Nanda Shrestha, Bimal Paul - Nepal and Bangladesh - A Global Studies handbook-ABC Clio (2002)

NEPAL and
BANGLADESH
A Global Studies Handbook
Other Titles in
ABC-CLIO’s
GLOBAL STUDIES: ASIA
Series
Japan, Lucien Ellington

The Koreas, Mary E. Connor
Vietnam, L. Shelton Woods
FORTHCOMING
China, Robert LaFleur
India, Fritz Blackwell
GLOBAL STUDIES: ASIA
NEPAL and
BANGLADESH
A Global Studies Handbook
Nanda R. Shrestha
Santa Barbara, California—•—Denver, Colorado—•—Oxford, England

Copyright 2002 by Nanda R. Shrestha
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior
permission in writing from the publishers.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Shrestha, Nanda R.
Nepal and Bangladesh : a global studies handbook /
Nanda R. Shrestha.
p. cm. — (Global studies, Asia)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-57607-285-1 (Hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN 1-85109-365-6 (e-book)
1. Nepal—Handbooks, manuals, etc. 2. Bangladesh—Handbooks,
manuals, etc. I. Title. II. Series.
DS393.4 .S55 2002
954.96—dc21
2002007223
06 05 04 03 02—10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an e-book.

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ABC-CLIO, Inc.
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This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Manufactured in the United States of America
To Rev. Jon Magnuson, a loving brother, true friend, and
confidant, who gave me a new life thirty years ago and who
is always there for me and my family.
Contents
Series Editor’s Foreword—xi

Preface—xiii
Acknowledgments—xix
Maps—xxi
NEPAL 1
PART ONE: NARRATIVE SECTION—3
Geography and History of Nepal—5
Physical and Human Geography—7
Ecology and Regional Division—8
The Monsoon and Nepali Life—15
A Sketch of Human Habitation—17
A Historical Profile—21
Ancient History—22
Medieval History—25
Modern History—28
Conclusion—39
The Economy of Nepal—43
Government’s Role in the Economy—45
Economic Planning and Foreign Aid—45
Planning and Some Key Economic Sectors—50
Conclusion: Future Prospects—68
Nepali Institutions—73
Government and Politics—74
The Dawn and Death of Democracy
and Economic Stagnation—75
Return of Democracy and the Multiparty System—80
Nepal and the World—82
Ethnic Groups, Castes, and Social Classes—85
Ethnic Groups—85
The Caste System—90
Social Classes and Stratification—93
——vii
viii—— Contents
Religion and Society—95

Hinduism—97
Buddhism—99
Education—101
Education under Rana Rule—101
Education since 1951—103
Conclusion—104
Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues—107
Family and Kinship Networks—107
Women’s Status in Society—110
Gender Relations—114
Child Labor—116
Popular Culture and Recreation—117
Hindi Movies—118
Western Popular Culture—119
Drug Use—121
Recreational Activities—121
The Internet—125
Conclusion—126
PART TWO: REFERENCE MATERIALS—129

Key Events in Nepali History—131
Significant People, Places, and Events—137
Nepali Language, Food, and Etiquette—151
Language—151
Food and Beverages—154
Common Nepali Dishes—155
Common Nepali Beverages—158
Etiquette—159
Nepal-Related Organizations—163
Business and Economic—163
Culture, Education, and Exchange—165
Nepal’s Government Representatives in the United States—167
Tourism—168
Annotated Bibliography of
Recommended Works on Nepal—171
——Contents——ix
BANGLADESH 179
PART ONE: NARRATIVE SECTION—181
Geography and History of Bangladesh—183
Physical and Human Geography—184
Climate and Rainfall—187
Forests—191
Population—192
History—198
Early History—198
Mughal (Islamic) Rule—200
British Rule—201
The Pakistan Period—204
The War for Independence—206
Independent Bangladesh—207
Conclusion—209
The Economy of Bangladesh—211
Agriculture—213
Industry—218
Service Sector—221
Poverty—223
Public Finance and Foreign Aid Dependency—226
Economic Performance and Barriers to Growth—227
Conclusion—229
Bangladeshi Institutions—231
Government and Politics—232
The Mujib Era (1972–1975)—232
The Zia Regime (1977–1981)—233
The Ershad Regime (1982–1991)—234
The Begum Zia Regime (1991–1996)—235
The Sheikh Hasina Regime (1996–2001)—236
The Second Begum Zia Regime (2001–)—237
Bangladesh and the World—239
Ethnicity and Social System—241
Ethnic Groups—241
Social System—243
Religion and Society—245
Education—249
x—— Contents
Educational System—249
Literacy—251
Religious Education—252
Conclusion—253
Bangladeshi Society and Contemporary Issues—255
Culture of Corruption and Violence—256
Lawlessness and Corruption—256
Gender Violence—258
Other Violence—261
Women’s Status in Society—262
Child Labor—264
Popular Culture and Recreation—266
Conclusion—269
PART TWO: REFERENCE MATERIALS—271

Key Events in Bangladeshi History—273
Significant People, Places, and Events—277
Bangladeshi Language, Food, and Etiquette—285
Language—285
Food and Beverages—286
Common Bangladeshi Dishes—287
Common Bangladeshi Beverages—289
Etiquette—290
Bangladesh-Related Organizations—293
Business and Economics—293
Culture, Education, and Exchange—295
Bangladesh’s Government Representatives
in the United States—298
Tourism—298
Annotated Bibliography of Recommended
Works on Bangladesh—301
Index—305
About the Author—323
Series Editor’s Foreword
It is imperative that as many Americans as possible develop a basic

understanding of Asia. In an increasingly interconnected world, the
fact that Asia contains almost 60 percent of all the planet’s popula-
tion is argument enough for increased knowledge of the continent on
our parts. There are at least four other reasons, in addition to demog-
raphy, that it is critical Americans become more familiar with Asia.
Americans of all ages, creeds, and colors are extensively involved
economically with Asian countries. U.S.-Pacific two-way trade sur-
passed our trade with Europe in the 1970s. Japan, with the world’s
second-largest economy, is also the second-largest foreign investor in
the United States.
American companies constitute the leading foreign investors in
Japan.
The recent Asian economic crisis notwithstanding, since World
War II East Asia has experienced the fastest rate of economic growth
of all the world’s regions. Recently, newly industrialized Southeast
Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have
joined the so-called Four Tigers—Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan—as leading areas for economic growth. In the
past decade China has begun to realize its potential to be a world-
influencing economic actor. Many Americans now depend upon
Asians for their economic livelihoods and all of us consume products
made in or by Asian companies.
It is impossible to be an informed American citizen without knowl-
edge of Asia, a continent that directly impacts our national security.
America’s war on terrorism is, as this foreword is composed, being
conducted in an Asian country—Afghanistan. (What many Americans
think of as the “Mideast” is, in actuality, Southwest Asia.) Both India
and Pakistan now have nuclear weapons. The eventual reunification
of the Korean Peninsula is fraught with the possibility of great prom-
ise or equally great peril. The question of U.S.-China relations is con-
sidered one of the world’s major global geopolitical issues. Americans
everywhere are affected by Asian political and military developments.
Asia and Asians have also become an important part of American
culture.
Asian restaurants dot the American urban landscape. Buddhism is
rapidly growing in the United States. Asian movies are becoming
——xi
xii—— Series Editor’s Foreword
increasingly popular in the United States. Asian-Americans, while

still a small percentage of the overall U.S. population, are one of the
fastest-growing ethnic groups in the United States. Many Asian-
Americans exert considerable economic and political influence in
this country. Asian sports, pop music, and cinema stars are becom-
ing household names in America. Even Chinese language characters
are becoming visible in the United States on everything from baseball
caps to t-shirts to license plates. Followers of the ongoing debate on
American educational reform will constantly encounter references to
Asian student achievement.
Americans should also better understand Asia for its own sake.
Anyone who is considered an educated person needs a basic under-
standing of Asia. The continent has a long, complex, and rich history.
Asia is the birthplace of all the world’s major religions including
Christianity and Judaism.
Asian civilizations are some of the world’s oldest. Asian arts and lit-
erature rank as some of humankind’s most impressive achievements.
Our objectives in developing the Global Studies: Asia series are to
assist a wide variety of citizens to both gain a basic understanding of
Asian countries and to enable readers to be better positioned for
more in-depth work. We envision the series being appropriate for
libraries, educators, high school, introductory college and university
students, businesspeople, would-be tourists, and anyone who is curi-
ous about an Asian country or countries. Although there is some
variation in the handbooks—the diversity of the countries requires
slight variations in treatment—each volume includes narrative chap-
ters on history and geography, economics, institutions, and society
and contemporary issues. Readers should obtain a sound general
understanding of the particular Asian country about which they read.
Each handbook also contains an extensive reference section.
Since our guess is that many of the readers of this series will actually
be traveling to Asia or interacting with Asians in this country, intro-
ductions to language, food, and etiquette are included. The reference
section of each handbook also contains extensive information—
including Web sites when relevant—about business and economic,
cultural, educational, exchange, government, and tourist organiza-
tions. The reference sections also include capsule descriptions of
famous people, places, and events and a comprehensive annotated
bibliography for further study.
—Lucien Ellington
Series Editor
Preface
The most important aspect of story writing is not the style one writes in, but the
feelings one is able to convey . . . It is like hearing, understanding, and following
the heartbeat of the people.
—Madan Mani Dixit
Indeed, “hearing, understanding, and following the heartbeat of the

people.” What Madan Dixit—a distinguished Nepali journalist who
also writes novels—says about story writing is generally true of book
writing as well. After all, virtually every book contains a story of a
people, place, and time. The bubbling question is: Does the story
convey the feelings, the heartbeat of the people, place, and time it
covers?
When Dr. Lucien Ellington, the editor of the Global Studies: Asia
series, approached me to write this book, I was quite apprehensive. I
felt the tight grip of my inner fear. Besides the daunting task of writ-
ing a book, what concerned me most was the essence of the question
posed above. What is the point of writing a book if the story is devoid
of substance, if it fails to engender feelings? So I had to first search for
some meaning and message for the book before I could commit myself
to the demanding task of writing it. It is not that the book lacked the-
matic topics, but it was important to weave those topics into a coher-
ent story filled with feelings—a sense of people and places.
Over the years, I have done my share of writing. To me, writing is
generally fun. But it doesn’t always flow like a river, defying the
mountains and masses of boulders it encounters along the way, run-
ning freely and creating its own gullies and fissures, deltas and plains.
As it encounters a flat valley on the way to its eventual destination,
it moves at a relaxed pace. Sometimes, the routine of writing feels
like digging a canal, an arduous task. At any rate, writing is not about
having fun no matter how fun it is to write. It is about conveying a
message, not merely lifeless facts and figures or certain pieces of
information. Writing has to have some message and meaning,
although not everybody will agree with it.
Then I began to ponder the issues to cover and the angles to pur-
sue within the general framework of the series and, at the same time,
to tell a meaningful story of Nepal and Bangladesh. One critical com-
ponent of the story of this book is that both countries have failed to
——xiii
xiv—— Preface
free themselves from the shackles of their tortured pasts; each coun-
try has one foot tied to an internal feudalistic structure and the other
to external domination. It is technically true that Nepal was never
formally colonized in the manner that Bangladesh was. But this fac-
tual difference is largely superficial. Not too long after the British
entered South Asia, they emerged as a powerful master that drew the
subcontinent into its global imperial orbit. Even Nepal, which had
managed to maintain its relative independence, was independent no
more. Nepal was kept as a semicolony subjected to every savagery
and trickery of colonialism that the world has known since its
dawn—basically to the same fate that Caliban was forced to suffer in
Shakespeare’s play, The Tempest, when colonial Prospero managed
to control Caliban’s island as well as his destiny. In this respect, both
Nepal and Bangladesh underwent the same fate as did the rest of
South Asia, and they are both still reeling from the lingering specter
of British colonialism.
Today, the fortunes of both countries are deeply mired in the
swamp of poverty that pervades every facet of life. It is nothing new,
though, as its roots date far back in history. Both historically and at
present, poverty is a subcontinental problem, by no means confined
to the borders of Nepal and Bangladesh. In the pages of some ancient
Hindu texts, one can find references to people being stricken by mas-
sive poverty. For instance, there is a parabolic story about Lord
Krishna’s divine act (miracle), one in which he transforms a morsel
of mustard greens into a bountiful feast to feed a mass of humanity
suffering from starvation. But this entrenched historical malady
developed a new and much grimmer face as the subcontinent was
brought under British colonialism, which was bent on bleeding its
colonies white. Yet it would be intellectually questionable and socio-
historically naive for anyone to claim that British colonialism, no
matter how pernicious, was the sole perpetrator of the ongoing prob-
lems facing Nepal and Bangladesh—or, for that matter, South Asia as
a whole. Equally responsible for the contemporary woes of both
countries are their feudalistic institutions and factional politics.
Caught in the vortex of external colonialism and internal institu-
tional deformities, both Nepal and Bangladesh are having difficulty
emerging from the dark shadow of their past in order to effectively
manage the present. How well they will navigate their future or what
kind of a future awaits them is a deeper question that is hard to
answer at this time with any degree of certainty.
Although geographically separated by a narrow strip of Indian ter-
——Preface——xv
ritory (see Map of South Asia), Nepal and Bangladesh evidently share
many commonalities. There are, to be sure, noticeable differences
between the two countries—in fact, some quite stark, such as their
physiographic features and population sizes. Whereas Nepal is
mostly mountainous, Bangladesh is largely a lowland country with a
few scattered low hills. Even though they are relatively close in terms
of their total areal size, Bangladesh has more than five times as many
people as Nepal does. Furthermore, Nepal is dominated by Hindus
and Bangladesh by Muslims. Nonetheless, they are immersed into the
same drainage system that traverses the whole length of their con-
tiguous subcontinental landscape, gradually rising from the coastal
lowlands to the snow-capped Himalayas. As a result, they are integral
parts of the same environmental system, although their specific eco-
logical locations and their characteristics within the system certainly
vary. What is more, their common past of being incorporated into the
British colonial orbit as well as their similar contemporary socioeco-
nomic conditions place them on the same page. It is precisely these
commonalities that led me to combine coverage of Nepal and
Bangladesh into this volume.
Although it would have been preferable to write a separate volume
on each country, enough space was made available to put them
together. In other words, this volume is sufficiently deep to provide a
sound topical coverage of both countries without compromising the
integrity of their individual stories born out of their collective expe-
rience and vista. To repeat, despite some regional peculiarities and
differences, the socioeconomic stories of these two countries—sepa-
rated at their historical birth—reveal remarkable similarities in
terms of both content and trends. Simply expressed, a common
thread ties them together, although, admittedly, the bond is nowhere
near as tight as the one that exists between North and South Korea.
In reading the present volume, one should not make the inevitable
comparison and contrast between Nepal and Bangladesh in the same
light as that presented in The Koreas: A Global Studies Handbook.
In that book, the comparative perspective was natural as the two
countries were built on the same historical, cultural, and linguistic
foundation. They are (were) one country, fragmented into two parts
because of the ideological dictation of cold war geopolitics. In a
broader sense, therefore, the comparison and contrast between them
is along the ideological line: communist North versus capitalist South
and how they have fared in various arenas since their partition in the
post–World War II period.
xvi—— Preface
On the Nepal-Bangladesh front, there are no inherent links like

those between North and South Korea. Consequently, in spite of the
thematic similarities and identical chapter headings to The Koreas,
the present volume on Nepal and Bangladesh contains certain varia-
tions with respect to its topical focus and specific issues. It is, there-
fore, advisable that any similarities and contrasts that the reader may
note between the two separate segments of this book should be
treated with caution and interpreted in broader historical and social
contexts rather than in their specific contents. However, in order to
provide the reader a sense of continuity and comparison of the two
segments in the text, I have tried to maintain as much consistency as
possible in their thematic coverage. This is a deliberate format
designed to facilitate the reader’s comparative understanding of
Nepal and Bangladesh as well as selective focus. That is to say, if the
reader chooses to pick out only certain topics for, say, Nepal, he or
she can do so easily without being distracted by the same topics on
Bangladesh.
Before concluding this preface, I would like to draw the reader’s
attention to two issues. First, in order to keep the story line simple
and straightforward, I have kept the language as free of academic jar-
gon as possible. Over the years, I have come to the conclusion that the
most effective way to tell a story and convey its feelings to the reader
is to keep the language simple and accessible. Although I can’t claim
total freedom from jargon, my academic writing has surely taught me
enough to realize that language often gets in the way of a story or at
least makes it inaccessible or cumbersome to the general public.
When the story is lost, both its message and meaning are lost.
Second, although the reader will, no doubt, be the ultimate judge
of the stories of Nepal and Bangladesh told in this book, it is incum-
bent on me to inform the reader that it is written from my insider-
outsider perspective. This is particularly true of the Nepal segment. I
am both an insider and an outsider to Nepal. As a person born and
raised there for the first 22 years of my life who has conducted plenty
of fieldwork in the country, I am keenly familiar with its interior con-
tours and exterior textures. On the other hand, as an academician
trained and teaching in America, I am an outsider automatically. In
my role as an insider-outsider, I generally read the Nepali landscape
as a distant observer, wearing a pair of theoretical glasses, but always
with an insider’s instinct, insight, and understanding.
Given my unique role, I could not fully isolate myself as a story-
teller from the story itself, for I am, at least by association, a part of
——Preface——xvii
it. In addition, some of the issues and topics covered in the book are
deeply seeped in my bones—they have shaped the course of my life
as well as my perspective since my early days back in Nepal. Yet I have
kept the story straight not only to portray a genuine picture but to
maintain its integrity. As an author, it is precisely this insider-outsider
perspective—the eyes of an outsider and the feel of an insider—that I
hope pulsates the heartbeat of the story as it unfolds and that the
reader finds it refreshing to read and revealing in content.
——Geography and History——xix
Acknowledgments
First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Lucien Ellington for asking me
to write this book and for his many insightful comments and sugges-
tions on its earlier draft. In addition, I am extremely grateful to
Florida A&M University and to Dr. Sybil C. Mobley, dean of the Uni-
versity’s School of Business and Industry, for granting me a sabbati-
cal leave to work on this book. Without their support and commit-
ment to faculty scholarship, it would have been extremely difficult
for me to complete the book in a timely manner. My sincere thanks
go to Alicia Merrit, Carol Smith, Liz Kincaid, and Scott Horst at ABC-
CLIO for their unsurpassed professionalism, responsiveness, and
constant support during the preparation and production of this vol-
ume and to Michelle Asakawa, whose meticulous copyediting has
immensely elevated its quality. Thank you to Bill Nelson for drawing
the maps. I also owe a great deal to my wife, Pamela, and son, Kiran,
for their patience and understanding while I was engrossed in its
writing and often negligent of my family responsibilities.
Much of the book’s Bangladesh segment was coauthored with Dr.
Bimal K. Paul. Born and raised in Bangladesh, Dr. Paul received his
early education in his native country and his Ph.D. education in the
United States. Currently a professor of geography at Kansas State
University, he has published numerous professional journal articles
on a variety of topics concerning Bangladesh. I am thankful to Bimal
for his friendship, as well as his scholarly support and contribution to
this volume.
——xix
xx——K O R E A : A Global Studies Handbook
——Geography and History——xxi
Map of South Asia
——xxi
Map of Nepal
——
Map of Bangladesh
NEPAL
PART ONE
NARRATIVE SECTION
Geography and History of Nepal
The Bagmati is a river that flows right next to Pashupati, one of

the holiest Hindu shrines, located in the heart of Kathmandu.
This locational link makes the Bagmati more than simply a river
meandering through a valley; to Hindus, it is a holy river, a
revered cremation site in the Kathmandu Valley. Metaphorically,
however, it has emerged in recent years as an uncanny symbol of
what is rapidly unfolding in Nepal—a deepening tension between
enduring traditional values and inevitable outcomes of soaring
Westernization.
Now a battle is brewing over the Bagmati. Because its water level
is no longer sufficient to flush out ashes and human remains from
endless cremations, concerns have been raised about the river’s
continuing viability. So, at the suggestion of Western agencies and
environmentalists, a proposal has been floated to launch an electric
crematorium. But devout Hindu traditionalists are at a loggerheads
with modern environmentalists over this proposal because they
prefer “last rites to be performed in a manner and place prescribed
by the Veda and other (Hindu) scriptures,” that is, on the bank of a
holy river such as the Bagmati (Adhikary 2000).
Nepal is thus a living exhibit of contradictions and conflicts, for
example, between the young and old, tradition and modernity,
and the past and present. As one middle-aged Nepali (or Nepalese)
put it, “No Nepalese has lived or ever again will live a life like
mine. My parents were born in the Middle Ages. My son belongs
to the 21st century. Only my life spans both the Middle Ages and
the new millennium. No Nepalese will ever again live in three
epochs. Someday you must tell the story of how Nepal went from
the Middle Ages to the 21st century” (quoted in Allman 2000,
98–102). What is notable about this epochal leap is that it has all
happened within a short stretch of forty years. Yet it seems like a
long lifetime for the post–World War II generation like myself,
ironically because the transformation has been rapid, forcing one
to wonder in disbelief: How could somebody who grew up in
5
6——NEPAL and BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook
Valley farmland with the morning sun-kissed hills in the background and a
family farmhouse with a thatch roof in the foreground (Courtesy of Nanda
R. Shrestha)
——Geography and History of Nepal——7
medieval times be experiencing the world of high-tech and mate-

rial marvels? How could a person who grew up in the midst of
ancient belief that the earth was flat and for whom time and dis-
tance seemed completely frozen suddenly be watching CNN live?
Although the older generations tend to cling to traditional val-
ues, Nepal’s younger generation is mesmerized by everything
Western—including X-rated movies on television that go against
Hindu tenets of modesty, where even simple kissing in public is
taboo. This deepening juxtaposition is increasingly turning into
what can be described as an intergenerational cultural tension
between the old and new. Compounding this cultural tension is
the fact that the country is faced with a massive growth of mate-
rial consumerism and population. As a result, Nepal is witnessing
an array of problems rarely seen until about two decades ago.
These problems range from increasing impoverishment to a
breakdown in social order to pollution and commercialized pros-
titution. Because Nepal has been unable to effectively deal with its
mounting problems, Western agencies have been all too eager to
propose solutions, thereby giving rise to yet another problem—of
East versus West.
PHYSICAL AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

Nepal is a small landlocked country of less than 55,000 square
miles, where more than 23 million human souls are compressed.
Sandwiched between the two Asian giants—China and India—its
geographical position is hardly enviable, as it has been tradition-
ally characterized as a yam trapped between two rocks (see map
of Nepal). The country is separated from its other two neighbor-
ing countries, Bangladesh and Bhutan, by a narrow strip of Indian
territory. The territorial detachment from Bangladesh is particu-
larly notable, for it makes Nepal totally dependent on India for its
external transit routes and sea access, even for most goods and
products coming from China. The country is, hence, absolutely
vulnerable to India’s trade and transit policy toward Nepal, as was
demonstrated by the trade embargo that the former imposed on
the latter in 1989. It is precisely this geographical squeeze
between China and India that has historically played a paramount
role in defining Nepal’s human geography, cultural landscapes,
8——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook
economic life, and diplomatic navigation. In other words, the way

of life in Nepal, as it has evolved over many centuries, cannot be
diagnosed in isolation from the hard realities of its geography—
both from its relative locational and physiographic perspectives.
An elongated rectangle nestled in the vast slopes of the majes-
tic Himalayan massifs, Nepal stretches from west to east much
like Tennessee in the United States. With a total area of 56,827
square miles, the country is roughly 25 percent larger than Ten-
nessee (42,144 square miles), however, and the physiographic
features of the two are very different. To be sure, Tennessee has
its share of ridges and valleys, but they seem like mere bumps and
dips compared to those found in Nepal. So stark is the difference
that the comparison actually appears quite awkward.
Nepal is perhaps the most mountainous country in the world,
at least in terms of altitude, featuring six of the world’s ten tallest
peaks. Included among these peaks is, of course, Mt. Everest, the
most imposing of all, which the Nepalis fondly call Sagarmatha—
the roof of the world. Despite its highly mountainous and hilly
topography, about 20 percent of Nepal’s total land area lies in the
subtropical lowland called the Tarai, bordering India. Indeed,
within a mere south-north span of some 100 miles between its
Indian and Chinese borders, Nepal’s altitude ranges from barely a
couple of hundred feet above sea level to the tallest point on the
earth’s surface. Consequently, the country constitutes an array of
climatic zones, encompassing almost all of those found on the
whole continent of North America—from the subtropical jungle
and hot, humid conditions to the arcticlike permafrost regime of
the snow-clad Himalayas to the arid condition of the inner
Himalayan region that extends into the Tibetan (Xizang) plateau.
Not surprisingly, the country’s temperature regimes are deter-
mined more by its altitudinal variations than its latitudinal loca-
tion, ranging from subzero tundra conditions to over 100 degrees
F in the southwestern Tarai during the premonsoon season of
April and May.
Ecology and Regional Division

From the lowland Tarai belt, Nepal’s elevations rise in successive
hill and mountain ranges like a massive stairway, ultimately
reaching the soaring heights of the Himalayas and then taking a

dive toward the Tibetan plateau (Sill and Kirkby 1991, 53). This
magnificent rise in elevations is punctuated by valleys situated
between the mountain ranges. The country is commonly consid-
ered to be composed of three broad physiographic regions based
on elevation changes and ecological variations. They are (1) the
mountain (Himalayan) region, (2) the hill region, and (3) the
Tarai region. All three regions extend as contiguous ecological
belts, occasionally bisected by the country’s drainage (river) sys-
tems and valleys.
The Mountain Region. The mountain region, the Nepali term
for which is parbat, is situated 12,000 feet above sea level and lies
to the north of the hill region. Because the Great Himalayan
Range passes through this region, the most imposing features of
its landscape obviously are these renowned snow-capped moun-
tains. The region’s inclement climate and harsh topography limit
human habitation and make economic activities extremely ardu-
ous. It is no wonder, therefore, that the region is very sparsely
populated, with less than 8 percent of Nepal’s total population liv-
ing there.
Whatever farming activity is found in this region is mostly con-
fined to its valleys and the river basins, the same areas where most
of the settlements are concentrated. The fact that the region con-
sists of only 5 percent of Nepal’s total cultivatable land is quite
telling of its agricultural status. This geographical limitation on
farming is further compounded by a harsh climatic condition. The
two economic activities most commonly practiced by mountain
dwellers are pastoralism and trans-Himalayan trade. As regards
the former, Nepali herders move their goth (temporary shelters),
along with herds consisting of mostly goats and sheep, between the
mountains in the summer and the valleys in the winter (see Zurick
and Karan 1999). In a similar fashion, Himalayan traders migrate
seasonally between Tibet to the north and the hills and lowlands to
the south, buying and selling goods and products in order to gen-
erate income and to secure food supplies for the winter months,
when such movement comes to a complete halt (Furer-Haimen-
dorf 1975). This historical north-south trade has, however, wit-
nessed a noticeable decline over recent years, following the annex-
ation of Tibet by China in the late 1950s. This decline has resulted
Machhapuchhre (fish tail mountain) as seen from Pokhara. Part of the

Annapurna Range, this peak is considered to be the most beautiful
mountain in Nepal. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)
in a significant change in the regional economy and human geog-

raphy of the mountains, as its inhabitants, especially those from
the upper crusts of society belonging to the Thakali and Manange
groups, have increasingly moved southward to urban centers, scat-
tered in the hills and Tarai. Many of those traders have now
become settled merchants in these urban centers.
Despite its limited human habitation, the Himalayan Range ful-
fills two valuable functions. First, it acts as a series of massive
walls, effectively preventing the bursts of freezing arctic air
masses from Inner Asia from penetrating the lower southern hills
and valleys, including the Tarai. This not only insures relatively
warmer winters in these regions than otherwise would be the case
but extends their effective growing season, thus permitting a
higher level of aggregate farm outputs. Second, the Himalayas
serve as a powerful hydraulic force in two respects: (1) When the
masses of moist clouds from the Bay of Bengal encounter these
permafrost walls, condensation occurs, and resulting precipita-
tion is bounced back in the form of monsoon rains that determine

the economic fate of hundreds of millions of farmers throughout
Nepal, Bangladesh, and India; and (2) the mountains are the
source of most of the rivers that drain the subcontinent, eventu-
ally finding their way to the Bay of Bengal. As peasants and farm-
ers across the subcontinent plow their rice fields year after year,
it is these waters from the monsoon rains and mountain rivers
that fill the furrows and nourish the paddies. So, to the countless
peasants and farmers who dominate the economic life and land-
scape on the subcontinent, these mountains embody an eternal
source of life. When the mountains are dry, farmers suffer and life
is sapped. When the mountains are moist and wet, life radiates
vigor and vitality.
Too, the Himalayan Range played another role during the cold
war era. The U.S. government saw it as a formidable barrier to
block the sweeping march of Red China into the Indian subcon-
tinent. The tiny, remote country of Nepal thus became a valuable
player on the U.S. geopolitical chessboard. The policy gained
heightened significance following China’s territorial annexation
of Tibet. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responded by
training and arming Tibetan guerrilla bands to engage in armed
insurgencies into Tibet. From the highlands of Nepal along the
border, the Tibetan guerrillas routinely conducted raids across
the border, thereby placing Nepal in a tenuous diplomatic posi-
tion vis-à-vis China. One tragic outcome of this operation was
that those Tibetan guerrillas turned into a menacing force, peri-
odically terrorizing Nepali villages in the highlands, including
raping and looting. However, those guerrilla bands have now
been disbanded.
The Hill Region. Commonly called the pahar in Nepali, the
hill region lies mostly between 2,000 and 12,000 feet in altitude
and includes the Mahabharat Range. This range is basically a
chain of middle mountains that merges with the Himalayan Range
to their north. In addition to many intermontane valleys, the
region includes two well-known and relatively large valleys:
Pokhara and Kathmandu. The Valley of Kathmandu is perhaps the
most fertile of all, both in terms of its soil composition and a pro-
ductivity per unit of land that approaches the Japanese level. The
farmers of this valley, invariably known as jyapus, are renowned
Terraced farmland in the pahar, the hill region of Nepal (Courtesy of Nanda
R. Shrestha)
throughout the country for their farming skills. Containing

approximately 1.5 million people within its three districts of Kath-
mandu, Lalitpur (Patan), and Bhaktapur, the Kathmandu Valley is
the single most urbanized area in the country, with a long history
and deep cultural roots. It is not only the nerve center of Nepal,
both historically and in contemporary times, it is also the cradle
of Nepali culture and civilization.
Thanks to the centrality of the Kathmandu Valley, the hill
region has long functioned as the political and cultural heart of
Nepal. Consequently, whether justified or not, it is the pahar that
bestows Nepal with its national identity, popularly known as
Nepali. The pahar has historically contained the largest popula-
tion in Nepal—almost 53 percent in 1971. However, as a result of
heavy hill outmigration that began in the 1960s, the area has lost
population and power to the Tarai region. According to the latest
projection for 2001, the hills retain less than 45 percent of the
total national population (Ministry of Population and Environ-
ment 1998, vol. 2).
The famous ancient peacock window in Bhaktapur. Crafted from a single

piece of wood, the window is a popular tourist attraction and an
embodiment of the Newars’ artistic achievements. (Courtesy of Nanda R.
Shrestha)
The hill landscape is a cultural mosaic, a masterpiece of agrar-

ian art and survival imperatives. Sculptured into a wonderful
complex of winding terraces, the region on the whole is exten-
sively cultivated. Although agriculture remains the predominant
economic activity, the hills contain only 38 percent of the nation’s
total cultivatable land, a significant portion of it being pakho
(upland or dry land), meaning that it is not very hospitable for
paddy production. The pahar as a whole suffers from chronic food
shortages, which generally intensify as one moves westward. In
short, its regional economic vulnerability runs deep. The situation
is particularly acute in the Kathmandu Valley, as its susceptibility
to external dependency was openly bared during the Indian eco-
nomic embargo of 1989.
The Tarai Region. Although geographically conjoined, the
Tarai (plain) stands in complete topographic and climatic contrast
to the mountain (parbat) and hill (pahar) regions to its north. It
is a lowland subtropical belt straddling the Nepal-India border,

along the northern extension of India’s vast Gangetic Plain. Its
altitude rises gradually from about 200 feet to 2,000 feet at the
foot of the Siwalik Range, also known as the Chure Hills. The word
Tarai, which is derived from Persian, means “damp” and appro-
priately describes its hot and humid climatic conditions. The level
of precipitation declines gradually as one moves toward its west-
ern frontier, where the premonsoon temperature in April and May
can reach well above 100 degrees F, thus making the weather con-
dition extremely oppressive.
The region is formed and fed by the three primary river sys-
tems of Nepal: the Kosi (east), Gandaki (central), and Karnali
(west), all of which eventually join the Ganges River in northern
India. Until the early 1950s, the region was a dense malarial sub-
tropical jungle, commonly known as the char kose jhari (i.e.,
approximately 8-miles-wide dense forests). During the early
period of the subcontinental British Raj, the Tarai acted as a
defensive frontier against the British imperial incursion into
Nepal. In its role as a front line of defense, it was the extreme
malarial condition of the dense Tarai forests that was the most
potent weapon against the British—a sort of natural biological
warfare. To maintain the maximum potency of this malarial bio-
logical deterrence, the forests were generally left undisturbed.
Today, however, malaria has been contained, and vast patches of
those dense forests have disappeared through both legal and ille-
gal logging, with much of the reclaimed wastelands being con-
verted into farms.
The Tarai’s sociopolitical standing in Nepal has fallen griev-
ously short of its enormous economic and defensive importance.
Successive ruling elites of Nepal regarded the Tarai as an internal
economic colony and cultural backwater. Instead of systemati-
cally integrating it into the national political economy, it was con-
sistently viewed with suspicion as having close affinity toward
India rather than pledging its allegiance to the central authority.
In essence, as an internal colonial possession, the Tarai was
merely a bountiful territory to serve the economic interests of the
Kathmandu-based aristocracy (Regmi 1984, 13).
In fact, the region was not incorporated into the national con-
figuration until the early 1950s. Starting in the mid-1950s, a new
picture began to emerge, as this internal colony was converted

into a land frontier for resettlement by the pahari (hill) residents.
The Nepali government opened up this land frontier by imple-
menting a series of planned agricultural resettlement schemes in
the Tarai, from east to west, as an integral feature of its national
development plan. Although the policy was designed expressly to
resettle hill victims of natural calamities and to mitigate popula-
tion pressure in the hills, it also signaled the Nepali government’s
not-so-subtle attempt at paharization of the Tarai through pahari
resettlement (Gaige 1975). In essence, it signified a systematic
attempt to neutralize, or even overcome, the perceived pro-India
sentiment of the Tarai dwellers by populating the region with
pahari residents who were presumed to be culturally superior and
promonarchy, the power axis of Nepal’s hill-based central author-
ity. It was a demographic approach to regional unity—that is,
nationalization of the hill culture and authority through demo-
graphic domination of the Tarai by pahari residents.
Despite its depleted forest base, the Tarai remains the principal
source of commercial forestry in Nepal. In addition, with 57 per-
cent of Nepal’s cultivatable land, the Tarai unquestionably
remains the country’s granary, and all this with limited techno-
logical inputs and at a level of per-unit land productivity that is
generally less than one-third of what Japanese farmers have
achieved. Its relatively high agricultural prospect is comple-
mented by a viable industrial and commercial potential due to its
close proximity to India and reasonable transportation networks.
It is Nepal’s richest economic region.
The Monsoon and Nepali Life

The rhythm of life in Nepal is intrinsically intertwined with its
physical environment. Geography is therefore not merely a geo-
logical entity but an indicator of life deeply imbued with cultural
meaning and rituals, social customs and values. Nowhere is this
relationship more keenly demonstrated than in the annual drama
of what is commonly known as the monsoon, a climatic phenom-
enon that forms the umbilical cord of Nepali life. The annual cycle
of the monsoon evokes both fear and reverence. To Nepali farm-
ers and peasants, the monsoon is their rain god, who can be as
Women weeding in a rice field in the Tarai. These hill migrant women, who
have settled in the Tarai, represent a common scene during the weeding
cycle of rice farming as weeding is usually done by women in a group
setting. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)
richly nurturing as ravagingly punishing. It all depends on the

timing of its arrival. So, during every rice planting season, farm-
ers and peasants await its arrival with a sense of urgency and
eagerness, with profound fears and high hopes.
As reliant as Nepali life is on the monsoon, its timely arrival is
rarely assured. The start of the annual summer monsoon can vary
by as much as a month, though it normally arrives in Nepal in
early June. This is the season when the celestial drama of life
begins in Nepal, featuring the interplay between the towering
mountains and the monsoon clouds surging from the Bay of Ben-
gal. As the mountains and the monsoon clouds engage in their
swirling annual tango, Nepali farmers are busy in the valleys and
lowlands, readying their fields for paddy cultivation. For the next
3–4 weeks, farmers work like bees to prepare the fields and plant
rice seedlings. They wake up at the rooster’s first crow, pack their
breakfast (often roasted corn or some type of homemade bread),
collect their tools, and hit the roads on their way to the fields,
some to prepare the soil and others to plant rice seedlings. If the
rain god fails to descend with nimbus clouds bearing rains, farm-
ers fear for a life condemned to misery, and they begin to pray.
The new crops of rice, the grain of life across monsoon Asia, will
suffer, and the harvests will be reduced, adversely affecting mil-
lions of lives. Such is the fragility of life in Nepal, all dependent on
one timely stroke of the mighty monsoon.
Nepal’s plains and hills receive more than 70 percent of their
annual precipitation during the summer monsoon. The amount of
summer monsoon rain generally declines from southeast to
northwest as the maritime wedge of air gradually becomes thin-
ner and dryer. Although the summer monsoon is critical for farm-
ers and peasants, it does not always represent an eternal blessing.
Periodically, the monsoon turns violent, causing immense land-
slides and flooding. Consequently, human lives and livestock are
lost, farmlands are washed away, and properties are destroyed.
Besides these visible losses, day-to-day life becomes ruptured. As
basic an act as daily cooking can be severely affected. Everything
is so damp and soaked in rain that it is very difficult to find rela-
tively dry firewood to cook food. Lighting a fire suddenly becomes
a defiant challenge. As a result, the simple task of cooking rice
turns into a daunting chore. This situation is particularly precar-
ious for Nepal’s countless poor, for whom gathering firewood is a
daily routine like securing food itself.
A Sketch of Human Habitation

The demographic history of Nepal is filled with stories of migrants
from both north and south. The hill region long ago became a meet-
ing ground, a sanctuary, for the surrounding peoples and cultures.
The ancient migration of the nomadic Mongoloid people from Tibet
began during the unrecorded period of Nepal’s history. Available
ethnic and linguistic data suggest that there were at least three dis-
tinct waves of migration into the country from the north. The first
wave came primarily from the eastern and central parts of Mongo-
lia, especially ancestors of the tribal groups such as the Kiratas
(Rais and Limbus) who are concentrated in the eastern hills. The
second wave most probably was composed of the Gurungs and
Magars, whose geographical domain within Nepal is found in the

central hills. Finally, the third wave, a fairly recent one, brought the
distinctively “Tibeto-Himalayan” people such as the Dolpos in the
western hills and Sherpas and Lepchas in the eastern hills, in all
likelihood crossing the Himalayas only after Tibet’s conversion to
Buddhism in the mid-seventh century. It is believed that these dif-
ferent tribal groups journeyed to the lush hills from the cold and dry
Inner Himalayan region of Tibet for economic and climatic reasons.
They wandered over the Himalayan passes to escape the bareness
and the bitter cold of the Tibetan plateau and to seek forage for their
animals in the warm, wet valleys on the southern slopes of the
mountains. The earliest arrivals were pushed further south by each
successive wave of later arrivals.
These southward waves of migrants were later followed by the
northward movements of the Indo-Aryans into the hills of Nepal.
They first reached the western hills of Nepal somewhat less than
1,000 years ago (Gaige 1975). Concurrent with their migration
were waves of immigration of high-caste Hindus from Indian bor-
der districts, mostly Brahmans and Rajputs, fleeing the religious
crusade of invading Muslims and their subsequent tyranny against
the Hindus. The northward migration of those Hindus had major
consequences on Nepal’s socioeconomic transformation, includ-
ing their exploitative relations with Mongoloid migrant groups.
Prior to the arrival of the Aryans, the mode of production com-
monly found among the Mongoloids was communal. They gener-
ally practiced animal herding and limited cultivation, usually
characterized as slash-and-burn agriculture. Production was
based on kinship relations and communal alliances rather than
class stratification. Property was characterized by communal land
ownership, known as the kipat system. This system of land own-
ership was not only equitable and just but was based on a num-
ber of considerations, such as family needs and communal
responsibility, respect, and welfare. If a family had more land than
it needed, it was reallocated to others in the community. The
tribal organization of land under the kipat system was equally
concerned with the protection of the physical environment, mak-
ing provisions for household-level fodder and fuel-collecting rights
as well as imposing rules allocating certain amounts of land for
grazing, so that overgrazing would not result.
In all likelihood, the communal mode of production found

among most Mongoloid tribal groups was at a rudimentary level of
technological advancement. As a result, it gradually yielded to the
relatively more advanced agricultural farming technology and
class-structured social institution brought with them by the immi-
grants from India. These Indian immigrants increasingly asserted
their socioeconomic dominance over the northern immigrants
through social, cultural, educational, and political control. Grab-
bing tribal kipat lands through treachery and deceit, they gained
institutional control and thus affected the gradual demise of the
kipat system.
The course of Nepal’s migration history took a new turn start-
ing in the late nineteenth century, when the hills ceased to be the
migration destination from either direction. Since then, they have
emerged as the prime source of outmigration, mostly people going
across the border into India in search of military and menial jobs.
Although the migratory waves from the north stopped many cen-
turies ago, the southern waves continue to this day. Prior to the
1950s, most of the southern migrants from the neighboring Bihar
and West Bengal provinces of India were lured to Nepal by the
possibilities of acquiring land in the Tarai. Migrants from these
same Indian territories still cross the border into Nepal. Although
some of these migrants control significant portions of trade and
commerce in Tarai urban centers and in Kathmandu, most are
engaged in semiskilled construction and repair labor as well as
vegetable trade. The migration pattern between Nepal and India
is thus distinctly a two-way flow.
Despite voluminous outmigration, Nepal still contains a large
population base. The current population is almost 23.5 million,
with a total of 52 percent residing in the hill and mountain regions
and 48 percent occupying the Tarai. In the past thirty years the
population has more than doubled, with the fastest growth taking
place in the Tarai, both through inmigration and natural growth
(see table 1). Given the fact that the current annual rate of popu-
lation growth is nearly 2.3 percent and that over 40 percent of the
population is below the age of fifteen, there is little likelihood that
growth will slow down any time soon.
Such a scenario of continued high population growth is bound
to pose a serious dilemma for Nepal, specifically in relations to its
existing economic resource base. The simple population density,

as measured in terms of population per square mile (of the total
physical area), currently stands at 413 persons. This simple den-
sity picture is, however, significantly different from what
Shrestha, Conway, and Bhattarai (1999) term the economic den-
sity picture, which is calculated on the basis of the available pri-
mary resource base, such as land, forests, and livestock. In terms
of these resources, the Tarai is better positioned to cope with its
growing population than are the hills. Irrespective of the regional
outlooks, there is little question that the overall relationship
between Nepal’s population growth and limited economic
resource base bodes ill, no matter how one dissects it.
Table 1. Regional Distribution of Population and

Cultivated Land in Nepal, 1971–2001
Population Cultivated Area
Region (in thousands) (in thousand acres)
1971 2001 Change 1971 Per capita 2001 Per capita
Hills & Mountains 7,210 12,223* 5,013 1,737 0.24 2,189** 0.17
(%) (62.4) (52.1) (-10.3) (35.2) (38.1)
Tarai 4,346 11,231* 6,885 3,195 0.74 3,558** 0.32
(%) (37.6) (47.9) (10.3) (64.8) (61.9)
TOTAL 11,556 23,454 6,906 4,932 0.42 5,748 0.25
Total Area Density Based

Region (sq. miles) on Total Area
1971 2001
Hills & Mountains 43,692 165 280
(%) (76.9)
Tarai 13,135 331 855
(%) (23.1)
TOTAL 56,827 203 413
Sources: Ministry of Population and Environment. 1998. Population Projections for Nepal,
1996–2016. Vol. 2, table 3, 11. Kathmandu: Ministry of Population and Environment; Shrestha,
Nanda, Dennis Conway, and Keshav Bhattarai. 1999. “Population Pressure and Land Resources in
Nepal: A Revisit, Twenty Years Later.” Journal of Developing Areas 33: 249, table 2.
** These are projected figures.
** These figures are for 1991. Increase in cultivated areas from 1991 to 2001 is expected to be very
minimal, if any.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that Nepal

remains predominantly an agrarian country with only limited
advancements in agricultural technology. The agrarian nature of
the economy is reinforced by the fact that over 88 percent of the
population still resides in rural areas. Barely 12 percent is concen-
trated in urban centers. This makes Nepal one of the least urban-
ized countries in the world. With the exception of the Kathmandu
Valley, Nepal has never been a city-dominated country. But it is dif-
ficult to assume that the growth of urbanization alone would bring
reprieve to what can be described as Nepal’s quadrangular prob-
lems of heavily agrarian economy, low resource base, high popula-
tion growth, and low technological advancements.
Historically, increased urbanization was directly correlated
with economic development in Europe, Japan, and North Amer-
ica. In fact, it was precisely this historical mode (or model) of
urban-industrial development that formed the basis for the major
push that both Western and national economic development
experts gave to urban-industrial development in the 1960s in
most underdeveloped countries following their independence
from colonialism. The debate still rages on regarding the efficacy
or the universal applicability of the urban-industrial development
model of the 1960s. The major dilemma for Nepal is that whatever
urban growth has taken place over the past three decades has
mostly resulted from—and in—the demographic shift of rural
population to the cities, rather than the industrial economic
expansion that propelled today’s advanced countries. To be more
specific, what has occurred over the years is largely a geographi-
cal shift of rural poverty to urban areas. In light of the current
trend of little direct correlation between urbanization and indus-
trialization, and given Nepal’s geographical and resource limita-
tions, as previously discussed, it is highly unlikely that the future
urban growth will lead to sustained industrial growth and eco-
nomic advancements.
A HISTORICAL PROFILE
Nepal has a relatively long history. However, much of it, especially
prior to the medieval period, is clouded due to the lack of speci-
ficity and definable records. Notwithstanding such lapses, the
country’s history can be segmented into three distinct periods:

ancient, medieval, and what can be loosely termed modern.
Ancient History
The ancient history of Nepal is based on chronicles that are liter-
ary rather than historical compositions and that can be traced to
the origin of the Kathmandu Valley. These chronicles suggest that
the Kathmandu Valley was once a lake. This lush lake basin sur-
rounded by hills was drained by goddess Manjusri for human
habitation by cutting a deep gorge in the mountains. The chroni-
cles also offer an explanation for how the name Nepal was derived.
A muni (sage) named Ne—commonly known as Ne Muni (or
Nemuni)—appeared on the scene as the pala (protector) of the
land and the founder of the first ruling dynasty. In other words, in
early times, the country, if it could be defined as such, was called
Ne-pala, the land protected by Ne. Subsequently, the name was
shortened to Nepal.
Ne Muni’s successors were called gopalavamshi (cow-herd
dynasty), the descendants of the gopala (cow herders) lineage.
They are generally recognized as Nepal’s first ruling dynasty,
which was followed by members of the mahisapala (buffalo
herders), forming the mahisapalavamshi (buffalo-herder
dynasty). Such descriptive taxonomies as gopalas and mahis-
apalas found in the chronicles offer insight into the ancient way
of life in Nepal, characterized by a pastoral stage of civilization
rather than sedentary agriculture.
The dynasty of mahisapalas was overthrown by the army of
Yellung Kirata from the eastern hill areas of today’s Nepal, thereby
establishing what is known as the Kirata dynasty. This was per-
haps the first (and last) dynasty of distinctly Mongoloid origin to
rule Nepal, which back then consisted mainly of the Kathmandu
Valley and its surrounding regions. Moreover, Shaha (1992, 8)
remarks, “it is with the Kiratas that the chronicles reach slightly
more solid ground above the boggy realm of myth and legend. The
Kiratas have a good deal more than the shadowy existence of their
predecessors in the chronicle account, for they still exist. The
Rais and Limbus of eastern Nepal are collectively known as Kiratis
to this day . . . (and) celebrated in the well-known Hindu epic, the
Mahabharata . . . as a hill-tribe with remarkable skill in archery

and warfare” (the very reason why the British army recruiters
fancied Rais and Limbus for their imperial army). The Kirata
dynasty lasted for at least 1,500 years.
The Licchavi Period. The Kirata dynasty was succeeded by
the Licchavi dynasty. Although it is not certain when exactly the
Licchavis entered Nepal from the south and started their reign,
their rule in Nepal must have commenced around the first cen-
tury of the Christian era. Only with the ascension to the throne of
a prominent Licchavi king named Manadeva I did Nepal move on
to the terra firma of history supported by epigraphic records. As
Manadeva’s inscriptions provided a reliable glimpse of recorded
history, the veil of brackish history that afflicted early Nepal was
finally lifted. His inscriptions reveal that he ruled the country
from A.D. 464 to 508.
In many respects, the Licchavi period marked a decisive depar-
ture from earlier eras in Nepal’s history. The Kathmandu Valley
made an apparent transition from a pastoral economy to a well-
established agricultural mode of production. As the valley increas-
ingly developed urban characters, various artisan activities, along
with trade and commerce, expanded. Long-distance trade was
intimately connected to the spread of Buddhism and religious pil-
grimage to places well beyond the valley. In fact, Nepali mer-
chants and missionaries served as the primary conduit of the dif-
fusion of Buddhism to Tibet and, subsequently, to central and east
Asia. In return, Nepal managed to gain money from customs
duties and goods that helped to support the Licchavi state.
Manadeva I was the first Licchavi king responsible for bringing
about change in Nepal’s social system and for the dawn of what
can be loosely described as its architectural and artistic renais-
sance or heritage. Among the many successive ruling dynastic lin-
eages of Nepal, chained together by an entourage of corrupt, self-
serving kings and rulers, Manadeva I was believed to be one of the
rarest beacons of light, a truly benevolent king. Perhaps the most
significant change that Manadeva instituted was to put into circu-
lation coins, thus introducing a monetary basis for economic
transactions, a bedrock of social and economic transformation.
Besides exhibiting qualities of advanced economic thinking, he
held a liberal outlook on religion. Although himself a devotee of
Lord Vishnu, he was believed to be instrumental in constructing

