EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

RAC 18-24
Chapter 5
OPERATION AND EFFECT OF LAWS

Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation, unless it is otherwise provided
Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is
expressly provided.
Sec. 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. - In the interpretation of a
law or administrative issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English text
shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or
mistake, the other texts may be consulted.
Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior
law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so
provided.
Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior
law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law
provides otherwise. Sec. 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.

Chapter 6
OFFICIAL GAZETTE

Sec. 24. Contents. - There shall be published in the Official Gazette all legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of general
application; decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published; such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and such documents or classes of documents as the
President shall determine from time to time to have general application or which he may
authorize so to be published.
 The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette
shall be prima facie evidence of its authority.

TAÑADA V. TUVERA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office,
and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized
in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265,
286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427,
429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658,
661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061,
1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810,
1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155,
161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228,
231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-
299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385,
386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587,
594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839,
878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-
1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-
1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807,
1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-
1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923,
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161,
2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-
510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574,
593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94,
95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on
the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a
public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus
would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent
of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively
to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79
M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call
a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that
the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought
to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general
rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under
the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel
for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in
the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no
other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed
be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question
contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official
Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2
of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides
as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may
be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents
or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine
from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize
so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of
laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept
abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and
for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and
texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica
de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso
de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such
listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be
included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized
to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of
the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of
all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their
official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have
not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs.
Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found
to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is
quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed
to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted
upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of
those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right
of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said
law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which
cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ...
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have
not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may
be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or
enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that
they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same
category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published
in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so
aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible
misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed
with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its
first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case.
Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before
they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its
closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires
notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without
notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would
indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is
unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure
once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its
effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of
past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be
that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the
Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such
"Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision.
Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still
be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to
laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the
Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot
have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may
be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable
to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur
in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed
that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be
punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in
earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions,
a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code
and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the
corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions
of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only
laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette
for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is
that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is
provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly
published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best
example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents'
misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this
reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to
nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of
prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate
effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days
following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will
not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in
the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The
due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already
provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided "
Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a
built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law
may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different
mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the
Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such
as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required
to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential
for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth
Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a
provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is
elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be
by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same
category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published
in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so
aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible
misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed
with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its
first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case.
Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before
they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its
closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires
notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without
notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would
indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is
unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure
once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its
effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of
past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be
that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the
Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such
"Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision.
Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still
be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to
laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the
Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot
have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may
be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable
to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur
in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed
that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be
punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in
earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions,
a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code
and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the
corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions
of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only
laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette
for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is
that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is
provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly
published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best
example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents'
misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this
reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to
nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of
prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate
effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days
following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will
not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in
the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The
due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already
provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided "
Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a
built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law
may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different
mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the
Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such
as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required
to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential
for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth
Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a
provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is
elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be
by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the
Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners,
vs.
CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR
MALCAMPO,Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal real property, employing a challenged
affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid consent, loss of right to
declare nullity of sale, and prescription.
The Facts and the Case
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On
October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of
absolute sale.1 But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred
to his name.
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia
Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D.
Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an agreement
to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared2 dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated
that it was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of
₱60,000.00 for the transfer of the lot’s title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to
clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife,
Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an
additional ₱140,000.00 or ₱160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in
demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further
formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other
requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips
to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent.3 As soon as Tarciano met the other
conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11,
1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale4 in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then
paid him the additional ₱140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued
in the name of the spouses5 who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January
28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months
afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarciano’s
sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the
Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the
Fuentes spouses before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case
4707. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife,
Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been
forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of
the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.6
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that
he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence in Paco, Manila, on September
15, 1988. He admitted, however, that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four
months later on January 11, 1989.7 All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the
claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-
year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts at the trial.
Comparing Rosario’s standard signature on the affidavit with those on various documents
she signed, the Rocas’ expert testified that the signatures were not written by the same
person. Making the same comparison, the spouses’ expert concluded that they were.8
On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that the
action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the sale,
forgery or fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years after its
discovery. In this case, the Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the fraud from the date
the deed of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new title was issued.
Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine years after the title was issued to the
Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989.9
Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the fraud. Mere
variance in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of forgery.10 The RTC ruled
that, although the Rocas presented a handwriting expert, the trial court could not be bound
by his opinion since the opposing expert witness contradicted the same. Atty. Plagata’s
testimony remained technically unrebutted.11
Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagata’s defective notarization of the affidavit of consent
did not invalidate the sale. The law does not require spousal consent to be on the deed of
sale to be valid. Neither does the irregularity vitiate Rosario’s consent. She personally
signed the affidavit in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA found sufficient
evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw
Rosario sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said differently. Also, upon comparing
the questioned signature with the specimen signatures, the CA noted significant variance
between them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since
1958 also reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been forged.
Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their property
relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for annulment of sale on
the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage
within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs,
brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale.
Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely
voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what
they paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until actual
payment. Since the Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled
under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the value of the improvements they
introduced on the lot. The CA did not award damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the
award of attorney’s fees to the Fuentes spouses.13
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition for
review.14
The Issues Presented
The case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband
Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action
to annul that sale.
The Court’s Rulings
First. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of
consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her
consent to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues merely
academic.
The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been forged. The CA observed a marked
difference between her signature on the affidavit of consent15 and her specimen
signatures.16 The CA gave no weight to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario sign
the document in Manila on September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his declaration in
the jurat that Rosario signed the affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.
The Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature strokes on the affidavit
appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other hand, are
consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R" and "s" were written
is also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.
Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that she signed
the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for comparison.
The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from any illness or
disease that accounted for the variance in her signature when she signed the affidavit of
consent. Notably, Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958.
And she resided so far away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to
just forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to the sale or
demand a stiff price for it.
What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent. That
jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in Zamboanga City on
January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about four
months earlier at her residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988. While a defective
notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a
private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the
signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That
the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent
does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.
Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is
the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal
partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the
sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 16617 prohibited him from selling
commonly owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without
his wife’s consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the
right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the
sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the
value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. Thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on
Property Relations Between Husband and Wife.18Further, the Family Code provisions were
also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested
rights.19 Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of
gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws,
as provided in Article 256. (n)
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11,
1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide
a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the
real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court
order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:
Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. x x x
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has
no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are
declared void by positive provision of law,20 as in the case of a sale of conjugal property
without the other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is
absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or
prescription.21
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside,
when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is
necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.22 This action, according to
Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. Thus:
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his
wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction as the CA
held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale on the
ground of lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the
transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within
10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.
The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale to them based on fraud
and that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive period should be that which applies to
fraudulent transactions, namely, four years from its discovery. Since notice of the sale may
be deemed given to the Rocas when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989,
their right of action already prescribed in 1993.
But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the Fuentes spouses in that
they appeared to have agreed to buy the property upon an honest belief that Rosario’s
written consent to the sale was genuine. They had four years then from the time they
learned that her signature had been forged within which to file an action to annul the sale
and get back their money plus damages. They never exercised the right.
If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent upon a false
representation that the property would go to their children, not to strangers, and it turned
out that this was not the case, then she would have four years from the time she discovered
the fraud within which to file an action to declare the sale void. But that is not the case
here. Rosario was not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was simply not
obtained at all. She lost nothing since the sale without her written consent was void.
Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of
their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.
Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not
obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’s sale of
conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that
the right to have the sale declared void is forever lost?
The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the
land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died,
they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas.23 As lawful
owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person
from its enjoyment and disposal.1avvphi1
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things, to
recover from Tarciano’s heirs, the Rocas, the ₱200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal
interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.
Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land and
building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted with
closing and documenting the transaction, represented that he got Rosario’s signature on
the affidavit of consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer had
violated his commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing that Rosario did not
come to Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no evidence that they had a premonition
that the requirement of consent presented some difficulty. Indeed, they willingly made a 30
percent down payment on the selling price months earlier on the assurance that it was
forthcoming.
Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses that
everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in their
favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid the balance due him. And, acting on the
documents submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in
the names of the Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these had passed that the spouses
entered the property and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article
526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition
any flaw which invalidates it.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their
stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them.24 What
is more, they are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they
introduced into the property with a right of retention until the reimbursement is made.
Thus:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code,25 of
indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying the increase
in value which the property may have acquired by reason of such improvements.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated February 27, 2007 as follows:
1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca executed in favor of
Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title
T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued in the names of the latter
spouses pursuant to that deed of sale are DECLARED void;
2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer Certificate of
Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel;
3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar
Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the
₱200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989
until fully paid, chargeable against his estate;
4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar
Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements on the
subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those
improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the
indemnity is made; and
5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED to receive
evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which petitioner spouses Manuel and
Leticia Fuentes are entitled.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179579 February 1, 2012
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF
SUBIC, Petitioners,
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 assailing the Decision2 and the
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs Memorandum Order
(CMO) No. 27-20034 on the tariff classification of wheat issued by petitioner Commissioner
of Customs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the
Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1)
importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge.5 The regulation
provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and
countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food
grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade,
7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and
Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the
articles that were the subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to cover
the tariff differential.6
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief7 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It
anticipated the implementation of the regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese
milling wheat in transit from China.8 Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued
without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation,
prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law
Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade
supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having
imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the
shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was
violated when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no
reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was
confiscatory in nature.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for
twenty (20) days from notice.9
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.10 They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, because respondent was asking for a
judicial determination of the classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was
improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in
nature; and (4) the claims of respondent were speculative and premature, because the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s products. They likewise
opposed the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they had
not inflicted any injury through the issuance of the regulation; and that the action would be
contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are assumed valid until declared
otherwise.
On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for
preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss would just be resolved together in the
main case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision11 without having to
resolve the application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject Customs
Memorandum Order 27-2003 is declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT.
Respondents Commissioner of Customs, the District Collector of Subic or anyone acting in
their behalf are to immediately cease and desist from enforcing the said Customs
Memorandum Order 27-2003.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised by
respondent concerned the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a
petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper
party to file it. The court considered that respondent was a regular importer, and that the
latter would be subjected to the application of the regulation in future transactions.
With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not
followed the basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-
2003. It likewise held that petitioners had "substituted the quasi-judicial determination of
the commodity by a quasi-legislative predetermination."13 The lower court pointed out that
a classification based on importers and ports of discharge were violative of the due process
rights of respondent.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the
same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.14 The appellate court, however, dismissed the
appeal. It held that, since the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners and other
importers, petitioners should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing and
publication.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
The Petition has no merit.
We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof,
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.15 We find
that the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by
petitioner Commissioner of Customs. In Smart Communications v. NTC,16 we held:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the
scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance
Secretary,17 we said:
xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are
designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of
enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three
inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative
agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper
procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or
wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment,
has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments.
In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the
correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an
interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite
extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative
weight to the interpretative rule. (Emphasis supplied)
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are
summarily imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation
of CMO 27-2003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat,
on 14 August 2003, it has actually made shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The
shipment was set to arrive in December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the
conditions of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the imposition of different tariff rates,
depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent alleged that it would be
made to pay the 7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food
grade wheat. In addition, respondent would have to go through the procedure under CMO
27-2003, which would undoubtedly toll its time and resources. The lower court correctly
pointed out as follows:
xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing
wheat, each and every importation will be subjected to constant disputes which will result
into (sic) delays in the delivery, setting aside of funds as cash bond required in the CMO as
well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see that business uncertainty will be a
constant occurrence for petitioner. That the sums involved are not minimal is shown by the
discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the pleadings filed. It may be that
the petitioner can later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed because the Collector
of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner
cannot get its refund with the said agency. We believe and so find that Petitioner has
presented such a stake in the outcome of this controversy as to vest it with standing to file
this petition.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation
is inevitable19 for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in
the enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial
court stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and
be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the
circumstances of the case.
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of
respondent as explained above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied
the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not
thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far
as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties
the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall
have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before
the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the
law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes
beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of
law.20
Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of
laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept
abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and
for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records – no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and
texts of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised
Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in
like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if
there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown
that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the
same class.22
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the
quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it
came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported
food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification
subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-
2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus
depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not become
disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat importations
and thus prevent their misclassification." A careful study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not
only fails to achieve this end, but results in the opposite. The application of the regulation
forecloses the possibility that other corporations that are excluded from the list import
food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates an assumption that those who meet the
criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first case, importers are unnecessarily
burdened to prove the classification of their wheat imports; while in the second, the state
carries that burden.
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation
limited the customs officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs
Law, as amended. The law provides:
Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise
Imported Articles. – The customs officer tasked to examine, classify, and appraise imported
articles shall determine whether the packages designated for examination and their
contents are in accordance with the declaration in the entry, invoice and other pertinent
documents and shall make return in such a manner as to indicate whether the articles have
been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity, measurement,
weight, and tariff classification and not imported contrary to law. He shall submit samples
to the laboratory for analysis when feasible to do so and when such analysis is necessary
for the proper classification, appraisal, and/or admission into the Philippines of imported
articles.
Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are usually
bought and sold, and appraise the imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this
Code.
Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to the
penalties prescribed under Section 3604 of this Code.1âwphi1
The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the
classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-
2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer had the chance to
examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted
by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer
required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the proper
classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to
create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It
is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that
it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.23
In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of CMO
27-2003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative
Code. Petitioners likewise violated respondent’s right to equal protection of laws when
they provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation.
Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated
authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and
assess imported articles.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR
ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN, Petitioners,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in
her capacity as Municipal Engineer and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez
Jaena Municipality, Misamis Occidental,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 30,
2008 and Resolution3 dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
00284-MIN which reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated November 26, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction.
The Facts
Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-
governmental organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in
the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis
Occidental.5 In line with its objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of indigenous
materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar
cottage in 20016which it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its
beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr.
(Azcuna) and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal
Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the
construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096,8 otherwise known
as the "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop all illegal building
activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for the
issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by
respondents against it on July 8, 2002,9 but still the same remained unheeded.
It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted
Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among
others: (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or organization inside the
sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the
premises, except if authorized by the local government.12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna
approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the
matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas, including Capayas Island,
declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress
thereto.13
On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it
to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its
violation of the subject ordinance. A similar notice was also served against individual
petitioners on October 25, 2002.
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, injunction and damages15 against respondents before the RTC, docketed
as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize
Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
thereof since 1961, with whom it entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the
operation of the said island as a camping, tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the
issuance of the subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were deprived of
their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the
following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province as required by Republic Act
No.7160,16 otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was
not approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.17
In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against
them since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was
classified as timberland and property belonging to the public domain. Further, they
maintained that they have complied with all the publication and hearing requirements for
the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved by operation of law for
failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as provided under the LGC. As such, it is
valid and enforceable.
The RTC Ruling
On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision19 declaring the subject ordinance as
invalid/void based on the following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has not been resolved
and that the subject ordinance was not duly approved by the SP; (b) the said ordinance was
not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor was it posted in public places; (c)
Capayas Island is classified as timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird or fish sanctuary;
and (d) the authority and control over timberlands belong to the national government,
through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).20 Based on the
foregoing, respondents were ordered, among others, to desist from closing Capayas Island
to the public.21 However, the petitioners were ordered to remove the structures they built
thereon without valid building permits22 since they were found to have no title over the
disputed property.23
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN.
The Proceedings Before the CA
On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 granting respondents’ appeal.
Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon
failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within30 days after its submission in
accordance with Section 56 of the LGC.25 It also gave credence to Azcuna’s testimony that
the subject ordinance was posted and published in conspicuous places in their
municipality, and in the bulletin board.26 Moreover, public consultations were conducted
with various groups before the subject ordinance was passed.27 The CA further ruled that
the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to pass and
adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447 in relation to Section 16 of the
LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could create and administer
sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a municipality
and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the
subject ordinance is valid.30
On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no proprietary
rights over the Capayas Island, thereby rendering their action for injunction improper.31
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a
Resolution33 dated March 9, 2009. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and
enforceable against petitioners.34
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Section 56 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the
local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local
development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The
provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from
receipt of the documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments or
recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making
its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond
the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned,
it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or
municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days
after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent
with law and therefore valid.
In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved
through the mere passage of time considering that the same is still pending with the
Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the SP.35 It, however, bears to note that
more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the said ordinance was submitted to
the latter for review by the SB;36 hence, it should be deemed approved and valid pursuant
to Section 56 (d) above. As properly observed by the CA:
Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the
disputed word, "action." It is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the action that
must be entered in the minutes of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the declaration of the
sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is invalid in whole or in part. x x x.
This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory construction that
the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them
and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting each other. x x x laws are given
a reasonable construction such that apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand
and given effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the moving spirit behind the
enactment of the statute.37
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject ordinance
was not published nor posted in accordance with the provisions of the LGC.38 It is
noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence reveals that a public hearing39 was conducted
prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare
allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or
posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have
complied with the publication and posting requirements.40 While it is true that he likewise
failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of
validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own
allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA,41 citing
United States v. Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance
therein despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local government to
show that public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of
controverting evidence to demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance with the
said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local government’s non-compliance was a
negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of action:
However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not
presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the
enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the Municipality of
Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted before the subject
ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish
this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence
showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment. In an
analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was alleged that the ordinance making it a
crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not been submitted by the provincial board as
required by §§2232-2233 of the Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court
held:
From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon
the theory that the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the part of the
municipality and was therefore unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no
proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing that said ordinance had been approved
by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law that it is the duty of the
provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the municipal councils of
the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that
the law has been complied with.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do,
in the absence of positive proof to the contrary.
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's
cause of action in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the
burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the
subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were
conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their
constitutionality or legality.43 (Emphases supplied, citation omitted)
All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the validity
of the subject ordinance.
In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to the property in dispute to be
entitled to its possession. Besides, the RTC’s order directing the removal of the structures
built by petitioners on Capayas Island without building permits was not appealed. As such,
the same should now be deemed as final and conclusive upon them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,
vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of
an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
Antecedents
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a
violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon.
The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan
to apply on account or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996
payable to cash in the amount of ₱336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of
issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in
the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of
₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as
Civil Case No. 915-00).2 He alleged in his complaint the following:
xxx
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation
encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of ₱336,000.00 to the plaintiff
assuring the latter that the check is duly funded and that he had an existing account with
the Land Bank of the Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as Annex
"A";
3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the
ground that the account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been
closed contrary to his representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and
that the said check was duly funded and will be honored when presented for payment;
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the
value of the check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex "B", but
despite such demand defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiff’s
valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiff’s valid demands,
plaintiff has been compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as
reasonable attorney’s fees the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus additional amount of ₱2,000.00
per appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation
upon which this action is brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claims
sought in this action which fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he
has an existing account and sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact his account was
already closed at the time he issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under
Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and
the amount due the plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of
preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of
damages should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment.3
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which
was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of
Simon.4
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge
plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,5 pertinently averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action
between the instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X (10) entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed
thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section 1,
(e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said
Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis
of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiff’s criminal complaint against defendant
arising from a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged
dishonor in plaintiff’s hands upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank
Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of ₱336,000- drawn allegedly
issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal
information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto
attached and made integral part hereof as Annex "1".
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, "when a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil
action or reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages, stating:
1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint is the
alleged pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause,
contending among others that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon" renders this case dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff
does not contest; however, it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation
of the right to file a civil action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information
for violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of
damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery of damages; on top of
this the plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation of the
prosecution evidence was not represented at all by a private prosecutor such that no
evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of
these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the right of
the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court which mandates that after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;
however, the defendant overlooks and conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2,
Rule 111 which provides as follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided
the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it
is based on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal
action;
4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the
right to file a separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case
because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the
plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the
defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check.
Assuming the allegation of the defendant of the alleged circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check payable to bearer to that certain
Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by delivery by who
ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and effective against the
drawer;
5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances
relative to the issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have
been aware that such check was intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable
considering that the said check was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;
6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case
without a reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal offense charged. However,
in this instant case since the liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of the
plaintiff are created by the negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all
this instant action may still be prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiff’s complaint the application for damages against
the bond is totally without any legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright.6
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss
with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,7 dismissing the
complaint of Chan because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to
Dismiss and the application to charge plaintiff’s bond for damages.
For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites
must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment, which
may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other. xxx
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of Money" and the criminal
case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only identical
but also the cause of action being asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank
Check No. 0007280 in the amount of ₱336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases, the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts, are
identical.
Plaintiff’s claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case
owing to the fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there
was no private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution evidence is
unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or criminal Information is filed, even
without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim them, the offended
party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is made or
unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil action. xxx The
over-all import of the said provision conveys that the waiver which includes indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the
Civil Code must be both clear and express. And this must be logically so as the primordial
objective of the Rule is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for
the same act or omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to
his right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
the defendant herein. To the considered view of this court, the filing of the instant
complaint for sum of money is indeed legally barred. The right to institute a separate civil
action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation. xxx
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff’s submission that the herein case for sum of
money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior
reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:
"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided
the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence."
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:
1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis pendentia";
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;
3. Charge the plaintiff’s bond the amount of ₱336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the
damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the implementation of the writ of attachment;
4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the
defendant’s physical possession the vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and
5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of ₱5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,8 viz:
Considering that the plaintiff’s arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous
submissions, and which submissions this court have already passed upon; and taking into
account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the
plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation to
file a separate civil action, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of
Chan’s complaint, disposing:9
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
review,10 challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis
pendentia.
In his comment, 11 Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in
prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter
embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case because of
the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure was warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,12 overturning the RTC, viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury
produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the
corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the
crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is also civil in
nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission
of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the
criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on
December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been
changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only
the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through
Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and
waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising
from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32,
33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
which may be prosecuted separately without a reservation".
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended
party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil
actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. xxx
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account of the
fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may
proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing."
It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint
was also brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by
the respondent in the issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed before the
trial court, despite the pendency of the criminal case for violation of BP 22 against the
respondent. While it may be true that the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure pertaining to independent civil action became effective on December 1, 2000,
the same may be given retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at
bench, since procedural rules may be given retroactive application. There are no vested
rights in the rules of procedure.
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages
in favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the
complaint filed by petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s motion for reconsideration.13
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its
decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CA’s reliance on the ruling in DMPI
Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez14 stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling,
and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that
this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding the application of
Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.15
In his comment,16 Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the
petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being based on fraud,
was an independent civil action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the
criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil action.
Issue
The lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded
check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise
to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,17 holding:
xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the
offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a
consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to
pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime
(Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692).
Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party,
and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled
to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been
caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to
leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil
liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a
Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party
unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the
errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide
would, therefore, be brought to naught.
xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check
issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective
December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.18
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as
the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but
any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance
with section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended
party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan
commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason
is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural
laws.19 Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their
promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of
procedure,20 except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they
permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time
of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for
being ex post factounder the Constitution.21
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any
assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-
97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules
and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal
cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance
of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed or recognized.22
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in
Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party
further seeks to enforce against the accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees
therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or information. If
not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the
amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111
governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.
4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall
take effect on November 1, 1997.
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,23 thus:
xxx
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also
impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall
be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil
action is no longer needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
(a) x x x
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as
the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees
based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance
with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions.1avvphi1
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states
that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for
criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of
B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This
rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as
creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in
criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal
charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even
informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall
be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of
a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after
the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are
allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed
that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored
checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties
and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be
avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the
trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In
view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil
Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.24
The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez25 to give due course to the
civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was
unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours
with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled
that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of
estafa and violation of BP 22,26 the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising
from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of
estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may
institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,27 as
DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court
has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to
claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons
delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the
prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal
Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the
ground of litis pendentia?
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the
following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least
such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the
other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes
nil.28
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that
all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action
involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon,
are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in
Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280
worth ₱336,000.00 payable to "cash," thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the
reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were
identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily
bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same
claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00
on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the
RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.
Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and
set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate
the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in
Pasay City.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998

TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her Husband SIMEON
EVANGELISTA; ARACELI F. MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY MARILLA; ANTONIO
V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse respondent appellate court's
decision1 promulgated on October 7, 1991, affirming in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court which ruled,2 thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff, as follows:
1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint with costs against the plaintiff;
2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio Francisco the administrator of the properties
described in paragraph eight (8) of the Complaint; and
3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of P10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second
marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio
Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have
acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment
house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban),
Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers
that these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of
tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them.
Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign
a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house
and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general
power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be
declared as the administratrix of the properties in dispute. In due course, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to
adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of the second
conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court
ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to
administer them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 160 AND 158, UNDER TITLE VI OF
THE (NEW) CIVIL CODE BECAUSE SAID TITLE, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHERS, HAVE (SIC)
ALREADY BEEN REPEALED BY ARTICLE 253 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY
CODE. 3
But in her reply, petitioner posed the sole issue "whether or not Article 116 of the Family
Code applies to this case because Article 253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals
Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code"4
To our mind, the crucial issue in this petition is whether or not the appellate court
committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's ruling that the properties, subject
matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital properties of Eusebio exclusively.
Indeed, Articles 1585 and 1606 of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family
Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. The aforecited articles fall
under Title VI, Book I of the New Civil Code which was expressly repealed by Article
2547 (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in her petition and reply) of the Family Code.
Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the new law in this case without impairing prior vested
rights pursuant to Article 2568 in relation to Article 1059 (second paragraph) of the Family
Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not
operate to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while
the said provisions were in force. 10 Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited
articles were in effect survive their repeal. 11We shall therefore resolve the issue of the
nature of the contested properties based on the provisions of the New Civil Code.
Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal, thus, she should administer
these on account of the incapacity of her husband. On the other hand, private respondents
maintain that the assets in controversy claimed by petitioner as "conjugal" are capital
properties of Eusebio exclusively as these were acquired by the latter either through
inheritance or through his industry prior to his second marriage. Moreover, they stress that
Eusebio is not incapacitated contrary to petitioner's allegation.
We find petitioner's contention lacks merit, as hereafter elucidated.
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. 12 Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 13 The party who asserts this
presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers
only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no
showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. 14 Moreover, this
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing
evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. 15
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which
she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute
the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents. Interestingly,
petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in
the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second marriage is
inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of
law, pursuant to Article 14816 of the New Civil Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the
marriage, is considered his or her separate property. 17 Acquisitions by lucrative title refers
to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the
marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. 18 Hence, even if it be assumed that
Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the
land would still be his "exclusive property" because it was acquired by him, "during the
marriage, by lucrative title." 19
As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents aver that these
properties were either constructed or established by their father during his first marriage.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the said assets belong to conjugal partnership. In
support of her claim, petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the
apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the
business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.
It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove that the
improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact that one is the
applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is
conjugal or not. As the appellate court aptly noted:
. . . . And the mere fact that plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] is the licensee of the sari-
sari store (Exhibit "F-3"; Exhibit "G", pp. 44-47, Record) or is the supposed applicant for a
building permit does not establish that these improvements were acquired during her
marriage with Eusebio Francisco, especially so when her exhibits ("D-1", "E", "E-I", "T", "T-
1", "T-2", "U", "U-l" and "U-2"; pp. 38-40; 285-290, Record; TSN, January 17, 1989, page 6-7)
are diametrically opposed to her pretense as they all described Eusebio Francisco as the
owner of the structures (Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4. Rule 129, Revised Rules on
Evidence).
Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio
Francisco has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that
it was constructed at the expense of their partnership (second paragraph, Article 158, New
Civil Code). Normally, this absence of evidence on the source of funding will call for the
application of the presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code that the store is
really conjugal but it cannot be so in this particular case again, by reason of the dearth in
proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage (5 Sanchez Roman 840-841; 9
Manresa; cited in Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Volume 1, 1983 Edition, page
421).20
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert that
their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims
ownership over said property in as much as the title thereto is registered in the name of
"Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco."
It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim is
inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco,
married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the property was acquired during the
spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. 21 It is
well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already
existing. 22 The phrase "married to" preceding "Teresita Francisco" is merely descriptive of
the civil status of Eusebio Francisco. 23
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be said to have been
without valid basis in affirming the lower court's ruling that the properties in controversy
belong exclusively to Eusebio.
Now, insofar as the administration of the subject properties is concerned, it follows that
Eusebio shall retain control thereof considering that the assets are exclusively his
capital. 24 Even assuming for the sake of argument that the properties are conjugal,
petitioner cannot administer themn inasmuch as Eusebio is not incapacitated. Contrary to
the allegation of petitioner, Eusebio, as found by the lower court, is not suffering from
serious illness so as to impair his fitness to administer his properties. That he is
handicapped due to a leg injury sustained in a bicycle accident, allegedly aggravated when
petitioner pushed him to the ground in one of their occasional quarrels, did not render him,
in the Court's view, incapacitated to perform acts of administration over his own
properties.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice (now supreme Court Associate
Justice) Jose A.R. Melo and concurred in by JJ. Regina G. Ordonez-Benitez and
Felimon H. Mendoza.
2 RTC Decision, p. 6; CA Rollo.
3 Petition, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 15-16.
4 Reply, p. 1; Rollo, p. 61.
5 Art. 158. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate
property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the
industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership.
Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on
land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of
the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
6 Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
7 Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI, and of Book I or Republic Act No. 386,
otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17,
18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
8 Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
9 Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during
marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.(n)
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256.
10 Villones vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 92 SCRA 320 (1979) at p.
328 citing 82 Corpus Juris Secundum 1010.
11 Ibid.
12 Jocson vs. Court of appeals, 170 SCRA 333 (1989) at p. 344 citing Cobb-Perez vs.
Lantin, 23 SCRA 637 (1968).
13 ibid.
14 Cuenca vs. Cuenca, 168 SCRA 335 (1988) at p. 344 citing Philippine National
Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435 (1987); Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA
282 (1986); and Maramba vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474 (1967).
15 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1985, p. 427, citing Magnolia Pet.
Co. vs. Crigler. (La. App.) 12 So. (2d) 511; Succession of Burke, 107 La. 82, 31 So.
391.
16 Art. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other
property belonging to only one of the spouses;
 (4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
17 Tolentino, supra at p. 395.
18 Tolentino, supra at p. 396.
19 Villanueva vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 192 SCRA 21 (1990) at p. 26.
20 CA Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 27.
21 Jocson vs. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 345.
22 Ibid., citing Torela vs. Torela, 93 SCRA 391 (1979).
23 Ibid., citing Litam vs. Rivera, 100 Phil. 394 (1956); Stuart vs. Yatco, 4 SCRA 1143
(1962); Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 (1986).
24 Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 71

