
at bar, principally citing in support of his stand, the cases of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597);
and People v.Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard
to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is
generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting
marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not
known to be still a married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another
marriage.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any right or interest therein
is made in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said property is located. Verification in the
office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions involving the said property can easily
be made by any interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the offended
person or the authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person.
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive notice was
applied, involved therein were land or property disputes and certainly, marriage is not property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary
to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused.
To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would
amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the
bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the
offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned
the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a
married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for
these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married
person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the
bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that
the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the
said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the prescriptive period
for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution
of the violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the
petitioner would encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished and protected by
law. 9
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National Census
Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second or
even third marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is
too formidable a task to even contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for
constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of the Register
of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from the time of such
registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act
No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads
us to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the
documents registered in the Civil Register.
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his
marriage contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and
sundry for inspection. We cannot go along with his argument because why did he indicate in the
marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a married man? Or
for that matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in Marikina
so that everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He knew that no priest or
minister would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to
punishment under the Marriage Law.10 Obviously, petitioner had no intention of revealing his
duplicity to his first spouse and gambled instead on the probability that she or any third party
would ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple expedience
of having the second marriage recorded in the local civil registry, he has set into motion the running
of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary and the unsuspecting victim of his
philandering.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be
playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage
with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the stability
of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary concern of
our society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the
same is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO,
ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband
BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ,
EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE
PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO,
ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO,
PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE
PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 37034-
R, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No.
6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife
was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After
Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan,
Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her
deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino,
Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is
also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely:
Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but
survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio and
Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina
Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan
A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio
Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial
Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B,
807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about
the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February 22, 1963, against the children of the
second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs
alone. They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute
the document in question through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the
lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina
Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido,
who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the "Declaration of
Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved
among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that the five children of Lucio Perido with
his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were
the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows: declaring the
following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio
Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased;
great grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great grandson: George Perido;
Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the
legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio
Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido,
Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A. Perido;
Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-
part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them
should be divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but because of his death
leaving eight (8) children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia
Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio
Perido, of age, married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma
Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age,
married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but
because she is now dead the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando
Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael Perido, but
because he is already dead leaving five children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows:
1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo Perido, of age married to Trinidad
Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is already dead with one son, the same goes to George
Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of
age, widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he is already dead with seven children,
the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56
goes to Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of age, married to Isaias Ruiz;
1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age, married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of
age, single; 1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to
Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he is already dead with one child, the
same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married to Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of
age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo
Perido, of age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No. 458
as conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat, which should be divided
and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal shares and
11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal shares or 11/120 for each of the
children and again to be divided by the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel
Perido owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be determined accordingly
later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J" of the plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10" for the
defendants, without costs and without adjudication with respect to the counterclaim and damages,
they being members of the same family, for equity and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring
that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the
legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that
Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of
Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the
conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in
holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed it in
toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they instituted he
instant petition for review reiterating in effect the assignments of error and the arguments in the
brief they submitted to the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina
Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three
were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two
were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their
marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the
first three children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by
petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the
face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner
Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show that
Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding conclusive
upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal
impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in
1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he
was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut
the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. This
presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome
only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs.
Cheong Seng Gee1 this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of
human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such
is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of
marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the
appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido
on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina
Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because "during
the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and
placed in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506,
511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of the
contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio
Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:têñ.£îhqwâ£
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the lands covered by the
certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is
evidence showing that the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n., p.
21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive properties of the late Lucio Perido
which he brought into the first and second marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be
divided accordingly among his legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the aforementioned lots
were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother and contend that they were able to establish
through the testimonies of their witnesses that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong
acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question
involves appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals, the
factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the
finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the appellate court:têñ.£îhqwâ£
With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 21769
issued in 1925 the same should be considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second
wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this point need not be disturbed. It is
expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the registered owner, was
married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the law presumes a property
registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil.
144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes
stronger when the document recites that the spouse in whose name the land is registered is married
to somebody else, like in the case at bar. It appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458
belonged to the conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary, we
are constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido
and Marcelina Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove that 6/12
of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita
Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of
sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the first marriage. As in
the second assignment of error, the issue raised here also involves appreciation of the evidence
and, consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court. Indeed,
a review of that finding would require an examination of all the evidence introduced before the
trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances surrounding the
case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal of the
probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary
appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the purpose for which
the latter procedure has been established. 2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside
the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the
reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human
beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong)
and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex?
May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate
to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change
of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.
The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as
respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling
trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a
plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting
that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought
to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex
from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the
order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to
the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always
felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken
against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite
due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose
any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name
or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled
to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section
1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law
is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless
an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise
lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege,
any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local
civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because
the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in
the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his
birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official
name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of
Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded
in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments
of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized
nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities
and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as
the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and
its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This
is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent
of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and
hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in
case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there
is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning
in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the
Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore
be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary.
In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is "the
sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words
that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language
of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be
argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that
allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret
the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to
confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex
to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010
MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS
NERI, Petitioners,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO
G. JALANDONI as Special Administrator, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576.
In the said decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the Orders3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and their
siblings4 to intervene in the estate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. 5 The decretal
portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July
2, 2004 and January 26, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET
ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is hereby issued enjoining respondents
[petitioners], their agents and anyone acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the assailed
Orders. No costs.6
The antecedents are:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966. 7 He died without issue.8
On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration9 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
to commence the judicial settlement of the latter’s estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 338 and is currently pending before the intestate court.10
On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation11 before the intestate
court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis
(Sylvia)—who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John
Desantis.12
The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother—Isabel—was, at the time of
Rodolfo’s death, the legal spouse of the latter.13 For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in
the estate of Rodolfo.
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed
to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. 14 As it was,
by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the
former predeceasing the latter.15
To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the
following documents:
a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;16
b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;17 and
c.) Their respective proof of births. 18
It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of evidence
sufficiently establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful
representatives.
The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its
Special Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground that
the petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo.
The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a previous
and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo.
In its Comment to the Manifestation, 19 the respondent called attention to the entries in the birth
certificate of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946. 20 As it turned out, the record of birth of
Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John Desantis. 21 The document also
certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as "married."22 The respondent posits that the
foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry, constitute prima facie proof of a prior
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. 23
According to the respondent, Isabel’s previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was
dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio. 24
On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to
take part in the settlement proceedings. 25 The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at
hand adequately establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token,
permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her behalf. 26
The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there
was a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. 27 It ventured on the possibility that the
entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may
have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family from the social condemnation of having
a child out of wedlock.28
The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate court in its order dated
26 January 2006.29 Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.
On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the intestate
court.30
In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the
intestate court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvia’s birth certificate.31 The appellate
court, siding with the respondent, held that Sylvia’s birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated—which includes the civil status of her parents. 32 Hence, the previous
marriage of Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.