Buddhist monasteries.
Following the death of Manadeva I, it appears that a renewed
challenge to the Licchavi monarchy from the feudatories that he
had managed to suppress resurfaced. This was manifested during
the reign of Sivadeva I (A.D. 590–604). One primary source of
opposition was Amsuvarman, who was thought to have belonged
to a western feudatory Thakuri clan. He pursued an interesting
approach of opposition, implanting himself within Sivadeva’s
court. He started out as an influential officer of the court and,
later, managed to elevate himself to be a coruler, eventually suc-
ceeding Sivadeva I after the latter’s death. He ruled from A.D. 605
to 621. However, as a Thakuri ascending to the Licchavi throne,
Amsuvarman’s case was, in all likelihood, comparable to that of
the Khans in China. Like the Mongol Khans, who generally accul-
turated themselves to the Chinese culture, Amsuvarman adopted
the Licchavi tradition. There is no indication, in other words, that
his early opposition to the Licchavi rule led him to dismantle it.
Amsuvarman adopted Sivadeva’s son, Udayadeva, as his heir, thus
showing no inclination to start his Thakuri dynasty in the Kath-
mandu Valley.
Very generous and liberal like Manadeva, Amsuvarman proved
himself to be a highly able ruler, one who was also learned and
enlightened in terms of his religious and philosophical outlook.
In addition to Manadeva and Amsuvarman, the Licchavi
dynasty saw a powerful monarch in Narendradeva, the son of
Udayadeva, whose rule was relatively short. When his father was
ousted from the throne, Narendradeva escaped to Tibet, seeking
asylum. The Tibetan government later helped him reclaim his
father’s throne, most likely in A.D. 643. It was indicated that dur-
ing his rule, Tibet wielded influence over Nepal. Narendradeva
was the first Nepali ruler to initiate formal diplomatic relations
with the Chinese court when he sent a mission with lavish gifts to
the emperor. With the passage of time, friendship between the two
countries solidified.
Narendradeva turned Nepal into a relatively prosperous coun-
try. Few would doubt that Nepal’s prosperity during his rule was
directly attributed to growing trade and commerce. “The country
had,” writes Shaha (1992, 21) “become a thriving centre by serv-
ing as a gateway from India to China, both for merchandise and

for scholars who disseminated knowledge and culture as they
traveled. About this time Nepal learned from China the art of
paper making. Handmade paper of the finest quality was added to
its traditional exports of musk, orpiment, blankets and other
woollen goods to India.”
Few Licchavi rulers after Narendradeva possessed his com-
manding power, personality, and acumen. The heyday of the Lic-
chavi dynasty, in essence, reached its climax during his rule. From
that point on, it saw its gradual decline, ultimately coming to an
end in 879, during the rule of Manadeva IV. Raghavadeva, who fol-
lowed Manadeva IV and whose rule began in 880, appears to have
been the transitional ruler, separating the Licchavi period from the
dawn of the medieval era. Indeed, the Licchavi period is often
characterized as the “golden age” of Nepali history. By the time it
was replaced by the Malla dynasty, the Licchavi dynasty had set
Nepal on sound footing in many respects. To repeat, in addition to
creating a distinct architectural and artistic heritage and liberal
religious framework, coins were introduced, thus setting a mone-
tary basis for the country’s relatively prosperous economy.
Although land and agriculture remained the twin pillars of the
national economy, a reasonable network of trade and commerce
had emerged. Nepal was not only a thriving center for trade and
handicrafts, it was also engaged in entrepôt trade between India
and China. Those foundational achievements were nicely comple-
mented by its leaders’ effective management of diplomacy. In other
words, one could make the strong argument that Narendradeva
was the first Nepali king to fully grasp the geopolitical gravity of
Nepal’s geographical entrapment between India and China and,
hence, the necessity of a balancing act between the two.
Medieval History
In 880, Nepal exited the Licchavi period and entered the medieval
era. But the entry was less than auspicious, as the dawn of the
new era ushered in a dark age in Nepal’s history that would last
more than three hundred years, until A.D. 1200. The solid foun-
dation laid by the Licchavi rulers was frozen or even stunted, with
the dark age plunging Nepal into a state of retreat and retrench-
ment. In short, at this juncture of history, the country suffered a

decline in both territory and power. Although Mary Slusser (1982,
41) treats this dark age as “The Transitional Period,” it was little
more than a period of confusion. Heitzman (1993, 9) states that
“it is the least understood time in Nepal history, with only a very
few inscriptional sources.”
The Malla Period. With the appearance of leading notables
starting in A.D. 1200, the dark age finally subsided and Nepal
emerged from the state of historical confusion. In essence, the
path was paved for the inception of the Malla period in Nepal’s
medieval history.
Ari Malla (or Arimalla) was the first of several Malla kings of the
Kathmandu Valley. Although it is not clear how he ascended to
the throne, his rule is known to have begun in 1200 and lasted
until 1216. Early in the Malla period, the Kathmandu Valley was
subjected to several external attacks from the south. These
attacks suggest that Nepal was a relatively weak kingdom during
that period. It is, therefore, no surprise that Nepal’s overall eco-
nomic progress was relatively minor, although trade and urban
growth continued, along with it’s friendly relations with China and
Tibet. This was evident in the fact that at the request of the
Emperor Kublai Khan’s teacher Saskyapa Lama of Tibet, Nepal
sent a group of artisans to Lhasa to construct a golden stupa,
under the leadership of Aniko (or Arniko), who was credited with
the diffusion of Nepali architectural styles to Tibet, China, and
beyond. With this exception, Nepal’s advancement during these
years was limited and generally insignificant.
However, Nepal embarked on a path of recovery from these
early setbacks following the rise of Jayasthiti Malla in 1370. Per-
haps the first distinguished figure of the Malla dynasty, he gave the
Malla dynasty its vigor and identity. Despite Jayasthiti’s promi-
nent place in the annals of Nepal’s history, his ancestry is some-
what obscure, and his ability was at times overshadowed by his
marriage to a royal princess of Bhadgaun. Although Jayasthiti had
effectively gained control of power by 1370, he was not officially
crowned until 1382. He ruled until 1395 with great foresight and
vision, instituting a legal and social code to consolidate the coun-
try under one set of rules. The fact that his code still forms the
general basis for the way the Newar society in the Kathmandu Val-
ley operates clearly indicates that it has passed the test of time.
And, like Manadeva I, he adhered to a liberal outlook on matters
of religion, both in word and deed. Nonetheless, the code system
that he formalized to classify individuals into subcastes and the
detailed rules he charted for caste marriage, dining, and drinking
water still haunts Nepal, particularly the Newars.
One of Jayasthiti’s most important achievements was his abil-
ity to restore “a considerable measure of order and stability
throughout the land” after a period of anarchy and to consolidate
the Malla dynasty (Shaha 1992, 56). He “united the entire valley
and its environs under his rule, an accomplishment still remem-
bered with pride by Nepalese, particularly Newars” (Heitzman
1993, 12). After his death, his three sons ruled the valley.
Although the three sons ruled the kingdom conjointly, it was
effectively divided into three administrative units, one for each,
almost like three different mini states within the kingdom—an
ominous sign of their eventual breakup into separate kingdoms.
Indeed, it happened in 1482, exactly a hundred years after
Jayasthiti’s coronation. The same Kathmandu Valley that
Jayasthiti kept unified skillfully and with foresight and fortitude
was fragmented into three separate and often rival kingdoms—
Kathmandu, Patan, and Bhadgaun (Bhaktapur)—following the
death of his grandson, Yaksha Malla, whose career signified the
zenith of the power and glory of the Malla kings. This signaled the
beginning of the end of the Malla dynasty of Nepal.
Apparently, the breakup and consequent political rivalries and
intrigues did not affect the Kathmandu Valley’s status as a main
center of entrepôt trade, as it was able to maintain its overall eco-
nomic vitality. The valley’s common citizens, no matter which
kingship they belong to, demonstrated their remarkable resil-
iency, steadfastly remaining faithful to their industriousness even
when there were few constructive policy measures forthcoming
from their respective rulers to support them. Sadly, however, the
political and moral decay was already under way, and the pomp
and glitter of the three competing royal courts continued in the
midst of this deepening decay. Shaha (1992, 103) remarks, “The
main fabric of their political life had worn out, and became thin
and thread-bare. Perpetual conspiracy, fraud and deceit had
undermined their moral fibre; and their health and character
were equally affected by their excesses.” The fact that the divided
three Malla kingdoms endured for almost three hundred years
after the formal breakup is by no means a true measure of their
strength and power, however. It lasted that long simply because
there was no effective outside challenge to them—that is, until
the appearance of the territorially ambitious Gorkha king named
Prithvi Narayan (or Prithvinarayana) Shah.
Modern History
Characterization of the post-Malla era as a modern period in
Nepal’s history is strictly a matter of convenience rather than a
sign of its progressive social, economic, and technological trans-
formations associated with “modernization.” After all, Nepal
remains to this day shrouded in what may be termed feudocracy.
During the period the Malla kings ruled the Kathmandu Valley,
Nepal was divided into a total of forty-six principalities, not count-
ing those in the valley. They were aggregately known as the
Chaubise (twenty-four principalities that were located in the cen-
tral hills) and the Baise (twenty-two principalities that were con-
centrated in the western hills). Those fiefdoms were invariably
associated with immigrant Hindu chiefs from India. Over time,
they carved out separate fiefdoms for themselves and their prog-
eny in hill areas largely inhabited by various indigenous tribes of
Mongoloid origin, eventually bringing them under their rule. They
were a bickering bunch, constantly engaged in petty quarrels and
rarely finding common ground or seeing a bigger picture. As a
result, few rose above their petty heights to form a large territo-
rial foundation, though a few certainly made some feeble
attempts. Among the fiefdoms was the House of Gorkha, founded
in 1559 by Dravya Shah, located in today’s Gorkha district in the
central hills. It was in the Chaubise group.
In 1743, the House of Gorkha crowned Prithvi Narayan Shah
its king. As it turned out, he possessed an imperial mindset,
doggedly bent on massive territorial expansion, never before wit-
nessed in the history of Nepal. Whatever his motive, Prithvi
Narayan set out on an unparalleled mission of territorial con-
quests and consolidation of scattered fiefdoms under one flag. His-
torians claim that he was intent on warding off potential British
The Nyatapola (pagoda) temple in Bhaktapur, built around A.D. 1708. The
temple is one of the most striking features of the Kathmandu Valley’s
artistic and architectural heritage. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)
territorial advances toward the hills. But the biggest trophy of his
colossal territorial ambitions lay in the conquest of the agricul-
turally fertile, economically prosperous, and culturally prodigious
Kathmandu Valley, for it was bound to propel his kingship to an
unsurpassed summit of power. Furthermore, his successful con-
quest of the valley would not only give him an added advantage of
economic strength and military might but also moral authority
and justification to impose his will over the other former fiefdoms
in the name of national unification.
With his territorial plan set in motion, Prithvi Narayan
launched several unsuccessful attacks to conquer the Kathmandu
Valley before attaining his goal. Ruthless and relentless in his
drive, he launched a surprise assault on Kathmandu in September
1768 while its people were celebrating a religious festival. He eas-
ily captured the town with little resistance. With this vital foot-
hold gained, the door had been opened for his conquest of the
whole valley. He wasted no time. Before any organized resistance
or counteroffensive could be mobilized against his troops, he
seized the adjoining kingdom (city) of Patan unopposed and
moved against the next adjoining kingdom of Bhadgaun (Bhakta-
pur), subjecting it to his rule the following year.
The Shah Dynasty. Within a year after his victory flag flew
over Kathmandu, he gained complete control of the whole Kath-
mandu Valley. With this vital territorial mission accomplished, he
moved his capital to the lush valley of Kathmandu and started a
new dynastic rule in Nepal: the current Shah dynasty (Vaidya
1993). For the first time, the territorial entity and identity of
Nepal extended well beyond the confines of this valley, as the
House of Gorkha successfully expanded its geographical domin-
ion. However, Prithvi Narayan’s vision of greater Nepal was far
from reaching its destination. Heitzman (1993, 18) writes: “The
conquest of the three kingdoms was only the beginning of a
remarkable explosion of Gorkha military power throughout the
Himalayan region. Prithvi Narayan Shah quickly made a move-
ment toward the Chaubise states in the west.”
Although one may debate Prithvi Narayan’s motives and tac-
tics, few would, irrespective of their perspectives, question his
strategic territorial vision and mission for Nepal, certainly not his
success in terms of carrying out his mission. In this respect, he
has no parallel among the kings of Nepal throughout its history. In

1775, six years after he overran the valley, Prithvi Narayan died.
Though he did not live to complete his mission and see his vision
of a unified Nepal materialize, the vision lived on as the course of
action was pursued by his successors.
But, on the domestic front, trouble was brewing within the
court. As is characteristic of almost all personality-based auto-
cratic systems, the death of a strong political leader leaves a vac-
uum and, hence, a power struggle between competing factions. In
Nepal, the death of Prithvi Narayan resulted in an intense compe-
tition for leadership. Competing queens and their vested interests
often became the primary sparks of continued power struggles.
The court was filled with palace plots, endless suspicions, and
mindless intrigues. Consequently, court life was consumed with
internal rivalries, leading to constantly shifting alignments and
realignments of power and personalities, royal factions and
courtiers. This gradually moved the administrative and decision-
making power to palace-appointed bhardars (courtiers), even
though the ruling monarch remained the symbolic center of
power and authority. As one would have anticipated, royal fac-
tional feuds spilled over to, or became compounded by, deadly
factional animosities among competing bhardar clans. As a result,
murders and assassinations became routine events. A new phase
of political dark age haunted Nepal during this period.
Eventually, in 1799, Damodar Pande, a leader of the Pande
bhardar clan, took control of the administrative power as mukhti-
yar (something like a premier) and held it until 1804. Later,
Damodar was executed and replaced by Bhimsen Thapa, who in
1806 became prime minister. Murder of competing characters
continued. Bhimsen, however, proved to be a skillful as well as
powerful prime minister, but not immune to palace plots and
murderous tactics. He managed to reign in the competing bhardar
factions for more than thirty years (1806–1837). Meanwhile,
Nepal’s military march for territorial expansion continued, per-
haps largely owing to Bhimsen’s charismatic rule. By 1814, Nepal
had managed to control areas as far away as today’s Indian terri-
tory of Kangra, beyond Garhwal, in the west and beyond the river
Tista into Sikkim in the east, quite a feat of achievement for a tiny
power (see Shaha 1992, map; Heitzman 1993, figure 3).
But Nepal’s very territorial success became its military liability,

as it drew the attention and ire of bigger players, specifically
British India. Like all military powers, for example, Japan, it was
blinded by its own success. Its military was spread too thin to hold
on to its gains. Yet Nepal failed to learn when and where to draw
the line to contain its own territorial ambitions, overestimating
the scope of its ability and underestimating its enemy’s strength.
Eventually, the Nepali interest collided with the British interest,
and the Nepal-Anglo War broke out in 1814. Although the Nepali
forces managed to engage the British forces in protracted battles
for nearly two years, they ultimately proved to be no match for
the superior British military resources and contingents. Decisive
battles occurred in Makwanpur, the principal gateway to Kath-
mandu from the south, which resulted in the final defeat of Nepal.
The 1814–1816 war with the British was an absolute disaster,
forcing Nepal into total retrenchment. It was costly in every
respect—morally, politically, and territorially, not to mention the
enormous economic and human cost that it incurred. As part of
its defeat, Nepal signed a treaty with the British, known as the
Treaty of Sagauli. Nepal lost all of its territorial gains and more
and was forced to accede to the British plan to establish its resi-
dency in Kathmandu. As Stiller (1976) poignantly remarked in
the preface of his book, most appropriately entitled The Silent
Cry, “the Treaty of Sagauli was a beginning rather than an end to
Nepal’s time of troubles.”
The time of severe crisis, however, failed to bring together the
fighting factions among the nobility in the name of national inter-
ests and integrity and to present a united front against external
enemies. It was, in fact, viewed as a most opportune time to dec-
imate the ruling faction and its associates. Bhimsen Thapa was
finally deposed in 1837 and was later maneuvered to take his own
life in a most gruesome fashion. Deadly palace plots became dead-
lier, finally resulting in the deadliest of all: the Kot Parba (the
courtyard massacre) of 1846.
The Kot Parba and the Rise of Rana Rule. It will never be
known whether Jang Bahadur Kunwar carefully planned or fortu-
itously expected the occurrence of the Kot massacre, which will
live in infamy as the bloodiest chapter in Nepal’s history. What-
ever the case, Jang Bahadur was fully prepared for it; in fact, he
was the only courtier prepared for it. Precisely because of his pre-
paredness, he proved to be the principal force behind the mas-
sacre and its sole beneficiary. The massacre unfolded as follows:
One of the casualties of the ongoing saga of palace plots and
counterplots was Gagan Singh, whom Queen Lakshmidevi had
planned to deploy to put her own son on the throne. Gagan Singh
was murdered on September 14, 1846. At the discovery of her
favorite courtier’s murder, the queen ordered General Abhiman
Singh to immediately assemble the entire royal military and
administrative entourage at the kot (courtyard). Jang Bahadur
was the only leader who arrived at the court with three regiments
under his command, accompanied by all of his brothers and rela-
tives. He had his troops strategically lined up in the kot area as
well as surrounding it, blocking all the entry and exit points and
giving specific instruction not to let anyone leave or enter the
courtyard without his order.
The queen accused Birkishor Pande, the leader of the Pande fac-
tion, of Gagan Singh’s murder, and she ordered General Abhiman
to execute him. Chaos followed. While the councilors were engaged
in heated arguments, Jang Bahadur sparked violence. One of his
soldiers stabbed Abhiman to death. Deadly fighting broke out
among the assembled, with swords flying all over. Jang Bahadur had
his troops slaughter everyone present at the courtyard. The extent
of the carnage was enormous, not just in terms of the number of
dead bodies but in terms of who was eliminated. The nobility from
virtually every faction of competing courtier clans was removed
from the political scene with one massacre. Leading nobles of the
Pande faction were destroyed, and so were the leading Thapa clan
nobles; later, the Basnyat faction leaders were liquidated. The only
surviving faction was Jang Bahadur’s, that is, the Kunwar clan.
Jang Bahadur faced no immediate threat from any of the aris-
tocratic clans with palace ties. The day after the kot carnage, he
became prime minister and wasted no time to embark on a mas-
sive purge campaign, executing more competing nobles, to make
absolutely sure that there was no one left to outshine and under-
mine him, at least not before he could establish a firm grip on his
newly minted power.
The Kot Massacre produced three major outcomes. First, as
previously noted, it eliminated competing bhardar clans. As a
result, factional feuds subsided, though not necessarily intrafam-

ily plots within the ruling clan. Second, the Shah dynasty as a
monarchical lineage was retained, but the Shah kings were rele-
gated to a puppet status. They were, in effect, confined to their
own royal compounds and subsequently rendered secondary to
Jang Bahadur and his clan in terms of both power and authority.
The king was stripped of all power except his titular kingship and
royal crown. Finally, the massacre elevated Jang Bahadur Kuwar
to the position of prime minister. As he shed his last name, Kun-
war, in 1858 when King Surendra bestowed upon him the hon-
orific title of Rana, denoting martial glory, he inserted Rana in its
place, thus initiating his own prime ministerial Rana dynasty with
autocratic power and authority. Previously, he was hardly a major
power broker among the courtiers, nor did he come from the
higher echelon of aristocracy. Yet, as a career opportunist, he was
quick to seize the moment and take full advantage of it. In sum,
while the first outcome was instrumental in Jang Bahadur’s sud-
den rise to the prominence of power (as there was nobody of
higher or equal stature left to be considered as an alternative
choice for his position), the second one is a direct result of his rise
to power and consequent Rana rule.
History has rarely been kind to Jang Bahadur Rana. This is not
necessarily because of the way he usurped his power but because
of what he ushered in when he instituted his hereditary Rana
rule, which lasted for more than a century. In every conceivable
regard, Rana rule represented the darkest phase in Nepali history.
For example, the period of Rana rule was a total economic
calamity except for the Ranas themselves and their associates.
Judicially, their word was the law of the land, which nullified the
judicial process. One bright moment arose when Prime Minister
Chandra Shamsher, relatively a liberal figure by Rana standards,
abolished slavery in 1924 and the sati (widow burning) tradition
in 1920. To sum, “the Rana administration was a colossal network
of corruption practiced for the benefit of a particular family and
at the expense of the people” (Joshi and Rose 1966, 321).
The Return of Shah Rule, Continued Chaos, and Palace
Tricks and Treacheries. As the Rana rule saw its demise during
the reign of Prime Minister Mohan Shamsher Rana, Nepal felt a
sigh of relief and liberation from the Rana despots. The downfall
of the Rana regime resulted from the confluence of many concur-

rent events. For instance, the departure of their patron, the
British, from India in 1947 was perhaps the biggest blow to the
Ranas, whose impact was magnified by the growing internal as
well as India-based opposition from Nepali citizens led by leaders
like B. P. Koirala and Puspa Lal Shrestha. Armed attacks and
insurgency movements at various times and in various places
within the country further accentuated the gravity of popular
anti-Rana struggle. On November 6, 1950, King Tribhuvan
escaped the palace in protest of the Rana regime and sought asy-
lum in the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu. He was later flown to
India. All of these events forced Mohan Shamsher to negotiate and
finally relinquish his power. As part of the agreement of the nego-
tiation, the king returned to Kathmandu, and an interim ministry
was sworn in during February 1951, thus officially marking the
end of Rana rule and the return of the Shah rule and, supposedly,
the dawn of democracy in Nepal.
Little did Nepali citizens realize that the presumed dawn of
democracy was merely a mirage. The whole episode proved to be
little more than the revitalization of the Shah dynasty that had
long been relegated to puppetry. Once secured in his throne as
the sole authority, generally vested in the divine image of Lord
Vishnu, the early liberal tendency that King Tribhuvan exhibited
quickly dissipated. The much-anticipated general election that
was supposed to have been held no later than 1952 in accordance
with the negotiated agreement did not take place. Tribhuvan
failed to fulfill the promise of democracy. Instead he shuffled the
government like a deciduous tree that undergoes a seasonal
change, appointing a different prime minister (and, thus, forming
a new government) every few months. Following his death, his
son Mahendra claimed the Shah throne in 1955. He took the prac-
tice of governmental shuffles to an extreme plateau. He resur-
rected the darkness of the Rana rule in the new Shah court with
some minor twists, but with greater vigor.
Ever cunning and calculative, always concerned about pre-
serving his own absolute power but often burdened with a self-
inflicted sense of insecurity, King Mahendra not only revived the
nationally destructive internecine factional feuds among courtier
clans, the hallmark of the pre-Rana Shah courts, but masterfully
orchestrated them like a bamboo dance. He changed the govern-

ment every few months, frequently appointing a prime minister
from a different faction and, therefore, never allowing any one
prime minister or government to develop a firm foothold, legiti-
macy, or stability. This treacherous practice of Mahendra, while
increasingly strengthening his power hold, was severely detri-
mental to the nation.
First, as Mahendra deliberately pitted one faction against
another, he exacerbated their preexisting distrust and animosity
instead of fostering a climate of much-needed cooperation and
reconciliation among them in the name of national progress—a
climate he could have easily engendered from his position of
monarchical power. Second, the practice severely hampered the
foundation of administrative stability and predictability, policy
cohesiveness and continuity, and leadership quality and commit-
ment. As a result, this critical foundational requirement for
national progress could not be met. Third, Mahendra’s practice
made administrative corruption rampant at every echelon of the
government. Since every new government and its functionaries
knew that they were all short-timers, a temporary stop in Mahen-
dra’s shuffle scheme, they were primarily interested in maximiz-
ing the spoils of power within a minimum time. They had little
desire in serving the interest of the people, who, after all, played
no role in their selection. Finally, the practice allowed Mahendra
to continuously postpone general elections to form a legitimate
democratic government, with which he would have to share the
leverage of power. He thrived in political chaos and uncertainty.
Despite his palace-centered tricks and treacheries, he was
pressured to honor the popular will and hold the long overdue
first general elections on February 18, 1959, to form a represen-
tative government. The Nepali Congress Party won a two-thirds
majority in the elections, finally allowing B. P. Koirala to become
the first elected prime minister and form a democratic govern-
ment. But Mahendra was completely bent on destroying both the
newly established democratic foundation and the Koirala govern-
ment before they could develop deep roots among the general
populace. So, reminiscent of the typical Shah (royal) tradition, he
was soon busy hatching plots and mobilizing his cadre of royalists
to foment social disorder in different parts of the country. Using
the pretext of such fabricated civil disorder, Mahendra launched a

swift palace coup on December 15, 1960, against the Koirala gov-
ernment, sending his army to arrest the prime minister and his
cabinet members. With his government dismantled, Koirala was
jailed until October 1968. Democracy was abruptly brought to a
screeching halt.
Once again, the practice of governmental shuffles at Mahen-
dra’s whim was renewed with full force and vigor. Mahendra intro-
duced a partyless panchayat system with him as its ringleader.
Aside from a few minor challenges waged by outlawed Nepali Con-
gress Party workers, his absolute rule continued uninterrupted
until his death in early 1972. His son Birendra carried forward his
father’s policy and panchayat system. But some strain was begin-
ning to build up. At the end of 1976, B. P. Koirala and Ganeshman
Singh, another prominent leader of the Nepali Congress Party,
returned to Nepal from India. They were immediately arrested.
Koirala was later released and rearrested, and underwent five
treason trials in early 1978 before being acquitted. But sociopolit-
ical turmoil continued to ferment throughout 1978, as student
demonstrations against the panchayat system intensified. Some
students were killed.
The situation reached a critical point. To avert imminent
threat to his throne and the Shah dynasty, King Birendra
announced a national referendum to decide the fate of the pan-
chayat system. To the dismay of countless demonstrators, Koirala
accepted Birendra’s call for a national referendum without giving
much consideration to its implications. Some demonstrators and
activists felt betrayed. At any rate, the referendum was held on
May 2, 1980. To nobody’s surprise, the outcome was predeter-
mined, as the king’s forces managed to rig the referendum, giving
victory to him and his propanchayat forces. In a way, the pan-
chayat system, with the king presiding at its helm, was legit-
imized, but only for ten more years.
If we were to provide one simple explanation for the demise of
the panchayat system, we can apply the same logic embedded in
Joshi and Rose’s characterization of the Rana system as a colossal
network of corruption. This was precisely what the panchayat
system was—a colossal network of economic corruption, political
suppression, and social disintegration. While it fattened a few, it
suffocated the rest, miserably failing to meet even the most basic
human needs of the masses, let alone their rising expectations
that the rapidly advancing time was arousing. In simple terms,
except for the mechanical passage of time and some organic
growth brought on by such time, there was not a whole lot of dif-
ference between the Rana system and the new Shah system. The
new Shah kings should be given credit for the fact that despite
massive corruption (whose hierarchical chain ultimately rests at
the royal gate), they managed to keep the monarchy in complete
control of national affairs for thirty years within a panchayat
political framework.
The Second Coming of Democracy and Continued Corrup-
tion. Once again, in 1989, the ever susceptible and corrupt pan-
chayat system came under renewed assault. But panchayat was
largely a pretext, not the real target. Although many may dispute
it, what was actually coming under assault was the monarchy
itself, as it remained a symbol of both reverence and revulsion.
Monarchy is a sociopolitical divide, and the forces of revulsion
were resurfacing to challenge it once again. The assault came
from different fronts, culminating in the eventual complete dis-
mantling of the panchayat system.
The disintegration of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union and
the subsequent success of the democracy movement in Eastern
Europe gave new impetus for the pro-democracy movement in
Nepal. The country was reeling from the economic embargo that
India imposed in 1989. Ever-simmering disenchantment was
beginning to openly surface in the form of protest. In late 1989,
the banned Nepali Congress Party and Communist Party of Nepal
formed a coalition to present a united front to pose a serious chal-
lenge to King Birendra’s regime. As a result, thirty years after the
first coming of democracy was prematurely aborted by King
Mahendra, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy was
established on February 18, 1990, followed by a series of antipan-
chayat demonstrations and rallies all across the nation. Violence,
numerous arrests, and deaths ensued. Consequently, political
uprising became even more widespread.
In essence, the pro-democracy movement advanced at a sur-
prisingly lightening speed, much faster than anyone expected.
The political situation was getting out of control. King Birendra
realized that this time the threat to his 200-year-old dynasty was
real and imminent. His choices were two: either to fight back to
protect his absolute monarchical power and face the possibility of
complete dissolution of his rule, or to accept a constitutional
monarchy and preserve the crown. Determined to preserve the
crown for himself and for his successors, Birendra decided to
accede to the popular demand to restore democracy that his
father had ruthlessly ravaged. In April 1990, the panchayat gov-
ernment was replaced by a multiparty interim government under
the prime ministership of the Nepali Congress Party leader
Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. In November 1990, a new constitution
was approved, reducing the monarchy to more or less a constitu-
tional status.
Almost a year later, in May 1991, general elections were held to
elect a representative government fashioned after a parliamentary
system. The Nepali Congress Party won the elections with a sim-
ple majority, and Girija Prasad Koirala, a younger brother of the
late B. P. Koirala, became prime minister. He proved to be an inef-
fective leader, the primary cause of friction and division within his
own Congress Party. As some of his own party members deserted
him, he lost the vote of confidence in the parliament. A new
national election was held in 1994. The Communist Party of
Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist, or UML) won the largest number
of parliamentary seats, thus allowing it to form a minority gov-
ernment under the prime ministership of Man Mohan Adhikari.
Within a year, the communist government fell. Since 1991, Nepal
has undergone nine different governments, a sign of political
impermanence. Recently, Sher Bahadur Deuba has returned to
power as the latest prime minister.
CONCLUSION
Despite its potential, the second coming of democracy has failed
to deliver on its promise to bring relief to the general population.
Nepal remains mired in constant political bickering both between
and within parties. So far, few party leaders—be they communist,
congress, or some other party members—have demonstrated any
zeal and genuine commitment to the welfare of the nation and its
citizens. They have all made a mockery of democracy, both indi-
vidually and collectively, thus failing to outshine the previous sys-

tems and live up to its expectations. But rhetoric continues to get
louder and louder. In the midst of their piercing rhetoric and hol-
low anticorruption slogans that can be heard all across the hills
and valleys and plains, corruption spreads like a massive network
of termite tunnels, extending from peons to palace dwellers. As a
result, the so-called political leaders have lost the promise of their
purpose. Their failure is evident from the fact that the Maoist
movement that started in mid-1990s has not only become popu-
lar but now gained vigorous steam throughout the nation. It is
believed that, with their stronghold based in the western hills, the
Maoists now have de facto control over some 25 percent of the
country.
Relief so far has eluded Nepal. Condemned to a state of per-
manent misery, Nepal is like an embittered soul whose silent cry
goes on but always fades into an endless vacuum of leadership.
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The Economy of Nepal
The people of Nepal have a life and economy of their own. “A

very simple one, it may seem, but geographical and institutional
restrictions make it rather complicated,” wrote Lambers (1973,
1). Life is indeed complicated—and more. With Nepal’s economy
long mired in poor conditions, life is, for many, constantly swing-
ing between bare subsistence and hunger. This precariousness of
life was poignantly captured in a 1974 report by the Asian
Regional Team for Employment Production (ARTEP) that con-
cluded, “Nepal is poor and daily becoming poorer.” In the mid-
1970s, approximately 40 percent of the Nepali households were
reported to be below the poverty line. Since then Nepal’s poverty
situation has deteriorated. It is, therefore, no surprise that the
World Bank has consistently ranked Nepal as one of the poorest
countries in the world, with a per capita income of $220.
Simply expressed, the economy of Nepal is a landscape filled
with poverty. However, the fact that 88 percent of the population
lives in rural areas means it is largely rural poverty that domi-
nates the landscape. Regardless of its geographical distribution,
the face of poverty is no longer strictly determined by people’s
economic inability to meet the basic minimum requirements of
life, such as staple food and shelter. Poverty has also grown a sec-
ond face, the one that is intimately associated with what can be
called relative scarcity. As the culture of consumerism pene-
trates every facet of life and every corner of the country, the sec-
ond face becomes openly visible. As poverty is increasingly
defined and measured in terms of material possessions, the visi-
ble distance between the rich and poor is widened, often leading
to the stigmatization of the poor. They become the economic
equivalent of the Untouchables in the Hindu caste hierarchy (see
“Nepali Institutions”).
Let us use Coca-Cola (any other U.S. beverage maker would
also do) as a simple example to illustrate the reality of poverty’s
second face. Coke became available in Nepal around the mid-
43
A hill man carrying a large load takes a brief rest. (Courtesy of Nanda R.
Shrestha)
——The Economy of Nepal——45
1960s, when Western tourists began to pour into the country. Its
availability was almost exclusively confined to tourist hotels.
Because Coke was rarely available in the open market, it was con-
sidered a luxury consumer product back then, something that
only a tiny fraction of the Nepali population could afford. If one
could not afford it, that was alright—nobody made a big deal
about it. But the picture changed in the late 1970s, when a Coca-
Cola bottling factory was established in Kathmandu. Coke
instantly became a mass consumer product in Nepal.
Because it is no longer considered a luxury drink, one is now
expected to be able to afford it. The very notion of a product’s
affordability compounds the problem of poverty. So those who
cannot afford a bottle of Coke without sacrificing some of the
basic necessities of life—for example, staple food—are automati-
cally labeled “poor.” The point is that, today, poverty is not
merely a matter of not being able to fulfill basic, minimum neces-
sities of life. It is also associated with the deprivation of certain
consumer products even though they are hardly needed as part of
basic requirements. Poverty is thus more than an economic con-
dition—it is a social stigma as well.
GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN THE ECONOMY

Irrespective of how one frames the picture of Nepal’s poverty, it is
real and it reverberates across the country. In its attempt to
develop the economy and reduce poverty, the Nepal government
has been the primary agent of economic policies and change since
the 1950s. Nowhere is the government’s economic role more
entrenched than in the arena of macroeconomic planning, a
process that is heavily dependent on foreign aid for development
financing, as well as technical expertise. Given this reality, it is
important to first shed light on the nature and direction of plan-
ning that the government has carried out for nearly five decades.
Economic Planning and Foreign Aid

From the dark clouds of World War II emerged a wave of inde-
pendence across Asia. India became one of the earliest countries
to gain independence from European colonialism. India’s freedom
from Great Britain in 1947 dealt a death blow to the Rana autoc-
racy in Nepal, whose rulers had flourished under the tutelage of
the British Raj. When the British left India, the Rana regime lost
its imperial patrons and consequently became defanged. Four
years later, in 1951, Nepal was able to officially shed the yoke of
Rana rule (see “Geography and History of Nepal”). The euphoric
trumpet of liberation was, however, tempered by the formidable
task of rebuilding the national economy, which had been left in
shambles by the Ranas.
In other words, the country found itself in a state of bewilder-
ment and poverty, as economic realities hit hard and political
uncertainties loomed heavy. In essence, like other newly emerg-
ing nations, including its immediate neighbors in South Asia,
Nepal faced, to use Baran’s (1973) phrase, two stark realities that
normally accompany freedom: “the revolution of rising expecta-
tions” and “the steep ascent” of development. The gravity of these
issues was profound, particularly in a society where the masses
had long been politically repressed, economically deprived, and
socially bereaved. So, following the end of Rana repression, the
general masses felt the sudden force of rising expectation, a sort
of pent-up demand, as they expected a quick turnaround in their
economic fortunes and social conditions. Rising expectations
seemed quite natural, especially given that their new political
leaders promised them prosperity. This prosperity could not be
achieved in the absence of economic development or “modern-
ization.” But attaining economic development was no ordinary
task, for its ascent was steep and demanding.
This was all compounded by the new political reality. Although
the monarchy was restored, Nepal suffered from the lack of
administrative stability in political governance (see “Geography
and History of Nepal” and “Nepali Institutions”). Marred by the
utter lack of administrative stability, Nepal was paralyzed, unable
to climb “the steep ascent” of development in order to quench the
thirst of “rising expectations.” The country could not escape its
poor economic conditions as the severe shortage of capital, tech-
nical know-how, resources, an industrial class, skilled labor, and
necessary transportation infrastructure hindered the prospect of
development. The notion of banking was too remote for it to serve
as a reliable channel of capital formation, a critical ingredient of
development. One time-honored source of capital formation in

the very early stages of development is to tax the peasantry. Given
that the vast majority of peasants had only minimal landholdings,
the new Nepal government could hardly fathom the policy of
squeezing peasants to generate capital. Thus, any attempt to
apply the Japanese saying that “peasants are like sesame seeds;
the harder you press them, the more oil you get from them”
would only mean risking peasant reprisals and rebellions. As a
result, the peasantry was not a viable source of capital formation.
It was at this point that foreign aid entered the picture, both as
an invaluable source of capital and technical expertise. From the
very outset, the Nepal government has heavily relied on foreign
aid as the axis of its efforts to achieve economic development and
poverty alleviation. In the prevailing climate of constant adminis-
trative flux, foreign involvement in Nepal’s development process
proved to be significant in charting its national economic direc-
tion and defining its purpose. With the help of foreign aid as well
as foreign technical experts, Nepal launched its first five-year plan
in 1956, thus firmly setting its national economy on the path of
planned development—a form of social engineering to guide the
economy.
Planning as an institutional approach to development meant
direct state (government) involvement in determining national
economic priorities. In spite of its seeming intrusiveness, state
economic planning had merit, as it was firmly grounded in sound
economic logic. This allowed Nepal’s economic system to assume
the form of what is commonly known as state capitalism. That is,
in a society where capital was generally scarce, the state would
serve as a capitalist, consolidating capital formation and making
capital investment decisions. The logic was that the state would
be better equipped to make effective allocations of the country’s
limited capital resources. Nepal’s economic planning thus was
patterned after India’s, and the budget for the first five-year plan
(1956–1961) was entirely financed by foreign aid from different
countries, including the United States.
In the first plan, the largest share of the budget outlays was
allocated to the development of transportation and communica-
tion infrastructure, followed by agriculture, including village
development and irrigation. This was not surprising in light of the
fact that the country had few modern transportation and com-
munication networks to link different areas of the country and
that its agriculture was in dire need of development to transform
its rural economy. One notable outcome of the first plan was to
open the Rapti Valley in the central Tarai district of Chitwan for
land settlement by hill residents and consequent agricultural
expansion. Rapti Valley resettlement was the first planned land
colonization scheme in the country and was designed and funded
by foreign aid from the United States. Land resettlement was a
deliberate government plan to redistribute population from the
presumably overpopulated hills to the Tarai frontier and to
increase agricultural production (see Kansakar 1979). Aside from
this scheme, the economic success of the first plan was rather
inconsequential, owing largely to poor planning formulation and
poorer implementation. Furthermore, the first plan that initially
represented a concrete course in national economic development
suffered from a new round of political posturing and positioning.
The National Planning Commission introduced the second
plan in 1962. Hastily conceived, the plan was largely devoid of
much forethought and necessary analysis. At any rate, the second
plan too placed emphasis on transportation and communication.
In addition, it stressed industrial development, tourism, and
social services. Although Nepal witnessed some improvements in
the areas of industrial production, road construction, and educa-
tion, the plan’s achievements were relatively lackluster. Regard-
less of the outcome, foreign aid dominated the planning budget.
Although its total share declined to 78 percent, it remained,
unquestionably, the cornerstone of development financing.
Despite its dubious records, Nepal’s ruling elites of all stripes
have been steadily enamored by foreign aid (for details, see
Shrestha 1997). Consequently, it remains the guiding policy
framework of national development to this day. The following
dimensions of Nepal’s development planning have undergone
noteworthy change and so deserve a brief discussion:
Foreign Aid to Foreign Debt. The overall share of develop-
ment financing through foreign aid has averaged 66 percent
(Shukla 1993). It is no exaggeration that in Nepal, no develop-
ment project is possible without some form of foreign aid. The
nation’s development fate is, therefore, inextricably predicated on
foreign aid. Although India has historically been the largest donor
nation, the Western aid and agencies, especially from the United
States, are most influential in terms of setting the country’s direc-
tion of development. The very first package of American aid came
in 1951, containing a mere sum of 22,000 rupees (or just a few
thousand dollars). But that tiny seed of foreign aid has grown into
a huge tree as the amount of aid that Nepal now receives from var-
ious countries has increased many folds.
What is notable about foreign aid to Nepal is that, initially,
almost all of it constituted outright grants regardless of the coun-
try of its origin. As such, foreign aid was free. These days, how-
ever, more than two-thirds of foreign aid comes in the form of
loans (debt) that have to be paid back with interest. That is to say,
what once came as free money has now turned into a mountain
of foreign debt, a financial burden that Nepal is in no position to
shake off. In a way, it is a misnomer to use the term foreign aid,
for it is mostly foreign debt. By 1998, Nepal’s foreign debt burden
had reached $2,646 million, a figure that amounts to almost 55
percent of its 1999 GDP (gross domestic product) of $4,904.
Although this debt burden may seem minuscule compared to
those of debt-laden countries like Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico,
it is an insurmountable sum for Nepal, a country saddled with
economic stagnation and resource scarcity.
Development Planning to Economic Privatization. Although
planning still remains popular as a form of state-directed eco-
nomic engineering, it has undergone some significant change in
its policy focus and emphasis, especially since 1990. Urged by the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and
World Bank, the two most powerful development agencies in the
world in terms of development policy formulation and recom-
mendation, Nepal’s planning has now increasingly emphasized
economic privatization under the new banner of neoliberalism.
The sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 not only
ushered in an era of political democratization in many previously
undemocratic countries but also signaled a massive wave of eco-
nomic liberalization across the Third World. Nepal was no excep-
tion. As its new democratic government was swept by this wave
of neoliberalism, national planning made provision to relax state
control of many industries, stressing privatization of the econ-
omy. To be sure, Nepal was hardly a command economy. Between

1991 and 1997, the government of Nepal privatized more than fif-
teen enterprises, including the Bhrikuti Paper Mill, Harisidhi
Brick and Tile Factory, Bansbari Leather and Shoe Factory, Bal-
aju Textile Industry, and the Agricultural Tools Factory. The gov-
ernment had also agreed to privatize the Nepal Tea Development
Corporation. Furthermore, many other state-run enterprises were
being considered for privatization. Included in the list are the
Nepal Telecommunications Corporation, Butwal Power Company,
Nepal Bank, Salt Trading Corporation, cement factories, and oth-
ers. To a large extent, however, the speed of future privatization
of state-owned enterprises will be contingent on the government
makeup. It is safe to assume that whereas the single-party major-
ity in the parliament will have a decisive impact on privatization,
any coalition government will tend to slow it down.
Planning and Some Key Economic Sectors

Throughout its history, one of the distinctive features of Nepal’s
planning has been its emphasis on sectoral development of the
economy. Specifically, although different plans have given priori-
ties to different economic sectors, one can discern four major tar-
gets of sectoral development: agriculture, industry, tourism, and
transportation and communication.
Agriculture. Historically, Nepal was a predominantly agrarian
society, with the vast majority of its population composed of peas-
ants living in rural areas. As such, it was a subsistence economy.
Yet various historical accounts leave little doubt that Nepal once
was a relatively self-sufficient economy. Although the country was
never prosperous in a typical sense, it was not mired in poverty
the way it is today. Nepal enjoyed a healthy agricultural surplus,
beyond satisfying its national food requirements. The country
experienced no population pressure. In fact, due to regular labor
shortages, it could not harness all of its land potential. That meant
that despite its small areal size and rugged topography, it had
plenty of cultivatable land relative to its population size, at least
in the years prior to 1951.
Nepal’s economy is still predominantly agrarian, deeply embed-
ded in crop production and animal rearing. Agriculture is undoubt-
Spring farming in the hills. This photo shows an almost seamless blending
of people, houses, and farmland into a hill landscape. (Courtesy of Nanda
R. Shrestha)
edly the single most important economic activity in the country; it

is the backbone of the Nepali economy. According to data provided
by the World Bank, more than 40 percent of Nepal’s gross domes-
tic product comes from agriculture. In terms of the national
employment structure, agriculture directly employs over 76 per-
cent of the total labor force, which in 1999 was estimated to be 9.5
million. Technically, however, this agricultural employment figure
is lower than the actual situation, for significant numbers of those
employed in the nonagricultural activities are also engaged in
farming. It is, therefore, fair to assume that the number of people
who are directly as well as indirectly dependent on agriculture for
overall family survival is closer to the percentage of the national
population living in rural areas—that is, over 85 percent.
No matter how we dissect the employment structure, the agri-
cultural sector plays the most dominant role in Nepal; unques-
tionably, therefore, the economic fate of the vast majority of its
population is directly anchored to agriculture’s success or failure.
Except when the monsoon cooperates with farming needs, allow-
ing farmers to collect bountiful harvests, Nepal unfortunately no
longer enjoys the agricultural surpluses of the past. Food deficits

have become increasingly common, especially in the hills and
western parts of the country. For instance, during the five-year
period between 1995 and 1999, Nepal’s annual agricultural growth
averaged only 2.3 percent. When only the production of food
crops—namely, paddy (rice), maize, millet, wheat, and barley—
was taken into account, the annual agricultural growth rate
dropped to less than 1.5 percent. In simple terms, agricultural
growth failed to keep pace with population growth, which averaged
almost 2.4 percent over the same period, thus providing a clear
indication of agricultural deficits in relation to the population.
The topic of agricultural growth (or stagnation) is particularly
significant in an agrarian country like Nepal, where the popula-
tion is growing rapidly in the face of very limited land resources.
Although the socioeconomic survival of the vast majority of peas-
ants is intrinsically tied to agriculture, the per capita availability
of cultivatable land has been diminishing. It has reached its low-
est level yet, currently standing at merely 0.25 acre per capita
nationally (see Table 1 in “Geography and History of Nepal”).
Nationally, 51 percent of the population owns less than 1.24 acres
of land per household, which on average consists of about 6 per-
sons. Another 16 percent owns 1.24–2.47 acres per household. In
total, 67 percent of the households occupy only 17 percent of
Nepal’s farm land, many being entirely landless. Generally speak-
ing, such a small amount of land is hardly sufficient to adequately
support a family of six for a year. The situation is particularly pre-
carious in the hills, where land deficits are quite high.
What is more, the prospect of further land reclamation for agri-
cultural expansion is almost nil unless whatever forest areas that
remain are sacrificed. This overall limitation on land is generally
true even in the case of the Tarai, a region regarded as the gran-
ary of Nepal. This is a label the Tarai certainly deserves, for it
occupies over 60 percent of the nation’s total cultivated land. In
other words, future agricultural fortunes are rooted in the soils of
the Tarai. As goes the Tarai, so goes the country’s agriculture.
Notwithstanding this regionally confined prospect, agriculture has
nationally come under increasing pressure to support Nepal’s
huge rural population. The constraints of land resources are com-
pounded by two immediate factors.
This man is using a public space to sell bananas grown in his backyard.
Such vending is a common way to earn supplementary cash income.
(Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)
First, the agricultural sector is lopsidedly tilted toward the pro-

duction of food crops: grains. For example, 78 percent of the total
land area of 5.75 million acres under cultivation is devoted to only
four crops: paddy (rice), maize, wheat, and millet. Second, despite
nearly five decades of relentless emphasis on agricultural devel-
opment, the record of farm productivity per unit of land is far
from noteworthy. This is true particularly for the four major crops
noted above. For instance, the average yield for these four crops
is normally around 0.8 ton per acre, a figure that is roughly one-
half of the level of land productivity attained by Japanese farmers
(also see Shrestha 1990).
Although emphasis on food production is undeniably impor-
tant, especially in light of the country’s chronic poverty, a heavy
commitment to these crops tends to reduce the amount of land
available for growing more productive crops, such as potatoes and
other vegetables, which can be domestically consumed or sold in
the market to generate cash. Most vegetables are high not only in
terms of their nutritional value but also their market value, for
they command much higher prices than do grain crops. If both
summer and winter vegetables are planted, several crops can be
grown on the same piece of land, thus propelling the productivity
of land to a much higher plateau.
In short, the agriculture sector suffers deeply from Nepal’s
quadrangular problems: heavy agrarian dependence, limited land
resources, high population growth, and low technological
advancements (see “Geography and History of Nepal”). More
specifically, while the country’s high population growth has
imposed greater demands on its limited land resources, the agrar-
ian economy’s ability to respond rapidly to such rising pressure
has been stunted because of the absence of necessary agricultural
technologies and foresight. For example, the lack of surface irri-
gation is a prevailing impediment to agricultural development.
Only 15 percent of the total cultivated land is under year-round
irrigation, and 25 percent has limited irrigation access. Conse-
quently, the vast segment of crop production is excessively
dependent on the vagaries of the monsoon.
One additional factor plaguing the agricultural sector is that its
excess labor supply suffers from the absence of regular and reli-
able off-farm or nonagricultural employment outlets. The fact that
the country is heavily agrarian means its urban-industrial sector
is grossly underdeveloped. As noted in “Geography and History of
Nepal,” barely 12 percent of the country’s total population resides
in urban areas, with the vast majority being concentrated in the
Kathmandu Valley, the most urbanized area in the country. Given
its limited urbanization, the country’s industrial base is naturally
rudimentary and handicapped (discussed below). As a result, its
ability to generate urban-industrial jobs in order to gainfully
employ the surplus agricultural labor force and to increase
national income levels is greatly diminished.
The economic history of today’s advanced countries generally
shows that their urban-industrial growth provided employment
for surplus rural labor. It was precisely this avenue that allowed
large numbers of rural workers who were employed in the urban-
industrial sector to enhance their incomes significantly, attain
middle-class status, and, subsequently, generate mass consumer
demands for manufactures. As a consequence, the industrial

expansion process was reinforced. But this is not what is occur-
ring in Nepal. The country is trapped in a catch–22 situation in
that the high population concentration in rural areas, along with
their heavy dependence on farming, means the demand for indus-
trial outputs is choked off. This has led to a situation in which the
domestic consumer market for industrial products is small and,
hence, unable to support internal industrial growth and expan-
sion, which in turn impedes the generation of gainful employment
opportunities for the surplus agricultural labor force. In short,
Nepal is caught in a negative feedback loop that perpetuates its
economic stagnation. The ultimate outcome is that the ability of
Nepal’s agricultural sector to free itself from the fetters of rapid
population growth, land resource constraints, and heavy agrarian
dependence is severely sapped.
In addition to the production of various crops, most peasants
and farmers are engaged in some form of animal husbandry. As an
intertwined part of the farming system, livestock and poultry
serve three key functions. First, they provide manure for crop
production. Second, for most farmers they are a source of supple-
mentary cash incomes, whether they are used for dairy, meat,
eggs, or wool purposes. Third, they supplement the household
food supply, particularly providing protein in the form of meat,
milk, and eggs. It is only rarely that one will come across a farm-
ing family in Nepal without some animals and/or poultry. In
1996–1997, Nepal had more than 7 million cattle, 3.4 million buf-
faloes, and 5.9 million goats. The pig and sheep populations
totaled almost 1 million each, whereas poultry numbered 15.6
million (CBS 1997).
Industry. It is clear from the preceding discussion that, at best,
Nepal’s urban-industrial development is in its infancy. This does
not, however, mean the country is totally void of industrial his-
tory. Historically, Nepal was not only self-sufficient agriculturally;
it was also self-supporting industrially (see Regmi 1988). There
were two main reasons why the country was relatively self-suffi-
cient and even modestly advanced in craft, commerce, and
small-scale industrial activities. First, and ironically, the very geo-
graphical isolation and landlocked condition of the country that
now stands as a huge economic impediment formerly led to an
economic system reliant on itself for its requirements. “Such

forced isolation and self reliance made people industrious and
content with whatever they had or whatever they could produce
to meet all their few simple needs of daily life” (Shrestha 1967,
135–136). Second, the protective measures deliberately under-
taken by the early Shah rulers safeguarded and promoted the
domestic trade and industrial infrastructure against foreign intru-
sion and competition.
One example of such measures was the protective trade policy
adopted by Prithvi Narayan Shah with regard to foreign imports
and foreign merchants’ entrance into the country. His instruc-
tions were to prohibit the use of foreign products and to encour-
age domestic production by utilizing local resources, by training
local producers, and by providing them with samples of foreign
products. This way money would not flow out of the country.
Meanwhile, herbs, drugs, and other indigenous products could be
exported to foreign countries to earn money.
Even Jang Bahadur Rana fully understood the meaning and
importance of Prithvi Narayan’s protective economic policy. In
spite of cultivating a friendly relationship with the British in India,
he kept a vigilant eye on trade relations with them. However, the
situation changed gradually with the passage of time. The more
the Ranas and members of the nobility came in contact with the
British, the faster the measures taken by the previous rulers to
protect domestic industries from foreign competition disap-
peared. That is, the later Rana rulers showed little regard for the
protection and improvement of the existing domestic industrial
foundation. Their lack of interest in fostering domestic industries
was partially attributed to their preference for British imports.
But it was also equally related to their perceived fear that indige-
nous technical innovations and economic progress would foment
an upheaval in the existing social and political order, eventually
dismantling their autocratic rule. Furthermore, some of the West-
ern habits and ways of life followed by the Ranas and members of
the nobility began to slowly permeate into the upper crust of the
Nepali public. “This encouraged large inflows of cheap goods
which hit hard, for the first time, the traditional craft of the coun-
try” (Shrestha 1967, 138). The problem was further exacerbated
when the Ranas signed a trade treaty with British India in 1923,
permitting practically unlimited imports of British goods and

commodities into the country. Consequently, the domestic indus-
tries were effectively rendered impotent against British imports,
thus marking their gradual demise.
For instance, in a hill village called Those, some 100 kilometers
east of Kathmandu, there was, Hagen (1971, 141–142) wrote, an
important source of income: an iron works. “The iron works
started in 1893 and developed into a boom in 1924, when 18 fur-
naces were in operation. . . . Hydro-electric power was installed to
run an electromagnetic separator and various lathes and drilling
machines. Produced were rifles and guns, chains, hammers,
plough shares, shovels, pickaxes, kodalis (spades), locks, nails,
khukris (knives), horseshoes, butter-lamps, and sold within areas
of five days walk around Those.” Hagen further noted that instead
of advancing Those’s industrial infrastructure, the Maharaja (i.e.,
the Rana prime minister) began importing guns and other items
from the British. As a result, the iron industry at Those was
pushed to the brink of extinction. By 1968 only two furnaces were
left, and most of the blacksmiths had migrated to Kathmandu or
India.
This policy change imperiled the country’s balance of trade.
The trade surplus Nepal had previously enjoyed began to dwindle
rapidly because it had to pay for imported goods, most of which
had been previously produced domestically. According to one
report: “Annual values of trade which approximately trebled in
the fifty years from 1835 to 1885 had trebled again by the end of
the century, with the value of Nepali exports double that of
imports. This strong trading surplus was produced with no inter-
nal transportation improvements and in a period in which emi-
gration grew” (Blaikie et al. 1980, 37). As the imports of mass-
manufactured commodities from British India climbed, Nepal’s
trade surplus disappeared.
In the midst of the continued erosion of Nepal’s industrial foun-
dation and fortunes came World War II, which put a brake to the
eroding trend. In a sense, then, it can be plausibly argued that the
so-called modern industrial history of Nepal began with the onset
of World War II. In response to the demands for jute products cre-
ated by the war economy, the Biratnagar Jute Mill was established
in the mid-1930s in the eponymous eastern Tarai town, located
along the Indian border. As Radhe Pradhan (1984, 49) remarks,