G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner
vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998,
in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of
Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975
while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship,
they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as
petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country
on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the
young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their
own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the
couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together - when respondent
was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-
year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed
signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of
being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel
and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least,
minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased
petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children.
The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in
the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two
months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him
a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed,
matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for
about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She
submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which
diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the
barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries.
He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven
days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her
sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before
the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking
psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and
prayed for support pendente lite .
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April
1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter
his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor
to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03
August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that
there was collusion between the parties. 1âwphi1.nêt
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the
same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted
the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. He also confirmed
the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent
vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its
decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab
initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial
court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null
and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs
of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave,
has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital
responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the
incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert;
and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity."1
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals
reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina,3 promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no
retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied
retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not
mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of
the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings and not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed
decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological
incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and
reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of
the phrase 'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder
by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases'). Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet"
- that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law.3 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed
would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when
a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied
on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith5 under the
familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel
provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family
Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first
time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided
procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not
overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in
her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let
alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity
of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family6 that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court
commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally
terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it.
In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, J.C.; Melo, J.A.R; Panganiban, A.V.; Gonzaga-Reyes, M.P.; Sandoval-Gutierez, A., Concur.
Footnotes:
1 Rollo. pp. 42-43
2 240 SCRA 20.
3 268 SCRA 198.
4 People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
5Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 285; Tanada vs.
Guingona, 235 SCRA 507; Columbia Pictures, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144.
6 See Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162518 August 19, 2009
RODRIGO SUMIRAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES GENEROSO DAMASO and EVA DAMASO Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated
December 22, 2003, and the Resolution2 dated February 20, 2004, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment (Civil Case No. 93-2588) against respondents before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73. Petitioner is also the private complainant in Criminal
Case Nos. 92-8157 and 92-8158 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with respondent
Generoso Damaso as accused. Upon motion of respondents, said civil and criminal cases
were consolidated and jointly tried.
On February 21, 2003, the RTC promulgated its Decision3 dated January 16, 2003, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused GENEROSO DAMASO is hereby ACQUITTED in
Criminal Case Nos. 92-8157 and 92-8158 on grounds of insufficiency of evidence.
As for Civil Case No. 93-2588, in the interest justice and equity, judgment is hereby
rendered against the plaintiff Rodrigo Sumiran and in favor of the defendants Damaso. The
plaintiff is further ordered to pay to the defendants the following:
a. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
b. ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
c. the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
On March 6, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated Match 4, 2003,
stating that he received a duplicate original copy of the decision on February 21, 2003.
Respondents opposed said motion. On May 9, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, on May 29, 2003, petitioner filed a
Notice of Appeal dated May 28, 2003, stating instead that he received a copy of the decision
dated January 16, 2003 only on March 8, 2003 and of the Order dated May 9, 2003 denying
his motion for reconsideration on May 19, 2003.
On June 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to the notice of appeal for
having been filed out of time, emphasizing that the decision was promulgated on February
21, 2003 in the presence of both parties and their counsels. Considering counsel for
petitioner to have received a copy of the decision on said date of promulgation, the RTC
ruled that since petitioner had filed a motion for reconsideration on the 13th day (March 6,
2003), he had belatedly filed the notice of appeal when he filed it ten (10) days after
allegedly receiving the Order of May 9, 2003 on May 19, 2003. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by petitioner on June 20, 2003, but the same was denied by the RTC on October 1,
2003.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA found the
petition unmeritorious and dismissed the same in its Decision dated December 22, 2003.
Ruling that petitioner was bound by his judicial admission that he received the Decision of
the RTC when it was promulgated on February 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner’s
period within which to file an appeal had lapsed by the time the Notice of Appeal was filed
on May 29, 2003. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per
Resolution dated February 20, 2004.
Hence, this petition where it is alleged that the CA erred in ruling that petitioner’s period to
appeal had lapsed, as such ruling was premised on misapprehension of facts and
contradicted by evidence on record. The CA also allegedly failed to state in its decision and
resolution the particular evidence upon which the same was based; and there were
supposedly some facts that, if properly noticed and considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
The petition deserves some consideration.
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals5 that by
virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules
in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of
appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
should be counted. Thus, the Court stated:
To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise,
the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period
provided in Rule 41, Section 3.6
The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes,7 to
wit:
Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 September 2005
while the present Petition was already pending before us. x x x
xxxx
With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties who availed themselves of the remedy of
motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days
from the denial of that motion.
The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court which states that the appeal shall be taken "within fifteen (15) days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from." The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," x x x.
xxxx
The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal
period should be counted – from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of
"final order" appealed from.
Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of
a notice of appeal which was purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the
15-day period within which to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the
denial of the therein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.1avvphi1
We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein we applied the principle granting a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or
resolution.
Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, we held that a
party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from receipt of the
original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.
In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied the same principle of "fresh period rule,"
expostulating that procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and
forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws
do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is irrefragably procedural,
prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or
determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity,
such as the present case, without danger of violating anyone else’s rights. (Emphasis
supplied)
The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior
to the date of promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the
Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia,8 stating thus:
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September
2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of
the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as
they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears
the quested retroactive effect, to wit:
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in
order that courts may be able to administer
justice.http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/october2007/149508.htm
- _ftnProcedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive
effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there
are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/october2007/149508.
htm - _ftn
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within
which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by
the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period
rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to
injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued
two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order
in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties
receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit
of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant
case, will not.9
Since this case was already pending in this Court at the time of promulgation of Neypes,
then, ineluctably, the Court must also apply the foregoing rulings to the present case.
Petitioner is entitled to a "fresh period" of 15 days − counted from May 19, 2003, the date
of petitioner’s receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC
Decision − within which to file his notice of appeal. Therefore, when he filed said notice on
May 29, 2003, or only ten (10) days after receipt of the Order denying his motion for
reconsideration, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22, 2003, and the Resolution dated
February 20, 2004, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated June 2, 2003 in Civil Case No. 93-2588, and its
Order dated October 1, 2003, reiterating the June 2, 2003 Order, are hereby declared NULL
and VOID. The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, is DIRECTED to give due
course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal dated May 28, 2003. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
March 18, 2015
G.R. No. 199113
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated October 8,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the
petition for certiorari filed by Renato(petitioner)M. David. Petitioner assailed the
Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental
Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.
The factual antecedents:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines.
Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in Tambong,
Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year
2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and
part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the
subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner,
a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No.
08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued
by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended
to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that
he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from
the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they
have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the
institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding
probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and
recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged
the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that
petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in
his MLA which was void ab initio.8
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by
the DOJ which held that the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public
document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of
any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing the act of
falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed
before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the
petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting
the provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion,
holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became foreign citizens
during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before its enactment
when the governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for
which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed on April
12, 2007 before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that
petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of merit,
the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him
relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal.
He argued that since his application had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the
DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant
(petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for
lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration.14
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari
under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted
that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-
determination of probable cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second,
the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino
citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A.
9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said
naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification
was already consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship,
and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship
status and not his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said oath of
allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for certiorari
after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without any
remedy or recourse because he can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to
be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of
conviction, to appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has
disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that
by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction "deemed not to
have lost" it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was
said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to
surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to
Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his
wife and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before
the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument regarding the
retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit.1âwphi1 It is contended that this Court’s rulings
in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the
retroactivity of one’s re- acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his
application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming for
the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still not
work for petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that he had not alleged, much less proved,
that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the
declaration in the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that
in falsification of public document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to
injure a third person be present. As to petitioner’s defense of good faith, such remains to be
a defense which may be properly raised and proved in a full- blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General
opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion
for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person
to the said court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly
ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of the parties’
arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the
court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification
for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent
re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC
properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003,"
was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2
and 3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of
another country shall be deemed "not to have lost their Philippine citizenship," such is
qualified by the phrase "under the conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down such
conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second
paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The
taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens
who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, "re-
acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is
"Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the authors of the law intentionally employed the
terms "re-acquire" and "retain" to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both
re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have
re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which
naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may
be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in
the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also
provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case
of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine
citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of
allegiance under the new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A.
9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the
accused is preferred because it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of
innocence, and in this case it becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of
law is expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of
the commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated January 31,
201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-
born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18,
2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of Representative
Exequiel Javier:
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate
version, "Any provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their
Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by
reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have
reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens
who acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this act are considered to have
retained their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship
before the effectivity of this act are considered to have reacquired. May I know the
distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who became, let’s say, American
citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship before
the effectivity of this act are no longer natural born citizens because they have just
reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention and
reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine
citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63.Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we
can agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act
63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine
citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future
instances. So that’s the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here making distinctions
between natural-born citizens. Because this is very important for certain government
positions, ‘no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one of the provisions,
yes. But just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is our
conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by
virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis
supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of
R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first
paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it
is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the
policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of
which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to
Section 3 on the particular application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise
misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused following the
time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of
the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who
did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents.
The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:
(1)that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position;
(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;
and
(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a
natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated
act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of
public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground
for denying petitioner’s motion for re- determination of probable cause, as the motion was
filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of
reliefs other than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion
to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody of the law
and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused
is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases
when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over
his person. Thus:
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by
their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the
same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either
by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not
yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested
by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in
the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of
the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but
is not limited to, detention.
xxxx
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify
that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
xxxx
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction
of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even
though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a
person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit
himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-
determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction
over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC's order, the
RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in
denying the said motion for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case
No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Designated additional member per Raffle dated March 9, 2015.
1 Rollo, pp. 26-29. Penned by Presiding Judge Recto A. Calabocal.
2 Id. at 67-71. Penned by Acting MTC Judge Benuardo B. Manalo.
3 Id. at 32.
4AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
5 Rollo, p. 33.
6 Should be January 8, 2009, id. at 13 & 50; records, pp. 6 &30.
7 Rollo, pp. 36-38.
8 Id. at 34-35.
9 Id. at 50-53.
10 Id. at 54-58.
11AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE
LOST OR REACQUIRED, approved on October 21, 1936.
12 Rollo, p. 71.
13 Id. at 72-75.
14 Id. at 76.
15 Records, pp. 1-16.
16 Id. at 65-67.
17 Rollo, p. 29.
18 Id. at 16.
19 327 Phil. 521 (1996).
20 484 Phil. 609 (2004).
AASJS (Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied
21

Workers) v. Datumanong, 551 Phil. 110, 117-118 (2007).

22 Rollo, p. 59.
23People v. Temporada, 594 Phil. 680, 735 (2008), citing People v. Ladjaalam, 395
Phil. 1, 35 (2000).
24Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. – The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of
not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1.Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in
the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or
any other kind of commercial document; and
2.Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or
to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use
any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article, or in any of the
foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in
degree.
25ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical
minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall
be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of
his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1.Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2.Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate;
3.Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements
other than those in fact made by them;
4.Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5.Altering true dates;
6.Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning;
 7.Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8.Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol,
registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall
commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article,
with respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification may
affect the civil status of persons.
26 Panuncio v. People, 610 Phil. 595, 603-604 (2009).
27Jimenez v. Sorongon, G.R. No. 178607, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 151,
161, citing Alawiya, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 603 Phil. 264, 276 (2009);
and Miranda v. Tuliao, 520 Phil. 907, 919 (2006).
28 Id. at 919 & 921.
29 Id. at 918-922.
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji,
Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a
report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where
he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at
around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego
together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s]
at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a
[p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with
pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5
ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the
chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and
the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under
construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily
jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then
on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the
removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of
the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer
raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State
Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in
toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR[sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
PETITIONER.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED
NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT
PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore,
inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official
records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception.4 A witness,
therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was
told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources
of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a
witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The
hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are entries in official
records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice
Moran, enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the
last requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified
before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire
Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report also testified before the trial
court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth
of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of the officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-
examination, the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which
consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such
as the summary of the statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which
were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose
of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered
as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the course of the investigation
and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has
been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is
relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to
the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and
made himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it
proved that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed
from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this
section does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official
record, considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in
said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and
trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in
which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are
numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in
which testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there no exception for official
statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time to
attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition before an officer. The work of
administration of government and the interest of the public having business with officials
would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity
is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on
Evidence, Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will
discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they
do in discharge of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under
such a degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to
require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to
testify on his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have
been ripe for determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals
that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not
satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to
qualify as "official information," there being no showing that, at the very least, they were
under a duty to give the statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth
of the statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his
personal knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator
crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s remains at the morgue,12 making the latter’s death
beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the
building the day after the incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that
the platform was crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required
Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he
noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause
of the fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed
that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions,18 the
opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.19
Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa
loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that
the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality
was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of
an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was
due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means,
literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or
instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be
such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of
the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury
complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the
occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not
happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient
evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is
absent or not available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge
of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has
the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and
therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of
the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause,
whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to
the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff,
without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the
cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of
which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a
rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in
which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there
was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond
plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the application
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of
knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence
has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while he was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his
death. The construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It
has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in
complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would
occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the
other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa
loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind
which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while
performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first
requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier,
the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the
injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second
requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s
deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or
inference of appellant’s negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise
since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s
husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated
earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes
the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under
appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence,
may outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to
prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due
care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established.1âwphi1.nêt
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed
before the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn
statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its
workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing
its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in
arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s
employees, also assails the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are
inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on
the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but
also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant
himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements which
may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore,
cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more than private respondent can
use it to prove the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any
other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the
application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits
provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the
deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the
employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive
damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under
this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended,
Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight
hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the
System or by other agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by this Act to
an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws
because of said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as
well as under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally
settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in
resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the
mining corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the
required precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased
employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon
motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs
sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the
Court En Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the
affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of
death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the
worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers
by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves
cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA
442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the
fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil
action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of
action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their
suit under the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated
May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely
Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted
notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of
Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino
Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was
admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27,
1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the
committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence
and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to
then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before
the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in
its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation
under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and
regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.
The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies
the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their
bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring
supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael
Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining
Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had
been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course
of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the
exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in
favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation
Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one
remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy
chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception
is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or
developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private
respondent was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for
damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s
Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While
stating that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the
prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in
nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as
early as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee
merely executed her sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her
personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She
did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s
employees. It was the investigator who recommended the filing of said case and his
supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s office. This is a standard operating
procedure for police investigators which appellee may not have even known. This may
explain why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public
prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand
Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the
public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said memorandum:
"Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present
controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the public prosecutor to summon the
appellee. Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on appellee before she
applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment therefrom.
Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991
may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of
the Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence,
stating therein that: "The death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the
part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this case is civil in nature."
(Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe
appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied
for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall
under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her
rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her
educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the
death of her husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more from
the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to
allege in her complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were
attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, the
trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts
because as early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a
criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s
employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the action in the lower
court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there was insufficient
evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly
show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every
month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of remedies available to
her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent
remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the
elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a
bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate
possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold
people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence,
the rule in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor
Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his
choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but
chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that
the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they
depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it
can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right
exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an
awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be
illustrated on the record or by the evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the
exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to
allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous
for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the
contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its
Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now
contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded
waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s
death and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this
case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of
petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the
prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it was
the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules and
regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter,
however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final say.
Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that
the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied
in Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the
elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits
from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after
the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November
27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her
when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that
she was not aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code),
private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a
choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and
prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which,
notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws.
The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory
nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not
indicate the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it
appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the
accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension,
according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was
P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the
sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation,
and the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Should the trial court
find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by private
respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court'’ award of
damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double
compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine
whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award
decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made
to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other
respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193484 January 18, 2012

HYPTE R. AUJERO, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the November 12,
2009 Decision1 and July 28, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
107233 entitled "Hypte R. Aujero v. National Labor Relations Commission and Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation."
In its November 12, 2009 Decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from the National Labor Relations
Commission’s (NLRC) July 4, 2008 and September 29, 2008 Resolutions, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions dated July 4, 2008 and
September 29, 2008 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC
NCR Case No. 00-07-08921-2004 [NLRC NCR CA No. 049644-06] are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.3
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the above Decision but this was
likewise denied by the CA in its July 28, 2010 Resolution.
The Antecedent Facts
It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working for respondent Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) as an accountant in the latter's Finance
Department. On August 15, 2001 or after thirty-four (34) years of service, the petitioner
applied for early retirement. His application for retirement was approved, effective
September 15, 2001, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one
and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the petitioner was
Philcomsat's Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of Two Hundred Seventy-Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Five Pesos (₱274,805.00).4
On September 12, 2001, the petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim5 in
Philcomsat’s favor, following his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of Nine
Million Four Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-Seven and 91/100
Pesos (₱9,439,327.91).6
Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement
benefits, claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is Fourteen Million Fifteen
Thousand and Fifty-Five Pesos (₱14,015,055.00) and the ₱9,439,327.91 he received from
Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more than
enough reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void. According to the petitioner, he had
no choice but to accept a lesser amount as he was in dire need thereof and was all set to
return to his hometown and he signed the quitclaim despite the considerable deficiency as
no single centavo would be released to him if he did not execute a release and waiver in
Philcomsat's favor.7
The petitioner claims that his right to receive the full amount of his retirement benefits,
which is equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service, is
provided under the Retirement Plan that Philcomsat created on January 1, 1977 for the
benefit of its employees.8 On November 3, 1997, Philcomsat and the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) executed a Trust Agreement, where UCPB, as trustee, shall hold,
administer and manage the respective contributions of Philcomsat and its employees, as
well as the income derived from the investment thereof, for and on behalf of the
beneficiaries of the Retirement Plan.9
The petitioner claims that Philcomsat has no right to withhold any portion of his
retirement benefits as the trust fund created pursuant to the Retirement Plan is for the
exclusive benefit of Philcomsat employees and Philcomsat had expressly recognized that it
has no right or claim over the trust fund even on the portion pertaining to its
contributions.10 As Section 4 of the Trust Agreement provides:
Section 4 – The Companies, in accordance with the provisions of the Plan, hereby waive all
their rights to their contributions in money or property which are and will be paid or
transferred to the Trust Fund, and no person shall have any right in, or with respect to, the
Trust Fund or any part thereof except as expressly provided herein or in the Plan. At no
time, prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities with respect to the participants and their
beneficiaries under the Plan, shall any part of the corpus or income of the Fund be used for
or diverted to purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of Plan participants and their
beneficiaries.11
The petitioner calls attention to the August 15, 2001 letter of Philcomsat's Chairman and
President, Mr. Carmelo Africa, addressed to UCPB for the release of ₱9,439,327.91 to the
petitioner and ₱4,575,727.09 to Philcomsat,which predated the execution of his quitclaim
on September 12, 2001.12 According to the petitioner, this indicates Philcomsat’s pre-
conceived plans to deprive him of a significant portion of his retirement pay.
On May 31, 2006, Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria (LA Lustria) issued a Decision13 in the
petitioner’s favor, directing Philcomsat to pay him the amount of ₱4,575,727.09 and
₱274,805.00, representing the balance of his retirement benefits and salary for the period
from August 15 to September 15, 2001, respectively. LA Lustria found it hard to believe
that the petitioner would voluntary waive a significant portion of his retirement pay. He
found the consideration supporting the subject quitclaim unconscionable and ruled that
the respondent failed to substantiate its claim that the amount received by the petitioner
was a product of negotiations between the parties. Thus:
It would appear from the tenor of the letter that, rather that the alleged agreement,
between complainant and respondent, respondent is claiming payment for an "outstanding
due to Philcomsat" out of the retirement benefits of complainant. This could hardly be
considered as proof of an agreement to reduce complainant’s retirement benefits. Absent
any showing of any agreement or authorization, the deductions from complainant’s
retirement benefits should be considered as improper and illegal.
If we were to give credence to the claim of respondent, it would appear that complainant
has voluntarily waived a total amount of [₱]4,575,727.09. Given the purpose of retirement
benefits to provide for a retiree a source of income for the remainder of his years, it defies
understanding how complainant could accept such an arrangement and lose more than
[₱]4.5 million in the process. One can readily see the unreasonableness of such a
proposition. By the same token, the Quitclaim and Waiver over benefits worth millions is
apparently unconscionable and unacceptable under normal circumstances. The Supreme
Court has consistently ruled that waivers must be fair, reasonable, and just and must not be
unconscionable on its face. The explanation of the complainant that he was presented with
a lower amount on pain that the entire benefits will not be released is more believable and
consistent with evidence. We, therefore, rule against the effectivity of the waiver and
quitclaim, thus, complainant is entitled to the balance of his retirement benefits in the
amount of [₱]4,575,727.09.14
In its July 4, 2008 Resolution,15 the NLRC granted Philcomsat’s appeal and reversed and set
aside LA Lustria’s May 31, 2006 Decision. The NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint
for unpaid retirement benefits and salary in consideration of the Deed of Release and
Quitclaim he executed in September 12, 2001 following his receipt from Philcomsat of the
amount of ₱9,439,327.91, which constitutes the full settlement of all his claims against
Philcomsat. According to the NLRC, the petitioner failed to allege, much less, adduce
evidence that Philcomsat employed means to vitiate his consent to the quitclaim. The
petitioner is well-educated, a licensed accountant and was Philcomsat’s Senior Vice-
President prior to his retirement; he cannot therefore claim that he signed the quitclaim
without understanding the consequences and implications thereof. The relevant portions
of the NLRC’s July 4, 2008 Resolution states:
After analyzing the antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent facts surrounding the
alleged underpayment of retirement benefits, We rule that respondent-appellant have no
more obligation to the complainant-appellee.
The complainant-appellee willingly received the check for the said amount, without having
filed any objections nor reservations thereto, and even executed and signed a Release and
Quitclaim in favor of the respondent-appellant. Undoubtedly, the quitclaim the
complainant-appellee signed is valid. Complainant-appellee has not denied at any time its
due execution and authenticity. He never imputed claims of coercion, undue influence, or
fraud against the respondent-appellant. His statement in his reply to the respondent-
appellant’s position paper that the quitclaim is void alleging that it was obtained through
duress is only an afterthought to make his claim appear to be convincing. If it were true,
complainant-appellee should have asserted such fact from the very beginning. Also, there
was no convincing proof shown by the complainant-appellee to prove existence of duress
exerted against him. His stature and educational attainment would both negate that he can
be forced into something against his will.
It should be stressed that complainant-appellee even waited for a period of almost three
(3) years before he filed the complaint. If he really felt aggrieved by the amount he
received, prudence dictates that he immediately would call the respondent-appellant’s
attention and at the earliest opportune shout his objections, rather than wait for years,
before deciding to claim his supposed benefits, [e]specially that his alleged entitlement is a
large sum of money. Thus, it is evident that the filing of the instant case is a clear case of
afterthought, and that complainant-appellee simply had a change of mind. This We cannot
allow.
xxxx
In the instant case, having willingly signed the Deed of Release and Quitclaim dated
September 12, 2001, it is hard to conclude that the complainant-appellee was merely
forced by the necessity to execute the quitclaim. Complainant-appellee is not a gullible or
unsuspecting person who can easily be tricked or inveigled and, thus, needs the extra
protection of law. He is well-educated and a highly experienced man. The release and
quitclaim executed by the complainant-appellee is therefore considered valid and binding
on him and the respondent-appellant. He is already estopped from questioning the same.16
Philcomsat’s appeal to the NLRC from LA Lustria’s May 31, 2006 Decision was filed and its
surety bond posted beyond the prescribed period of ten (10) days. On June 20, 2006, a copy
of LA Lustria’s Decision was served on Maritess Querubin (Querubin), one of Philcomsat’s
executive assistants, as Philcomsat’s counsel and the executive assistant assigned to her
were both out of the office. It was only the following day that Querubin gave a copy of the
said Decision to the executive assistant of Philcomsat’s counsel, leading the latter to believe
that it was only then that the said Decision had been served. In turn, this led Philcomsat’s
counsel to believe that it was on June 21, 2006 that the ten (10) day-period started to run.
Having in mind that the delay was only one (1) day and the explanation offered by
Philcomsat’s counsel, the NLRC disregarded Philcomsat’s procedural lapse and proceeded
to decide the appeal on its merits. Thus:
It appears that on June 20[,] 2006[,] copy of the Decision was received by one (Maritess)
who is not the Secretary of respondents-appellants’ counsel and therefore not authorized
to receive such document. It was only the following day, June 21, 2006, that respondents-
appellants[’] counsel actually received the Decision which was stamped received on said
date. Verily, counsel has until July 3, 2006 within which to perfect the appeal, which he did.
In PLDT vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 60250, March 26, 1984, the Honorable Supreme Court held
that: "where notice of the Decision was served on the receiving station at the ground floor
of the defendant’s company building, and received much later at the office of the legal
counsel on the ninth floor of said building, which was his address of record, service of said
decision has taken effect from said later receipt at the aforesaid office of its legal counsel."
Be that as it may, the provisions of Section 10, Rule VII of the NLRC Rules of Procedure,
states, that:
"SECTION 10. TECHNICAL RULES NOT BINDING. The rules of procedure and evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. x x x"
Additionally, the Supreme Court has allowed appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiter to
the NLRC, even if filed beyond the reglementary period, in the interest of justice. Moreover,
under Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code, the NLRC may, in the exercise of its appellate
powers, correct, amend or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or
in form. Further, Article 221 of the same provides that: In any proceedings before the
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process.17
In his petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to the CA, the petitioner
accused the NLRC of grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the respondent’s
belated appeal by relaxing the application of one of the fundamental requirements of
appeal. An appeal, being a mere statutory right, should be exercised in a manner that
strictly conforms to the prescribed procedure. As of July 3, 2006, or when Philcomsat filed
its appeal and posted its surety bond, LA Lustria’s Decision had become final and executory
and Philcomsat’s counsel’s failure to verify when the copy of said Decision was actually
received does not constitute excusable negligence.
The petitioner likewise anchored his allegation of grave abuse of discretion against the
NLRC on the latter's refusal to strike as invalid the quitclaim he executed in Philcomsat’s
favor. According to the petitioner, his retirement pay amounts to ₱14,015,055.00 and
₱9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his claims
against it is unconscionable and this is more than enough reason to declare his quitclaim as
null and void.
By way of the assailed Decision, the CA found no merit in the petitioner’s claims, holding
that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the
respondent’s appeal.
The Supreme Court has ruled that where a copy of the decision is served on a person who is
neither a clerk nor one in charge of the attorney’s office, such service is invalid. In the case
at bar, it is undisputed that Maritess Querubin, the person who received a copy of the Labor
Arbiter’s decision, was neither a clerk of Atty. Yanzon, private respondent’s counsel, nor a
person in charge of Atty. Yanzon’s office. Hence, her receipt of said decision on June 20,
2006 cannot be considered as notice to Atty. Yanzon. Since a copy of the decision was
actually delivered by Maritess to Atty. Yanzon’s secretary only on June 21, 2006, it was only
on this date that the ten-day period for the filing of private respondent’s appeal
commenced to run. Thus, private respondent’s July 3, 2006 appeal to the NLRC was
seasonably filed.
Similarly, the provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code requiring the posting of a bond for
the perfection of an appeal of a monetary award must be given liberal interpretation in line
with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits. If only to achieve
substantial justice, strict observance of the reglementary periods may be relaxed if
warranted. However, this liberal interpretation must be justified by substantial compliance
with the rule. As the Supreme Court ruled in Buenaobra v. Lim King Guan:
xxxx
We note that in the instant case, private respondent substantially complied with the filing
of its appeal and the required appeal bond on July 3, 2006 – the next working day after July
1, 2006, the intervening days between the said two dates being a Saturday and a Sunday.
Substantial justice dictates that the present case be decided on the merits, especially since
there was a mere one-day delay in the filing by private respondent of its appeal and appeal
bond with the NLRC. x x x.18 (citation omitted)
The CA further ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s
quitclaim. Thus:
In the same vein, this Court finds that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring as valid the Deed of Release and
Quitclaim dated September 12, 2001 – absolving private respondent from liability arising
from any and all suits, claims, demands or other causes of action of whatever nature in
consideration of the amount petitioner received in connection with his retirement – signed
by petitioner. x x x
xxxx
The assertion of petitioner that the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he signed should be
struck down for embodying unconscionable terms is simply untenable. Petitioner himself
admits that he has received the amount of [₱]9,327,000.00 – representing his retirement
pay and other benefits – from private respondent. By no stretch of the imagination could
the said amount be considered unconscionably low or shocking to the conscience, so as to
warrant the invalidation of the Deed of Release and Quitclaim. Granting that the source of
the retirement pay of petitioner is the trust fund maintained by private respondent at the
UCPB for the payment of the retirement pay of private-respondent’s employees, the said
circumstance would still not justify the invalidation of the Deed of Release and Quitclaim, for
petitioner clearly understood the contents thereof at the time of its execution but still
choose to sign the deed. The terms thereof being reasonable and there being no showing
that private respondent employed coercion, fraud or undue influence upon petitioner to
compel him to sign the same, the subject Deed of Release and Quitclaim signed by petitioner
shall be upheld as valid.19 (citations omitted)
The petitioner ascribes several errors on the part of the CA. Specifically, the petitioner
claims that the CA erred in not dismissing the respondent’s appeal to the NLRC, which was
filed beyond the prescribed period. There is no dispute that Querubin was authorized to
receive mails and correspondences on behalf of Philcomsat’s counsel and her receipt of LA
Lustria’s Decision on June 20, 2006 is binding on Philcomsat. Also, the failure of
Philcomsat’s counsel to ascertain when exactly the copy of LA Lustria’s Decision was
received by Querubin is inexcusable negligence. Since the perfection of an appeal within
the ten (10)-day period is a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement, Philcomsat’s failure
to justify its delay should have been reason enough to dismiss its appeal.
The petitioner also claims that the CA erred in upholding the validity of the subject
quitclaim. The respondent has no right to retain a portion of his retirement pay and the
consideration for the execution of the quitclaim is simply unconscionable. The petitioner
submits that the CA should have taken into account that Philcomsat’s retirement plan was
for the exclusive benefit of its employees and to allow Philcomsat to appropriate a
significant portion of his retirement pay is a clear case of unjust enrichment.
On the other hand, Philcomsat alleges that the petitioner willfully and knowingly executed
the subject quitclaim in consideration of his receipt of his retirement pay. Albeit his
retirement pay was in the reduced amount of ₱9,439,327.91, Philcomsat alleges that this
was arrived at following its negotiations with the petitioner and the latter participated in
the computation thereof, taking into account his accountabilities to Philcomsat and the
latter’s financial debacles.
Philcomsat likewise alleges that the NLRC is clothed with ample authority to set aside
technical rules; hence, the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining
Philcomsat’s appeal in consideration of the circumstances surrounding the late filing
thereof and the amount subject of the dispute.
Issues
In view of the conflicting positions adopted by the parties, this Court is confronted with
two (2) issues that are far from being novel, to wit:
a. Whether the delay in the filing of Philcomsat’s appeal and posting of surety bond is
inexcusable; and
b. Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby
foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat.
Our Ruling
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is confined to the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and will not issue absent a showing of a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Not every error in a proceeding, or
every erroneous conclusion of law or of fact, is an act in excess of jurisdiction or an abuse of
discretion.20 The prerogative of writ of certiorari does not lie except to correct, not every
misstep, but a grave abuse of discretion.21
Procedural rules may be relaxed to give way to the full determination of a case on its
merits.
Confronted with the task of determining whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC's decision to give due course to Philcomsat's appeal despite its being
belatedly filed, this Court rules in Philcomsat's favor.
Procedural rules may be waived or dispensed with in absolutely meritorious cases. A
review of the cases cited by the petitioner, Rubia v. Government Service Insurance
System22 and Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,23 where this Court adhered to
the strict implementation of the rules and considered them inviolable, shows that the
patent lack of merit of the appeals render liberal interpretation pointless and naught. The
contrary obtains in this case as Philcomsat's case is not entirely unmeritorious. Specifically,
Philcomsat alleged that the petitioner's execution of the subject quitclaim was voluntary
and he made no claim that he did so. Philcomsat likewise argued that the petitioner's
educational attainment and the position he occupied in Philcomsat's hierarchy militate
against his claim that he was pressured or coerced into signing the quitclaim.
The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of
technicalities.24 Far from having gravely abused its discretion, the NLRC correctly
prioritized substantial justice over the rigid and stringent application of procedural rules.
This, by all means, is not a case of grave abuse of discretion calling for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari.
Absent any evidence that any of the vices of consent is present and considering the
petitioner’s position and education, the quitclaim executed by the petitioner
constitutes a valid and binding agreement.
In Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation, v. Ativo,25 this Court reiterated the standards that
must be observed in determining whether a waiver and quitclaim has been validly
executed:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties
and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there
is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person,
or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to
annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the
waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.26 (emphasis supplied)
In Callanta v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 this Court ruled that:
It is highly unlikely and incredible for a man of petitioner’s position and educational
attainment to so easily succumb to private respondent company’s alleged pressures
without even defending himself nor demanding a final audit report before signing any
resignation letter. Assuming that pressure was indeed exerted against him, there was no
urgency for petitioner to sign the resignation letter. He knew the nature of the letter that he
was signing, for as argued by respondent company, petitioner being "a man of high
educational attainment and qualification, x x x he is expected to know the import of
everything that he executes, whether written or oral."28
While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are
inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their
legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's
claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties.29 Considering the
petitioner's claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this
Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.
While the petitioner bewailed as having been coerced or pressured into signing the release
and waiver, his failure to present evidence renders his allegation self-serving and inutile to
invalidate the same. That no portion of his retirement pay will be released to him or his
urgent need for funds does not constitute the pressure or coercion contemplated by law.
That the petitioner was all set to return to his hometown and was in dire need of money
would likewise not qualify as undue pressure sufficient to invalidate the quitclaim. "Dire
necessity" may be an acceptable ground to annul quitclaims if the consideration is
unconscionably low and the employee was tricked into accepting it, but is not an acceptable
ground for annulling the release when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to
execute it.30While it is our duty to prevent the exploitation of employees, it also behooves
us to protect the sanctity of contracts that do not contravene our laws.31
The petitioner is not an ordinary laborer.1awphi1 He is mature, intelligent and educated
with a college degree, who cannot be easily duped or tricked into performing an act against
his will. As no proof was presented that the said quitclaim was entered into through fraud,
deception, misrepresentation, the same is valid and binding. The petitioner is estopped
from questioning the said quitclaim and cannot renege after accepting the benefits
thereunder. This Court will never satisfy itself with surmises, conjectures or speculations
for the purpose of giving imprimatur to the petitioner's attempt to abdicate from his
obligations under a valid and binding release and waiver.
The petitioner's educational background and employment stature render it improbable
that he was pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. This
Court cannot permit the petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of his act,
when his knowledge and understanding thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that
the petitioner allowed to lapse before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency
in his retirement pay clouds his motives, leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim
of being aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a mere pretention.
The CA and the NLRC were unanimous in holding that the petitioner voluntarily executed
the subject quitclaim. The Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine
applies with greater force in labor cases. Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to
resolve and whether the petitioner voluntarily executed the subject quitclaim is a question
of fact. In this case, the factual issues have already been determined by the NLRC and its
findings were affirmed by the CA. Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a
reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has
based its determination.32
Factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters
within their respective jurisdictions are generally accorded not only respect, but even
finality, and are binding on the SC. Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon
appeal, especially when supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the SC is not
duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear
showing that the same were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis.33
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
November 12, 2009 Decision and July 28, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 107233 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 201931 February 11, 2015