The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any other
evidence proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time
she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriage—the Isabel-Rodolfo union—
is a nullity for being bigamous. 33 From that premise, Isabel cannot be considered as the legal
spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has any
interest in the estate of Rodolfo.
Hence, the instant appeal.34
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of
the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement
proceedings.
The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:
One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari. 35 In nullifying
the intestate court’s order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of whether the same
was issued with grave abuse of discretion. 36 Rather, it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch
upon the issue pertaining to Isabel’s right to inherit from Rodolfo. 37
Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion exists, it
would have found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or capriciously in issuing its
assailed orders.38 Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court is belied by the fact
that the said orders may be supported by the two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and
Rodolfo.39
Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in addressing the
issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to inherit from
Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that there was none. 40 A proper evaluation of the evidence
at hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had a previous marriage with John Desantis. 41
To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed between
Isabel and John Desantis.42 The conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in turn, only lend
credibility to the position that no such marriage ever took place.
Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be able
to prove a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. 43 In assessing the probative value of such
entries, the Court of Appeals should have taken note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino
couples who, in order to "save face" and "not to embarrass their families," concoct the illusion of
marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. 44
Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven, the
Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is bigamous.
We are not impressed.
First Argument
The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether the
intestate court gravely abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of whether there was
sufficient evidence to establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.
A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by
the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or
proceeding may be allowed to intervene.45Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a
person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein. 46
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in
a case—the mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the
allowance is made in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise
of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for
certiorari.
Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of certiorari,
when it examined the evidence proving Isabel’s right to inherit from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or
insufficiency of such evidence determines whether the petitioners and their siblings have
successfully established Isabel’s interest in Rodolfo’s estate—which, as already mentioned, is an
indispensable requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence
presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate court
were issued in excess of the latter’s jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.
Second Argument
The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to
establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their
siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that
no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. 47 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. 48 Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.49
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable
entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate"
child.50 In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are
presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will,
stand as proof of the facts attested. 52In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered
no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as
untruthful statements made only in order to "save face."53 They urge this Court to take note of a
"typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it
appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not
diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to
do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was
in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue that the document
on which they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which,
properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John
Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the
time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior
marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo.
Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot
be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202805
ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT, Petitioner,
vs.
WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the February 14, 2012 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 affirming with modification the May 26, 2003
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10 in LRC Case No. P-443-99,
as well as its July 26, 2012 Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration5 of the
herein assailed judgment.
Factual Antecedents
Adriano M. Tambuyat (Adriano) and respondent Wenifreda Balcom- Tambuyat (Wenifreda) were
married on September 16, 1965.6 During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties,
including a 700-square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Muzon, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan (the subject property),7 which was bought on November 17, 1991.8 The deed of sale over
the said property was signed by Adriano alone as vendee; one of the signing witnesses to the deed
of sale was petitioner Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat (Banguis), who signed therein as "Rosario
Banguis."9 When Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-145321(M) (TCT T-145321) covering the
subject property was issued, however, it was made under the name of "ADRIANO M.
TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS."10
All this time, petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco (Nolasco). They were
married on October 15, 1975, and at all times material to this case, Nolasco was alive, and his
marriage to petitioner subsisted and was never annulled. 11
On June 7, 1998, Adriano died intestate.12
On October 18, 1999, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation13 of TCT T-145321, which was
docketed as LRC Case No. P-443-99 and assigned to Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan (Malolos RTC). She alleged therein that she was the surviving spouse of
Adriano; that TCT T-145321 was erroneously registered and made in the name of "ADRIANO M.
TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS;" that per annexed Marriage Contract, Banguis
was still married to Nolasco; that Banguis could not have been married to Adriano; that the
issuance of the title in Banguis’s name as Adriano’s spouse was due to "an insidious machination
by her and the person who brokered the sale of the subject property, allegedly a cousin or relative
of hers;"14 and that consequently, she suffered damages. Thus, Wenifreda prayed that TCT T-
145321 be cancelled; that a new certificate of title be made out in Adriano’s name, with her as the
spouse indicated; that Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT T-145321; and that moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of litigation be adjudged in her favor.
In her Opposition15 to the petition for cancellation, Banguis denied specifically that the subject
property was acquired by Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage. She claimed that on the
other hand, she alone bought the subject property using her personal funds; that she and Adriano
were married on September 2, 1988 and thereafter lived together as a married couple; that their
union produced a son, who was born on April 1, 1990; that the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the petition for cancellation, which is merely a summary proceeding – considering that a thorough
determination will have to be made as to whether the property is conjugal or exclusive property,
and since she and Adriano have a child whose rights will be adversely affected by any judgment
in the case; and that Wenifreda is guilty of forum-shopping in filing LRC Case No. P-443-99,
considering that a prior similar case was already filed by her and dismissed on April 22, 1999 by
Branch 76 of the Malolos RTC. Banguis prayed for the dismissal of LRC Case No. P-443-99 and
to be paid moral damages and attorney’s fees by way of counterclaim.
During the course of the proceedings, the parties presented the following evidence, among others:
1.Marriage Contract of Adriano and Wenifreda;16
2.Publication of Adriano’s death;17
3.Social Security System (SSS) data record of Adriano indicating that Wenifreda is his spouse; 18
4.Barangay Council Certificate indicating that Adriano and Wenifreda were legally married and
residents of No. 13 Hyacinth Road, Phase V, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City since 1981;19
5.Marriage Contract of Banguis and Nolasco dated October 15, 1975;20
6.Banguis’s SSS Member’s Data Change or Addition Report indicating that Banguis: a) sought to
change her name from "Rosario E. Banguis" to "Rosario B. Nolasco"; b) listed Nolasco as her
husband; and c) changed her civil status to "married;"21
7.Banguis’s correspondence at work – Ocean East Agency Corporation (Ocean East), which was
owned and operated by Adriano – in which she signed as "Rosario B. Nolasco;"22
8.Banguis’s résumé on file with Ocean East, reflecting that she was married;23
9.Negative Certification of Marriage issued by the Civil Registrar of Bulacan to the effect that the
Civil Register does not have any record of Adriano and Banguis’s marriage which was supposedly
solemnized on September 2, 1988;24
10.Certification dated April 17, 2002 issued by Rev. Fr. Narciso Sampana, Parish Priest of St.