“The establishment of this enterprise can be considered a land-
mark in the history of industrial development in Nepal.” So high
were the wartime demands for various industrial products that
they engendered investment enthusiasm among entrepreneurs
and industrialists. Soon after the creation of that mill, several
other factories were established, almost all of them in the Tarai’s
border towns because of their proximity to British India, the pri-
mary market for Nepali products. Furthermore, because Indian
capital was heavily involved in the country’s wartime industrial
surge, the Tarai proved to be the most attractive location thanks
to its easy accessibility to Indian railheads along the border, its
cultural similarity with northern India, and its ready access to
Indian labor.
Between 1936 and 1945, some twenty joint stock companies
sprouted, manufacturing mostly agro- and forest-based products
such as paper, soap, furniture, jute products, matches, sugar, tex-
tiles, cigarettes, and mustard oil. Prominent among them were the
Juddha Match Factory, the Morang Sugar Mill, and the Nepal Ply-
wood and Bobbin Company. Also established was the Morang Elec-
tricity Supply Company. By the time Rana autocracy ended in
1951, a total of sixty-five companies had been registered, with the
vast majority of capital as well as labor coming from India. As the
number of companies increased, so did the number of companies
that went belly up, especially after the end of the war. Such a rise
in the liquidation rate was not surprising, especially in view of the
fact that Nepal’s industrial growth during the war period was
mostly attributed to the demands of the war economy, which
entailed large profit margins. It had little to do with long-range
industrial foresight, managerial experiences, sustained capital
reinvestment, domestic markets, and necessary infrastructural
development. So, when the war economy came to a halt, a sharp
reduction in the demands of Nepal’s products ensued.
Nevertheless, the war economy proved to be instrumental in
laying Nepal’s industrial foundation. Its manufacturing base has
expanded since then, albeit at a sluggish pace. The growth of
tourism (discussed later) over the past thirty years and the delib-
erate adoption of neoliberal economic policies or privatization
since 1990 have given added impetus to industrial growth and
expansion. During the 1995–1999 period, the industrial sector

accounted for close to 20 percent of GDP, with almost one-half of
it coming from manufacturing alone. In addition, the industrial
sector’s share of national employment was almost 10 percent. It is
estimated that this sector has been growing at the rate of 4–5 per-
cent per annum, which is sizably higher than the annual growth
rate of 2.3 percent registered by the agriculture sector during the
same period. All of these statistics add up to reveal that Nepal’s
industrial sector is making some headway in the national eco-
nomic landscape.
Nepal’s industrial sector can be broadly categorized into two
major groups: domestically oriented and export based. Domesti-
cally oriented industries are generally those whose primary target
is the domestic market. As such, they tend to be largely agro-
based, meaning much (not all) of their raw material needs can be
met domestically. Included in this group are rice, sugar, cotton,
paper, timber, and oil mills, along with cigarette and match facto-
ries. Some of them produce tools, utensils, bricks, and leather
products. Also significant in this group are those enterprises
focused on the country’s growing tourist sector and the urban
middle class. Even though the middle class comprises perhaps no
more than 5 percent of the total population, it does represent
around 20–25 percent of the national disposable income. Particu-
larly notable among these enterprises are the beverage industry
(namely beer and soft drink production) and the handicraft
industry, for which Nepal is quite well-known.
Within the export-based manufacturing group, perhaps the
most widely recognized is the carpet industry. Nepal’s handmade
carpet production is slowly gaining a foothold in the international
carpet market, particularly in Germany. For the gradual rise of its
carpet industry, Nepal owes a great deal to Tibetan refugees on the
production front and to Western tourists on the consumption
side. Settled in the country since the early 1960s, Tibetans are the
primary drivers of this industry. On average, carpets alone
account for more than 35 percent of Nepal’s total exports, fol-
lowed by ready-made garments, which contribute an additional
27 percent. However, in 1999, these two exports were almost
equal in terms of dollar values, with carpets grossing $144.2 mil-
lion and ready-made garments $142.6 million.
Besides capital, there are five principal issues with regard to

the viability of Nepal’s sustained industrial growth and expansion.
First, as already noted, its domestic market is very small and
weak, a situation that automatically constrains its dynamic indus-
trial growth. Second, except for some domestically oriented
industrial enterprises, the country generally lacks necessary
resources to fulfill its raw material needs. Consequently, it is
heavily dependent on raw material imports, particularly for its
export industries—for example, carpets and garments. In addi-
tion, the industrial sector, in general, relies on imported techno-
logical resources and capital equipment. Third, its transportation
and social infrastructure is very cumbersome and often unreli-
able. The country is totally dependent on India for transit facili-
ties or sea access, the main artery of commodity flows in the
global market. Fourth, as a result of the above limitations, Nepal
is hardly in a position to enjoy any competitive advantage—cost
or quality—in a world where deepening globalization has height-
ened competition. Moreover, in the face of sweeping globalization,
almost every country is eager to open its borders to multination-
als, whose production operations and technologies not only are
becoming increasingly mobile but they also have a tendency to
homogenize export products. As a result, even Nepal’s ability to
stake its claim to uniqueness in terms of products may be lost to
globalization. For instance, just like China now manufactures
products that were once typically Indian and handcrafted in
India, any other country can produce products that were once
considered indigenous to Nepal and its craftsmen. Finally, politi-
cal instability and resultant periodic administrative changes, as
well as directional uncertainties regarding economic policies, are
totally antagonistic to continued industrial growth and advance-
ments. To sum, with the possible exception of tourism, there are
few areas in which Nepal can offer some tangible competitive
advantage to attract substantial global investment capital.
Tourist Industry. Tourism is the dominant segment of Nepal’s
service sector and is perhaps the only reliable growth industry,
the only one to have experienced a consistent upturn. Prior to
1951, Nepal was almost completely isolated—and insulated—
from Westerners, who were seldom allowed into the country. But
the situation changed after 1951. It is fair to claim that the coun-
This upscale hotel in Kathmandu caters to Western tourists. (Courtesy of

Nanda R. Shrestha)
try witnessed the first dawn of tourism with the sporadic arrival
of some Peace Corps volunteers (PCVs), a few mountaineers, and
a small horde of hippies in the early 1960s. Since its inception in
the 1960s, when the number of tourists barely exceeded merely a
few thousand, tourism has undergone tremendous growth. In
1999 the tourism sector boasted almost half a million foreign vis-
itors, accounting for 3.6 percent of the GDP. Although its contri-
bution to the GDP fluctuates somewhat from year to year, there is
little doubt that it has been growing, routinely contributing more
than 20 percent of foreign earnings. Although this sector is gen-
erally ranked third behind carpet and garment exports, in terms
of foreign earnings it directly complements both the carpet and
handicraft industries. One could, in fact, go so far as to claim that
the growth of tourism is critical for the sustained growth of both
industries, for it is the tourists who provide a vital link to
increased sales of Nepali carpets and handicrafts. They are the
primary agent of the international diffusion of Nepal-made carpets
in the international markets. In addition, tourism is the central
Vendors selling antiques (or counterfeit antiques) at a rent-free public retail

space. Although no Westerners are seen in this picture, such vending
operations are primarily intended for Western tourists. (Courtesy of Nanda
R. Shrestha)
link to related industries such as airlines, travel agencies, hotels

and restaurants, and trekking. The fate of these and many other
auxiliary services is thus directly dependent on tourism.
Speaking of hotels and restaurants catering to foreigners, their
numbers have mushroomed, incessantly competing against ubiq-
uitous ancient temples to dominate the Kathmandu Valley’s cul-
tural landscape. One can find fancy international chains such as
Everest Sheraton, Radisson, and Soaltee Holiday Inn to accom-
modate uppercrust tourists, as well as mediocre hotels for low-
budget travelers. Some big hotels—for example, Soaltee Holiday
Inn and Annapurna Hotel—are even equipped with American-run
casinos. In fact, Kathmandu has become the Las Vegas of South
Asia. Equally remarkable is the parallel growth of all types of
restaurants, serving everything from local delicacies to interna-
tional dishes. Every cuisine is represented, although one may

observe that the local adaptations have often led to change in both
taste and form.
Traditional sightseeing remains the centerpiece of Nepali
tourism, but Western and Japanese visitors are increasingly
engaged in various recreational or adventurous activities.
Included among these activities are mountaineering, trekking,
rafting, ecotourism, and even prostitution. Ecotourism is the lat-
est trend, and Nepal has plenty to offer ecotourists. Additionally,
Nepal is now seen as a safe and virgin territory in the shifting fron-
tier of the rapidly growing global prostitution market. In short,
Nepal’s prospect of growth and expansion within the tourism sec-
tor is good, at least in the short term. Posing the biggest threat to
tourism in Nepal are the growing shortage of water and the Kath-
mandu Valley’s rapidly deteriorating environment. Water is
extremely polluted and so gritty is the air in this bowl-shaped val-
ley that the view of the mighty Himalayas, one of the focal points
of tourist attraction, has become blurry to tourist eyes (see
“Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues”). If the trend contin-
ues, in the next 10–15 years Kathmandu will face a massive pub-
lic health crisis as a direct result of air and water pollution. This
will severely undercut the country’s tourism industry, whose grav-
itational axis is centered in Kathmandu.
Transportation and Communication. As already stated, from
the very outset, high-level planning has stressed transportation
and communication development. Being a landlocked country,
Nepal has no direct access to sea transportation. Besides trails,
which were historically the only means of transportation, Nepal
now has two other principal modes of transportation. They are
surface roads and airlines.
Although the quality of motorable surface roads are generally
poor throughout the country, largely because of massive corrup-
tion within the road construction industry and frequent land-
slides, Nepal’s road networks have vastly increased since the early
1950s. Currently, the country enjoys 8,265 miles of roads, of
which 2,960 miles are paved, 2,175 miles graveled, and the rest
considered passable only in fair weather. One noticeable charac-
teristic of the road networks is that they are mostly concentrated
in the Tarai and in certain nodal areas of the hills, the two most
A rickshaw driver takes a nap during a slack time. (Courtesy of Nanda R.

Shrestha)
prominent points being Kathmandu and Pokhara. The first high-

way in the country was built by India in the early 1950s to con-
nect Kathmandu with Birganj, a city located along the Nepal-India
border in the central Tarai. This is still an important highway in
terms of trade and transit between the two countries. Other major
highways in the country include the East-West Highway that
extends along the Tarai belt, the Kathmandu-Pokhara Highway,
the Pokhara-Sunauli Highway, and the Kathmandu-Kodari High-
way (see Karan and Ishii 1994, figure 29).
Being that Nepal is a landlocked and mountainous country, air-
ways play a critical role in its transportation system, both domes-
tically and internationally. Air transportation provides quick links
to different parts of the country that are inaccessible to motor
vehicles. Because of the emergence of private airlines companies,
the quality of domestic air service has vastly improved in recent
years. Internationally, air transportation is more than an avenue of
Nepal’s direct link to countries beyond India; it is the umbilical
chord of the tourism industry. Without it, tourism would flounder.
The only international airport in Nepal is situated in Kathmandu,
and it is served by the Royal Nepal Airlines and numerous overseas
airlines, including Aerofloat, Biman Bangladesh, China South West
Airlines, Dragon Air, Druk Air, Indian Airlines, Lufthansa, Pakistan
International Airlines, Singapore Airlines, and Thai International
Airways. Kathmandu has direct air service to several cities in
Europe and Asia, namely London, Paris, Frankfurt, Moscow,
Dubai, Karachi, Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Dhaka, Rangoon,
Bangkok, Singapore, Osaka, Lhasa, Thimpu, and Hong Kong.
Regarding its telecommunication network and facilities, Nepal
can hardly be considered advanced. This does not, however,
mean the country is still living in the dark ages. Since the mid-
1980s, Nepal has made significant strides in the communication
sector. Most cities in Nepal now have telephone service, and the
international telecommunication network is digitalized, with
fiber-optic links to India and satellite links to other countries. The
telephone connection between Nepal and the United States, for
example, is direct, clear, and reliable. Internet links are also fully
established, especially in urban areas. There are commercial
Internet hubs—or so-called Internet cafes—where tourists can
access e-mail as well as surf the net. Nepal is equipped with a tel-
evision broadcast system. Programs offered by foreign TV organi-

zations such as CNN, BBC, and those broadcast from India can be
received via satellite dishes, which, by the way, have become a
status symbol and one of the most visible features of Kathmandu’s
cultural landscape. From a policy perspective, it is important to
note that the government has created the Nepal Telecommunica-
tion Authority, an independent regulatory body, to facilitate pri-
vate-sector participation and fair competition within the sector.
The government plans to further develop this sector to augment
the country’s trade, industry, commerce, and tourism.
In addition to these four sectors, three other areas of the
national economy deserve some attention; namely, foreign trade
and foreign investment, banking, and water resources.
Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment. Historically, Nepal
traded with India mainly and with Tibet to some extent. Until the
1950s, over 90 percent of trade was conducted with India, a coun-
try that supplied, and continues to supply, the majority of basic
goods, along with some raw materials and machines for Nepali
industries. In addition to being almost the exclusive supplier of
basic imports, India acted as the primary foreign market for most
of Nepal’s exports. In these trade relations, however, Nepal always
experienced a huge trade deficit with India.
Though India still remains the single most important trading
partner, Nepal’s foreign trade with India has been on the decline
vis-à-vis other countries, especially for exports. For example, in
1996–1997, Nepal’s exports to Germany amounted to 7,652 mil-
lion Nepali rupees (or roughly $134.2 million at the conversion
rate of NRs. 57 to U.S. $1). The volume of similar trade with the
United States was NRs. 5,930 million. India ranked third with a
total export value of NRs. 5,448 million. These three major export
trading partners were followed by seven other minor partners:
Bangladesh, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, United Kingdom, France,
and Belgium. However, with respect to Nepal’s imports during the
same year, India was, as usual, the largest partner, with a trade
volume totaling NRs. 25,844 million, or one-third of the total
imports. It was followed by Hong Kong (not counting imports from
mainland China), from where Nepal imported NRs. 20,243 million
worth of goods and products. Singapore ranked third.
Although carpets and ready-made garments are Nepal’s main
exports, petroleum products, machinery, transport equipment

and vehicles, medicines and medical equipment, textiles, raw
wool, and electric goods top the list of imports. Also important
among the imports are chemical fertilizers, cooking oil, threads,
cement, and various chemicals. During certain years, gold occu-
pies the position of a major import category.
As mentioned earlier, since the early 1990s Nepal has been
deliberately encouraging foreign investments in the country under
its policy to promote privatization of the economy, particularly its
state-owned industries. Several companies already have been
denationalized. Except in certain areas with a strong domestic
base, Nepal has a fairly open foreign investment policy. Broadly
speaking, such investments are welcome in those industries that
are focused on manufacturing, energy development, tourism, min-
eral resource development, agriculture, and services. And they can
be joint ventures or 100-percent foreign-owned enterprises.
Banking. Nepal’s banking system used to be quite archaic and
cumbersome. In recent years, however, it has undergone signifi-
cant improvements. Currently, the banking system consists of the
Nepal Rastra Bank (the central bank of Nepal), thirteen commer-
cial banks, and two development financing banks.
The Nepal Rastra Bank’s main function is to regulate and super-
vise the country’s banking institutions. It issues currency as well as
determines the daily buying and selling rates of foreign currencies.
In essence, it is in charge of implementing the nation’s monetary
policy in order to maintain financial stability and the health of the
economy. In contrast, the country’s commercial and development
banks are responsible for providing industrial, agricultural, and
commercial credits to individuals as well as businesses. They offer
both industrial long-term loans and short-term working capital
loans. The Nepal Bank, Rastriya Banijya Bank (commercial bank
of Nepal), and Agricultural Development Bank are quite active in
the credit lending area and mostly operate through their branches,
which are scattered throughout the country.
There are nine foreign joint venture banks in Nepal, most of
which are concentrated in the Kathmandu Valley. They are the
Nepal Arab Bank, Nepal Indo-Suez Bank, Nepal Grindlays Bank,
Nepal SBI Bank, Himalayan Bank, Everest Bank, Nepal
Bangladesh Bank, Bank of Kathmandu, and Nepal Bank of Ceylon.
Additionally, the Standard Chartered Bank, Citibank, American

Express, and Union European de CIC have representative offices
in Kathmandu. In recent years, there has been a noticeable
increase in both the number and size of banks, financial institu-
tions, and insurance companies in Nepal, all due to the govern-
ment’s push for market liberalization. This increasing competi-
tion within the banking sector has significantly facilitated the
foreign currency exchange situation. Moreover, a small stock mar-
ket operates in Kathmandu.
Water Resources. To be sure, Nepal’s energy needs are quite
limited, largely due to its small urban-industrial base. This does
not, however, mitigate the fact that the country is highly depend-
ent on energy imports. Petroleum products top the list of Nepal’s
major imports. This situation of energy dependence would be eas-
ily rectified if Nepal could harness its enormous hydroelectric
potential, which is estimated to be around 83,000 megawatts,
among the highest in the world. The potential is so vast and so
widespread that it can be developed virtually in any region of the
country. If carefully developed and efficiently operated, Nepal
could readily export electricity to its neighboring countries,
mainly to India, and turn it into a major component of foreign
trade. Instead, Nepal currently imports electricity from India to
light up some its border towns in the Tarai.
As of 1997–1998, Nepal had managed to exploit only 262
megawatts of hydroelectricity, that is, less than 0.5 percent of the
estimated total potential. However, to increase its hydro power
capacity, several projects are either under construction or are
being commissioned. Now that the so-called power of the private
sector has been unleashed to develop hydroelectric power plants,
Nepal may soon be in a position to convert this magnificent
source of potential energy into a constant flow of electricity, not
only to light up all corners of the country but also to enhance its
national treasury through the export of electricity.
CONCLUSION: FUTURE PROSPECTS

No matter how one analyzes Nepal’s economy, its present is mired
in poverty and its future uncertain. Its problems are too varied
and too entrenched to have sustained solutions. Despite this gen-
A scene from the city of Bhaktapur (Bhadgaon), a major center of

commercial chili production in Nepal. Hot chili peppers are dried on mats
spread on the streets. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)
erally gloomy outlook, its agricultural and tourism sectors hold

some tangible prospect for future progress. One might ask, How
could Nepal expect to achieve agricultural development under the
condition of limited land resources? The simple fact that Nepal’s
crop yields per unit of land are so low means there is tremendous
room for raising land productivity through technological improve-
ments and carefully balanced shifts from low-value to high-value
crops such as vegetables and potatoes. Furthermore, as the bread
basket of Nepal, the Tarai enjoys substantial potential for agricul-
tural development.
Tourism is the only sector, however, to have consistently
expanded over the past forty years. There is enough evidence to
be hopeful about its continued growth during the next few years.
This will, however, require geographical diversification from its
current gravitational axis in the Kathmandu Valley. It is no exag-
geration that the valley’s growth potential is already saturated, if
not geographically then at least in terms of its pending environ-
mental crisis, which has no immediate remedy. The crisis of the
Kathmandu Valley is too serious to continue to foster a physical
environment that is tourist friendly.
Some may argue that in light of the government’s determined
push for privatization of various state-owned enterprises and rel-
atively liberal foreign investment policies, Nepal’s industrial hori-
zon appears quite bright. Although it is always hazardous to proj-
ect too far into the future, no amount of neoliberalism or
privatization is likely to suddenly rectify the country’s deep-
seated, multidimensional industrial woes. No doubt, neoliberal
policies seem to have injected some temporary vigor into this sec-
tor, but they are fraught with expectations that defy the macro-
economic realities of Nepal. In addition, the advocates of these
neoliberal policies are tainted with a one-sided view that greatly
inflates benefits while completely ignoring detrimental effects.
In the final analysis, unless Nepal can achieve dynamic agri-
cultural development relatively fast and at a furious pace, the
specter of poverty will continue to haunt the country for the fore-
seeable future (Panday 1999). This is not a pleasant prospect, but
it is a reality that Nepal can hardly afford to ignore or treat lightly.
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University Press.
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Change in a Landlocked Himalayan Kingdom. Tokyo: Tokyo
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Nepal and Bhutan Country Studies (Area Handbook Series).
Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
Nepali Institutions
As an entrenched political and cultural institution, the monarchy

of Nepal is an important marker in the evolution of Nepal as a
nation. It was firmly consolidated as one family lineage after the
rise of the Shah dynasty with Prithvi Narayan Shah in the late
1760s. But this institution recently suffered a debilitating blow:
On June 1, 2001, a bizarre royal massacre left the royal family
dead, tarnishing the institution greatly in the process.
It all happened very fast, in a matter of minutes. King Birendra
and every member of his family were gunned down in the royal din-
ing room by his own son, Crown Prince Dipendra, who later shot
himself. Obviously, the murder did not stem from some carefully
hatched palace plot to assassinate the king and to prematurely
usurp power. At twenty-nine years of age, Dipendra had remained
unmarried well past the expected age of marriage for a crown
prince. Apparently he was ready to marry the woman whom he
loved. But his parents were vehemently opposed to his choice of
bride. In fact, King Birendra allegedly warned him that he would be
passed over as heir if he disobeyed. Because of this heated dispute,
it is believed, the crown prince flew into a rage and fatally shot his
father first and then the rest of his family assembled in the palace
(BBC News 2001a). Because Dipendra was clinically still alive on
June 2, he was declared the new king of Nepal. He was pronounced
dead two days later, on June 4. With Birendra’s direct family killed
and no direct heir to the throne, the Shah dynasty crown was, for
the first time, passed to Birendra’s brother, Gyanendra, on June 4
(BBC News 2001b, c). The Shah dynasty thus remains in power, but
a new lineage has been started—that of Gyanendra.
The chain of events following the massacre is quite revealing of
both the enduring quality and absurdity of monarchy as a national
institution. The fact that the transition was orderly clearly indi-
cates its centrality in Nepal’s government and politics. No known
political maneuvering or conspiratorial attempts were made to
undermine this institution during the hours of its greatest vulner-
73
ability. In the meantime, it clearly showed how the hereditary

nature of the monarchical institution works. Specifically, there are
two aspects to it. First, Crown Prince Dipendra, who had just mur-
dered his own family in cold blood, was named as king because of
his ingrained hereditary right. Second, following Dipendra’s death,
Gyanendra instantly became the new monarch because of his
dynastic linkage. Prior to being crowned king, Gyanendra was a
very unpopular member of the royalty. The general public viewed
him as an irresponsible character with a long unsavory past, who
openly abused his royal privileges. His public unpopularity was
evident during his coronation as the very masses who grieved over
King Birendra’s death openly expressed their objections to Gya-
nendra’s crowning. During the coronation procession, streets were
lined with protesters who shouted “Down with the king!” rather
than “Hail to the king!” In addition, thousands of people marched
on the royal palace, chanting “We don’t want Gyanendra” (BBC
News 2001d).
Corruption seemed to trail Gyanendra. In the eyes of the peo-
ple, he had brought dishonor to his royal dynasty. To cite one
minor example, he defiantly refused to pay his public utility bills.
The people found this unacceptable, especially in light of the fact
that he is one of the wealthiest individuals in Nepal, with a vast
network of business enterprises. Common citizens would have
their electricity cut off. Gyanendra’s son, Paras—now the crown
prince—has been the perpetrator in at least three known hit-and-
run vehicular accidents, including a fairly recent one in which he
ran over and killed a popular Nepali musician (BBC News 2001b).
No charges or court cases could be lodged against him without
royal consent, which the palace would not grant.
Such is the drama of the royal tradition that resides at the core
of Nepal’s government and politics. Against the backdrop of this
introductory snapshot, this chapter will provide brief descriptions
of (1) government and politics since 1951; (2) ethnicity, castes,
and social classes; (3) religion; and (4) education.
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

As discussed in “Geography and History of Nepal,” the modern
history of Nepal did not begin until its unification in 1769 under
——Nepali Institutions——75
the leadership of Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of the Shah

dynasty. But, both by design and default, the country remained
almost entirely divorced from the rest of the world until 1951, the
year that marked the end of the autocratic Rana government and
the beginning of a new era in Nepal’s government and politics. In
a true sense, the year 1951 marked the dawn of the modern
period in Nepali history. With the fall of the Rana rule also came
the end of Nepal’s isolation. As the country emerged from its veil,
it entered the world stage. Soon after 1951, Nepal was diplomati-
cally recognized by many countries. It became a member of the
United Nations in 1955. Yet Nepal and its citizens had to wait
almost nine more years before they had their first glimpse of dem-
ocratic governance and politics in 1959.
The Dawn and Death of Democracy and

Economic Stagnation
The roots of Nepal’s democracy can be traced back to the anti-
Rana movement, much of which started in India. It should be
noted, however, that the whole anti-Rana movement was driven
by the desire and determination to establish democracy. So the
movement was at once anti-Rana and pro-democracy. In many
respects, the movement was not only influenced by India’s anti-
colonialism movement but also patterned after it. However,
despite being centered on the immediate task of overthrowing the
Rana government, it involved various political party-based fac-
tions. Perhaps the most organized and prominent of those fac-
tions were the Nepali Congress Party, under the leadership of
Bishweshwar Prasad (B. P.) Koirala and Ganeshman Singh, and
the Communist Party of Nepal, led by Puspa Lal Shrestha and
Man Mohan Adhikari. The Congress party was much bigger and
more expansive than the Communist party and espoused the
ideal of democratic socialism, a system based on electoral politics
and socialist economics.
The movement culminated in a victory over the Rana regime
in early 1951. Little did Nepali citizens realize, however, that the
presumed dawn of democracy was merely a tantalizing mirage.
The whole episode turned into one big revitalization of the Shah
dynasty that had long been relegated to puppetry. Although King
Tribhuvan had promised to hold a national election in 1952 to

form a democratic government, he never held one, leaving the
revolutionaries and citizens dangling under his broken promise
while he consolidated his absolute power. Democracy was thus
frozen. Four years later, in 1955, he died. His son, King Mahen-
dra, also kept postponing the promised election. He shuffled his
self-appointed government like a deck of cards, constantly pitting
one ruling clan against another in a manner clearly reminiscent
of Shah politics prior to the rise of the Rana rule. Mahendra was
in total control of power as he sat on its saddle with the bridle
and whip in his hands.
Finally in 1959, under mounting pressure from those who had
fought hard and shed blood to overthrow the Rana regime,
Mahendra agreed grudgingly to hold a national election within the
framework of parliamentary democracy. The Congress party won
the election, and its leader, B. P. Koirala, became the first elected
prime minister of Nepal. Intent on dismantling democracy, King
Mahendra did not waste much time to launch a swift palace coup
in December 1960, arresting Koirala and dissolving the parlia-
ment. Mahendra then declared the party system illegal. The dem-
ocratic experiment was again stopped in its infancy. Conse-
quently, the much-anticipated transition to a new, progressive
social order was stymied; Nepal remained mired in feudalism.
King Mahendra declared a state of emergency and ruled
directly. He appointed a council of five ministers to help run the
administration. The emergency lasted for two years. On Decem-
ber 16, 1962,—the second anniversary of his coup—he instituted
a four-tier panchayat system of government. It was presented as
a system of partyless guided democracy, or what Mahendra called
panchayat democracy, rooted in the social and cultural heritage
of Nepal. In reality, however, it was anything but democratic; it
was a one-party system, a rubber-stamp body, operating at the
whim of the king (Joshi and Rose 1966). In addition, Mahendra
was the supreme commander of the armed forces. He appointed
members of the Supreme Court, with the power to not only
remove them at will but to overrule their decisions. In essence, he
controlled all three branches of the government: the executive,
legislative, and judiciary. His power had no limits except to his
own plans and wishes.
The panchayat system continued even after Mahendra’s death

in January 1972. In a short span of eleven years, from the day of
the coup to his death, he ruled directly for a total of three years,
including the last year of his life. During the remaining eight
years, he blissfully engaged in the “government shuffle,” dissolv-
ing and reconstituting his cabinet five different times and appoint-
ing three different prime ministers. This was a legendary tactic he
mastered to keep his prime ministers and cabinet members off
guard and totally dependent on his whims. Nevertheless, each fac-
tion was given its turn to share the power and the spoils that came
with the power as long as it remained loyal and adhered to Mahen-
dra’s design. So the whole issue of access to power was turned into
a game of musical chairs.
Mahendra’s successor, King Birendra, stayed the course care-
fully charted by his father. In his early twenties at the time of his
coronation, the new and young king encountered the growing
possibility of political turmoil and agitation against the panchayat
system, that is, the renewed demand for democracy. But, like his
father, Birendra also relied on factional politics to consolidate his
power and authority. During his absolute rule from 1972 to 1990,
the government (cabinet) changed at least eleven times, with six
different prime ministers leading it at different times. Only one
government, headed by Prime Minister Marich Man Shrestha,
lasted for more than three consecutive years. The rest changed
hands usually within one to two years.
Such was the nature of the political environment that the Shah
monarchy created after 1951, in which the deep-seated insecurity
of factional politics prevailed and the government was ever
tainted with the stain of impermanence and discontinuity. Under
such circumstances, no prime minister or government was
allowed to develop a long-lasting framework of policy continuity
for national development and governance. Nor did they have
enough time to establish long-range relations with the bureau-
crats and technocrats or general citizens to rally them around cer-
tain policy agendas. Nepal therefore failed to benefit from any rel-
ative certainty of political winds or any firm direction of economic
development policy and implementation. The country simply
lacked any sense of policy consistency and continuity. The only
thing that was certain and constant was the whimsical change of
government orchestrated by the palace. And a civil society never

emerged to facilitate democratic transition and a steady course of
economic progress.
As a result, the bureaucratic cadres simply turned into a col-
lective body of shuttles, constantly moving from one political
wind and policy agenda to another every so many months, or qui-
etly ignored frequently changing political bosses. In other words,
this critical mass of “worker ants” who form the central nerve of
every government apparatus, who are integral to the efficient
operation of bureaucracy and to the effective execution of gov-
ernment policies, was essentially neutralized or even paralyzed
into inaction and indecision—or simply turned to building their
own little fiefdoms of corruption, generally immune from political
accountabilities and professional responsibilities.
Caught in this triangular vortex of palace, power, and politics,
factional political leaders became the king’s career pawns, to be
moved in and out of the government at his will. Well adapted to
this role, both historically and in the contemporary context, they
were willing participants in this vortex. After all, access to politi-
cal power translated into a profitable profession, a fail-proof and
risk-free source of enormous financial gain for the political clan.
In a country where there are few reliable avenues of economic
advancements and industrial opportunities, the palace-centered
political career was a natural choice. That is, factional leaders
pursued politics as a career not to uplift the nation and its masses
but because it was a proven economic enterprise for personal and
clan gains. So the obvious rhetorical question was, Why bother to
engage in risky industrial and commercial ventures to advance
one’s economic interests when political pawnship achieves the
same objective with minimal capital investment and risk?
As politics became increasingly factionalized and fragmented,
the national interest of Nepal was sacrificed. Economic progress
was suffocated, as was the welfare of the general masses, who had
little say in national political matters. In the absence of democ-
racy, their voices were muted, along with their basic freedoms and
human rights. Politically disfranchised and economically derailed,
the masses were restless. Although the palace had managed to co-
opt the political factions within the panchayat system, those out-
side the system, especially those who adhered to democratic ideals
and party politics to establish a new social order, began to raise

their muted voices against the status quo, demanding democracy.
Frustration and discontent continued to mount, eventually reach-
ing a boiling point in early 1979 when, guided by banned political
party leaders, social agitations and protests were launched
throughout the country (see Kaplan and Shrestha 1982).
In the face of growing protests, King Birendra managed to out-
maneuver the new pro-democracy movement and its party lead-
ers by announcing a referendum in May 1979. The following May,
a national referendum was held to determine the fate of the pan-
chayat system. Because the outcome was essentially predeter-
mined, the panchayat system survived and remained the central
axis of palace politics and power for one more decade. In a way,
the referendum ratified the panchayat system and its legitimacy,
something it clearly lacked previously. But the problem did not
disappear. Given its internal decay and disfunctionality, pan-
chayat’s demise was inevitable. The system had failed on all
fronts. The living conditions of the general masses saw little
upswing. The pro-democracy movement reared its head once
again in early 1990, with a vengeance. Dramatic events unfolded
as a new popular revolution erupted, this time somewhat sud-
denly, but much more fiercely than in the late 1970s.
The ground for the new anti-panchayat and pro-democracy
movement was plowed in mid-January 1990 when the banned
Nepali Congress Party defiantly held a three-day national confer-
ence in Kathmandu to chart a framework for the movement. Feb-
ruary 18, 1990, was chosen as the launching date of what became
commonly known as the “Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy.” Other banned political parties, especially the vari-
ous factions of the Communist party, were invited to join the
movement, and they did. As scheduled, the movement got under-
way on February 18. As the masses joined the movement, it
spread rapidly throughout the country. But the most intense bat-
tles were fought in the heart of Nepal, the Kathmandu Valley,
often right in front of the palace or nearby. Plenty of blood was
shed as scores of people were killed over a period of roughly fifty
days. Shops were closed in support of the movement. Lights were
turned out night after night across the valley as part of the
protest. Nurses and doctors, students and teachers went on
strike. Workers boycotted jobs. Ordinary people joined the

movement in droves, burning copies of the panchayat constitu-
tion. The demand for democracy was intensifying, virtually in
every corner—in urban trenches as well as rural fringes (for
details, see Parajuli 2000, 78–95). This time the movement was
resolute, defiant, and determined to thwart any palace trickeries.
King Birendra finally recognized the gravity of the movement as
he realized the two stark choices confronting him: (1) to con-
tinue to suppress the fiery movement, kill more citizens, and risk
the dismemberment of his dynastic monarchy under his own
watch, or (2) to give up his absolute power and accept constitu-
tional monarchy. He chose the latter. On April 16, he announced
the dissolution of the much-despised panchayat system, and the
disintegration was swift. On April 19, the king invited Krishna
Prasad Bhattarai, a veteran Congress party leader, to form a
coalition interim government for the purpose of drafting a new
constitution and setting the date for a general election to estab-
lish a democratic government.
Return of Democracy and the Multiparty System

And so thirty years after King Mahendra choked the life out of
infant democracy, it was reborn in 1990. To be sure, King Biren-
dra saved the Shah dynasty from extinction, but the form of gov-
ernance changed. The multiparty system was reestablished, and a
new constitution was drafted and enacted. A national election was
held in May 1991. The Nepali Congress Party won 110 out of 205
seats in the House of Representatives and formed the government
with Girija Prasad (G. P.) Koirala (B. P.’s youngest brother) serv-
ing as its prime minister. To the surprise of many pundits and
observers, the Communist Party of Nepal (also known as the
United Marxist-Leninist Party, or UML) came in second with
sixty-nine seats, thus becoming the main opposition party in the
House of Representatives. In addition, three other communist
parties won a total of thirteen seats (see Parajuli 2000).
Before his term expired, Prime Minister Koirala lost the vote of
confidence. Subsequently, a general election was held in 1994. G.
P. Koirala’s party lost. Although the UML fell short of the majority,
it did win the largest number of seats. With its plurality in the
House, the UML was able to form a popularly elected communist

government in 1994 under Prime Minister Man Mohan Adhikari.
It was perhaps the first time a democratic communist government
was established since Marxist President Salvador Allende’s popu-
larly elected government in Chile. This was quite remarkable in
that communism was reeling from global setbacks in the wake of
the Soviet Union’s sudden disintegration. In 1995, it too was dis-
solved as it failed to retain enough support in the House. Since the
first national election following the formation of the interim gov-
ernment in 1990, Nepal has seen nine governments in one decade
under six prime ministers, the latest being that formed under
Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba after King Birendra’s murder.
In the midst of all this governmental flux and temporality, the
Maoist faction of the communist bloc launched a revolutionary
movement in early 1996. Commonly called the people’s war, this
movement has stirred the nation and made notable gains in the
past five years, expanding its guerilla operations from its strong-
hold in the western hills to many other areas. It is estimated that
the Maoists currently exercise control in some 25 percent of the
national territory. There is every indication that the movement is
growing both in strength and territorial expansion. However, in
fall 2001, the Maoists agreed to hold negotiations with the Deuba
government, thus temporarily suspending their revolutionary
campaign. In fact, Prime Minister Deuba’s one key national polit-
ical agenda was to end the surging Maoist movement through
negotiations. However, when the Deuba government refused to
accept the Maoists’ demand to rewrite the constitution, the
Maoists withdrew from any further negotiations and broke off a
four-month cease-fire with a series of attacks on army and police
posts, killing dozens of policemen and soldiers. Following those
attacks, King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency on
November 26, 2001, thus suspending civil liberties, including
freedom of the press as well as freedom of assembly, expression,
and movement. As the king now has total control over the lever-
age of power, Nepal’s nascent democratic experiment has, once
again, been suspended, thus engendering a profound sense of fear
among the people that Nepal might revert to the days of absolute
monarchy. Whatever the eventual outcome of the state of emer-
gency and the ongoing Maoist revolution, the country, as Panday
(1999) aptly suggests, remains cursed with political chaos and

economic disillusionment.
Nepal and the World

Metaphorically, Nepal has been described as a yam between two
rocks. This is a reference to its geographical position of being
hemmed in by India and China. As a result, Nepal has been his-
torically forced into a situation where it had no choice but to be
a proficient diplomatic juggler, constantly striving to maintain a
balance between its two giant neighbors so it can preserve its
national identity and independence. Nepal’s recorded history
reveals that this is an ongoing dilemma that every ruler dating
back to the Licchavi Era (A.D. 400–880) has had to acknowledge
and accommodate in his management of international diplomacy.
In spite of this long history of diplomacy with its immediate
neighbors, Nepal has had virtually no role in geopolitics until the
early 1950s. During the Rana period and the corresponding
British Raj on the Indian subcontinent, Nepal chose isolation as
opposed to a more global role. Besides, given its semicolonial sta-
tus, it could not open any new door of diplomacy to other coun-
tries without a nod from the British. Consequently, Nepal’s link to
the world was through its Gorkha (Gurkha) mercenaries, whom
the British fancied and recruited en masse. The Gorkhas fought
for the British Empire and died for it in droves all the way from
the jungles of Borneo to the islands of Malvinas and across the
Middle East, North Africa, and Europe (Shrestha 1998). Those
who survived returned to the hill villages and valleys with a few
British pounds from monthly pensions. Their homecoming
brought tales of adventure from throughout the world, opening a
little window to the world for their fellow villagers. Now many
Nepalis had something to help them construct their world view—
Gorkha soldiers’ battle tales and travel accounts. But soldiers’ tri-
als and tales are not diplomacies, no matter how captivating.
In essence, then, Nepal’s interaction with the world remained
confined to China (including Tibet), India, and the British
Empire. With the dawn of a new era in the 1950s, however, Nepal
began opening up to the world. Although its international links
continued to grow, it maintained its firm commitment to a policy
of neutrality and nonalignment. This policy was immensely facil-

itated as Nepal joined the Nonalignment Movement, which during
the heat of the cold war had gathered tremendous momentum as
a countervailing force against the two competing forces associated
with the U.S. and Soviet blocs. In 1955 it was admitted to the
United Nations, playing an active role. Nepal also played a signifi-
cant part in the 1985 founding of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which is headquartered in Kath-
mandu. Today, Nepal has established diplomatic relations with
about 100 countries.
In reality, however, Nepal’s diplomatic relations with all other
countries are dwarfed by its ties to India and China, largely
because of its geographical proximity, historical links, and political
necessity to safeguard its national security and independence. Per-
haps the only other nations that come relatively close to Nepal’s
relations with India and China are Great Britain, the United States,
Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and other South Asian countries,
namely SAARC members. Official relations between Nepal and
Britain go back almost 200 years, to 1816, when the Treaty of
Sagauli was signed and the British residency was set up in Kath-
mandu. The United States was one of the very first countries to
extend diplomatic recognition to Nepal following its freedom from
the autocratic Rana rule. The U.S. recognition was a significant
event in that it paved the way for other countries to quickly rec-
ognize the young nation of Nepal, striving to enter the world of
progress after being kept in the dark for more than a century. Fur-
thermore, since the early 1990s, the United States has, in league
with the World Bank, emerged as a dominant force in terms of set-
ting Nepal’s economic agenda and framework. It is largely because
of U.S. and World Bank prodding that Nepal decided to pursue a
policy of economic liberalization in the 1990s.
Notwithstanding some of these issues, the geographic reality is
an overwhelming determinant of Nepal’s link to the world. In this
sense, India tops the list, superceding even China. That is,
although Nepal’s diplomatic relationship with China is at about
the same par as that with India, it cannot compete with the latter
at a broader level. The link simply is not as extensive and expan-
sive with China as it is with India, largely because of its physio-
graphic layout and orientation. Even though Nepali merchants in
the past had established viable trade networks in Tibet, the mas-
sive mountains and treacherous valleys always posed a formida-
ble challenge in terms of transportation and movement. This geo-
historical limitation has not changed much, even with the
Chinese construction of a highway in the 1960s linking Kath-
mandu with Tibet at the border town of Kodari. To this day, most
of the goods coming to Nepal from China are channeled through
the port of Calcutta.
Naturally, therefore, Nepal’s relations to India are far more
extensive and entrenched. This inevitability has been further
reinforced by the fact that, historically, Nepal’s cultural ties with
India go much deeper than with any other country, although
many Nepali politicians are loath to admit it. The population flows
between the two countries are constant, as both sides have main-
tained an open border policy with respect to the cross-border
movement of their citizens. Most important, it is economic rela-
tions that make Nepal and India intrinsically intertwined. This is
particularly true for Nepal for at least two primary reasons. First,
virtually all basic necessities that it cannot produce within its bor-
ders come from India—for example, petroleum, kerosene, salt,
spices, and many other essential products, including raw materi-
als for much of its industrial production. Second, India has a vir-
tual choke hold on Nepal’s transit facilities. As a landlocked coun-
try, Nepal has no direct sea access. It cannot even use the port
facility in Bangladesh, for the two nations are separated by a nar-
row strip of land, about twelve miles wide, that falls within the
Indian territory.
Consequently, the country is almost totally dependent on India
and its diplomatic whims. This suffocating dependency was
nakedly exposed and exploited in 1989, when India imposed a
year-long economic embargo, closing all border entry points
except two and allowing only the minimum amounts of basic
necessities to enter Nepal. Although disagreement over the terms
of the new Trade and Transit Treaty was outwardly evoked as the
reason for the embargo, the underlying cause was rooted in the
Nepali king’s decision to purchase certain military armaments
from China without prior consultation with India. Because India
fully realizes Nepal’s extreme vulnerability and dependency, it
never ceases to cast its ominous shadow over the Nepali regime. It
is precisely this “bully” attitude and behavior on the part of India

that engenders a profound sense of resentment across Nepal. But,
at the same time, most Nepalis realize the position they are in;
they know there is little they can do to change it fundamentally.
So, when their frustration builds up and boils, they tend to vent it
out through anti-India demonstrations and protests, shouting a few
nasty slogans in front of the Indian embassy and even boycotting,
occasionally, Hindi movies or burning effigies of Indian leaders. At
the end, however, the practical reality sets in, the steam of anger
evaporates, life reverts to the normal routine, and most Nepalis
grudgingly bite the hard bullet. And, of course, they go back to
watching Hindi movies, which, somehow, always seem to act as a
palliative for social ills as well as diplomatic ill feelings. Now that is
recreation with a diplomatic touch.
ETHNIC GROUPS, CASTES,

AND SOCIAL CLASSES
Ethnic Groups
Nepal is an ethnically diverse and complex society. The people of
Nepal can be classified into three broad ethnic groups in terms of
their ancestral origin. In addition to those whose origins can be
traced to India and Tibet, there is a sizeable pool of indigenous
people. Whereas the Indo-Nepali group inhabits the more fertile
lower hills, river valleys, and Tarai plains, the Tibeto-Nepali pop-
ulation mostly occupies the higher hills. The indigenous people
comprise a number of tribal communities, such as the Tharus and
the Dhimals of the Tarai. The Newar group that consists mostly of
the original inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley is also consid-
ered by some scholars as being indigenous to Nepal. It is believed
that indigenous people and communities predate the advent of
Indo-Nepali and Tibeto-Nepali people.
Within the Indo-Nepali segment, at least two distinct categories
can be discerned. The first category includes those who fled India
and moved to the safe sanctuaries of the Nepal hills several hun-
dred years ago, in the wake of the Muslim invasions of northern
India. The hill group of Indian origin—popularly known as the
pahari (hill dwellers)—includes descendants of high-caste Hin-
An ancient stone sculpture of a Hindu goddess in a public square in Patan.