DOÑA ADELA1 EXPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (TIDCORP), AND THE
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI), Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision2 dated November 15, 2011 and the
Order3 dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch
211 in SEC Case No. MC06-103 for Voluntary Insolvency. The RTC approved the Joint
Motion to Approve Agreement filed by respondents Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).
Respondents stipulated in their agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to
confidentiality under the provisions of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits and the
General Banking Law of 2000.
The facts follow:
On August 23, 2006, petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc., (petitioner, for
brevity) filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency.4 The case was docketed as SEC Case No.
MC06-103 and raffled off to the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211.
On August 28, 2006, the RTC, after finding the petition sufficient in form and substance,
issued an order declaring petitioner as insolvent and staying all civil proceedings against
petitioner. In the same order, the RTC set the initial hearing on October 19, 2006.5
Thereafter, Atty. Arlene Gonzales was appointed as receiver. After taking her oath, Atty.
Gonzales proceeded to make the necessary report, engaged appraisers and required the
creditors to submit proof of their respective claims.
On October 22, 2010, Atty. Gonzales filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise
Agreement6 incorporating therein her proposed terms of compromise, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
1. The remaining assets of the Petitioner Dona Adela Export Int’l., Inc., (Dona Adela)
consists of the following:

Asset Appraised Value Remarks

1.1 Land ₱5,616,000 w/ REM to TRC

1.2 Building 6,480,000 w/ REM to TRC

1.3 Sewing machines 942,000 w/o chattel mortgage to TRC (sic)

1.4 Sewing machines 755,000 w/chattel mortgage

1.5 Furnitures and Fixtures w/o appraised value

The detailed list of the abovementioned assets and the corresponding appraised value is
attached hereto as Annex A;
2. The claims of the creditors of Petitioner previously submitted with their respective
proofs of claim are shown below:

NAME OF CREDITOR AMOUNT

Technology Resource Center 29,546,342.45

BPI 11,069,575.82
 *TIDCORP

City of Mandaluyong as of 3/25/09 1,061,370.12

*TIDCORP has not yet submitted its peso amount of claim

xxxx
WHEREFORE, undersigned receiver respectfully proposed for the concerned parties of this
(sic) proceedings to enter into a compromise Agreement under the following terms and
conditions:
a. That the remaining assets of the Petitioner mentioned under 1 above be assigned and
applied to their respective claims in the following manner:
a.1. The real estate property mentioned under 1.1 and 1.2 above with real estate mortgage
(REM) to Technology Resource Center (TRC) be assigned and applied to its credit. All costs
and expenses for the transfer of the registration of the said property, including its unpaid
real estate taxes due to the City of Mandaluyong, and cost for cancellation of real estate
mortgage shall be borne by TRC.
a.2. For TRC to assign and waive its rights over the sewing machines and equipments under
chattel mortgage to it mentioned under 1.3 above as its share for the administrative costs
of this proceedings.
a.3. To assign to BPI and TIDCORP the sewing machines and equipments mentioned under
1.3 and 1.4 above in proportion with their credits.
a.4. All other remaining assets of Petitioner under 1.5 above be assigned to the Court-
appointed receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales for payment of receiver’s fees.
a.5. All other administrative expenses, if any, shall be for the account of TRC, BPI and
TIDCORP, in proportion to their respective credits.
b. That for the abovementioned purpose mentioned under 3.a. above, the appraisal value of
the property (as appraised by Royal Asia Appraisers which was previously submitted to the
Honorable Court) be made as the basis in determining the value of the properties; and the
amount of the claims that will be approved by this Honorable Court be made as the basis in
the determination of the amount of credits due to the respective creditors.
c. Furthermore, that the Compromise Agreement being proposed herein shall be without
prejudice to rights of the creditors to enforce actions against other debtors who are jointly
and solidarily liable with the petitioner.
d. Finally, that the petitioner, Dona Adela Int’l., Inc., be discharged from its debts to the
party-creditors by virtue of the Compromise Agreement as being proposed herein.7
On May 26, 2011, petitioner, through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology
Resource Center (TRC) entered into a Dacion En Pagoby Compromise Agreement8 wherein
petitioner agreed to transfer a 351-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 10027
with existing improvements situated in the Barrio of Jolo, Mandaluyong City, in favor of
TRC in full payment of petitioner’s obligation. The agreement bears the conformity of Atty.
Gonzales as receiver. TRC filed on May 26, 2011 a Compliance, Manifestation and Motion to
Approve Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement.9
On August 11, 2011, creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement10 which contained the following terms:
1. OBLIGATION OF PETITIONER.– The parties agree that the outstanding principal
obligation of petitioner to TIDCORP shall be in the amount of NINE MILLION FORTY-FOUR
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHT & 15/100 PESOS (₱9,044,708.15), while to BPI in the
amount of ELEVEN MILLION SIXTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDREDSEVENTY FIVE &
82/100 PESOS (₱11,069,575.82).
2. SETTLEMENT.– TIDCORP and BPI both hereby agree to accept all the machineries in
petitioner’s inventory set aside pursuant to the Motion for Parties to Enter Into
Compromise Agreement dated 18 October 2010 filed by the Receiver, Atty. Arlene T.
Gonzales. The said machineries valued at THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱350,000.00)shall be divided equally between TIDCORP and BPI.
3. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS. – TIDCORP and BPI hereby agree that acceptance of the
abovementioned settlement shall constitute payment of petitioner’s aforesaid obligation
pursuant to Act No. 1956 (Insolvency Act). However, the benefit of payment under the said
Insolvency Act shall only be in favor of petitioner and shall not in any manner affect the
claims of TIDCORP and BPI as against its sureties and/or guarantors.
4. EXPENSES AND TAXES.– All necessary expenses, including but not limited to, fees of the
Receiver, documentation and notarization, as well as all fees incurred or to be incurred in
connection to the full implementation of this Agreement shall be for the account of Mr.
Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr.
All taxes and fees incurred or to be incurred including but not limited to gross receipts tax
shall be for the account of the petitioner.
5. WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY. – The petitioner and the members of its Board of
Directors shall waive all rights to confidentiality provided under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, and
Republic Act No. 8791, otherwise known as The General Banking Law of 2000. Accordingly,
the petitioner and the members of its Board of Directors by these presents grant TIDCORP
and BPI access to any deposit or other accounts maintained by them with any bank.
For this purpose, the petitioner and the members of its Board of Directors shall authorize
TIDCORP and BPI to make, sign, execute and deliver any document of whatever kind or
nature which may be necessary or proper to allow them access to such deposits or other
accounts.
TIDCORP and BPI shall be further authorized to delegate to any person, who may exercise
in their stead, any or all of the powers and authority herein granted to them or substitute
any person in their place to do and perform said powers and authority.
18. HOLD FREE AND HARMLESS. – The petitioner shall indemnify and hold TIDCORP and
BPI, their respective Board of Directors, and officers free and harmless against any liability
or claim of whatever kind or nature which may arise from, or in connection with, or in
relation to this Agreement.11 (Underscoring supplied)
Epifanio Ramos, Jr. filed a Manifestation and Motion to the Proposed Compromise
Agreement12 of TIDCORP and BPI wherein he stated that petitioner has a personality
separate and distinct from its stockholders and officers. He argued that he cannot be held
liable for the expenses and taxes as a consequence of the auction or distribution/payment
of said machineries to the creditors; hence, his name should be deleted as a party to the
Compromise Agreement.
Likewise, Atty. Gonzales filed a Manifestation and Comment (On Dacion En Pago by
Compromise Agreement with TRC and Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI and
TIDCORP) with Motion for Payment of Administrative Expenses and Receiver’s Fees.13 Atty.
Gonzales manifested that she is entitled to payment of administrative expenses and
receiver’s fees in the total amount of ₱740,200.00. She further stated that it is just and fair
for her to ask her due for services rendered as officer of the Court from TRC who benefitted
the most from the insolvency proceedings; and, that she is waiving the administrative
expenses and receiver’s fees due from TIDCORP and BPI.
In its Comment,14 TRC requested that the receiver’s fee be reduced to ₱106,000.00. In her
Reply,15 Atty. Gonzales said that she will accept the amount of ₱106,000.00 being offered by
TRC.
On November 15, 2011, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision approving the Dacion En
Pagoby Compromise Agreement and the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered based on the foregoing
exchange of pleadings, as follows:
1. Finding the aforequoted Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement dated May 26, 2011
executed by and between Dona Adela Export International, Inc., represented by its
president Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource Center, represented by its
Director General Dennis L. Cunanan, to be in order and not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, and the fact that the Court-Appointed Receiver in
her Reply filed on October 24, 2011 intimated her conformity to the Dacion En Pago by
Compromise Agreement, the same is hereby APPROVED and is made the basis of this
judgment;
2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated July 29, 2011, filed by creditors
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines and the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, with the exception of paragraph 4 thereof pertaining to Expenses and
Taxes, the same is likewise APPROVED, for the same is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, and the fact that the Court-Appointed Receiver in
her Reply filed on October 24, 2011 intimated her conformity to said Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement;
3. Pursuant to its Comment filed on October 19, 2011, Technology Resource Center is
hereby ordered to pay the Court-Appointed Receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales the sum of
₱106,000.00, representing its proportionate share of the administrative expenses incurred
by the receiver with legal interest from date of termination of this insolvency proceedings.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission who is
directed to cause the removal of petitioner Dona Adela Export International, Inc., from the
list of registered legal entities and to make a report to this Court of its Compliance within
fifteen (15) days from said elimination so that the Court could terminate the instant
insolvency proceedings and release the Court-Appointed receiver from her duties and
responsibilities.
SO ORDERED.16
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration17 and claimed that TIDCORP and BPI’s
agreement imposes on it several obligations such as payment of expenses and taxes and
waiver of confidentiality of its bank deposits but it is not a party and signatory to the said
agreement.
In its Order18 dated May 14, 2012, the RTC denied the motion and held that petitioner’s
silence and acquiescence to the joint motion to approve compromise agreement while it
was set for hearing by creditors BPI and TIDCORP is tantamount to admission and
acquiescence thereto. There was no objection filed by petitioner to the joint motion to
approve compromise agreement prior to its approval, said the RTC. The RTC also noted
that petitioner’s President attended every hearing of the case but did not interpose any
objection to the said motion when its conditions were being discussed and formulated by
the parties and Atty. Gonzales.19
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner asserts that express and written waiver from the depositor concerned is
required by law before any third person or entity is allowed to examine bank deposits or
bank records. According to petitioner, it is not a party to the compromise agreement
between BPI and TIDCORP and its silence or acquiescence is not tantamount to an
admission that binds it to the compromise agreement of the creditors especially the waiver
of confidentiality of bank deposits. Petitioner cites the rule on relativity of contracts which
states that contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or
prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has knowledge thereof.
Petitioner also maintains that waivers are not presumed, but must be clearly and
convincingly shown, either by express stipulation or acts admitting no other reasonable
explanation.
Respondent BPI counters that petitioner is estopped from questioning the BPI-TIDCORP
compromise agreement because petitioner and its counsel participated in all the
proceedings involving the subject compromise agreement and did not object when the
compromise agreement was considered by the RTC.
Respondent TIDCORP contends that the waiver of confidentiality under Republic Act (R.A.)
Nos. 1405 and 8791 does not require the express or written consent of the depositor. It is
TIDCORP’s position that upon declaration of insolvency, the insolvency court obtains
complete jurisdiction over the insolvent’s property which includes the authority to issue
orders to look into the insolvent’s bank deposits. Since bank deposits are considered debts
owed by the banks to the petitioner, the receiver is empowered to recover them even
without petitioner’s express or written consent, said TIDCORP.
TIDCORP further avers that the BPI-TIDCORP compromise agreement approved by the RTC
is binding on petitioner and its Board of Directors by reason of estoppel. The compromise
agreement is not an ordinary contract. Since it was approved by the insolvency court, the
compromise agreement has the force and effect of judgment; it is immediately executory
and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery, TIDCORP concluded.
The main issue for our consideration is whether the petitioner is bound by the provision in
the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve Agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights
to confidentiality of its bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known
as the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits and R.A. No. 8791, otherwise known as The General
Banking Law of 2000.
The petition is meritorious.
A judgment rendered on the basis of a compromise agreement between the parties in a civil
case is final, unappealable, and immediately executory.20
However, if one of the parties claims that his consent was obtained through fraud, mistake,
or duress, he must file a motion with the trial court that approved the compromise
agreement to reconsider the judgment and nullify or set aside said contract on any of the
said grounds for annulment of contract within 15 days from notice of judgment. Under Rule
37, said party can either file a motion for new trial or reconsideration. A party can file a
motion for new trial based on fraud, accident or mistake, excusable negligence, or newly
discovered evidence. On the other hand, a party may decide to seek the recall or
modification of the judgment by means of a motion for reconsideration on the ground that
"the decision or final order is contrary to law" if the consent was procured through fraud,
mistake, or duress. Thus, the motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration is the
readily available remedy for a party to challenge a judgment if the 15-day period from
receipt of judgment for taking an appeal has not yet expired.21
In this case, petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the decision based on compromise
agreement assailing the waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between its
two creditors, TIDCORP and BPI, in which petitioner was not a party. After the trial court
denied the motion on the ground of estoppel, petitioner sought a direct recourse to this
Court.
We stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There
is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the
doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when
there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is
correct or not, is a question of law.22 Petitioner submits the lone question of law on
whether the waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between TIDCORP and
BPI is valid despite petitioner not being a party and signatory to the same. According to
petitioner, R.A. No. 1405requires the express and written consent of the depositor to make
the waiver effective.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405, the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits enacted in 1955, was first
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1792 in 1981 and further amended by R.A. No. 7653 in
1993. It now reads:
SEC. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except when the examination is made in the course of
a special or general examination of a bank and is specifically authorized by the Monetary
Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or
serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the
deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, or when the examination is made by an
independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the
examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use
of the bank, or upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials,
or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
R.A. No. 1405 provides for exceptions when records of deposits may be disclosed. These
are under any of the following instances: (a) upon written permission of the depositor, (b)
in cases of impeachment, (c) upon order of a competent court in the case of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials or, (d) when the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation, and (e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money Laundering
Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Council may inquire into a bank account upon order of any
competent court.23
In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI and TIDCORP
only. There was no written consent given by petitioner or its representative, Epifanio
Ramos, Jr., that petitioner is waiving the confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision
on the waiver of the confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits was merely inserted in the
agreement. It is clear therefore that petitioner is not bound by the said provision since it
was without the express consent of petitioner who was not a party and signatory to the
said agreement.
Neither can petitioner be deemed to have given its permission by failure to interpose its
objection during the proceedings.1âwphi1 It is an elementary rule that the existence of a
waiver must be positively demonstrated since a waiver by implication is not normally
countenanced. The norm is that a waiver must not only be voluntary, but must have been
made knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences. There must be persuasive evidence to show an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Mere silence on the part of the holder of the right should not be
construed as a surrender thereof; the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption
against the existence and validity of such waiver.24
In addition, considering that petitioner was already declared insolvent by the RTC, all its
property, assets and belongings were ordered delivered to the appointed receiver or
assignee. Thus, in the order of the RTC appointing Atty. Gonzales as receiver, petitioner was
directed to assign and convey to Atty. Gonzales all its real and personal property, monies,
estate and effects with all the deeds, books and papers relating thereto,25 pursuant to
Section 3226of the Insolvency Law.27 Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee
all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution.28 Corollarily, the
stipulation in the Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement that petitioner waives
its right to confidentiality of its bank deposits requires the approval and conformity of Atty.
Gonzales as receiver since all the property, money, estate and effects of petitioner have
been assigned and conveyed to her29 and she has the right to recover all the estate, assets,
debts and claims belonging to or due to the insolvent debtor.30
While it was Atty. Gonzales who filed the Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise
Agreement, she did not sign or approve the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement submitted
by TIDCORP and BPI. In her Manifestation and Comment (on Dacion En Pago by
Compromise Agreement with TRC and Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI and
TIDCORP) there is no showing that Atty. Gonzales signified her conformity to the waiver of
confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits. Atty. Gonzales stated thus:
13. COMPROMISE AGREEMENT OF TIDCORP AND BPI
The undersigned receiver is in conformity with the compromise agreement of TIDCORP
and BPI, attached hereto as Annex C, which they submitted to this Honorable Court under
the abovementioned Joint Motion in so far as the sharing scheme of the sewing machine
inventories of Dona Adela is concerned. However, the undersigned receiver has the
following comments on the other provisions of the said compromise agreement:
xxxx
13.2. The undersigned receiver reiterates that Dona Adela has no cash or other assets to
source payment for expenses and taxes provided under no. 4 of the Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement. In fact, except for the amount of ₱5,000.00 she initially asked for
administrative expenses and the appraisal fees for the assets of Dona Adela advanced by
MR. EPIFANIO RAMOS, she has been shouldering all the administrative expenses of this
insolvency proceedings.
xxxx
21. As also mentioned under 13.2. above, Dona Adela has no cash to source payment for the
abovementioned administrative expenses and receiver’s fees, and its assets, which should
have been the source for payment for administrative expenses and receiver’s fees before
the distribution to the creditors, have already been assigned to the creditors by
compromise agreement.
22. After considering its savings from foreclosure expenses, sheriff’s fees and other related
expenses had it pursued foreclosure proceedings, it is just fair for the undersigned receiver
to ask her due for services rendered as officer of this Honorable Court from TRC who
benefitted the most from the insolvency proceedings.31 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint
Motion to Approve Agreement lacks the required written consent of petitioner and
conformity of the receiver. We, thus, hold that petitioner is not bound by the said provision.
It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the
parties to the compromise, and not upon non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of
contracts.32 The rule is based on Article 1311 (1) of the Civil Code which provides that
"contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs x x x."33 The sound
reason for the exclusion of non-parties to an agreement is the absence of a vinculum or
juridical tie which is the efficient cause for the establishment of an obligation.34 Consistent
with this principle, a judgment based entirely on a compromise agreement is binding only
on the parties to the compromise the court approved, and not upon the parties who did not
take part in the compromise agreement and in the proceedings leading to its submission
and approval by the court. Otherwise stated, a court judgment made solely on the basis of a
compromise agreement binds only the parties to the compromise, and cannot bind a party
litigant who did not take part in the compromise agreement.35
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The second
paragraph of the November 15, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 211, in SEC Case No. MC06-103 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated July 29, 2011, filed by creditors
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines and the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, with the exception of paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 thereof pertaining to
Expenses and Taxes and Waiver of Confidentiality, the same is likewise APPROVED, for the
same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and the
fact that the Court-Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on October 24, 2011 intimated her
conformity to said Joint Motion to Approve Agreement.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

1987 Consti Article 18 Sec. 3

Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER
DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner,
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002
resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing
the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance.
The dispositive portion2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a)
this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is
not sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in
the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent
gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She
wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the
freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country,
respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the
househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her
carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter
Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing
Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City
but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan.
Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their
daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara,
Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification3 that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing
calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces.
Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals
which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not
have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997)
gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it
impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals)
and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals)
has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act
expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in
Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the
jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is
concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word
"exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If
a court other than the Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the
jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent – and such an interpretation is
contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas
corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of
habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial
Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is
conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot
exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court – or any
court for that matter – to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the
exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy
is not to be sought form the courts but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,
effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a
petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,4Court of Appeals, or with any
of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369
that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of
minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by
giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers
intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo,
the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable
only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from
one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus
case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the
intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed
by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect the rights
and promote the welfare of children." The creation of the Family Court is geared towards
addressing three major issues regarding children’s welfare cases, as expressed by the
legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family
Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of
regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of
the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the
case remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule
therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the
Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus
involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in
one of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is
paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in
disruption of the child’s privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the
appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature:
the child’s welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing
resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs.
Philex Mining Corporation,6 the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were
allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports
petitioner’s submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not
connote automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases
involving minors. In the same manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective,
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent.
The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial
jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the
enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can
issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102
of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof,
on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the
instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before
a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may
also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time,
and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis
supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioner’s "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the
regular courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was merely
applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established
rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures
man’s survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth;
its spirit giveth life."
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of
law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the
implementing legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one
sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in
the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to
absurdity, injustice or contradiction.7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word
"exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and
promote the welfare of children"8 under the Constitution and the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities
and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface,
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the
maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must
be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known
the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts
must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject."9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP
129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No.
03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be
enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The
writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region
where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on
the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of
minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country
is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground
for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:10
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not
represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more
different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest,
since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-
SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth
Division.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban,, J., Chairman, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, on leave.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion A. Aquino and concurred in by Associate
Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Regalado E. Maambong.
2 CA Decision, p. 3.
3 Rollo, p. 49.
4 Article VIII. Section 5. "The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction… over petitions for… habeas corpus.
xxx xxx xxx."
5 Section20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of
habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The
writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Courts
belong.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or with
any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforecebale anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be returnable to a Family Court or any regular court
within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for
hearing and decision on the merits.
6 136 SCRA 141 [1985].
7 Agpalo Statutory Constitution, 1986, p. 98.
8 SEC.
2. State and National Policies.- The State shall protect the rights and promote
the welfare of children in keeping with the mandate of the Constitution and the
precepts of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. xxx
9 Republic vs. Marcopper Mining, 335 SCRA 386 [2000].
10 Ibid. at 120.