Joseph Parish, to the effect that the parish never had a parish priest by the name of Fr. Roberto de
Guzman – who is claimed to have solemnized the alleged marriage between Adriano and
Banguis;25
11.Banguis’s testimony on direct examination that she and Adriano were married on September 2,
1988; that they had a son named Adrian; that Adriano purchased the subject property on November
17, 1991 per Deed of Sale – executed in Manila and with Adriano as the purchaser – entered as
"Document No. 173; Page No. 3550; series of 1990" in the notarial registry of Mr. Julian B. Tubig;
that she paid for the same with her own money; and that she stayed at the subject property each
Friday night up to Sunday night;26
12.Banguis’s testimony on cross-examination that she is married to Nolasco, who is still alive; that
her marriage to the latter is still subsisting and has not been annulled; and that she knew that
Adriano was married to someone else;27
13.Photographs depicting Adriano and Banguis as a couple and with a child, supposedly taken at
the subject property.28
On May 26, 2003, the Malolos RTC rendered its Decision, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby RENDERED in favor of the petitioner
herein, as follows:
1.Directing the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan to cancel TCT No. T-145321 (M) and
in lieu thereof to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to
Wenifreda "Winnie" Balcom Tambuyat;
2.Directing the defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco of 1714 Ibarra St., Sampaloc, Manila to
surrender to the Register of Deeds for Meycauayan, Bulacan, the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT
No. T- 145321 (M) within five (5) days from receipt of the order, failing which the Register of
Deeds should proceed with the cancellation of said TCT.
3.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as and
by way of moral damages.
4.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as and
by way of exemplary damages; and
5.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner attorney’s fees in the amount of
P100,000.00, and the cost of suit.
Accordingly, the counterclaim of the oppositor is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.29
In arriving at the above pronouncement, the trial court held among others that under Section 112
of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act – now Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(PD 1529) or the Property Registration Decree30 – court authorization is required for any alteration
or amendment of a certificate of title when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a
certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate, or when there is reasonable
ground for the amendment or alteration of the title; that it has been established that Wenifreda is
the surviving spouse of Adriano, and the subject property was acquired during their marriage, but
it was erroneously registered in the name of another; that Banguis had a subsisting marriage with
Nolasco when TCT T-145321 was issued with her being erroneously included and referred to
therein as Adriano’s spouse; that Adrian’s filiation may not be proved collaterally through LRC
Case No. P-443-99; that Wenifreda is entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages
without proof of pecuniary loss, for the damage caused upon her reputation and social standing
caused by the wanton, fraudulent, malicious and unwarranted inclusion of Banguis’s name in the
title; and that Wenifreda is likewise entitled to attorney’s fees as she was compelled to litigate and
incur expenses to protect her interests by reason of Banguis’s unjustified act.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner appealed the trial court’s Decision with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84954,
the appeal basically revolved around the thesis that the trial court erred in applying Section 108 of
PD 1529; that with the serious objections raised by Banguis and considering that she is the actual
owner and possessor of the subject property, a proper action in a different court exercising general
jurisdiction should be filed, rather than in the current trial court which sits merely as a land
registration court; that the trial court disregarded Article 148 of the Family Code 31 which provides
for the division of properties acquired by individuals united in a defective marriage; that the trial
court erred in awarding damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit; that the trial court erred in
granting execution pending appeal despite the absence of any good or special reasons; and that the
denial of her counterclaim was improper.32
Meanwhile, on October 30, 2003, Wenifreda moved for execution pending appeal. It appears that
Banguis failed to oppose the motion; she did not appear during the scheduled hearings on the
motion as well. As a result, the trial court issued a March 30, 2004 Order directing the issuance of
a Writ of Execution. Such writ was thus issued on April 14, 2004. TCT T-145321 was cancelled,
and a new title – TCT T-433713(M) – was issued in its place.
On February 14, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following decretal
portion:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 26,
2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Malolos, Bulacan is AFFIRMED with the
modification that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit
in favor of Wenifreda Tambuyat is hereby deleted.
SO ORDERED.33
The CA sustained the trial court’s application of Section 108 of PD 1529, noting that Banguis’s
name was included in TCT T-145321 by error or mistake. It held that the evidence adduced proved
that Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is the lawful wife of Adriano; that there is a valid and subsisting
marriage between Nolasco and Banguis, and the latter admitted to such fact during the course of
the proceedings in the trial court; and that Banguis’s opposition to Wenifreda’s petition for
cancellation of TCT T-145321 is not real and genuine as to place the latter’s title to the subject
property in doubt.34
The CA added that contrary to Banguis’s position, a separate and different proceeding is not
necessary to resolve her opposition to the petition in LRC Case No. P-443-99, as: 1) she in effect
acquiesced and freely submitted her issues and concerns to the trial court for complete
determination, submitting all her relevant documentary and other evidence to the court in order to
prove her allegations – particularly that she is the lawful spouse of Adriano and that she is the
actual owner and possessor of the subject property; and 2) pursuant to law 35 and
jurisprudence,36 the distinction between the trial court sitting as a land registration court and as a
court of general jurisdiction has been eliminated with the passage of PD 1529. It held further that,
based on the evidence adduced, Adriano and Banguis are not co-owners of the subject property as
it has been shown that: a) both of them had valid and subsisting marriages when they conducted
their adulterous relations; b) Banguis failed to present even a modicum of evidence that she
contributed to the purchase of the subject property; and c) the deed of sale itself indicated that
Adriano alone was the vendee. Finally, in denying Wenifreda’s pecuniary awards and Banguis’s
counterclaim, the CA held that the parties are not entitled thereto as there is no legal and factual
basis to grant them.
Banguis moved for reconsideration, but in a July 26, 2012 Resolution, the CA was unconvinced.
Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Banguis cites the following issues for resolution:
I.THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH
CANCELLED AND CORRECTED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M)
FROM "ROSARIO E. BANGUIS" TO "WENIFREDA ‘WINNIE’ BALCOM TAMBUYAT"
UNDER SECTION 108 OF THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE DESPITE THE
LACK OF JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE SAME IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS AND
WEIGHTY OBJECTIONS OF THE PETITIONER AND THAT THE INSTITUTION OF
ESTATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LATE ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT AND THE
CONSEQUENT APPOINTMENT OF AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR WHICH IS
THE PROPER REMEDY WHO CAN GO AFTER HIS PROPERTIES HELD BY OTHER
PERSONS.
II.THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH
CORRECTED AND CANCELLED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M)
THROUGH AN ABSOLUTE AND COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE PROOF OF
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION BY THE PETITIONER OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
III.THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH
CORRECTED AND CANCELLED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M)
IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE PROVIDING FOR THE
SHARING OF PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY PERSONS UNITED IN A DEFECTIVE
MARRIAGE.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH
GRANTED THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF ITS DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE
SEASONABLE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONER AND THE UTTER LACK OF ANY GOOD
OR SPECIAL REASONS JUSTIFYING THE SAME. 37
Petitioner’s Arguments
In her Petition and Reply38 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and thus
dismiss Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation in LRC Case No. P-443-99, Banguis insists on her
original position adopted below that Section 108 of PD 1529 cannot apply in view of the
contentious and controversial nature of her opposition to the petition for cancellation, which can
be threshed out only in a separate proper proceeding where the court sits not merely as a land
registration court, but as a court of general jurisdiction. She cites Tagaytay-Taal Tourist
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,39 Liwag v. Court of Appeals,40 and Vda. de Arceo
v. Court of Appeals,41 which made pronouncements to such effect.