This sculpture demonstrates the artistic achievements of the Newar group, the
indigenous population of the Kathmandu Valley. The Newars are the source of
Nepal’s civilization and urban culture. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)
dus, mostly of Brahman and Kshatriya (Chhetri) status. They

have spread throughout Nepal with the exception of the areas
immediately adjacent to the northern border. They usually con-
stitute a significant portion of the local elites and are frequently
the largest landowners in their local communities. This segment
of the Indo-Nepali population, at the apex of which stands the
royal family, has played the most dominant role in local as well as
national politics and governance (see Joshi and Rose 1966). Other
ethnic groups, including those of Indian origin that settled in the
Tarai and, with some exception of Kathmandu, Newars, have been
peripheral to the political power structure controlled by the nexus
of high-caste and dominant-class elites. All of these people,
regardless of their specific geographical locations, have adopted
Nepali as their official and vernacular language, which, by the
way, is the country’s official language.
The second group of Indo-Nepali people primarily includes
Tarai inhabitants excluding hill migrants in the region. Generally
identified as the madhesi, they relocated to Nepal from northern
India. As Regmi (1984) notes, most of them were actually encour-
aged by the government of Nepal or its agents to move into the
Tarai for settlement during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, when the country was attempting to expand its revenue
base through agricultural land settlement. Although some of those
Indian migrants later became large landowners in the Tarai, most
of them remain peasants with small tracts of land or no land at all.
They belong to different subethnic groups with their own respec-
tive dialects as the primary medium of communication. Although
their facility with Nepali has greatly improved over the years, they
use it only when necessary.
Most of the Indo-Nepali people are primarily agriculturalists,
although a majority of them also rely on other activities to pro-
duce supplementary income. They generally raise some farm ani-
mals, particularly water buffalo, cows, goats, and sheep, for
domestic purposes. The paharis (hill group) traditionally have
occupied the vast majority of civil service positions since the rise
of the Shan dynasty. As a result, they have managed to dominate
and control bureaucracy to their advantage. It was not until the
late 1980s that a prime minister came from the nonpahari seg-
ment of the population. Despite some loosening of the pahari
domination of the bureaucracy in recent years, a 1991 newspaper

report summarized in the Nepal Press Digest revealed that 80
percent of the posts in the civil service, the army, and the police
still were held by the Brahmans and Chhetris of the hills, who
comprised far less than 50 percent of the population.
As already noted, unlike the Indo-Nepali population, the
Tibeto-Nepali people are generally found in higher altitudes. This
discernable altitudinal pattern of geographical distribution of
these groups is mainly attributed to the directional origins of their
early migrations. Because the Tibeto-Nepali people originally
moved into Nepal from the north, they populated the higher
reaches of the hills, whereas the Indo-Nepalis with their origin in
India naturally gravitated toward the lower hills and valleys (see
Gaige 1975). It is believed that the migrants from India brought
with them a relatively more advanced form of agricultural tech-
nology that allowed them to exploit land more intensively,
thereby increasing its productive capacity to support a larger pop-
ulation. This technological advantage also allowed them to estab-
lish their social, economic, and political dominance over Nepal.
The Tibeto-Nepali population is composed of several subethnic
groups (see Bista 1967). Included among them are the Sherpa,
Gurung, Rai, Limbu, Magar, Thakali, and Tamang tribes, who are
widely known and studied. One notable ethnic feature of their
cultural landscape is their communal settlement patterns. Unlike
the Indo-Nepali people, who are scattered throughout the country
and widely mixed, these subethnic groups are concentrated in
their own specific geographic pockets across the hill region from
east to west, that is, each within the domain of its own communal
space and within a relatively self-contained community. For
example, the Sherpas occupy the northeast, mainly around Mt.
Everest. To the west of the Sherpa domain are found separate Rai
and Limbu congregations. Then, moving westward along the hills,
we see concentrations of Tamang populations, followed by several
pockets of the Gurung tribe in the west-central hills. The Magars
are also found in these hills as well as further west. The Gurungs
and Magars apparently cover the largest geographical areas with
respect to their territorial dispersal (see Karan and Ishii 1994).
Yet, communally, they are concentrated in their specific geo-
graphical pockets. The Thakalis, a highly entrepreneurial tribe
A Tibeto-Nepali man enjoying a puff of pipe tobacco while taking a rest. This
picture was taken along a trail in the hills. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)
once well-known for their Himalayan trade, have settled along the
upper reaches of the Kali Gandaki river basin, which served as a
leading trade route between Tibet and India until the former’s
absorption by China in the late 1950s. Further north to their
domain is found the Bhote tribe located in the Trans-Himalayan
zone near the Tibetan border. The Gurungs, Rais, Limbus, and
Magars are renowned as the martial tribes of Nepal; they are the
so-called Gurkhas (Gorkhas) in the British military parlance and
lore. In a way, they are mercenaries whose blood has flooded and
fertilized the British empire across the globe, from the jungles of
Borneo to the islands of Malvinas (Falkland).
Most of the Tibeto-Nepali groups traditionally could be consid-
ered agro-pastoralists. Because their physical environment
offered only limited agricultural possibilities, they were almost
forced to rely more on herding and pastoral activities than on
crop farming. The higher the altitude, the harsher the climatic
and physiographic condition. As a result, agricultural opportuni-
ties are quite limited. Perhaps the most affected Tibeto-Nepali
groups are the Bhote, Manange, and Sherpa communities located
in the lower flanks of the Himalayas. In addition to pastoralism,
they used to participate in seasonal trading activity to supplement
their income and food supply (Furer-Haimendorf 1975). Those
inhabiting the midhills—for instance, the Gurung, Magar, Rai, and
Limbu groups—depend on both farming and herding. These hills
are relatively more suitable for agriculture. And, as already
remarked, they are also famous for their mercenary service in the
Indian and British militaries.
The Caste System

Like religion, the caste system is a fundamental feature of Nepal
as it plays a central role in one’s life from birth to death. For
example, it has direct bearings on who one marries or can marry,
on one’s social status and mobility, and on educational opportu-
nities and access. Even though its influence has gradually waned
over time, especially in cities, its undercurrent still runs deep.
Modeled after the ancient and orthodox Brahmanic system of
the Indian plains, the caste system is commonly viewed as a mul-
tifaceted status hierarchy composed of all members of society,
A Damai sewing clothes on an old-fashioned sewing machine. The Damais

are a professional tailor caste, which was once treated as untouchable.
with each individual ranked within the fourfold Hindu caste

(varna or color) divisions (Bishop 1990). Some extend this four-
tiered hierarchy to add the Untouchables—the socially polluted.
Within this preordained construct, the caste is an indelible
imprint of one’s identity and status. Like a birthmark, one is born
with it, lives with it, and dies with it.
The four castes are the Brahman (priests and scholars), Ksha-
triya (or Chhetri, rulers and warriors), Vaisya (merchants and
traders), and Sudra (artisans and laborers). Within each group are
many hierarchically ranked subcastes. Based on the Hindu ethos,
the caste system finds its immediate application among Nepal’s
Indo-Nepali people, the primary adherents of Hinduism. Although
the Newars, who tend to follow both Hinduism and Buddhism,
have adopted the caste system, they do not strictly uphold the
four divisions. According to the Hindu system of castes, the
Newars technically fall in the Vaisya group because of their tradi-
tional professional role. But they have their own parallel hierar-
chy of castes, with a distinct priestly group that is equivalent to
the Brahman caste. In both systems, each caste (jati) is regarded
as an endogamous group in which membership is both hereditary
and permanent. One way to change one’s caste status is to
undergo Sanskritization, a process that can be achieved by
migrating to a new area and assuming a new caste or via marriage
across the caste line. Although the former is a self-proclaimed
process, the latter is normally predefined and can lead to either
upgrading or downgrading of one’s caste, depending on the
spouse’s caste. However, given the rigidity of the caste system,
intercaste marriage carries a social stigma, especially when it
takes place between two castes at the extreme ends of the social
spectrum.
At the core of the caste structure is a rank order of values
bound up in concepts of ritual status, purity, and pollution. Con-
sequently, caste is used to determine an individual’s behavior,
obligations, and expectations. All the social, economic, religious,
legal, and political activities are prescribed by sanctions that
determine access to land, position of political power, and com-
mand of human labor. Within this constrictive system, wealth,
political power, high rank, and privilege converge. Hereditary
occupational specialization is a common feature. Yet it is perti-
nent to bear in mind that caste is functionally significant only

when viewed in a local context and at a particular time. The
assumed correlation between the caste hierarchy and the socioe-
conomic class hierarchy does not always hold. Because of numer-
ous institutional changes over the years and increased dilution (or
expansion) of the caste hierarchy stemming from intercaste mar-
riages, many poor high-caste and rich low-caste households can
be found in Nepali society.
Although the footprint of the caste system can be seen in almost
every facet of life, compared to the Indo-Nepali population, the
question of caste is less ingrained in Tibeto-Nepali communities,
which usually follow the Tantric version of Buddhism, mixed with
some aspects of Hinduism. Insofar as they accept the caste-based
notions of social ranks imposed on them by the Hindu system, the
Tibeto-Nepalis tend not only to see themselves at a higher level
than do the Indo-Nepalis and Newars but also differ as to ranking
among themselves. For instance, the Rai tribe’s assumption of
their caste superiority over the Magar and Gurung tribes is not
accepted by the two latter groups. Moreover, the status of a partic-
ular group is apt to vary from place to place, depending on its rel-
ative number, wealth, and local power. Similar to the Newar caste
system, Tibeto-Nepali subethnic groups have their own internal
social hierarchies, although rarely as rigidly delineated as that
found among the Newars and Indo-Nepali population.
Social Classes and Stratification

In terms of differences in wealth and access to political power, the
people of Nepal can be divided into three categories: (1) a small but
powerful ruling elite class; (2) a growing class of government offi-
cials, large landholders, and merchants; and (3) the large majority
of peasants and workers. These divisions are descriptive, func-
tional class categories rather than social class entities based on the
Marxian concept of the social relations of production. In a way, all
three classes are a long continuum in Nepal’s social structure.
Even though the peasant population as a whole faces similar
economic and technological circumstances, it contains several
strata in terms of landholdings, relative economic dependence,
independence, or social status. However, landholding is the pri-
An educated and upwardly mobile urban family. Ownership of a motor-

cycle is the first step of urban prosperity. A higher step or status symbol is
ownership of an automobile. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)
mary determinant of one’s economic position and social standing

in Nepal. Although those with small or no landholdings are eco-
nomically dependent and vulnerable, relatively large landholders
both enjoy economic security and control local social institutions
and political processes. The social, economic, and educational
advantages of this segment make its members relatively homoge-
neous in terms of their shared interest. They generally aspire to
achieve a middle- or elite-class status. Numerically, however, this
group is quite small. Small landholders constitute the largest bulk
of the rural population in Nepal.
The smallest and least diverse of the three social classes is the
ruling elite, largely composed of high-caste, educated paharis, usu-
ally from the Brahman and Chhetri castes. Moreover, its number
is relatively constant. Unlike this group, the second social class—
composed largely of bureaucrats—has witnessed a steady growth
in its number. This is largely attributed to the continued expansion
of Nepali bureaucracy and development activities. In the absence
of employment opportunities in the industrial and commercial
sectors, the expansion of bureaucracy has emerged as a path of
least resistance to absorb an increasing number of the educated
class. Moderate growth in the service sector over the past thirty
years also has contributed to an increased pool of this class.
Since the early 1980s, many people with a college or university
level education, namely those residing in the Kathmandu Valley,
have discovered a second employment outlet. Development con-
sultant firms and associated services have sprouted throughout
Kathmandu. Because of the growing pressure on foreign donors to
hire Nepali consultants for development feasibility and evaluation
projects, these firms have been able to tap into a large pool of for-
eign aid money and have generated a measurable number of jobs.
This opportunity has allowed many of Nepal’s more educated per-
sons to attain a middle-class status.
RELIGION AND SOCIETY

Religion occupies an integral position in Nepali life and society.
Most dominant and visible within the realms of religious faiths is
Hinduism. This is hardly surprising, because Nepal is the only
constitutionally declared Hindu state in the world. There is, how-
Kumari, a living goddess, as devotees worship her in Kathmandu

ever, a great deal of intermingling of Hindu and Buddhist beliefs in

terms of daily practice. Nonetheless, many individuals regarded as
Hindus could easily be called Buddhists. The fact that Hindus
worship at Buddhist temples and Buddhists worship at Hindu
temples clearly explains why adherents of the two dominant
groups in Nepal have never engaged in any overt religious con-
flicts. Because of such dual faith practices, the differences
between Hindus and Buddhists in Nepal have been, in general,
very subtle and academic in nature. However, according to the
1991 census, 88 percent of the Nepali people identified them-
selves as Hindus. Buddhists and Muslims comprise roughly 7 and
3 percent, respectively. Most of the small remainder are Chris-
tians, who have a visible and active presence despite their minor-
ity status. The primacy of Hinduism in the census largely stems
from its status as the national religion. When asked about their
faith, people tend to identify Hinduism. This is particularly true
among individuals who follow tenets of both Hinduism and Bud-
dhism. Furthermore, by identifying themselves as Hindus they
reduce the probability of being discriminated against.
The geographical distribution of religious groups reveals a pre-
ponderance of Hindus, accounting for at least 87 percent of the
population in every region. Geographically, the lower hills are
heavily influenced by Hinduism whereas the upper hills and
trans-Himalayan areas are predominated by Buddhism. Large
pockets of Buddhists are also found in the eastern hills, the Kath-
mandu Valley, and the central Tarai; in each area about 10 per-
cent of the people are Buddhist. Buddhism is relatively more com-
mon among the Newar and Tibeto-Nepali groups. Among the
Tibeto-Nepali, those most influenced by Hinduism are the Magars
and Rais. Hindu influence was less prominent among the Gurung,
Limbu, Bhote, and Thakali groups, who continue to employ Bud-
dhist monks for their religious ceremonies.
Hinduism
Hinduism generally is regarded as the oldest formal religion in the
world. Unlike other world religions, Hinduism has no single founder,
nor has it ever been missionary in orientation. It is believed that in
about 1200 B.C.—earlier by some accounts—the Vedas, a body of
hymns originating in northern India, were produced; these texts

form the theological and philosophical precepts of Hinduism.
Hindus believe that the absolute (the totality of existence,
including God, humans, and the universe) is too vast to be con-
tained within a single set of beliefs. A highly diverse and complex
religion, its religious practices tend to differ somewhat from group
to group and place to place. The average Hindu does not need any
systematic formal creed in order to practice his or her religion;
Hindus only need to comply with the customs of their family and
social groups. This is partly related to the fact that Hinduism is
polytheistic. It incorporates many gods and goddesses with differ-
ent functions and powers. But they are all considered merely dif-
ferent manifestations of a single underlying divinity that is
expressed as a Hindu trinity of the religion’s three primary figures:
Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, respectively personifying the three
universal roles of creation, preservation, and destruction. Vishnu
and Shiva, or some of their numerous avatars (incarnations), are
most widely worshiped, and their prescribed roles are often inter-
changeable, for they can function both as protector and destroyer,
depending on the context and the demand of time.
One fundamental precept is that of dharma, loosely defined as
religious acts and obligations. It holds that individuals should play
their proper role in society as prescribed by their dharma. The
caste system has been incorporated as an integral part of its social
expression. That is, each person is born into a particular caste,
whose traditional occupation is graded according to the degree of
inherent caste purity and impurity. Dharma cannot be viewed in
isolation, however. So the other side of dharma is karma (univer-
sal justice or the outcome of dharmic acts and duties). The belief
is that the consequence of every good or bad action must be fully
realized. In other words, one’s dharmic act dictates his or her
karmic manifestation, and one’s karmic act or outcome reflects
his or her dharmic deeds and behavior. The two are, therefore,
absolutely inseparable. Another basic concept is that of samsara,
the transmigration of souls; rebirth is required by karma in order
that the consequences of action be fulfilled. The role an individ-
ual must play throughout his or her life is fixed by his or her good
and evil actions in previous existence. It is only when the indi-
vidual soul sees beyond the mist of maya—illusion or the belief in
the appearance of things—that it is able to realize its identity with

the impersonal, transcendental reality (world soul) and then
escape from the otherwise endless cycle of rebirth to be absorbed
into the world soul. This ultimate release is known as moksha
(similar to nirvana in Buddhism and salvation in Christianity).
Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, is regarded as the ninth
avatar of Vishnu. Some Hindus regard Christ as the tenth avatar;
others regard Kalkin (or Kalki) as the final avatar who is yet to
come to rescue the world from total abyss, a redemptive concep-
tion of the world that has its parallel in the apocalyptic thinking
in Christianity. These avatars are believed to descend upon earth
from time to time to restore peace, order, and justice, to save
humanity from injustice and miseries. The very notion or reason
for their arrival thus signals a phase of destruction in order to res-
cue humanity from its own excesses and injustices. Therefore,
Hinduism inherently entails an inseparable link between destruc-
tion and preservation (construction). There is, in other words, no
construction without destruction. So it is tenable to pronounce
that at the core of Hinduism resides the fundamental notion of
creative destruction, a process that may involve a long time. Time
as related to a given avatar is thus conceived in epochal terms, or
what the Hindus call yuga. So the arrival Buddha symbolized the
Buddha yuga (or of Jesus as the Christ yuga), that is, his time to
right the wrongs of the world.
Buddhism
Buddhism has its origin in the teachings of Buddha, a Sakya
prince whose birth name was Siddhartha Gautama. Born in 563
B.C. in Lumbini, located in Nepal’s central Tarai, he was educated
in the Hindu tradition. Frustrated with Hindu orthodoxy and dis-
turbed by endless human sufferings and earthly trappings, Sid-
dhartha renounced worldly life when he was twenty-nine and
spent the next six years in meditation. Finally, he attained
enlightenment. Thereafter, known as the Buddha, or the Enlight-
ened One, he devoted the remainder of his life to preaching his
doctrine, thus laying the pillars of Buddhism.
The Four Noble Truths summarize the Buddha’s analysis of the
human condition and the solution he found for the problems of
A village temple in the hills against the backdrop of Machhapuchhre (fish

tail mountain), which is renowned as the most beautiful Himalayan peak
in Nepal. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)
life. The first truth is that life is inherently imperfect and sorrow-
ful, and that misery is not merely a result of occasional frustration
of desire or misfortune but is a quality permeating human experi-
ence. The second truth says the cause of sorrow is desire (similar
to maya), the emotional involvement with existence that leads
from rebirth to rebirth through the operation of karma. In other
words, it is desire that tempts people to commit misdeeds (un-
dharmic acts) which result in rebirth. The third truth is that the sor-
row can be ended only by eliminating desire. The fourth truth sets
forth the Eightfold Path leading to elimination of desire, rebirth,
and sorrow—or to nirvana, a state of bliss and selfless enlighten-
ment in which the soul is free from desire and the cycle of rebirth.
The religions of Nepal occupy center stage in Nepali life and soci-
ety. From one’s birth till death, religious ceremonies and rituals
form a seamless chain. In addition to birth, death, wedding, plant-
ing, and harvesting rituals and ceremonies, there are many other
religious festivities in which people participate. Virtually every
occasion requires a religious sanction or blessing. Some ceremonies
are strictly family matters, whereas others are performed collec-
tively in public settings. The people of Nepal annually celebrate
numerous public festivals keyed to various seasonal occasions and
events. The two biggest Hindu festivals are the Dashain (or Bijaya
Dashami) and Tihar (also Deepawali or Diwali), which are cele-
brated about a month apart, usually in October and November, fol-
lowing the rice harvest. People also go to temples routinely—in
many cases, every morning before breakfast—to worship their
favorite gods or goddesses. Within Buddhism, Buddha Jayanti
(Buddha’s birthday) is the most significant celebration. Although
there is no public celebration of Christmas in Nepal, it is lately
becoming increasingly commercialized as a festivity, specifically in
Kathmandu, where some merchants display Christmas decorations
to attract Western tourists, travelers, and expatriates.
EDUCATION
Education under Rana Rule

The Rana rulers feared an educated public. This fear also was held
by Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher Rana, who established Tri-
Chandra College in 1918 and named it after himself. During the

inauguration of the college, Chandra Shamsher lamented that its
opening was the ultimate death knell to Rana autocracy. He per-
sonally felt responsible for the downfall of the Rana rule, and his
words proved prophetic in that thirty-three years later the Ranas’
political power crumbled (Sharma 1990).
The privileged access of the members of the higher castes and
wealthier economic strata to education was for centuries a distin-
guishing feature of Nepali society. The Ranas kept education the
exclusive prerogative of the ruling elite; the rest of the population
remained largely illiterate. The Ranas were opposed to any form
of public schooling for the people, although they emphasized for-
mal instruction for their own children to prepare them for a place
in the government.
The founder of the Rana regime, Jang Bahadur, chose to give
his children an English education rather than the traditional reli-
giously oriented training within the Sanskritic tradition. In 1853
Jang Bahadur engaged an English tutor to hold classes for his and
other Rana children in his palace. This act tipped the balance in
favor of English education and established its supremacy over the
traditional type of Sanskrit-based education. Today, the status of
English education has been elevated even higher relative to tradi-
tional education.
Jang Bahadur’s school was eventually converted into the Dur-
bar (palace) High School, again with the sole purpose of educat-
ing all Rana children in a formal setting. A brief shift in the Rana
education policy came in 1901, when Prime Minister Dev
Shamsher Rana called for sweeping education reforms. He pro-
posed a system of universal public primary education, using
Nepali as the language of instruction, and opening the Durbar
High School to non-Rana children. So unpopular was Dev
Shamsher’s policy among the conservative faction of the Rana
clan that he was deposed within a few months after becoming
prime minister. His call for reforms did not entirely disappear,
however. A few Nepali-language primary schools scattered around
the country remained open, and the practice of admitting a few
middle- and low-caste children to Durbar High School continued.
Before World War II, several new English middle and high schools
were founded in Patan, Biratnagar, and elsewhere, and a girls’ high
school was opened in Kathmandu. In the villages, public respect

for education was increasing, largely as a result of the influence of
returning Gorkha (Gurkha) soldiers, many of whom had learned
to read and write while serving in the British army. Some retired
soldiers began giving rudimentary education to children in their
villages. Some members of the high-caste, elite families sent their
children to Patna University and Banaras Hindu University in
India for higher academic or technical training. It was, in fact,
some of those students who launched anti-Rana movements, pro-
vided revolutionary cadres, and finally began the revolution that
ultimately toppled Rana autocracy.
Education since 1951

When the Rana rule ended in 1951, Nepal had merely 310 pri-
mary and middle schools, eleven high schools, two colleges, one
normal school, and one special technical school, but no univer-
sity for graduate education. In the early 1950s, the national lit-
eracy rate was 5 percent: 10 percent among males and 1 percent
among females. Since then, Nepal has come a long way, making
education available to the general public. The historical monop-
oly of education by members of the wealthier and higher-caste
groups has gradually diminished. Schools and colleges are
presently open to all, and enrollment figures are rising. The long-
standing prejudice against the education of girls is gradually
falling, as verified by their increasing enrollments in schools and
colleges. Yet there is no denying that quality education still
remains a social preserve of the wealthy and powerful, namely
landlords, businessmen, government leaders, and other elite
members of the society. This is largely due to the fact that they
are the only ones who can easily afford and are likely to pursue
higher education for their children.
Although there has been a consistent growth in the literacy
rates as well as the number of educational institutions over the
years, Nepal has a long way to go. Its average literacy rate in 1997
was 53 percent. Only 38 percent of the female population is con-
sidered literate. What is even more dismaying is that the quality of
education seems to be on the decline while the number of schools,
both public and private, continues to climb. The pool of qualified
teachers and professors is shrinking, and those who are well qual-
ified exhibit little commitment to educating their students.
Because the pay scale is quite low, many professors are also
engaged in other income-generating activities, thus treating their
profession as a supplementary source of income. Their overall
morale is low. The research focus or tradition is virtually absent,
mainly because there are few research facilities available to pro-
fessors in Nepal. Further aggravating this damning situation is the
general lack of students’ devotion to their education. As previously
mentioned, schools and colleges are frequently closed due to
strikes. And cheating is rampant at all levels and everywhere. In
short, the education system of Nepal is in dire need of fundamental
repairs. Whereas Nepal’s poor and less wealthy families are
entrapped in such a broken system with few viable alternatives, the
wealthy and powerful send their children overseas—to the United
States, Britain, and other advanced countries—for quality educa-
tion. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Nepal’s educational
access and quality remain largely polarized along the class divide.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, in spite of the return of democracy, Nepal remains
paralyzed in that its economic outlook is frighteningly stagnant
and its social institutions archaic and feudalistic in nature.
Attempts at democracy have been repeatedly thwarted, resulting
in abuses of power rather than empowerment of the people and
reconstruction of the nation. Opposition for the sake of opposi-
tion has become the name of the political game. The caste system
still takes its toll on individual and social advancements as it
severely limits access to education and other opportunities. Fuel-
ing this already gloomy scenario is the feudalistic class structure
that continues to dash every hope of social transformation and
progress within Nepal. The education system is deteriorating to
the point where serious reform will require a massive local and
national commitment that are unlikely under present conditions.
These are also the very institutions that join forces to keep
women, who constitute 50 percent of the nation’s social wealth, at
the fringes of viable education, tangible social power, and dynamic
political play.
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Losing Shangri-La?” Education about Asia 3, 1: 11–18.
Nepali Society and
Contemporary Issues
Nepal is a living contradiction. Still chained to its feudal past, its

present is staggering in the midst of broken agendas and lost
opportunities. What one can observe, in essence, is a great deal of
both persistence and change—persistence of many traditional
values, and change in attitude and behavior brought on by the
demands of time and Western influence. Some of these contra-
dictory societal and cultural issues are discussed in this chapter.
Although their current treatment is somewhat limited in scope,
these issues are portrayed in a manner that should assist readers
in gaining an informed understanding of the people, society, and
culture of contemporary Nepal.
FAMILY AND KINSHIP NETWORKS

Family—or paribar, as it is called—is the central axis of social
and economic life in Nepal. As the family traditionally consists of
a patrilineally extended household, every aspect of life and living
is a family affair. Decisions are made in consideration of what is
good for the family and its honor. For many, the extended family
serves as a vehicle to strengthen their family heritage, sociocultu-
ral bonds, and kinship networks. The extended family should not,
however, be construed as a tightly woven, unyielding fabric of
family life. The point is that many extended families break apart
as sons separate from parents and brothers from each other. At
the time of separation, the family property is equally divided
among the sons. If parents are alive, they each receive a share.
Family separation generally occurs in cases where the head of the
household is less assertive and domineering, when the father dies,
or when the sons marry. Generally, sons marry in the same order
they are born, meaning the first-born son marries first and the
youngest last. Unmarried sons normally do not separate from
107
their parents; if the parents are deceased, unmarried sons usually

stay with their older brothers. Family separation always results in
a division of family landholdings. Sometimes, family separation
and resulting land fragmentation turn into bitter family feuds and
legal battles.
It should be noted that the family as a social unit in Nepal is
coming under increasing pressure, both internally and externally.
Internally, pressure builds as a result of rapid population growth.
As the family size expands in the absence of commensurate
growth of family resources, the pressure mounts and the fre-
quency of intrafamily disputes increases, often the outcome being
separation. What is paradoxical about this tendency is that
already limited family resources are further reduced as they are
parceled out among separating family units. As a result, these
families become susceptible to debt and subsequent land sales.
This is a historical pattern that continues to this day. Externally,
rising pressure is coming from increasing migration and modern-
ization. Although migration is often viewed as a release valve for
mounting population pressure at the household level or as a cal-
culated plan to enhance the family resource base, it also tends to
trigger separation. To illustrate, when grown-up sons move to
cities and come in contact with other migrants who are also geo-
graphically detached from their families and who have developed
individualistic inclinations associated with modernization, their
sense of family ties and obligations gradually erodes. The increas-
ing flows of rural-to-urban migration have, therefore, intensified
this external pressure.
Beyond the immediate family, there exists a larger kinship
network at a village or community level, or even at the ethnic
level. Such a network normally involves sharing food, informa-
tion, and helping each other out at times of need. Also included in
this broader network is what can be loosely defined as a mutual
support system, one in which people help their kin or village folks
find employment. This type of network is particularly active and
important within the framework of migration. Although farming is
still the most dominant economic activity among rural Nepalis,
migration is an integral part of life for countless hill residents; it
has increasingly become a critical supplementary source of sub-
sistence for many. Not surprisingly, therefore, villagers frequently
——Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues——109
encourage some of their children to migrate in search of civil serv-

ice, army, and other employment opportunities in urban areas
within the country or in India and other foreign countries. In
other words, migration as a household economic strategy is
widely practiced throughout the hills because it serves as a safety
valve to mitigate growing population and employment pressures.
As it generates cash incomes, it often helps households alleviate
undue economic crises.
But where one decides to migrate depends, to a large extent,
on where family members, relatives, and members of one’s com-
munity or ethnic group have already gone and established them-
selves. This is particularly true of those migrants who follow the
trails of pioneer migrants or who need to tap into some form of
networks, a process that helps to continually expand the channels
of migratory networks. Additionally, such a process reinforces the
local kinship or ethnic networks back in Nepali villages and com-
munities. In the absence of such networks, a gainful migration
experience in the new place (destination) turns into an uphill bat-
tle. By implication, then, those who are outside the network are
entirely left to their own personal abilities, endeavors, and initia-
tives to make it in the new environment.
Furthermore, the kinship network at the village level acts as
an important social framework of meeting farm labor needs,
especially during the planting and harvesting seasons, when
labor shortages are common. The village itself, in other words,
functions as a broader unit of kinship network that is required
for social existence and collective communal life. The commu-
nity as an overarching entity is further heightened when it is
viewed in light of the fact that in a society like Nepal, life is one
long chain of interdependencies, where individual families can-
not be seen as completely separate from their community. So vil-
lages or communities are both geographical settlements with a
residential base and social units with shared cultural values and
mutually interdependent collective existence and identity. Vil-
lagers periodically pool their resources and labor together to
implement village-level projects such as building irrigation
ditches or channels or constructing school buildings, drinking
water facilities, trails, and bridges. If a household cannot afford
to hire farm labor, it usually relies on the mutual labor-sharing
system called parma, which allows villagers to exchange labor

for labor at times of need.
WOMEN’S STATUS IN SOCIETY

Nowhere is the Hindu paradox much more vividly demonstrated
than in the arena of women’s status in society. On the one hand,
Hinduism features highly revered goddess figures, for example,
Durga (goddess of power), Kali (goddess of power), Laxmi (god-
dess of wealth), and Saraswoti (goddess of learning and wis-
dom)—all of equal status and power vis-à-vis god figures. The two
biggest and most important Hindu festivals—Dashain and Tihar—
revolve around goddesses. Dashain is celebrated over a period of
ten consecutive days in honor of Goddess Durga for her victory
over a demon named Mahisur. And Laxmi puja (worship of God-
dess Laxmi) takes center stage during the Tihar festival that lasts
3–4 days. On the other hand, as a Hindu society, Nepal treats
women as if they are male properties, born to serve men at their
pleasure. In fact, the practice of polygamy (which seems to be on
the decline in Nepal) was directly linked to the fact that wives
were viewed as free household labor. That is why it used to be
quite common among males of landed families to have several
wives. At the opposite end is found polyandry. In some mountain
communities where resources are very limited and population
control is a survival imperative, polyandry is still frequently prac-
ticed to keep household size relatively small and properties con-
solidated (Haddix and Gurung 1999).
The United Nations has defined the status of women in the
context of their access to knowledge, economic resources, and
political power as well as their personal autonomy in the process
of decisionmaking. When Nepali women’s status is analyzed in
this light, the picture is generally gloomy. There is no denying that
in this rigidly patriarchal society, women are regarded as subor-
dinate to men, virtually in every facet of life and institutional set-
ting. Women’s relative status, however, varies from one ethnic
group to another. The status of women in Tibeto-Nepali commu-
nities is relatively better than that of pahari and Newari women.
Women from the low-caste groups also enjoy relatively more
social autonomy and freedom of geographical mobility than do
An urban woman unhusking rice in a traditional manner (Courtesy of

Nanda R. Shrestha)
pahari and Newari women, for the former are far less confined by
puritanical values than are the latter. Upper-class families also
would restrict the geographical mobility of their unmarried
daughters to protect their complexions from being darkened by
sun exposure. Nonetheless, similar to the Confucian system,
Nepali women’s social status generally is directly related to that of
their men—that is, with the father as a daughter, with the hus-
band as a wife, and with the son(s) as a mother.
Yet it is important to clarify that the universe of women’s sta-
tus in Nepal is, by no means, unidimensional or unidirectional.
There are at least two distinct terrains of women’s status: the pub-
lic space and the domestic space. What was described above is a
picture that generally captures the reality prevailing in the public
space, where women’s status is quite diminutive. But in the
domestic space, women’s status takes on greater assertiveness
and complexity (Acharya 1994). Within the household, the senior
female member usually plays a commanding role by controlling
resources, making crucial planting and harvesting decisions, and
determining the expenses and budget allocations. In general,
therefore, wives are the managers of the domestic front. This is
particularly true in those communities where male outmigration
is common, for example, in the hills. While husbands are away,
virtually every decisionmaking task, not to mention the day-to-
day chores, falls on wives (Shrestha and Conway 1998). If a
household consists of different hierarchical echelons of female
members, a mother-in-law normally exercises significant control
over daughters-in-law, often more than she does on her own
daughters. In fact, family tensions sometimes are directly tied to
wives’ influence on their husbands regarding family matters, often
prompting married sons to separate from their parents and broth-
ers. Separation allows wives not only to be freed from the vise of
their mothers-in-law and the shadow of other family members but
also to exercise greater leverage over their own family resources
and affairs.
On the whole, however, few would dispute that women’s lives
remain centered on their traditional roles, that is, taking care of
most household chores, fetching water and animal fodder, and
doing farm work (see Des Chene 1997). Restrictions on their geo-
graphical mobility naturally limit their access to markets, employ-
ment, education, health care, and local government services. Mal-

nutrition and poverty hit women hardest. Female children usually
are given less food than are male children, especially when the
family experiences food shortages. Women usually work harder
than men. One exception is that women from high-class families
have maids to take care of most household chores and other
menial work and, thus, work far less than women in lower socioe-
conomic brackets (Upadhya 1996).
With respect to day-to-day operations, the economic contribu-
tion of women is substantial. But it is often devalued or goes unno-
ticed because their traditional role is taken for granted. Their con-
tributions are seldom included in any economic calculations.
Furthermore, daughters are denied rights to family properties
(namely land) unless they remain unmarried until they are thirty-
five years old, the primary reason being that they become
detached from their parental families upon marriage. Only there-
after can they claim their share of family properties in amounts
equal to their brothers’ shares, for they are considered to have
surpassed the marriageable age. Daughters-in-law are entitled to
their husbands’ shares after they are widowed. When employed,
their wages are substantially lower than those paid to men. In
most rural areas, their employment outside the household is con-
fined to planting, weeding, and harvesting. In urban areas, they
are employed in domestic and traditional jobs. Within the gov-
ernment sector, they are often relegated to low-level positions
such as secretarial or clerical jobs.
One tangible measure of women’s status is their educational
attainment. Although the constitution offers women equal educa-
tional rights, many social, economic, and cultural factors impede
girls’ school enrollments and higher education (Fisher 1990).
With high dropout rates, their low education and illiteracy pose
the biggest hindrance to enhancing equal opportunity and status
of women. In short, they are caught in a vicious circle imposed by
the nexus of patriarchal feudalism, Hindu orthodoxy, and poor
family conditions. Their lower status hampers their education,
and the lack of education, in turn, defines their status, placing
them in a tenuous position of disadvantage. Although the female
literacy rate has improved noticeably over the years, their aver-
age educational attainment falls far short of the male level. Defy-
ing this general rule is the greatly higher rate of educational

attainment among female children of wealthy and educated fami-
lies. This class disparity in educational attainment is also true for
boys. In Nepal, education is heavily class-biased.
GENDER RELATIONS
A primary consideration among gender relations in Nepal is
female virginity, which is treated as something sacred and funda-
mental to preserving family honor. If a girl is engaged in a sexual
relationship prior to marriage, it is viewed as a social disgrace to
the family. In the eyes of the society, she becomes an outcast, for
few families will find her socially acceptable as a potential bride
for their sons. Not even minor infractions with sexual connota-
tions are tolerated. So, naturally, girls are highly protected. In
fact, in order to insure their virginity prior to marital conjugation,
they are commonly married away at a relatively young age, before
their hormonal rise may interfere with their biological urge.
Because marriages in Nepal are invariably family-arranged,
daughters usually have little say in when and with whom to get
married. Although the average age of marriage for girls in Nepal
has been slowly climbing (while the number of arranged mar-
riages is on the decline) with modernization and their increased
education, it is still routine for girls to be married at the age of fif-
teen or sixteen. This is particularly true in rural areas where both
education and employment for women are scarce.
Given this scenario, Nepali society frowns upon male-female
bodily contacts in public. Even simple hand-holding and kissing
between boys and girls is taboo. One can observe a clear physi-
cal distance between even husbands and wives in public places.
In short, any public display of physicality with the opposite gen-
der is considered a lowly act, socially immoral and unacceptable.
This said, it is important to note that there are some minor
exceptions to the traditional taboo of male-female physical rela-
tions in public places. The Tibeto-Nepali and low-caste groups
are bound to this social rule to a much lesser degree than are
those from high-caste Indo-Nepali families and the Newar com-
munities. Within the Tibeto-Nepali group, the Gurung settle-
ments, for example, uphold a time-honored tradition of what is
called rodi ghar (i.e., a collective singing house or club). Young

men and women in the village—sometimes including those from
surrounding villages—periodically gather at the rodi ghar after
dinner and spend the night singing and socializing. Physical con-
tacts and expressions between opposite genders are normal dur-
ing rodi ghar gatherings.
One other area of exception can be found among urban and
educated women, who are often from high-caste and high-class
families. As they attend colleges and universities in growing num-
bers, the parameters of their geographical mobility expands. Away
from the vigilant eyes of their parents, they may encounter regu-
lar contact with men on their college or university campuses.
Under such circumstances, the natural attraction between the
opposite sexes tends to result in some physical contact. Moreover,
as they emulate Western tourists and expatriates and are stirred
by explicit Hollywood films and television shows, the frequency of
physical contacts between them goes up. There are even upscale
disco clubs where upper-class educated men and women dance
the night away in the midst of booming Western tunes. All of these
trends have increasingly contributed to the narrowing of the
boundaries of sexual taboos and contacts (Liechty 1996). Gender
relations are definitely undergoing some noticeable transforma-
tion in Nepal, although this is mostly limited to urban areas and
tourist centers.
One insidious outcome of this Western emulation and tourism
has been the growth of prostitution. Prostitution in Nepal is noth-
ing new; every year, thousands of poor girls and young women are
pushed into it and are taken to India to join brothels (Shrestha
1997). But it is no longer the exclusive territory of poor women
trying to eke out a living for themselves and their families. Increas-
ingly drawn into the circle of this age-old profession are some
upper-class, educated women who offer their bodies as commodi-
ties in high-class hotels patronized by Western tourists. Viewing
Nepal as a virgin territory that is safe in terms of HIV/AIDS inci-
dence, tourists are driving the demand for sexual services.
In the final analysis, the expanding market of prostitution
hardly bodes well for the improvement of women’s status and
their empowerment in Nepal. Additionally, the growing popularity
of the nightclub culture among young females has engendered in
some corners an adverse reaction toward women’s liberation and

advancement. The only sure gain that a segment of Nepali women
seems to have made so far is a sense of freedom from the domi-
nant-subordinate power relations that characterize the prevailing
male-female relations. Whether this sense of freedom will soon
produce other tangible social, economic, and political gains for
the general masses and upcoming generation of Nepali women
remains a big question.
CHILD LABOR
As is the case in most agrarian societies of Asia, child labor is a
national feature of household labor in Nepal. However, child labor
has a distinct class and geographical character within the country,
for it is particularly common among the poor and in rural areas
where the household economy is deeply entrenched in farming. By
the time children are six or seven years old, they are required to
do various family chores, from fetching water and fodder to clean-
ing animal sheds to taking care of their younger siblings. Simply
put, child labor is a vital part of family labor; it is an unavoidable
part of growing up. Many Nepali children have no time to enjoy
childhood as most Western and wealthy children do. For countless
children, therefore, childhood is merely a biological phase, not a
social one. Their maturation process begins very early in their life
cycle and proceeds at a fairly rapid pace as they are routinely
assigned many family responsibilities. Moreover, children are often
a source of income within poor households, working as wage earn-
ers to supplement meager family resources. This is a fact of life few
can avoid. So, for countless households, child labor is not a choice
but a family requirement necessitated by the imperative of sur-
vival. This hard reality does not, however, imply that one ought to
defend or promote child labor (see Shrestha 2000).
Although the extensive use of child labor in the household con-
text is nothing new, a new trend is emerging. Now children are
being increasingly used as a source of profit. They are used in the
service sector, including restaurants, hotels, and private domestic
help. In addition, child labor is becoming increasingly common in
certain manufacturing operations, such as carpet weaving,
because they are cheaper to hire and easier to exploit. Recent
international outcries against child labor in Nepal as well as else-

where have done little to abate the problem. Although the
employers of children in such labor-intensive industries as carpet
production have repeatedly heard the growing chorus of protest
against child labor, their response has been basically to hide it
rather than to avoid it. The employers believe that without child
labor, they will lose their competitive advantage in terms of pric-
ing. They see child labor as a business imperative rather than as
a social concern. So child labor continues.
As employees, children are routinely abused and deprived of
their basic rights. As bad as their working conditions are, that is
not the worst that Nepali children have encountered, however.
What is truly tragic goes deeper than the obvious grim reality of
child labor. Despite an increasing incidence of child labor use,
countless children cannot find work even when they are willing to
be openly exploited. Trapped in abject poverty and unable to find
work, Nepali children are increasingly turning to urban streets as
their ultimate refuge (see Onta-Bhatta 1996). Not surprisingly,
therefore, street children have witnessed a consistent increase in
their numbers over the past decade, some rummaging through
garbage piles, some becoming pocket pickers, and some simply
relying on begging, all for their survival. There is also sporadic evi-
dence of them forming mini gangs. This is a social reality that is
bound to intensify with the passage of time as Nepal remains
mired in a state of economic stagnation, continued population
growth, and impoverishment.
POPULAR CULTURE AND RECREATION

When discussing the prevalence of popular culture in Nepal, it’s
important to bear in mind that most of it has foreign origins.
Because of this, it tends to contradict traditional values—its roots
are in modernization and/or sociocultural transformation. Its con-
sumption invariably demands additional expenses beyond basic
necessities, and so its vanguards in Nepal tend to be young and
relatively well-off.
To be sure, some form of Western influence has been present
in Nepal for a long time, at least since the rise of the Rana clan as
the country’s ruling elite. The Ranas adopted many Western val-
An urban scene in Narayanghat, a city situated in the central Tarai district

of Chitwan. Note the wall-size Coca-Cola sign, painted on the side of a
building. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)
ues and styles and made use of many Western products that had
previously been unavailable in Nepal. Such infiltration of British
cultural values was not surprising given their dependence on
British support. Furthermore, Nepal’s geographical proximity to
the British Raj in India also contributed to the process. However,
beyond the Ranas, Western influence prior to 1950 was mostly
confined to a tiny circle of the elite class, concentrated in the
Kathmandu Valley (see Liechty 1997). As a result, few Western
values and cultural modes seeped down to the general public,
mainly because they were neither accessible nor affordable. Pop-
ular culture as a contemporary notion or value system in Nepal
thus can be traced only to the early 1960s. This decade witnessed
both the rising popularity of Hindi (Indian) movies and the advent
of Western popular culture.
Hindi Movies
From the very outset, Hindi movies have served as a vital source
of popular culture in Nepal. They reveal not only the importance

of film and video as a powerful medium of popular cultural diffu-
sion, but also something about the role(s) of familiarity of lan-
guage, certain aspects of cultural and social realities, and thematic
plots in making certain phenomena popular for public consump-
tion. Hindi movies are popular in Nepal for two reasons: First,
Hindi is a familiar language for most Nepalis, and many can actu-
ally speak it quite well. (Movies have, in fact, acted as a medium
for learning Hindi.) Second, many Hindi movie plots contain cul-
tural and social undertones that are familiar to Nepali viewers.
As in most of the world, movie theaters allow young men and
women to come together to socialize or even romance in the
absence of their parents’ glaring gaze. When the familiar Hindi
movie plots are presented in forms and formats that defy any
notion of normalcy and ordinariness, they naturally turn into
objects of popular culture, something to emulate and espouse.
They stir up the audience’s imagination. And, consequently, they
catch on. It is, therefore, no wonder that young Nepali viewers
imitate Indian movie heroes and heroines, copying their moves
and dialogues, their dress styles and hairdos. They evoke their
names, often seeing them as role models. They know almost every
song from every movie and can detail each scene as if it is carved
on their palms. One obvious reason for the popularity of Hindi
movies is that they are readily accessible, both geographically and
in terms of language and cultural familiarity. Furthermore, even
the poor can generally afford them.
Western Popular Culture

Competing with Hindi movies is the rapid current of Western pop-
ular culture in Nepal. Its public consumption has greatly increased
with the introduction of satellite TV and the Internet (Himal South
Asia 1996). English education has also contributed to the growth
and expansion of Western pop culture. Unlike Hindi movies, how-
ever, Western popular culture is based in urban areas and along
tourist trails and destinations. Additionally, as it is invariably class-
and education-biased—satellite hookups and Internet services
cost money, after all—it tends to be socially concentrated among
the well-to-do and more educated segment of the population.
Within this population group, Western popular culture is definitely

hip and hot, often running parallel to—or even surpassing in cer-
tain cases—Hindi movies as the primary source of the Nepali pop
culture diet. To many, it is a cherished form of status symbol, a
mode of exhibiting what they consider to be their “modern” or
Western outlook and attitude. Also increasingly popular but still far
behind Hindi songs in popularity is Western (American) music.
Among the favorite artists are those who are hot in the West,
including rap singers. Most of the popular Western movies tend to
become popular in Nepal as well once they have been released in
video—they are not typically shown in cinema halls.
In many respects, the onset of Western popular culture—both
movies and music—in Nepal can be attributed to the arrival of U.S.
Peace Corps volunteers (PCVs) and “hippies” in the 1960s and
1970s. Particularly influential were the hippies, for they easily out-
numbered PCVs, tended to be concentrated in certain areas—
namely the valley of Kathmandu and the town of Pokhara—and
exhibited a distinct and somewhat homogeneous behavior. As hip-
pies poured into Nepal in increasing numbers, looking for inex-
pensive marijuana and hashish, they introduced a popular taste of
Western culture whose tentacles have now reached many corners.
In fact, it was the arrival of Western hippies that initially enhanced
the locational value of Kathmandu as a desirable tourist destina-
tion, thus providing incentives for capital investment for the devel-
opment of tourism. Hotels and restaurants sprouted, along with
other tourist services and facilities (Shrestha 1998). As tourist
flows increased, so did the growth of tourist services. This positive
feedback loop between the two forces continues to grow.
Hippies were soon followed by other Western tourists. With
each successive wave of Westerners came an increasing penetra-
tion of Western popular culture in the forms of movies, music,
fashion, foods and beverages, and a host of other Western values
and tastes. Furthermore, the galloping pace of globalization dur-
ing the 1990s has given an added push to the growth of popular
culture. A culture of consumerism suddenly began to spread, as
did cultural commercialization. In addition to hippies and regular
tourists, flocks of Western development advisers and experts
began to arrive in ever increasing numbers, along with diplomatic
contingencies who, in their own ways, contributed to the rein-
forcement and entrenchment of Western values and popular cul-

ture. Today, almost everything Western in Nepal is accepted as
good and desirable, something to be imitated and adopted, irre-
spective of its value and benefit to the general well-being of the
society and its people. There is little selectivity in terms of which
Western values to adopt and which ones to avoid. This thinking is
prevalent among the youth as well as development policymakers
and advocates. Also joining this bandwagon are urban merchants
who cater to Westerners or whose sole objective is to make prof-
its no matter what the social consequence.
Drug Use
Apart from the growth of body trade within the tourist sector, one
notable adverse outcome of Western popular culture is the emerg-
ing drug culture in Nepal (Shrestha 1997). Since the mid-1980s,
the situation has been progressively worsening. The number of
young people, including college and high school students, who are
addicted to drugs has been consistently rising. Although drug use
is almost exclusively confined to young males, there is no way to
prevent females from plunging into this self-destructive habit.
Nowhere is this trend more gripping than in the Kathmandu Val-
ley, where the youth receive a daily dose of Western influences
through various channels. What is frightening about this deepen-
ing drug culture is that many of the addicts have stretched the
drug boundaries from locally available marijuana and hashish to
more potent foreign drugs such as crack and cocaine. In 1989, it
was estimated that Nepal had 20,000 heroin addicts, mostly in the
Kathmandu Valley (Bhandari 1989). Although it is hard to derive
a definite number, there is little doubt that the number of addicts
has surely reached a higher plateau. One additional dimension of
drug use (abuse) in Nepal is that unlike the local drugs (e.g., mar-
ijuana) that are grown throughout the country, crack and cocaine
are smuggled into Nepal.
Recreational Activities
The traditional notion of “rest and recreation” is quite remote to
most Nepalis for several reasons. First, the vast majority of the
A Gaine with his sarangi (an indigenous stringed instrument). The Gaines
are a professional minstrel caste group, previously treated as untouchable.
They sing in public or for individuals and usually receive donations for
their performances. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)
people simply do not have leisure time—they are too busy trying
to eke out their living and worrying about where their next meal
is going to come from. Whatever free time they may have is usu-
ally spent in search of jobs, for they cannot afford to miss any
income opportunity. To many, “rest” is not a choice; it is simply
idle time forced upon them due to the paucity of employment
opportunities. Second, because they are poor and living hand-to-
mouth on a daily basis, they have no means to be able to engage
in recreational activities. Third, the concept of rest and recreation
is largely associated with the postindustrial society, and Nepal is
still largely trapped in the agrarian age, where recreational facili-
ties are limited. Whatever recreational facilities and amenities
one may observe within Nepal are provided mainly to meet the
demands and desires of foreign tourists. Notwithstanding religious
pilgrimages and some scattered exceptions of wealthy individuals
traveling to foreign destinations for visits and enjoyment, domes-
tic tourism is essentially nonexistent. In simple terms, the Nepali
masses do not participate in recreation.
Socialization as Recreation. Given the above scenario, the
concept of recreation has to be narrowly defined and applied to
limited geographical confines. That is, in the Nepali context,
recreation as a leisurely activity has to be viewed in light of
socialization as a group activity that involves leisurely participa-
tion, an atmosphere where people detach themselves from work
to have fun, at least temporarily. In this sense, recreational func-
tions are invariably short and carried out in a local setting with
friends and relatives rather than as a family or individual vacation
and travel to some distant destinations filled with amenities. For
instance, going to see movies with friends, as indicated earlier, is
a favorite and popular recreational function for many people, irre-
spective of age and gender. The many festivals and communal fes-
tivities that occur each year also offer outlets for people to get
together, to share communal meals, to discuss communal issues
as well as engage in gossip (a time-honored pastime activity), to
celebrate events or simply have fun, temporarily removed from
their daily chores and survival routine.
Also increasingly popular is the enjoyment of restaurants,
which is now common among members of upper-class families
and young professionals. They drink, eat, and engage in random
Religious festivity taking place in front of the Hanuman Dhoka (gate) in

the Kathmandu Durbar Square. At the center of the photo is the statue of
Hanuman (the monkey god) draped in red cloth. (Courtesy of Nanda R.
Shrestha)
discussions and gossiping, usually late in the afternoon. Although

this type of activity existed in the past, it was quite limited. Its
growing popularity is due to the growth of Nepal’s middle class. In
addition, as noted earlier, many in this socioeconomic circle also
enjoy Nepal’s Western-style night clubs.
This type of recreational socialization is not an option, however,
for the vast majority of Nepalis, especially those who reside in rural
areas. It is beyond their reach both physically and materially: Such
amenities rarely exist in rural areas because of the extremely limited
market demand, and those that do exist are too expensive for cash-
strapped villagers to enjoy. Instead of eating out at restaurants with
their friends, villagers trek down to local tea stalls, that enduring
symbol of rural cultural life. Almost every rural community has a tea
stall within walking distance. It is an important social venue where
adult villagers gather early in the morning to enjoy a cup of hot tea,
fill up their chilam (short clay pipes) with home-grown tobacco and
share it, exchange news and gossip, and discuss issues related to
their community and crops. One can observe villagers chattering
away, laughing, and enjoying each other’s company before they head
back home or to the fields to carry on their daily tasks.
Temple Visits as Recreation and Socialization. In Nepal,
regular temple visits during weekends, namely Saturdays, are an
important and time-honored form of recreational socialization
that is very common in cities, where temples can be found almost
on every corner. Nowhere is this traditional form of recreation
more noticeable than at Pashupati, an extremely popular religious
shrine in Kathmandu. Every Saturday morning, masses of peo-
ple—male and female, young and old—flock to Pashupati in the
company of friends and relatives. Although such visits certainly
carry a religious meaning, they are also fundamental to recreation
and socialization. Sometimes the visits are extended to include
picnics. Interestingly, the deepening incursion of Western popular
culture has failed to dampen the popularity of regular temple vis-
its. This holds true even for the young generation, who are most
influenced by Western values and modernity.
The Internet
Accessed with a keystroke from within one’s own room, the Inter-
net has become a lively and friendly source of popular culture

from across the globe. To put it simply, the Internet has opened a
new frontier of popular culture, one that crosses and defies geo-
graphical borders, legal barriers, cultural barricades, and even
parental resistance. To access and enjoy different forms of popu-
lar culture, one no longer needs to rely on the conventional agents
of cultural diffusion such as books and movies. Among those
Nepali citizens who can afford a computer and Internet service,
the Internet is fast becoming the recreational mode of choice.
One side note about popular culture in Nepal is that as the coun-
try has gained access to Western-style entertainment and recre-
ation, social fissures between the younger and older generations
regarding various sociocultural norms and values have been cre-
ated. The people of Nepal are beginning to question what is appro-
priate versus what is not, how far to push the boundary of popu-
lar culture before it corrodes the very social fabric and soul on
which the national identity is built, and where the balance lies
between the advantage of cultural transfusion and the disadvan-
tage of cultural transgression.
CONCLUSION
What we see from the above discussion is a great deal of both con-
tinuity and change. Notwithstanding some relatively minor
improvements, women’s status in Nepal still remains low. Similar
to women’s standing in society, continuity is also seen in other
areas of Nepal’s overall social system, for instance, family and kin-
ship networks, one-sided gender relations, and child labor. Conti-
nuity does not necessarily imply that the Nepali society is totally
stagnant; rather, it means, in this case, that change has been
extremely sluggish. In contrast, significant changes have occurred
in the popular culture and its growing consumption, a phenome-
non that is closely related to the expansion of tourism. And, of
course, Indian movies and Western popular cultural penetration
have given an added push to the rapid infusion of popular culture.
In all likelihood, the rising tide of popular culture will continue to
swell as Nepal’s links to the world community deepen in terms of
both diplomatic thrusts and global communication powered by
satellites and the Internet.
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Shrestha, Nanda R., and Dennis Conway. 1998. “The Shadow Life of a
Migrant’s Wife.” Unpublished manuscript.
Upadhya, Shizu. 1996. “The Status of Women in Nepal—15 Years on.” Studies
in Nepali History and Society 1, 2: 423–454.
PART TWO
REFERENCE MATERIALS
Key Events in Nepali History
563 B.C.
The Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama) is born in Lumbini, Kapil-
vastu, located in the central Tarai region of Nepal and ruled by the
Sakya (Shakya) dynasty.
Before A.D. 400
Various pastoral dynasties rule Nepal, which at this time is con-
stituted essentially by the Valley of Kathmandu and its surround-
ing areas. The most well known of these dynasties is the Kirata
dynasty, established by Yellung Kirata from the eastern hills. (It is
believed that the Kirata dynasty’s rule spanned at least 1,500
years, until about A.D. 400, when it was dislodged by what came
to be known as the Licchavi dynasty.)
A.D. 400–880
The Licchavi Era. With the inception of the Licchavi era, Nepal
slowly moves onto the terra firma of history. This period is often
regarded as the “Golden Age” in the history of Nepal. The era
begins with the rule of Vrasadeva (c. 400–425) and ends with
Manadeva IV (c. 875–879). Raghadeva, whose rule begins in 880,
appears to be the transitional ruler separating the end of the Lic-
chavi era and the advent of the medieval period.
880–1200
The medieval era is the darkest period in the history of Nepal,
completely shrouded in chaos and confusion.
1200–1769
The Malla Period. The rule of Ari Malla (Arimalla) signals the
beginning of the Malla period and a return to many of the foun-
dations built during the Licchavi era. Some of the notable events
that occur during this period include:
1345–1346
Sultan Shams ud-din Ilyas of Bengal raids the Kathmandu Valley.
131
1482
The Malla kingdom of the Kathmandu Valley is formally frag-
mented into three separate kingdoms of Kathmandu, Bhadgaon
(Bhaktapur), and Patan (Lalitpur). This division signals the
decline and eventual downfall of the Malla period.
1559
The Gorkha principality is established in the central hills.
1743
Prithvi Narayan Shah is crowned king of Gorkha. Soon after his
coronation, Prithvi Narayan embarks on a long military campaign
of territorial conquests and national unification.
1769
Prithvi Narayan Shah completes the conquest of all three valley
(Malla) kingdoms, leading to the unification of fragmented Nepal.
The city of Kathmandu is declared the capital of new Nepal.
1769–Present
The Modern Period and the Shah Dynasty. With the unification
of Nepal begins what can be loosely described as the modern
period. Many notable events take place during this period.
1769–1816
Continued territorial expansion and annexation campaign
1775
Death of King Prithvi Narayan Shah
1792
Treaty of Commerce between Nepal and the East India Company.
Nepal-China War.
1803
Nepal’s westward expansion resumes under the leadership of
Amar Singh Thapa. Nepal’s boundary is extended as far as the
Satlej (Sutlej) River in India.
1806
Bhimsen Thapa takes office as mukhtiyar (prime minister).
1814–1816
War with British India (Anglo-Nepal War)
——Key Events in Nepali History——133
1816
Treaty of Sagauli (Sugauli). As part of the treaty, Nepal cedes
roughly one-half of its territory to British India.
1837
Dismissal of Mukhtiyar General Bhimsen Thapa
1846
Nepal’s bloodiest kot parba (courtyard massacre) takes place,
leaving twenty-nine leading bhardars (court nobles) slaughtered
by Jang Bahadur Kunwar (Rana) and his brothers. Following the
massacre, Kunwar is bestowed with the title of prime minister and
commander-in-chief of Nepal.
1846–1951
The Rana’s rule is rooted in hereditary and autocratic prime min-
istership.
1951
Successful pro-democracy revolution against the Rana rule; end
of the Rana rule and restoration of the Shah rule, with attendant
glimmer of democracy.
1955
Death of King Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah. His son Mahendra Bir
Bikram Shah is subsequently crowned king.
1959
A national general election is held, resulting in majority rule for
the Nepali Congress Party in the House of Representatives. B. P.
Koirala becomes the first elected prime minister of Nepal.
1960
King Mahendra launches a palace coup against the elected Koirala
government and jails party leaders, including Prime Minister
Koirala. Premature death of nascent democracy.
1962
King Mahendra institutes the panchayat system. Although her-
alded as a partyless system, panchayat is a one-party system
designed to serve Mahendra’s absolute rule and wishes.
1972
Death of King Mahendra is followed by his son Birendra Bir
Bikram Shah’s ascension to throne
1979
Nationwide pro-democracy movement against the panchayat sys-
tem. As the movement heats up, King Birendra announces a ref-
erendum on the panchayat system.
1980
King Birenda and the panchayat system emerge victorious in a
rigged referendum. In essence, panchayat gains a semblance of
legitimacy.
1990
Second Coming of Democracy. A second nationwide pro-democ-
racy movement begins. Under pressure, King Birendra dissolves
the panchayat system and accepts a constitutional monarchical
role; an interim coalition government is formed under the prime
ministership of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. A new constitution is
promulgated.
1991
A general election is held to form a parliamentary government;
the Nepali Congress wins the majority of seats in the House of
Representatives and forms a new government headed by Girija
Prasad Koirala, a brother of the late prime minister B. P. Koirala.
1996
The “Peoples War” is launched by Maoist revolutionaries whose
primary support base lies in rural areas.
2001
June 1. The royal palace witnesses a bizarre and bloody massacre
that leaves King Birenda’s immediate family dead by the hand of
Crown Prince Dipendra Bir Bikram Shah. He is believed to have
shot himself following the massacre.
June 2. The dying Dipendra is declared king. On June 4, King
Dipendra is pronounced dead, and his uncle (Birendra’s brother)
Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah is crowned king.
November 26. King Gyanendra declares a state of emergency,
thus suspending civil liberties, including freedom of the press as
well as freedom of assembly, expression, and movement. Once
again, Nepal’s democratic experiment is placed under severe
stress.
——Key Events in Nepali History——135
2002
January 4–5. The SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation) meeting is held in Kathmandu.
January 17. The government announces new taxes on industrial
products and additional import-export duties to fund the military
offensive against the Maoists who, in February 1996, launched
what is nationally known as the “People’s War.” This guerilla revo-
lution was intended to abolish the monarchical system and estab-
lish a socialist republic. Although largely rural based, the move-
ment begins to operate in some urban areas. The Nepali armed
forces and the Maoists intensify their battles against each other—
specifically since the state of emergency was declared by the king.
January 18. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visits Nepal. In
addition to holding talks with the king and the prime minister,
Powell is briefed by the army chief on the military offensive
against the Maoists. Subsequent to his visit, American military
advisors and personnel are sent to Nepal to advise and train
Nepal’s armed forces in their fight against the Maoists.
February 16–17. Maoist rebels launch a daring strike against the
government forces, inflicting heavy losses. According to news
reports, 142 people are killed. The Maoists mount attacks on a
local airport, government buildings, a military barrack and an
armory in Mangalsen, and the district headquarters of Achham in
far western Nepal. Buildings are blown up and banks looted. Gun
battles between rebels and the security break out from midnight
until well after dawn. Among the dead were 57 out of 58 soldiers,
49 policemen, the chief district officer Mohan Singh Khatri, the
district intelligence officer Lok Raj Upreti and his wife, a post-
man and a local photographer. The heavy casualties also include
some rebels.
March 2. The state of emergency declared on November 26, 2001,
is extended.
March 29. A bomb explodes on a bridge in Kathmandu, wounding
at least 27 people.
April 12. Maoist revolutionaries kill almost 90 policemen in four
separate and simultaneous attacks in the district of Dang in west-
ern Nepal, about 190 miles west of Kathmandu. Also killed during
the attacks are scores of rebels as a result of the military assaults
on the guerillas. Sixty-two Maoists are found buried in a makeshift

mass grave in a ditch. According to one estimate, more than 300
are feared dead, including both policemen and rebels.
April 13. A land mine blast in the far western district of Bajura
kills 3 people. This is believed to be the first land mine explosion
in Nepal.
April 16. Maoists revolutionaries ambush a police patrol and kill
at least 9 policemen in the Grokha district, about 70 miles west of
Kathmandu.
April 18. Two bomb explosions shake the capital city of Kath-
mandu. This is a clear indication that the “People’s War” has
extended its frontier from the rural fringes to urban trenches. The
deepening intensification of confrontations between the military
and Maoists has besieged the nation and claimed more than 3,500
lives since the Maoist revolution began in early 1996. Of this total,
nearly 1,700 deaths occurred since the declaration of the state of
emergency in November 2001. Although the number of military
and police casualties has been quite small relative to innocent and
rebel body counts, the Maoists have so far gained a psychological
edge over the army and police forces, especially in light of their
massive military disadvantage. They have also managed to garner
remarkable support from peasants across the nation.
April 23. Maoists call for a nationwide strike, and Nepal is essen-
tially shut down as everything comes to a halt. Businesses,
schools, and offices are closed across the country.
April 24. The nation remains paralyzed. The total shutdown is most
noticeable in the bustling twin cities of Kathmandu and Patan.
Significant People,
Places, and Events
Acharya, Baburam (1887–1972) A famous historian, scholar, and

thinker. He was decorated with the title of Itihas Shiromani (a
crown jewel among Nepali historians). He was also given many
other awards.
Acharya, Bhanu Bhakta (1814–1861) Regarded as the father of