G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN,
ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR
DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO
ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the
Philippines,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196305
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management, PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197221
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197280
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO
DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES,
JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as
Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197282
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197392
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197454
JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael
Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305;
(d) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R.
No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi
Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan
in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim
Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to issue
clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order (TRO) is still existing
and effective.
These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional
mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be
held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and
recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to
temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected
officials.
The Motions for Reconsideration
The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in support of their
motion:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ARMM ELECTIONS
ARE LOCAL ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE
ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS AND IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT.
III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC ACT (R.A. 9054) ARE NOT
IRREPEALABLE LAWS.
IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE SECTION 18,
ARTICLE X OF THE CONSTITUTION.
V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.]1
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that:
I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS OF ARMM
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED WITH THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE
(A) THERE IS NO EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON SUCH PARITY; AND
(B) THE ARMM IS MORE SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE, POWERS AND
AUTONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS OWN APART FROM
TRADITIONAL LGUs.
II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR AN
ELECTIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY IN ARMM INDUBITABLY PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY THE
PRESIDENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE (OICs), ALBEIT MOMENTARY OR
TEMPORARY, FOR THE POSITIONS OF ARMM GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR AND
MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLY.
III. THE PRESIDENT’S APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS
AND DOES NOT EXTEND TO ELECTIVE OFFICIALS EVEN AS THE PRESIDENT IS
ONLY VESTED WITH SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER THE ARMM, THEREBY
NEGATING THE AWESOME POWER TO APPOINT AND REMOVE OICs OCCUPYING
ELECTIVE POSITIONS.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE HOLDOVER OF ARMM
ELECTED OFFICIALS PENDING THE ELECTION AND QUALIFICATION OF THEIR
SUCCESSORS.
V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS
WHOSE TERMS OF OFFICE ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION BUT
PRESCRIBED BY THE ORGANIC ACTS.
VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF ¾ VOTES IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE
AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT IMPOSE AN
IRREPEALABLE LAW.
VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF A
SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT
UNDULY EXPAND THE PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.
VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION WITH THE NATIONAL AND
LOCAL ELECTIONS IS NOT MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD AND CONDUCT SPECIAL
ELECTIONS IN ARMM, AND THE ENACTMENT OF AN IMPROVIDENT AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE IS AN ANALOGOUS CAUSE WARRANTING
COMELEC’S HOLDING OF SPECIAL ELECTIONS.2 (italics supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that:
I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET A STATUTE, IT IS A
CONDITION SINE QUA NON THAT THERE BE DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS
LANGUAGE.
THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY
REFER TO THE 1992 ELECTIONS AND TURN-OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.
IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED "INTENT" OF THE FRAMERS, AND APPLYING
THE SAME TO ELECTIONS 20 YEARS AFTER, THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
MAY HAVE VIOLATED THEFOREMOST RULE IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
xxxx
II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT RA 9054, AN
ORGANIC ACT, WAS COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE, RA 10153 SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ENACTED PRECISELY TO AMEND RA 9054.
xxxx
III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN
DECLARING THE 2/3 VOTING REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN RA 9054 AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxx
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT A PLEBISCITE IS NOT NECESSARY IN AMENDING THE ORGANIC
ACT.
xxxx
V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE
HOLD-OVER OF ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxx
VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE
APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.3 (italics and underscoring supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that:
A.
ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF OICs FOR THE
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMM IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN
WITH, SUCH APPOINTMENT OF OIC REGIONAL OFFICIALS WILL CREATE A
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT SUCH THAT R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A
PLEBISCITE IN THE ARMM FOR APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE, WHICH PLEBISCITE
REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING THE
PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON APPOINTMENT OF OICs AS AN "INTERIM
MEASURE".
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT BY THE
PRESIDENT OF OICs FOR THE ARMM REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE
OF THE CONSTITUTION.
C.
THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTION, AND BEFORE THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN EITHER AN
ELECTION TO BE HELD AT THE SOONEST POSSIBLE TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE
SAID INCUMBENT ARMM REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY VALIDLY CONTINUE
FUNCTIONING AS SUCH IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII OF R.A. NO. 9054.
D.
WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM ELECTIONS, SPECIAL
ELECTIONS MUST IMMEDIATELY BE HELD FOR THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL
OFFICIALS OF THE ARMM WHO SHALL SERVE UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE
ELECTED IN THE MAY 2013 SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS.4
Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that:
a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not apply to the ARMM
elections;
b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican democracy which, by
constitutional mandate, guides the governance of the Republic;
c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and, thus, has to comply
with the 2/3 vote from the House of Representatives and the Senate, voting
separately, and be ratified in a plebiscite;
d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to hold their offices even after
their terms are over and non-elective individuals getting into the vacant elective
positions by appointment as OICs, the holdover option is the better choice;
e) the President only has the power of supervision over autonomous regions, which
does not include the power to appoint OICs to take the place of ARMM elective
officials; and
f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately from the national and
local elections as this will make it easier for the authorities to implement election
laws.
In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions:
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections
with national and local elections?
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to
comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and
representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s
supervisory powers over autonomous regions?
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the motions for lack of merit.
Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not
expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the
intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which state:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President,
which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It
shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the
Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the
highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three
years.
xxxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected
in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we refer to the
discussions of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we
will temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE
FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF JUNE
1992."
This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner
Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in
view of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a
new proposal. It will read as follows: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992."
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory
Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992.
Necessarily then, since the term provided by the Commission for Members of the
Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987,
the next election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992.
We could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once
every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in
1992, and consequently, we should not have a local election or an election for
Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to complete their term of
three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will
result in an election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12
Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term
is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections
in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators
and of course to the local officials and the Members of the Lower House. But,
definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three years,
therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term
of six years for the President and another six years for the Senators with the
possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three years insofar
as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect
the first synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two
years to the Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local
elective officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was
the one who proposed that in order to synchronize the elections every three years,
which the body approved — the first national and local officials to be elected in
1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is
now proposing. That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of
the President will be for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we
will again have national, local and presidential elections. This time, in 1992, the
President shall have a term until 1998 and the first 12 Senators will serve
until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve until 1995, and then the local officials
elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall have an election
every three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to
synchronize our elections every three years which was already approved by the
body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
xxxx
MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the
incumbent President and Vice-President in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of
the Senators and local officials with the election of the President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the
assumption that the provision of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the
incumbent President and Vice-President would really end in 1992.
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from
the President up to the municipal officials.5 (emphases and underscoring ours)
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more
clearly – there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the
President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even
willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to
meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.
We came to the same conclusion in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,6 where we
unequivocally stated that "the Constitution has mandated synchronized national
and local elections."7 Despite the length and verbosity of their motions, the
petitioners have failed to convince us to deviate from this established ruling.
Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the ARMM elections
are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization because the
ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean
that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
synchronization. We have to consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not
yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by
the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for
the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it
remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be
construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only
the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the
principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of
its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to
stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static.8
To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled "Local Government," clearly
shows the intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous regions, such as the
ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section 1 of this Article, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of
the State under the heading "Local Government" indicates quite clearly the
constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local
governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the "local
governments," and does not make a distinction between the "local government" and
the "regional government," is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not
as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having more
powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the
category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local
governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also
considered as local elections.
The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates
the synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not covered by this
mandate since they are regional elections and not local elections.
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is,
wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed."9 Applying this principle to
determine the scope of "local elections," we refer to the meaning of the word "local,"
as understood in its ordinary sense. As defined in Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary Unabridged, "local" refers to something "that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political
subdivision." Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of
the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this definition.
To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces,
cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections
differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.10
RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054
The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in postponing the
ARMM elections, amend RA No. 9054.
We cannot agree with their position.
A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only
the first ARMM elections;11 it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular
ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No.
9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not
change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM
elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely
filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
We reiterate our previous observations:
This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of
succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s
recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM
elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the
subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections,
leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No.
7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by
Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or
modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this
latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for
ratification.
The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001,
provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September
2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM
elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the
ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM
regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified
in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA
No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this
law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the
laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct
from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it
passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No.
9054.12 (emphases supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is no lacuna in RA
No. 9054 as regards the date of the subsequent ARMM elections. In his estimation, it
can be implied from the provisions of RA No. 9054 that the succeeding elections are
to be held three years after the date of the first ARMM regional elections.
We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the court may not,
in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however
later wisdom may recommend the inclusion.13 Courts are not authorized to insert
into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the
legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to the
omission.14Providing for lapses within the law falls within the exclusive domain of
the legislature, and courts, no matter how well-meaning, have no authority to
intrude into this clearly delineated space.
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there
is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth
in Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have already
established that the supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article
XVII of RA No. 905415 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress
cannot pass irrepealable laws.
The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal
these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to
amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering
with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade:16
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether
pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce
new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the
federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its
successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every
legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors.
This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act
was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours]
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a
mere majority vote, provided there is quorum.17 In requiring all laws which amend
RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution
provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very
principle which we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one
legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.18
We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his
dissenting opinion, where he stated: "Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high
vote threshold for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively and
unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress’ amendatory
powers. One Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of
succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than what the
Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing
such a higher vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary
legislation, to amend the Constitution."19
Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad
Similarly, we struck down the petitioners’ contention that the plebiscite
requirement20 applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable
enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.]" We interpreted this
to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-
essential to the creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic
Act21 – require ratification through a plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.
The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to comply with
the plebiscite requirement is to recognize that sovereignty resides primarily in the
people.
While we agree with the petitioners’ underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately
resides with the people, we disagree that this legal reality necessitates compliance
with the plebiscite requirement for all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were
to go by the petitioners’ interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
that all amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement
before becoming effective, this would lead to impractical and illogical results –
hampering the ARMM’s progress by impeding Congress from enacting laws that
timely address problems as they arise in the region, as well as weighing down the
ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a
plebiscite.
Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153, in giving
the President the power to appoint OICs to take the place of the elective officials of
the ARMM, creates a fundamental change in the basic structure of the government,
and thus requires compliance with the plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No.
9054.
Again, we disagree.
The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which reads:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-
in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic structure of
the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves
the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices
of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily
assume these offices to "perform the functions pertaining to the said offices."
Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision
The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII
of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to remain in their positions in a
holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials
should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013
elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits
regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X which provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of Office. The
terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of
the Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years, which shall begin at
noon on the 30th day of September next following the day of the election and shall
end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective
officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are
elected and qualified.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of
the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within
which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have already established
that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from
acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no
authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA
No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in
various laws. One significant difference between the present case and these past
cases22 is that while these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the
Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor,
the ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly -
whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is
evident.23
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it
clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054.
Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly acted within
its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to
question the wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or
grave abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this
Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which
arise from the legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of
synchronization.
COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) is sufficiently empowered to set the date of special elections in the
ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.24 Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone
elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls within the
narrow confines of the following provisions:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such
as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the
holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by
any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested
parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election
therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in
any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [emphases and
underscoring ours]
As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section 5 and Section
6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have already been scheduled to take
place but do not occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism,
and other analogous circumstances.
In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the
constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously,
this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or
Section 6 of BP 881.
More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM
elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and
this Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to
shorten the terms of the newly elected officials in order to synchronize the ARMM
elections with the May 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the
Court nor the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an
amendment of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the term of local
officials to three years.
President’s authority to appoint OICs
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the President’s power to appoint
pertains only to appointive positions and cannot extend to positions held by elective
officials.
The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in
nature.25 Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the
extent of this power, thus:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted above.
Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the
rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
[emphasis ours]
The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its
counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction; while in the 1935
Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are enumerated in a
single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the
President is empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The
change in style is significant; in providing for this change, the framers of the 1987
Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the first group of
presidential appointments and the second group of presidential appointments, as
made evident in the following exchange:
MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after "captain" and x x
x delete "and all" and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed
amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned therein do
not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.26
The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President
by the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments.
The second group of officials the President can appoint are "all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint."27 The second sentence acts as the
"catch-all provision" for the President’s appointment power, in recognition of the
fact that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature.28 The wide latitude
given to the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the
President’s power to appoint officials whose appointments are not even
provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which have to be
filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling them, the Constitution
recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by appointment.
Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s appointment
power should be strictly construed and must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.29 Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the
ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential
appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution; the President’s appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional
basis.
The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the
power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the
Constitution,30 which merely grants the President the power of supervision over
autonomous regions.
This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s appointment power.
There is no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local
governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President,
within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it
that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law."31 This is
distinguished from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter."32
The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control
over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President’s appointment power
includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners
foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The
provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the
offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the
duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints
that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made.
Clearly, the petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a
vacuum, but within the context it was enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted
RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the constitutional mandate to synchronize the
ARMM regional elections with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress
had to postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the
problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening
period, between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the
assumption to office – twenty-one (21) months away – of those who will win in the
synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to
Congress to address the problem created by synchronization – (a) allow the
incumbent officials to remain in office after the expiration of their terms in a
holdover capacity; (b) call for special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of
those to be elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13,
2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his appointment powers
and in line with his power of supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs
to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM regional government upon the expiration
of their terms. We have already established the unconstitutionality of the first two
options, leaving us to consider the last available option.
In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the
adjustment that synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA
No. 10153 by the standard of reasonableness in responding to the challenges
brought about by synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. In other words, "given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a
holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or
shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s
power to appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as
allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an unconstitutional or
unreasonable choice for Congress to make?"33
We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a
local community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s choice of leaders. However,
we have to keep in mind that the adoption of this measure is a matter of necessity in
order to comply with a mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us.
Moreover, the implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim
measure is comparable to the interim measures traditionally practiced when, for
instance, the President appoints officials holding elective offices upon the creation
of new local government units.
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the elective
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. The
power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the
Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the
Regional Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook).34
Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and Motion dated
December 21, 2011, question the propriety of the appointment by the President of
Mujiv Hataman as acting Governor and Bainon Karon as acting Vice Governor of the
ARMM. They argue that since our previous decision was based on a close vote of 8-7,
and given the numerous motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, the
President, in recognition of the principle of judicial courtesy, should have refrained
from implementing our decision until we have ruled with finality on this case.
We find the petitioners’ reasoning specious.
Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and
applies only to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of
preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a
lower court to suspend its proceedings for practical and ethical considerations.35 In
other words, the principle of "judicial courtesy" applies where there is a strong
probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and
moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or
court of origin.36Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the President,
who represents a co-equal branch of government. To suggest otherwise would be to
disregard the principle of separation of powers, on which our whole system of
government is founded upon.
Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does
not, and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any less effective or binding.
Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of the majority
of the members of the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the
case,37 a decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the
Supreme Court en banc and must be respected as such. The petitioners are,
therefore, not in any position to speculate that, based on the voting, "the probability
exists that their motion for reconsideration may be granted."38
Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to Issue
Clarificatory Resolution, argues that since motions for reconsideration were filed by
the aggrieved parties challenging our October 18, 2011 decision in the present case,
the TRO we initially issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and
effective. He further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our
October 18, 2011 decision pending resolution of the motions for reconsideration
"borders on disrespect if not outright insolence"39 to this Court.
In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v. COMELEC,40 where the Court
held that while it had already issued a decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO
is not yet final and executory, and can also be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner also cites the minute resolution issued by the Court
in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,41 where the Court reproached the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for manifesting its intention to
implement the decision of the Court, noting that the Court had not yet lifted the TRO
previously issued.42
We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included as a subject of
a motion for reconsideration filed to assail our decision. It does not follow, however,
that the TRO remains effective until after we have issued a final and executory
decision, especially considering the clear wording of the dispositive portion of our
October 18, 2011 decision, which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing
the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of
this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our
Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.43 (emphases ours)
In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino and the present
case. While it may be true that Tolentino and the present case are similar in that, in
both cases, the petitions assailing the challenged laws were dismissed by the Court,
an examination of the dispositive portion of the decision in Tolentino reveals that
the Court did not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the present case, we
expressly lifted the TRO issued on September 13, 2011.1âwphi1 There is, therefore,
no legal impediment to prevent the President from exercising his authority to
appoint an acting ARMM Governor and Vice Governor as specifically provided for in
RA No. 10153.
Conclusion
As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner in G.R. No.
197282 presents in his motion, that our Decision has virtually given the President
the power and authority to appoint 672,416 OICs in the event that the elections of
barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or cancelled.
We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.
This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal
circumstances which led to the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153 was
passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections, Congress had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the
ARMM, in light of the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM elective
officials is legally impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special elections
and shorten the terms of elective local officials for less than three years.
Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit for
barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there is no legal proscription which
prevents these specific government officials from continuing in a holdover capacity
should some exigency require the postponement of barangay or Sangguniang
Kabataan elections. Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand
on.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners’ motions for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the motions for
reconsideration for lack of merit and UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

I reiterate my Dissenting I reiterate my Dissenting

Opinion Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I maintain my vote joining the

dissent of Justice Velasco
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
Associate Justice
CASTRO
Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I maintain my dissent
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I join the Dissent of J. Carpio

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 (On Leave)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. BIENVENIDO L. REYES
SERENO** Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* On official leave.
** On leave.
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, p. 1221.
2 Id. at 1261-1263.
3 Id. at 1345-1383.
4 Id. at 1174-1175.
5V Record of the Constitutional Commission, October 3, 1986, pp. 429-431.
6 G.R. Nos. 100318, 100308, 100417, and 100420, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750.
7 Id. at 762.
8 See
Ruben, Statutory Construction, 5th ed., 2003, p. 435, citing Roman Cath.
Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. v. Land Reg. Com., et al., 102 Phil. 596 (1957).
9 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 884 (2003).
10Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189600, June 29,
2010, 622 SCRA 593, citing Adasa v. Abalos, G.R. No. 168617, February 19, 2007, 516
SCRA 261, 280, and Philippine Free Press, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 510 Phil. 411, 433
(2005).
11 Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054 provides:
Section 7. First Regular Elections. — The first regular elections of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the regional legislative assembly
under this Organic Act shall be held on the second Monday of September 2001. The
Commission on Elections shall promulgate rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the conduct of said election.
The election of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor, and members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) set forth in Republic Act No. 8953 is hereby reset accordingly.
The funds for the holding of the ARMM elections shall be taken from the savings of
the national government or shall be provided in the General Appropriations Act
(GAA).
12 Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, pp. 1035-1037.
13 Ruben, supra note 8, at 74, citing Morales v. Subido, etc., 135 Phil. 346 (1968).
14 Id., citing People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950).
15 Section1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 provides: "Consistent with the provisions of
the Constitution, this Organic Act may be re-amended or revised by the Congress of
the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting separately."
16 32Phil. 36, 49 (1915), citing Lewis' Southernland on Statutory Construction,
section 244.
17 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 16(2) states: "A majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under
such penalties, as such House may provide."
18 SeeThe City of Davao v. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Davao City, 504 Phil.
543 (2005), citing 59 C.J., sec. 500, pp. 899-900.
19 Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, pp. 1084-1085.
20 Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 provides: "Any amendment to or revision of
this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty
(60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or
revision."
21 These include: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the region’s
judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally
conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
22 Adap v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161984, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA
403; Sambarani v. COMELEC, 481 Phil. 661 (2004); and Montesclaros v. Comelec, 433
Phil. 620 (2002).
23 Guekeko v. Santos, 76 Phil. 237 (1946).
24 See CONSTITUTION, Article IX(C), Section 2.
25 Hon.Luis Mario M. General, Commissioner, National Police Commission v. Hon.
Alejandro S. Urro, in his capacity as the new appointee vice herein petitioner Hon.
Luis Mario M. General, National Police Commission, and Hon. Luis Mario M. General,
Commissioner, National Police Commission v. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
thru Executive Secretary Leandro Mendoza, in Her capacity as the appointing
power, Hon. Ronaldo V. Puno, in His capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government and as Ex-Officio Chairman of the National Police
Commission and Hon. Eduardo U. Escueta, Alejandro S. Urro, and Hon. Constancia P.
de Guzman as the midnight appointee, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011.
26 II Record of the Constitutional Commission, July 31, 1986, p. 520.
27 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 16.
28 Pimentel, Jr. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, 509 Phil. 567 (2005).
29 Id. at 573, citing Sarmiento III v. Commissioner Mison, 240 Phil. 505 (1987).
30 Section16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
31 Bito-ononv. Hon. Yap Fernandez, 403 Phil. 693, 702 (2001), citing Drilon v. Lim,
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 141.
32 Drilon v. Lim, supra, at 140-141.
33 Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, pp. 1057-1058.
34 Section
35. Filling of vacancy. - Pending an election to fill a vacancy arising from
any cause in the Sangguniang Pampook, the vacancy shall be filled by the President,
upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Pampook: Provided, That the appointee
shall come from the same province or sector of the member being replaced.
35 Rep. of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan (First Div.), 525 Phil. 804 (2006).
36 Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 247 Phil. 387, 394
(1988).
37 Section1(a), Rule 12 of the 2010 Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
SECTION 1. Voting requirements. – (a) All decisions and actions in Court en banc
cases shall be made upon the concurrence of the majority of the Members of the
Court who actually took part in the deliberations on the issue or issues involved and
voted on them.
38 Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, p. 1440.
39 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, September 23, 1994, Minute
Resolution.
40 G.R. Nos. 107854 and 108642, July 16, 1993, 224 SCRA 631.
41 G.R.
Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873,
and 115931, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630.
42 The Court, in its Minute Resolution dated September 23, 1994, stated thus:
The Court calls the attention of respondents of the fact that the temporary
restraining order issued on June 30, 1994 was effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from this Court. Although the petitions in connection with which
the TRO was issued were subsequently dismissed, the decision is not yet final and
the TRO previously issued has not been lifted xxx because the TRO in these cases
was expressly made effective until otherwise ordered by this Court. (Rollo, G.R. No.
196271, p. 1426; emphasis ours.)
43 Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, p. 1067.