Banguis adds that the instant case involved the partition of Adriano’s estate which in effect
transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests her and her son Adrian of their rights
and interests therein; that based on the evidence she introduced, it should be concluded that the
property belongs to her as it was acquired using solely her own funds and money borrowed from
her sister, and because she has been in constant possession thereof, introducing improvements
thereon through the years; that the subject property is owned in common by her and Adriano since
it was acquired during their cohabitation; and that the CA erred in refusing to rule on the propriety
of the trial court’s grant of execution pending appeal.
Respondent’s Arguments
In Wenifreda’s Comment,42 it is stressed that the distinction between the trial court acting as a land
registration court, on one hand, and its acting as a court of general jurisdiction, on the other, has
been removed with the effectivity of PD 1529; thus, trial courts are no longer fettered by their
former limited jurisdiction which enabled them to grant relief in land registration cases only when
there is unanimity among the parties, or when none of them raises any adverse claims or serious
objections. It is further argued that Banguis’s claim of ownership cannot stand, for the evidence
fails to indicate that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property, even as the deed of
sale to the property itself shows that Adriano alone is the vendee thereof, and Banguis signed
merely as a witness thereto. Finally, respondent explains that during the proceedings covering the
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, Banguis was accorded the
opportunity to participate, but she did not; as a result, the old title was cancelled and a new one
was accordingly issued in its stead.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The trial court in LRC Case No. P-443-99 was not precluded from resolving the objections raised
by Banguis in her opposition to the petition for cancellation; a separate action need not be filed in
a different court exercising general jurisdiction. Banguis should be considered to have acquiesced
and freely submitted the case to the trial court for complete determination on her opposition, when
she went to trial and adduced and submitted all her relevant evidence to the court. "The active
participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object
to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to
an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will
bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction." 43
Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances: (1) when registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2)
when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (3) when
any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or
on any duplicate certificate; (4) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed;
(5) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when a
corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same
within three years after its dissolution; and (7) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment
or alteration of title.44 The present case falls under (3) and (7), where the Registrar of Deeds of
Bulacan committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of "Adriano M. Tambuyat
married to Rosario E. Banguis" when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis
– is Adriano’s lawful spouse.
Proceedings under Section 108 are "summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of
mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues." 45 Banguis’s opposition to
the petition for cancellation ostensibly raised controversial issues involving her claimed ownership
and the hereditary rights of Adrian, which she claims to be her son by Adriano. However, apart
from the fact that evidence of Banguis’s ownership is irrelevant in Wenifreda’s petition, the
evidence apparently indicates that Banguis could not be the owner of the subject property, while a
resolution of the issue of succession is irrelevant and unnecessary to the complete determination
of Wenifreda’s petition. The Court is thus led to the conclusion that the Registrar of Deeds of
Bulacan simply erred in including Banguis in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse.
As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that
Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence – among others, the parties’
respective marriage contracts, which, together with marriage certificates, are considered the
primary evidence of a marital union46 – indicates that Adriano was married to Wenifreda, while
Banguis was married to Nolasco – and both marriages were subsisting at the time of the acquisition
of the subject property and issuance of the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be said that
Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a
common-law relationship at all. Consequently, Banguis cannot be included or named in TCT T-
145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone.
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where
they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.1âwphi1
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in
our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man
and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case,
herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court,
thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and
Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with
respect to ‘spouse’, the same must be the legitimate ‘spouse’ (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is
said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or
legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the
facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly
providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her;
in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. 47 (Emphasis supplied)
The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99 is – who should be included
in the title to the subject property as Adriano’s spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda? Was there error in
placing Banguis’s name in the title as Adriano’s spouse? If Banguis is Adriano’s spouse, then there
would be no need to amend or even cancel the title. On the other hand, if Wenifreda is Adriano’s
spouse, the inclusion of Banguis would then be erroneous, and TCT T-145321 would have to be
cancelled. All that is required in resolving this issue is to determine who between them is Adriano’s
spouse; it was unnecessary for Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the property. Title
to the property is different from the certificate of title to it.
x x x. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the Court made a clear distinction between title and
the certificate of title:
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that
document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the
mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed.
Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a
piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired
interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the
equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not
be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used. x x x.
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do
not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. 48
Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to demonstrate that she is the true owner
of the subject property in order to convince the trial court that there is no need to cancel TCT T-
145321, then she was not precluded from presenting evidence to such effect. Understandably, with
the quality of Wenifreda’s documentary and other evidence, Banguis may have felt obliged to
prove that beyond the certificate of title, she actually owned the property. Unfortunately for her,
this Court is not convinced of her claimed ownership; the view taken by the CA must be adopted
that she and Adriano could not have been co-owners of the subject property as she failed to present
sufficient proof that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property, while the deed of sale
covering the subject property showed that Adriano alone was the vendee. This Court is not a trier
of facts, so it must rely on the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, which are thus considered
conclusive and binding.49 Moreover, the Court notes that while Banguis claims that she alone paid
for the property using her own funds and money borrowed from her sister, she nonetheless
acknowledges that Adriano is a co-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its
acquisition. Such contradictory statements cast serious doubts on her claim; basically, if she were
the sole purchaser of the property, it would only be logical and natural for her to require that her
name be placed on the deed of sale as the vendee, and not as mere witness – which is what actually
occurred in this case. On the other hand, if Adriano contributed to its purchase, Banguis would
have required that her name be placed on the deed as a co-vendee just the same. Her failure to
explain why – despite her claims that she is the purchaser of the property – she allowed Adriano
to be denominated as the sole vendee, renders her claim of ownership doubtful. "Where a party
has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, if it does
not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference against him."50 One cannot
also ignore the principle that "the rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and
common sense."51
Neither can the Court believe Banguis’s assertion that Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of
TCT T-145321 is in reality a partition of Adriano’s estate which in effect transfers the subject
property to Wenifreda and thus divests Banguis and her son Adrian of their rights and interests
therein. LRC Case No. P- 443-99 is simply a case for the correction of the wrongful entry in TCT
T-145321; it simply aims to reflect the truth in the certificate of title – that Adriano is married to
Wenifreda – and nothing else. It would have been a summary proceeding, but Banguis complicated
matters by injecting her claims of ownership, which are irrelevant in the first place for, as earlier
stated, registration is not the equivalent of title.
Finally, with the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised
by the petitioner, particularly those relating to the trial court’s March 30, 2004 Order directing the
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, as well as the April 14, 2004 Writ of Execution
issued, as they have become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 14, 2012 Decision and July 26, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and
Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaña (Omaña).
The Antecedent Facts
Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer,
malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.
Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal
(Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve
their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan
Ng Paghihiwalay" (contract) which reads:
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
BAYAN NG GUMACA
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON
KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY
KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang,
dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy.