Nepali literature, Bhanu Bhakta was born in the central hill dis-
trict of Tanahu. His adaptation of the Hindu epic Ramayana into
Nepali earned him a reputation as a supreme literary figure of the
Nepali language.
Acharya, Tanka Prasad (1912–1992) As a political leader engaged

in the anti-Rana and pro-democracy movement, he founded the
first political party of Nepal, called the Nepal Praja Parishad
(Nepal People’s Council) party, in 1936. In January 1956 he was
appointed prime minister (1956–1957) by King Mahendra.
Adhikari, Man Mohan (Manmohan) (1922–1999) Adhikari

received his higher education in India. Along with Puspa Lal
Shrestha, he was instrumental in forming the Communist Party
of Nepal (CPN). Later, he became the party’s general secretary. In
1994, when his party (United Marxist-Leninist, or UML) came to
power, he became the first Marxist prime minister of Nepal. This
development made Nepal the second country in the world to be
led by a popularly elected Marxist government (the first being
Chile in the early 1970s under President Salvador Allende).
Anglo-Nepal War (1814–1816) As Nepal forged ahead with its ter-

ritorial expansion policy following unification in 1769, it encoun-
tered British resistance. Eventually, a war broke out between the
British and Nepali forces in 1814. This war, which lasted almost
two years, later came to be known as the Anglo-Nepal War. Nepal’s
137
eventual surrender was the most humiliating defeat the nation

ever suffered in the hands of a foreign army. This defeat still
haunts Nepal (see Treaty of Sagauli).
Aniko or Arniko (1245–1306) A renowned architect, sculptor,

and bronze caster. At the request of the Chinese (Mongolian)
Emperor Kublai Khan’s teacher Saskyapa Lama of Tibet, Nepal
commissioned Aniko to lead a group of artisans to Lhasa to con-
struct a golden stupa. Beijing’s White Pagoda, or Pai Ta Sze, stands
today as a monument to the artistic contribution of Aniko. He evi-
dently had over 200 apprentices and pupils, and his influence
through these artists may be seen in the temple art and architec-
ture of East and Southeast Asia. He died in China in 1306.
Annapurna (Anna = grains + Purna = full, filled) In Nepali, Anna-

purna means a mountain filled with grain. The Annapurna Range
is composed of four different Annapurna peaks: I, II, III, and IV.
Of these, Annapurna I (26,545 feet) is the tallest, followed by
Annapurna II (26,041 feet).The front view of 24,456-feet-high
Annapurna IV as seen from the city of Pokhara looks like a cap at
its summit. Legend has it that if the cap looks full in the winter,
the peasants and farmers down in the valleys will have a good
year. If the cap is not filled with snow, a year of hardship would
follow (for a detailed discussion of the folklore, see Shrestha and
Conway 1996).
Aruna Lama (1945–1998) A famous musician, Aruna Lama was

born in Darjeeling, India, a major hub of Nepali literature. Popu-
larly known as the nightingale of the Himalaya, Ms. Lama played
a prominent role in elevating Nepali music to a higher plateau.
Bhattarai, Baburam (1954–) One of the key leaders of the ongo-

ing Maoist movement that has launched what is known as the
People’s War throughout Nepal since early 1996. He began his
political career as the founding president of All India Nepali Stu-
dents Association in 1977.
Bhattarai, Krishna Prasad (1924–) A founding member of the

Nepali Congress Party, Bhattarai actively participated in the anti-
——Significant People, Places, and Events——139
Rana popular revolution, which culminated in the overthrow of

Rana autocracy in early 1951. He was prime minister during the
1990–1991 interim government (see Second Coming of Democ-
racy). After the 1999 elections, Bhattarai formed the Congress
government as its prime minister.
Buddha. See Gautama, Siddhartha.
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) This political party was created

in early 1949 as a revolutionary party, with the purpose of
dethroning the Rana regime and establishing a socialist state.
Puspa Lal Shrestha was the founding general secretary of the
party. However, due to constant internal tussles for leadership
positions and philosophical and programmatic differences, CPN
underwent many changes in a manner similar to the Nepali Con-
gress Party. Consequently, those who quit the CPN organized
their own factions and mini parties under the overarching ideol-
ogy of Marxism. However, following its Fourth Congress in the late
1980s, the CPN began to develop a much more united and cohe-
sive front than ever seen before. During the 1990 antipanchayat
and pro-democracy movement, the CPN decided to coordinate its
efforts with the Congress Party. As part of this participation, the
CPN under the leadership of Madan Bhandari (who was later
killed) succeeded in uniting seven different communist factions
into what is now commonly identified as the United Marxist-
Leninist Party (UML). It is now the largest CPN faction. As it won
the largest numbers of parliamentary seats in the 1994 general
election, it was able to form a national government with Man
Mohan Adhikari as prime minister.
Cow Known as gai in Nepali, it is a national animal of Nepal. It is

highly revered as a sacred symbol of motherly nurturing and
nourishing. As a constitutionally declared Hindu society, Nepal
treats the killing of a cow as the most serious crime, worse than
killing a human being.
Dashain Also known as Bijaya Dashami, it is the most important

and biggest Hindu festival, celebrated over a period of ten con-
secutive days, usually in October following the rice harvest. It sig-
nifies the victory of Goddess Durga over the demon Mahisur.

Many male animals—namely buffaloes, goats, and roosters—are
sacrificed as an integral part of this celebration. The official cele-
bration inside the Hanuman Dhoka in Kathmandu involves the
slaying of 108 mature male buffaloes on the eighth day (ashtami)
of Dashain. Many people sarcastically refer to it as dasha (misery,
trouble) because they go into debt, often mortgaging land or jew-
elry to borrow money so they can celebrate as expected, includ-
ing purchasing gifts for family members.
Devkota, Laxmi Prasad (1909–1959) One of the most versatile lit-

erary figures of modern Nepal, he wrote epics, plays, poems, essays,
short stories, and novels. Many regard him as the father of modern
poetry in Nepal. He was adorned the title of Maha Kabi (Great Poet).
Gautama, Siddhartha (563–487 B.C.) Universally known as the

Buddha, Siddhartha was born in Lumbini, a small settlement in
Nepal’s central Tarai district of Kapilvastu. He was a Hindu prince
of the Sakya (Shakya) dynasty that ruled that part of Nepal. Dis-
turbed by human suffering and sorrow, he renounced his princely
status and left the palace in search of truth. After years of medi-
tation, he attained Enlightenment, thus becoming the “Enlight-
ened One,” or Buddha. It was his preaching and philosophy that
provided the foundation of what is now called Buddhism, a reli-
gion that has spread across the world with its central axis
grounded in East, Southeast, and South Asia. He is sometimes
referred to as The Light of Asia. Buddhism owes a great deal to its
principal apostle Ashok (Ashoka; Asoka), a great Indian emperor,
whose preeminent role in its early diffusion paralleled that of Paul
in Christianity.
Gorkhapatra Published in Kathmandu, it is Nepal’s oldest news-

paper, having begun circulation in early 1901. Originally, it was a
weekly newspaper; it became a daily paper in late 1966. As a gov-
ernment publication, it has often served as a mouthpiece of the
ruling power, especially during the Panchayat System.
Janakpur is a border town located in the eastern Tarai. It is believed

that Janakpur was the capital of King Janak’s kingdom. Known as
Mithila during Janak’s reign, it was a highly acclaimed center of

Hindu philosophical learning and discussions. Janak’s daughter Sita
was married to King Rama of Kosala (Kousala) in northern India.
Kathmandu is both the capital city and cultural hearth of Nepal.

This oldest urban center of Nepal has historically been the prime
domain of Nepali civilization, including its administrative system,
institutional setup, and artistic/architectural heritage. However,
Nepal owes much of its cultural and commercial identity to Kath-
mandu’s indigenous population, the Newars. As a Hindu society
where deities abound, it is no surprise that the landscape of Kath-
mandu is dotted with countless temples.
Koirala, Bishweswar Prasad (B. P.) (1914–1982) Born and edu-

cated in Benaras, India, Koirala is one of the leading founders of
the Nepali Congress Party (1947). He played a key role in spear-
heading the popular revolution of 1950 that toppled the Rana
regime in early 1951. Following the general election in 1959 in
which his Congress Party scored a solid victory, he formed the first
democratic government of Nepal. Consequently, he became Nepal’s
first elected prime minister. But his government was short-lived as
King Mahendra launched a swift palace coup against him and against
nascent democracy in December 1960. He was jailed for several
years, during which time political parties were banned in Nepal. He
was also a highly accomplished author whose contribution to Nepali
literature is timeless. To this day, B. P. Koirala remains the most
admired and distinguished political leader within Nepal and, cer-
tainly, the most well-recognized Nepali political figure in the inter-
national arena, easily overshadowing any king, including his archri-
val King Mahendra. B. P., as he was fondly called, was highly feared
by his enemies and admired by his supporters.
Koirala, Girija Prasad (1925–) The youngest brother of B. P.

Koirala, Girija is perhaps the most controversial and divisive fig-
ure within the Congress Party. Nevertheless, when the Congress
Party won the general election in 1991 (the first such election
since 1959), he became the second elected prime minister in the
history of Nepal. He lost the vote of confidence in 1994 but
became prime minister again in 1998 and 2000, both times for
short durations. Typical of all clannish politics, his rise to power

is largely hinged on his blood ties to B. P. Koirala rather than to
his own inherent competence or leadership ability, something he
has miserably failed to demonstrate despite being given several
chances to prove himself.
Kot Parba (Courtyard Massacre) Nepal’s infamous courtyard mas-

sacre of September 14, 1846, in which twenty-nine leading
bhardars (court nobles) were butchered by Jang Bahadur Kunwar
and his brothers. Prominent nobles of all competing courtier fac-
tions were either wiped out or exiled, leaving Jang Bahadur fully
in charge of court affairs and without any parallel to challenge his
power and authority. Following the massacre, he was bestowed
with the title of prime minister and commander-in-chief (see
Rana, Jang Bahadur).
Kumari is a young living goddess who comes from the Newar

group. For a young Newari girl to be selected as Kumari, she must
be virgin, about 4–8 in age, and possess a flawless body and pass
an excruciating test of endurance against fear and terror. There are
presently several Kumaris throughout the Kathmandu Valley, but
the main one is in Kathmandu. She lives in a house called Kumari
ghar (Kumari house), which is located at the center of Kath-
mandu. Attendants are appointed to take care of her meticulously.
According to the historical custom, the ruling monarch is sup-
posed to visit her once a year to receive her blessing. The ruling
Kumari is immediately dethroned at the first sign of menstruation.
Lumbini is the birthplace of Buddha, located in the central Tarai

district of Nepal. It has emerged as a leading pilgrim destination
for both Nepali and international Buddhists, particularly those
from Japan. Despite some attempts to develop this sanctuary of
peace, Lumbini remains relatively inconspicuous in terms of its
physical aura and attraction.
Machhapuchhre is a mountain in the Great Himalayan Range in

Nepal. In English it is called the “fish-tail mountain” because its
peak, when seen from the side, looks like a fish tail, split into two
halves. Situated next to Annapurna, few Himalayan peaks capture
one’s imagination as much as this peak does. It is by far the most

attractive Himalayan peak that Nepal has to offer; its beauty is
truly striking and unsurpassed, especially when viewed against
the backdrop of Phewa Tal (Lake Phewa) in Pokhara. However, it
is a relatively low peak with a height of only 22,727 feet.
Mount Everest. See Sagarmatha.
Muktinath is a major Hindu shrine, adorned with the three-roofed

pagoda temple of Jwalamai. There is a small eternal flame (jwala)
inside the temple. Located close to the Tibetan border, in the
inner-Himalayan district of Mustang, Muktinath is considered an
important destination for Hindu pilgrims.
Nepali Congress Party (NCP or CP) This is the largest political

party of Nepal. Founded in January 1947, its founders’ immediate
revolutionary intention was to dismantle Rana autocracy. Under
the capable leadership of Bishweswar Prasad (B. P.) Koirala, the
Party was, indeed, instrumental in bringing down the Rana rule in
1951. After Koirala’s death in 1982, Ganeshman Singh emerged as
the primary voice of the party. The NCP played a leading role dur-
ing the 1990 antipanchayat and pro-democracy movement that
led to the sudden disintegration of the Panchayat System. It is not
farfetched to assert that B. P. and Ganeshman are essentially syn-
onymous with the Congress Party.
Palace Massacre On June 1, 2001, Nepal witnessed an extremely

bizarre and bloody massacre that left the whole royal family of
King Birendra dead. The assassin was the king’s son, Crown
Prince Dipendra, who was believed to have later shot himself. On
June 2, Dipendra was declared king although he was lying on his
death bed in the hospital. When King Dipendra, who was unmar-
ried, was pronounced dead on June 4, there was no heir left from
King Birendra’s or King Dipendra’s side to assume the throne. So,
on June 4, the crown was passed on to Dipendra’s uncle (Biren-
dra’s brother) Gyanendra.
Panchayat System (panchayat raj) Two years after nascent

democracy was suffocated, King Mahendra instituted the pan-
chayat system in 1962, describing it as the “Nepali plant . . .

suited to the climate of our country. . . . The nationalistic feelings
associated with the awakening are not as possible under any other
system as they are under the panchayat system” (quoted in Joshi
and Rose 1966, 397). However, over the next twenty-eight years
(1962–1990), this “Nepali plant” proved to be anything but the
sharp instrument of Mahendra’s monarchical dictatorship (see
Shah, Mahendra Bir Bikram). Although heralded as a partyless
system, panchayat was fundamentally a one-party system.
Parijat (1937–1993) Simply known as Parijat in Nepal’s literary

circle, she was a famous Nepali novelist, poetess, and short-story
writer. Her full name was Bishnu Devi Waiba. She won many
awards during her relatively short literary career.
Pashupati (Temple) Pashupati is another name for Shiva, one of the

principal gods of the Hindu trinity, the other two being Brahma and
Vishnu. Shiva is loosely regarded as the god of destruction (Brahma
and Vishnu are, respectively, the gods of creation and protection).
Located on the bank of the holy river of Bagmati in Kathmandu,
Pashupati is one of four major Hindu pilgrim destinations, or char
dham, that every able Hindu is prescribed to visit during his or her
lifetime. Every year, Hindus flock to visit Pashupati, especially dur-
ing the festival called Shiva Ratri (the night of Shiva worship).
Pokhara is a city nestled in a narrow central hill valley, perhaps

the most preferred tourist destination outside the Kathmandu Val-
ley, largely thanks to the fact that it is situated at the foothills of
Machhapuchhre and Annapurna. Its attraction is further en-
hanced by the presence of Lake Phewa. It also owes its popularity
to the earliest wave of Western tourists in Nepal: the hippies who
came in the 1960s, mostly seeking dope and tranquility.
Pradhan, Sahana (1932–) Ms. Pradhan was married to Puspa Lal

Shrestha, a prominent leader of the communist movement in
Nepal. She joined the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in 1952.
Following the second coming of democracy in 1990, she became
cabinet minister (1990–1991) during the interim government,
representing the CPN (UML), and minister of industry and com-
merce (1994) during the UML government headed by Prime Min-

ister Man Mohan Adhikari. See Communist Party of Nepal and
Adhikari, Man Mohan Interestingly, unlike other Nepali women,
she chose to keep her maiden name after marriage instead of
adopting her husband’s family name.
Ramayana A favorite Hindu epic that revolves around the story

of Rama (believed to be one of the many incarnations of Vishnu)
and his wife, Sita (see Janakpur) vis-à-vis Rawana (Ravana), the
king of Sri Lanka. It is a fascinating story that involves many
intriguing political plots and subplots and human relations.
Rana, Jang Bahadur (1817–1877) Whether justified or not, few

Nepali political leaders are remembered with the degree of disdain
that is reserved for Jang Bahadur, perhaps because his history is
scripted in the thick pool of cold blood. In terms of known
records, the murderous course of history that Jang Bahadur Kun-
war pursued began with his 1845 assassination of his own uncle,
Prime Minister Mathbar Singh Thapa. This was followed by the
Kot Parba of 1846, in which he and his brothers slaughtered
twenty-nine high-ranking courtiers in one sweep, thus extermi-
nating virtually everybody who could potentially challenge his
authority. Immediately following the massacre, he became prime
minister, thereby setting in motion what later became known as
the Rana Rule. Jang Bahadur changed his surname from Kunwar
to Rana after King Surendra bestowed upon him the honorific title
of Rana. See Kot Parba.
Rana Rule (1846–1951) From the pool of blood shed by the mur-
derous hands of Jang Bahadur rose the autocratic and hereditary
rule of the Rana clan in 1846. The Ranas ruled Nepal for over 100
years. During that period, they were the law of the land. Virtually
in every respect, this was a dark period in the annals of Nepal. See
Kot Parba and Rana, Jang Bahadur.
Regmi, Dilli Raman (1915–) A distinguished historian, scholar,

and politician who founded Nepal Rashtriya (National) Congress
Party, which is now defunct. He has written many authoritative
books on Nepali history, covering almost all periods.
SAARC This is the acronym for the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation, established in 1985. Headquartered in
Kathmandu, its member countries are Bhutan, Bangladesh, India,
the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
Sagarmatha is the Nepali name for Mt. Everest. The word means
“the roof of the world.” The Sherpas call it Chomolongma (the
mother goddess of the snow). With the altitude of 29,035 feet
above sea level, it is the highest summit in the world. The ultimate
dream of almost any serious mountain climber, it annually
attracts numerous mountaineering expeditions from all over the
world, despite the fact that it has mercilessly consumed many
climbers’ lives. It was first successfully scaled by Sir Edmond
Hillary and his local guide, Tenzing Norgay Sherpa, in 1953.
Second Coming of Democracy (1990) Led by prominent leaders

of the banned Congress Party and Communist Party, Nepali citi-
zens launched a massive antipanchayat and pro-democracy
movement across the country in early 1990, on the eve of the
thirtieth anniversary of the palace coup that aborted the first
dawn of democracy. As the movement spread rapidly, it grew in
intensity. Protesters were killed randomly. With the number of
deaths increasing, King Birendra faced two stark choices: either to
continue to suppress the movement, killing more and more peo-
ple and, consequently, risking the total overthrow of the whole
institution of monarchy; or to dissolve his panchayat system and
restore democracy. He went with the second option, subsequently
ending the Panchayat System and restoring democracy. An
interim coalition government was formed under the prime minis-
tership of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, and a new constitution was
promulgated, turning the institution of monarchy into a constitu-
tional role. Under the stewardship of the interim government, a
national election was held in 1991 to form a parliamentary gov-
ernment, thus inaugurating the second coming of democracy in
Nepal thirty years after it was prematurely aborted.
Shah, Birendra Bir Bikram (1945–2001) Crowned king in 1972,

he was murdered during the dinner hours by his own son,
Crown Prince Dipendra (see Palace Massacre) on June 1, 2001.
He will be remembered for his decision to restore parliamentary

democracy in 1990 and accept his role as a constitutional
monarch. Because of that decision, he was widely admired by
his citizens.
Shah, Gyanendra Bir Bikram (1947–) Became king by default on

June 4, 2001 (see Palace Massacre).
Shah, Mahendra Bir Bikram (1920–1972) King Mahendra earned

a dubious distinction of being perhaps the craftiest Shah king. He
is most remembered for his 1960 palace coup against the demo-
cratically elected government of Prime Minister B. P. Koirala and
for instituting his dictatorial Panchayat System in 1962 (see Sec-
ond Coming of Democracy).
Shah, Prithvi Narayan (1722–1775) Founder of unified Nepal and

the ruling Shah dynasty. In a series of brilliant military cam-
paigns, complemented by shrewd diplomacy, he completed his
sweep of all three kingdoms of the Kathmandu Valley in 1769,
thereby symbolizing the unification of Nepal. Staunchly national-
istic in every respect, Prithvi Narayan is regarded as one of the
most farsighted rulers that Nepal has ever seen. To this day, he is
remembered with fondness for his contribution to building the
nation of Nepal.
Shah, Tribhuvan Bir Bikram (1906–1955) King Tribhuvan is

known mainly for his defiant stance against the Rana Rule and for
resurrecting the Shah monarchy to its pre-Rana status. When he
abruptly fled his palace on November 6, 1950, seeking asylum in
the Indian Embassy, he dealt a severe blow to the legitimacy of
the Rana rule and gave a tremendous moral boost to the raging
popular anti-Rana revolution. In essence, his calculated move
hastened the demise of Rana autocracy.
Sherchan, Bhupi (1935–1989) Leftist in ideological orientation,

he was a charismatic poet with a vibrant personality and a gift for
wit. His bitingly sarcastic and accessible style of poetry made him
perhaps the most popular modern poet of Nepal, especially among
the young generation. Bhupi Sherchan commanded respect
across all political spectrums in a country where virtually every-

thing is tainted with politics or political factionalism.
Sherpa, Tenzing Norgay (1914–1986) Tenzing Norgay accompa-

nied Sir Edmund Hillary to the top of Mt. Everest, thus becoming
one of the first two successful climbers of this highest peak. As his
name suggests, he belonged to the Sherpa (Tibeto-Nepali) ethnic
group that inhabits the Everest region. The Sherpas are renowned
as mountain climbers and as guides/porters for mountaineering
expeditions. Following his legendary achievement, Tenzing Nor-
gay became an Indian citizen and opened a mountain climbing
school in Darjeeling, India.
Shrestha, Marichman Singh (1942–) So far the only Newar to

have risen to prime ministership (1986–1989) in the modern his-
tory of Nepal, Shrestha is also the only prime minister to have
broken the monopolistic grip on Nepal’s prime ministership by
high-caste Brahmans and Chhetris.
Shrestha, Puspa Lal (1924–1978) Husband of Sahana Pradhan,

he was a fiery and charismatic leader of the Communist Party of
Nepal, which he helped to found and build. In some quarters of
the Kathmandu Valley, his name still engenders a great deal of
fond memories. His unyielding motto was that the political party
should be policy-oriented rather than personality driven.
Singh, Ganeshman (1915–1997) A true leader in every sense of

the word and one of the greatest and boldest fighters for democ-
racy that Nepal has ever seen. As a national political leader, few
could surpass him for his honesty and integrity. He is perhaps the
only Congress Party leader who could match B. P. Koirala with
respect to stature, respect, and name recognition. In league with
Koirala, he was the embodiment of the Nepali Congress Party,
especially after Koirala’s death. Ganeshman was given U Thant
Peace and United Nations awards in 1993 for his outstanding
achievements in the field of human rights.
Slavery Das pratha, as it is called in Nepali, existed particularly

in the form of bonded labor. It was abolished in 1924 by Prime
Minister Chandra Shamsher Rana, one of the very few positive

achievements of the Rana rule.
Swayambhu is a world-renowned Buddhist stupa located in Kath-

mandu. In addition to its enormous religious significance, it is truly
a marvelous work of architecture, with the colorful symbolic “Third
Eye” (i.e., the inner eye that symbolizes Enlightenment) embossed
on it. Swayambhu is also regarded as a symbol of world peace.
Thapa, Bhimsen (1772–1839) Recognized as the first prime min-

ister of Nepal, Bhimsen (or Bim Sen) Thapa was one of the most
powerful political figures in Nepali history; he controlled the
country’s political and military machinery for more than thirty
years (1906–1937). During his long tenure, Nepal experienced
both its dramatic rise and colossal fall as it made its most expan-
sive territorial gains through military conquests and suffered its
most humiliating military defeat. Following the signing of the
Treaty of Sagauli in 1916, Nepal suddenly shrank as it lost about
one-half of its territory (see Anglo-Nepal War). Despite his politi-
cal fame and fortunes, no national leader in the recorded history
of Nepal was ever fated to the kind of gruesome and humiliating
death that Thapa was subjected to (for a detailed account, see
Stiller 1976, 284–285, including footnotes).
Tihar The “Festival of Light,” usually celebrated over a period of

three days. Also variably known as Diwali or Deepawali, it is the
second-largest Hindu festival and is observed about a month after
Dashain. Besides decorating houses with lights (butter lamps,
candles, or electricity), three major events characterize this festi-
val: cow and dog worship (homage), worship of Laxmi (the god-
dess of fortune), and blessing of brothers by sisters.
Treaty of Sagauli or Sugauli (1816) As the British eventually pre-

vailed during the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814–1816, Nepal surren-
dered to preserve its national sovereignty. It was a strategic deci-
sion on the part of Bhimsen Thapa, for a clear-cut defeat could
have led to the absorption of Nepal into the colonial orbit of the
British Raj. As a result, the treaty was signed and ratified in 1816.
As part of that treaty, Nepal had to relinquish roughly one-half of
its territory to British India, mostly on the west and south sides,
but also some to the east. In addition, a British residency was
established in Kathmandu, thereby relegating Nepal to semicolo-
nial status. However, Nepal was never formally colonized.
Nepali Language, Food,
and Etiquette
LANGUAGE
Nepali is the national language of Nepal. It is closely related to, but
not identical with, Hindi. Many words used in these languages are
similar, as is the grammar structure; in fact, individuals who can
read Nepali can read Hindi, and vice versa. This is directly attrib-
uted to the fact that both languages are derived from Sanskrit—
the language of original Hindu texts and epics and of Vedic or reli-
gious studies in the past, monopolized by the upper crust of the
Brahman caste. All three languages are written in Devanagari
script with an elaborate vowel and phonetic structure.
Nepali is the dominant language in Nepal, largely thanks to its
persistent national push as the medium of public education.
Although there are still many remote pockets where Nepali is
rarely heard, it is widely spread. In fact, Nepali has been deployed
not only as a common language but as an instrument to foster and
fortify Nepali nationalism (patriotism) as well as national consol-
idation—that is, loyalty to the crown. As a result, Nepali is now
spoken even among the various Tibeto-Nepali ethnic tribal groups
and the Tarai-based Indo-Nepalis, who are historically least accul-
turated to Nepali. They each have their own dialects, some of
which are quite elaborate. This is true also among the Newars.
Because of their command of the language, the hill-based Indo-
Nepali ethnic group has taken full advantage of Nepali to maintain
their domination of various Nepali institutions, including social
and political, from the local to the national level. In this sense, the
language has historically become a source of power and promi-
nent positions in society.
Besides Nepali, other languages of Nepal include Newari, Maith-
ili, Bhojpuri, Tharu, Tamang, Gurung, and many others. In terms
of linguistic roots, Nepali, Maithili, and Bhojpuri belong to the
151
Indo-European family whereas the mother tongues of the Tibeto-

Nepali groups, including Newari, are derived from the Tibeto-
Burman language family. Irrespective of their roots, virtually
every tribal group, especially within the Tibeto-Nepali and indige-
nous (native) population segments, has its own dialect. Non-
Nepali languages and dialects are, however, rarely spoken outside
their ethnic enclaves. Nepali is thus the common medium of com-
munication between diverse ethnic groups.
Nepali has thirty-one consonants and sixteen vowels (including
both long and short vowels). Despite its elaborate structure and
sound system, most of the sounds in Nepali are not difficult to
master. Many are very similar to English. Unlike in some other
languages, Nepali entails no contradiction between the way it is
written and the way it is pronounced. For instance, in Spanish,
the letter “j” in its written form often carries the sound of the let-
ter “h” in its spoken form. But Nepali is straightforward in this
respect in that the letter “j” is pronounced with a “j” sound. There
is, however, one specific Nepali sound that poses a challenge for
many Westerners. This sound is associated with the seventh con-
sonant and can be written in the Roman alphabet as “chh.” This
is basically the aspirated and slightly longer version of the English
sound “ch” as in “church.” The sound comes more from the
throat than from a single flap of the tongue against the front part
of its roof. This is one sound that most Westerners, for some rea-
son, find extremely difficult to pronounce correctly even after a
long stay in Nepal. Although both sounds appear to have the same
base, the “chh” sound is definitely distinct. In Nepali, there is a
separate consonant for the “ch” sound that is nonaspirated.
Unlike in English, in which the sentence (grammar) order is
subject-verb-object, in Nepali the normal sequence is subject-
object-verb. For instance, “I go home” in English would be “I
home go” in Nepali. It is, nonetheless, important to keep in mind
that there is flexibility in the sentence formation both in speaking
and writing. Casual conversational Nepali can be even more flex-
ible. It is common for people to converse in single words rather
than in complete sentences, yet be quite clear in communicating
messages and meanings. One thing that is critical to remember
about Nepali is that it is very hierarchical, with a social class con-
notation when it comes to addressing others. For instance, the
——Nepali Language, Food, and Etiquette——153
pronoun “you” has at least three different words in Nepali to dif-

ferentiate social status: “ta” (pronounced with a dental “t” sound
and nasal accent; used for those with low social status, ranks, and
for children), “timi” (for medium status or among close friends),
and “ta-pai” (for high status, higher ranks, seniors, etc.). The
hierarchical variations for the pronouns “she, he, they” are not as
severe as they are for “you.” Foreigners should avoid using the
first two versions of “you” just to play it safe.
The following are some useful survival Nepali expressions:
Namaste. Greetings (applicable to any time of the

day, but used when one meets some-
body, not at the time of parting. It is
gender neutral).
Lau (la) ma janchhu. Okay, I am leaving (going) now; a com-
mon and polite way to say goodbye.
Ke chha? Abbreviated way to say “What’s going
on?” It is usually combined with the
word bhannos (please say), which can
come first or last.
Kasto chha? Abbreviated way to say “How are things
going?” Again combined with bhannos.
Dhannebad. Thank you.
Kah (kaha) chha . . .? Where is . . .?
Dekhai dinos. Please show me.
Ek chhin. Just a moment.
Kurnos Please wait.
Basnos. Please sit down.
Khanos. Please eat.
Thik (or ramro) chha It’s good; it’s nice.
Pugyo. Enough.
Hunchha. Yes.
Nahi (or hoina). No.
Maph garnos. Please pardon me; excuse me.
Pheri dinos. Give me one more, please;
give me again.
Man pardaina. Don’t like it.
Ke bhayo? What happened?
Yo ke ho? What is this?
FOOD AND BEVERAGES

In Nepal, eating is more than a nutritional necessity to sustain life,
it is a time-honored social activity, imbued with cultural mean-
ings. In addition to communal eating during certain festivals and
occasions, sharing meals and offering food and drink to guests is
an integral cultural practice that transcends all geographical, eth-
nic, caste, and class boundaries. No matter how poor a family may
be, they are likely to offer some snacks or at least a cup of tea to
visitors, whether the visitors are relatives, friends, or neighbors. If
they fail to offer some food or drink, they will be seen as either too
poor or too miserly to have any social grace and sense of dignity.
Those who act miserly are seldom openly welcome by other fam-
ilies when they come for a visit. At times, therefore, this cultural
practice borders on social obligation.
If somebody happens to visit a family during lunch or dinner
hours, the visitor is normally offered a full meal, even if that
means the family members may have to be served less than a
normal portion. Furthermore, it is considered impolite for family
members to eat before the visitors are fed. In terms of family hier-
archies, senior male members are fed before female and junior
members. In this hierarchical eating structure, daughters-in-law
or wives are usually the last ones to eat, and the cook rarely eats
until other members of the family have finished eating. In group
settings, including in restaurants, few will dare to eat until the
senior-most member—determined based on either rank or age—
initiates and signals others to begin eating. This rule applies
within the family as well, when several family members eat
together. Such eating order and etiquette are closely observed
across both ethnic and class lines.
Although the frequency of dining out has increased over the
years, eating is still a family affair in two respects. First, most
lunches and dinners are eaten at home. Second, in most families,
several members generally eat in a family atmosphere rather than
individual members eating separately. However, these days mem-
bers of most wealthy urban families consume their snacks in
restaurants, usually with their friends and colleagues. This is an
important aspect of socialization, group formation, and network
building. Such a setting also acts as an important venue for con-
ducting business transactions. In sum, food and beverage con-

sumption constitute more than nutrition—they are a central link
of social networks, civility, and cultural immersion.
Common Nepali Dishes

Rice. When it comes to the place of rice in the social and cultural
life of Nepal, the situation is no different than what is observed
throughout monsoonal Asia. Its preeminence is demonstrated not
only in terms of its extensive cropping but also through its use dur-
ing many festivals and ceremonies from birth to death. Rice is an
unmistakable symbol of Nepali culture and social status. Those
who cannot afford rice on a daily basis are generally considered
poor. A family’s inability to serve rice to guests is a source of
shame. And those who can afford rice consume it up to three times
a day (including breakfast), certainly for both lunch and dinner.
Rice is served in Nepal in a variety of flavors and shapes and to dif-
ferent standards of quality. Many different dishes are prepared
from rice, especially in Newar communities. Beverages also are
made out of rice, namely jand (fermented rice mixed with water)
and raksi (similar to Japanese sake). Boiled rice is the most com-
mon preparation, followed by chiura (beaten or flat rice). In Nepal,
rice is rarely consumed by itself; it is invariably mixed with cooked
dal (lentils), some vegetable dish, and/or chutney (pickles). If fam-
ilies can afford meat, it is added to the rice. The higher the house-
hold economic position, the greater the variety and the number of
side dishes to complement the taste of rice.
Dal. This is a generic term used for most types of lentils. It is also
a lentil dish, soupy in form and, usually, prepared from black, yel-
low, or red lentils or mung beans. Within most households, rice is
not complete unless it is accompanied by dal, which is a very
important source of protein.
Meat. Meat is not a common dish for most Nepali households

because they cannot afford it. It is usually limited to once a week
or even once every 2–3 months in some cases. Major festivals are
perhaps the only occasions when almost every family acquires
some meat to consume. Nepalis consume a variety of meats, the
most common being goat/sheep, buffalo, chicken, and pork.

Unlike in the United States, chicken is usually the most expensive
meat in Nepal.
Cultural and religious taboos against consumption of certain
meats exist within the various Nepali subcultures. Although the
low castes, Tibeto-Nepali ethnic groups, and the Newars are per-
mitted to consume different types of meats, Brahmans and
Chhetris were traditionally confined to goat and sheep meat.
Although the concept of vegetarianism certainly exists, few
Nepalis practice it as a religious dogma. Although the reason for
the restriction of buffalo meat consumption within Brahman and
Chhetri communities is not clear, poultry and pork were consid-
ered unclean or polluted meats because chickens and pigs eat
anything, including human feces. As a result, these groups were
prohibited from consuming them (as well as liquor) to preserve
their caste purity. These days, however, not too many Brahmans
and Chhetris adhere to such traditional prohibitions, largely due
to their widespread social intermingling with other groups. Most
now eat other meats when given the opportunity. People in Nepal
eat almost every body part, including brains, feet, and tongues.
Blood is also consumed in different forms.
There are two more cultural aspects of meat consumption in
Nepal. First, as a Hindu society, eating beef is absolutely prohib-
ited. Although the Muslim and Untouchable members of society
are allowed to consume beef, killing a cow (even by accident) is a
serious crime, for which the perpetrator can be imprisoned for
life. Such a strict observance of beef consumption does not, how-
ever, keep fancy hotels from discretely importing beef and serving
it to Western tourists. Second, there is an unwritten gender rule
regarding meat consumption. Specifically, female buffaloes and
goats are rarely killed for meat—at least not openly.
Vegetables. Vegetables are an important part of the Nepali diet,

almost as important as the ubiquitous dal. Most farming families
grow some vegetables for domestic consumption or to supplement
their food supply. Given the fact that most families consume very
limited amounts of meat and dairy products, dal and vegetables
are the major sources of protein and vitamins. Although some
vegetables are intercropped with other crops, some are grown
separately, both in the summer and winter. Most of the vegetables

found in the United States are also found in Nepal. One dry (dehy-
drated) vegetable that is strictly indigenous to Nepal and is rarely
found in any other cultures, including its closest neighbor India,
is called gundruk. It is actually composed of a variety of winter
vegetables, for example, cabbage, mustard, cauliflower, or radish
greens. The greens are first slightly sun-dried; then beaten down
to extract juice; packed tightly in bamboo, wooden, or clay con-
tainers for several days until they are fermented (but not rotten);
and then taken out and thoroughly dried in the sun. Gundruk can
be mixed with other dishes or prepared as a separate dish. No
matter how it is fixed, it is a typical specialty of Nepal.
Curry. It is not a particular dish or ingredient; it is largely a

method of preparation using certain spices. Most common among
these spices are turmeric, cumin, coriander, garlic, ginger, hot
chili pepper, and, of course, salt. Most vegetable and meat dishes
are cooked as curry dishes. In this respect, most of the curry
dishes in Nepal are similar in taste and form to those found in
northern India and Bangladesh, although some local variations
are certainly normal and common.
Newari Dishes. With respect to Nepali cuisine, the Newars are

perhaps the most renowned chefs of Nepal. Newari dishes are
quite distinct because of their sophistication, originality, prepara-
tion, and number. Most Newari dishes are also exquisite in their
taste, particularly sweets and meat dishes. So well known are the
Newari dishes that many of them have become national stan-
dards; they are served throughout Nepal, both geographically and
demographically. One of the dishes is called momocha or momo,
which is, in a way, similar to Chinese dumplings. It is, in fact,
believed that its origin is rooted in Chinese dumplings that made
their way into Tibet and were later introduced to the Newari com-
munities in the Kathmandu Valley by Nepali merchants doing
business in Tibet. Other highly popular Newari dishes include
bhutan (thoroughly fried internal organs like intestines, lungs,
hearts, etc.), chhwa-la (similar to shish kebab), and kachi-la
(fresh raw meat tastefully marinated in spices). Although bhutan
and chhwa-la can be made from any meat, kachi-la is restricted
to buffalo and goat/sheep meat. Momocha is also usually made out

of buffalo and goat meat. These four dishes are widely served in
most Newari restaurants, especially in the Kathmandu Valley.
Nicely spiced and tasty, they are very popular as snacks. Although
foreign dishes such as pizza have become popular on an occa-
sional basis, they cannot compete with native Newari dishes on a
sustained or day-to-day basis.
Common Nepali Beverages

Raksi. Similar to Japanese sake in taste and texture, raksi is per-
haps the most common and traditional alcoholic beverage in
Nepal. Although it can be made from a variety of grains, rice and
millet are the two most commonly used. Depending on the prepa-
ration, it comes in various levels of alcoholic content or strength.
Once again, the Newars are considered to be some of the best raksi
makers in Nepal. Their best raksis can easily match some of the
finest scotch in the West. Few people serve or drink raksi (or any
other alcoholic beverage) by itself, without some snacks, the most
preferred being the above-mentioned Newari dishes. Unlike other
types of commercially produced alcoholic beverages available in
Nepal, raksi cannot be purchased in the open market. It is strictly
a matter of domestic production, often for family consumption.
Some households also sell it to neighbors and friends to generate
supplementary cash incomes, but such transactions are conducted
discretely because of the restriction on its commercial production.
Beer. In the past 10–15 years, beer has made tremendous inroads
in Nepal. It is now a very popular alcoholic drink, a status symbol
among the upwardly mobile and upscale urban and educated
crowds. It is “the drink to order” in restaurants. Though some
imported beers are available, most beer consumed in Nepal is
brewed in the country, mostly through joint ventures with foreign
beer companies such as San Miguel.
Tea and Soft Drinks. Tea, which is widely consumed in both rural
and urban areas, is without question the national drink of Nepal.
Nepal produces some tea in the eastern hills around Ilam, but most
is imported from India. Few families fail to serve tea to guests and
visitors, and one can always expect a cup of hot black tea, often
mixed with some milk and sugar, when visiting a Nepali home. Many
Nepalis drink several cups of tea a day. These days one can find a
variety of Western soft drinks, including the locally bottled Coca-
Cola, as well as bottled water, at shops and carts throughout Nepal.
ETIQUETTE
As a very structured and reserved society, Nepal certainly has
some expectations with regard to certain sociocultural etiquette
and manners. Although the whole cultural conception of individ-
ual social etiquette and manners is constantly evolving, there are
some that seem timeless in terms of their practice.
Namaste or Namaskar. These are the most common form of

greeting when individuals meet. Namaste denotes both formal-
ity (respect) and informality (casualness). It is almost like “hi”
or “hello” in the United States, not bound to any specific time of
the day as, for instance, “good morning.” It is not used at the
time of parting.
Taking Shoes off. It is critical to take shoes off at the main entry-
way before entering homes and temples. Failing to do so is a seri-
ous breach of etiquette. This tradition is rooted in both Nepal’s
agrarian structure and religious conception. Peasants and farmers
returning from the field had dirty shoes. They were, therefore,
required to take their shoes off at the door before entering the
house so its interior would remain clean. Religiously, the house is
more than a shelter built for the family’s physical security, it is a
cultural hearth and a symbol of social stability and family lineage,
a sacred place where a family god is kept or where gods are wor-
shiped. As a sacred place, it is supposed to be kept clean, free of
any form of pollution. And shoes are one of the prime sources of
pollution, partly because they are usually made from leather (a
pollutant) and partly because they can bring polluted objects like
feces into the house.
Social Hierarchy and Respect. As previously indicated, there is a

deep tradition of social hierarchy and respect for elders and higher
ranks. Because hierarchy can be determined based on age or official

or social rank, it can sometimes be difficult to figure out who is
higher or lower on the scale of social hierarchy. At any rate, age and
ranks command tremendous respect, and one is expected to show
deference. As an expression of respect, it is common to call some-
body of one’s parental age or older ba (father) and ma or ama
(mother). Those of older bothers’ or sisters’ age are called dai (older
brother) or didi (older sister). Such functional relations are assumed
not only to show respect but also to ease the process of interaction
and communication. The practice of social hierarchy and respect
remains entrenched in Nepal despite the contemporary dissolution
of many traditional mores; they are enduring traits of Nepali society.
Compliments. Although offering compliments is acceptable, it is

not necessarily common. If one offers a compliment, it should be
tempered, not done excessively or profusely, for such an act,
unlike in the United States, can be easily construed as phony and
insincere. Furthermore, compliments and certain Western
niceties may not be reciprocated openly. For example, a “thank
you” may not be replied with a “you’re welcome.” This should
not, however, be construed as a sign of rudeness. It is often an
indication of humility and modesty in that one’s action is a mat-
ter of duty and service, not necessarily something that deserves to
be thanked. Reciprocity is, normally, displayed in subtle forms.
Modesty and Humbleness. It is important to explicitly demon-

strate a sense of modesty and humbleness about one’s achieve-
ments when interacting with seniors and strangers in Nepal. Open
bragging is viewed as impolite, ungraceful, and uncultured. When
dealing with seniors and elders, one should not be direct and
opinionated or look directly in their eyes. Prolonged eye contact
between seniors and juniors is often avoided. If a person talks too
much, he or she will lose others’ trust and respect, for such per-
sons are regarded as shallow, undignified, or not trustworthy.
Public Display of Affection between Opposite Sexes. As discussed

earlier, displaying affection in public is seen as an immoral act.
This is particularly true for girls/women, who will be perceived as
having a loose character that would bring disgrace to the family.
Sitting. Although modern and wealthy houses are equipped with

chairs, in most households one is expected to sit cross-legged on
a mat on the floor.
Nose Blowing. Contrary to the United States, blowing one’s nose

at dinner tables or in eating places is considered extremely unso-
ciable.
Burping. Burping immediately after dinner is normal and com-

mon. In some cases, it is even expected, for it connotes a display
of satisfaction with the meal.
Bargaining. Bargaining is a form of cultural practice that is highly

expected and common in Nepal. In the open market, few things
have fixed prices. Price is something that one arrives at after some
bargaining between the seller and buyer; it is set at the time of
purchase.
Business Cards. In formal settings (e.g., business meetings or offi-

cial visits), exchanging business cards is becoming quite common.
Clothes. Nepal is a relatively traditional and conservative society

when it comes to clothes and dressing. Formal clothing with min-
imal bodily exposure is expected; adults should not wear shorts
and short skirts. Women should avoid low-cut dresses to minimize
the exposure of thighs and cleavage, especially in official and for-
mal settings.
Nepal-Related Organizations
BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC

The following is a list of various Nepal trade- and business-related
organizations. Note that telephone calls to Nepal require a coun-
try code (977) and the appropriate one-digit city code (for Kath-
mandu, the city code is 1).
Central Carpet Industries Association

P.O. Box 2419
Bijulee Bazaar Kathmandu, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) -496108
Fax: (977-1) -496108 or -475291
E-mail: ccia@enet.com.np
Federation of Nepali Chambers of Commerce and Industry

P.O. Box 269
Milan Marg, Teku, Kathmandu, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) -262061, -244758, -262218, or -266889
Fax: (977-1) -261022 or -262007
E-mail: fncci@mos.com.np
Handicraft Association of Nepal

P.O. Box 784
Maitighar, Kathmandu, Nepal
E-mail: han@wlink.com.np
Nepal Chamber of Commerce

Kantipath, Kathmandu, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) -222890, -230290, or -213535
Fax: (977-1) -229998
The Nepal Chamber of Commerce is the nation’s oldest organ-
ization of business entities from across the country, established to
163
promote the interests of Nepal’s business community both domes-

tically and abroad.
Nepal Garment Association

Shankhamul Road, New Baneshwor, Kathmandu, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) -482691 or -481773
Fax: (977-1) -482173
E-mail: gan@asso.wlink.com.np
Nepal Home Page

http://www.nepalhomepage.com
This is an excellent and most comprehensive Web site; it pro-
vides information on virtually every topic related to Nepal, from
politics and government to culture, society, business, economics,
trade, and travel. It is also very user friendly as it is easy to navi-
gate. In addition, it provides links to other pertinent Web sites.
Nepal Industrial and Commercial Bank

P. O. Box 7367
New Road, Kathmandu, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) -227305
Fax: (977-1) -227507
Telex: 2845 NICB NP
E-mail: newroad@nicbank.com.np
Nepal Rastra Bank

Baluwatar, Kathmandu, Nepal
Fax: (977-1) -414553
E-mail: nrbgov@mos.com.np
The central bank of Nepal, the Nepal Rastra Bank determines
the country’s monetary policy and sets daily foreign currency
exchange rates.
Nepal Stock Exchange Limited