G.R. No. 207942 January 12, 2015

YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902
and existing prior to November 15, 1935 are vested rights that cannot be impaired.
Antecedents
This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Barrio Larap,
Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of which was owned
and mined by Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. (PIMI), which ceased operations in 1975
due to financial losses. PIMI's portion (known as the PIMI Larap Mines) was sold in
a foreclosure sale to the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) and Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB, later Banco De Oro, or BD0).1
In 1976, the Gold Mining Development Project Team, Mining Technology Division,
The Mining Group of the Bureau of Mines prepared a so-called Technical Feasibility
Study on the Possible Re-Opening of the CPMI Project of PIM (Mining Aspect) and
the Exploration Program (Uranium Project) at Larap, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, which discussed in detail, among others, an evaluation of the ore reserve and
a plan of operation to restore the mine to normal commercial mining production
and budgetary estimate should the Bureau of Mines take over and run the PIMI
Larap Mines. The Government then opened the area for exploration. In November
1978, the Benguet Corporation-Getty Oil Consortium began exploration for uranium
under an Exploration Permit of the area, but withdrew in 1982 after four years of
sustained and earnest exploration.2
Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored the
area from 1986 onwards. In 1996, it entered into an operating agreement with
Philex Mining Corporation over the area, their agreement being duly registered by
the Mining Recorder Section of Regional Office No. V of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). In 1997, Trans-Asia filed an
application for the approval of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)3 over
the area in that Regional Office of the DENR, through the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB), in Daraga, Albay. The application, which was amended in 1999, was
granted on July28, 2007 under MPSA No. 252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia was
given the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the mineral deposits in the
portion of the mineral lands.4
On August 31, 2007, Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR by
letter that it had acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of a
deed of absolute sale, stating that the areas covered by its mining patents were
within the areas of Trans-Asia’s MPSA. Based on the documents submitted by Yinlu,
four of the six transfer certificates of title (TCTs) it held covered four mining claims
under Patent Nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18 respectively named as Busser, Superior,
Bussamer and Rescue Placer Claims, with an aggregate area of 192 hectares. The
areas covered occupied more than half of the MPSA area of Trans-Asia.5
On September 14, 2007, Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by letter that it would
commence exploration works in Yinlu’s areas pursuant to the MPSA, and requested
Yinlu to allow its personnel to access the areas for the works to be undertaken. On
September 23, 2007, Yinlu replied that Trans-Asia could proceed with its
exploration works on its own private property in the Calambayungan area, not in
the areas covered by its (Yinlu) mining patents.6 This response of Yinlu compelled
Trans-Asia to seek the assistance of the MGB Regional Office V in resolving the
issues between the parties. It was at that point that Trans-Asia learned that the
registration of its MPSA had been put on hold because of Yinlu’s request to register
the deed of absolute sale in its favor.7
The matter was ultimately referred to the DENR Secretary, who directed the MGB
Regional Office V toverify the validity of the mining patents of Yinlu. On November
29, 2007, the MGB Regional Office V informed the Office of the DENR Secretary that
there was no record on file showing the existence of the mining patents of Yinlu.
Accordingly, the parties were required to submit their respective position papers.8
The issues presented for consideration and resolution by the DENR Secretary were:
(1) whether the mining patents held by Yinlu were issued prior to the grant of the
MPSA; and (2) whether the mining patents were still valid and subsisting.9
On May 21, 2009, DENR Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr. issued his order resolving the
issues in Yinlu’s favor,10finding that the mining patents had been issued to PIMI in
1930 asevidenced by and indicated in PIMI’s certificates of title submitted by Yinlu;
and that the patents were validly transferred to and were now owned by Yinlu.11 He
rejected Trans-Asia’s argument that Yinlu’s patents had no effect and were deemed
abandoned because Yinlu had failed to register them pursuant to Section 101 of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended. He declared that the DENR did not issue
any specific order cancelling suchpatents. He refuted Trans-Asia’s contention that
there was a continuing requirement under the Philippine Bill of 1902 for the mining
patent holder to undertake improvements in order to have the patents subsist, and
that Yinlu failed to perform its obligation to register and to undertake the
improvement, observing that the requirement was not an absolute imposition. He
noted that the suspension of PIMI’s operation in 1974 due tofinancial losses and the
foreclosure of its mortgaged properties by the creditor banks (MBC/PCIB)
constituted force majeure that justified PIMI’s failure in 1974 to comply with the
registration requirement under P.D. No. 463; that the Philippine Bill of 1902, which
was the basis for issuing the patents, allowed the private ownership of minerals,
rendering the minerals covered by the patents to be segregated from the public
domain and be considered private property; and that the Regalian doctrine, under
which the State owned all natural resources, was adopted only by the 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions.12
Consequently, DENR Secretary Atienza, Jr. ordered the amendment of Trans-Asia’s
MPSA by excluding there from the mineral lands covered by Yinlu’s mining patents,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement No.
252-2007-V is hereby ordered amended, to excise there from the areas covered by
the mining patents of Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation as described and defined in the
Transfer Certificates of Title concerned: Provided, That the consequent conduct of
mining operations in the said mining patents shall be undertaken in accordance
with all the pertinent requirements of Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995, and its implementing rules and regulations.
SO ORDERED.13
Trans-Asia moved for reconsideration,14 but the DENR Secretary denied the motion
on November 27, 2009,holding in its resolution that the arguments raised by the
motion only rehashed matters already decided.15
Trans-Asia appealed to the Office of the President (OP).
On May 4, 2010, the OP rendered its decision in O.P. Case No. 09-L-638 affirming in
totothe assailed order and resolution of the DENR Secretary,16 to wit:
The first contention of appellee is untenable. It is conceded that Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 463, otherwise known as the Mineral Resources Development Decree,
prescribed requirements for the registration of all mining patents with the Director
of Mines within a certain period, among others. The existence of the mining claims
were in fact registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Camarines Norte
prior to the issuance of PD 463, as found in the 4 TCT’s issued to PIMI that were
foreclosed by MBC, and eventually purchased by appellee through an Absolute Deed
of Sale. The existence of the mining patents, therefore, subsists. Under the Philippine
Constitution, there is an absolute prohibition against alienation of natural resources.
Mining locations may only be subject to concession or lease. The only exception is
where a location of a mining claim was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when
the government under the 1935 Constitution was inaugurated, and according to the
laws existing at that time a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from
the public domain, and the locator is entitled to a grant of the beneficial ownership
of the claim and the right to a patent therefore (Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs.
Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259). The right of the locator to the mining patent is a vested
right, and the Constitution recognizes such right as an exception to the prohibition
against alienation of natural resources. The right of the appellee as the beneficial
owner of the subject mining patents in this case, therefore, is superior to the claims
of appellant. The existence of the TCT’s in the name of appellee further bolsters the
existence of the mining patents. Under PD 1529, also known as the Property
Registration Decree, once a title is cleared of all claims or where none exists, the
ownership over the real property covered by the Torrens title becomes conclusive
and indefeasible even as against the government. Noteworthy is the fact that the
title trace backs of the said TCTs show that the titles were executed infavour of the
appellee’s predecessors-in-interest pursuant to Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act of 1902, in relation to the Philippine Bill of 1902, which
govern the registration of mineral patents.
xxxx
After a careful and thorough evaluation and study of the records of this case, this
Office agrees with the DENR, as the assailed decisions are in accord with facts, law
and jurisprudence relevant to the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order and Resolution of the DENR
dated May 21, 2009 and November 27, 2009, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.17
Trans-Asia filed a first and a second motion for reconsideration.
Trans-Asia stated in its first motion for reconsideration that the OP erred: (1) in
resurrecting Yinlu’s mining patents despite failure to comply with the requirements
of Presidential Decree No. 463; (2) in holding that Yinlu’s predecessors-in-interest
had continued to assert their rights to the mining patents; and (3) in not holding
that the mining patent had been abandoned due to laches. The OP denied the first
motion through the resolution dated June 29, 2010,18 emphasizing that there was no
cogent reason to disturb the decision because the grounds were mere reiterations of
arguments already passed upon and resolved.
Nothing daunted, Trans-Asia presented its second motion for reconsideration, but
this motion was similarly denied in the resolution of March 31, 2011,19 the OP
disposing thusly:
xxxx
After a second thorough evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Office
finds no cogent reason to disturb its earlier Decision. The second paragraph of
Section 7, Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987 provides that
"[o]nly one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and
entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases." This second motion is clearly
unmeritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of this Office dated May 4, 2010 and June 29, 2010,
respectively, affirming the DENR decisions, are hereby declared final. Let the
records of the case be transmitted to the DENR for its appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.20
Trans-Asia then appealed tothe Court of Appeals (CA).
On October 30, 2012, the CA promulgated the assailed decision reversing and
setting aside the rulings of the DENR Secretary and the OP.21 It agreed with the
DENR Secretary and the OP that Yinlu held mining patents over the disputed mining
 areas, but ruled that Yinlu was required to register the patents under PD No. 463 in
order for the patents to be recognized in its favor. It found that Yinlu and its
predecessors-in-interest did not register the patents pursuant to PD No. 463; hence,
the patents lapsed and had no more effect,22 viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated May 4, 2010, as well as the Resolutions dated June 29, 2010 and March 31,
2011, respectively, rendered by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 09-L-638,
and the Order dated May 21, 2009 as well as the Resolution dated November 27,
2009 issued by the DENR Secretary in DENR Case No. 8766 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.23
Yinlu sought reconsideration of the decision. On June 27, 2013, the CA denied the
motion for reconsideration.24
Issues
In its appeal, Yinlu raises the following issues, namely:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE THE COURT OF
APPEALS WAS FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S MINING PATENTS ARE VALID, EXISTING AND
IMPERVIOUS TO THE MINERAL PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENT SUBSEQUENTLY
GRANTED TO THE RESPONDENT TRANS-ASIA.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S TITLES BASED ON "PATENTS" WERE MINING
PATENTS OR SOME OTHER PATENT.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S PURCHASE OF ITS TITLES INCLUDED
PURCHASEOF THE MINERALS FOUND THEREIN.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
PETITIONER YINLU THAT IT’S PRIVATE PROPERTY SHALL NOT BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC
USE WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES APPLY TO TITLED PROPERTY.
VII.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SHARE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ITS NATURAL
RESOURCES WAS AFFECTED BY THE MINING PATENTS OF PETITIONER YINLU.25
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I Procedural Issue:
Tardiness of Trans-Asia’s Appeal
Yinlu contends that the CA should have outrightly dismissed TransAsia’s appeal for
being taken beyond the required period for appealing; and that Trans-Asia’s filing of
the second motion for reconsideration was improper inasmuch as the motion did
not cite any exceptional circumstances or reasons as required by Section 7 of the
OP’s Administrative Order No. 18 Series of 1987.26
The contention of Yinlu is correct.
Section 1,27 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment rendered by the
OP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is appealable to the CA. Section 428 of
the Rule states that the appeal must be taken within 15 days "from notice of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its lastpublication, if
publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x."
Trans-Asia received a copy of the OP resolution dated June 29, 2010 denying the
first motion for reconsideration on July 14, 2010.29 Hence, it had until July 29, 2010
to appeal to the CA by petition for review. However, it filed the petition for review
only on May 11, 2011,30 or nearly 10 months from its receipt of the denial. Under the
circumstances, its petition for review was filed way beyond the prescribed 15-day
period.
The CA opined that Trans-Asia’s petition for review was timely filed, citing the fact
that Trans-Asia filed its second motion for reconsideration dated July 20, 2010
which the OP denied through the resolution dated March 31, 2011. It pointed out
that Trans-Asia received a copy of the resolution dated March 31, 2011 on April 26,
2011; hence, the 15-day appeal period should be reckoned from April 26, 2011,
rendering its filing of the petition for review in the CA on May 11, 2011 timely and
within the required period. It observed that Trans-Asia’s filing of the second motion
for reconsideration was allowed under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 of
the OP Rules on Appeal because the second motion was exceptionally meritorious,
not pro forma, for, even if the motion reiterated issues already passed upon by the
OP, that alone did not render the motion pro formaif it otherwise complied with the
rules.31
It is true that Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 of the OP Rules on Appeal
authorizes the filing of a second motion for reconsideration. But that authority is
conditioned upon the second motion being upon a highly meritorious ground.32 The
rule remains to be only one motion for reconsideration is allowed. In that regard,
the Court stresses that the determination of whether or not the ground raised in the
second motion for reconsideration was exceptionally meritorious lies solely
belonged to the OP.33 The CA could not usurp the OP’s determination in order to
make its own.
As earlier indicated, the OP found and declared the second motion for
reconsideration of Trans-Asia "clearly unmeritorious" when it denied the motion on
March 31, 2011. Consequently, the filing of the second motion for reconsideration
on July 20, 2010 did not stop the running of the appeal period that had commenced
on July 14, 2010, the date of receipt by TransAsia of the OP resolution denying the
first motion for reconsideration. The decision of the OP inevitably became final and
immutable as a matter of law by July 29, 2010, the last day of the reglementary
period under Section 4 of Rule 43.
In taking cognizance of Trans-Asia’s appeal despite its tardiness, therefore, the CA
gravely erred. Under Section 4 of Rule 43, the reckoning of the 15-day period to
perfect the appeal starts from the receipt of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration. Section 4 specifically allows only one motion for reconsideration to
an appealing party; as such, the reckoning is from the date of notice of the denial of
the first motion for reconsideration.34 With Trans-Asia having received the denial on
July 14, 2010, its 15-day appeal period was until July 29, 2010. The filing of the
petition for review only on May 11, 2011 was too late.
Verily, an appeal should be taken in accordance with the manner and within the
period set by the law establishing the right to appeal. To allow Trans-Asia to
transgress the law would be to set at naught procedural rules that were generally
mandatory and inviolable. This is because appeal, being neither a constitutional
right nor part of due process, is a mere statutory privilege to be enjoyed by litigants
who comply with the law allowing the appeal. Failure to comply will causethe loss of
the privilege. Moreover, procedural rules prescribing the time within which certain
acts must be done are indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Among such rules is that
regulating the perfection of an appeal, which is mandatory as well as jurisdictional.
The consequence of the failure to perfect an appeal within the limited time allowed
is to preclude the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case in order
to review and revise the judgment that meanwhile became final and immutable by
operation of law.35
Although procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, there
are no reasons to relax them in Trans-Asia’s favor. As noted, the OP found the
ground for the second motion for reconsideration "clearly unmeritorious." To ignore
such finding without justification is to unduly deprive the OP of its authority and
autonomy to enforce its own rules of procedure. On the other hand, Trans-Asiacould
have easily avoided its dire situation by appealing within the period instead of
rehashing its already discarded arguments in the OP.
II Substantive Issues:
Yinlu’s mining patents constituted
vested rights that could not be disregarded
The finality and immutability of the decision of the OP are not the only reasons for
turning down Trans-Asia’s appeal. Trans-Asia’s cause also failed the tests of
substance and validity.
Yinlu claims that its mining patents, being evidenced by its TCTs that were
registered pursuant to Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act of 1902) in relation to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 (Act of Congress of July 1 , 1902), the governing law on the
registration of mineral patents, were valid, existing and indefeasible; that it was the
absolute owner of the lands the TCTs covered; that the TCTs were issued pursuant
to mineral patents based on Placer Claims36 named Busser, Superior, Bussamer and
Rescue; that the TCTs were presented to and confirmed by the DENR and the OP;
that Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 allowed citizens of the United States
and of the Philippine Islands to explore, occupy and purchase mineral lands; that
after the exploration and claim of the mineral land, the owner of the claim and of the
mineral patents was entitled to all the minerals found in the area subject of the
claim as stated in Section 27 of the Philippine Bill of 1902; that the person holding
even a mere mineral claim was already entitled to all the minerals found in such
area; that, as such, the mineral claims that had been patented and perfected by
registration still enjoyed the same privilege of exclusivity in exploiting the minerals
within the patent; that aside from being entitled to the minerals found within the
mineral claim and patent, it was also entitled to the exclusive possession of the land
covered by the claim; that its mining patents are property rights that the
Government should not appropriate for itself or for others; that its registered
mineral patents, being valid and existing, could not be defeated by adverse, open
and notorious possession and prescription; that its substantive rights overmineral
claims perfected under the Philippine Bill of 1902 subsisted despite the changes of
the Philippine Constitution and of the mining laws; that the Constitution could not
impair vested rights; that Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 would impair
its vested rights under its mineral patents if said provisions were applied to it; and
that Section 99 of PD No. 463 expressly prohibited the application of Section 100
and Section 101 to vested rights.37
Yinlu asserts that contrary to the claim of Trans-Asia, the titles issued to it were
mining patents, not homestead patents.38 It stresses that the TCTs from which it
derived its own TCTs were issued pursuant to Patents 15, 16, 17 and 18; that under
the Philippine Bill of 1902, there was no mineral patent separate from the original
certificate of title issued pursuant thereto; that the mineral patent applied for under
the procedure outlined in the Philippine Bill of 1902 resulted to an original
certificate of title issued under Act No. 496; that the beginning statements
mentioned in Yinlu’s title stated "pursuant to Patent No._____,________Placer Claim;"
that as such, its mineral patents were part of its actual titles; that Section 21 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 allowed the titling of the land and the exploration of both the
surface and the minerals beneath the surface; and that its TCTs were already
inclusive of the minerals located in the properties by virtue of the Philippine Bill of
1902, and thus could not be separately soldor mortgaged from each other.39
The decision of the OP was actually unassailable in point of law and history.
During the period of Spanish colonization, the disposition and exploration of
mineral lands in the Philippines were governed by the Royal Decree of May 14,
1867,40 otherwise known as The Spanish Mining Law.41 The Regalian doctrine was
observed, to the effect that minerals belonged to the State wherever they could be
found, whether in public or private lands. During the American occupation, the
fundamental law on mining was incorporated in the Philippine Bill of 1902, whose
Section 2142 declared: That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the
Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free
and open to exploration, occupation, and purchase, and the land in which they are
found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said Islands.
Its Section 27 provided that a holder of the mineral claim so located was entitled to
all the minerals that liewithin his claim, but he could not mine outside the boundary
lines of his claim. Pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902, therefore, once a mining
claim was made or a mining patent was issued over a parcel of land in accordance
with the relative provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, such land was considered
private property and no longer part of the public domain. The claimant or patent
holder was the owner of both the surface of the land and of the minerals found
underneath.
The term mining claim connotes a parcel of land containing a precious metal in its
soil or rock. It is usuallyused in mining jargon as synonymous with the term
location, which means the act of appropriating a mining claim on the public domain
according to the established law or rules.43 A mining patentpertains to a title
granted by the government for the said mining claim.
Under the 1935 Constitution, which took effect on November 15 1935, the
alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, was
expressly prohibited. The natural resources being referred therein included mineral
lands of public domain, but not mineral lands that at the time the 1935 Constitution
took effect no longer formed part of the public domain. Consequently, such
prohibition against the alienation of natural resources did not apply to a mining
claim or patent existing prior to November 15, 1935. Jurisprudence has enlightened
us on this point.
In McDaniel v. Apacible,44 the petitioner sought to prohibit the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from leasing a parcel of petroleum land in San
Narciso in Province of Tayabas. He claimed that on June 7, 1916 he entered an
unoccupied land in San Narciso and located therein three petroleum mineral claims
in accordance with the Philippine Bill of 1902; that on July 15, 1916, here corded the
three mineral claims with the mining office of the Municipality of Lucena through
notices of location under the names Maglihi No. 1, Maglihi No. 2, and Maglihi No. 3;
that he had been in open and continuous possession of the claims since June 7,
1916; that in 1918, he drilled five wells on said claims and made discoveries of
petroleum on them; thaton June 18, 1921, respondent Juan Cuisia applied with
respondent Galicano Apacible, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, for the lease of a land whose boundaries included his three claims; that
he protested in writing to Secretary Apacible the inclusion in the Cuisia lease
application of his three mineral claims; that Secretary Apacible denied his
protest,and was about to grant the lease application by virtue of Act No. 2932;
thatsaid law, in so far as it purported to declare open to lease lands containing
petroleum oil on which mineral claims had been validly located and held, and upon
which discoveries of petroleum oil had been made, was void and unconstitutional
for it deprived him of his property without due process of law and without
compensation; and that Secretary Apacible was without jurisdiction to lease to
Cuisia his mining claims. The Court granted the petition, ruling as follows:
Mr. Lindlay, one of the highest authorities on Mining Law, has discussed extensively
the question now before us. (Lindlay on Mines, vol. I, sections 322, 539.)
The general rule is that a perfected, valid appropriation of public mineral lands
operates as a withdrawalof the tract from the body of the public domain, and so long
as such appropriation remains valid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is
deemed private property. A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the
highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the
effect of a grant (patent) by the United States of the right of present and exclusive
possession of the lands located. And even though the locator may obtain a patent to
such lands, his patent adds but little to his security. (18 Ruling Case Law, p. 1152
and cases cited.)
The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is entitled to
the exclusive possession and enjoyment against everyone, including the
Government itself. Where there is a valid and perfected location of a mining claim,
the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the
locator.
It was said by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, "The Government itself
cannot abridge the rights of the miner to a perfected valid location of public mineral
land. The Government may not destroy the locator's right by withdrawing the land
from entry or placing it in a state of reservation." (Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U. S., 279;
Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U. S., 431.)
A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance
with the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by
the United States of the present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and
this exclusive right of possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of
the location. There is no provision for, nor suggestion of, a prior termination thereof.
(Gwillim vs. Donnellan, 115 U. S., 45; Clipper Mining Co. vs. Eli Mining & Land Co.,
194 U. S., 220.)
There isno pretense in the present case that the petitioner has not complied with all
the requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral placer claims in
question, or that the claims in question were ever abandoned or forfeited by him.
The respondents may claim, however, that inasmuch as a patent has not been issued
to the petitioner, he has acquired no property right in said mineral claims. But the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Union Oil Co, vs. Smith (249 U. S.,
337), and St. Louis Mining & Milling Co, vs. Montana Mining Co. (171 U. S., 650), held
that even without a patent, the possessory right of a locator after discovery of
minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact
that the paramount title to the land is in the United States. There is no conflict in the
rulings of the Court upon that question. With one voice they affirm thatwhen the
right to a patent exists, the full equitable title has passed to the purchaser or to the
locator with all the benefits, immunities, and burdens of ownership, and that no
third party can acquire from the Government any interest as against him. (Manuel
vs. Wulff, 152 U. S., 504, and cases cited.)
Even without a patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator after discovery of
minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact
that the paramount title to the land is in the Government, and it is capable of
transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or devise. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S.,
337; Forbes vs. Jarcey, 94 U. 4S., 762; Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U. S., 279; Del Monte
Mining Co. vs. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U. S., 55;Elver vs. Wood, 208 U. S., 226,
232.)
Actual and continuous occupation of a valid mining location, based upon discovery,
is not essential to the preservation of the possessory right. The right is lost only by
abandonment as by nonperformance of the annual labor required. (Union Oil Co. vs.
Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Farrell vs. Lockhart, 210 U. S., 142; Bradford vs. Morrison, 212
U. S., 389.)
The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location
perfects his claim and his location not only against third persons, but also against
the Government. A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest
sense of that term, which may be sold and conveyed, and will pass by descent, and is
not therefore subject to the disposal of the Government. (Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U. S.,
279, 283; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U. S., 431; Consolidated Mutual Oil
Co. vs. United States, 245 Fed. Rep., 521; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131, 136,
137.)
The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located,
and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States
Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment
of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were
exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of
public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and,
of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterward included in
a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former
location. By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the
public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S.,
337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc, 546.)
From all of the foregoing arguments and authorities we must conclude that,
inasmuch as the petitioner had located, held and perfected his location of the
mineral lands inquestion, and had actually discovered petroleum oil therein, he had
acquired a property right in said claims; that said Act No. 2932, which deprives him
of such right, without due process of law, is in conflict with section 3 of the Jones
Law, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. Therefore the demurrer herein is
hereby overruled, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that, unless the respondents
answer the petition herein within a period of five days from notice hereof, that a
final judgment beentered, granting the remedy prayed for in the petition. So
ordered.45
In Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez,46 the petitioner prayed that Eulogio
Rodriguez as the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, as
the Director of the Bureau of Mines, be compelled to approve its application for
patent on a certain mining claim. It alleged that it owned the Nob Fraction mineral
claim situated in Itogon, Mountain Province, and located on public lands by C. L.
O’Dowd in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902; that said
claim was located on January 1,1929, and was registered in the office of the mining
recorder of Mountain Province on January 7, 1929; that by itself and its
predecessor-in-interest it had been in continuous and exclusive possession of the
claim from the date of location thereof; and that prior to November 15, 1935, it filed
an application for patent but both respondents failed and refused to grant the
application despite its having complied with all the requirements of the law for the
issuance of such patent. On the other hand, the respondents contended that the
petitioner was not entitled as a matter of right to a patent to said mineral claim
because the 1935 Constitution provided that "natural resources, with the exception
of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated."The Court ordered the
respondents to dispose of the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the
prohibition against the alienation of natural resources provided in Section 1, Article
XII of the 1935 Constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137, explaining:
This is one of several cases now pending in this court which call for an
interpretation, a determination of the meaning and scope, of section 1 of Article XII
of the Constitution, with reference to mining claims. The cases have been instituted
as test cases, with a view to determining the status, under the Constitution and the
Mining Act (Commonwealth Act No. 137), of the holders of unpatented mining
claims which were located under the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, as amended.
In view of the importance of the matter, we deem it conducive to the public interest
to meet squarelythe fundamental question presented, disregarding for that purpose
certain discrepancies found in the pleadings filed in this case. This is in accord with
the view expressed by the Solicitor-General in his memorandum where he says that
"the statements of facts in both briefs of the petitioners may be accepted for the
purpose of the legal issues raised. We deny some of the allegations in the petitions
and allege new ones in our answers, but these discrepancies are not of such a nature
or importance as should necessitate introduction of evidence before the cases are
submitted for decision. From our view of the cases, these may be submitted on the
facts averred in the complaints, leaving out the difference between the allegations
inthe pleadings to be adjusted or ironed out by the parties later, which, we are
confident, can be accomplished without much difficulty.
Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution reads as follows:
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall
not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant."
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention
to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the
constitutional provisions themselves. It is clear that the foregoing constitutional
provision prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land. It seems likewise clear that the term "natural resources," as used
therein, includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not mineral lands which at
the time the provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain. The
reason for this conclusion is found in the terms of the provision itself. It first
declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, etc.,
and other natural resources of the Philippines, belong to the State. It then provides
that "their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centumof the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing
right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution." Next comes the prohibition against the
alienation of natural resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation of
such natural resources as were declared to be the property of the State. And as only
"agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain" were declared
property of the State, it is fair to conclude that mineral lands which at the time the
constitutional provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain, do
not come within the prohibition.
This brings us to the inquiry of whether the mining claim involved in the present
proceeding formed part of the public domain on November 15, 1935, when the
provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective in accordance with
section 6 of Article XV thereof. In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that
a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in
the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them.
"Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar
with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate,
and upon which theyexpress their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry
vs.Truax, 13 N. D., 181; 99 N. W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.)
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was
perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth
was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and
applied by this court in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil., 749), a valid
location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the
court in that case: "The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit
on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of
the United States Governmentto deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession
and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands
and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The
reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands
afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the
validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is
segregated from the public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co.
vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc., 546.)"
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area
from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the
claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and
conditions prescribed by law. "Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the
area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator."
(St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co., 171 U. S., 650, 655; 43 Law.
ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a
grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the
right to the exclusive enjoyment ofall the surface ground as well as of all the
minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral rights of
adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance
of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his
location, made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues" (18 R. C. L., 1152.) In Noyes vs. Mantle (127 U. S.,
348, 351; 32 Law. ed., 168, 170), the court said:
"There is no pretense in this case that the original locators did not comply-with all
the requirements of the 1aw in making the location of the Pay Streak Lode Mining
claim, or that the claim was ever abandoned or forfeited. They were the discoverers
of the claim. They marked its boundaries by stakes, so that they could be readily
traced. They posted the required notice, which was duly recorded in compliance
with the regulations of the district. They had thus done all that was necessary under
the law for the acquisition of an exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of
the ground. The claim was thenceforth their property. They needed only a patent of
the United States to render their title perfect, and that they could obtain at any time
upon proof what they had done in locating the claim, and of subsequent
expenditures to a specified amount in developing it. Until the patent issued the
government held the title in trust for the locators or their vendees. The ground itself
was not afterwards open to sale."
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was said:
"The rule is established by innumerable decisions of this court, and of state and
lower Federal courts, thatwhen the location of a mining claim is perfected under the
law, it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and
exclusive possession. The claim is property in the fullest sense of that term; and may
be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right or title of
the United States. The right of the owner is taxable by the state; and is 'real
property,' subject to the lien of a judgment recovered against the owner in a state or
territorial court. (Belk vs. Neagher, 104 U. S., 279, 283; 26 L. ed., 735, 737; 1 Mor.
Min. Rep., 510; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U. S., 505, 510, 511; 38 L. ed., 532-534; 14, Sup.
Ct. Rep., 651; 18Mor. Min. Rep., 85; Elder vs.Wood, 208 U. S., 226, [317] 232; 52 L.
ed., 464, 466; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 263; Bradford vs.Morrison, 212 U. S., 389; 53 L. ed.,
564; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep., 349.) The owner is not required to purchase the claim or
secure patent from the United States; but so long as he complies with the provisions
of the mining laws, his possessory right,for all practical purposes of ownership, is as
good as though secured by patent." (Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.
S., 306; 74 Law. ed., 445.)
The Solicitor-General admits in his memorandum that the decision in the McDaniel
case is determinative, of the fundamental question involved in the instant case. But
he maintains "that this decision is based on a misapprehension of the authorities on
which the court relied," and that it "is not well founded and should be abandoned."
We do not deem it necessary to belabor this point. Whether well-founded or not, the
decision in that case was the law when section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution
became effective; and even if we weredisposed to overrule that decision now, our
action could not affect rights already fixed under it.
Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no longer formed
part of the public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution
became effective, it does not come within the prohibition against the alienation of
natural resources; and the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
It remains to consider whether mandamus is the proper remedy in this case. In
Wilbur vs.United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that"mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of the Interior to dispose
of an application for a patent for a mining claim on its merits, where his refusal to do
so is based on his misinterpretation of a statute." In the course of its decision the
court said: "While the decisions of this court exhibit a reluctance to direct a writ of
mandamus against an executive officer, they recognize the duty to do so by settled
principles of law in some cases. (Lane vs.Hoglund, 244 U. S., 174, 181; 61 L. ed.,
1066, 1069; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 552; and case cited.) In Roberts vs.United States (176
U. S., 221, 231; 44 L. ed., 443, 447; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 376), referred to and quoted in
the Hoglund case, this court said:
"’Every statute to some extent requires construction by the public officer whose
duties may be defined therein. Such officer must read the law, and he must
therefore, in a certainsense, construe it, in order to form a judgment from its
language what duty he is directed by the statute to perform. But that does not
necessarily and in all cases make the duty of the officer anything other than a purely
ministerial one. If the law direct him to perform an act in regard to which no
discretion is committed to him, and which, upon the facts existing, he is bound to
perform, then that act is ministerial, although depending upon a statute which
requires, in some degree a construction of its language by the officer. Unless this be
so, the value of this writ is very greatly impaired. Every executive officer whose duty
is plainly devolved upon him by a statute might refuse to perform it, and when his
refusal isbrought before the court he might successfully plead that the performance
of the duty involved the construction of a statute by him, and therefore it was not
ministerial, and the court would on that account be powerless to give relief. Such a
limitation of the powers of the court, we think, would be most unfortunate, as it
would relieve from judicial supervision all executive officers in the performance of
their duties, whenever they should plead that the duty required of them arose upon
the construction of a statute, no matter how plain its language, nor how plainly
theyviolated their duty in refusing to perform the act required.'" In the instant case,
we are not justified, upon the state of the pleadings, to grant the relief sought by the
petitioner. Considering, however, that the refusal of the respondents to act on the
application for a patent on its merits was due to their misinterpretation of certain
constitutional and statutory provisions, following the precedent established by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic,
supra, a writ of mandamus should issue directing the respondents to dispose of the
application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition against the
alienation of natural resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of the
Constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137. So ordered.47
The foregoing rulings wereapplied and cited in Salacot Mining Company v.
Rodriguez,48 Republic v. Court of Appeals49 and Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals.50 Here, the records show that TCT Nos. 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 and 98
involved six parcels of land with an area of 248.342 hectares situated in Barrio
Larap and Santa Elena, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.51 The
TCTs were transferred tothe MBC and PCIB after PIMI’s properties were sold in the
foreclosure sale conducted on December 20, 1975.52 Consequently, new TCTs,
namely: TCT Nos. 14565, 14566, 14567, 14568, 14569 and 14570, were issued to
MBC and PCIB cancelling TCT Nos. 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 and 98.53 MBC and BDO, as
registered owners of said lands, subsequently sold the same to Yinlu by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale.54 Hence, TCT Nos. 72336, 72337, 72338, 72339, 72340 and
72341 were issued to Yinlu as the new registered owner.55
It also appears that TCT Nos. 94, 95, 96 and 97 covered mining lands with an
aggregate area of 192 hectares. The lands wereoriginally registered in 1925, and the
TCTs were issued toPIMI in 1930. These TCTs of PIMI corresponded to more than
half of the areas involved in Trans-Asia’s MPSA. However, the TCTs of PIMI
constituted mining patents and mining claims of the lands they covered. TCT No. 94
was issued pursuant to Patent No. 15 under the Busser Placer Claim; TCT No.
95,Patent No. 16 under the Superior Placer Claim; TCT No. 96, Patent No. 17 under
the Bussemer Placer Claim; and TCT No. 97, Patent No. 18 under the Rescue Placer
Claim.56 Considering that these TCTs werevalidly transferred to Yinlu by virtue of
the deed of absolute sale, and with the consequent issuance of TCT Nos. 72336,
72337, 72338 and 72339 in itsname, Yinlu was the owner and holder of the mining
patents entitled not only to whatever was on the surface but also to the minerals
found underneath the surface.
The lands and minerals covered by Yinlu’s mining patents are private properties.
The Government, whether through the DENR or the MGB, could not alienate or
dispose of the lands or mineral through the MPSA granted to Trans-Asia or any
other person or entity. Yinlu had the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize
the minerals therein, and it could legally transfer or assign such exclusive right. We
uphold the rulings of the DENR Secretary and the OP to exclude the disputed areas
that had been established to belong exclusively to Yinlu as registered owner to be
taken out of the coverage of Trans-Asia’s MPSA.
Still, Trans-Asia insists that Yinlu’s mining patents should no longer be recognized
because they were not registered pursuant to Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No.
463, which read: Section 100. Old Valid Mining Rights May Come Under This Decree.
Holders of valid and subsisting mining locations and other rights under other laws,
irrespective of the areas covered, may avail of the rights and privileges granted
under this Decree by making the necessary application therefor and approval
thereof by the Director within a period of two (2) years from the dateof approval of
this Decree.
Section 101. Recognition and Survey of Old Subsisting Mining Claims. All mining
grants patents, locations, leases and permits subsisting at the time of the approval of
this Decree shall be recognized if registered pursuant to Section 100 hereof:
Provided, That Spanish Royal Grants and unpatented mining claims located and
registered under the Act of the United States Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Philippine Bill", as shall be surveyed within one (1) year
from the approval of this Decree: Provided, further, That no such mining rights shall
be recognized if there is failure to comply with the fundamental requirements of the
respective grants: And provided, finally, That such grants, patents, locations, leases
orpermits as may be recognized by the Director after proper investigation shall
comply with the applicable provisions of this Decree, more particularly with the
annual work obligations, submittal of reports, fiscal provisions and other
obligations.
Trans-Asia submits that because MBC/BDO did not comply with the requirement for
the registration of the patents, Yinlu’s mining rights should now be deemed
abandoned because no title or right was passed to it. In that sense, Trans-Asia
maintains that Yinlu had no vested right. We disagree with Trans-Asia.
Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 require registration and annual
work obligations, Section 99 of PD No. 463 nevertheless expressly provides that the
provisions of PD No. 463 shall not apply if their application will impair vested rights
under other mining laws, viz: Section 99. Non-impairment of Vested or Acquired
Substantive Rights. Changes made and new provisionsand rules laid down by this
Decree which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
order mining laws previously in force shall have no retroactive effect. Provided,
That the provisions of this Decree which are procedural in nature shall prevail.
The concept of a vested right was discussed and applied in Ayog v. Cusi Jr.57 Therein,
the Director of Land sawarded on January 21, 1953 to Biñan Development Co, Inc.
(BDCI) a parcel of land on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application. BDCI filed an
ejectment suit against the occupants of the land who had refused to vacate. In its
judgment, the trial court ordered the occupants to vacate the land. The judgment
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. BDCI thenmoved for the
execution of the trial court’s judgment, but the occupants opposed on the ground
that the adoption of the 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973,
was a supervening event that rendered it legally impossible to execute the trial
court’s judgment. They invoked the constitutional prohibition that "no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in the area." The Court rejected the
invocation, and ruled that BDCI had a vested right in the land, to wit:
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the
sales application of Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it already acquired a vested
right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution.1âwphi1 Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporation to purchase public lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four
hectares. Petitioners’ prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some
particular person or persons as a present interest.’ (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the
privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights
of property conferred by existing law" (12 C.J. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or
interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open
to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount, 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. ‘A state may not
impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the
State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power’ (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses the concept
of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just an imperative right
which an enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual
rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).58
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,59 we stated that mining rights acquired under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were
vested rights that could not be impaired even by the Government. Indeed, the
mining patents ofYinlu were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were
subsisting prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and
its predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral
lands that could not and should not be impaired even in light of their past failure to
comply with the requirement of registration and annual work obligations.
Relevantly, we advert to the DENR’s finding that PIMI’s failure to register the
patents in 1974 pursuant to PD No. 463 was excusable because of its suffering
financial losses at that time, which eventually led to the foreclosure of the mortgages
on its assets by the MBC and PCIB as its creditors.60 The failure of Yinlu’s
predecessors-in-interest to register and perform annual work obligations did not
automatically mean that they had already abandoned their mining rights, and that
such rights had already lapsed. For one, the DENR itself declaredthat it had not
issued any specific order cancelling the mining patents.61 Also, the tenets of due
process required that Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest be given written notice
of their non-compliance with PD No. 463 and the ample opportunity to comply. If
they still failed to comply despite such notice and opportunity, then written notice
must further be given informing them of the cancellation of their mining patents. In
the absence of any showing that the DENR had provided the written notice and
opportunity to Yinlu and its predecessors-ininterest to that effect, it would really be
inequitable to consider them to have abandoned their patents, or to consider the
patents as having lapsed. Verily, as held in McDaniel and Gold Creek, supra, a mining
patent obtained under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was a protected private property.
The protection should be basic and guaranteed, for no less than Section 1, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution decrees that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law.
Nonetheless, we deem it significant to remind that Yinlu has been directed by the
DENR to henceforth conduct its mining operations in accordance with Republic Act
No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) and its implementing rules and
regulations.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on October 30,
2012 by the Court of Appeals; REINSTATE the decision issued on May 4, 2010 and
resolutions dated June 29, 2010 and March 31, 2011 by the Office of the President in
O.P. Case No. 09-L-638; and DIRECT the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 112.
2 Id. at 113.
3 Id. at 168-193.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 112-114.
7 Id. at 114.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 127.
10 Id. at 123-128.
11 Id. at 127-128.
12 Id. at 128.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 129-144.
15 Id. at 121-122.
16 Id. at 112-118.
17 Id. at 116-118.
18 Id. at 110.
19 Id. at 104-107.
20 Id. at 107.
21Id. at 47-66; penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz, with Associate Justice
Noel G. Tijam and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, concurring.
22 Id. at 56-66.
23 Id. at 66.
24 Id. at 70-72.
25 Id. at 15-16.
26 Id. at 17-20.
27Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic
Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (n)
28Section 4. Period of appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its
last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner’smotion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (n)
29 Rollo, pp. 360.
30 Id. at 73-100.
31 Id. at 53-56.
32Securities and Exchange Commissionv. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 164314,
September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 451, 466.
33 Id. at 468.
34 Id. at 465-466.
35Air France Philippines v. Leachon, G.R. No. 134113, October 12, 2005, 472 SCRA
439, 442-443; Balgami v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131287, December 9,2004, 445
SCRA 591, 602.
36In the United States, a "placer claim" granted to the discoverer of valuable
minerals contained in loose material such as sand or gravel the right to mine on
public land (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_placer_claim);
As used in the United States Revised Statutes, a "placer claim" means ground that
includes valuable deposits not in place, that is, not fixed in rock, but which are in a
loose state. (Narciso Peña, Philippine Law on Natural Resources, 111 (1997).
37 Rollo, pp. 20-34.
38 Id. at 34-35.
39 Id. at 35.
40 Narciso Peña, Philippine Law on Natural Resources, 104 (1997).
41Atok Big-Wedge Mining Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 63528,
September 9, 1996, 261 SCRA 528, 546.
42 Section 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine
Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to
exploration, occupation, and purchase, and the land in which they are found to
occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said Islands:
Provided, that when on any lands in said Islands entered and occupied as
agricultural lands under the provisions of this Act, but not patented, mineral
deposits have been found, the working of such mineral deposits is hereby forbidden
until the person, association, or corporation who or which has entered and is
occupying such lands shall have paid to the Government of said Islands such
additional sum or sums as will make the total amount paid for the mineral claim or
claims in which said deposits are located equal to the amount charged by the
Government for the same as mineral claims.
43 Narciso Peña, supra note 40, at 110.
44 42 Phil. 749 (1922).
45 Id. at 753-756.
46 66 Phil. 259 (1938).
47 Id. at 262-269.
48 67 Phil. 97 (1939).
49 Nos. L-43938, L-44081, L-44092, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 228.
50 G.R. No. 88883, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 71.
51 Rollo, p. 124.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 215-217.
55 Id. at 124 and 460-516.
56 Id. at 124, 127-128 and 460-516.
57 No. L-46729, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 492.
58 Id. at 498-499.
 59 Supra note 49, at 233 and 239-240.
60 Rollo, p. 128.
61 Id.