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod,
matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay ng walang pakialaman,
kung kaya’t bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasama sa buhay;
2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11
taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming
dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang
bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena;
3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang
mananatili sa kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng
isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya ay naninirahan;
4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon;
5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga
pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina;
6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay
aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;
7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga panahong darating ay
aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.
BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997,
dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd) (Sgd)
ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA
Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997,

dito sa Gumaca, Quezon
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA
Notary Public
PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97
Gumaca, Quezon
Doc. No. 482;
Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.
Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract
dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal
eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they
acquired during their union.
Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who
informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired
the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that
she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the
notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa
returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office
staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract.
Omaña presented Marantal’s "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her allegations and to
show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaña further presented a letter of apology
from her staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the document without Omaña’s
knowledge, consent, and authority.
Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaña arrived at his residence
together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further
stated that Omaña was not in her office when the contract was notarized.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosa’s
desistance did not put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaña had
failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to comply
with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaña
who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed
that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:
Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby
revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary
sanction or disbarment.
The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaña be suspended for one year from the practice of law and
for two years as a notary public.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Omaña filed a motion for reconsideration.
In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaña’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in
the notarization of Marantal and Espinosa’s "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay."
The Ruling of this Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void. 2 The Court has also ruled that a notary public should
not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, 3 which is exactly what Omaña did
in this case.1avvphi1
In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was
sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a
document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed the
wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other;5 ratifying a document entitled
"Legal Separation" where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and
voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and
renouncing any action that they might have against each other;6 preparing a document authorizing
a married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of
action which each may have against the other;7 and preparing a document declaring the conjugal
partnership dissolved.8
We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the
contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract. Even if it were
true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña’s negligence
in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the
entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the
blame on his secretaries9 or any member of his staff.
We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaña
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Omaña knew fully
well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy.
Therefore, Omaña may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 10
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña from the practice of law for ONE YEAR.
We REVOKE Atty. Omaña’s notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a
notary public for TWO YEARS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña’s personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of
Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise.
Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied
having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner,
on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on
February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a
decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the
natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay
to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth
day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual
and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and
P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of
promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the
Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since
one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin
on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954,
Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.
Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic.
However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the
present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted
the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage.
No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor with
the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if
the banns have been published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged
to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the
promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought
within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs.
Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such
promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the
Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the
Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are
not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to
the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative
solutions to some questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed
are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage,
and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken.1awphîl.nèt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter
I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian, be
entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the
ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the
engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the
promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly
actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a
male for seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even
though a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring
suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary
losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced
parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material
and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be obliged
to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise of the
marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report
of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of
promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to
the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344
Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762
Nevada 1943 — p. 75
Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141
New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223
California 1939 — p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326
Indiana 1936 — p. 1009
Michigan 1935 — p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation
when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such
causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence of years of experience are doing
away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol.
IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and
manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the
award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals
said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee,
overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-
control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction
and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219,
paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs
preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said
paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as
such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does
not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant —
who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher
and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a
mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to
bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of
P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had
allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and
compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The
Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 — consisting of P144.20, for
hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance
representing expenses incurred to support the child — and increased the moral damages to
P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance.
It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez
David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and
PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario
Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated December
24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del Rosario
Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8).
During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia
Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria
del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children named Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died
and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter
named Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had
three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and
Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was
still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in the
complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p.
39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del
Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate.
Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the
adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the
registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-
mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into
Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the
respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with
Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with
the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were
deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967
(Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos
were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as
plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the
partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record
on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on Appeal,
p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition of natural
children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in an order the
dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by counsel
for the defendants are of erroneous application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore
denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed
by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous
enjoyment and possession of status of children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to
sustain either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court committed
an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco
(were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate children of their
said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and
descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the
third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the
adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually acquired transfer
certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said
adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all
the parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui
after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for
lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred
private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether
or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove
their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the
resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private
respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased spouses
Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had
repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn, have
continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the
deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are
entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among
others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in
favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally
one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only
collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly
adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged
in the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the
law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which
plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief
demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro
vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of
the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930.
This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified
that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother
were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no
marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert
these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106
[1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according
to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131,
Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation,
85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court
of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following
rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City
Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is
not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact
(Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban,supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However,
considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided
under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events,
to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989).
Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children — legitimate and
illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established
by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth
certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to
disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other
private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the
documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as
to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor details.
The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941,
the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that
even the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana
Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay
pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are
legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in
Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription
does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long
as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated
the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when
the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano
vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible
and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an
action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC,
165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the
extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in their own
names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the
prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971 was
an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private respondents
filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except
the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their
lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied
by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put
differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private
respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's
share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been
inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by
their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because
they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where
he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]),
the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions:
(1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known
to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise
been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument
to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered
the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription
definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant
action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots
involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997
PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case where
the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and a
retired member of the Judiciary.
In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge
Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the
Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave misconduct.1
After an answer2 and a reply3 were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court,
in its Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate
Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following
recommendation:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid
Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent, former
Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within the contemplation of Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal or suspension of attorneys, and therefor(e), he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, commencing from the finality of
the Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will
be dealt with more severely.
On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent
facts in his aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his
disposition of this case may be duly appreciated:
Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while
respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime
Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada.
Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced Special
Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo Mijares
presumptively dead, after an absence of sixteen (16) years.
Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding
before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their
marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when
respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying a
murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a close
family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). After the wedding, they received their
guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the newlywed(s) resumed their
usual work and activities. At 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched
complainant from her house in Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of
respondent two hours later at which time, she answered the phone. At the other end of the line was
a woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted respondent
on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just a call at the
wrong number". What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another,
to a point when respondent called complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang
gusto ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and have it
burned." Such unbearable utterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leave in haste
the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the complainant and respondent have been
living separately because as complainant rationalized, contrary to her expectation respondent never
got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for what happened (TSN, p. 13, April
10, 1996.
Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the
complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group, that
he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a
certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant lost no
time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the instant
Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").
On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against respondent, the
complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for
Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1").
Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered
by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and
to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when her
married Lydia Geraldez. This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral and indiscreet life. He
resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented. Also presented for complainant
were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B"); Order declaring her first
husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim
Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and
"F-1").
Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant on
January 7, 1994 was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he
voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge Mijares in
the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph
Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when his marriage with
complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Peña, his first
wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet
become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet published as required by
the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Peña having been made by publication, and
subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B.
Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh.
"4").
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of demanding
respect and dignity.4 He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein complainant, the
decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Peña, had not yet attained
finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman,
Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license
that his previous marriage had been annulled.
Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify
his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which
amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social
propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an
ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the
Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a marriage
celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites. 5
On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating Justice
Purisima which we quote with approval:
That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a Marriage
Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to solemnize a civil
marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by respondent himself, he could not be forced to
do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a).