Kathmandu, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) -250757 or -250735
E-mail: nepse@stock.mos.com.np; stock@enet.com.np
The Nepal Stock Exchange Limited is a fairly recent initia-
tive, intended to promote stock trades and generate private cap-
——Nepal-Related Organizations——165
ital for investment. It is supposed to give a boost to recent gov-

ernment efforts to promote greater market liberalization and
free trade.
Nepali Chamber of Commerce—USA

1314 Towlston Road
Vienna, VA 22180, USA
Phone: (703) 759-3954
Nepal–USA Chamber of Commerce & Industry

2769 TNT Building, Teenkune, Koteswar, Kathmandu, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) -478020
Fax: (977-1) -478020
E-mail: nusacci@vishnu.ccsl.com.np
CULTURE, EDUCATION, AND EXCHANGE

Himalayan Buddhist Education Foundation
P.O. Box 100
Chakupat, Lalitpur, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) -520558
Fax: (977-1) -527446
E-mail: niem@wlink.com.np
Nepal Education Foundation

P.O. Box 833
Lazimpat, Kathmandu, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) -413114
Fax: (977-1) -525111
School of International Training

Study Abroad Program—Nepal
Brattleboro, Vermont, 05302, USA
Phone: (802) 257-7751
Toll-free within the U.S.: (888) 272-7881
Fax: (802) 258-3296
E-mail: info@sit.edu
In addition to the School of International Training, the follow-
ing universities offer excellent study abroad opportunities in
Nepal, focusing on language learning, culture, society, history,

geography, and economy.
Cornell University
Nepal Study Program
Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
Phone: (607) 255-6224
Michigan State University
Study Abroad
East Lansing, MI 48824, USA
Phone: (517) 353-8920
New College of California
World Studies Project
San Francisco, CA 94110, USA
Phone: (415) 437-3406
E-mail: worldstudies@newcollege.edu
University of Connecticut
College of Continuing Studies
Storrs, CT 06420, USA
Phone: (860) 486-5985
University of Wisconsin–Madison
Center for South Asia
Madison, WI 53706, USA
Phone: (608) 265-6329
USEF/NEPAL—The Fulbright Commission

P.O. Box 380
Kathmandu, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) 415845
Fax: (977-1) 410881
E-mail: fulbcomm@mos.com.np
The Commission for Educational Exchange between the
United States and Nepal is known to many as the United States
Educational Foundation in Nepal (USEF/Nepal) or simply as The
Fulbright Commission. It administers educational exchange activ-
ities between Nepal and the United States and provides informa-
tion about U.S. higher education opportunities to the Nepali pub-
lic. Its principal programs are the Fulbright program, the Hubert
Humphrey Fellowship program, academic and professional

awards from the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii, and
a full range of student counseling, standardized test preparation
(ACT, SAT, TOEFL), and test administration services provided
through USEF’s Educational Advising Center (EAC).
The Fulbright program also provides opportunities for U.S. cit-
izens and permanent residents (students, teachers, and profes-
sors) to study, teach, and do research in Nepal.
NEPAL’S GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES

IN THE UNITED STATES
Embassy
2131 Leroy Place NW
Washington, DC 20008
Phone: (202) 667-4550
E-mail: nepali@erols.com
Consulates General of Nepal

Atlanta
212 15th Street NE
Atlanta, GA 30309
Phone: (404) 892-8152
Dallas
16250 Dallas Parkway, Suite 110
Dallas, TX 75248
Phone: (214) 931-1212
San Francisco
473 Jackson Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Phone: (415) 434-1111
United Nations Permanent Mission

820 Second Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10017
Phone: (212) 370-4188 or -4189
TOURISM
American Embassy
U.S. Embassy
Panipokhari, Kathmandu, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) -411179
Fax: (977-1) -419963
The U.S. Embassy provides valuable information to American
tourists and travelers planning to visit Nepal, along with travel tips
and alerts. Also included is information on the business climate,
investment opportunities, and trade rules and regulations. The
Web site for the U.S. Embassy in Nepal can be accessed through
the U.S. government Web site or via www.south-asia.com/USA.
Catmando.com
http://www.catmando.com
An excellent and comprehensive source of Nepal information
on a variety of travel-related issues and topics, for example,
hotels, airlines, tours, trekking, shopping, travel agencies, and a
host of other useful and pertinent information. Also covered are
news and trades.
Fodors
http://www.fodors.com
Provides valuable information for tourists and travelers plan-
ning to visit Nepal
Lonely Planet Online

http://www.lonelyplanet.com
A good Web site to visit for travel information on Nepal
Nepal Association of Travel Agents

P.O. Box 362
Goma Ganesh, Naxal, Kathmandu, Nepal
Phone: (977-1) -418661 or -413991
Fax: (977-1) -413991
This agency seeks to insure that Nepali travel agencies and
agents render quality services to tourists and travelers as well as
promote the business interests of travel agencies in Nepal.
Nepal Homepage
By far the best, unsurpassed by any other Web site related to
Nepal. As already noted, it offers the most comprehensive and
complete information on all topics related to Nepal, including
travel and tourism.
Visit Nepal.com Travel Information Network

http://www.visitnepal.com
An excellent site for tourists and travelers to Nepal—plenty of
good and valuable information.
Recommended Works on Nepal
The references listed in this section include some of those cited

within this book as well as others related to Nepal. These refer-
ences constitute general but very useful sources of information on
various aspects of Nepal and are arranged in the same chronolog-
ical order as the narrative chapters.
GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF NEPAL

BBC News. A great deal of current news about Nepal can be
accessed through the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
Web site, news.bbc.co.uk. It also provides a country profile and
timeline of key events in Nepali history. The timeline information
is frequently updated.
Encyclopedia Britannica. This is also a very good source of infor-

mation on Nepal’s history and geography as well as other topics,
including limited biographical information.
Joshi, Bhuwan Lal, and Leo E. Rose. 1966. Democratic Innova-

tions in Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation. Berkeley:
This book is a must for anybody who is interested in the polit-
ical history of Nepal. Although its temporal coverage is obviously
limited, from a historical perspective it is a classic piece, one that
is filled with unsurpassed insights into the fundamental nature of
Nepali politics.
Nepal Home Page

This is a quick and concise source of information on various
aspects of Nepal. Because it is a privately operated Web site, one
is cautioned against the accuracy and completeness of certain
171
information. For the most part, it is quite reliable. A very user-

friendly Web site.
Savada, Andrea Matles, ed. 1993. Nepal and Bhutan Country Stud-
ies (Area Handbook Series). Washington, D. C.: Library of Congress.
A U.S. government publication, this is a very useful and com-
prehensive source of information on various topics on Nepal,
including its geography and history. Although some statistical infor-
mation is somewhat dated, general information is very pertinent.
Shaha, Rishikesh. 1990. Modern Nepal: A Political History

1769–1955 (2 vols.).
Shaha is one of the creative scholars that Nepal has produced.
His books provide a very valuable political and historical profile of
Nepal that parallels the work by Joshi and Rose (1966) cited above.
Sill, Michael, and John Kirkby. 1991. The Atlas of Nepal in the
Modern World. London: Earthscan Publications.
Although somewhat outdated, this a valuable source of infor-
mation on various Nepali topics, including geography, graphically
presented in the form of maps and accompanied with some text.
Stiller, Ludwig F. 1976. The Silent Cry: The People of Nepal:

1916–39. Kathmandu: Sahayogi Prakashan.
A long-time foreign observer of Nepal and Nepali history, Stiller
provides an interesting perspective on Nepal’s historical develop-
ments. He has lived in Nepal for many years, having arrived in the
country as a Christian missionary. He is now a Nepali citizen.
South-Asia.com
http://www.south-asia.com
This is also a very good source of information on Nepal. A very
user-friendly Web site.
THE ECONOMY OF NEPAL

Fisher, James F. 1986. Trans-Himalayan Traders: Economy,
Society and Culture in Northwest Nepal. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
——Annotated Bibliography of Recommended Works on Nepal——
A very good source of information on trans-Himalayan trade in

the northern parts of Nepal and on the mode of life and living in
those areas where trade is a primary source of survival.
Panday, Devendra Raj. 1999. Nepal’s Failed Development: Reflec-

tions on the Mission and the Maladies. Kathmandu: Nepal South
Asia Centre.
As a leading authority who has been in and out of government
many times, Panday offers in this book an excellent and moving
account of Nepal’s development policy, performance, and prob-
lems based on the vast pool of his profound theoretical knowl-
edge, empirical understanding, and personal involvement and
experience.
Pradhan, Radhe S. 1984. Industrialization in Nepal. Delhi: NBO

Publishers’ Distributors.
This provides a good historical overview of Nepal’s industrial
development policy and problems.
Regmi, Mahesh C. 1984. The State and Economic Surplus.

Varanasi: Nath Publishing House.
There are very few Nepali or foreign scholars of Nepali eco-
nomic history during the Rana period who can outdo Mr. Regmi.
This is a masterful and insightful portrayal of the economic con-
ditions and policies of Nepal during the Rana period.
Schwartz, Moshe, and A. Paul Hare. 2000. Foreign Experts and

Unsustainable Development. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing
Company.
This book reveals the tragedy of contemporary development
conceived in a grandiose fashion that is locally unsuitable and
unsustainable. The argument presented here is similar to those by
Panday (1999) and Shrestha (1997).
Sharma, Kishor. 1999. Trade Liberalisation and Manufacturing

Performance in Developing Countries: New Evidences from
Nepal. Nova Science Publishers.
The objective of this book is to examine the impact of liberal-
ization on manufacturing performance in developing countries,
with special emphasis on productivity growth and trade orienta-

tion in Nepal.
Shrestha, Badri P. 1981. An Introduction to Nepalese Economy.

Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar.
Authored by a leading contemporary economist of Nepal, this
book represents an excellent source of pertinent information on
the economy of Nepal.
Shrestha, Nanda R. 1997. In the Name of Development: A Reflec-

tion on Nepal. Lanham, MD: University Press of America (Nepal
edition, Kathmandu: Educational Enterprise, 1999).
This study provides real-life stories of how development vic-
timizes people. It is based on the author’s personal observations
and his conversations with victims of development in Nepal.
Using a narrative and nonjargonistic style, the author offers what
can be described as an insider-outsider perspective, a sort of
social commentary, on various aspects of development.
World Bank. 1999. Country Assistance Strategy: Nepal. Washing-

ton, D.C.: World Bank.
This report provides an overview of Nepal’s contemporary eco-
nomic condition, performance, and problems.
NEPALI INSTITUTIONS
Caplan, Lionel. 1970. Land and Social Change in East Nepal: A
Study of Hindu-Tribal Relations. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press.
A very good source of information on Nepal’s social institutions
and social conflicts and change within an ethnic context and on
how high-caste Brahmans and Chhetris came to dominate these
institutions.
Fisher, William F. 2001. Fluid Boundaries: Forming and Trans-

forming Identity in Nepal. New York: Columbia University Press.
A very good cultural anthropological study of identity forma-
tion, transformation, and acquisition, with a particular focus on
the Thakali community of Nepal.
Fricke, Tom. 1994. Himalayan Households: Tamang Demo-

graphy and Domestic Processes. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press.
This provides an anthropological overview of demographic and
social changes taking place in rural areas of Nepal.
Gellner, David N., and Declan Quigley, eds. 1999. Contested Hier-
archies : A Collaborative Ethnography of Caste among the
Newars of the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal. London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
A very good account of the three ancient Newar cities of Kath-
mandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur, and of other settlements nearby.
The social institutions of all the main caste groups—priests,
patrons, artisans, farmers, and low castes—are given extended
consideration.
Guneratne, Katharine Bjork. 1999. In the Circle of the Dance:

Notes of an Outsider in Nepal. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
This book depicts the effects of modernization and tourism on
a society that remained closed to the West well into this century,
while offering comparative insights about wider South Asian cul-
tures. The primary focus is on the Tharu population of the Tarai
region.
Karan, Pradyumna P. 1996. Nepal: A Himalayan Kingdom in

Transition. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
A very good source of general and comprehensive information
on the various aspects of Nepali life and society.
Sanday, John. 1995. The Kathmandu Valley: Jewel of the King-

dom of Nepal. New York: McGraw Hill.
An attractive description of the Kathmandu Valley, the cradle
of Nepal’s artistic and architectural traditions. It is an urban val-
ley that features a vast array of religious art in diverse forms.
Shrestha, Nanda R., and Dennis Conway. 1996. “Ecopolitical Bat-

tles in the Tarai of Nepal: An Emerging Human and Environmen-
tal Crisis.” International Journal of Population Geography 2:
313–331.
This article provides a contemporary portrait of Nepal’s human-

development relations from a political ecology perspective.
Slusser, Mary S. 1983. Nepal Mandala: A Cultural Study of the

Kathmandu Valley. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
An excellent source of Nepal’s cultural history and traditions,
with a particular focus on the Kathmandu Valley and its multifac-
eted contributions.
NEPALI SOCIETY AND

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
Ahern, Laura M. 2001. Invitations to Love: Literacy, Love Letters, and
Social Change in Nepal. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
A contemporary description of what is taking place in today’s
Nepal as a result of the penetrative forces of modernization. Social
change is the focus of the study.
Cameron, Mary M. 1998. On the Edge of the Auspicious: Gender

and Caste in Nepal. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
A contemporary assessment of ongoing social change in the
caste and gender relations in Nepal.
Finlay, Hugh, and Richard Everist. 2001. Lonely Planet Nepal.

Berkeley, CA: Lonely Planet Publications.
A good travel guide to Nepal.
Hutt, Michael James, ed. 1991. Himalayan Voices: An Introduc-

tion to Modern Nepali Literature. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press.
This book provides admirers of Nepal and lovers of literature
with their first glimpse of the vibrant literary scene in Nepal today.
It profiles eleven of Nepal’s most distinguished poets and offers
translations of more than eighty poems written from 1916 to 1986.
Hutt, Michael James, and Abhi Subedi. 1999. Teach Yourself

Nepali: A Complete Course in Understanding, Speaking, and
Writing (book & cassette). New York: McGraw Hill.
The title is self-descriptive.
Taylor, Chris. 2002. Traveler’s Companion: Nepal. Guilford, CT:

Globe Pequot Press.
This is a combination of travel accounts and valuable informa-
tion on travel in the country.
BANGLADESH
PART ONE
NARRATIVE SECTION
Geography and History
of Bangladesh
Bangladesh—the nation (desh) of Bangla or Bengalis—is a proud

nation built on the foundation of a rich literary tradition and his-
tory. As they finally won independence from Pakistan in 1971 after
many years of struggle, the masses of people in what was once East
Bengal and East Pakistan were able to loudly pronounce their own
nationhood: Bangladesh. With the ringing sound of freedom had
suddenly vanished years of despair and shame. As this youngest
nation of South Asia was finally free to chart its own destination,
unencumbered by the fetters of colonialism, its citizens were not
only able to restore their national pride and renew their faith in
self-determination; they were also swept by the euphoria of high
hopes and expectations of a better life, a brighter future for them-
selves and their future generations.
But now all the euphoria is gone. And all those high hopes and
expectations have been dashed as the country is totally drowned
in a vast pool of poverty. For an average Bangladeshi, life is a daily
struggle, constantly fluctuating between subsistence and hunger.
As life moves with the cyclical motion of nature, it closely mirrors
its inherent paradox. The same force that brings the monsoon
rains—the lifeline of Bengali peasants and farmers—also unleashes
the deadly wrath of cyclones and flooding, wreaking havoc
throughout the coastal areas. Lives are lost, properties are dam-
aged, and crops are ruined. Whereas some areas are immersed in
massive floods from cyclones and swelling rivers, bringing life to a
standstill, other parts are baked by prolonged droughts. Such is the
fate of life in Bangladesh. It is no wonder the terrain of struggle
waged by the majority of Bangladeshis has now shifted from polit-
ical independence to economic survival.
This economic battle of survival is bound to get even more
intense as the country finds itself in the midst of a large and grow-
ing population and many social and environmental ills. In terms of
both area and population, Bangladesh is the third largest country
183
Plowing a rice field with the use of buffaloes. Throughout South Asia buf-
faloes and oxen are the principle draft animals for plowing. Female cattle
are rarely used for labor because they are the source for milk. In addition,
cows are considered sacred by Hindus. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)
of South Asia, behind India and Pakistan. The areal size of

Bangladesh is roughly comparable to Wisconsin, but the similarity
ends there. With 128 million inhabitants (1999) crowded into an
area of 55,126 square miles Bangladesh has the highest population
density in the region: about 2,400 persons per square mile , com-
pared with an average of less than 80 per square mile in the United
States. Each year Bangladesh adds about 3 million people to its
population—that is, about one-sixth of Australia’s total population.
PHYSICAL AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

Bangladesh is a subtropical country located along the Tropic of
Cancer. It is bounded by India on the west, north, and northeast.
There is a short border with Myanmar (Burma) on the southeast,
and to its south is the Bay of Bengal. Within this compact geogra-
phy, the country is composed primarily of a vast area of thick allu-
vial and deltaic sediments deposited by three major rivers: the
Padma, Brahmaputra, and Meghna. These rivers, along with their
——Geography and History of Bangladesh——185
Small-scale agriculture is common in Bangladesh, and this village farm-

land scene is typical. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)
230 tributaries, account for a total length of 14,967 miles. Com-

bined, the drainage area of the Padma, Brahmaputra, and Meghna
Rivers is estimated at 694,980 square miles, of which only 9 per-
cent lies in Bangladesh. With the exception of tertiary hills and two
Pleistocene-era terraces, the dominant physiographic features of
the country are the flood plains and coastal tidal plains.
Bangladesh is the meeting ground of South Asia’s two famed
rivers: the Ganga (Ganges) and Brahmaputra. The Ganga River,
the source of which can be traced to the Gangotri glacier in the
Great Himalaya Range, flows through the vast plains of northern
India. At Farakka, about 10.5 miles west of the India-Bangladesh
border, the Ganga divides into two channels. The left channel,
called the Padma, flows eastward into Bangladesh. From the north-
ern side comes the roaring Brahmaputra, which has its origin in
the trans-Himalayan plateau of Tibet, known in China as Xizang.
As it enters Bangladesh, it becomes Jamuna, which in Hindu
mythology is regarded as the sister of Ganga. As the two separated
sisters, Ganga and Jamuna, finally come together, they form the
Padma River, which is then joined by the Meghna River, some 60
miles north of the coasts. Together, they flow gently toward their
ultimate destination, the Bay of Bengal, forming a deltaic land-

scape and depositing each year more than two billion tons of silt
(see map of Bangladesh).
In essence, the alluvial plains of Bangladesh are an eastern
extension of the Indian subcontinent’s Gangetic Plains. Its overall
elevation in Bangladesh is very low, ranging from sixteen to eight-
een feet above sea level. Nowhere are the deltaic characteristics of
these plains more pronounced than in the area southwest of the
Padma-Meghna confluence. Overall, this area is divided into three
zones: a tidal plain (active delta), the moribund (old delta), and a
mature delta. The southern coastal area of Bangladesh (including
the Sundarbans) is affected by tides, which play an important role
in the fluvial processes of the channels of this zone. Based on the
tidal characteristics of these channels, this area is termed the
active delta region (Johnson 1975).
Southwestern Bangladesh, north of the Sundarbans, differs
from the tidal plains in that its rivers are less active—some river
beds are dry, and others have reduced flows. This area is also
higher in elevation compared to the neighboring areas and thus
lacks the regular inundations that bring fresh nutrients for farm-
ing. The rest of the plains located southwest of the Padma-Meghna
confluence is often termed the mature delta. Unlike the flood
plains, this zone does not receive extensive silt or alluvial deposits.
There are two systems of tertiary hills in Bangladesh: The Chit-
tagong Hills in the southeast, and the low hills of Sylhet in the
northeast. Together they occupy about 12 percent of the country.
The Chittagong Hills found along the north-south mountain ranges
of Myanmar constitute the only significant hill system in the coun-
try and are composed of sandstone, sandy clay, and silt stones.
They rise steeply to narrow ridge lines, generally no wider than
120 feet and no higher than 2,950 feet above sea level. At 3,432
feet, the highest peak in Bangladesh is found in the southeastern
part of these hills near the Myanmar border. Most of these hills are
covered with forests, but their valleys are devoted to rice cultiva-
tion. Most of the tribal populations of Bangladesh reside in this
region, and some still practice shifting cultivation, locally called
jhum cultivation.
Northwards the ranges of the Chittagong Hills extend into the
Indian state of Tripura, from which their counterparts project into
the greater Sylhet district of Bangladesh. These hills are lower in

elevation than the Chittagong Hills, and their slopes are the pri-
mary tea growing areas in the country. Unlike the Chittagong Hills,
no rubber plantation is located in the Sylhet Hills. Another small
natural zone can be found in greater Dinajpur and Rangpur dis-
tricts in the north, a zone known to geographers as the North Ben-
gal Alluvial Fan. This submontane belt of alluvial cone stretches
the length of the Himalayan foothills and is composed of detrial
material from the adjacent hills.
Three Pleistocene-era terraces cover 8 percent of the country’s
land area (Haque 1997, 88). The Barind of North Bengal is a gen-
tly undulating region consisting of soils similar to those found on
the tertiary hills. Facing the Barind across the Jamuna flood plain
is the Madhupur Tract. Unlike the Barind, the Madhupur Tract
contains sal (Shorea robusta) forest on the slopes, and agriculture
is largely practiced in the valleys. The third terrace is located in
Comilla and is known as the Lalmai Hill. This hill is actually a sta-
bilized flood plain composed of lowlands.
Climate and Rainfall

Bangladesh generally enjoys a subtropical monsoon climate, char-
acterized by high temperatures over 70 degrees F. for about eight
months, with heavy rainfall during the summer months and a rel-
atively mild, dry winter (December–January). Temperatures
throughout the country are similar, with the highest temperature
usually occurring during May (88–90 degrees F.) and the lowest in
January (64–68 degrees F.). Given this situation, both daily and
seasonal temperature variations are relatively minor.
In contrast, the distribution of rainfall demonstrates not only a
distinct seasonal pattern, with the heaviest concentration from
June to September, but also an increase in precipitation from the
west to the east. About 80 percent of all rainfall in Bangladesh
occurs during the summer. This season is characterized by high
humidity and high temperatures. Average annual rainfall in
Bangladesh varies from around 57 inches to 117 inches, with the
northeastern and southeastern hilly regions generally receiving
the most rains. With under 57 inches of average annual rainfall,
the driest areas are found in the west and northwest.
Two women use a makeshift raft to keep food packets dry. This flood,
which occurred in October 2000 near Indian West Bengal, killed 100 people
and affected 2.63 million. (AFP/CORBIS)
Natural calamities such as floods, tropical cyclones and tidal

bores, and droughts are associated with the climatic and physio-
graphic conditions of Bangladesh. All of these natural phenomena
are directly related to the monsoon and its intensity and timing.
Heavy monsoon rains result in swelling rivers that often cause
massive flooding and damage. Yet it is this very monsoon, in coop-
eration with the country’s river system, that renews and sustains
life for peasants and farmers year after year.
Every year during the summer, almost one-third of
Bangladesh is flooded. Since 1954, there have been twelve
occurrences of tremendous floods, six of which (1954, 1955,
1977, 1987, 1988, and 1998) were devastating. The most recent
two floods, considered by many to be the most disastrous in
recent history, inundated more than half of the country.
Although several thousand people in Bangladesh become home-
less during a normal flood season, during the 1998 flood more
than 60 million were uprooted and as many as 1,500 people
House with a tin roof and bamboo mat walls (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)
died. This flood also damaged nearly half a million homes and
many roads, schools, bridges, health centers, and industrial
sites. The estimated damage exceeded $3.5 billion, an amount
equivalent to 3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of
Bangladesh (Shehabuddin 2000).
One obvious cause of flooding is the heavy monsoon rains, lead-
ing to high volumes of river water discharge. Compounding this
problem is a low channel gradient and loss of channel capacity due
to siltation, a condition that results in rising water overtopping the
riverbanks and submerging the vast flood plains. Extremely low
gradients create inefficient channels for discharging the excess
water received during the monsoon season, particularly when
intense rainfall occurs simultaneously over the entire Ganga-
Brahmaputra basin. The combined runoff from all rivers of this
basin generates a colossal volume of discharge. Furthermore, the
tropical cyclones (hurricanes) strike the coastal area of Ban-
gladesh either in the premonsoon season (April–May) or during
the retreating monsoon (October–December). The average fre-

quency of tropical cyclones over the Bay of Bengal is about six per
year. Since 1960, Bangladesh has experienced at least six major
cyclones (1963, 1965, 1970, 1985, 1988, and 1991). In 1965 alone,
three cyclones occurred, each killing more than 15,000 people.
These cyclone-related strong winds and storm surges frequently
cause unusually high floods in coastal areas. Although their lifes-
pan is generally no more than a couple of days, the damage can be
enormous. In fact, tropical cyclones are often more destructive
than are floods. For instance, the 1991 cyclone destroyed 122
miles of coastal embankment, 74,100 acres of crops, and over
900,000 head of cattle.
Then there is the drought, whose impact often tends to be
slower but prolonged. Droughts afflict the country at least as fre-
quently as do major floods and cyclones. Bangladesh has suffered
severe droughts in 1973, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1989, 1992, and
1994–1995. The area that is most drought-prone is the northwest-
ern region of the country, which is relatively drier on average,
receiving much less rainfall than the rest of the country. In
1994–1995, this part of Bangladesh, popularly known as North
Bengal, experienced a severe drought that reduced rice production
by 3.5 million tons (Paul 1998).
In addition to these most visible problems, Bangladesh suffers
from the presence of arsenic in tube well water at levels exceed-
ing the permissible limit set by the World Health Organization
(WHO). Nearly 76 million people are now believed to be afflicted
with arsenic poisoning from contaminated tube wells, the main
source of drinking water in rural Bangladesh. Long-term expo-
sure to arsenic may lead to skin, lung, or bladder cancer. Arsenic
is a crystalline metallic substance that occurs naturally in subsoil
and is relatively soluble in water. The source of the arsenic is
pyrite (iron sulfide), a sedimentary rock that is washed down
from the Himalayas and deposited at a depth of 65 feet to 325
feet in the Bengal basin by the Ganga River (Paul and De 2000,
800). Geologists indicate that arsenic has been seeping into the
water supply for decades, but the rate of seepage is more rapid
now than in the last few decades due to the fast withdrawal of
groundwater to both irrigate land and provide safe drinking
water. Since the mid-1970s, nearly 4 million tube wells have
been installed. Today, 96 percent of Bangladeshis obtain their

drinking water from tube wells.
Forests
Nearly 5 million acres, or about 14 percent of the total land in
Bangladesh, is forested. These forests can be divided into six
categories: the hill reserved, plain land, coastal accretion, Sun-
darban, unclassified, and homestead/village forests. The first five
are state-owned forests and managed by the Forest Department.
The hill reserved forests cover about 70 percent of the total
forested area.
The largest concentration of reserved forests is found in the
Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) region. Rubber plantations constitute
an important component of this region’s forests, along with several
tea plantations. Valuable commercial trees grown in these forests
are mahogany and teak, both introduced in the late nineteenth
century from neighboring Myanmar. Also included are famed sal
(hardwood) trees that are indigenous to South Asia; they are used
to construct houses, buildings, and bridges in addition to being
used for telephone poles.
An extensive tidal mangrove forest along the Bay of Bengal in
the south Ganga Delta includes the world-renowned Sundarban,
which literally means beautiful (sunder) forests (ban). But it is
believed that the name Sundarban is originally derived from
Sundai trees, the main timber trees in the forest. The Sundarban
covers southwestern Bangladesh and the southeastern portion of
West Bengal in India. Two-thirds of this forest is within
Bangladesh. The Sundarban is also the home of the world-famous
Bengal tigers.
Due to growing demands for land, forest covers in Bangladesh
have been decreasing at an annual rate of 2.5 percent. The coun-
try currently has less than 0.05 acre of forest land per person, one
of the lowest in the world. Such a low level of forest cover is con-
sidered too small to meet growing demands for timber and other
forest products and at the same time to maintain ecological bal-
ance. As humans increasingly encroach into the wild habitats of
the tigers and elephants, these animals have come under mount-
ing pressure. Not surprisingly, therefore, the frequency of deadly
and destructive encounters between these wild animals and

human beings has increased.
Population
Race and Religion. The overwhelming majority of the people of
Bangladesh are Bengalis, a branch of what is commonly believed to
be Indo-Aryans. Prior to their arrival in the region around 2000
B.C., the area that is now Bangladesh had been populated by Dra-
vidians, whose physical characteristics include relatively shorter
stature and darker skin. Santals, a tribal group that lives in the
Barind region of North Bengal, are considered to be the descen-
dants of the Dravidian population. People of Mongoloid origin can
be seen in eastern Bangladesh, especially in the CHT and Sylhet
areas. They also are found in the northern part of the Mymensingh
district. Altogether the Mongoloid group barely exceeds 1 percent
of the country’s total population. To this day, the majority of the
tribal population lives in rural settings.
Bangladesh is predominantly a Muslim country, just the oppo-
site of Nepal. According to the 1991 census, 88 percent of the peo-
ple are Muslims and almost all of them belong to the Sunni branch
of Islam. Nearly 11 percent of Bangladeshis are Hindus and the
remaining are Buddhists and Christians (BBS 1994, 101). The Hin-
dus of Bangladesh mostly belong to scheduled castes (a legal term
for those formerly known as Untouchables) and are concentrated
in central districts. In contrast, Buddhists are primarily concen-
trated in the CHT region, whereas the distribution of Christians
largely corresponds to tribal populations.
Throughout the twentieth century the Muslim population in
Bangladesh consistently increased, whereas the Hindu population
experienced the opposite trend. In 1951, four years after the par-
tition of India and Pakistan, Muslims accounted for 77 percent of
the total population of Bangladesh, and Hindus constituted 22 per-
cent. But, according to the 1991 census, the percentage of the
Muslim population has jumped to 88 percent and the correspon-
ding figure for Hindus has been cut in half. The rest of the religious
population groups remained at 1 percent.
Bengali, or Bangla, is the native language of almost all
Bangladeshis except for the tribal population. It is the official lan-
——Geography and History of Bangledash——193
Bicycles, rickshaws, buses, and pedestrians jam a street in Dhaka in this

1994 photo. Such overcrowding occurs during festivals and special events.
(AP Photo/John Moore)
guage of the country. A member of the Indo-European language

family, Bengali is believed to be derived from Sanskrit. It is written
in script that is a modification of the Sanskrit writing system. As a
result, it shares countless words and phrases with Hindi and
Nepali, the other two Sanskrit derivatives. There are several
regional dialects in Bengali, most dominant being those in Sylhet,
Noakhali, and Chittagong. Bengali has a distinguished history in
literature, music, and poetry. At least two Bengali poets are well
known in the West—Rabindranath Tagore, a Nobel laureate, and
Kazi Nazrul Islam. Despite Bengalization of all official activities
after independence in 1971, English remains an important lan-
guage in Bangladesh.
Biharis, a group that included mostly Urdu-speaking non-Ben-
gali Muslim refugees from Bihar, settled in area cities after 1947. At
the time of independence in 1971, they totaled about one million,
but since then their number has dwindled to roughly 500,000 due
to their relocation to Pakistan, where they find a receptive climate
in terms of both their language and customs.
Distribution, Density, and Growth. Bangladesh is widely
known for its chronic population problem. The country ranks
ninety-sixth in the world in terms of area but is the ninth most
populous country in the world. This makes Bangladesh the most
densely populated country in the world with the exception of a
city-state like Singapore. With current average population density
of about 2,400 people per square mile, the country is extremely
crowded. The fertile flood plains as well as coasts are heavily con-
gested. According to the 1991 census, the Dhaka district had the
highest density, with more than 10,000 people per square mile. In
contrast, all three districts of the CHT region had the lowest pop-
ulation density—nearly 135 people per square mile.
Currently, the population of Bangladesh is growing at an annual
rate of 1.8 percent. The country had a population of 44 million in
1951 but climbed to 108 million in 1991. In 1999 it was estimated
to have 128 million people. If the recent demographic trends hold,
the total population of Bangladesh may reach approximately 250
million by 2030. Like most developing countries, the population
growth rate of Bangladesh primarily reflects the imbalance of
births and deaths. In simple terms, the greater the disparity
between births and deaths, the faster the rate of population change
from one period to another. Over time, Bangladesh’s crude birth

rate (i.e., the number of births per 1,000 people) has declined sub-
stantially, from 49 in 1951 to 25 in 1996. But the crude death rate
(i.e., the number of deaths per 1,000 persons) has declined even
faster, going down from 30 in 1961 to less than 10 for the same
time period. As a result, population growth has been relatively
rapid. However, in recent years, Bangladesh has witnessed a
declining trend in national population growth rates.
Age-Sex Composition and Dependency Ratio. The simplest
demographic characteristic by which to categorize a population is
by sex. The sex composition of a population is conveniently
described by the sex ratio, that is, the number of males per 100
females. A sex ratio of 100 is considered balanced, as it indicates
that there are equal numbers of males and females in a population.
A ratio above 100 means there are more males than females
(called a masculine ratio), and a ratio below 100 indicates more
females than males (called a feminine ratio).
Like most countries of South Asia, Bangladesh has a masculine
sex ratio. There were 106 males per 100 females in the country in
1991. Although this ratio has remained high, it has decreased
slightly during the past three decades. The masculine ratio tends
to be even higher in urban areas and relatively lower in rural areas
because of the departure of male migrants from rural to urban
areas. For example, the 1991 census showed an average urban sex
ratio of 124, compared to 102 in rural areas (Paul 1994). The coun-
try’s masculine sex ratio is largely attributed to high mortality rates
among female children under five and women of childbearing age.
This mortality trend reflects the low status of women in
Bangladesh. As in Nepal and other parts of Asia, girls are often neg-
lected; they receive less food and less health care relative to their
male siblings. This is particularly true among poor families who
face a chronic shortage of food and health care. Further com-
pounding this problem is the high dowry price incurred by girls at
the time of their marriage, a practice that imposes significant hard-
ship on family resources.
Family Planning. In view of the serious social, economic, and
environmental consequences of rapid population growth, the gov-
ernment has adopted policies to reduce population growth, espe-
cially through family planning programs (FPPs). By declaring pop-
ulation growth as the number-one problem of the country, the gov-

ernment has greatly emphasized family planning as an integral
component of its overall national development policy. As a result,
FPPs were further strengthened and expanded. Currently, family
planning services are provided through a network of more than
3,000 clinics and about 24,000 female field workers who visit
women in their homes. Additionally, at least twelve nongovern-
ment organizations (NGOs) provide services at 324 sites.
To increase the adoption rate of family planning, the govern-
ment makes available a wide variety of contraceptive methods.
The overall use of short-term methods like oral pills, condoms, and
injectable hormones has increased, while long-term methods such
as sterilization have declined. The pill is the most preferred
method of contraception among Bangladeshi women; at present 25
percent of married women are using it (Mitra et al. 1997). How-
ever, there seem to be noticeable urban and class biases in that
women from well-educated, affluent, and urban families use them
at a higher rate and more regularly than those in rural areas and
the poor. In addition, employed women are generally more open to
practicing contraception and have lower fertility than women not
so engaged.
Despite an increasing rate of family planning use, Bangladesh’s
population growth is not expected to experience a sharp decline
anytime soon. The main reason for this scenario is that 45 percent
of its population is under the age of fifteen. As this population
cohort enters the reproductive phase, the population will continue
to grow. In essence, family planning has served as a breaker grad-
ually slowing down the rate of population growth rather than curb-
ing it drastically.
Foreign Migration. A recent government report claims that
about 3 million Bangladeshis are now living legally abroad as guest
workers. An overwhelming majority of these workers are
employed in Middle Eastern countries. Bangladesh entered the
Middle Eastern labor market in 1976 and sent an average of 81,000
Bangladeshis annually to work in the region between 1976 and
1995. Throughout the 1980s, more than a third of Bangladesh’s
international laborers worked in Saudi Arabia, followed by the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, and Iraq. Since the
mid-1980s, Bangladeshis have moved to Southeast and East Asian
countries such as Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Brunei. Every

year between 1980 and 1995 more than 11,000 Bangladeshi work-
ers left the country to work in these countries. Migration to the
Western world also increased in the 1980s. Now many
Bangladeshis are found throughout Europe and North America,
some working legally and others illegally. For instance, they con-
stitute a significant number of taxi drivers in most major cities in
the United States, from New York to Los Angeles. Their numbers
have continued to swell because the economy of Bangladesh has
failed to generate sufficient domestic employment for the growing
population (Paul 2000).
Perhaps the principal impact of labor migration to the Middle
East and other foreign countries has been the volume of remit-
tances repatriated to Bangladesh. In the mid-1990s, remittances
were equivalent to more than 50 percent of all exports. Another
positive aspect is that the export of labor has reduced the pres-
sure of domestic unemployment. Additionally, some employ-
ment has been generated domestically due to the increase in the
demand for several economic activities such as air transport,
travel agencies, hotels, banks, health clinics, secretarial services,
and recruiting agencies induced by labor migration. The conse-
quence has not been all positive, however. Because most foreign
migrants tend to be young and relatively more educated, their
departure has created a void of skilled labor in the country. In
some cases, young married migrants with additional income at
their disposal have divorced their wives to remarry into families
of higher social status.
Urbanization. Historically, the degree of urbanization in
Bangladesh has been low. In 1961, only 5 percent of the popula-
tion lived in cities and towns. According to the 1991 census, the
percentage of the population living in urban areas has risen to over
20 percent, and it is projected to approach 37 percent by 2015. In
terms of absolute number, 22.5 million lived in urban areas in
1991, compared to only 2.6 million in 1961. Such a significant
numerical growth in the urban population does not, however,
reflect commensurate economic development; it is rather indica-
tive of rural overpopulation and poverty. In essence, the growth of
the country’s urban population has occurred mainly because of
three factors: massive rural-to-urban migration, a natural increase
in the native urban population, and the territorial extension of

existing urban areas together with a change in the definition of an
urban area. Of these three, migration is by far the biggest contrib-
utor as rural people continue to pour into cities en masse year after
year.
In 1991, about 9 percent of the total population of Bangladesh
lived in its four largest cities, including the capital city of Dhaka,
which alone contained over 28 percent of the country’s total urban
population. Dhaka is a clear case of single-city primacy, but this
primacy is more prominent in functional terms than by population
numbers. For example, this city accounts for about one-half of
national manufacturing employment.
With increasing urban population growth, the cities, especially
the larger ones, are facing mounting problems associated with
the provision of basic needs and services. About 12 million urban
dwellers—over 50 percent—live in absolute poverty. Hunger is
routine and rampant. Life is a constant vacillation between bare
subsistence and starvation. Furthermore, the urban poor live in
slums and squatter settlements called bustees, most with mud
floors and leaky roofs; two-thirds of the urban population have no
access to sanitary facilities, and 55 percent are denied access to
clean water, electricity, health care, and education for their chil-
dren. Under these circumstances, it is hardly any surprise that
murder, torture, illegal arms smuggling, and drug addiction have
become much too common. In addition, deepening urban
poverty forces thousands of women to resort to prostitution as an
avenue of survival.
HISTORY
The area that now constitutes Bangladesh has a long history, dat-
ing back to 1,000 B.C. when Dravidians began settling in this part
of the subcontinent. This long history can be divided into the fol-
lowing periods.
Early History
Several Indo-Europeans tribes called Aryans moved from the
Indus Valley to the lower Gangetic plains, and from there a group
called Bang moved to the Bengal area around 1,000 B.C. (Baxter
1984, 11). It is believed that the Bang tribe gave its name to the
area, which comprises present-day Bangladesh and West Bengal in
India. Others claim that the Bangs were Dravidian-speaking people
who had settled in this area before the arrival of Indo-Europeans
(see Blood 1989, 4). At any rate, Bengal formed the eastern
extremity of the Mauryan empire, which included most of present-
day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The empire was built by
Chandragupta in the fourth century B.C. and expanded under his
grandson Ashok in the third century B.C. Considered the greatest
Mauryan ruler, Ashok, a Hindu emperor, converted to Buddhism
and assisted in its diffusion. During his time, Buddhism came to
Bengal and the seaport established during the Mauryan period was
used for trade and to spread Buddhism to Sri Lanka and Southeast
Asia (Baxter and Rahman 1989).
Shortly after Ashok’s death, the Mauryan empire collapsed, and,
subsequently, Bengal was ruled by the Indian Gupta empire (ca.
A.D. 319–540). The new empire exacted tribute from Bengal but
generally allowed local chieftains to exercise authority. Later, the
eastern portion of Bengal became the kingdom of Samatata
(located near the present city of Chandpur in the Comilla district).
Although politically independent, it was a tributary state of the
Gupta empire. In the seventh century, Samatata was drawn briefly
into the powerful but short-lived (A.D. 606–647) Harsha empire in
northern India. From the time of the Mauryan empire through rule
under the Harsha empire, Bengal basically was treated as a back-
water (Blood 1989).
In 750, Bengal produced a dynasty of its own under a Buddhist
chief named Gopala. Called the Pala dynasty, it ruled all of Bengal
until 1150. The Pala dynasty expanded its territory westward and
established its capital in the present-day city of Monghyr in Bihar,
India. The Pala capital within Bengal was at Vikrampur, near
Dhaka. As ardent Buddhists, the Palas established many Buddhist
monasteries and schools and helped spread the religion through-
out their empire and neighboring territories. Trade and influence
were extensive under Pala leadership, as emissaries were sent as
far as Tibet and Indonesia (Baxter 1984).
The Senas, orthodox and militant Hindus, replaced the Bud-
dhist Palas as rulers of a united Bengal. They ruled from 1150 to
1202 from their capital, Nadia, in West Bengal. During their brief
rule, the Senas tried unsuccessfully to revive Brahmanism as the
religion of Bengal. The Turkish conquest in 1202 marked the end
of the Sena dynasty and beginning of Islamic rule. Collateral
branches of the Senas, however, continued to rule for a short time
in eastern Bengal.
Mughal (Islamic) Rule

Although the Muslims entered the Indian subcontinent from
Afghanistan in about the eighth century A.D., they did not take
political control of the subcontinent until 1206. The Slave or Mam-
luk dynasty (1206–1290) was the first to rule from Delhi. It was
replaced by the Khalji dynasty between 1290 and 1320. In 1341,
Bengal gained independence from Delhi and Dhaka became its
capital. Finally, in 1576, Emperor Akbar (1556–1605) conquered
Dhaka. However, because of its remote location and poor commu-
nication system with Delhi, Dhaka governors found it easy to
ignore imperial directives and maintain their autonomy.
Although physically quite far from Delhi, the Mughal (Moghul;
Mogul) rule had a lasting effect on Bengal. Akbar introduced the
present-day Bengali calendar, and his son, Jahangir (1605–1627),
instituted civil and military officials outside Bengal who collected
land taxes from Bengali subjects. This institution ultimately led to
the development of a zamindar (landlord) class during the British
period. In essence, the former tax collectors of the Mughal period
(1526–1857) became landlords during British rule. As the Mughals
considered Bengal the “breadbasket of India,” they drained its
resources to maintain the Mughal army. Yet Bengal prospered.
Agriculture and trade expanded, and Dhaka became a major cen-
ter of textile trade in South Asia.
After the death of Aurangzeb, the last Mughal emperor, in 1707,
Bengal governors became practically independent rulers. They
were strong enough to defend themselves against the Hindu
Marathas challenge from the Bombay area. In the meantime, Euro-
peans began to arrive in Bengal, starting with the Portuguese in
Chittagong in 1517. Later, British merchants founded Calcutta in
1690 and built trading networks with local merchants (Baxter and
Rahman 1989, 10). So long as Bengal governors were backed by
Mughal authority and military power, they were able to keep the
Europeans in check and to regulate their activities. In the early
eighteenth century, however, the system began to break down and
ultimately the British were able to defeat the last Mughal governor
of Bengal, Siraj ud Daulah, in 1757 with the help of the treachery
of Mir Jafar, a close relative of Siraj.
British Rule
The British came to India under the auspices of the famous British
East India Company with the initial aim to seek trade under con-
cessions obtained from local Mughal governors. Their arrival gen-
erally coincided with the gradual decline of Mughal power. This
enticed the company, formed in 1600, to become more directly
involved in the politics and military affairs of the subcontinent.
Aside from their superior military power, the British deployed the
principle of “divide and rule” to rise to power. In this game, they
greatly profited from the entrenched Hindu-Muslim animosities.
The British defeated the Mughal emperor in 1764 at the Battle
of Buxar on the Ganges. As a result, the British East India Com-
pany was granted diwani (the right to collect and expend rev-
enues) in the areas of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. Henceforth the
British governed Bengal, and from there they eventually extended
their rule to all of India. By the 1850s, British control and influence
had extended into territories that later became the independent
states of India and Pakistan. Calcutta served as the first capital of
British India until 1911 when it was moved to New Delhi, partly
because of its geographical centrality. The long-term dominance of
Calcutta, however, made eastern Bengal a backwater, and the
importance of Dhaka declined. As Calcutta became the core of
commerce, business, industry, culture, arts, and literature, Dhaka
witnessed its industrial base shrink, particularly most of its world-
famous muslin industry.
In 1857, however, the British faced a large-scale mutiny by the
Bengal army. The British East India Company’s military establish-
ment consisted of three separate armies: Bengal, Bombay, and
Madras. Although the troops (sepoy) were Indian, the officers were
British. The Bengal component of the British army, mostly drawn
from Muslim-dominated eastern Bengal, mutinied at the Meerut
cantonment near Delhi on May 10, 1857. The insurrection was

sparked by the introduction of cartridges rumored to have been
greased with pig or cow fat, which was offensive to both Hindus
and Muslims. As Delhi fell to the sepoy mutineers, the British rule
in India was threatened. However, the Sepoy Mutiny, often referred
to as India’s “first war of independence,” was eventually brought
under control, with the help of Nepal, which sent several thousand
soldiers to assist the British in supporting the mutiny.
As a direct consequence of the mutiny, the British East India
Company ceased to function as the government of India. Adminis-
tration was turned over to the British government, and the com-
pany was abolished in 1858. This marked the beginning of the
British Raj in India. From then until independence, India was
headed by a governor-general, also called viceroy when acting as
the direct representative of the British crown. The governor-
general embodied the supreme legislative and executive authority
in India, but was responsible to the secretary of state for India, a
member of the British cabinet in London.
The Indian National Congress Party was formed in Bombay on
December 28, 1885. It was headed by a Bengali Hindu from Cal-
cutta. Muslims of India, including Bengal Muslims, did not join the
party in large numbers because they considered the Indian
National Congress to be a Hindu party that would not adequately
represent Muslim interests. Muslims eventually formed the All-
India Muslim League in Dhaka in 1906. One important event
occurred at the time of the formation of the Muslim League. The
British governor-general, Lord Curzon (viceroy, 1899–1905),
divided Bengal into eastern and western parts. The eastern portion
of the province (roughly today’s Bangladesh) was joined with
Assam into the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam; the remain-
ing area became the province of Western Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.
Dhaka became the capital of the eastern province, and some of the
city’s finest buildings were constructed at this time (1905–1911).
Calcutta remained the capital of western Bengal.
The division of Bengal was favored by the Bengali Muslims
because they viewed the partition as an initial recognition of their
cultural and political separation from the Hindu majority popula-
tion. But the Bengali Hindus along with the Congress Party
opposed the division. Linguistically, Bengali became a minority
language in the western province, adding to the dissension. As a

protest to the division, the Bengali Hindus started a swadeshi (a
devotee of one’s own country and products) movement by boy-
cotting British-made goods. The swadeshi movement spread
throughout India and became a major issue in the Congress Party
platform.
Although the Congress Party was claiming to represent all Indi-
ans along a secular ideology, the Muslim League was essentially a
political party formed to protect the interests of Indian Muslims
and wished to divide British India on the basis of what was known
as “Two-Nation Theory.” The Muslim League in Bengal became
more and more dominated by a “national elite” concerned prima-
rily with the problems of the Muslim population. Many of them
were descendants of Delhi sultanate and empire officials and spoke
Urdu as their mother tongue. In contrast, there were Bengali Mus-
lims who used Bengali rather than Urdu as their family language
and who were concerned about their own status and welfare.
Notable among this group were Fazlul Haq and Husain Shahid
Suhrawardy. Haq’s platform was based on economic and social
issues, and the Muslim League’s on communal matters. In the late
1930s, Fazlul Haq formed his own party, called the Krishak Praja
Party (KPP, or Farming People’s Party).
Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1873–1938), an Islamic revivalist poet
and philosopher, gave his presidential speech to the Muslim
League conference at Allahabad in 1930. He spoke of a possible
Muslim state composed of the Punjab, the Northwest Frontier
Province (NFP), Sind, and Baluchistan. However, he chose not to
mention the Muslim-dominated princely state of Kashmir and Ben-
gal in his address. Iqbal also gave no name to his proposed state;
that was done by Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali in 1933. He coined the
name Pakistan by taking the P from Punjab, A from Afghania, K
from Kashmir, S from Sind, and Tan from Baluchistan. When writ-
ten in Urdu, the word Pakistan has no i between the K and S.
The name means “the land of the Paks,” the spiritually pure and
clean. Significantly, Ali neglected to fit Bengal into his imperfect
acronym.
In 1934, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) took over leader-
ship of the Muslim League. On March 23, 1940, in Lahore, the
Muslim League passed a resolution often called the “Pakistan Res-
olution” or “Lahore Resolution.” This resolution demanded two

independent Muslim states, one northwestern and the other south-
eastern. Fazlul Haq was among the supporters of this resolution.
Although Suhrawardy was in favor of the creation of a separate
“united” Bengal as a third dominion on the subcontinent, in the
subsequent political developments Jinnah apparently saw the pos-
sibility of achieving a single Muslim state when partition of British
India became inevitable.
In February 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed
viceroy and was given instruction to arrange the transfer of power
from Great Britain to the local governments. On July 14, 1947, the
British House of Commons passed the India Independence Act, by
which two independent states were created on the subcontinent
and the 562 princely states were left to accede to either. Pakistan
came into existence as an independent Muslim state on August 15,
1947, but was allocated two disjointed territorial entities separated
by India. As the eastern territory of the newly created state of Pak-
istan, East Bengal was called East Pakistan. And today’s Pakistan
was called West Pakistan.
The Pakistan Period

From the very outset, East Pakistan, separated from West Pakistan
by 992 miles of Indian territory, felt mistreated by West Pakistan.
The latter tended to look down on East Pakistanis as “second-class
Muslims” and, therefore, not in the same league in terms of reli-
gious purity. The West Pakistanis considered themselves to be
direct descendants of those who brought Islam to the Indian sub-
continent. Furthermore, West Pakistanis, especially Punjabi Mus-
lims, saw themselves as direct heirs to the ruling tradition of the
Mughal empire, in which Bengal had been a subjugated territory
East Pakistan had the larger population of the two wings, but the
economic and political power resided in West Pakistan. There were
very few Bengalis in the civil service of Pakistan; this imbalance
was even greater in the armed services, where they were only
sometimes employed as clerks. Economic development was also
uneven between the two wings. Most of the new industries were
established in West Pakistan, and East Pakistan became a large
protected market for its products. Jute was the mainstay of the
Pakistani economy. The foreign exchange earnings gained from

the export of jute, grown wholly in East Pakistan, was invested
entirely in West Pakistan.
The declaration of Urdu as the single national language of Pak-
istan further fanned the flame of East Pakistani anger and resent-
ment. Agitation and many civil disturbances erupted in East Pak-
istan. On February 21, 1952, while students in Dhaka were
protesting in the streets against the declaration and demanding
equal status for Bengali, the police reacted by firing into the crowd.
Two students were killed. A memorial, the Shaheed Minar (Mar-
tyrs’ Memorial), was built to commemorate the martyrs of the lan-
guage movement. This incident ultimately led to the independence
movement, and the day is still observed as Martyrs’ Day in
Bangladesh. Eventually, in September 1954, the Pakistan govern-
ment accepted Bengali as a national language on an equal footing
with Urdu.
Another blow for the East Pakistanis came on March 23, 1956,
when the new constitution for Pakistan was finally passed. The
constitution stated that the national parliament was to consist of
one house of 300 members, with equal representation from both
West and East Pakistan. Thus, the constitution disregarded the
numerical majority of East Pakistan. President Iskandar Mirza
abrogated the constitution on October 7, 1958, and proclaimed
martial law. The army commander-in-chief, General Muhammad
Ayub Khan, was named the chief martial law administrator and, on
October 28, he dismissed Mirza, exiled him to London, and
assumed the presidency. Martial law continued until 1962, and
Ayub Khan remained Pakistan’s president until 1969, when he was
forced to resign. He was replaced by General Yahya Khan.
When Yahya took power, he promised to hold national elec-
tions and did so on December 7, 1970. The Awami League, mainly
based in East Pakistan and led by Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib) Rah-
man, won a majority of the seats in the Pakistan National Legisla-
ture. The league won all but two of the 162 seats allotted to East
Pakistan in the National Assembly. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan
People’s Party won eighty-one of the 138 West Pakistani seats in
the Assembly. Neither party won any seat in the other wing. Based
on the election results, Mujib should have assumed Pakistan’s
prime ministership, but the election results were not acceptable
to political leaders in West Pakistan. General Yahya opened talks

with both Bhutto and Mujib, trying to form a government agree-
able to both and to lead them toward cooperation to draft a new
constitution.
On March 1, 1971, General Yahya postponed indefinitely con-
vening the National Assembly, which had been scheduled to con-
vene two days later on March 3. On the same date, he named Gen-
eral Tikka Khan, who had been dubbed the “Butcher of
Baluchistan” for his suppression of Baluch separatists, as East Pak-
istan’s military governor. The number of West Pakistani troops
entering East Pakistan had increased from 25,000 to about 60,000
in the preceding weeks. As tensions rose, General Yahya came to
Dhaka in mid-March to negotiate with Mujib; later Bhutto joined
them (Blood 1989, 29). But those talks failed, and President Yahya
Khan left Dhaka. East Pakistanis immediately began to protest,
and Yahya ordered the Pakistani army to crack down hard. At mid-
night on March 25, 1971, Mujib was arrested and jailed in West
Pakistan. Following this brutal crackdown, Bangladesh declared
independence from Pakistan and the ensuing struggle became a
civil war that lingered for about nine months.
The War for Independence