G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL -
ARROYO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191032
JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191057
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO
APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191149
JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.;
NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE’S LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past
President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in his own personal capacity
as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG
ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN
SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE)
CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY)
SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN
NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD
RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL
UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES;
COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA;
and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA.
CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES;
WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA
GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA;
LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE LEON; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
JR.;Intervenors.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191342
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY.
ROLAND B. INTING (IBPGovernor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191420
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No.
191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of
merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar
Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be
created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief
Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in
the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto
in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Motions for Reconsideration
Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting
(G.R. No. 191342), and Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as intervenors
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert
S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang Bayan and others (BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso
V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP); Marlou B.
Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et
al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Also filing a motion for
reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention was
allowed.
We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration,
in the aforegiven order:
Soriano
1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the
power to designate the Chief Justice belonged to the Supreme Court en banc.
2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory
judgment and did not involve a justiciable controversy.
3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. The mere fact that
the Chief Justice sits as ex officio head of the JBC should not prevail over the more
compelling state interest for him to participate as a Member of the Court.
Tolentino and Inting
1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts
judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.
2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made distinctions and has created
exemptions when none exists.
3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it
limits an executive, not a judicial, power.
4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is
powerless to vary the terms of the clear prohibition.
5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby,
the Court has raised the Constitution to the level of a venerated text whose intent can only
be divined by its framers as to be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign
people that ratified it.
6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.
7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal standing to question the
illegal composition of the JBC.
Philippine Bar Association
1. The Court’s strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that
the Court should not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than what is required
by the precise facts of the case.
2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of the
Court is to apply it. The provision expressly and clearly provides a general limitation on the
appointing power of the President in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any
position in the Government without any qualification and distinction.
3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against
midnight appointments.
4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition against
midnight appointments, and the creation of the JBC. It is not within the authority of the
Court to prefer one over the other, for the Court’s duty is to apply the safeguards as they
are, not as the Court likes them to be.
5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in
interpreting the Constitution.
6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section headings, despite
precedents on statutory construction holding that such headings carried very little weight.
7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments, and the only
exception is that on temporary appointments to executive positions.
8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of
the candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno with a view to submitting the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President
Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010. The Constitution grants the Court only the power of
supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot tell the JBC what to do, how to do it, or
when to do it, especially in the absence of a real and justiciable case assailing any specific
action or inaction of the JBC.
9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in
speculations.
10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the Court’s directing the
JBC to comply with the decision constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution and the
commission of an election offense.
11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously
formulated by the Court en banc.
12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the
incumbent is indisposed. Thus, the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is not
urgently necessary.
13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to
prolong the outgoing President’s powers by means of proxies. The attempt of the
incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate
her power beyond her term of office.
IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.
1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies to
appointments to the Judiciary. Hence, no cogent reason exists to warrant the reversal of the
Valenzuela pronouncement.
2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the
Constitutional Commissions and the JBC with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Its phrase "other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation on the appointing power of the President
extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 of
Article VII apply to all presidential appointments in the Executive and Judicial Branches of
the Government.
3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting
Chief Justice in all cases.
Lim
1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Court’s exercise of judicial review.
2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Court and to other appointments to the Judiciary.
3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of
Article VII against midnight appointments in the Judiciary.
Corvera
1. The Court’s exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on
midnight appointments is based on an interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal
language of the Constitution.
2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the
Executive and Judicial Departments. The application of the principle of verba legis
(ordinary meaning) would have obviated dwelling on the organization and arrangement of
the provisions of the Constitution. If there is any ambiguity in Section 15, Article VII, the
intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political partisanship in all branches of the
Government, should have controlled.
3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on
compartmentalization and physical arrangement, especially considering that the
Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the
Constitution should yield to the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.
5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in
accord with the Constitution.
BAYAN, et al.
1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did
not present a justiciable controversy. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication,
considering that the office of the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has
yet to decide whether or not to submit a list of nominees to the President.
2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the
opinion of Justice Regalado.
3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court
has violated the principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat (which mandates that the
Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be
harmonized as to fully give effect to all). There is no conflict between the provisions; they
complement each other.
4. The form and structure of the Constitution’s titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship
carry little weight in statutory construction. The clear and plain language of Section 15,
Article VII precludes interpretation.
Tan, Jr.
1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy. The clash of legal
rights and interests in the present case are merely anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with
certainty, no actual vacancy in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred.
2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the
Judiciary runs in conflict with long standing principles and doctrines of statutory
construction. The provision admits only one exception, temporary appointments in the
Executive Department. Thus, the Court should not distinguish, because the law itself makes
no distinction.
3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended
the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary. Hence, giving
more weight to the opinion of Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in
Valenzuela was unwarranted.
4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day
mandate to fill any vacancy lasts until August 15, 2010, or a month and a half after the end
of the ban. The next President has roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent
President (i.e., 44 days) within which to scrutinize and study the qualifications of the next
Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than enough opportunity to examine the nominees
without haste and political uncertainty.1avvphi1
5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII
is suspended.
6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17,
2010. The directive to the JBC sanctions a culpable violation of the Constitution and
constitutes an election offense.
7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice, because the Court
sits en banc, even when it acts as the sole judge of all contests relative to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President and Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of
the Court can validly comprise the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
WTLOP
1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for
Chief Justice to the President on or before May 17, 2010, and to continue its proceedings for
the nomination of the candidates, because it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the
JBC a deadline not provided by law or the Constitution; exercised control instead of mere
supervision over the JBC; and lacked sufficient votes to reverse Valenzuela.
2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic principle of
statutory construction to the effect that the literal meaning of the law must be applied
when it is clear and unambiguous; and that we should not distinguish where the law does
not distinguish.
3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of
1948 already provides that the power and duties of the office devolve on the most senior
Associate Justice in case of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice.
Ubano
1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal, needs no
interpretation
2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to the organization and
arrangement of its provisions.
3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15, Article VII and the
pertinent records of the Constitutional Commission are clear and unambiguous.
4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by
May 17, 2010 at the latest, because no specific law requires the JBC to submit the list of
nominees even before the vacancy has occurred.
Boiser
1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on midnight
appointments is the temporary appointment to an executive position. The limitation is in
keeping with the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to place a restriction on the
power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make appointments.
2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight
appointments makes the appointee beholden to the outgoing Chief Executive, and
compromises the independence of the Chief Justice by having the outgoing President be
continually influential.
3. The Court’s reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the
principle of stare decisis.
Bello, et al.
1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing
President is prohibited from making within the prescribed period. Plain textual reading
and the records of the Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on
midnight appointments extends to judicial appointments.
2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The subordinate subject to
oversight must first act not in accord with prescribed rules before the act can be redone to
conform to the prescribed rules.
3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did
not present a justiciable controversy.
Pimentel
1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable, rational, and conformable
to the general intent of the Constitution as a limitation to the powers of Government and as
a bastion for the protection of the rights of the people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly
conflicting provisions of the Constitution, the interpretation should always be one that
protects the citizenry from an ever expanding grant of authority to its representatives.
2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally
repugnant to republican constitutional democracy, and is tantamount to a judicial
amendment of the Constitution without proper authority.
Comments
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their
respective comments, thus:
OSG
1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the
position of Chief Justice.
2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice.
3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary.
4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from
the ban on midnight appointments.1awph!1
5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as
other related matters.
JBC
1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC
has not yet decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the incumbent President
has the power to appoint the new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to
interview the candidates, has not submitted a short list to the President.
2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is
necessary for the President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft of
constitutional and legal basis. The statement undermines the independence of the JBC.
3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional
mandate and its implementing rules and regulations.
For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even
if the OSG and the JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so. He states that the
motions for reconsideration were directed at the administrative matter he initiated and
which the Court resolved. His comment asserts:
1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision
and the separate opinion.
2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Court’s power of supervision over the
JBC as provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as distinguished from the
Court’s adjudicatory power under Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for
judicial review are not required, which was why Valenzuela was docketed as an
administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a position on when to
submit the short list to the proper appointing authority, it has effectively solicited the
exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the JBC.
3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the
Constitution.
4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent
of Justice Carpio Morales, as well as in some of the motions for reconsideration do not refer
to either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on
nepotism).
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby
raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010.
Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification
and emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and
accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.1
The contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e.,
to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a
principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling
the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same
jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of
competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of
appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts
and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. 2
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that
must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of
those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like ours,
the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate
authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested
with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights.4
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow
blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a
rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like
the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours
is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly
followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent
in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in
the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The
application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or
reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is,
therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the
Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse
a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.7
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the
Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments
during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the
Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1),
Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the
Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to
include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during
his or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to
include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication,"8 such
that the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII even completely
omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:
Section 13. xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not
apply to appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused
to apply many principles of statutory construction.
The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening
their avowed reliance on the principles of statutory construction.
For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express
extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the
Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.
Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and
Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article
VII during the period provided therein, despite the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet,
construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would generally constitute an
encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and
Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no
words can be interpolated in them.9Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law
is more than likely to fail to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other
words, the addition of new words may alter the thought intended to be conveyed. And,
even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted
word or words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative
intent is in the language of the law itself.10
Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point
in order to suit the purposes of any quarter.
Final Word
It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving
that because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent
President, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the
successor of the retiring Chief Justice.
The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.
The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the
issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the
outgoing President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged the current
situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court could have
prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a
decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements were
mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the
vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence.
Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the
Constitution to settle the controversy.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido
B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408.
2 Price & Bitner, Effective Legal Research, Little, Brown & Co., New York (1962), § 9.7.
3 Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar, No. L-19650, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 247
4 E.g., Dias, Jurisprudence, Butterworths, London, 1985, Fifth Edition, p. 127.
5Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118509, September 5, 1996, 261
SCRA 464.
6See Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Harvard University Press, p. 4
(1982) and endnote 12 of the page, which essentially recounts that the strict application of
the doctrine of stare decisis is true only in a common-law jurisdiction like England (citing
Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 Wayne Law Review, 1043, 1046-1047 (1975).
Calabresi recalls that the English House of Lords decided in 1898 (London Tramways Co. v.
London County Council, A.C. 375) that they could not alter precedents laid down by the
House of Lords acting as the supreme court in previous cases, but that such precedents
could only be altered by an Act of Parliament, for to do otherwise would mean that the
courts would usurp legislative function; he mentions that in 1966, Lord Chancellor
Gardiner announced in a Practice Statement a kind of general memorandum from the court
that while: "Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation
upon which to decide what is the law," they "nevertheless recognize that too rigid
adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict
the proper development of the law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present
practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart
from a previous decision when it appears right to do so." (Calabresi cites Leach,
Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 Harvard Law
Review, 797 (1967).
7 Section 4 (2), Article VIII, provides:
xxx
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence
of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc;
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered
en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
8Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, July 31, 1986, RCC No. 44. pp. 542-
543.
9 Smith v. State, 66 Md. 215, 7 Atl. 49.
10 State ex rel Everding v. Simon, 20 Ore. 365, 26 Pac. 170.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
No compelling reason exists for the Court to deny a reconsideration of the assailed
Decision. The various motions for reconsideration raise hollering substantial arguments
and legitimately nagging questions which the Court must meet head on.
If this Court is to deserve or preserve its revered place not just in the hierarchy but also in
history, passion for reason demands the issuance of an extended and extensive resolution
that confronts the ramifications and repercussions of its assailed Decision. Only then can it
offer an illumination that any self-respecting student of the law clamors and any adherent
of the law deserves. Otherwise, it takes the risk of reeking of an objectionable air of
supreme judicial arrogance.
It is thus imperative to settle the following issues and concerns:
Whether the incumbent President is constitutionally proscribed from appointing the
successor of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 until
the ban ends at 12:00 noon of June 30, 2010
1. In interpreting the subject constitutional provisions, the Decision disregarded
established canons of statutory construction. Without explaining the inapplicability of each
of the relevant rules, the Decision immediately placed premium on the arrangement and
ordering of provisions, one of the weakest tools of construction, to arrive at its conclusion.
2. In reversing Valenzuela, the Decision held that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest
on ConCom deliberations, yet it did not offer to cite a material ConCom deliberation. It
instead opted to rely on the memory of Justice Florenz Regalado which incidentally
mentioned only the "Court of Appeals." The Decision’s conclusion must rest on the strength
of its own favorable Concom deliberation, none of which to date has been cited.
3. Instead of choosing which constitutional provision carves out an exception from the
other provision, the most legally feasible interpretation (in the limited cases of temporary
physical or legal impossibility of compliance, as expounded in my Dissenting Opinion) is to
consider the appointments ban or other substantial obstacle as a temporary impossibility
which excuses or releases the constitutional obligation of the Office of the President for the
duration of the ban or obstacle.
In view of the temporary nature of the circumstance causing the impossibility of
performance, the outgoing President is released from non-fulfillment of the obligation to
appoint, and the duty devolves upon the new President. The delay in the fulfillment of the
obligation becomes excusable, since the law cannot exact compliance with what is
impossible. The 90-day period within which to appoint a member of the Court is thus
suspended and the period could only start or resume to run when the temporary obstacle
disappears (i.e., after the period of the appointments ban; when there is already a quorum
in the JBC; or when there is already at least three applicants).
Whether the Judicial and Bar Council is obliged to submit to the President the
shortlist of nominees for the position of Chief Justice (or Justice of this Court) on or
before the occurrence of the vacancy.
1. The ruling in the Decision that obligates the JBC to submit the shortlist to the President
on or before the occurrence of the vacancy in the Court runs counter to the Concom
deliberations which explain that the 90-day period is allotted for both the nomination by
the JBC and the appointment by the President. In the move to increase the period to 90
days, Commissioner Romulo stated that "[t]he sense of the Committee is that 60 days is
awfully short and that the [Judicial and Bar] Council, as well as the President, may have
difficulties with that."
2. To require the JBC to submit to the President a shortlist of nominees on or before the
occurrence of vacancy in the Court leads to preposterous results. It bears reiterating that
the requirement is absurd when, inter alia, the vacancy is occasioned by the death of a
member of the Court, in which case the JBC could never anticipate the death of a Justice,
and could never submit a list to the President on or before the occurrence of vacancy.
3. The express allowance in the Constitution of a 90-day period of vacancy in the
membership of the Court rebuts any public policy argument on avoiding a vacuum of even
a single day without a duly appointed Chief Justice. Moreover, as pointed out in my
Dissenting Opinion, the practice of having an acting Chief Justice in the interregnum is
provided for by law, confirmed by tradition, and settled by jurisprudence to be an internal
matter.
The Resolution of the majority, in denying the present Motions for Reconsideration, failed
to rebut the foregoing crucial matters.
I, therefore, maintain my dissent and vote to GRANT the Motions for Reconsideration of the
Decision of March 17, 2010 insofar as it holds that the incumbent President is not
constitutionally proscribed from appointing the successor of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 until the ban ends at 12:00 noon of June 30, 2010 and
that the Judicial and Bar Council is obliged to submit to the President the shortlist of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:
The Motions for Reconsideration
After sifting through the motions for reconsideration, I found that the arguments are
largely the same arguments that we have passed upon, in one form or another, in the
various petitions. Essentially, the issues boil down to justiciability; the conflict of
constitutional provisions; the merits of the cited constitutional deliberations; and the
status and effect of the Valenzuela1 ruling. Even the motion for reconsideration of the
Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), whose petition I did not expressly touch upon
in my Separate Opinion, basically dwells on these issues.
I have addressed most, if not all, of these issues and I submit my Separate Opinion2 as my
basic response to the motions for reconsideration, supplemented by the discussions below.
As I reflected in my Separate Opinion (which three other Justices joined),3 the election
appointment ban under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution should not apply to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court whose period for appointment is separately
provided for under Article VIII, Section 4(1). I shared this conclusion with the Court’s
Decision although our reasons differed on some points.
I diverged fully from the Decision on the question of whether we should maintain or
reverse our ruling in Valenzuela. I maintained that it is still good law; no reason exists to
touch the ruling as its main focus – the application of the election ban on the appointment
of lower court judges under Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution – is not even an issue
in the present case and was discussed only because the petitions incorrectly cited the
ruling as authority on the issue of the Chief Justice’s appointment. The Decision proposed
to reverse Valenzuela but only secured the support of five (5) votes, while my Separate
Opinion in support of Valenzuela had four (4) votes. Thus, on the whole, the Decision did
not prevail in reversing Valenzuela, as it only had five (5) votes in a field of 12 participating
Members of the Court. Valenzuela should therefore remain, as of the filing of this Opinion,
as a valid precedent.
Acting on the present motions for reconsideration, I join the majority in denying the
motions with respect to the Chief Justice issue, although we differ in some respects on the
reasons supporting the denial. I dissent from the conclusion that the Valenzuela ruling
should be reversed. My divergence from the majority’s reasons and conclusions compels
me to write this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
The Basic Requisites / Justiciability
One marked difference between the Decision and my Separate Opinion is our approach on
the basic requisites/justiciability issues. The Decision apparently glossed over this aspect
of the case, while I fully explained why the De Castro4 and Peralta5 petitions should be
dismissed outright. In my view, these petitions violated the most basic requirements of
their chosen medium for review – a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
The petitions commonly failed to allege that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) performs
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, an allegation that the petitions could not really make,
since the JBC does not really undertake these functions and, for this reason, cannot be the
subject of a petition for certiorari; hence, the petitions should be dismissed outright. They
likewise failed to facially show any failure or refusal by the JBC to undertake a
constitutional duty to justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus; they invoked judicial
notice that we could not give because there was, and is, no JBC refusal to act.6 Thus, the
mandamus aspects of these petitions should have also been dismissed outright. The
ponencia, unfortunately, failed to fully discuss these legal infirmities.
The motions for reconsideration lay major emphasis on the alleged lack of an actual case or
controversy that made the Chief Justice’s appointment a justiciable issue. They claim that
the Court cannot exercise the power of judicial review where there is no clash of legal
rights and interests or where this clash is merely anticipated, although the anticipated
event shall come with certainty.7
What the movants apparently forgot, focused as they were on their respective petitions, is
that the present case is not a single-petition case that rises or falls on the strength of that
single petition. The present case involves various petitions and interventions,8 not
necessarily pulling towards the same direction, although each one is focused on the issue of
whether the election appointment ban under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution
should apply to the appointment of the next Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Among the petitions filed were those of Tolentino (G.R. No. 191342), Soriano (G.R. No.
191032) and Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC). The first two are petitions for prohibition
under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.9 While they commonly share this medium
of review, they differ in their supporting reasons. The Mendoza petition, on the other hand,
is totally different – it is a petition presented as an administrative matter (A.M.) in the
manner that the Valenzuela case was an A.M. case. As I pointed out in the Separate Opinion,
the Court uses the A.M. docket designation on matters relating to its exercise of supervision
over all courts and their personnel.10 I failed to note then, but I make of record now, that
court rules and regulations – the outputs in the Court’s rulemaking function – are also
docketed as A.M. cases.
That an actual case or controversy involving a clash of rights and interests exists is
immediately and patently obvious in the Tolentino and Soriano petitions. At the time the
petitions were filed, the JBC had started its six-phase nomination process that would
culminate in the submission of a list of nominees to the President of the Philippines for
appointive action. Tolentino and Soriano – lawyers and citizens with interest in the strict
observance of the election ban – sought to prohibit the JBC from continuing with this
process. The JBC had started to act, without any prodding from the Court, because of its
duty to start the nomination process but was hampered by the petitions filed and the legal
questions raised that only the Supreme Court can settle with finality.11 Thus, a clash of
interests based on law existed between the petitioners and the JBC. To state the obvious, a
decision in favor of Tolentino or Soriano would result in a writ of prohibition that would
direct the JBC not to proceed with the nomination process.
The Mendoza petition cited the effect of a complete election ban on judicial appointments
(in view of the already high level of vacancies and the backlog of cases) as basis, and
submitted the question as an administrative matter that the Court, in the exercise of its
supervisory authority over the Judiciary and the JBC itself, should act upon. At the same
time, it cited the "public discourse and controversy" now taking place because of the
application of the election ban on the appointment of the Chief Justice, pointing in this
regard to the very same reasons mentioned in Valenzuela about the need to resolve the
issue and avoid the recurrence of conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary, and the
need to "avoid polemics concerning the matter."12
I recognized in the Separate Opinion that, unlike in Valenzuela where an outright defiance
of the election ban took place, no such obvious triggering event transpired in the Mendoza
petition.13 Rather, the Mendoza petition looked to the supervisory power of the Court over
judicial personnel and over the JBC as basis to secure a resolution of the election ban issue.
The JBC, at that time, had indicated its intent to look up to the Court’s supervisory power
and role as the final interpreter of the Constitution to guide it in responding to the
challenges it confronts.14 To me, this was "a point no less critical, from the point of view of
supervision, than the appointment of the two judges during the election ban period in
Valenzuela."15
In making this conclusion, I pointed out in my Separate Opinion the unavoidable
surrounding realities evident from the confluence of events, namely: (1) an election to be
held on May 10, 2010; (2) the retirement of the Chief Justice on May 17, 2010; (3) the lapse
of the terms of the elective officials from the President to the congressmen on June 30,
2010; (4) the delay before the Congress can organize and send its JBC representatives; and
(5) the expiration of the term of a non-elective JBC member in July 2010.16 All these –
juxtaposed with the Court’s supervision over the JBC, the latter’s need for guidance, and the
existence of an actual controversy on the same issues bedeviling the JBC – in my view, were
sufficient to save the Mendoza petition from being a mere request for opinion or a petition
for declaratory relief that falls under the jurisdiction of the lower court. This recognition is
beyond the level of what this Court can do in handling a moot and academic case – usually,
one that no longer presents a judiciable controversy but one that can still be ruled upon at
the discretion of the court when the constitutional issue is of paramount public interest and
controlling principles are needed to guide the bench, the bar and the public.17
To be sure, this approach in recognizing when a petition is actionable is novel. An
overriding reason for this approach can be traced to the nature of the petition, as it rests on
the Court’s supervisory authority and relates to the exercise of the Court’s administrative
rather than its judicial functions (other than these two functions, the Court also has its
rulemaking function under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution). Strictly speaking,
the Mendoza petition calls for directions from the Court in the exercise of its power of
supervision over the JBC,18 not on the basis of the power of judicial review.19 In this sense,
it does not need the actual clash of interests of the type that a judicial adjudication requires.
All that must be shown is the active need for supervision to justify the Court’s intervention
as supervising authority.
Under these circumstances, the Court’s recognition of the Mendoza petition was not an
undue stretch of its constitutional powers. If the recognition is unusual at all, it is so only
because of its novelty; to my knowledge, this is the first time ever in Philippine
jurisprudence that the supervisory authority of the Court over an attached agency has been
highlighted in this manner. Novelty, per se, however, is not a ground for objection nor a
mark of infirmity for as long as the novel move is founded in law. In this case, as in the case
of the writ of amparo and habeas data that were then novel and avowedly activist in
character, sufficient legal basis exists to actively invoke the Court’s supervisory authority –
granted under the Constitution, no less – as basis for action.
To partly quote the wording of the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 8(1) and (5) provide
that "A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court… It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to
it." Supervision, as a legal concept, more often than not, is defined in relation with the
concept of control.20 In Social Justice Society v. Atienza,21 we defined "supervision" as
follows:
[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its assigned task, i.e.,
who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to recommend. It cannot
even direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty, but it can, under its power of
supervision, direct the JBC to "take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties," if the duties are not being performed because of JBC’s fault or
inaction, or because of extraneous factors affecting performance. Note in this regard that,
constitutionally, the Court can also assign the JBC other functions and duties – a power that
suggests authority beyond what is purely supervisory.
Where the JBC itself is at a loss on how to proceed in light of disputed constitutional
provisions that require interpretation,22 the Court is not legally out of line – as the final
authority on the interpretation of the Constitution and as the entity constitutionally-tasked
to supervise the JBC – in exercising its oversight function by clarifying the interpretation of
the disputed constitutional provision to guide the JBC. In doing this, the Court is not simply
rendering a general legal advisory; it is providing concrete and specific legal guidance to
the JBC in the exercise of its supervisory authority, after the latter has asked for assistance
in this regard. That the Court does this while concretely resolving actual controversies (the
Tolentino and Soriano petitions) on the same issue immeasurably strengthens the intrinsic
correctness of the Court’s action.
It may be asked: why does the Court have to recognize the Mendoza petition when it can
resolve the conflict between Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) through
the Tolentino and Soriano petitions?
The answer is fairly simple and can be read between the lines of the above explanation on
the relationship between the Court and the JBC. First, administrative is different from
judicial function and providing guidance to the JBC can only be appropriate in the discharge
of the Court’s administrative function. Second, the resolution of the Tolentino and Soriano
petitions will lead to rulings directly related to the underlying facts of these petitions,
without clear guidelines to the JBC on the proper parameters to observe vis-à-vis the
constitutional dispute along the lines the JBC needs. In fact, concrete guidelines addressed
to the JBC in the resolution of the Tolentino/Soriano petitions may even lead to accusations
that the Court’s resolution is broader than is required by the facts of the petitions. The
Mendoza petition, because it pertains directly to the performance of the JBC’s duty and the
Court’s supervisory authority, allows the issuance of precise guidelines that will enable the
JBC to fully and seasonably comply with its constitutional mandate.
I hasten to add that the JBC’s constitutional task is not as simple as some people think it to
be. The process of preparing and submitting a list of nominees is an arduous and time-
consuming task that cannot be done overnight. It is a six-step process lined with standards
requiring the JBC to attract the best available candidates, to examine and investigate them,
to exhibit transparency in all its actions while ensuring that these actions conform to
constitutional and statutory standards (such as the election ban on appointments), to
submit the required list of nominees on time, and to ensure as well that all these acts are
politically neutral. On the time element, the JBC list for the Supreme Court has to be
submitted on or before the vacancy occurs given the 90-day deadline that the appointing
President is given in making the appointment. The list will be submitted, not to the
President as an outgoing President, nor to the election winner as an incoming President,
but to the President of the Philippines whoever he or she may be. If the incumbent
President does not act on the JBC list within the time left in her term, the same list shall be
available to the new President for him to act upon. In all these, the Supreme Court bears the
burden of overseeing that the JBC’s duty is done, unerringly and with utmost dispatch; the
Court cannot undertake this supervision in a manner consistent with the Constitution’s
expectation from the JBC unless it adopts a pro-active stance within the limits of its
supervisory authority.
The Disputed Provisions
The movants present their arguments on the main issue at several levels. Some argue that
the disputed constitutional provisions – Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1)
– are clear and speak for themselves on what the Constitution covers in banning
appointments during the election period.23 One even posits that there is no conflict because
both provisions can be given effect without one detracting against the full effectiveness of
the other,24 although the effect is to deny the sitting President the option to appoint in favor
of a deferment for the incoming President’s action. Still others, repeating their original
arguments, appeal to the principles of interpretation and latin maxims to prove their
point.25
In my discussions in the Separate Opinion, I stated upfront my views on how the disputed
provisions interact with each other. Read singly and in isolation, they appear clear (this
reading applies the "plain meaning rule" that Tolentino advocates in his motion for
reconsideration, as explained below). Arrayed side by side with each other and considered
in relation with the other provisions of the Constitution, particularly its structure and
underlying intents, the conflict however becomes obvious and unavoidable.
Section 15 on its face disallows any appointment in clear negative terms ("shall not make")
without specifying the appointments covered by the prohibition.26 From this literal and
isolated reading springs the argument that no exception is provided (except that found in
Section 15 itself) so that even the Judiciary is covered by the ban on appointments.
On the other hand, Section 4(1) is likewise very clear and categorical in its terms: any
vacancy in the Court shall be filled within 90 days from its occurrence.27 In the way of
Section 15, Section 4(1) is also clear and categorical and provides no exception; the
appointment refers solely to the Members of the Supreme Court and does not mention any
period that would interrupt, hold or postpone the 90-day requirement.
From this perspective, the view that no conflict exists cannot be seriously made, unless
with the mindset that one provision controls and the other should yield. Many of the
petitions in fact advocate this kind of reading, some of them openly stating that the power
of appointment should be reserved for the incoming President.28 The question, however, is
whether – from the viewpoint of strict law and devoid of the emotionalism and political
partisanship that permeate the present Philippine political environment – this kind of
mindset can really be adopted in reading and applying the Constitution.
In my view, this kind of mindset and the conclusion it inevitably leads to cannot be
adopted; the provisions of the Constitution cannot be read in isolation from what the whole
contains. To be exact, the Constitution must be read and understood as a whole, reconciling
and harmonizing apparently conflicting provisions so that all of them can be given full force
and effect,29 unless the Constitution itself expressly states otherwise.30
Not to be forgotten in reading and understanding the Constitution are the many established
underlying constitutional principles that we have to observe and respect if we are to be
true to the Constitution. These principles – among them the principles of checks and
balances and separation of powers – are not always expressly stated in the Constitution,
but no one who believes in and who has studied the Constitution can deny that they are
there and deserve utmost attention, respect, and even priority consideration.
In establishing the structures of government, the ideal that the Constitution seeks to
achieve is one of balance among the three great departments of government – the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary, with each department undertaking its
constitutionally-assigned task as a check against the exercise of power by the others, while
all three departments move forward in working for the progress of the nation. Thus, the
Legislature makes the laws and is supreme in this regard, in the way that the Executive is
supreme in enforcing and administering the law, while the Judiciary interprets both the
Constitution and the law. Any provision in each of the Articles on these three
departments31 that intrudes into the other must be closely examined if the provision affects
and upsets the desired balance.
Under the division of powers, the President as Chief Executive is given the prerogative of
making appointments, subject only to the legal qualification standards, to the checks
provided by the Legislature’s Commission on Appointments (when applicable) and by the
JBC for appointments in the Judiciary, and to the Constitution’s own limitations. Conflict
comes in when the Constitution laid down Article VII, Section 15 limiting the President’s
appointing power during the election period. This limitation of power would have been all-
encompassing and would, thus, have extended to all government positions the President
can fill, had the Constitution not inserted a provision, also on appointments, in the Article
on the Judiciary with respect to appointments to the Supreme Court. This conflict gives rise
to the questions: which provision should prevail, or should both be given effect? Or should
both provisions yield to a higher concern – the need to maintain the integrity of our
elections?
A holistic reading of the Constitution – a must in constitutional interpretation – dictates as
a general rule that the tasks assigned to each department and their limitations should be
given full effect to fulfill the constitutional purposes under the check and balance principle,
unless the Constitution itself expressly indicates its preference for one task, concern or
standard over the others,32 or unless this Court, in its role as interpreter of the Constitution,
has spoken on the appropriate interpretation that should be made.33
In considering the interests of the Executive and the Judiciary, a holistic approach starts
from the premise that the constitutional scheme is to grant the President the power of
appointment, subject to the limitation provided under Article VII, Section 15. At the same
time, the Judiciary is assured, without qualifications under Article VIII, Section 4(1), of the
immediate appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, i.e., within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. If both provisions would be allowed to take effect, as I believe
they should, the limitation on the appointment power of the President under Article VII,
Section 15 should itself be limited by the appointment of Members of the Court pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 4(1), so that the provision applicable to the Judiciary can be given full
effect without detriment to the President’s appointing authority. This harmonization will
result in restoring to the President the full authority to appoint Members of the Supreme
Court pursuant to the combined operation of Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section
4(1).
Viewed in this light, there is essentially no conflict, in terms of the authority to appoint,
between the Executive and Judiciary; the President would effectively be allowed to exercise
the Executive’s traditional presidential power of appointment while respecting the
Judiciary’s own prerogative. In other words, the President retains full powers to appoint
Members of the Court during the election period, and the Judiciary is assured of a full
membership within the time frame given.
Interestingly, the objection to the full application of Article VIII, Section 4(1) comes, not
from the current President, but mainly from petitioners echoing the present presidential
candidates, one of whom shall soon be the incoming President. They do not, of course, cite
reasons of power and the loss of the opportunity to appoint the Chief Justice; many of the
petitioners/intervenors oppose the full application of Article VIII, Section 4(1) based on the
need to maintain the integrity of the elections through the avoidance of a "midnight
appointment."
This "integrity" reason is a given in a democracy and can hardly be opposed on the
theoretical plane, as the integrity of the elections must indeed prevail in a true democracy.
The statement, however, begs a lot of questions, among them the question of whether the
appointment of a full Court under the terms of Article VIII, Section 4(1) will adversely affect
or enhance the integrity of the elections.
In my Separate Opinion, I concluded that the appointment of a Member of the Court even
during the election period per se implies no adverse effect on the integrity of the election; a
full Court is ideal during this period in light of the Court’s unique role during elections. I
maintain this view and fully concur in this regard with the majority.
During the election period, the court is not only the interpreter of the Constitution and the
election laws; other than the Commission on Elections and the lower courts to a limited
extent, the Court is likewise the highest impartial recourse available to decisively address
any problem or dispute arising from the election. It is the leader and the highest court in
the Judiciary, the only one of the three departments of government directly unaffected by
the election. The Court is likewise the entity entrusted by the Constitution, no less, with the
gravest election-related responsibilities. In particular, it is the sole judge of all contests in
the election of the President and the Vice-President, with leadership and participation as
well in the election tribunals that directly address Senate and House of Representatives
electoral disputes. With this grant of responsibilities, the Constitution itself has spoken on
the trust it reposes on the Court on election matters. This reposed trust, to my mind,
renders academic any question of whether an appointment during the election period will
adversely affect the integrity of the elections – it will not, as the maintenance of a full Court
in fact contributes to the enforcement of the constitutional scheme to foster a free and
orderly election.
In reading the motions for reconsideration against the backdrop of the partisan political
noise of the coming elections, one cannot avoid hearing echoes from some of the arguments
that the objection is related, more than anything else, to their lack of trust in an
appointment to be made by the incumbent President who will soon be bowing out of office.
They label the incumbent President’s act as a "midnight appointment" – a term that has
acquired a pejorative meaning in contemporary society.
As I intimated in my Separate Opinion, the imputation of distrust can be made against any
appointing authority, whether outgoing or incoming. The incoming President himself will
be before this Court if an election contest arises; any President, past or future, would also
naturally wish favorable outcomes in legal problems that the Court would resolve. These
possibilities and the potential for continuing influence in the Court, however, cannot be
active considerations in resolving the election ban issue as they are, in their present form
and presentation, all speculative. If past record is to be the measure, the record of past
Chief Justices and of this Court speaks for itself with respect to the Justices’ relationship
with, and deferral to, the appointing authority in their decisions.
What should not be forgotten in examining the records of the Court, from the prism of
problems an electoral exercise may bring, is the Court’s unique and proven capacity to
intervene and diffuse situations that are potentially explosive for the nation. EDSA II
particularly comes to mind in this regard (although it was an event that was not rooted in
election problems) as it is a perfect example of the potential for damage to the nation that
the Court can address and has addressed. When acting in this role, a vacancy in the Court is
not only a vote less, but a significant contribution less in the Court’s deliberations and
capacity for action, especially if the missing voice is the voice of the Chief Justice.
Be it remembered that if any EDSA-type situation arises in the coming elections, it will be
compounded by the lack of leaders because of the lapse of the President’s term by June 30,
2010; by a possible failure of succession if for some reason the election of the new
leadership becomes problematic; and by the similar absence of congressional leadership
because Congress has not yet convened to organize itself.34 In this scenario, only the
Judiciary of the three great departments of government stands unaffected by the election
and should at least therefore be complete to enable it to discharge its constitutional role to
its fullest potential and capacity. To state the obvious, leaving the Judiciary without any
permanent leader in this scenario may immeasurably complicate the problem, as all three
departments of government will then be leaderless.
To stress what I mentioned on this point in my Separate Opinion, the absence of a Chief
Justice will make a lot of difference in the effectiveness of the Court as he or she heads the
Judiciary, sits as Chair of the JBC and of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, presides over
impeachment proceedings, and provides the moral suasion and leadership that only the
permanent mantle of the Chief Justice can bestow. EDSA II is just one of the many lessons
from the past when the weightiest of issues were tackled and promptly resolved by the
Court. Unseen by the general public in all these was the leadership that was there to ensure
that the Court would act as one, in the spirit of harmony and stability although divergent in
their individual views, as the Justices individually make their contributions to the collegial
result. To some, this leadership may only be symbolic, as the Court has fully functioned in
the past even with an incomplete membership or under an Acting Chief Justice. But as I said
before, an incomplete Court "is not a whole Supreme Court; it will only be a Court with 14
members who would act and vote on all matters before it." To fully recall what I have said
on this matter:
The importance of the presence of one Member of the Court can and should never be
underestimated, particularly on issues that may gravely affect the nation. Many a case has
been won or lost on the basis of one vote. On an issue of the constitutionality of a law,
treaty or statute, a tie vote – which is possible in a 14 member court – means that the
constitutionality is upheld. This was our lesson in Isagani Cruz v. DENR Secretary.
More than the vote, Court deliberation is the core of the decision-making process and one
voice is less is not only a vote less but a contributed opinion, an observation, or a
cautionary word less for the Court. One voice can be a big difference if the missing voice is
that of the Chief Justice.
Without meaning to demean the capability of an Acting Chief Justice, the ascendancy in the
Court of a permanent sitting Chief Justice cannot be equaled. He is the first among equals –
a primus inter pares – who sets the tone for the Court and the Judiciary, and who is looked
up to on all matters, whether administrative or judicial. To the world outside the Judiciary,
he is the personification of the Court and the whole Judiciary. And this is not surprising
since, as Chief Justice, he not only chairs the Court en banc, but chairs as well the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal that sits in judgment over election disputes affecting the
President and the Vice-President. Outside of his immediate Court duties, he sits as Chair of
the Judicial and Bar Council, the Philippine Judicial Academy and, by constitutional
command, presides over the impeachment of the President. To be sure, the Acting Chief
Justice may be the ablest, but he is not the Chief Justice without the mantle and permanent
title of the Office, and even his presence as Acting Chief Justice leaves the Court with one
member less. Sadly, this member is the Chief Justice; even with an Acting Chief Justice, the
Judiciary and the Court remains headless. 35
Given these views, I see no point in re-discussing the finer points of technical interpretation
and their supporting latin maxims that I have addressed in my Separate Opinion and now
feel need no further elaboration; maxims can be found to serve a pleader’s every need and
in any case are the last interpretative tools in constitutional interpretation. Nor do I see any
point in discussing arguments based on the intent of the framers of the Constitution now
cited by the parties in the contexts that would serve their own ends. As may be evident in
these discussions, other than the texts of the disputed provisions, I prefer to examine their
purposes and the consequences of their application, understood within the context of
democratic values. Past precedents are equally invaluable for the lead, order, and stability
they contribute, but only if they are in point, certain, and still alive to current realities,
while the history of provisions, including the intents behind them, are primarily important
to ascertain the purposes the provisions serve.
From these perspectives and without denigrating the framers’ historical contributions, I
say that it is the Constitution that now primarily speaks to us in this case and what we hear
are its direct words, not merely the recorded isolated debates reflecting the personal
intents of the constitutional commissioners as cited by the parties to fit their respective
theories. The voice speaking the words of the Constitution is our best guide, as these words
will unalterably be there for us to read in the context of their purposes and the nation’s
needs and circumstances. This Concurring and Dissenting Opinion hears and listens to that
voice.
The Valenzuela Decision
The ponencia’s ruling reversing Valenzuela, in my view, is out of place in the present case,
since at issue here is the appointment of the Chief Justice during the period of the election
ban, not the appointment of lower court judges that Valenzuela resolved. To be perfectly
clear, the conflict in the constitutional provisions is not confined to Article VII, Section 15
and Article VIII, Section 4(1) with respect to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court; even before the Valenzuela ruling, the conflict already existed between Article VII,
Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 9 – the provision on the appointment of the justices and
judges of courts lower than the Supreme Court. After this Court’s ruling in Valenzuela, no
amount of hairsplitting can result in the conclusion that Article VII, Section 15 applied the
election ban over the whole Judiciary, including the Supreme Court, as the facts and the
fallo of Valenzuela plainly spoke of the objectionable appointment of two Regional Trial
Court judges. To reiterate, Valenzuela only resolved the conflict between Article VII, Section
15 and appointments to the Judiciary under Article VIII, Section 9.
If Valenzuela did prominently figure at all in the present case, the prominence can be
attributed to the petitioners’ mistaken reading that this case is primary authority for the
dictum that Article VII, Section 15 completely bans all appointments to the Judiciary,
including appointments to the Supreme Court, during the election period up to the end of
the incumbent President’s term.
In reality, this mistaken reading is an obiter dictum in Valenzuela, and hence, cannot be
cited for its primary precedential value. This legal situation still holds true as Valenzuela
was not doctrinally reversed as its proposed reversal was supported only by five (5) out of
the 12 participating Members of the Court. In other words, this ruling on how Article VII,
Section 15 is to be interpreted in relation with Article VIII, Section 9, should continue to
stand unless otherwise expressly reversed by this Court.
But separately from the mistaken use of an obiter ruling as primary authority, I believe that
I should sound the alarm bell about the Valenzuela ruling in light of a recent vacancy in the
position of Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan resulting from Presiding Justice
Norberto Geraldez’s death soon after we issued the decision in the present case. Reversing
the Valenzuela ruling now, in the absence of a properly filed case addressing an
appointment at this time to the Sandiganbayan or to any other vacancy in the lower courts,
will be an irregular ruling of the first magnitude by this Court, as it will effectively be a
shortcut that lifts the election ban on appointments to the lower courts without the benefit
of a case whose facts and arguments would directly confront the continued validity of the
Valenzuela ruling. This is especially so after we have placed the Court on notice that a
reversal of Valenzuela is uncalled for because its ruling is not the litigated issue in this case.
In any case, let me repeat what I stressed in my Separate Opinion about Valenzuela which
rests on the reasoning that the evils Section 15 seeks to remedy – vote buying, midnight
appointments and partisan reasons to influence the elections – exist, thus justifying an
election appointment ban. In particular, the "midnight appointment" justification, while
fully applicable to the more numerous vacancies at the lower echelons of the Judiciary
(with an alleged current lower court vacancy level of 537 or a 24.5% vacancy rate), should
not apply to the Supreme Court which has only a total of 15 positions that are not even
vacated at the same time. The most number of vacancies for any one year occurred only
last year (2009) when seven (7) positions were vacated by retirement, but this vacancy
rate is not expected to be replicated at any time within the next decade. Thus "midnight
appointments" to the extent that they were understood in Aytona36 will not occur in the
vacancies of this Court as nominations to its vacancies are all processed through the JBC
under the public’s close scrutiny. As already discussed above, the institutional integrity of
the Court is hardly an issue. If at all, only objections personal to the individual Members of
the Court or against the individual applicants can be made, but these are matters addressed
in the first place by the JBC before nominees are submitted. There, too, are specific reasons,
likewise discussed above, explaining why the election ban should not apply to the Supreme
Court. These exempting reasons, of course, have yet to be shown to apply to the lower
courts. Thus, on the whole, the reasons justifying the election ban in Valenzuela still obtain
in so far as the lower courts are concerned, and have yet to be proven otherwise in a
properly filed case. Until then, Valenzuela, except to the extent that it mentioned Section
4(1), should remain an authoritative ruling of this Court.
CONCLUSION
In light of these considerations, a writ of prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from
performing its principal function, under the Constitution, of recommending nominees for
the position of Chief Justice. Thus, I vote to deny with finality the Tolentino and Soriano
motions for reconsideration.
The other motions for reconsideration in so far as they challenge the conclusion that the
President can appoint the Chief Justice even during the election period are likewise denied
with finality for lack of merit, but are granted in so far as they support the continued
validity of the ruling of this Court in In Re: Valenzuela and Vallarta, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC,
November 9, 1998.
My opinion on the Mendoza petition stands.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408. This A.M. involves the
constitutional validity of the appointment of two (2) RTC Judges on March 30, 1998 – a date
that falls within the supposed ban under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. We
nullified the appointments.
2 G.R. No. 191002 and companion cases, promulgated on March 17, 2010.
3 Justices Diosdado M. Peralta, Mariano C. Del Castillo and Jose Catral Mendoza.
4 G.R. No. 191002, Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
5 G.R. No. 191149, Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
6 The JBC reiterates its position in its Comment (dated April 12, 2010) on the motions for
reconsideration that it is still acting on the preparation of the list of nominees and is set to
interview the nominees.
7 See, for instance, the motion for reconsideration of intervenor Alfonso Tan, Jr.
8 The docketed petitions were seven; the petitions-in-intervention were ten.
9A prohibition petition seeks to stop the proceedings of a tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions if any of its act is
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
10 Separate Opinion, p. 16.
11 The JBC position states:
xxxx
Likewise, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to the proper
appointing authority, in light of Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides
that vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the
occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution concerning the ban on
Presidential appointments "two (2) months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term" and Section 261(g), Article XXIII of the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines.
12. Since the Honorable Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution, the JBC
will be guided by its decision in these consolidated Petitions and Administrative Matter.
[Emphasis supplied.]
12 Mendoza Petition, pp. 5-6.
13 Separate Opinion, pp. 16-17.
14 Supra note 11.
15 Id. at 17.
16 Separate Opinion, pp. 19-22:
A first reality is that the JBC cannot, on its own due to lack of the proper authority,
determine the appropriate course of action to take under the Constitution. Its principal
function is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary and it has no authority to interpret
constitutional provisions, even those affecting its principal function; the authority to
undertake constitutional interpretation belongs to the courts alone.
A second reality is that the disputed constitutional provisions do not stand alone and
cannot be read independently of one another; the Constitution and its various provisions
have to be read and interpreted as one seamless whole, giving sufficient emphasis to every
aspect in accordance with the hierarchy of our constitutional values. The disputed
provisions should be read together and, as reflections of the will of the people, should be
given effect to the extent that they should be reconciled.
The third reality, closely related to the second, is that in resolving the coverage of the
election ban vis-à-vis the appointment of the Chief Justice and the Members of the Court,
provisions of the Constitution other than the disputed provisions must be taken into
account. In considering when and how to act, the JBC has to consider that:
1. The President has a term of six years which begins at noon of June 30 following the
election, which implies that the outgoing President remains President up to that time.
(Section 4, Article VII). The President assumes office at the beginning of his or her term,
with provision for the situations where the President fails to qualify or is unavailable at the
beginning of his term (Section 7, Article VII).
2. The Senators and the Congressmen begin their respective terms also at midday of June
30(Sections 4 and 7, Article VI). The Congress convenes on the 4th Monday of July for its
regular session, but the President may call a special session at any time. (Section 15, Article
VI)
3. The Valenzuela case cited as authority for the position that the election ban provision
applies to the whole Judiciary, only decided the issue with respect to lower court judges,
specifically, those covered by Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. Any reference to the
filling up of vacancies in the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII
constitutes obiter dictum as this issue was not directly in issue and was not ruled upon.
These provisions and interpretation of the Valenzuela ruling – when read together with
disputed provisions, related with one another, and considered with the May 17, 2010
retirement of the current Chief Justice – bring into focus certain unavoidable realities, as
follows:
1. If the election ban would apply fully to the Supreme Court, the incumbent President
cannot appoint a Member of the Court beginning March 10, 2010, all the way up to June 30,
2010.
2. The retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice – May 17, 2010 – falls within the period of
the election ban. (In an extreme example where the retirement of a Member of the Court
falls on or very close to the day the election ban starts, the Office of the Solicitor General
calculates in its Comment that the whole 90 days given to the President to make
appointment would be covered by the election ban.)
3. Beginning May 17, 2010, the Chief Justice position would be vacant, giving rise to the
question of whether an Acting Chief Justice can act in his place. While this is essentially a
Supreme Court concern, the Chief Justice is the ex officio Chair of the JBC; hence it must be
concerned and be properly guided.
4. The appointment of the new Chief Justice has to be made within 90 days from the time
the vacancy occurs, which translates to a deadline of August 15, 2010.
5. The deadline for the appointment is fixed (as it is not reckoned from the date of
submission of the JBC list, as in the lower courts) which means that the JBC ideally will have
to make its list available at the start of the 90-day period so that its process will not eat up
the 90-day period granted the President.
6. After noon of June 30, 2010, the JBC representation from Congress would be vacant; the
current representatives’ mandates to act for their principals extend only to the end of their
present terms; thus, the JBC shall be operating at that point at less than its full membership.
7. Congress will not convene until the 4th Monday of July, 2010, but would still need to
organize before the two Houses of Congress can send their representatives to the JBC – a
process may extend well into August, 2010.
8. By July 5, 2010, one regular member of the JBC would vacate his post. Filling up this
vacancy requires a presidential appointment and the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments.
9. Last but not the least, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII is that "a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments." This prohibition is expressly addressed to
the President and covers the act of appointment; the prohibition is not against the JBC in
the performance of its function of "recommending appointees to the Judiciary" – an act that
is one step away from the act of making appointments.
17The Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel Ancestral Domain, G.R. Nos. 183591, 183791, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962,
October 14, 2008.
18By virtue of its power of administrative supervision, the Supreme Court oversees the
judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with the laws, rules and regulations. It may take
the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. See Ampong v.
CSC, G.R. No. 107910, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 293. The Constitution separately provides
for the Supreme Court’s supervision over the JBC. See Article VIII, Section 8 of the
CONSTITUTION.
19Judicial Review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative
acts for their conformity with the Constitution, Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
157584, April 2, 2009.
20 Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. It is distinguished from supervision in that the
latter means overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former
may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.
Nachura, J., Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2006 ed., p. 276.
21 G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92.
22 Supra notes 11 and 14.
23Philippine Bar Association (PBA), Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines
(WTLOP), Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Atty. Roland B. Inting, Peter Irving Corvera and
Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.
24 See PBA’s Motion for Reconsideration.
25See the Motions for Reconsideration for PBA, WTLOP, Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Atty.
Roland B. Inting, Peter Irving Corvera and Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.
26 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 15:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
27 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 4(1):
(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
xxxx
28See Petition on Intervention of WTLOP, as cited in the decision in the above-captioned
cases; see also: PBA’s motion for reconsideration.
29 Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA
44, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1994); Peralta v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30 (1978); Ang-Angco
v. Castillo, G.R. No. 17169, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 619 (1963).
30 Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 310 SCRA 614,
citing Chiongbian v. De Leon, 82 Phil 771 (1949).
31Article VI for the Legislature, Article VII for the Executive, and Article VIII for the
Judiciary.
32See Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49; where the court
resolved the clash between the power of the President to extend ad interim appointments
and the power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm presidential appointments.
33 Ibid.
34 Supra note 13.
35 Separate Opinion, p. 32.
36 Aytona v. Castillo, G.R. No. 19315, January 19, 1962, 4 SCRA 1.