That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and
the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles
2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male and
a female; consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer; authority of the
solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of Title
I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and
complied with.
The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a "sham"
marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he entered
into subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge of immorality against
her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying "I do" with complainant
before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His consent thereto
was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize the civil marriage,
and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage.
Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the
criminal case of Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of argument
that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between
respondent and Librada Pena had not attained complete finality due to non publication of said
judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance, alone, only made subject
marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage between complainant and
respondent void.
Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage with
Librada Pena had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia
Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel,
from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by a second marriage, his first
marriage with Librada Peña was subsisting and unannulled.
But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or not respondent
can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a crucial issue
pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional
Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted with complainant on January
7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion is — that what respondent
perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member of the Philippine Bar and as former
appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the immorality charge against herein complainant in
the administrative case instituted against her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded,
respondent was not justified in resorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her (complainant) from
said immorality charge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim
that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with
Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating
the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have testified in her favor in said
administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained
of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis.
In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of
marriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery thereof
and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the sacredness of
marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent
that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing but a "sham"
marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross misconduct, nay
sacrilege.
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness
for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law
requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.6 Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of
grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers. 7
However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive
conduct during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior
probably ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has rendered some years of
commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would be too harsh a penalty
in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended, would suffice as a
punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.
WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of
immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof,
with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the
same or a similar offense hereafter.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. 9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." 13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. 15 The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. 16 After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. 17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of
any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify
or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal
capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to
the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of
the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before
our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling
on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.
She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law." 28 Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles
read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately
a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall
be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding
article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
body or tribunal of a foreign country. 32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. 37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of
foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation
is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices,
still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus,
the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other
party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part
of the alien applicant for a marriage license. 50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B"
– Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan
City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D.
Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick
A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law
Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit
"3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi
of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" –
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia
Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated
to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a
nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro
Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case
to the court a quofor the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000
ARTHUR TE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of
Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 239711 and CA-G.R. SP No.
261782 and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September
14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other
regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner
stopped visiting her.3
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted
a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella). 4
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she
learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy
was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990. 5 This case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.6
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the
annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He
alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their
marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.7
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective
engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and
subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage,
petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent
added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella
that he was still single.8
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to
evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism
and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.
The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990
which stated that the same could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently
established a prima facie case against the accused.9 The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to
inhibit for lack of legal basis.10
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting
antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due
process by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before
the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for
judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie
evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
23971.11
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the
administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend
the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to
private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC
of Quezon City.12 When the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16,
1991,13 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that
the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment
case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that
the continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right
against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-
sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation
and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before
the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the
same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.14
The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the
consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to
petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and
had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law. 15 The Court of Appeals
likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure
to set forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to
adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy. 16
Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order
denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of
prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action
sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case. 17
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but
the same was denied.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND
THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN
ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF. 19
The petition has no merit.
While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to
private respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for
bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of
petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss
the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and rules. 20
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined.21 The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 22
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment
of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which
would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 23Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of
his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal
proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs.
Mendoza24 and People vs. Aragon25 cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing
rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of
petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which
is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.26 In Landicho vs. Relova,27 we held that:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of
marriage exists.28
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial
question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial
question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. 29
Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it
shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the
respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in
another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as
in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the
proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the
case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or
quasi-judicial body.
It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are
not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella.
Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as
husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without
the benefit of marriage.30 The existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the
proceedings before the PRC Board.
Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his
demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to
establish the existence of both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner
claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was not
presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the
requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the
marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said
contract was adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage
ceremony participated in by him ever took place.31
We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse
of such discretion.32 In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the
prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second,
petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has
been held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the
prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.33 In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima
facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense.34
The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his
demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was
already making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits
but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or
not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case. 35 The RTC’s observation that there
was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient
evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless
petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion. 36 Said declaration by
the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because
of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present
evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by
both parties.
Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-
14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in
several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration
of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was
dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed.
Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was
not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case
and required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when
petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the
same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s
hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant
of his motion to inhibit.
We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did
not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. 37 In People of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,38this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been
recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the
rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.39
Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those
expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit
himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which
he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties
in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case,
for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.
This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s
motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether
petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial.40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly
exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a
fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to
suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and
jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s
counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which
rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s
counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified
delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly. 41
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September
2009 as well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007
Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case
No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena
Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information
against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime
of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second marriage with her [sic]
co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to
her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA."
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his
plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other
hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial
conference was held and both the prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of
facts:
"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat Nollora
solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino on
December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted the second
marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of Marriage with
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her
Counter-Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTC’s resolution is whether or not the
second marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was
set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses
were as follows:
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met
in Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base
Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got married at the
[IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit ‘A’). While
working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and because of
anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October
4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed,
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on
December 8, 2001 (Exhibit ‘B’) when she secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’) from the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November
2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the
latter’s workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between
complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and
despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him
so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew
that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she
(private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latter’s residence in Taguig,
Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.’s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was
there in the house together with a friend and she heard everything that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff
Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount of ₱34,000.00 a month, more or less.
When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that what happened to her was a
tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that because of what
happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her
alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to
assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount of
₱50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the private
complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding.
Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant to accompany the latter
to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the
private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation and she heard that Rowena P.
Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the
private complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him
very much (TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defense’s version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with
private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed
that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first
marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry
four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private complainant, Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji
Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit ‘2,’ ‘3’
and ‘4’). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of Conversion dated January 10,
1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A.
Alyamin (Exhibit ‘7’).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage
because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said
private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having learned of his second marriage
with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of
his first marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P.
Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a ‘Catholic
Pentecostal’ but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage
Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion ‘Catholic’ was also indicated because he was
keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim.
He also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret
(TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño testified that he is the founder and president of Balik
Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority
to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit ‘14’) and after receiving the application, said accused was
indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
embraced the Muslim faith. He was then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his
development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because of the
filing of the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is
stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10, 1992. Apart from the
above-mentioned document, their ‘Imam’ also issued a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit ‘7’). He
declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran. However,
before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first
Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her
consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in accordance
with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also
can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them equally. He claimed that he was not
aware of the first marriage but was aware of the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena
P. Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to
re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will
not be considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous
marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and
only came to know her when this case was filed. She insists that she is the one lawfully married to
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted
the former who admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. if he was single and the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband
was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband,
she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after learning that her husband was
a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance with the Muslim
rites. She also belied the allegations of the private complainant that she was sought by the private
complainant and that they had a confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. was married to the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to
marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came to know the private
complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)."5
The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted
Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 417 of
the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180 8 of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for
allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one
wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic
Law and only in exceptional cases."