Between March 25 and December 16, 1971, the Pakistan army
killed about 3 million innocent Bengalis during their efforts to
quell the civil war. The Pakistan army and their Bengali collabora-
tors also looted property belonging to Hindus and Awami League
leaders and supporters, burned their houses, and raped girls and
women. Some 10 million people fled to India to escape these bru-
talities, most of them taking refuge in the neighboring Indian
provinces of West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura.
After the tragic event of March 1971, India became vocal in its
condemnation of Pakistan. India provided shelter and food to the
refugees from East Pakistan and supplied aid to the rebels, known
as Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force). A propaganda war broke out
between India and Pakistan, and Pakistani President Yahya threat-
ened war against India if it made an attempt to seize any part of
Pakistan. Yahya also asserted that his country could count on its
U.S. and Chinese allies. Additionally, in order to ease the situation
in East Pakistan, Yahya replaced Tikka Khan with the more

restrained Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi. A civilian governor
was also installed in East Pakistan. These belated gestures of
appeasement, however, did not stop the fighting and the call for
independence. In fact, on April 12, 1971, a “provisional” govern-
ment was formed in Calcutta by a number of leading Awami
League members who were able to escape from East Pakistan.
They issued a proclamation of independence at Mujibnagar in the
Kushtia district, located very close to the Indian border, on April
17, effective retroactively from April 10, 1971. Mujib was named
president, but in his absence due to imprisonment, Syed Nazrul
Islam became the acting president.
Then came the decisive moment during the war. In response to
Pakistan’s preemptive strike against its territory and citizens on
December 3, India became directly involved in the war for East
Pakistan’s liberation when it retaliated against Pakistan on Decem-
ber 4 in support of the Bengali resistance. India sent its forces into
East Pakistan and formally recognized the provisional government
of Bangladesh two days later. As Dhaka fell to the Indian army and
the Mukti Bahini on December 16, Bangladesh became independ-
ent. The Pakistan army surrendered on the same day. Subse-
quently, in West Pakistan, President Yahya yielded power to a civil-
ian government under Bhutto, who released Mujib. On January 10,
1972, Mujib, also known as Bangabandhu (“Friend of Bengal,” or
the father of Bangladesh), arrived in Dhaka and formed a new gov-
ernment, the first government of independent Bangladesh.
Independent Bangladesh
Although he was a popular and charismatic leader, Mujib was less
than effective in governing a new nation facing many economic
and political problems. One of the most glaring was the breakdown
of law and order. Many had joined the Mukti Bahini during the fight
for independence, and some did not surrender their weapons.
Some took the law into their own hands and set up territories
under their own jurisdiction. Additionally, corruption among gov-
ernment officials and politicians increased markedly. To control
this situation, Mujib was consolidating power. However, his
increasingly authoritarian rule and the distrust of the military with
a long history of political meddling led to a bloody military coup on

August 15, 1975, in which he and most of his family, as well as sev-
eral close associates, were brutally killed.
Following the presidential massacre, General Ziaur (Zia) Rah-
man became martial-law administrator. He also had been a free-
dom fighter, and his “Z Force” (Z for Zia) had been the first to
announce the independence of Bangladesh from a captured radio
station in Chittagong. Having consolidated his position, Zia
became president in April 1977. The following month he created
his own political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). He
allowed national elections in 1979, and his BNP won two-thirds of
the seats in the National Legislature. Economic conditions and law
and order improved during his time, but Zia was assassinated by
dissident military officers in 1981.
The power vacuum created by Zia’s death led to a dispute over
the role of the army in the government. This dispute was
resolved in 1982 when the chief of staff of the army, General Hus-
sain Muhammad Ershad, seized power. As Zia had done, he
formed his own political party and won the presidential election
in 1986. But the two leading opposition parties, the Awami
League headed by Sheikh Hasina Wajid (or Wazed, daughter of
Mujib), and the BNP headed by Begum Khaleda Zia (widow of
General Zia), jointly initiated a public protest, calling for
Ershad’s resignation and new elections. In 1990, in response to
the public outcry, Ershad was forced to resign. He was replaced
by Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed of the Supreme Court as
acting president (Norton 1999).
Shahabuddin organized national elections in February 1991,
and Begum Zia’s BNP won. Because Begum Zia did not command
a majority of seats in the National Legislature, she formed the gov-
ernment with the help of the Jamaat-e-Islami, a conservative
Islamic party. In the subsequent elections, held in 1996, Sheikh
Hasina’s Awami League formed the government with the help of
Ershad’s party. In the most recent elections held in October 2001,
the Awami League lost and the BNP led by Begum Zia was returned
to power. The Awami League’s defeat has been largely attributed to
its inability to improve economic conditions and reduce social
problems, including the deteriorating situation of law and order
during its rule.
CONCLUSION
The fact that Bangladesh’s past two governments were led by civil-
ian political leaders who were able to complete their full terms
does not imply that the political atmosphere in the country has
necessarily improved. Although the transition of power from one
party to another in independent Bangladesh has been relatively
smooth (despite repeated accusations of electoral rigging and cor-
ruption), deep-seated animosities and political revenges are com-
mon. National interests take a back seat to personal and party
agendas. What is ironic in all of the political propaganda and posi-
tioning is that the ruling party is patently accused of massive cor-
ruption and mismanagement. But when a different party comes to
power, corruption is still there, in fact, kicking harder than ever
before. Not surprisingly, therefore, every level of rising political
rhetoric against corruption escalates the degree of corruption.
Caught in the midst of all this are the general masses, who have no
choice but to endlessly wage a silent battle of their own—the bat-
tle of survival.
References
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Westview Press.
Baxter, Craig, and Syedur Rahman. 1989. Historical Dictionary of
Bangladesh. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press.
BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics). 1998. 1997 Statistical Yearbook of
Bangladesh. Dhaka.
_____. 1994. Bangladesh Population Census 1991: Vol. 1 Analytical Report.
Dhaka.
Blood, Peter R. 1989. “Historical Setting.” In Bangladesh: A Country Study.
James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden, eds. Washington, D.C.: Library
of Congress, 1–41.
Brammer, H. 1990. “Floods in Bangladesh: Geographical Background to the
1987 and 1988 Floods.” Geographical Journal 156:12–22.
Haque, C. E. 1997. Hazards in a Fickle Environment: Bangladesh. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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Mitra, S. N., et al. 1997. Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey:
1996–1997. Dhaka: Mitra and Associates.
Norton, J. H. K. 1999. India and South Asia. Guilford, Conn.:
Dushkin/McGraw-Hill.
Paul, Bimal K. 2000. “HIV/AIDS in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Risk Factors.”
Pp. 283–300 in Geographic and Planning Research Themes for the

New Millennium. A. G. Noble, et al., eds. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing
House.
_____. 1998. “Coping Mechanisms Practiced by Drought Victims (1994–95) in
North Bengal, Bangladesh.” Applied Geography 18: 355–373.
_____. 1994. “Gender Ratios in the SMAs of Bangladesh: Is the Gap Declin-
ing?” Urban Geography 10: 345–361.
Paul, Bimal K., and Sujata De. 2000. “Arsenic Poisoning in Bangladesh: A
Geographical Analysis.” Journal of the American Water Resources
Association 36: 799–809.
PRB (Population Reference Bureau). 2000. 2000 World Population Data Sheet.
Washington, D.C.
Rasid, H., and B. K. Paul. 1987. “Flood Problems in Bangladesh: Is There an
Indigenous Solution?” Environmental Management 11: 155–173.
Shehabuddin, E. 2000. “Bangladesh in 1999.” Asian Survey 40: 181–188.
Upreti, B. C. 1993. Politics of Himalayan River Waters: An Analysis of the
River Water Issues of Nepal, India and Bangladesh. New Delhi: Nirala
Publications.
The Economy of Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, it is not uncommon to see a majhi—a fisherman or

boatman—fishing from his boat. Often he is alone. He spends many
a lonely hour, casting his hand net in the water and trying to catch
a few fish for his family or perhaps to sell some in the market so he
can earn money to supplement his family income. When one sees
the sight of that majhi against the sinking sun, what emerges is a sil-
houette, a dark human image with no identity. To painters and
innocent eyes, the image may seem quite artistic. But, for countless
Bangladeshis, it is a metaphor of life, a shadow of bare survival as it
serves as a constant reminder of hardship. So, for the poor, life is a
lonely affair of constantly staggering at the margin. In effect, what
the majhi’s silhouette reflects is the overall condition of
Fisherman hanging fish to dry. Fishing provides a means for supplemental

food and/or income. (Tiziana and Gianni Baldizzone/Corbis)
211
Two rural Bangladeshi women pile newly harvested rice in Nababerbagh

village outside Dhaka. Nationally, the rice crop makes up a major portion
of the country’s annual gross domestic product. (AFP/CORBIS)
Bangladesh’s economy: struggling to remain afloat in the midst of

growing population, limited opportunities, and mounting poverty.
The economy of Bangladesh has historically been dominated by
agriculture and other rural activities such as fishing and raising
animals, often carried out in conjunction with farming. Although
its overall dominance has declined over time, it still remains the
primary source of livelihood. Currently, this sector accounts for
about 24 percent of the GDP, employs nearly 50 percent of the
labor force, and constitutes about 35 percent of all export earnings.
In reality, however, the percentage of the agricultural labor force is
higher than 50 percent. The figure is generally very close to the
number of people living in rural areas, which is 80 percent accord-
ing to the 1991 census. After all, those who live in rural areas are
engaged in some form of farming activities for at least part of the
year. As agriculture’s GDP contribution has declined, the share of
the industrial sector has climbed from approximately 5 percent in
1971 to 27 percent in 1997. The contribution of the service sector
——The Economy of Bangladesh——213
to the GDP increased from about 20 percent to 49 percent over the

same period (Turner 2000, 257).
AGRICULTURE
Cropping Pattern. With the exception of city states like Singa-
pore, Bangladesh has the highest population density in the world.
As a result, per capita cultivated area in Bangladesh is one of the
lowest in the world—only 0.15 acre per person. Because of the
immense pressure on arable land, agriculture is practiced very
intensively. Most farmers produce double or triple crops each year
on more than half of the cultivated land. For this reason,
Bangladesh has a high proportion of its land area under cultivation.
Most of the crops under cultivation in Bangladesh are food
grains. Rice alone occupies about three-fourths of the total crop-
land and now accounts for nearly 90 percent of all cereal produc-
tion in Bangladesh. Rice is grown almost everywhere in the coun-
try except in the hilly areas. It is grown both under rain-fed
condition and with the aid of irrigation. The nation’s tropical cli-
mate and abundant water resources allow the cultivation of rice up
to three times a year, the peak harvest being in June. In 1998, total
rice production in Bangladesh was 28.29 million tons.
Wheat and other minor cereals such as millet and barley
account for about 10 percent of the cultivated land and about 8 per-
cent of grain production. Wheat is cultivated during the dry winter
season, usually following the rice harvest in September and Octo-
ber. Once negligible as a crop, wheat production in Bangladesh grew
rapidly during the 1970s. Today, it is the third most important crop,
behind only rice and jute. In 1999, Bangladesh produced over 1.9
million tons of wheat, or nearly 7 percent of total food grain pro-
duction. The major factor behind the growth of rice and wheat pro-
duction is what is popularly known as the Green Revolution, first
introduced in the mid-1960s. This technology is based on the inte-
grated use of high-yielding varieties (HYV) seeds, irrigation water,
and chemical fertilizers. With proper and timely application of the
required inputs, HYV wheat yields can be tripled and HYV rice
yields can be doubled. The area sown with HYV rice and wheat in
Bangladesh was negligible at independence. But, today, they are
grown on 50 percent of the land under cultivation.
Although mechanized harvesting is used by some large landowners, har-

vesting is still done mostly by hand in Bangladesh. For small farmers,
which are the majority, the price of mechanization is out of reach.
Additionally, an abundant supply of labor keeps the cost of manual har-
vesting lower than that for mechanization. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)
Potatoes, chilies, legumes, and oil seeds are also grown to sup-
plement the staple Bangladesh diet. Nonetheless, except for pota-
toes, the amount of land used for growing these crops has declined
in absolute terms from preindependence levels, mainly due to the
reallocation of land to wheat and rice. The expansion of irrigation
facilities has enabled farmers to exploit the Green Revolution tech-
nology available for rice and wheat. The decline has been most
severe for legumes (peas, beans, and lentils), which are the major
source of protein for the poor. The production of potatoes
increased slightly, from around 1.1 million tons in the early 1980s
to 1.6 million tons in 1998.
Among the country’s cash crops, jute is dominant, occupying 5
percent of the crop area. Jute often competes with rice for land
area. In recent years, however, both the area cultivated and the
total production of jute have shown a declining trend, largely
because of its diminishing demand in the world market. Jute prod-
ucts are being increasingly replaced by synthetic substitutes,
which are often more durable and cheaper. As a result, the price of
Transporting rice bags to the market on rickshaws. In addition to buffaloes

and oxen, rickshaws are used to haul produce and other products. (Courtesy
of Bimal K. Paul)
jute products has consistently declined, thus making its produc-

tion less lucrative. Bangladesh also grows some tea for both domes-
tic consumption and export.
Land Ownership and Farm Size. Most farmers are small land-
holders, owning less than 1.5 acres of land. Furthermore, land-
holdings are inequitably distributed and farm holdings are heavily
fragmented. Over time, the distribution of landholdings has
become increasingly disparate, resulting in increasing landlessness
and near landlessness. The bottom 60 percent of the total farm
households own less than 25 percent of the land, whereas the
wealthiest 10 percent enjoy between 25 and 50 percent. Small
farms, defined as a holding smaller than 2.5 acres, are the domi-
nant production unit in Bangladesh. Farms of this size are usually
unable to produce enough to feed the family for a year. Despite its
inadequacy, the proportion of small farms has increased from 70
percent in 1983 to almost 80 percent in 1996 (BBS 2000, 168). A
similar increase can be observed with respect to the percentage of
farm areas under small holdings (see table 2). Conversely, both the
number of farms and the area under medium and large farm hold-
ings have been declining over time, thereby indicating a trend

toward landholding marginalization.
Table 2. Number and Area of Farm Holdings in Bangladesh,

1984–1996
Number of Farms Percent of Farms
Farms 1996 1984 1996 1984
Size of Farms (in acres)

Small (>1.5) 9,423 7,066 79.8 70.2
Medium (1.5–7.49) 2,078 2,483 17.6 24.7
Large (<7.5) 308 513 2.6 5.1
TOTAL 11,809 10,062 100.6 100.0
Area of Farms (in acres)

Small 8,219 6,573 40.5 28.2
Medium 8,282 10,226 40.8 43.9
Large 3,809 6,492 18.7 27.9
TOTAL 20,310 23,291 100.0 100.0
Source: BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics). 1999. Statistical Pocketbook: Bangladesh 98. Dhaka,
195.
There is no precise estimate of the extent of landless house-

holds in rural Bangladesh. It is widely believed that about 50 per-
cent of the rural households are landless in the sense that their
landholdings are barely half an acre. As Alauddin and Tisdell
(1989, 554) point out, “there seems to [be] a process of polariza-
tion whereby the near landless are dispossessed and join the ranks
of the landless, while small farmers in turn become near landless.”
As a result, many of the landless and near landless households rely
on tenancy to have access to land. More than one-third of the total
agricultural land in Bangladesh is cultivated by tenant farmers.
The most common form of tenancy is sharecropping, a system in
which tenants assume all the production costs and share 50 per-
cent of the crops with the landlord.
The concentration of landownership and the prevalence of
sharecropping are considered to be two major reasons behind the
slow pace of agricultural modernization in Bangladesh. After all,
sharecroppers have little incentive to incur the cost of agricultural
modernization when one-half of what they produce goes to the
landlord. Similar to Nepal, this is a historical problem that con-
tinues to haunt Bangladesh’s agrarian economy. Several land

reform attempts to rectify the problem of land concentration and
tenancy have produced few tangible results for tenants. In the
meantime, the agrarian reality informs that the only way to
increase agricultural production is to pursue its modernization
because the prospect of farmland expansion is virtually nil. More-
over, any modernization efforts will have to incorporate diversifi-
cation of crops as well as gainful activities such as fisheries and
livestock farming.
Livestock. Rural Bangladeshis rely heavily on livestock for their
livelihood. Livestock are used for plowing lands, for threshing and
transporting products, and as a source of manure for farming and
fuel. They are a primary source of animal protein for both rural
and urban residents. Many village households raise livestock and
rely on livestock products such as milk to earn cash income. Even
dead livestock serve as a source of income, for their hides sustain
a thriving leather and tanning industry; leather goods are major
exports of Bangladesh.
In 1997–1998, about 12 percent of the value added to agricul-
ture originated in livestock and poultry. Over 50 percent of all
rural families own livestock, and about 5 percent of the livestock
population is owned by households not engaged in land cultiva-
tion. Such rural families are essentially engaged in animal hus-
bandry as a profession. Cattle and buffalo are generally raised by
farmers with small landholdings. Irrespective of farm size, these
animals are tended by men, whereas poultry is generally raised by
women, and sheep and goats are raised by children.
The existing commercial livestock and poultry farms in
Bangladesh are mostly owned by the government. According to the
1996 agriculture census, there were over 22 million bovine ani-
mals, 15 million goats and sheep, and 127 million poultry in the
country. According to recent estimates, cattle and buffalo account
for about 75 percent of the livestock value, followed by poultry,
and goats/sheep. Almost every household has a few chickens, for
they are quite easy to raise. As the demand for meat grows with
increasing population and urbanization, the livestock population
as well as its commercial farming are bound to rise.
Fisheries. Fish is perhaps the most preferred food in
Bangladesh. More than two-thirds of the animal protein in the
Bangladeshi diet comes from fish. Fisheries contribute about 18

percent of the agricultural value, or nearly 6 percent of the GDP,
and account for 12 percent of national exports. Bangladesh exports
fish to India, Japan, North America, the Middle East, and European
countries. Prawn and shrimp constitute major fish exports. In
1997–1998 the country harvested 1.5 million tons of fish from
inland and marine sources. Nearly 80 percent of the fish produc-
tion comes from inland fishing (BBS 2000, 195). Worldwide, only
China and India have larger annual catches of freshwater fish.
The fishery sector employs about 1.3 million commercial fish-
ermen, that is, 7 percent of the agricultural labor force. An addi-
tional 10 million are employed in fish marketing, processing, and
the manufacturing of fishing nets and equipment, including boats.
Bangladesh has a marine fishery area of about 27,000 square miles
within its exclusive sea boundaries and almost 10 million acres of
fishing areas including rivers, lakes, ponds, and flood plains. From
these diverse sources, Bangladesh produced 1.5 million tons of fish
in 1997–1998, representing 8 percent of the annual income.
Despite the growth of the fishing industry, the per capita avail-
ability of fish has decreased due to rapid population growth and
increased fish exports. As important as this industry is to the econ-
omy, it is faced with the growing problems of flood control, silta-
tion, land reclamation, water pollution, and poor transportation.
Yet there is little doubt that the country’s prospects of increased
fish production are enormous, especially in light of its extensive
river system and sizeable coastal areas.
INDUSTRY
The industrial sector accounted for 27 percent of the GDP and
employed 10 percent of the total labor force in 1997. This sector
includes both modern industries and traditional cottage industries.
Although large-scale industries have a larger share of the GDP,
small-scale and cottage industries generate more jobs. Unlike large
industries, small-scale industries are mostly family enterprises and
are characterized by traditional technology and relatively low
labor productivity. Before independence, large industries were pri-
marily owned by Pakistani private investors and the state-owned
East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (EPIDC).
Bangladeshi private industrialists owned only 18 percent of such

industries, and foreign ownership was minimal. Following inde-
pendence, Bangladesh nationalized most of the major industries,
leaving small industries to the private sector. As a result of nation-
alization, the government owned 92 percent of the fixed assets of
the modern manufacturing sector.
However, a new government formed in 1975 after Mujib’s assas-
sination reversed his industrial policy. The objective of the new
policy was to encourage private investments in industrial develop-
ment as well as to stimulate foreign investment. Although the new
policy met with little measurable success, the government stayed
the course of increased privatization. By 1985, only about 160
enterprises, or about 40 percent of industrial assets, remained
under public control. As the 1990s brought a new wave of market
liberalization with growing calls for privatization, the post-1975
industrial policy received a new boost. Today, most of the country’s
industries are privately owned.
The most important industries in Bangladesh are jute and cot-
ton textiles, tea, paper and newsprint, rayon, sugar, cement, chem-
ical fertilizers, tanneries, light engineering, and oil refining. Within
the cottage industry sector, handlooms, carpet making, shoe mak-
ing, bamboo and cane products, earthen pottery, brass and metal
products, small tool production, and handicrafts play major parts.
Most of the modern industries are located in the country’s three
major urban centers: Dhaka, Chittagong, and Khulna. Dhaka has
the largest concentration of industries, accounting for more than
two-thirds of total industrial production.
Historically, jute is perhaps the most dominant industry in
Bangladesh. It generates almost 37 percent of employment and
26 percent of production among large industries. However, the
importance of this industry has declined over time, largely
because of the rising popularity of petroleum-based synthetics,
which are cheaper and more durable than jute. It is no wonder,
therefore, that employment in this industry has diminished from
252,570 in 1981 to 127,364 in 1999. Despite consistent declines,
jute still generates a considerable proportion of national export
revenues.
Since the early 1980s, the garment industry has been growing
noticeably. It contributes almost 70 percent of Bangladesh’s hard
currency with the export value of $3.5 billion in 1997. The num-
ber of garment factories increased from 2,353 in 1996 to 2,963 in
1999, employing 1.51 million workers. One notable characteristic
of this industry is that 90 percent of it workforce consists of
women. Another feature is that many of them are owned by East
and Southeast Asia companies. The low labor cost and well-
disciplined labor force give Bangladesh a competitive advantage in
this industry. About 85 percent of garment production is sold to
North America, making it the sixth largest supplier to that region
and the fifth largest to the European Union. One major disadvan-
tage of this industry is that Bangladesh is heavily dependent on
imported raw materials to keep it going.
Other significant industries include food and paper products,
which share 15 percent of total industrial output and employ 20
percent of the industrial labor force. Then there are chemical,
leather, sugar, and match industries. Of these, the chemical indus-
try possesses the greatest prospect for future expansion due to an
ample supply of natural gas in the country. This gas is the basis for
fertilizer production, and Bangladesh has adequate amount to
meet domestic demand for chemical fertilizers. Estimated national
reserves range from 182 billion to 623 billion cubic meters. Addi-
tionally, Bangladesh has the potential for exploiting new offshore
gas reserves, which are estimated to have a minimum capacity of
approximately 2.5 trillion cubic meters.
Currently, industrial exports constitute less than one-fourth of
the gross value of manufactured outputs. The main exports include
ready-made garments, jute products, leather and leather products,
frozen fish and seafood, tea, chemical fertilizers, petroleum prod-
ucts, and newsprint. Of these, the first five can be considered
major export industries because they cater largely to the export
market. The United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France,
and Japan are major export markets. With respect to imports,
Bangladesh’s major trading partners include India, China, and Sin-
gapore, as well as the above countries. The narrow base of exports
and growing imports give rise to large trade deficits facing the
country. Foreign aid and overseas workers’ remittances are two
important sources for financing such deficits. Foreign enterprises
are permitted wholly to own local subsidiaries. Tax concessions are
available to foreign companies in the export zones of Dhaka and
Chittagong. But foreign enterprises do not feature prominently in

the manufacturing sector of Bangladesh.
Bangladesh’s industrial growth has been significantly hampered
by political instability and social turmoil. Frequent hartals
(strikes) and labor unrest engender an environment of uncertain-
ties and confusion. This chaotic sociopolitical situation is further
aggravated by an inadequate physical infrastructure and unreliable
power supplies (Rahman and Bakht 1997). Although the road net-
works have expanded, they have not kept pace with demand. Rail-
ways have stagnated, and the exploitation of waterways has been
limited because of inadequate investment. Additionally,
Bangladesh lacks skilled workers. To retain a competitive edge in
labor-intensive production, there is a need for skilled labor. The
lack of access to credit is also a big concern.
SERVICE SECTOR
The service sector refers to those economic activities that have
value to individual customers or clients or to society as a whole.
For example, they include wholesale and retail sales, personal
care, governmental functions, the exercise of legal actions, and
instructional activities. This sector accounted for 49 percent of the
GDP and employed nearly 40 percent of the labor force in 1997.
Currently, it is the largest sector of the Bangladesh economy and
continues to expand.
One main reason for its expansion is the continued outflow of
large numbers of contract workers to the Middle East and, lately,
to East and Southeast Asia (see “Geography and History of
Bangladesh”). In order to satisfy travel-related needs of contract
workers, employment opportunities in many interrelated service
areas were created. Included among these service areas are air
transport, travel agencies, hotels, banks, health clinics, secretarial
services, and recruiting agencies. Furthermore, the cash remit-
tances sent home by those workers increased the amount of dis-
posable income available in the country, thus generating demands
for goods and services. Another element contributing to the con-
tinued expansion of service activities is the growth in economic
development activities led by many foreign donors. These activi-
ties have brought into the country increasing numbers of foreign
In most urban areas, including the capital city of Dhaka, where this photo
was taken, rickshaws are a widely used mode of transportation.
Rickshaws are perhaps the most memorable feature of the urban cultural
landscape of Bangladesh. Ricksaw drivers endlessly compete with motor
vehicles for passengers as well as right-of-way, and they are often
extremely aggressive—partly by necessity. (Corbis)
donor agencies and agents, including an exploding number of non-

governmental agencies (NGOs) from all over the world. If these
trends continue as they have in the past twenty years, the service
sector is likely to grow even faster, creating more employment.
POVERTY
With a per capita income of $350, Bangladesh is one of the poor-
est countries in the world. Poverty is a way of life; it is everywhere.
The problem with poverty is not merely a matter of not having
enough food for the family. It also has many health effects in that
the poor generally lack adequate access to medical services. When
their health suffers, they have little chance of moving out of the
poverty trap. They have no access to education and cannot afford
to educate their children. As a result, poverty is perpetuated,
passed from one generation to the next.
In 1996, 41 million (36 percent) of Bangladeshis were below the
poverty line (World Bank 2001, 280). Given the fact that the coun-
try is predominantly agrarian, it is the rural poverty that dominates
the economic landscape. The landless and near landless villagers,
including agricultural laborers, sharecroppers, and artisans, consti-
tute most of the rural poor. In urban areas, over 90 percent of slums
and squatter settlers are classified as poor. There is little doubt about
the intensity of poverty infecting Bangladesh. There are, neverthe-
less, some signs that its grip has somewhat eased in recent years.
The World Bank data reveal that the incidence of poverty has
actually declined in Bangladesh from its 1992 level, when it stood
at 43 percent. But the rate of reduction has been much slower than
some other Asian countries have achieved over the same period of
time. For instance, China has made great strides in this area, along
with Indonesia. Most Bangladeshis, however, believe that their
average living standards have significantly improved, especially
compared to the depressing period immediately after independ-
ence. They further believe that the level of rural-urban income dis-
parity has lessened over the past twenty years.
Several factors are responsible for the decrease in poverty in
Bangladesh. For example, as the Green Revolution technology
spread, food production increased, leading to reduction in rural
poverty in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In addition, the govern-
Children with empty containers wait for drinking water in Dhaka. The
city’s scarce water supply dwindles in the middle of summer as tempera-
tures rise. (Reuters NewMedia Inc./CORBIS)
ment created employment opportunities in rural areas through the

Food-for-Work (FFW) program. Under this program, the rural poor
are employed to build and repair roads and other rural develop-
ment activities. In return, workers are paid in food grains. This
program has made a significant dent in poverty as many poor fam-
ilies can earn food for their work. These policies are further aug-
mented by the provision of credit to the poor to engage in micro
enterprising. The most outstanding and well-known program of
this type is the Grameen (Village) Bank (GB). This program pro-
vides credit to the landless and near landless without collateral.
Founded by Bangladeshi economist Muhammad Yunus in 1976,
the Grameen Bank believes that access to credit is a fundamental
human right, and that the poor often need only a small financial
loan in order to break free from the poverty trap (Ahsan 1996).
The GB further believes that economic development should start
with poverty alleviation, which will empower the people. The GB
has been financially self-sufficient since 1993 and now is one of
Buffalo cart on a highway. Such carts are a vital means of transportation

in Bangladesh. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)
Bangladesh’s largest banks, with over 1,200 branches. In 1997, the

bank underwrote over 2 million loans totaling $1 billion in more
than 35,000 villages throughout Bangladesh. More than 93 percent
of the borrowers are women, and the repayment rate of 97 percent
is stunningly high. Evidence is mounting that the micro-credit pro-
gram espoused by the GB has played a key role in the battle
against poverty.
Other poverty alleviation programs include feeding disadvan-
taged groups. This program has been in operation since the mid-
1980s with the purpose of addressing the problem of malnutrition
among rural mothers and children. In 1999 alone, more than
500,000 tons of grains were distributed under this program. Also
contributing to poverty alleviation is the involvement of many
NGOs, whose efforts are usually focused. Presently, more than one
thousand NGOs operate in Bangladesh, and most of them have
poverty alleviation programs for marginalized groups. NGOs also
help to provide employment opportunities to many people. Finally,

there is the increased flow of remittances sent home by
Bangladeshi laborers working overseas. As already discussed, such
remittances have significantly enhanced the availability of dispos-
able incomes among those households who have family members
working overseas.
PUBLIC FINANCE AND FOREIGN

AID DEPENDENCY
Bangladesh’s domestic budget consists of two parts: the revenue
budget and the development budget. The former includes govern-
ment incomes and expenditures relating to traditional duties such as
defense, wages and salaries of public employees, various types of
subsidies, debt servicing, and transfer payments. These expendi-
tures are financed mainly from tax and nontax revenues. In con-
trast, the development budget aims at building the socioeconomic
infrastructure to facilitate economic growth and development.
Around 80 percent of the development budget is financed by foreign
aid. What this means is that economic development of Bangladesh
is extremely dependent on foreign grants and loans (Kibria 2001).
Foreign aid is also important for financing trade deficits that
inflict the national economy. Until 1976, foreign aid financed
around 60 percent of annual imports. Although the extent of for-
eign aid-financed imports has since declined, it is still recorded at
45 percent. It is, however, noteworthy to point out that the decline
has resulted largely from the unavailability of aid rather than pol-
icy shifts to reduce foreign aid dependency. It is also notable that
the whole notion of foreign aid has taken a drastic turn since the
early 1980s. Previously, foreign aid to Bangladesh was largely
offered in the form of grants, which do not have to be paid back.
Since the early 1980s, however, foreign aid has been provided
mostly in the form of loans, which must be paid back with inter-
est. This shift clearly reveals that continued dependence on exter-
nal aid may create a serious debt problem in Bangladesh’s future.
In fact, the burden of debt had already surpassed $15 billion in
1997, averaging $124 per person. This is an insurmountable
amount for a country riddled with the heavy load of poverty. What
is worse, the debt is on the rise.
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND

BARRIERS TO GROWTH
Since independence, the Bangladesh economy has grown at an
annual rate of over 5 percent. The growth rate was higher during
the past two decades compared to the 1970s. Despite frequent
strikes, increased political polarization, a slow pace of institutional
reforms, widespread corruption and extortion, and periodic natu-
ral calamities, the country’s growth performance has been rela-
tively noteworthy. Higher agricultural outputs and increased
industrial production explain Bangladesh’s growth performance.
Yet the country has a long way to go in terms of attaining its full
agricultural and industrial potential and in arresting poverty. A
study by the World Bank and Bangladesh Centre for Advanced
Studies (1998, 17) claims that “agricultural and industrial expan-
sion must proceed hand-in-hand if Bangladesh is to reach the
threshold of a middle income country by 2010, and achieve mid-
dle order status in that group by 2020.”
As valuable as the past performance is, the road ahead promises
to be bumpy thanks to the many barriers faced by national eco-
nomic growth. First of all, population remains a major issue.
Although the population growth rate has recently displayed a
downward trend, the absolute annual population growth of some
3 million is indeed a huge economic and social concern. This is
compounded when it is considered in light of future needs for child
health care and literacy pressure; the country suffers from a
paucity of adequate health services and from high illiteracy. Aver-
age adult literacy is still well below 50 percent, and it is less than
30 percent among the female population.
In addition, low living standards, resource scarcity, massive
unemployment, and periodic natural disasters cannot be ignored
as potential impediments to future economic growth. Although low
living standards and massive employment naturally limit the
domestic market size, resource scarcities and natural disasters add
to the external costs of growth and development. With the excep-
tion of natural gas, the country is heavily reliant on imports of
many vital raw materials, including oil, to satisfy its industrial pro-
duction requirements. There is also the question of foreign aid,
which has proven to be a mixed blessing in terms of its efficacy.
These men and women are carrying earth to repair an unpaved (fair-
weather) road. This is a fairly common scene as most rural roads require
constant repair to keep them open to rickshaws and oxen carts. (Courtesy
of Bimal K. Paul)
Although foreign aid was certainly critical in sustaining the

economy during the early years following independence, it has, at
the same time, engendered what can be described as the “foreign
aid dependency mentality” among politicians and policymakers.
The availability of foreign assistance sidetracks policymakers from
the need to mobilize domestic savings for sustained growth. Large
and regular inflows of aid and public sector imports provide an
invaluable basis for the rapid enrichment of a small segment of the
population—the national ruling elite—at the top of the urban hier-
archy. Many claim that “75 percent of the foreign aid received by
the country in the last three decades was appropriated by people
outside the targeted groups. Of the total aid received by
Bangladesh, foreign equipment suppliers, agents, and consultants
took 25 percent; bureaucrats, politicians, commission agents, con-
sultants, and contractors inside the country took 30 percent; while
20 percent went to people in high income groups” (NFB, Feb. 11,
2001). In the meantime, aid dependency continues, sapping the
country’s internal inertia to become self-reliant and to mobilize
domestic resources for sustained growth.
As already noted, poor governance, widespread corruption,

heavy taxation, inadequate infrastructure, and social and political
instability continue to mar the economy and undermine its
prospects of attracting foreign investments and investments by
expatriate Bangladeshis. The foreign direct investment (FDI) stood
at $192 million in 1999, a mere fraction of such investment in
many East and Southeast Asian countries. And even this amount
was mainly tied to the power and natural gas sector and some to
the growing garment industry. Limited access to capital due to an
archaic commercial banking system and an underdeveloped capi-
tal market, inadequate domestic savings, and slow trade reforms
all join forces to undercut Bangladesh’s competitive advantage in
terms of attracting foreign investments (Hossain 1995).
CONCLUSION
Although significant economic obstacles remain, there is no rea-
son to infer that further progress is not possible in Bangladesh.
Given the numerous problems Bangladesh has faced since inde-
pendence, the country is doing better than expected. In the early
1970s, this new nation was referred to in foreign circles as an
“international basket case.” In the late 1980s, Bangladesh contin-
ued to be called the “largest poorest” country and was singled out
as “the test case for development.” By most accounts, Bangladesh
did not prosper economically, nor was it able to substantially
improve the quality of life for its huge population, but it did not
lose ground either.
Despite challenges, Bangladesh is about to become self-suffi-
cient in food production. It is a major world producer and exporter
of ready-made garments and frozen seafood. Bangladesh’s innova-
tive approach to micro-credit has not only made a significant dif-
ference in rural poverty reduction in the country but has emerged
as a model of micro entrepreneurial push in several other under-
developed countries.
The current trend indicates that the economy of Bangladesh is
growing at a rate comparable to that in many underdeveloped
countries. After many years of political turmoil, the country’s
recent democratic experiment seems to be on track as the trans-
fer of power from one elected government to another has gone rel-
atively smoothly in the past few years. Furthermore, the past two
governments have served out their full terms. This is a fact that is
bound to engender a sense of political stability and confidence on
the part of potential foreign investors. After all, political stability is
a precondition for continued economic growth as well as increased
foreign investment. What is needed now is a set of policy measures
focused on tangible reforms in the financial sector and institu-
tional mechanisms, infrastructural improvements, greater empha-
sis on environmentally sound agricultural modernization, and sus-
tainable industrialization stressing its massive labor utilization.
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Martin’s Press.
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Bangladesh 2020: A Long-Run Perspective Study. Dhaka: University
Press Limited.
Bangladeshi Institutions
The late Chinese Premier Zhou (Chou) Enlai once said that wher-
ever the British went, they left a little tail behind. That little tail
was directly related to the manner in which the colonial empire
was consolidated. Wherever they extended their imperial domi-
nance, they drove a wedge along the ethnic line, religious line, or
whatever fissure they could find so they could materialize their
time-honored policy of “divide and rule”—a policy that spawned
many little tails throughout the colonies. In many respects,
Bangladesh is one of those little tails that they invented and left
behind upon their departure from the subcontinent in 1947.
Under the political and territorial framework the British divided
India and Pakistan at the time of independence, Bangladesh was
bound to emerge as a by-product of that little tail. Bangladesh, or
what was East Pakistan, was annexed to Pakistan at the time of
partition solely based on the fact that the vast majority of its peo-
ple were Muslims. There was little consideration given to the issue
of Pakistan’s territorial fragmentation, to the deep-seated linguistic
and other cultural issues that were incompatible between East and
West Pakistan, and to the fact that West Pakistanis generally
regarded East Pakistanis (Bangladeshis) as second-class Muslims
(see “Geography and History of Bangladesh”). In view of these
realities, it was merely a matter of time before East Pakistan bolted
out of West Pakistan’s control and became an independent nation.
That time, as already stated, arrived in December 1971. And
Bangladesh was born.
But independence was just the beginning of nationhood. With
independence arose the responsibility of governing effectively. As
the jubilant atmosphere of independence dissipated, internal
issues surfaced, many of them revolving around the axis of domes-
tic politics and how to best govern the new nation and guide a pop-
ulace in the midst of poverty, a populace that had just emerged
from the long shadow of external suppression. Instead of striving
toward national goals in a unified manner, factions and fractures
231
developed, each vying for power. Coups were staged and presidents
were murdered in cold blood, including the founder of the nation,
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The military injected itself into national
politics. Social and political instability ensued. Indeed, within a
short span of thirty years since independence, Bangladesh has wit-
nessed many upheavals in its political and social landscapes. In
light of these changes, the main objective of this chapter is to pro-
vide an overview of contemporary Bangladesh politics and some of
its social institutions.
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Bangladesh has a unitary form of government. Whereas the presi-
dent is the head of the state, the prime minister is the head of the
government. The prime minister is assisted by a council of minis-
ters and advisers. For a better understanding of how political
change has shaped the present political environment of the coun-
try, a chronological discussion is in order.
The Mujib Era (1972–1975)

Bangladesh formed a parliamentary government following the
return of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in January 1972 from Pakistani
imprisonment. In October of that year, he crafted a constitution
that enumerated four principles on which Bangladesh was to be
governed: nationalism, socialism, secularism, and democracy
(Blood 1989, 32). These principles were commonly known as the
tenets of Mujibism or Mujibbad.
As a first step to implement socialism, the Mujib government
nationalized most large-scale industries, as well as banking and
insurance. A large proportion of the nationalized assets had
already been abandoned by their former Pakistani owners. In
order to ensure religious secularism, the new government banned
all political parties with a professed religious orientation, including
the Jamaat e Islam, the party that had vigorously opposed inde-
pendence and had collaborated with the Pakistani army during the
war for independence. The Mujib government also enforced Bangla
(Bengali) as the national language, replacing English, which was
formerly used at all levels.
——Bangladeshi Institutions——233
During the first national election, held in 1973, Mujib’s Awami

League (AL) party won 282 out of 289 contested seats. Mujib formed
the government under his leadership. His government undertook
several controversial actions. Included among them was the forma-
tion of the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defense Force) from the
ranks of the freedom fighters. As this paramilitary force appeared to
undermine the authority of the military led by repatriated military
personnel, Mujib alienated the military institution and its generals.
This myopic move by Mujib created a rift between the armed forces
and his government; it set the stage for the military’s later aggressive
incursion into national political affairs. After all, such a role was
nothing new to the military given the dictatorial martial law tradi-
tion it inherited from Pakistan before independence.
At the same time the rift between the government and the mili-
tary was deepening, the country’s law and order situation deterio-
rated. In the wake of the independence war, many guerrilla bands
roamed the countryside, fully armed and outside the circle of gov-
ernment control. They took the law into their own hands, thus
effectively creating a climate of lawlessness and chaos. In addition,
corruption within the high offices of the Mujib government contin-
ued, a situation that undercut the moral authority of the central
government. But Mujib lacked military support to subdue the roam-
ing guerrilla bands. On the morning of August 15, 1975, some army
officers brutally assassinated President Mujibur Rahman, along with
most of his family members (Heitzman and Worden 1989). Subse-
quently, Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmad, a conservative member of
Mujib’s cabinet, was installed as president. His regime was soon
overthrown. A series of coups took place in early November 1975,
at the end of which emerged General Ziaur (Zia) Rahman as the de
facto ruler. Some believed that Zia was behind Mujib’s murder or, at
least, that he had turned a blind eye when he could have readily
averted the coup, thus preventing Mujib’s murder by military offi-
cers. Even after he came to power, he did little to bring justice to
those who were involved in Mujib’s assassination.
The Zia Regime (1977–1981)

Following Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmad’s earlier removal from
the presidency, Chief Justice A. S. M. Sayem had been appointed
president and chief martial law administrator (CMLA). When Zia

came to power he first stripped Sayem of his CMLA position and
then replaced him as president on April 21, 1977 (Blood 1989). Zia
had created his own political party, which was later named the
Bangladesh Jatiyatibadi Party (Bangladesh Nationalist Party, or
BNP). On June 3, 1978, Zia held a national election to elect a pres-
ident. He won the election. Parliamentary elections were held later
in February 1979 to elect 300 members to the National Legisla-
ture. Zia fielded his party, BNP, in the parliamentary elections and
won two-thirds of the seats in the National Legislature.
Despite his heavy-handed electoral approach, Zia seemed to
be on the way to establishing a popular, democratic government.
For a military general, he seemed quite open to democratic
processes. He had not only restored law and order in the nation
but also appeared to preach the “politics of hope.” But before
democracy could be firmly grounded, Zia was assassinated on
May 30, 1981, by dissident military officers. Zia was succeeded
by his vice-president, Abdus Sattar. Disliked by the military, Sat-
tar was soon challenged by the army chief of staff, Lieutenant
General Husain Muhammad Ershad, who called for cleaning up
corruption, demanded a regularized role for the military in the
governance of the country, and asked for a national security
council that would be dominated by the military. When Sattar
refused to accept those demands, Ershad dismissed him on
March 24, 1982, dissolved the Parliament, and assumed full
power under martial law.
The Ershad Regime (1982–1991)

Ershad initially appointed Supreme Court Justice A. F. M.
Ahsanuddin Chowdhury interim president but later dismissed him
and became president in December 1983. He relaxed bans on
political activities in January 1984. As his hold on power was
secured, he held national elections in May 1986. His Jatiya Dal
(National Party) garnered a slim majority. However, the seven-
party alliance led by the BNP boycotted the elections (Baxter and
Rahman 1989, 25).
Two new leaders emerged on the national scene during the early
years of the Ershad regime: Begum Khaleda Zia, the widow of Gen-
eral Zia; and Sheikh Hasina Wajid, the eldest daughter of Mujib.
They were leaders of the BNP and AL, respectively, and both
formed alliances with similar minded political parties. Although
distrustful of each other, those two major alliances called for the
restoration of democracy. Furthermore, their intense opposition to
Earshad’s antidemocratic and promilitary policies brought these
two rival alliances together, putting additional pressure on the
Ershad government and eventually forcing Ershad to resign in
1990. A caretaker government headed by Justice Shahabuddin
Ahmed of the Supreme Court was established.
The Begum Zia Regime (1991–1996)

President Ahmed’s caretaker government held national elections
in February 1991, and the BNP won 140 of the 300 seats, but not
the majority. With the support of the Jamaat e Islam party, the
BNP was able to form a new government on March 20, 1991, under
the leadership of Begum Zia. Her regime was saddled with the con-
tinuous boycott of the Parliament in 1994 by opposition parties as
they pressed their demand for a constitutional amendment to pro-
vide a caretaker government to conduct all future elections. This
demand was the result of massive vote rigging by the BNP govern-
ment in the Magura-2 parliamentary by-election, which was
vacated due to a death (Hossain 1995). In defiance of the opposi-
tion demands, parliamentary elections were held on February 15,
1996, under Prime Minister Zia’s leadership rather than under a
caretaker government as the opposition had demanded. In the
absence of opposition parties’ participation in the elections, Zia’s
BNP won. Defying Zia’s victory, the opposition parties called a
series of local and national strikes, which brought the entire coun-
try to a standstill as banks, ports, factories, and shops closed and
all transportation and communications ceased.
The BNP government ultimately yielded to the pressure of the
opposition parties, and a caretaker government was formed to con-
duct new elections, which were held on June 12, 1996. This time,
the Awami League party emerged as the largest single party, win-
ning 135 of 300 seats in the National Legislature. With the support
of Ershad’s Jatiya Dal party, the AL headed by Sheikh Hasina Wajid
formed a new government on June 23, 1996.
Hundreds of supporters of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party marched

through the streets of Dhaka during a nationwide strike in 1999. The strike,
called by Bangladesh’s main opposition parties to protest taxes, shut down
businesses and schools and disrupted traffic in Bangladesh’s major cities.
(AP Photo/Pavel Rahman)
The Sheikh Hasina Regime (1996–2001)

Despite some turmoil and tensions, for the first time in its inde-
pendent history the popularly elected civilian government was
allowed to serve out its full term. In addition, the transition from
the Zia government to the newly elected government of Sheik
Hasina was relatively smooth, as no military intervention was
involved. However, political factionalism, turmoil, and animosities
did not subside. Party and personal interests were always placed
ahead of national interests. The fierce rivalry between the AL and
the BNP continued. This time it was Zia’s (and the BNP’s) turn to
stage regular demonstrations and strikes to paralyze the AL gov-
ernment. They were mostly demonstrations for the sake of
demonstrating, chiefly based on party politics, personalities, and
even family animosities.
In spite of ongoing disruptions, Prime Minister Hasina was able

to achieve some legislative successes. On the international front,
the Hasina regime concluded a historic thirty-year Ganges water-
sharing treaty with India. According to the treaty, Bangladesh was
assured of at least 35,000 cusecs (cubic feet per second) of water
during the critical dry period. On the domestic front, the new gov-
ernment scored several legislative achievements (Kochanek 1998).
For instance, the Hasina regime succeeded in enacting in Septem-
ber 1997 an important initiative for women in government, a
measure that reserves for women 30 percent of directly elected
seats in the 4,298 local councils. It also opened the Bangabandhu
Bridge in 1998 across the Jamuna River, thus directly linking the
eastern half of the country with the western portion for the first
time (Rashiduzzaman 2001). Despite many of her notable legisla-
tive achievements, Sheik Hasina’s regime was marred by political
strife, police brutality, violence, and charges of widespread cor-
ruption. In addition, the country was hit by several natural disas-
ters, the most notable being the catastrophic flooding and cyclone
of 1998.
The Second Begum Zia Regime (2001–)

As the Hasina government approached the end of its electoral
term, a new general election was held on October 1, 2001. The AL
suffered a major defeat, and the BNP enjoyed a landslide victory.
Consequently, Begum Zia returned to power after being on the
sideline since 1996 as an opposition leader. Her government was
formed on October 10.
Unfortunately, after the election results became public, the
country witnessed widespread violence and incidents of minority
repression. It is alleged that BNP activists and certain components
of its alliance parties actively participated in these incidents,
which included attacks on AL leaders and activists and ransacking
of their houses and properties. Scuffles also ensued over control of
dormitories at many educational institutions, markets, launch and
bus terminals, airport areas, and slums. Zia’s newly formed gov-
ernment failed to take immediate and necessary steps to stop such
attacks on religious minorities and AL supporters. So far, it has
failed to curb political violence against the opposition parties.
Bangladeshi prime minister and Bangladesh Nationalist Party chairperson

Khaleda Zia. In 1991 Zia was elected the country’s first woman prime min-
ister. Following the October 2001 parliamentary election, she became prime
minister for the second time. (AFP/CORBIS)
Crime is on the rise. Within the first thirty days of the new gov-
ernment, political killings totaled 262. Instead of going after the
criminals, Begum Zia’s new government has targeted the reporters,
journalists, and columnists who publish reports of such crimes
committed by BNP cadres.
Even after thirty years of freedom and ten years of democratic
experiment, any sensible and necessary exercise of political civility
and respect for opposition parties remains alien in Bangladesh. As a
consequence, the prospect of political stability is still brittle despite
the practice of electoral politics. If the current regime continues to
walk down the path of physical violence and revenge against its
opposition parties, as it seems to have done so far, it will have only
succeeded in perpetuating the cycle of violence and in undermining
national interests. Such a path will only make a mockery of democ-
racy as a civic exercise and process. After all, in politics, what goes
around comes around. Violence breeds more violence.
Bangladesh and the World