G.R. No. 187451 August 29, 2012

JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent.
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,*
VILLARAMA, JR.,**
PEREZ,***
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the
February 25, 2009 Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 72613,
reversing and setting aside the February 19, 2001 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1, Isabela, Basi Ian (RTC), in Civil Case No. 685-627, an action for "Recovery of
Possession and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction."
The Facts
Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed Homestead Application No. V-33203 (E-V-
49150) for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land situated in Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan in
1949. His application was approved on January 23, 1952.3 In 1955, however, the land was
subdivided into three (3) lots – Lot Nos. 138,139 and 140, Pls-19 - as a consequence of a
public land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio), who filed
Homestead Application No. 18-4493 (E-18-2958). Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Jesus
Virtucio (Virtucio), who filed Homestead Application No. 18-4421 (E-18-2924).4
Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that
his approved application covered the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140.5
On October 30, 1961, the Director of Lands rendered a decision denying Alegarbes' protest
and amending the latter's application to exclude Lots 139 and 140. Only Lot 138 was given
due course. The applications of Custodio and Virtucio for Lots 139 and 140, respectively,
were likewise given due course.6
Alegarbes then appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who
dismissed his appeal on July 28, 1967. He then sought relief from the Office of the President
(OP), which, however, affirmed the dismissal order of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources in a decision, dated October 25, 1974. Alegarbes moved for a
reconsideration, but the motion was subsequently denied.7
On May 11, 1989, an order of execution8 was issued by the Lands Management Bureau of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to enforce the decision of the OP. It
ordered Alegarbes and all those acting in his behalf to vacate the subject lot, but he refused.
On September 26, 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint9 for "Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with Preliminary Injunction" before the RTC.
In his Answer,10 Alegarbes claimed that the decision of the Bureau of Lands was void ab
initio considering that the Acting Director of Lands acted without jurisdiction and in
violation of the provisions of the Public Land Act. Alegarbes argued that the said decision
conferred no rights and imposed no duties and left the parties in the same position as they
were before its issuance. He further alleged that the patent issued in favor of Virtucio was
procured through fraud and deceit, thus, void ab initio.
Alegarbes further argued, by way of special and/or affirmative defenses, that the approval
of his homestead application on January 23, 1952 by the Bureau of Lands had already
attained finality and could not be reversed, modified or set aside. His possession of Lot Nos.
138, 139 and 140 had been open, continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept of
an owner for more than 30 years and had acquired such lots by acquisitive prescription.
In his Amended and Supplemental Answer,11 Alegarbes also averred that his now deceased
brother, Alejandro Alegarbes, and the latter's family helped him develop Lot 140 in 1955.
Alejandro and his family, as well as Alegarbes' wife and children, had been permanently
occupying the said lot and, introducing permanent improvements thereon since 1960.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC rendered its decision on February 19, 2001, favoring Virtucio. The decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the merit of this case, this court finds for the plaintiff and against the
defendant by:
1. Ordering the defendant and all those acting in his behalf to vacate Lot No. 140, Pls-19,
located at Lower Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan and surrender the possession and ownership
thereof to plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱
15,000.00) as attorney's fees and another Ten Thousand Pesos (₱ 10,000.00) as expenses
for litigation; and
3. To pay the cost of the suit in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (₱500.00).
SO ORDERED.12
Not in conformity, Alegarbes appealed his case before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On February 25, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision declaring Alegarbes as the owner of
Lot No. 140, Pls-19, thereby reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC. The CA
ruled that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 and, therefore, entitled to retain
possession of it.
Consequently, the awards of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit were
deleted.
In so ruling, the CA explained that even if the decision to approve Virtucio's homestead
application over Lot 140 had become final, Alegarbes could still acquire the said lot by
acquisitive prescription. The decisions on the issues of the approval of Virtucio's
homestead application and its validity were impertinent as Alegarbes had earlier put in
issue the matter of ownership of Lot 140 which he claimed by virtue of adverse possession.
The CA also found reversible error on the part of the RTC in disregarding the evidence
before it and relying entirely upon the decisions of the administrative bodies, none of
which touched upon the issue of Alegarbes' open, continuous and exclusive possession of
over thirty (30) years of an alienable land. The CA held that the Director of Lands, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the OP did not determine whether
Alegarbes' possession of the subject property had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the
mass of public land and, thus, was beyond their jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition.
ISSUES
Virtucio assigned the following errors in seeking the reversal of the assailed decision of the
CA, to wit:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the judgment of the trial court, which
awarded the lot in question to the respondent by virtue of acquisitive prescription
and ordered herein petitioner to surrender the ownership and possession of the
same to them.13
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the decision in CA-G.R. CV-
26286 for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Custodio vs. Alegarbes which
contains same factual circumstances as in this case and ruled against JOSE
ALEGARBES.14
3. The Court of Appeals erred in deleting the award of attorney's fees to the
petitioner.15
The lone issue in this case is whether or not Alegarbes acquired ownership over the subject
property by acquisitive prescription.
Ruling of the Court
The petition must fail.
Indeed, it is fundamental that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Only questions of law distinctly set forth
shall be raised in the petition.16
Here, the main issue is the alleged acquisition of ownership by Alegarbes through
acquisitive prescription and the character and length of possession of a party over a parcel
of land subject of controversy is a factual issue.17 The Court, however, is not precluded from
reviewing facts when the case falls within the recognized exceptions, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.18 [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bench, the findings and conclusions of the CA are apparently contrary to
those of the RTC, hence, the need to review the facts in order to arrive at the proper
conclusion.
On Acquisitive Prescription
Virtucio insists that the period of acquisitive prescription was interrupted on October 30,
1961 (or in 1954 when Alegarbes filed the protest) when the Director of Lands rendered a
decision giving due course to his homestead application and that of Ulpiano Custodio.
Virtucio further claims that since 1954, several extrajudicial demands were also made upon
Alegarbes demanding that he vacate said lot. Those demands constitute the "extrajudicial
demand" contemplated in Article 1155, thus, tolling the period of acquisitive prescription.19
Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article 712, provides that prescription
is a mode of acquiring ownership through the lapse of time in the manner and under the
conditions laid down by law. Under the same law, it states that acquisitive prescription may
either be ordinary or extraordinary.20 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years,21 while
extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith.22
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is,
the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in par. 1, Article 1106. Other
names for acquisitive prescription are adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind
is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined
in Article 1106 and par. 2, Article 1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is
litigation of action.23 These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.
Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of prescription of actions.
Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125
of the same Code. Thus, Virtucio’s reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the
period of acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that
effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil interruption.24
Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor.25 When
no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the
respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription continues to run.
In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his homestead
application interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive prescription. The law, as
well as jurisprudence, however, dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll
the said period.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon,26 the Court ruled that a mere
Notice of Adverse Claim did not constitute an effective interruption of possession. In the
case of Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel,27 which also cited the Rañon
Case, the Court stated that the acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes and
obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in one's name cannot defeat another's right of
ownership acquired through acquisitive prescription.28
In the same vein, a protest filed before an administrative agency and even the decision
resulting from it cannot effectively toll the running of the period of acquisitive prescription.
In such an instance, no civil interruption can take place. Only in cases filed before the courts
may judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession. Records show that it was
only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case before the RTC. The CA was, therefore, correct in
ruling that Alegarbesbecame ipso jure owner of Lot 140 entitling him to retain possession
of it because he was in open, continuous and exclusive possession for over thirty (30) years
of alienable public land.Virtucio emphasizes that the CA erred in disregarding the decisions
of the administrative agencies which amended Alegarbes' homestead application excluding
Lot 140 and gave due course to his own application for the said lot, which decisions were
affirmed by the RTC.
Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight
and respect on appeal and, in fact, are accorded finality when supported by substantial
evidence on the record.29 It appears, however, that the conclusion made by the RTC was not
substantially supported. Even the RTC itself noted in its decision:
The approval of a Homestead Application merely authorizes the applicant to take
possession of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law
before a final patent could be issued in his favor – what divests the government of title to
the land is the issuance of a patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of
Deeds.30
A perusal of the records would reveal that there was no issuance of any patent in favor of
either parties. This simply means that the land subject of the controversy remains to be in
the name of the State. Hence, neither Virtucio nor Alegarbes can claim ownership. There
was, therefore, no substantial and legal basis for the RTC to declare that Virtucio was
entitled to possession and ownership of Lot 140.
It can be argued that the lower court had the decisions of the administrative agencies,
which ultimately attained finality, as legal bases in ruling that Virtucio had the right of
possession and ownership. In fact, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) even issued the Order of Execution31 on May 11, 1989 ordering Alegarbes to vacate
Lot 140 and place Virtucio in peaceful possession of it. The CA, however, was correct in
finding that:
But appellant had earlier put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot 140 which he claims
by virtue of adverse possession. On this issue, the cited decisions are impertinent. Even if
the decision to approve appellee's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final,
appellant could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription.32
In the case of Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando,33 the Court ruled that the mere application
for a patent, coupled with the fact of exclusive, open, continuous and notorious possession
for the required period, is sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant applied for.34 It
likewise cited the cases of Susi v. Razon35 and Pineda v. CA,36 where the Court ruled that the
possession of a parcel of agricultural land of the public domain for the prescribed period of
30 years ipso jure converts the lot into private property.37
In this case, Alegarbes had applied for homestead patent as early as 1949. He had been in
exclusive, open, continuous and notorious possession of Lot 140 for at least 30 years. By
the time the DENR issued its order of execution in 1989, Alegarbes had Lot 140 in his
possession for more than 30 years. Even more so when Virtucio filed the complaint before
the RTC in 1997, Alegarbes was already in possession of the subject property for forty-
eight (48) years.
The CA correctly observed that the RTC erred in disregarding the evidence before it and
relying entirely upon the decisions of the Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the OP, which never touched the issue of whether Alegarbes’
open, continuous and exclusive possession of over thirty (30) years of alienable land had
ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the mass of public land and beyond the jurisdiction of
these agencies.38
When the CA ruled that the RTC was correct in relying on the abovementioned decisions, it
merely recognized the primary jurisdiction of these administrative agencies. It was of the
view that the RTC was not correct in the other aspects of the case. Thus, it declared
Alegarbes as owner ipso jure of Lot 140 and entitled to retain possession of it. There is no
reason for the Court to disturb these findings of the CA as they were supported by
substantial evidence, hence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court.39
On the CA Decision involving a similar case
Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision in Custodio v.
Alegarbes, CA-G.R. CV 26286, for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, which involved
the same factual circumstances and ruled against Alegarbes.
It must be noted that the subject property in the said case was Lot 139 allocated to
Custodio and that Virtucio was not a party to that case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever
benefits said favorable judgment may have had just because it involved similar factual
circumstances. The Court also found from the records that the period of acquisitive
prescription in that case was effectively interrupted by Custodio's filing of a complaint,
which is wanting in this case.
Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent.40 "The
principle of stare decisisenjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established
by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law
has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. "41
The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's insistence that it was
erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls
upon this Court to adhere to that decision by invoking the stare decisis principle, which is
not legally possible because only final decisions of this Court are considered precedents.42
In view of the foregoing, the Court need not dwell on the complaint of Virtucio with regard
to the deletion of the award of attorney's fees in his favor. It is ludicrous for the CA to order
Alegarbes to pay attorney's fees, as a measure of damages, and costs, after finding him to
have acquired ownership over the property by acquisitive prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199310 February 19, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-
11465.
The Facts
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application4 with
the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D,
Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order5 finding the respondent’s application for
registration sufficient in form and substance and setting it for initial hearing on February
21, 2002. The scheduled initial hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002.6 The Notice of
Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No. 13,
pages 1631-16337 and in the March 21, 2002 issue of People’s Balita,8 a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was likewise posted in a
conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a conspicuous place on the
bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig, Metro Manila.9
On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of
general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to
the respondent’s application for registration.10
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the respondent’s application for
registration, asserting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,12 alleging that the respondent
failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application ensued thereafter.
The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondent’s corporate
secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one authorized by it to
file the application for registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the
caretaker of the subject properties since 1957; and Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr.
Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to conduct a topographic survey of
the subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr.
Magalonga) and Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic
engineers employed by the LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased
Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares),
respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed by
Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots,
through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said
parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same
were purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents:
(1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor
of the respondent;13 (2) survey plans of the subject properties;14 (3) technical descriptions
of the subject properties;15 (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate;16 (5) tax declarations of Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002;17 and (6) certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by
Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR,
attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.18
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration
should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of
Republic Act No. 485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at
and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of
the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that,
upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of
Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of
National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject
properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the
subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the
actual topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the
respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above
12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging
from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC Ruling
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,20 which granted the respondent’s
application for registration of title to the subject properties, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming the title of the
applicant Remman Enterprises Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of
29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and 20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan,
Taguig, Taguig,
Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions Ap-04-003103 and
Swo-00-001769 respectively and ordering their registration under the Property
Registration Decree in the name of Remman Enterprises Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The RTC opined that the
elevations of the subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary elevation
of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s
claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the
same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey
on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed
conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the
topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the
same; that the elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966
when the supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was
based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in
measuring the elevations of the subject properties, pointing out that:
Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositor’s
witness merely compared their elevation to the elevation of the particular portion of the
lake dike which he used as his [benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation
of the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said portion of the lake dike that was then
under the construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79 meters and after finding that the
elevation of the subject lots are lower than the said [benchmark] or reference point, said
witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x.
Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was based on hearsay as said witness admitted
that it was DPWH or the FF Cruz who determined the elevation of the portion of the lake
dike which he used as the [benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of
the subject lots and that he has no personal knowledge as to how the DPWH and FF Cruz
determined the elevation of the said [benchmark] or reference point and he only learn[ed]
that its elevation is 12.79 meters from the information he got from FF Cruz.22
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the
RTC opined that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC
held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas
that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level
of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near
the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it,
which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject
properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are
dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC
likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision,23 affirmed the RTC
Decision dated May 16, 2007. The CA found that the respondent was able to establish that
the subject properties are part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain;
that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, as claimed by the petitioner. Thus:
The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant registration of the subject
lands in its name. Appellee’s witness Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area
verification of the subject lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot
No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other
lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6
meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. Said elevations are higher than
the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under paragraph 11, Section 41
of R.A. No. 4850, as amended.
In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies merely on the
Topographic Map dated March 2, 1966, prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which
allegedly shows that the subject parcels of land are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake
water] of Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered through aerial photography over the
area of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However, nobody testified on the due
execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards the testimony of the witness
for LLDA, Engr. Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5 meter
elevation, the same can be considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay considering his
admission that his findings were based merely on the evaluation conducted by DPWH and
FF Cruz. x x x.24 (Citations omitted)
The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued
by the DENR, attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled
that the respondent was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses, that it and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject properties prior to June 12, 1945.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC
Decision dated May 16, 2007, which granted the application for registration filed by the
respondent.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondent’s
application for registration since the subject properties do not form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the
subject properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, pursuant to Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is
a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a
long-standing policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted
and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and binding. This Court is not a
trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are
substantial reasons for doing so.25
That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not
necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding
that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m
and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No.
4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement
to registration of title to the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain
part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption
of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable."26
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152927, which provides that:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
xxxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or
the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.28 Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.29
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property
forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent
presented two certifications30 issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project No. 27-
B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that
the subject properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,31 the Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the
proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for
land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true
copy by the legal custodian of the records. Thus:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.32 (Emphasis ours)
In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N.
Properties, viz:
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of
the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land
classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the
DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area
per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established
by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as
alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and
technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the land’s
classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from
the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all
requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.34 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its
application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are
indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative
for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in spite of
the failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the
subject properties are alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was
promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of
this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws
shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for
registration of title to the subject properties was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to
the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to
present a copy of the original classification covering the subject properties approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent
claims, would not warrant the denial of its application for registration.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and granted by
RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may
be applied to the present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws
pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by
this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed, since this
Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
interpreted law carried into effect.35 "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage
of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing
one."36
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases
notwithstanding that the applications for registration were filed and granted by the lower
courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the subject properties therein
was filed on October 22, 2004 and was granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006.
Similarly, in Republic v. Jaralve,38 the application for registration of the subject property
therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted by the trial court on November 15,
2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the applications for registration were
filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, this
Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the applications for
registration on the ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal
custodian thereof as a true copy.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of
the subject properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena.
Cerquena testified that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who
supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime
sold the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the
respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and
occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest;
they do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and
occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed,
other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other evidence
to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-
interest of the subject properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific
acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application.
Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in
the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually
exercise over his own property.39
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest cultivated
the subject properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any
specificity as to the nature of such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they have
been indeed in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner required
by law. There was no showing as to the number of crops that are planted in the subject
properties or to the volume of the produce harvested from the crops supposedly planted
thereon.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest
have indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the
subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated
by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject properties may only have amounted
to mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so
as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land,
however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years."40
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by
the respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim
that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002
that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While tax declarations are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership."41 That the
subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the
presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject
properties starting that year. Likewise, no improvement or plantings were declared or
noted in the said tax declarations. This fact belies the claim that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquena's testimony, have been in possession and
occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by law.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12,
1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for registration should be denied.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 90503, which affirmed the Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Remman Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration
Case No. N-11465 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 7-30.
2Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with Associate Justices Fernanda
Lampas Peralta and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; id. at 33-50.
3 Issued by Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna; id. at 64-75.
4 Id. at 51-55.
5 Records, p. 15.
6 Id. at 19.
7 Id. at 111-112.
8 Id. at 118.
9 Id. at 36.
10 Id. at 50-51.
11 Id. at 126-130.
12 Id. at 135-137.
13 Id. at 277-280.
14 Id. at 281-282.
15 Id. at 283-284.
16 Id. at 285-286.
17 Id. at 287-288.
18 Id. at 291A-292.
19AN ACT CREATING THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PRESCRIBING ITS
POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
20 Rollo, pp. 64-75.
21 Id. at 74-75.
22 Id. at 71-72.
23 Id. at 33-50.
24 Id. at 41-42.
25 Padilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169956, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 219, 227.
26Republic v. Medida, G.R. No. 195097, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 317, 325-326, citing
Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 610, 621-622.
27 The Property Registration Decree.
28 Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, provides that:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
29 See Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr., G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011, 644 SCRA 516, 523.
30 Records, pp. 291A-292.
31 578 Phil. 441 (2008).
32 Id. at 452-453.
33 G.R. No. 175846, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 116.
34 Id. at 121-122.
35Accenture, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 190102, July 11, 2012, 676
SCRA 325, 339; Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501, 504 (1956).
36 Eagle Realty Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No. 151424, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 555, 558,
citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, id.
37 G.R. No. 195097, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 317.
38 G.R. No. 175177, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 495.
39 See Valiao v. Republic, G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 299, 308-309.
40 Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, 432 Phil. 824, 838 (2002).
41 Aide v. Bernal, G.R. No. 169336, March 18, 2010, 616 SCRA 60, 69.