In convicting Nollora, the trial court’s Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet
urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second
wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated,
not encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines
by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is
necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall
notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve
a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration
Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wife’s consent to the proposed
marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection
(Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did
not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he
was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the
Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again
after marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an
unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that
the Shari’a law imposes, that is, he should have notified the Shari’a Court where his family resides
so that copy of said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the
first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the
said court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Shari’a law. It is
the Shari’a Court that has this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in
accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has
already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only.
There is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence
presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage
between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several
interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to
the latter’s house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door
and heard their conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena
P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is
obviously misplaced since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino
understands what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that "(E)very
circumstance favoring accused’s innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must
survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment"
(People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders
judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the
same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nollora’s motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite
the prosecution’s failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 10
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nollora’s appeal and affirmed the trial
court’s decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful
exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court denied
Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim
women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1Nollora’s two marriages were
not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of
the Philippines should apply. Nollora’s claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State
and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nollora’s motion for
reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nollora’s
earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its 30 September 2009
Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The Court’s Ruling
Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally
married to Pinat;14(2) Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date
of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to
Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinat’s marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were
married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April
1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony. The
marriage certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were
married at Max’s Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001.
Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22,
1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National
Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN

a) December 08, b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd

2001 District)19
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He
alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is
indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, 20 Nollora cannot deny that
both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to
stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations of the
spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following
essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the
proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and
any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under
the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty
upon reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but
the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in
an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and
attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties
and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to
solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person designated by
the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Shari’a judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other
suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting
parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the
value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife,
be determined by the court according to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil
Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither
is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless
of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single."
Moreover, both of Nollora’s marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth
or falsehood of the declaration of one’s religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential
requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s liability for bigamy.
Nollora’s false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion,
Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim
convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992.
However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have
indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didn’t know why they did not place
any Catholic there.
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage
contract with your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us,
Mr. Witness, considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January
10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your
religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret
my being my Balik-Islam, that’s why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society
doesn’t approve a Catholic to marry another, that’s why I placed there Catholic as my
religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you indicate there that you’re single,
Mr. Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married.22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as
Catholic when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage
contract?
xxx
[A:] I don’t think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the
Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your
Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to
secure the permission of your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she
was always very mad, ma’am.23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage to
Geraldino.1avvphi1 Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February
2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
with a term of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight
years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the
accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31
August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed
the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a
complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-
98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to
the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her
complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in
Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact
of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus,
only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely:
Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948;
Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952.
Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla
and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by
the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an
action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, 4 essentially
averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in
Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in
her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla
herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office
of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila; 6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually filed
in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar General,
NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of
Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War issued
by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested
a true transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses
Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina. 15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place
in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he
already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a
common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to
substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract 17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on
3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he
contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one Tecla
Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr.,
all surnamed Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith
so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence,
her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s
counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed
by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby
DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA
HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and
Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina],
the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of
her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to
his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to
appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), in its Memorandum25dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the
validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without
proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the
original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the
existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the witness
stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves
the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on
Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial
court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol,
that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said
as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court
observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued
a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila
on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945
to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of
verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between
[Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon,
Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of
Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof
of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court
declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children.
Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications
disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina
Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to
the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is
well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo
v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact
can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals. 29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting
the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown
by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due
execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court
clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of
the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document.
It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-
existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution,
besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary.
It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents
but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish
its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such
evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which
is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. 30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during
the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown
by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been
held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization
is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
xxxx
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina],
the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of
her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to
his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale
behind the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage
in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec.
334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish
priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido
and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.
Isabelo V. Castro for plaintiff-appellant.
Arturo A. Romero for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court, Manila, of a complaint for annulment of marriage, docketed therein as Civil Case No. E-
00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya, plaintiff vs. Fernando O. Palaroan, defendant."
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora and
defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action
for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Manila
as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing
the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's
counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated
"to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their
marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement
to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked
their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced ... frank
disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the
marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within
the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She
prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the complaint and
denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative; he averred that under no
circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and from her relatives the
day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that he denied having committed any fraud
against her. He set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel, for her having prayed
in Civil Case No. 21589 for the validity of the marriage and her having enjoyed the support that
had been granted her. He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit.
Defendant Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with
respect to the alleged moral damages."
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:
(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and pretended to shower
her with love and affection not because he really felt so but because she merely happened to be the
first girl available to marry so he could evade marrying the close relative of his whose immediate
members of her family were threatening him to force him to marry her (the close relative);
(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not because he loved
her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the marital duties and obligations
appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to live with her;
(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely concretized for
him, when in order to placate and appease the immediate members of the family of the first girl
(referent being the close relative) and to convince them of his intention not to live with plaintiff,
carried on a courtship with a third girl with whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited and had
several children during the whole range of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589, had been litigated
between them (parties); (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26 August
1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that
Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage, and, on the
authority of Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, holding:
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can
take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if
any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record. —
the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed.
Plaintiff Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance therewith, but the court found it
inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for the dismissal of the complaint;
it also denied reconsideration.
The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which
may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his
wife, as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud
enumerated in Article 86, as follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for
annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the
causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment in a
subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were
otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already
mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and
specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by
enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a previous
conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all
other frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was
followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune
or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded
by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ...
chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-
disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to
the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given,
for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is
interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether
it agrees with the rule or not.
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-divulgement" (the
word chosen by her) of the pre-marital relationship of her husband with another woman as her
cause of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in her reply that defendant Fernando paid court
to her without any intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly
made up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred in
ignoring these allegations in her reply.
This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and absence of
intention to perform duties of consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of action."
According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of allegations is "apart, distinct and separate from
that earlier averred in the Complaint ..." (Record on Appeal, page 76). Said allegations were,
therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a party-plaintiff is not permitted to
amend or change the cause of action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445),
there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and additional cause of action in the
reply. Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could become interminable.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the
husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after
the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within
four years after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and
this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the
Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of his
marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on
April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial
court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced
him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the
marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private
respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. 4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim, 5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition,
arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan
for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to
Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about
the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent
also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00,
plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s
fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and
P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF
THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE
AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN
AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES,
SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW. 7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of
vitiated consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorney’s fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court,
as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. 8 We affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or
intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus –
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced
consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on
November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when
Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction
evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in
the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about
his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against him.
Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided ahead
with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present case
disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this
Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from
this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective,
the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit:
the harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three
men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening
presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant
claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province
of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in
a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way.
For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact
that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding
the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the
latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not
have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at
best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate
with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual
relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and
the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x
x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to
undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died,
on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the
registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there is
no controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the
continuation of the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely
born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The
Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony simply
on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death of the fetus, especially when she
herself had presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues in
his argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in
December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had
testified during the trial, because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time.
Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not
affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s
admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute
the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the
appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him
to the appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant
identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x.
The letters admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and
hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant
suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was
forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was laboring
under duress when he made the admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement
with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight realization
by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled
due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a
ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the
spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling
the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x
x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil
Code provides that attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under
the circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis.
There is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral
damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the
appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of
private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as
would entitle her to moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering,
mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during
the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and should have testified on the
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he
purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they
must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have proven such
damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary
damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must
show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated
damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such
liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of
granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would
be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for
liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary
damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages.12 In
the instant case, private respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages,
thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No.
3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with private
respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages
is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel
Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Cañizares contracted
on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that
the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis
for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage
and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day
after they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the
complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article
88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there
was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-
up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the
defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her
physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical
certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional five days
from notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo
medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest
on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be
rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree
annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city attorney
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that
the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had
not been physically examined because she had refused to be examined; that instead of annulling
the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to
undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be
reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude
or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the complaint
be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his
motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for
reconsideration was denied.
The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength
only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is
impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was absent during the hearing, and refused to
submit to a medical examination.
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state
has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security
and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member
of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and
ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of
the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in
question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony
tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife
is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part
therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her
part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not
arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would
not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court
may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not
charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. 1 "Impotency
being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of
potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and
wife.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez
David, and Dizon, JJ. concur.
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,
vs.
REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated 24 May 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which
dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint for the annulment of her marriage
to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before the RTC
on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11
October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their
wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the
hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but
respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where
he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not
communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times
but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-
teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner
was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the
latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead,
respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in
Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondent’s whereabouts.
Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had
been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her.
Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no
more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
Per the Sheriff’s Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of petitioner’s
Complaint, was served upon respondent on 30 September 2002. 4
On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion5 to direct the public prosecutor
to conduct an investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an Order 6 directing
the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the
parties; to submit a report thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that
evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her
Report manifesting that she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent
in January 2003, but respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also
noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and measures were taken to prevent
suppression of evidence between them. She then recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted
to determine whether petitioner’s Complaint was meritorious or not.
Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and
clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.
Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint.
Cabacungan corroborated petitioner’s testimony.
Petitioner’s third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner
and respondent:
After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to be free
from any underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits,
which may possibly impede her normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the
undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden breakdown of marital life between
petitioner and respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the respondent
is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to properly assume and comply [with]
essential roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder
clinically classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe,
long lasting in proportion and incurable by any treatment.
People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive pattern of
grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early
adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be
recognized as superior without commensurate achievements)
2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love
3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or should associate
with, other special or high status people (institutions)
4. requires excessive admiration
5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or
automatic compliance with his or her expectations
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends
7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others
8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her
9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.
The root cause of respondent’s personality disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years
with predisposing psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that
respondent is the first child of his mother’s second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial
constellation composed his immediate environment in his growing up years. Respondent had
undergone a severe longing for attention from his father who had been unfaithful to them and had
died early in life, that he was left alone to fend for the family needs. More so that they were coping
against poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the
love and attention he yearned which led to develop a pathological need for self-object to help him
maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great that everything other people offer is "consumed."
Hence, he is unable to develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no capacity
for empathy sharing, or loving others.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as it
already existed long before he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is
deeply engrained within his system and becomes a[n] integral part of his personality structure,
thereby rendering such to be permanent and incurable.7
Tayag concluded in the end that:
As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic)
ceased to exist and have their different life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to
be (sic). The essential obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband
and wife, mutual help and support, and commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between
them. With due consideration of the above-mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the
declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent. 8
On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S.
Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the
admission of petitioner’s evidence and manifested that she would no longer present evidence for
the State.
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioner’s Complaint for annulment of
her marriage to respondent, holding in substance that:
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with
petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite
their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of their marriage or
that these are incurable.
That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order11 dated
19 August 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
84471. In a Decision12dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated
9 June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed
to prove respondent’s psychological incapacity. Other than petitioner’s bare allegations, no other
evidence was presented to prove respondent’s personality disorder that made him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of
Appeals,13 the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that at least one
of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that said person could not have
known the marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have
validly assumed the same. At most, respondent’s abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for
legal separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.1avvphi1
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution14 dated 28 August 2008.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT
IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATONS.15
At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was
for annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. 16 Incapacity to consummate
denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse.17 Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife
and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may
be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical
conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has
the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act. 18
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically
incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-
examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before
respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondent’s part,
then, there is no ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Petitioner’s Complaint
was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence
presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that
petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on
the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s
mistake or gross ignorance.19 But even said reason cannot save petitioner’s Complaint from
dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. 20 Although this rule is not a hard and fast one and
admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable
as to result in the violation of his client’s substantive rights, 21 petitioner failed to convince us that
such exceptional circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit,
consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article
36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer,
rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.23
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,24 to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b)
alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x
x x.
Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals,
we scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not
enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s testimonies, merely established that
respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent
returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did
not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much
insight into respondent’s psychological state.
Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioner’s cause. It must
be noted that Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for
examination despite Tayag’s invitation.25 Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state,
had to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more
prudent and thorough in her evaluation of respondent’s psychological condition, since her source
of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.
Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, traceable to the latter’s experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft
of the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior"
that showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed
to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to
perform his obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just
to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological
disorder renders him "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."26 Psychological incapacity must be more
than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into petitioner’s
marital life and, as a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching
himself as much as possible from his wife.
To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of
psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy
for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple
remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses
only a very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded
because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and,
thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. 271avvphi1
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos28]:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. x x x.
Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. 29
As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads
abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion30 dated 21
August 2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who
is residing in the same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in
with another woman named "Sally."
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’s
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.31
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its
recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 32 Presumption is always
in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.33 In the case at bar,
petitioner failed to persuade us that respondent’s failure to communicate with petitioner since
leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are
grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.
We are not downplaying petitioner’s frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so to speak,
to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem. 34
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica
Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Edwin F. Cardenas.1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued
to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was
declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to
the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage
license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig,
Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown
to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant,
that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4)
months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby
was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio
E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they
discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their
marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig,
Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were
allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage
license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said
license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order
to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only
on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish
the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the
parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the
certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared
the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig
to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that
the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their
record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent
court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro
that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that
the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to
overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent
appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar,
regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no.
3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent
to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without
a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a
valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find
a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an
official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter
all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant
to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find"
sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting
parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in
itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the
subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage
is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or
friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between
Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against
her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy
of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was
properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest
to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there
was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that
indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may
have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject
marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.