G.R. No. 204039

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Petitioner
vs.
SPOUSES WALTER UY AND LILY UY, Respondents
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 23 May 2012
Decision1 and the 18 October 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 118534 which affirmed with modification the 24 March 2010 Decision3 of the Office of
the President (OP).
THE FACTS
Prime Town Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) and E. Ganzon Inc. were the joint developers of the
Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium Project (Kiener Hills). In 1997, spouses Walter and Lily
Uy (respondents) entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI for a unit in Kiener Hills. The
total contract price amounted to ₱1, 151,718. 7 5 payable according to the following terms:
(a) ₱l00,000.00 as down payment; and (b) the balance paid in 40 monthly installments at
₱26,297.97 from 16 January 1997 to 16 April 2000.4
On 23 April 1998, PPGI and petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) executed the
following: Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),5 and Sale of Receivables and Assignment of
Rights and Interests.6 By virtue of the said agreements, PPGI transferred the right to collect
the receivables of the buyers, which included respondents, of units in Kiener Hills. The
parties entered into the said agreement as PPGI's partial settlement of its
₱l,814,500,000.00 loan with UCPB.7
On 17 April 2006, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office (HLURB
Regional Office) received respondents' complaint for sum of money and damages against
PPGI and UCPB. They claimed that in spite of their full payment of the purchase price, PPGI
failed to complete the construction of their units in Kiener Hills.8
The HLURB Regional Office Decision
In its 29 November 2006 decision,9 the HLURB Regional Office found that respondents
were entitled to a refund in view of PPGI' s failure to complete the construction of their
units. Nonetheless, it found that UCPB cannot be solidarily liable with PPGI because only
the accounts receivables were conveyed to UCPB and not the entire condominium project.
The HLURB Regional Office suspended the proceedings as to PPGI on account of its being in
corporate rehabilitation. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered suspending the
proceedings of the present case. The complainants are therefore directed to file their claim
before the Rehabilitation Receiver.
No judgment as to cost.10
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed before the HLURB-Board of Commissioners (HLURB
Board).
The HLURB Board Decision
In its 17 September 2007 decision,11 the HLURB Board reversed and set aside the HL URB
Regional Office decision. It agreed that the proceedings against PPGI should be suspended
on account of its corporate rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the HLURB Board found UCPB
solidarily liable with PPGI because it stepped into the latter's shoes insofar as Kiener Hills
is concerned pursuant to the MOA between them. It noted that UCPB was PPGI's successor-
in-interest, such that the delay in the completion of the condominium project could be
attributable to it and subject it to liability. The HLURB Board ruled that as PPGI's assignee,
UCPB was bound to refund the payments made, without prejudice to its right of action
against PPGI. Thus, it pronounced:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the decision of the
Regional Office is SET ASIDE and a new one is entered as follows:
1. Respondent UCPB is hereby ordered to refund to the complainant the amount of
₱l,151,718.75 with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of
extrajudicial demand on May 24, 2005 until fully paid without prejudice to whatever claims
UCPB may have against PPGI; and
2. Respondent UCPB and PPGI, jointly and severally, are declared liable to the complainant
for payment of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00; and attorney's fees in the
amount of ₱30,000.00:12
Aggrieved, UCPB appealed before the OP.
The OP Decision
In its 24 March 2010 decision, the OP affirmed the decision of the HLURB Board. It
explained that the agreement between PPGI and UCPB clearly transferred all rights, titles,
interests, and participations over Kiener Hills to the latter. It concluded that as successor-
in-interest, UCPB now had the obligations relating to Kiener Hills, including the
reimbursement of payments to respondents. The OP added that benefit of suspension of
actions only attached to PPGI and not to UCPB. Thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.13
Undeterred, UCPB appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed 23 May 2012 decision, the CA affirmed with modification the OP decision.
While the appellate court agreed that respondents are entitled to a full refund of the
payments they may have made, it ruled that UCPB is not solidarily liable with PPGI, and as
such cannot be held liable for the full satisfaction of respondents' payments. It limited
UCPB's liability to the amount respondents have paid upon the former's assumption as the
party entitled to receive payments or on 23 April 1998 when the MOA and AIR Agreement
were made between UCPB and PPGI.
In addition, the appellate court noted the pronouncements of the CA in United Coconut
Planters Bank v. O'Halloran (O'Halloran). 14 It explained that it involved similar facts and
issues where the CA ruled that the assignment of the receivables did not make UCPB the
developer of Kiener Hills it being merely the assignee of the receivables under the contract
to sell and, as such, UCPB cannot be deemed as the debtor with respect to the construction,
development, and delivery of the subject condominium units. Thus, the CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The promulgated Decision dated 24 March 2010 and Resolution dated 16
February 2011 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:
1) UCPB is ordered to pay Spouses Uy the amount of ₱552,152.34, with legal interest at
6% per annum from the filing of the complaint until fully paid without prejudice to
whatever claims U CPB may have against Primetown; and
2) Without prejudice to a separate action Spouses Uy may file against Primetown,
Primetown is liable to pay Spouses Uy the amount of ₱599,566.41 with legal interest at
6% per annum from the filing of the complaint until fully paid.15
UCPB moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its assailed 18 October
2012 resolution.
Hence, this appeal raising the following:
ISSUES
I
[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
MISCONSTRUED THE APPLICABILITY TO THE INSTANT CASE OF THE FINAL AND
EXECUTORY DECISION IN UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK V. JOHN P. O'HALLORAN
AND JOSEFINA O'HALLORAN (CA-G.R. SP NO. 101699, 23 JULY 1999) UNDER THE
PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS; AND
II
[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
UCPB IS LIABLE TO THE RESPONDENTS FOR THE AMOUNT THE RESPONDENTS DID NOT
PAY THE BANK AND WHICH UCPB DID NOT RECEIVE.16
OUR RULING
The petition is meritorious.
Issues that may be raised on appeal
Respondents assailed that the CA erred in applying O'Halloran because the circumstances
were different, notably the issue that estoppel did not arise in the said case. In addition,
they argued that 0 'Halloran and the other cases cited by UCPB are not binding pursuant to
the doctrine of stare decisisbecause they were decided by the CA and not by this Court. As
such, respondents posited that only decisions of the Court, excluding all other courts such
as the CA, form part of the legal system.
On the other hand, UCPB countered that the only issue to be resolved in the present
petition is the actual amount of its liability. It explained that the assailed CA decision had
become final and executory after respondents failed to appeal the same. UCPB pointed out
that the issues respondents raised were already ventilated before the appellate court. It
believed that respondents should have filed their own appeal to assail the issues they found
questionable.
It must be remembered that when a case is appealed, the appellate court has the power to
review the case in its entirety.17 In Heirs of Alcaraz v. Republic of the Phils., 18 the Court
explained that an appellate court is empowered to make its own judgment as it deems to be
a just determination of the case, to wit:
In any event, when petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appealed
case was thereby thrown wide open for review by that court, which is thus necessarily
empowered to come out with a judgment as it thinks would be a just determination of the
controversy. Given this power, the appellate court has the authority to either affirm,
reverse or modify the appealed decision of the trial court. To withhold from the appellate
court its power to render an entirely new decision would violate its power of review and
would, in effect, render it incapable of correcting patent errors committed by the lower
courts.19
Thus, when UCPB appealed the present controversy before the Court, it was not merely
limited to determine whether the CA accurately set UCPB's liability against respondents. It
is also empowered to determine whether the appellate court's determination of liability
was correct in the first place. This is especially true considering that the issue of the nature
of UCPB's liability is closely intertwined and inseparable from the determination of the
amount of its actual liability.
Stare Decisis applies only to cases decided by the Supreme Court
As above-mentioned, respondents bewail the reliance of the CA on 0 'Halloran arguing that
it was not a binding precedent since it was not issued by this Court. In De Mesa v. Pepsi-Cola
Products Phils. Inc.,20 the Court explained that the doctrine of stare decisis deems decisions
of this Court binding on the lower courts, to wit:
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
xxxx
It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already
established in a final decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial
precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided,
it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.21 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In other words, the doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative only when judicial
precedents are set by pronouncements of this Court to the exclusion of lower courts. It is
true regardless whether the decisions of the lower courts are logically or legally sound as
only decisions issued by this Court become part of the legal system. At the most, decisions
of lower courts only have a persuasive effect. Thus, respondents are correct in contesting
the application of the doctrine of stare decisis when the CA relied on decisions it had issued.
UCPB only jointly liable to PPGI in reimbursing unitowners of Kiener Hills
With that said, the Court still finds that the CA did not err in ruling that UCPB was only
jointly, and not solidarily liable to PPGI against respondents. In Spouses Choi v. UCPB
(Spouses Choi), 22 the Court had definitely ruled on UCPB 's liability to the purchasers of
Kiener Hills, viz:
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether, under the Agreement between Primetown
and UCPB, UCPB assumed the liabilities and obligations of Primetown under its contract to
sell with Spouses Choi.
An assignment of credit has been defined as an agreement by virtue of which the owner of
a credit, known as the assignor, by a legal cause - such as sale, dation in payment or
exchange or donation - and without need of the debtor's consent, transfers that credit and
its accessory rights to another, known as the assignee, who acquires the power to enforce it
to the same extent as the assignor could have enforced it against the debtor. In every case,
the obligations between assignor and assignee will depend upon the judicial relation which
is the basis of the assignment. An assignment will be construed in accordance with the
rules of construction governing contracts generally, the primary object being always to
ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties. This intention is to be derived from a
consideration of the whole instrument, all parts of which should be given effect, and is to be
sought in the words and language employed.
In the present case, the Agreement between Primetown and UCPB provided that
Primetown, in consideration of ₱748,000,000.00, "assigned, transferred, conveyed and set
over unto [UCPB] all Accounts Receivables accruing from [Primetown's Kiener] ... together
with the assignment of all its rights, titles, interests and participation over the units
covered by or arising from the Contracts to Sell from which the Accounts Receivables have
arisen."
The Agreement further stipulated that "x x x this sale/assignment is limited to the
Receivables accruing to [Primetown] from the [b]uyers of the condominium units in x x x
[Kiener] and the corresponding Assignment of Rights and Interests arising from the
pertinent Contract to Sell and does not include except for the amount not exceeding
30,000,000.00, Philippine currency, either singly or cumulatively any and all liabilities
which [Primetown] may have assumed under the individual Contract to Sell." (emphasis
omitted)
The Agreement conveys the straightforward intention of Primetown to "sell, assign,
transfer, convey and set over" to UCPB the receivables, rights, titles, interests and
participation over the units covered by the contracts to sell. It explicitly excluded any and
all liabilities and obligations, which Primetown assumed under the contracts to sell.
The intention to exclude Primetown's liabilities and obligations is further shown by
Primetown's subsequent letters to the buyers, which stated that "this payment
arrangement shall in no way cause any amendment of the other terms and
conditions, nor the cancellation of the Contract to Sell you have executed with
[Primetown]." x x x (emphasis and underlining supplied)
xxxx
The intention to merely assign the receivables and rights of Primetown to UCPB is even
bolstered by the CA decisions in the cases of UCPB v. O'Halloran and UCPB v. Ho.
In UCPB v. O'Halloran, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101699, respondent O'Halloran's
accounts with Primetown were also assigned by Primetown to UCPB, under the same
Agreement as in this case. Since Primetown failed to deliver the condominium units upon
full payment of the purchase price, O'Halloran likewise sued both Primetown and UCPB for
cancellation of the contracts to sell, and the case eventually reached the CA. The CA held
UCPB liable to refund the amount it actually received from O'Halloran. The CA held that
there is no legal, statutory or contractual basis to hold UCPB solidarily liable with
Primetown for the full reimbursement of the payments made by O'Halloran. The CA found
that based on the Agreement, UCPB is merely the assignee of the receivables under the
contracts to sell to the extent that the assignment is a manner adopted by which
Primetown can pay its loan to the bank. The CA held that the assignment of receivables did
not make UCPB the owner or developer of the unfinished project to make it solidarily liable
with Primetown. The CA decision dated 23 July 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101699 became final
and executory upon Entry of Judgment on 17 August 2009 for O'Halloran and 18 August
2009 for UCPB.
In UCPB v. Ho, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 113446, respondent Ho was similarly situated
with O'Halloran and Spouses Choi. Upon reaching the CA, the CA considered the Agreement
between UCPB and Primetown as an assignment of credit, because: 1) the parties entered
into the Agreement without the consent of the debtor; 2) UCPB's obligation "to deliver to
the buyer the title over the condominium unit upon their full payment" signifies that the
title to the condominium unit remained with Primetown; 3) UCPB's prerogative "to rescind
the contract to sell and transfer the title of condominium unit to its name upon failure of
the buyer to pay the full purchase price" indicates that UCPB was merely given the right to
transfer title in its name to apply the property as partial payment of Primetown's
obligation; and 4) the Agreement clearly states that the assignment is limited to the
receivables and does not include "any and all liabilities which [Primetown] may have
assumed under the individual contract to sell." Thus, the CA ruled that UCPB was a mere
assignee of the right of Primetown to collect on its contract to sell with Ho. The CA, then,
applied the ruling in UCPB v. O'Halloran in finding UCPB jointly liable with Primetown only
for the payments UCPB had actually received from Ho.
On 4 December 2013, this Court issued a Resolution denying Ho's petition for review for
failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA. On 2 April 2014, this Court
likewise denied the motion for reconsideration with finality. Thus, the 9 May 2013 Decision
of the Special Fifteenth Division of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 113446 became final and
executory. (emphasis omitted)
Considering that UCPB is a mere assignee of the rights and receivables under the
Agreement, UCPB did not assume the obligations and liabilities of Primetown under its
contract to sell with Spouses Choi.
xxxx
Contrary to Spouses Choi's argument that UCPB was estopped, we find that estoppel would
not lie since UCPB's letters to the buyers only assured them of the completion of their units
by the developer. UCPB did not represent to be the new owner of Kiener or that UCPB itself
would complete Kiener.23(emphases and underlining supplied)
In Liam v. UCPB (Liam), 24 the Court maintained its position that the transaction between
PPGI and UCPB was merely an assignment of credit. Hence, what was transferred to UCPB
was only the right to collect PPGI's receivables from the purchases of Kiener Hills and not
the obligation to complete the said condominium project. Thus:
The terms of the MOA and Deed of Sale/Assignment between PPGI and UCPB unequivocally
show that the parties intended an assignment of PPG l's credit in favor of UCPB.
xxxx
The provisions of the foregoing agreements between PPGI and UCPB are clear, explicit and
unambiguous as to leave no doubt about their objective of executing an assignment of
credit instead of subrogation. The MOA and the Deed of Sale/Assignment clearly state that
UCPB became an assignee of PPGI's outstanding receivables of its condominium buyers.
The Court perceives no proviso or any extraneous factor that incites a contrary
interpretation. Even the simultaneous and subsequent acts of the parties accentuate their
intention to treat their agreements as assignment of credit.
xxxx
The last paragraph of the letter also confirms that UCPB's acquisition of PPGI's receivables
did not involve any changes in the Contract to Sell between PPGI and Liam; neither did it
vary the rights and the obligations of the parties therein. Thus, no novation by subrogation
could have taken place.
The CA was therefore correct in ruling that the agreement between PPGI and UCPB was an
assignment of credit. UCPB acquired PPGI's right to demand, collect and receive Liam's
outstanding balance; UCPB was not subrogated into PPGI's place as developer under the
Contract to Sen.25(emphases and underlining supplied)
It is noteworthy that the circumstances and issues in Choi and Liam fall squarely with the
case at bar. First, PPGI and UCPB were prominent parties in the cited cases. Second, it
involved the same documents and agreement between PPGI and UCPB whereby the right to
collect the receivables were assigned to the latter. Third, the controversy arose from the
complaints of disgruntled unit owners to recover the amount they had paid from PPGI or
UCPB after Kiener Hills was not completed.
In addition, the issue on estoppel was addressed in Spouses Choi. There, the Court ruled
that the demand letters UCPB sent to the buyers, including herein respondents, only
assured the completion of the condominium project. Nevertheless, there was no
representation on the part of the UCPB that it would continue the construction of Kiener
Hills or that it was the new owner thereof. Guided by the previous pronouncements of this
Court, it is settled that UCPB is only jointly liable with PPGI to the disgruntled purchasers of
Kiener Hills, including respondents. Thus, UCPB is only bound to refund the amount it had
unquestionably received from respondents.
Only questions of law may he raised in a petition for review under Rule 45; exceptions
In the present petition, UCPB does not contest the CA's conclusion that it is jointly liable
with PPGI to the unit owners of Kiener Hills.1âwphi1 It, however, assails that the CA erred
in computing its actual liability because it was only bound to refund the amount it had
actually received. Meanwhile, respondents contest that the resolution of the correct
amount of UCPB's liability is a question of fact, which is beyond the ambit of a petition for
review under Rule 45.
It is axiomatic that, as a rule, only questions of law may be raised under a petition for
review under Rule 45 because the Court is not a trier of facts and the factual findings of
lower courts are final, binding or conclusive on the parties and to the Court.26 As with every
rule, however, it admits certain exceptions. Among the recognized exceptions are when the
conclusion of the lower court is one grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures or when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.27
The Court finds that the exceptions are present to warrant a review of the factual matters.
Jurisprudence has settled UCPB's liability to unit owners to refund the amount it
indubitably received from the purchasers of Kiener Hills. In this case, the CA determined
UCPB's actual liability of ₱552,152.34 by subtracting the amounts already paid to PPGI
from the total purchase price of ₱l,151,718.75.28
Such computation of the appellate court, however, merely assumes that the said balance
was actually paid by respondents and received by UCPB. A closer scrutiny of the records,
nonetheless, shows that the said amount is not supported by the evidence at hand. The only
document that identifies the amount respondents had paid to UCPB is the demand letter it
sent to the former. It is noteworthy that the said demand letter was materially reproduced
in respondents' complaint29 before the HLURB Regional Office. In the said letter, the
amount UCPB received from respondents is only ₱157,757.82.
While respondents alleged that they had paid in full the purchase price of the condominium
units, only ₱157,757.82 was sufficiently substantiated to have been actually received by
UCPB. Thus, UCPB should only be held liable for ₱157,757.82 because it was the only
amount which was unequivocally shown it had received. This is especially true considering
that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving the fact of payment.30
Thus, it was incumbent upon respondents to prove the actual amount UCPB had
unquestionably received.
WHEREFORE, the 23 May 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals m CA-G.R. SP No. 118534
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank shall pay the
amount of ₱157,757.82 to Spouses Walter and Lily Uy, with legal interest at six percent
(6%) per annum, without prejudice to any action which the parties may have against Prime
Town Property Group, Inc.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165287 September 14, 2011

ARMANDO BARCELLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
DOLORES BAÑAS, represented by her son and Attorney-in-fact CRISPINO
BERMILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal by certiorari1 from the Decision2 of the Fifteenth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67702 dated 26 February 2004, granting the petition
of Dolores Bañas, herein respondent, to reverse and set aside the Decision3 of the lower
court.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
the court a quo is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and in its stead another one is
rendered GRANTING to petitioner-appellants the right to redeem the subject property for
the amount of Php 60,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision.
The facts as gathered by the court follow:
Respondent Bañas is an heir of Bartolome Bañas who owns in fee simple Lot 4485, PLS-
722-D situated in Hindi, Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is the property of Vicente
Medina (Medina), covered by Original Certificate of Title No. VH-9094, with an area of
1,877 square meters. On 17 March 1997, Medina offered his lot for sale to the adjoining
owners of the property, the heirs of Bartolome Bañas, including herein respondent Dolores
Bañas, Crispino Bermillo (Bermillo) and Isabela Bermillo-Beruela (Beruela)4 Crispino
Bermillo, as the representative of his family, agreed to the offer of Medina, the sale to take
place after the harvest season.5
On 3 April 1997, Medina sold the property to herein petitioner Armando Barcellano for
₱60,000.00. The following day, the heirs of Bañas learned about the sale and went to the
house of Medina to inquire about it.6 Medina confirmed that the lot was sold to Barcellano.
The heirs conveyed their intention to redeem the property but Medina replied that there
was already a deed of sale executed between the parties.7 Also, the Bañas heirs failed to
tender the ₱60,000.00 redemption amount to Medina.8
Aggrieved, the heirs went to the Office of the Barangay Council on 5 April 1997.9 Medina
sent only his tenant to attend the proceeding. On 9 April 1997, the Bañas heirs and
Barcellano, with neither Medina nor his tenant in attendance, went to the Office of the
Barangay Council to settle the dispute. According to one of the Bañas heirs, Barcellano told
them that he would be willing to sell the property but for a higher price of
₱90,000.00.10 Because the parties could not agree on the price and for failure to settle the
dispute, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action.11
On 24 October 1997, Dolores Bañas filed an action for Legal Redemption before the
Regional Trial Court. However, on 5 February 1998, the petition was withdrawn on the
ground that:
xxx considering the present worse economic situation in the country, petitioner opted that
the amount they are supposed to pay for the redemption be readily available for their
immediate and emergency needs.
On 11 March 1998, Dolores Bañas, as represented by Bermillo, filed another action12 for
Legal Redemption. It was opposed by Barcellano insisting that he complied with the
provisions of Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code but Bañas failed to exercise her right within
the period provided by law.
Trial ensued. On 15 March 2000, the trial court dismissed the complaint of the Bañas heirs
for their failure to comply with the condition precedent of making a formal offer to redeem
and for failure to file an action in court together with the consignation of the redemption
price within the reglementary period of 30 days.13 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court and
granted the heirs the right to redeem the subject property. The appellate court ruled that
the filing of a complaint before the Katarungang Pambarangay should be considered as a
notice to Barcellano and Medina that the heirs were exercising their right of redemption
over the subject property; and as having set in motion the judicial process of legal
redemption.14Further, the appellate court ruled that a formal offer to redeem, coupled with
a tender of payment of the redemption price, and consignation are proper only if the
redemptioner wishes to avail himself of his right of redemption in the future. The tender of
payment and consignation become inconsequential when the redemptioner files a case to
redeem the property within the 30-day period.15
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
In this petition, Barcellano questions the ruling of the appellate court for being contrary to
the admitted facts on record and applicable jurisprudence.
The Court’s Ruling
Barcellano maintains that the written notice required under Art. 1623 to be given to
adjoining owner was no longer necessary because there was already actual notice. Further,
he asserts that the appellate court erred in ruling that the tender of payment of the
redemption price and consignation are not required in this case, effectively affirming that
the respondents had validly exercised their right of redemption. Lastly, he questions as
erroneous the application of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as
"Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay Level," thereby ruling
that the filing by the heirs of the complaint before the Barangay was an exercise of right of
redemption.
We need only to discuss the requirement of notice under Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that:
The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
Nothing in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties shows that there was a
written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the period of thirty days
within which the right of legal pre-emption may be exercised, does not start.
The indispensability of a written notice had long been discussed in the early case
of Conejero v. Court of Appeals,16penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that such notice is
indispensable, and that, in view of the terms in which Article of the Philippine Civil Code is
couched, mere knowledge of the sale, acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner,
does not satisfy the statute. The written notice was obviously exacted by the Code to
remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that
the alienation is not definitive. The statute not having provided for any alternative, the
method of notification prescribed remains exclusive.
This is the same ruling in Verdad v. Court of Appeals:17
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written
notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its
terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
Lately, in Gosiengfiao Guillen v. the Court of Appeals,18 this Court again emphasized the
mandatory character of a written notice in legal redemption:
From these premises, we ruled that "[P]etitioner-heirs have not lost their right to redeem, for
in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not
even begun to run." These premises and conclusion leave no doubt about the thrust
of Mariano: The right of the petitioner-heirs to exercise their right of legal
redemption exists, and the running of the period for its exercise has not even been
triggered because they have not been notified in writing of the fact of sale. (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioner argues that the only purpose behind Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code is to
ensure that the owner of the adjoining land is actually notified of the intention of the owner
to sell his property. To advance their argument, they cited Destrito v. Court of Appeals as
cited in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where this Court pronounced that
written notice is no longer necessary in case of actual notice of the sale of property.
The Alonzo case does not apply to this case. There, we pronounced that the disregard of the
mandatory written rule was an exception due to the peculiar circumstance of the case.
Thus:
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that
they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By
requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in
favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its
purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly
notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually
informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice
was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963
and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first
complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale
and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could
have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs
made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua
filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the
period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged
right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his
claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of
ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make
it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who
were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a
house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a
mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly
situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts,
which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim
the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.20
xxxx
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and
ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are
the justifications for this exception.
The Court clarified that:
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of
the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly
stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we
are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Without the "peculiar circumstances" in the present case, Alonzo cannot find application.
The impossibility in Alonzo of the parties’ not knowing about the sale of a portion of the
property they were actually occupying is not presented in this case. The strict letter of the
law must apply. That a departure from the strict letter should only be for extraordinary
reasons is clear from the second sentence of Art. 1623 that "The deed of sale shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that
he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners."
Justice Edgardo Paras, referring to the origins of the requirement, would explain in his
commentaries on the New Civil Code that despite actual knowledge, the person having the
right to redeem is STILL entitled to the written notice. Both the letter and the spirit of the
New Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the "written notice" by
including therein any other kind of notice such as an oral one, or by registration. If the
intent of the law has been to include verbal notice or any other means of information as
sufficient to give the effect of this notice, there would have been no necessity or reason to
specify in the article that said notice be in writing, for under the old law, a verbal notice or
mere information was already deemed sufficient.22
Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.lawphi1 There
is only room for application.23 Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to
an injustice. The law is clear in this case, there must first be a written notice to the family of
Bañas.
Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget, when the language of the law is clear, no
explanation of it is required.24
We find no need to rule on the other issues presented by the petitioner.1âwphi1 The
respondent Bañas has a perfect right of redemption and was never in danger of losing such
right even if there was no redemption complaint filed with the barangay, no tender of
payment or no consignation.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 26 February 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67702, granting to petitioner-appellants the right to redeem the
subject property for the amount of Php60,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the finality
of this decision is hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
1987 Consti Article 12

Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies
and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

RULE 129

What Need Not Be Proved

Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. (1a)

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon.

G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910

S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.

Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.

Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are —

That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a
carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as she
was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of
fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the
opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of
the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great
speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give
defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's
wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it,
severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata
itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.

xxx xxx xxx

These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who
was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was
considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco
Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team
as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and
then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while
unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of
which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery
wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear
upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street
they came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.

The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.

Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against
him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of October,
1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.

There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil Code.
The provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —

Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors
who live with them.

Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live with them.

Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by the
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.

The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damages should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.

Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a
trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of
such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the
ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.

While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what different from that in
Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact of negligence is
determined are, nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating
the person responsible for a negligent act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law
determining what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme court
of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2 March, 1904;
7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13 April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March,
1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)

It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and
tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several
years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them
in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to
that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and
assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom
of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the
cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.

In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner
described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence.
(Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken
Land and Improvement Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y.,
212.) lawphi1.net

In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:

He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every person who suffered
a cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another to look after
the horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on.

In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:

The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the time of the injury, is
that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances. It
can not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is
negligence to leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse; whether he
was under the observation and control of some person all the time, and many other circumstances; and
is a question to be determined by the jury from the facts of each case.

In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the part of the trial court
to refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched
and otherwise unattended on the side of a public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading
goods on the wagon." The said court closed its opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the horse was quite and
gentle, and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of the alleged
injury, and that the horse had been used for years in that way without accident. The refusal of the trial
court to charge as requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the defendant, although the jury
was convinced that these facts were proven.lawphil.net

In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:

That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon stopping with his horse
and wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left the
horse unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not afraid of
cars, and having used it for three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not
conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.

The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise
reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or
inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues.
(Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing,
292; Jackson Architectural Iron Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63;
Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)

The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or
imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be
held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been
permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen
and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary
results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily
negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in
such a case, does not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only
creates aprima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act
complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case
showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing
Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):

. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the jury, was that if the
steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly
built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence on
the part of the defendant's agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the case
this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat
under control of her officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage was done in
this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury
might properly be so instructed.

There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of the runway and
the accident resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the runaway occurred. Those
conditions showing of themselves that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of
the horse, the prima facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to
deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which
that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in
which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive
of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years
without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be
permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every
reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces,
the custom of a people? We think not.

The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

I am of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.