With respect to the physical constraint on global links,
Bangladesh’s situation is vastly different from that of Nepal. With
direct access to the sea, Bangladesh is much better positioned
than Nepal to establish a much wider and freer network of exter-
nal contacts. At the same time, however, it was precisely because
of its easy sea access that Bangladesh came under British subju-
gation, whereas landlocked Nepal was able to defend and protect
its sovereignty. As the British superseded Mughal dominance,
Bengal’s links to the world became much more expansive in terms
of both European cultural influence and geographical scope.
Bangladesh, to put it simply, has a long history of global contact,
although mostly as a subjugated land until 1971. Only after its
emergence as a sovereign nation was it able to establish inde-
pendent links to the world without being openly dictated by some
outside power.
In the arena of external relations, there are few countries in the
world whose ties to Bangladesh run as deep as India’s. Notwith-
standing occasional tensions between the two countries on the
diplomatic front, they are inseparably linked—geographically, his-
torically, culturally, and economically. Until 1947, as two adminis-
tratively divided parts of greater Bengal, they both belonged to the
same geographical entity called the British Raj and, prior to that,
Mughal India. Besides geography and some of the major rivers,
they share their rich Bengali history, heritage, and culture. At no
point since the partition of British India was this shared history
more forcefully demonstrated than in late 1971, when India inter-
vened on behalf of Bangladeshi freedom fighters waging a war for
independence against the occupation forces of West Pakistan (see
“Geography and History of Bangladesh”). Few would deny that
India’s military assistance was critical for Bangladesh’s relatively
quick victory. Although India had its own vested interest in its
neighbor’s liberation, its role in 1971 has left indelible marks in the
relations between the two neighbors. Even now, what transpires in
Bangladesh is often a close reflection of the events taking place in
its giant next-door neighbor. In addition, India is the main source
of popular culture in Bangladesh.
Although their diplomatic relations have evolved and under-
gone significant changes since independence, the ties remain

embedded. During the Mujib era, the relationship was extremely
close, partly because of the gratitude that President Mujib felt for
India’s immense support during the war—militarily as well as in
terms of humanitarian aid to some 10 million refugees who flocked
across the border to avoid atrocities committed by the West Pak-
istani military. Following Mujib’s assassination, relations between
the two countries entered a period of chill and strain until the mid-
1990s. When Mujib’s daughter Sheikh Hasina Wajid became
prime minister in 1996, relations took a new turn, almost reach-
ing the level of warmth and friendliness that prevailed during the
very early years of independence. Regardless of the hot-and-cold
nature of their relations, the two countries are major trading
partners. India is a big foreign market for Bangladeshi exports and
the largest source of its imports, including many raw materials.
Yet Bangladesh remains somewhat wary of India’s regional inter-
ests and intentions as well as of its occasional tendency to act like
a bully on the block that is ready to flex its muscle against its
smaller neighbors, as it did in 1989 against Nepal by imposing an
economic embargo.
Since its independence, Bangladesh has played a visible role in
the regional affairs of South Asia. Particularly notable is the lead-
ing part it took in the founding of the South Asian Association of
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to promote regional cooperation in
the arena of economic development and cultural exchange among
South Asian nations. Given its general neutrality on most regional
issues, Bangladesh has managed to maintain close relations with
all of its South Asian neighbors, that is, SAARC members, includ-
ing Pakistan. As naturally expected, Pakistan was hostile toward
Bangladesh in the early 1970s, following independence. However,
as it came to terms with Bangladesh’s independent status and des-
tiny, Pakistan formally recognized the new nation in February
1974 and later established diplomatic relations, followed by com-
munication and transportation links between the two nations.
Bangladesh’s relations with other Asian nations also stand on a
sound foundation, although its relations with China were relatively
sour in the early 1970s. For example, in 1972, China, in order to
demonstrate its close ties with Pakistan, vetoed Bangladesh’s ini-
tial attempt to join the United Nations. But during a second
attempt in 1974, China expressed no objection since Pakistan had

already recognized Bangladesh. In 1976, China exchanged diplo-
matic missions with Bangladesh. Chinese Prime Minister Zhu
Rongji’s visit to Bangladesh in January 2002 is certainly bound to
further cement the expanding diplomatic ties between the two
nations.
Although the United States recognized Bangladesh in April
1972, shortly after its independence, relations between the two
countries remained relatively cool, mainly because the United
States had close relations with Pakistan. What is more, the United
States had supplied the Pakistan army with military equipment in
addition to having stationed its Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal
during the war as a show of support to Pakistan. These moves had
left most Bangladeshis feeling bitter over U.S. open opposition to
their liberation aspirations and struggles against Pakistan. How-
ever, time healed the wounds between the two nations, and by the
late 1980s the United States had become one of Bangladesh’s clos-
est international friends, as well as a major donor, operating a wide
variety of economic development projects in the country. The U.S.
commitment was further reinforced by President Bill Clinton’s
visit to Bangladesh in March 2000.
In addition to the above ties, Bangladesh has friendly relations
with Great Britain, its one-time colonial ruler, and other European
countries, many of which offer development assistance to the
country on a regular basis. Diplomatic relations with Bangladesh
also extend to Middle Eastern and other Muslim countries as well
as many African countries. In short, its link to the world is quite
wide and far-reaching in terms of diplomatic ties and missions.
ETHNICITY AND SOCIAL SYSTEM
Ethnic Groups
Ethnically, 98 percent of Bangladeshis are Bengalis and predomi-
nantly speak Bengali as their principal language. In terms of their
origin, they belong to a branch of the Indo-Aryans who entered the
subcontinent around 2000 B.C. (Baxter and Rahman 1989). Prior
to their arrival, the Bengal region was populated by Dravidians,
whose physical characteristics of shorter stature and darker skin
Questionnaire survey being conducted by rural villagers (Courtesy of

Bimal K. Paul)
are still seen in Bangladesh. The Santals, a tribal group that lives
in the Barind region of North Bengal, are considered to be Dravid-
ian descendants.
Half a million Bihari Muslims, who originally migrated from
Bihar after the partition of British India, mostly live in
Bangladesh’s cities. Although their mother tongue is Bihari, most
now speak Bengali as well. During the Pakistani period
(1947–1971), most Biharis were either engaged in commerce or
employed in the railway sector. In 1971 about one million Biharis
lived in Bangladesh. Their number has consistently decreased
since then because many have migrated to Pakistan, where they
find a more receptive environment than in Bangladesh, which has
tended to view them with suspicion due to their unyielding sup-
port of the Pakistani military operation during the war for inde-
pendence. In addition, their stalwart use of Urdu, the national lan-

guage of Pakistan, as their primary language does little to alleviate
such suspicion.
According to the 1991 census, the tribal population of
Bangladesh was 1.2 million, which constituted slightly over 1 per-
cent of the country’s total population. More than a dozen tribal
groups are found in Bangladesh. The four largest tribes are the
Chakmas, Marmas (or Maghs), Tipperas (or Triras), and Mros (or
Moorangs). Mostly of Mongoloid origin, they are largely the only
ones who are physically distinct from the vast majority of
Bangladeshis who, in general, look similar whether they are of
Indo-Aryan or Dravidian origin. The tribal populations are mainly
concentrated in the districts of Bandarban, Khagrachhari, and
Rangamati, all located in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region,
in north and northeastern parts of Sylhet, and in the northern part
of the greater Mymensingh district. Tribal members also differ
from the Bengalis in terms of their social organizations, marriage
customs, birth and death rites, food, and other social customs, as
well as language and religion.
Various tribes tend to intermingle and can be distinguished
from one another more by differences in their customs than by
tribal cohesion. Except for Chakmas and Marmas, no other tribal
groups have any formal tribal organization. Among the tribal
groups, Chakmas are the ones who seem to have adopted many
elements of the Bengali culture. Moreover, they are more often
formally educated than are members of other groups. Most tribal
people are poor, and farming is the main occupation. Although
some tribal groups still practice shifting cultivation in the Chit-
tagong Hill Tracts region, the area under shifting cultivation has
been consistently declining. Consequently, the pressure on their
fundamental means of survival has intensified.
Social System
More than three-fourths of the total population live in rural areas.
The basic social unit both in rural and urban areas is the family
(paribar, or gushti). A family generally consists of several mem-
bers who live together in a homestead (bari) and share the same
kitchen (chula). Married sons generally live in their parents’
household during the father’s lifetime. A bari consists of two to six

houses around a square or rectangular courtyard. Bari residents
are in most instances divided into households living in separate
houses that are used for sleeping, storage, and cooking, and they
are usually members of the same patrilineal paribar. Above the
bari level, patrilineal kin ties are linked into sequentially larger
groups based on real, fictional, or assumed relationships.
In rural Bangladesh, members of several baris usually form a
community or society (samaj). Usually a samaj is based on a
neighborhood (para), which is intermediate between the bari and
the village. A neighborhood is a cluster of adjacent baris, the for-
mation of which is usually conditioned by occupational, religious,
social, or topographical factors. Several neighborhoods form a vil-
lage. Small villages often consist of only one neighborhood.
A samaj is a voluntary informal social organization that includes
members from the same or different kin groups. The leader of a
samaj is called matabdar or sardar, a titular position generally
held by a member of a wealthy family. The leader usually settles
village disputes. Among many functions, a samaj maintains a
mosque and members of a samaj help other members with money
(loans) and advice. Typically, there are several samajs within a vil-
lage, each competing for influence over villagers and struggling for
resources from local administrative and development offices. How-
ever, the samaj system is normally absent in cities, for kinship ties
that often form the basis for rural communities are usually limited
and fragile among urban dwellers.
Family and kinship reside at the core of social life in rural
Bangladesh. A family group residing in a bari represents the pri-
mary economic unit. Patrilineal ties dominate the basis of family
life, but matrilineal ties also are important. Marriage is an impor-
tant event in a family. Similar to Nepali marriages, the vast major-
ity of Bangladeshi marriages are arranged. Parents in both rural
and urban areas generally select spouses for their children. But
men frequently exercise some influence over the choice of their
spouses, especially in urban areas where so-called love marriage—
a process in which young men and women select their own mar-
riage partners—is becoming increasingly common. Arranged mar-
riages are often preceded by extensive negotiations between the
families of the prospective bride and groom. Even among those
who are engaged in love marriages, parents tend to formalize the

process before the marriage actually takes place. The dowry sys-
tem, a common custom in most parts of India and Nepal, has now
gained popularity among Muslims of Bangladesh.
Unlike in the Hindu society of India or Nepal, no formal caste
system exists among the Muslims in Bangladesh. However, there
are several hierarchically arranged groups within Muslim society,
such as the syeds (noble born). At the opposite end are jolhas
(weavers) and kulus (a specific group of people whose traditional
function or role in society is to process mustard oil). Still, Muslim
society in Bangladesh is not rigidly stratified; rather, it is open,
fluid, and diffused, without a cohesive social organization and
social structure. Social class distinctions are mostly functional, for
there is considerable mobility among classes, invariably based on
economic status and social standing. Even the structure of the
Hindu caste system among the Hindus of Bangladesh is relatively
loose in that most of them belong to the scheduled caste, previ-
ously known as the Untouchables. In essence, there is only one
caste. So the complexity of the caste system and intricate inter-
caste relations that characterizes Hindu society in India and Nepal
are rarely an issue in Bangladesh because of the caste uniformity
among its Hindu population.
RELIGION AND SOCIETY

Religion takes center court in Bangladeshi society and life.
Although followers of several religions live in Bangladesh, the
majority of the population are Muslims, followed by Hindus, Bud-
dhists, and Christians. Islam is by far the most dominant religion,
with 88 percent of the people adhering to it. Hindus constitute
roughly 11 percent, and the rest belong to Buddhism and Chris-
tianity. Some tribal people living in the southeastern hills of the
country are animists. With the exception of Hindus, minority reli-
gious groups are found in specific geographical pockets.
Islam, unlike Hinduism and Buddhism, is not indigenous to the
region. It is a religion that was introduced by Muslim (Moslem)
invaders from West Asia. It all started with the Turkish conquest of
the subcontinent, a process that lasted several centuries. The con-
quest began in Afghanistan around A.D. 1000 and moved eastward
A mosque on the Meghna River in Narayanganj (Roger Wood/CORBIS)
to India. By the early thirteenth century, Bengal fell to Turkish

armies as the Hindu Sena dynasty was dismantled. Subsequently,
Bengal was subjugated to the Delhi sultanate, established in 1206.
During the drawn-out process of Muslim invasion and conquest,
Hindus were forced to either convert to Islam or flee for safety. Many
fled to the hills of Nepal. Some resisted, and countless were killed.
Just as Christianity has found a receptive population among low-
caste Hindus, Muslim invaders had little difficulty in proselytizing
Untouchables and other low-caste Hindus, who were attracted to its
casteless system and espousal of egalitarianism (Rahim 1989). It is
Thousands of Muslim devotees offered midday prayer during the World

Congregation of Islamic Preachers at Tongi in 2002. The annual congrega-
tion teaches the tenets of Islam and the practice of peace and harmony.
(AP Photo/Pavel Rahman)
because of this low-caste acceptance of Islam that high-caste Hindus

to this day generally view Muslims as Untouchables. (There are still
some orthodox Hindus in parts of India and Nepal who consider
themselves polluted if they come in physical contact with Muslims.
In such cases, they undergo some ritual to cleanse themselves.)
Moreover, the history of Islamic invasion lies at the root of much of
the Hindu-Muslim conflict in South Asia, including the entrenched
animosity between India and Pakistan.
The origin of Islam dates back to the early 600s, when the
Prophet Muhammad preached a series of his divine revelations in
Mecca, which has since then become the most important pilgrim-
age for Muslims across the world. Following Muhammad’s death,
his followers compiled his teachings in what is known as the
Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. As a religion, Islam is one of the
branches of Abraham’s (Ibrahim in the Arabic/Islam canon) triple
heritage: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Its five pillars (duties),
to which every Muslim is supposed to adhere, are recitation of the

testimony or shahadah (kalima in Bengali), daily prayer or salat
(namaj in Bengali), almsgiving or zakat (jakat; donations to the
poor), fasting or sawm (roja in Bengali), and pilgrimage or hajj.
The devout Muslim prays five times a day, facing Mecca: at dawn,
midday, midafternoon, sunset, and nightfall. Public prayer is a
widely practiced aspect of Bangladeshi Muslim society.
Ramadan is perhaps the most important celebration of Islam, at
least the one most well known in the West. It is a period of obliga-
tory fasting in commemoration of God’s revelation to Muhammad.
It falls during the ninth month of the Muslim calendar, which is
based on a lunar system—and so Ramadan occurs during various
seasons in different years. During the month of fasting, all Muslims
(except the sick, the weak, pregnant or lactating women, and sol-
diers on duty) are supposed to avoid eating, drinking, smoking,
and sexual intercourse during daylight hours. If Ramadan falls dur-
ing the rice planting season, when heavy physical work is required
of farmers and peasants, it imposes considerable hardship on
them. Id al Fitr, a feast celebrated in the Muslim world, marks the
end of the month of fasting. In addition, somewhat similar to other
major religions, pilgrimage is crucial to Islam. At least once in his
or her lifetime, every Muslim should, if possible, make the hajj to
Mecca during the twelfth month of the Muslim calendar. The pil-
grim, dressed in a white seamless garment, is required to abstain
from sexual relations, shaving and cutting of hair, and nail-paring
(Rahim 1989).
Although monotheist like Christianity and Buddhism, Islam has
many sects, Sunni and Shia being the two most prominent and
widely recognized. Almost all Bangladeshi Muslims belong to the
Sunni branch. Followers of the Shia faith mostly reside in cities.
Additionally, there is a type of Islamic mysticism known as Sufism.
This tradition emphasizes love of God rather than fear of God and
stresses a direct, unstructured, personal devotion to God in place
of ritualistic, outward observance of the faith. The spiritual leaders
of the Sufi tradition are called fakirs or pirs. Although they do not
normally gravitate toward the material world, some pirs in
Bangladesh have taken an active interest in politics either by run-
ning for public office or by supporting other candidates.
In Islam there has been a perennial tension between the ulema,
Muslim scholars trained in Islamic theology, and the Sufis.

Although a formal organization of ordained priests has no basis in
Islam, ulemas have traditionally provided the orthodox leadership
of the Muslim community. They unofficially interpret and admin-
ister religious laws. Ulemas include maulavis, imams, maulanas,
and mullahs. Most maulavis and imams are formally educated in
religious schools called madrasas. Imams lead congregational
prayers, whereas mullahs perform marriage and funeral cere-
monies. Many villagers are ardent followers of ulemas.
EDUCATION
At the time of independence, Bangladesh inherited what is called
the British system of education, which was introduced during the
colonial era. Emphasis on British education led to the growth of an
elite class that provided clerical and administrative support to the
colonial administration; they served as the internal agents of colo-
nialism. During the quarter century of Pakistani rule, no signifi-
cant change occurred in Bangladesh’s educational system. After
independence, successive governments introduced various
reforms to make education accessible to the general masses, both
geographically and socially. The emphasis shifted from the British
to American educational system, with greater emphasis on techni-
cal education and vocational training.
Educational System
Formal education in Bangladesh begins with five years of primary
education, followed by another five years of study to complete sec-
ondary education. After secondary education, two more years of
study are required to obtain a higher secondary education degree.
An additional two to four years of study are required to obtain a
college degree, which precedes a graduate degree at the university
level. Both technical and nontechnical degrees are offered by var-
ious educational institutions of Bangladesh. Development efforts in
the late 1980s included programs to provide low-cost vocational
education to the rural populace.
In 1997, there were 77,685 primary schools, with a total stu-
dent population of 18 million. The student-teacher ratio was as
high as 57 students per teacher. In view of the importance of edu-

cation for human resource development, Bangladesh has made
universal primary education a major objective of its educational
plans. Although the enrollment of primary students has risen over
time, the retention rates have generally fallen short of governmen-
tal goals. High annual dropout rates are common throughout the
country’s educational system, but it is particularly problematic for
primary schools. The dropout rate has been estimated to be
between 50 and 60 percent. Agricultural dependency and rampant
poverty are two major culprits behind such high attrition rates,
which are most acute in rural areas, where children constitute a
vital source of agrarian labor (BBS 1994, 135).
Bangladesh had 13,419 secondary schools, with over 6 million
students, in 1997. Secondary education for the most part is pri-
vate, but it is heavily subsidized by the government. At the sec-
ondary level, some schools are coeducational and others are exclu-
sively for female students. The same is true at the college level.
Postsecondary education is offered first at the intermediate college
level (which is equivalent to the associate degree in the United
States) and then at the undergraduate level, which requires two
more years of college education following the intermediate degree.
In 1997, nearly 3 million students were enrolled in 1,773 interme-
diate and 1,571 degree colleges within Bangladesh, with nearly 85
percent of them being privately operated.
The country also is home to technical institutes, including five
engineering colleges, eighteen medical colleges, and one dental
college. Most of the engineering and medical colleges are govern-
ment-owned. Admission into these colleges is highly competitive.
As a result, several technical colleges were established during the
1980s and 1990s to accommodate a growing number of students
interested in pursuing such degrees. But the fees required to
attend private technical colleges are beyond the reach of middle-
income families.
Following the undergraduate degree, one can pursue a higher
degree at the university level or what is called graduate studies in
the United States. Unlike in U.S. universities, which offer both
graduate and undergraduate curricula, universities in Bangladesh
are generally confined to graduate studies at the master’s and Ph.D.
levels. In 1997, there were twenty-seven general universities in
Bangladesh, with about 40 percent of them being designated as

public universities. In addition, several technical universities, such
as the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology in
Dhaka and the Agricultural University in Mymensingh, exist. Alto-
gether, more than 100,000 students were registered at the univer-
sity level in 1997.
One huge educational problem facing Bangladesh is high stu-
dent-teacher ratios at all levels. Further compounding this serious
problem is the lack of qualified teachers. Because education is
often provided by underqualified or even unqualified teachers, its
quality has degraded with each successive generation. In 1997,
there were more than fifty primary school teacher and fifteen sec-
ondary school teacher training colleges. The government also pro-
vides training for science teachers. To the dismay of most people,
these training institutions have a long way to go before they can
rectify the chronic shortage of qualified educators, especially at
the lower level. At the college and university levels, perhaps the
most serious problem is the scarcity of good textbooks, research
facilities, and research incentives for professors. Most professors
are sparsely engaged in serious and original research; they have
limited access to recent publications to keep current with ongoing
theoretical developments and empirical studies in their respective
fields. Many science and engineering classes lack necessary labo-
ratory facilities.
Literacy
Literacy plays a critical role in social, political, and economic
progress, for its extent often reflects the level of national devel-
opment. Unfortunately, literacy is low in Bangladesh. Although
the current average literacy rate had jumped from 25 percent in
1991 to 40 percent in 1997, it remains quite low compared to
many East and Southeast Asian countries. No less troubling is
the fact that there are substantial gaps between rural and urban
areas and between male and female literacy rates. In 1999 the
adult male (ages 15 and over) literacy rate was 52 percent, com-
pared to only 29 percent for adult females. The literacy rates
were quite similar at the youth level (ages 15–24): 60 percent for
males and 39 percent for females (World Bank 2001). In an agrar-
ian society like Bangladesh, low female literacy is a major barrier

to rural and agricultural development, which, by the way, acts as
a linchpin of national development. In light of the fact that
women are actively involved in farming decisions, their literacy
would significantly facilitate agricultural extension work,
designed to enhance agricultural performance. Moreover, low lit-
eracy rates tend to place a damper on widespread family plan-
ning adoption in rural areas, where it is quite low but much
needed. Overall, however, literacy tends to be higher among the
younger age groups than within the older population segments, a
situation that clearly reflects the government’s current emphasis
on children’s education.
Religious Education
As an Islamic country, the government supports religious educa-
tion at several levels. In the late 1980s, efforts were being made to
modernize madrasas (schools of Islamic education attached to a
mosque) to introduce science and vocational courses in their cur-
ricula under the Bangladesh Madrasa Education Board. In 1975,
there were 1,830 madrasas, with a total of 291,191 students. After
the change of political power in 1975, their numbers increased,
reaching 6,655 madrasas and 2 million students in 1997. There are
more than fifty madrasas for female students in Bangladesh. The
number of female students is higher at primary level madrasas
(Dakil) than those at higher levels, reflecting lower priorities on
female education at madrasas (see Hashmi 2000). Most primary,
secondary, and postsecondary madrasas are directly run by the
government. Before the political change in 1975, most of the
madrasas were dependent on public charity and endowments.
Madrasa graduates usually become imams at mosques or teach at
secular schools. Based on their qualifications, they are also eligible
for government jobs.
The education sector in Bangladesh is relatively underdevel-
oped compared to international and regional standards. Although
there is a need to improve education at all levels, added emphasis
should be given to primary education, not only because it is the
foundation of further education but also because it entices people
to be more receptive to more education and to the forces of mod-
Bangladeshi boys read Arabic scripture at a Muslim school, called a

madrasa, in Dhaka. (Reuters NewMedia Inc./CORBIS)
ernization. Similar emphasis should also be given for female, tech-

nical, and scientific education.
CONCLUSION
Bangladesh is facing many political, social, and economic prob-
lems. The principal causes of these problems are political instabil-
ity and intolerance, lack of accountability, inefficient administra-
tion, and widespread corruption at all levels. There is widespread
public uneasiness about the lack of discipline in political manage-
ment and in the maintenance of law and order. Bureaucracy, cor-
ruption, bribery, patronage, and political violence have developed
a life of their own, thus making governance difficult. Any sense of
civility and democratic respect for opposition is sorely missing
from the political scene (see Rahman 2000; Rashiduzzaman
2001). And national interests have taken a back seat to personal
and party agendas, which rule supreme. As a result, genuine pol-
icy reforms and policy implementations are politically coopted and

routinely undermined.
References
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Country Study (Area Handbook Series), James Heitzman and Robert
L. Worden, eds. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
Hashmi, Taj I. 2000. Women and Islam in Bangladesh: Beyond Subjection
and Tyranny. London: Macmillan Press.
Heitzman, James, and Robert L. Worden, eds. 1989. Bangladesh: A Country
Study. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
Hossain, Golam. 1995. “Bangladesh in 1994: Democracy at Risk.” Asian
Survey 35: 171–178.
Kochanek, Stanley A. 1998. “Bangladesh in 1997: The Honeymoon Is over.”
Asian Survey 38: 135–141.
Rahman, Mohammad H. 2000. “Human Rights in Bangladesh: Diversity in
Civil Society and NGO Action.” Asian Affairs 22: 5–28.
Rashiduzzaman, M. 2001. “Bangladesh in 2000: Searching for Better
Governance?” Asian Survey 41: 122–130.
Bangladeshi Society and
Contemporary Issues
There is a website called Bangladesh Showbiz, which is entirely

devoted to providing an extensive coverage of Bangladesh’s celebri-
ties. It is all about “who’s who” and “who is up to what” in Dhaka’s
“Dhallywood,” as it is called following the lead of Bollywood (Bom-
bay’s showbiz world), which itself is a mimicry of Hollywood.
Recently the website reported on its opening page that “These
days, you’re nobody in Dhaka ShowBiz until you have a secret
lover and a remarkable marriage coverage in publications.” This is
quite a remark, a remark that clearly highlights the direction of the
country’s popular culture. The web page is filled with the portraits
of glittery and glamorous actors and actresses who adorn the land-
scape of Dhaka’s showbiz world. It is these celebrities that
Bangladeshis follow and try to emulate. The sardonic reality is that
these days they are bigger than any national cause or national
leaders. Such is the parody of Bangladesh’s rapidly spreading pop-
ular cultural drama, which is being played out in the midst of mas-
sive poverty. In an interview with Bangladesh Showbiz, one of
Dhaka’s hot celebrities of the 1960s stated that “the younger gen-
eration is under absolute grip of satellite culture. . . . Sadly, we now
see a yawning gap between the younger generation and our tradi-
tional culture. If I may be allowed I would say we are living in a
time of cultural ailment” (Bangladesh Showbiz 2002).
The question of whether Bangladesh and its people suffer from
“cultural ailment” may be moot in the face of deepening modern-
ization. Every dose of modernization or Western cultural influence
inevitably transforms the popular cultural landscape of every soci-
ety it penetrates. And Bangladesh is no exception. As Bangladeshis
succumb to the allure of Western popular culture in increasing
numbers, with Dhallywood acting as its prime conduit, the coun-
try’s rich and indigenous cultural heritage is overshadowed. It is
precisely this tendency of Western popular culture to reduce the
255
value of indigenous culture that becomes a source of tension and

conflict between modernity and traditionalism, between the older
generation and the younger generation, often giving rise to religious
fundamentalism. Although Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh
is relatively less charged than its counterpart in some Middle East-
ern countries, it is on the rise among certain segments of the Mus-
lim population. The recent victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party is partially explained by this rise because BNP has, from its
very inception, been aligned with Islamic fundamentalists. In fact,
it was only with the support of Jamaat e Islami, the Islamic funda-
mentalist party of the country, that BNP was able to form its first
government in 1991 under Khaleda Zia as prime minister.
With this backdrop, this chapter now discusses some of the con-
temporary issues facing the nation of Bangladesh.
CULTURE OF CORRUPTION AND VIOLENCE

Despite some progress in fields such as family planning, education,
and poverty alleviation since independence, lawlessness, corruption,
and cultural tensions have become common in Bangladesh. And the
relatively low status of women and child labor continue to linger.
Lawlessness and Corruption

Over the years, the law-and-order situation in Bangladesh has
deteriorated, threatening the normal activity and peaceful living of
virtually every citizen. People do not feel safe at work, on the
street, or even at home; they are frustrated and tension-ridden.
The situation has already hindered social development, weakened
the economy, and placed the future of the country’s democracy in
jeopardy. Robberies, stealing, illegal toll collections, pickpocketing,
drug addiction, rapes, kidnapping, hijacking and abduction, deaths
in police custody, and campus violence have become common-
place. Any sense of security has been shattered as crimes and vio-
lence engulf cities, towns, and even remote villages. In the period
from 1997 to 2001, nearly 4,000 people were murdered annually
in Bangladesh, and several thousands more were victims of crimi-
nal activities. And political killings are climbing.
As a consequence of increasing violence, the level of trust
——Bangladeshi Society and Contemporary Issues——257
appears to have gone down. Obviously, this lack of trust extends to

the whole establishment of law enforcement. A question rises:
What is the problem with law enforcement in Bangladesh?
Although scant verifiable hard data is available, it is common
knowledge that most law enforcement agencies and agents are cor-
rupt. Their primary modus operandi is bribes. If one can afford to
bribe them, that individual can get anything done or get away with
anything, including murder. In other words, the law in Bangladesh
generally seems to apply only to those who cannot afford to—or
refuse to—bribe. This whole entrenched network of corruption is
further reinforced by the fact that pressure from influential politi-
cians or political leaders prevents law enforcement personnel from
performing their official duties. It is widely known that many crim-
inals operate under the umbrella of “godfathers,” people who are
financially powerful and who have direct links to political power
brokers. Given this scenario, the general public has little trust in
law enforcement agencies to apply laws justly and fairly.
What all of this means is that violence and corruption are sanc-
tioned by the underhanded operation of politics no matter what
politicians claim on the surface in their loud rhetoric against cor-
ruption. Recently, one adviser to the caretaker government
blamed the political parties for patronizing terrorist activities and
for much of the ongoing political violence across the country. Yet
the political violence continues under the new government that
came to power in October 2001. In fact, corruption runs so deep
that policemen often arrest people for minor infractions mainly to
extract bribes. Those who fail to stuff some money in police pock-
ets are detained. News reports suggest that custodial deaths are ris-
ing across the country. Evidence of police obstruction of press
freedom through attacks on journalists is mounting, and the
much-promised autonomy of the electronic media has yet to be
fulfilled (Rahman 2000).
It should be noted, however, that violence is not limited to streets
and private domains; it has also spread to college and university
campuses. Campus violence and fighting between rival student
groups and between student groups and policemen are frequent.
Each major political party has a student wing, for student support is
quite important for their vitality. Every year, students die because of
clashes. At times, they use firearms during conflicts. After each such
death, the campus is officially closed for days, thus disrupting edu-
cation. For example, institutions were closed forty-one times during
1992 as a direct result of a series of conflicts between student
activists; fifty-seven violent incidents were recorded at Dhaka Uni-
versity alone, where five students and two outsiders were killed and
forty-four were wounded. In some instances, political groupism
among the faculty erupts into violence as well. To exacerbate an
already volatile situation, campus dormitories (hostels) sometimes
provide shelter to nonstudent activists and hooligans.
According to some estimates, there are more than 100,000 ille-
gal arms in the country, with 50,000 being concentrated in Dhaka.
Political use of criminals has been so endemic that gangsters and
armed criminals have been glorified by their respective political
party patrons as “armed cadres” and their crimes justified. Since
the mid-1990s, there has been an increase in the incidents of
bomb explosions in processions and in public meetings by rival
political groups. Six explosions claimed about eighty lives in a
recent thirty-month period. At least 350 people were injured in
these acts of terrorism, many of them disabled for life.
A foreign panel report recently identified Bangladesh’s law-
enforcement agencies as the most corrupt in the world. Transparency
International–Bangladesh (TIB) also found those agencies and senior
government officials among the most corrupt. But the boundary of
corruption reaches far beyond law-enforcement agencies and other
government officials and politicians. Even educational and medical
institutions are not immune. TIB’s analysis of corruption trends con-
firms both the general public impression and concerns raised by such
multilateral agencies as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank,
and Amnesty International. The TIB study points to the staggering
loss of at least $160 million during the last half of the year 2000 due
to corruption. Similarly, a World Bank analysis has suggested how
GDP growth in Bangladesh would be markedly higher, at least by 2
percent, if corruption could be contained.
Gender Violence
Sporadic gender violence has a long history in Bangladesh, similar
to other South Asian countries. However, it was generally limited
to some verbal and physical abuse; deliberate murders of women
Bangladeshi women shout slogans during a demonstration in Dhaka in

2000 demanding the end to violence committed against women. In
Bangladesh violence against women takes many forms including wife beat-
ing, maiming by acid and rape, and physical and verbal harassment.
(AFP/CORBIS)
were rarely carried out. Now violence against women has taken a
new twist and reached a new height. Deaths of women due to
unnatural causes have gone up dramatically in recent years
(Hashmi 2000, 3). Divorce and desertion by men, sexual abuse,
and psychological violence of women have also seen a steady
ascent. Two major contemporary trends of gender violence in
Bangladesh are acid incidents and international trafficking of
women and girls.
Acid Violence. Acid violence refers to vicious attacks on
women whereby acid is thrown or poured at a woman’s face, caus-
ing disfiguration. This type of violence is quite new and has
increased at an alarming proportion. Accurate statistics of acid vio-
lence are difficult to obtain, but it was recently reported that
nearly 250 incidents occur every year in Bangladesh. Available
information suggests that most victims of acid violence are unmar-
ried women under twenty years of age from poor to middle-class
rural families. Perpetrators are usually jilted or unrequited lovers
and frustrated dowry-seekers, though some are husbands who, fail-
ing to get enough dowry from their wives’ parents, pour acid on
their faces. Sometimes daughters are disfigured by their parents
for marrying against their fathers’ wishes.
Laws in Bangladesh have been specifically established to curb
escalating acid violence. For example, if found guilty, an offender
may be sentenced to death or life imprisonment together with a
substantial monetary penalty for the offender and his family. In
reality, however, the perpetrators of acid attacks invariably go
unpunished due to the lack of initiative on the part of the police in
pursuing investigations and making arrests. Such an absence of
conviction is attributed to the fact that attackers often come from
wealthy families and bribe concerned authorities. In addition,
some criminals receive protection from their political parties,
while others take advantage of loopholes in the existing laws. Some
escape punishment because no witnesses exist. The end result is
that convictions for acid violence are rare.
Female Trafficking and Sexual Bondage. Bangladeshi women
and girls are being increasingly trafficked to neighboring or Middle
Eastern countries with the false promise of employment (Paul and
Hasnath 2000). Trafficking refers to the illegal exportation of
women and girls from their homes primarily for the purpose of
forced labor, domestic servitude, or sexual exploitation. The oil

boom created a large demand for labor in many Middle Eastern
countries with relatively low populations. The labor demand in
these countries extended to domestic servants for wealthy house-
holds. Legal and illegal female migrants from Bangladesh turned
out to be a cheap and convenient response to this demand. Large-
scale migration of both male and female Bangladeshi laborers to
Middle Eastern countries started in 1976.
Estimating the number of women and girls involved in traffick-
ing is difficult because little accurate information is available. A
recent report claims that, annually, some 15,000 Bangladeshi
women and girls are taken out of the country by traffickers, and
thousands more leave voluntarily in an attempt to escape abject
poverty each year. Although a vast majority of girls and women are
promised employment in the Middle East, large numbers of them
actually end up in India and Pakistan. According to Pakistan’s
Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid (PLHRLA), more than
200,000 Bangladeshi women and girls are being held in sexual
bondage in Pakistan. Some 14,000 are thought to be working in the
brothels of Calcutta, and more in Mumbai (Bombay), India’s two
largest cities. Many of those who end up in the Middle East are
sexually exploited and physically abused by their employers.
Other Violence
The road to democracy in Bangladesh—that is, responsible and
mutually respectful exercise of democratic rights—seems to be
paved with thorns. On the one hand, newspapers have come under
growing attack as their offices are ransacked and journalists
assaulted and arrested. Some of these attacks are orchestrated not
only by mobs but also by political and fundamentalist organiza-
tions. They rely more on violence than public debates to settle ide-
ological disputes, to defend their views or to counter opposing
views. On the other hand, ethnic minorities of Bangladesh con-
tinue to struggle for realization of their rights (CCHRB 1995). They
are victims of various forms of oppression, violence, and even
killing by nonminority groups who settle in areas predominantly
inhabited by ethnic minorities. The situation of religious minori-
ties is hardly any better. Migration of minority Hindus from
Bangladesh to India continues precisely because of discrimination

and violence, sometimes perceived and other times real. It is no
wonder, therefore, that the Hindu population in Bangladesh has
declined from about a million in the 1970s to about 600,000 in the
early 1990s.
WOMEN’S STATUS IN SOCIETY

The preceding discussion reveals that in Bangladesh, women’s fate
is still largely left in the hands of their male counterparts and that
their overall status is low. This does not mean that there has been
no improvement in women’s status in recent years. To begin with,
the country has been governed by women since 1991, first by
Prime Minister Khaleda Zia (1991–1996) and then by Sheikh
Hasina Wajid (1996–2001). Now Mrs. Zia is back in power again.
This is a political feat that not too many advanced countries can
boast. Furthermore, in 1997, the government held elections to
elect women to occupy seats reserved for women in the local coun-
cils. This step has led to women’s political empowerment. And,
legally, the Constitution grants equal rights to women in all
spheres of public life.
Despite these advances, women’s overall status remains low. As
they still bear a disproportionately large share of poverty, women
generally suffer from malnutrition and poor health. Other devel-
opment indicators such as educational levels and employment sta-
tus are hardly any better, as women are often relegated to work as
domestic maids, secretaries, or in some other role of lowly employ-
ment. Almost 90 percent of the laborers in the garment industry
are women. In short, women are still viewed mainly in terms of
their reproductive and domestic roles, and their status in society
is closely associated with the purdah, which is deeply rooted in
Islamic dogmas. The word literally means a curtain or veil, and the
practice epitomizes the exclusion of women from public male
spaces. Their activities are, therefore, mostly confined to the
domestic front.
The purdah is often seen as a symbol of the patriarchal family
structure that enables men to dominate women, particularly those
who live in rural areas. Men usually exert power and authority over
women because the former controls property and income, and
The status of Bangladeshi women remains low, and they are commonly rel-
egated to serving domestic roles. This women is cooking outdoors, which is
usually done over a coal or firewood stove. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)
because husbands generally are five to fifteen years older than

their wives (Paul 1992). The purdah and patriarchal family struc-
ture have produced a relatively rigid division of labor by gender
and a system of social stratification that makes women dependent
on husbands or other male relatives. The women’s apparent insur-
ance against such potential risks is having children, especially
sons, who confer some status and autonomy on a young woman.
Unlike Muslim women, Hindu women do not practice purdah.
Similarly, tribal women are also free from it. In this sense, non-
Muslim women are less constrained than their Muslim counter-
parts in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has witnessed a gradual erosion of the purdah prac-
tice over the years. Two factors are mainly responsible for its
decline. First, the growing pressure of poverty in the midst of deep-
ening consumerism has forced women to seek employment out-
side the domestic parameters to support their families. For exam-
ple, the garment, electronic, and fish-processing industries are all
dominated by female labor, a situation that leads them to shed
their veils, for it is difficult to perform any of these tasks while cov-
ered in a veil. Second, the growing current of modernization and
Dhallywood’s popular cultural influence have made the purdah
look like an inimical symbol of women’s confinement and the
denial of their freedom and progress. As a result, the purdah is not
as common in urban areas and among the educated segment of the
female population.
In some cases in the country, female adulterers have been stoned
to death in spite of the existence of formal laws against such vio-
lence. And husbands abandon their wives. This is a trend that has
become particularly noticeable in recent years among the married
male migrants who go overseas; some of them simply abandon their
wives to remarry women from families with higher social status and
wealth so they can collect more dowries from new wives’ parents.
CHILD LABOR
In 1999, a documentary film entitled That’s Why I’m Working
revealed the extent of child labor in Bangladesh and showed how
it is a by-product of pervasive poverty and globalization (Schmidt
and Doebele 1999). The film begins by showing a young boy, per-
haps twelve years old, rummaging through a small field of scattered
garbage in front of a high-rise slum dwelling complex in Dhaka.
With this backdrop, the documentary quickly moves on to its cen-
tral theme, in which young boys and girls—most of whom seem to
be between the ages of seven and twelve—tell their personal sto-
ries, each with a little variation but all deeply seeped in a poverty
that follows them like their own shadows from rural fringes to
urban trenches. As the scenes unfold, children are seen making
incense, wrapping candies, and producing plumbing parts in a
makeshift backyard foundry. In one segment, a girl is breaking
rocks into small pieces with a hammer, perhaps for some road con-
struction project. Besides working as a stone breaker, she is
responsible for taking care of her younger siblings and for house-
hold chores in the evenings. At the end of her story, she says, “I
break stones because I am poor.” Then she suddenly goes quiet,
and her face looks blank, as if her blood stopped flowing.
In another equally touching segment, a young boy talks about
his family. With tears flowing down his cheeks, he details his
A nine-year-old candy vendor waits for customers in front of a school in

Dhaka. Thousands of Bangladeshi children who live near the capital are
not able to attend school because they must earn supplemental income for
their families. Vending is a common way for children to earn money.
(AFP/CORBIS)
father’s prolonged illness and how it has inflicted tremendous

hardship on his family. As his father’s health deteriorates, both he
and his mother have to work hard to pay for his father’s treatment
and to survive. On top of that, he has to look after his baby brother
while his mother goes to work. At one point, the two brothers are
shown at home. The baby is crying hard because of hunger, but
there is scant food to soothe him. The boy soaks some rice in
water, pours it into a bottle, and feeds the baby. The baby stops
crying, his hunger temporarily abated. He does not get enough
food these days, the boy says, because his father can’t work.
Such is the grim picture of child labor and its imperatives. Child
labor is not a matter of choice—it is a survival necessity. And it is a
national feature of Bangladesh. Child labor has a distinct class
character, for it is particularly common among the poor. By the
time children are six or seven years old, they are required to do var-
ious family chores, from fetching water and fodder to cleaning ani-
mal sheds to taking care of their younger siblings—and doing what-

ever else needs to be done around the home. Similar to Nepal and
other parts of South Asia, child labor is a vital part of family sur-
vival. These children have no time to play and frolic carefree like
most Western and rich children do. For them, childhood is merely
a biological phase, not a social one. Their maturing process begins
very early in their lifecycle and proceeds at a fairly rapid pace as
they are routinely burdened with increasing family responsibilities.
Although the extensive use of child labor within the household
is nothing new to Bangladesh, a new trend is emerging. Now chil-
dren are being increasingly used as a source of profit, driven by the
forces of globalization. They are found within the service sector,
including in restaurants and hotels and as domestic help. In addi-
tion, they are increasingly found in certain labor-intensive manu-
facturing operations, such as garment and textile production and
even in leather factories. Their use is expanding because they are
cheaper to hire and easier to exploit, a situation that serves as a
modern day reminder of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Eng-
land, following the Industrial Revolution in the 1760s. In recent
years there have been international outcries against child labor in
Bangladesh and elsewhere. In fact, a couple of years ago, a leading
American discount retail company was involved in having some of
its apparel products made in a Bangladesh factory that employed
children to make them. But, despite international outcries, there
has been little progress toward abating this problem. The problem
is compounded by the fact that children are routinely verbally and
physically abused and are deprived of their basic rights. Whether
justified or not, most employers believe that without child labor,
they lose their competitive advantage in terms of pricing and
attracting foreign investments. As child labor increasingly
becomes an integral part of business imperatives rather than a
social concern, it continues in Bangladesh without concerted effort
to eliminate it.
POPULAR CULTURE AND RECREATION

Bangladesh is usually called a new nation in an ancient land with
a long and rich cultural heritage. Its long, turbulent history is
replete with the epic saga of invasions and subjugation that
resulted in a great deal of cultural fusion and transfusion. The long

chain of Buddhist and Hindu rules was broken by the advent of the
Muslims from West Asia in the thirteenth century. Following the
Muslim rule, Bangladesh was subjected to British rule for almost
two centuries. Between 1947 and 1971, it was part of Pakistan.
Each ruling body added elements of its culture to the indigenous
culture of Bangladesh.
In essence, the cultural diversity of the past has been replaced
by a cultural homogeneity in contemporary times. What is more,
in recent years Bangladesh has increasingly witnessed parallel
trends of Islamic fundamentalism on the one hand and popular
culture on the other. Although fundamentalism in Bangladesh is,
as noted earlier, relatively tempered by the standards of some Mid-
dle Eastern countries, popular culture is spreading widely—and
perhaps wildly. One can illustrate the deepening trend of popular
culture dominated by movies and TV with a simple example of the
visible change that has taken place in village life. In rural
Bangladesh, cultural life and entertainment used to be character-
ized by folk music and dances, performed in simple forms and in
natural settings. That was until the advent of movie theaters ini-
tially and now videocassette recorders (VCRs) and satellite TV.
Cinematic films have been shown throughout Bangladesh for a
long time (Raju 2002). TV is a more recent introduction; black-
and-white television was introduced in 1965, and color television
in 1980. Now TV is quite prevalent, especially in urban areas.
Typical villagers in Bangladesh live with their large extended
families in simple huts with thatch roofs and mud walls. They till
whatever land they have and raise a few domestic animals. Some
may do some fishing to supplement food supplies if they live near a
river. They mostly consume what they produce although some may
sell some produce in the market to generate cash income for fam-
ily needs. Some are engaged in wage laboring. The traditional form
of entertainment for many villagers is sitting around with family
members and friends, talking about the day’s events and problems.
They may occasionally share folk tales and participate in religious
ceremonies. Although such rudimentary entertainment is still alive
to some extent, times are certainly changing. Television is a prime
driver of this change, leading villagers toward a new form of enter-
tainment and popular culture. Nowadays after dinner, neighbors
For many Bangladeshis home is a thatch-roofed house with mud walls.

Such houses are usually found in settlements that feature a courtyard that
serves several purposes—a playground for children, an open space to dry
crops or other items, or a place to perform village ceremonies and festivals.
(Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)
will gather in the homes of villagers with TV sets and VCRs to watch
their favorite shows. Some villagers return home earlier than usual
from their fields, work, or outings to view popular programs. As
soon as the TV is turned on, silence descends in the room. In urban
areas, many households have their own satellite TV.
Two facts characterize TV in Bangladesh. First, the number of
domestic and foreign television channels and the duration of pro-
grams have both increased markedly in recent years. Second, TV
has emerged as the most dominant medium of popular cultural
consumption as well as cultural entertainment within Bangladesh.
Transnational satellite broadcasting made its debut in the early
1990s. Since then CNN, Star TV, and Zee TV have offered various
entertainment programs in numerous languages. Although the
most popular foreign TV program is Indian movies, broadcast both
domestically and from India, Hollywood shows are also featured,
including MTV. Domestic television programming was initially
kept under tight government control in terms of the amount and

content of broadcasting. Initially, it was significantly used for the
purpose of adult and general education and as an avenue of agri-
cultural extension, offering advice and information about various
farm-related issues. What is common now are commercial shows
and commercialization, serving a staple and steady diet of popular
culture, emanating from both India and America. As Japan has
become an important source of popular culture in East and South-
east Asia, India (i.e., Indian movies) has served as a similar source
for South Asia. India’s influence actually extends as far as East and
South Africa, Southeast Asia, certain parts of the Middle East, Eng-
land, and the West Indies—wherever there is a relatively large
enclave of Indians who gravitate to Indian movies, especially the
first generation Indian immigrants.
In the late 1970s, not even 5 percent of the households in
Bangladesh had television sets. Most of these sets were owned by
urban dwellers. By the late 1990s, over 15 percent of the house-
holds owned television sets. Nearly half of all television sets avail-
able in Bangladesh are now used in rural areas, a development that
has greatly opened the rural frontier for popular culture and con-
sumerism. As TV becomes increasingly accessible as a result of
reduced costs and greatly advanced means of transportation and
communication, the barometer of popular culture rises on the scale
of mass consumption. Its influence has been all encompassing,
affecting virtually every aspect of life—dress styles, music, food,
mannerism, gender relations, religious outlooks, educational prior-
ities, and even the course of politics as well as the nature and forms
of violence. And now, the Internet has added a new dimension to
this rapidly expanding vista of popular culture in Bangladesh.
CONCLUSION
What we see from the preceding discussion is a Bangladesh that is
both entrenched in tradition, characterized by gender violence and
women’s low status, and undergoing fairly remarkable changes in
its cultural landscape. Although some of these changes have cer-
tainly engendered a sense of freedom and progress for women,
other changes have made their status worse, with increased inse-
curity. A deepening trend toward both increased gender violence
and international trafficking of Bangladeshi women and girls hardly

bodes well for their improved standing. The country has a long way
to go before it can free itself from these burdens, which currently
sap its energy and hinder its social and economic progress. Hope-
fully, its growing links to countries across the world and its ongoing
trend of economic development and political democratization will
loosen the grip of its age-old order and usher in a new era, one in
which people are free from the fetters of feudalistic arrangements.
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PART TWO
REFERENCE MATERIALS
Key Events in Bangledeshi History
563–1000 B.C.
Arrival and settlement of Bang tribe (Dravidians)
273–232 B.C.
Mauryan empire, reign of Emperor Ashok (Asoka)
A.D. 320–540
Gupta dynasty
606–647
Rule of Harsha
750–1150
Pala dynasty
1001–1030
Turkish invasion into the Indian subcontinent and the coming
of Islam
1206
Establishment of Delhi sultanate
1517
Arrival of Portuguese in Chittagong
1526–1858
The Mughal (Moghul, Mogul) Period. The Mughal period is begun
with the foundation laid by Babur and consolidation of Islam.
1556–1605
Mughal Emperor Akbar expands and reforms the empire.
1576
Bengal is conquered by the Mughals.
1608
Dhaka is established as capital of the Mughal empire’s Bengal
Province.
1650
Arrival of the British in Bengal
273
1658–1707
Reign of Aurangzeb, the last renowned Mughal ruler
1707–1858
Decline of the Mughal empire on the subcontinent and the rise of
the British East India Company
1757–1947
The British Period. The British period begins with their victory
over the Mughal forces in Bengal during the battle of Plassey.
1793
The British impose the Permanent Settlement Act on Bengal.
1857–1858
Sepoy Mutiny (soldiers’ uprising)
1858
British East India Company is dissolved; rule of India under the
British crown is initiated. This is the beginning of the British Raj
(empire) and the formal end of the Mughal empire.
1905
Partition of Bengal into East Bengal and West Bengal (East Bengal
roughly constitutes today’s Bangladesh).
1947
With the partition of India and Pakistan by the British Raj on
August 15, the British period ends. India and Pakistan quickly
emerge as two independent nations separated by religious nation-
alism: India is identified largely as a Hindu state, and Pakistan as
Muslim. Pakistan is further divided into two separate territorial
parts: West Pakistan (where the central government is based) and
East Bengal (today’s Bangladesh).
1947–1971
The Pakistani Period. During these years West Pakistan rules
East Pakistan (previously East Bengal and now Bangladesh).
1949
The Awami (People’s) Muslim League (later renamed Awami
League) political party is founded in June by Husain Shahid
Suhrawardy.
——Key Events in Bangladeshi History——275
1952
On February 21, students are killed in a pro-Bengali-language
demonstration in Dhaka. The date is now celebrated annually as
Martyrs’ Day in Bangladesh.
1955
East Bengal is renamed East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
1970
General elections are held on December 7 to form a parliamen-
tary government in Pakistan. The Awami League led by Sheikh
Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman of East Pakistan secures an absolute
majority with 160 seats in the new National Assembly but is
denied the right to form a government.
1971
In late March, West Pakistani military forces launch massive
assaults on Bengal freedom fighters and the general public. They
arrest Mujibur Rahman and send him to prison in West Pakistan.
The war for independence officially begins.
April 17. East Pakistan formally declares its independence as the
nation of Bangladesh. The war for independence intensifies.
December 3. Pakistan launches a preemptive strike against India.
December 4. India strikes back and invades East Pakistan, thus
giving a military boost to freedom fighters trying to establish a free
Bangladesh.
December 6. India formally recognizes Bangladesh as an inde-
pendent nation.
December 16. Pakistani military forces in East Pakistan surrender
to India, and freedom fighters take over Dhaka, thus marking the
independence of Bangladesh.
1971–present
Independent Bangladesh. With the dawn of independence, a
new era begins in the history of Bangladesh.
1972
Mujib Rahman, jailed in Pakistan and regarded as the father of the
new nation, returns to Bangladesh on January 10. The new con-
stitution of Bangladesh is promulgated on December 16, marking
the first-year anniversary of liberation.
1973
The first general elections of independent Bangladesh are held.
Mujib’s Awami League wins 282 out of 300 parliamentary seats
and forms a government.
1974
On February 22, Pakistan formally recognizes Bangladesh. On
September 17, the new nation is admitted to the United Nations.
1975
Mujib Rahman is assassinated on August 15, along with twenty-
three of his family members and associates.
1977
General Ziaur (Zia) Rahman becomes president.
1981
President Zia is assassinated on March 30; Abdus Sattar is
appointed and later elected president.
1982
Sattar is overthrown in a military coup orchestrated by Hussain
Muhammad Ershad, who becomes president
1990
Ershad resigns the presidency on December 4.
1991
General elections are held in March, giving the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) a plurality; under the prime ministership
of Khaleda Zia (Zia Rahman’s widow), the BNP forms a new gov-
ernment.
1996
General elections are held in June, resulting in a plurality for the
Awami League led by Sheikh Hasina Wajid (Wazed), the late pres-
ident Mujib Rahman’s daughter. With Hasina Wajid as prime min-
ister, the Awami League forms a new government.
2001
General elections are held in October, returning power to the
BNP. Khaleda Zia is again prime minister.
Significant People, Places,
and Events
Abu Taher, Colonel (1938–1976) Recipient of the Bir Uttam

award for bravery during the war of liberation, he was executed
by Ziaur (Zia) Rahman’s regime for his radical leftist beliefs.
August Coup (August 15, 1975) The first coup in independent

Bangladesh led by the army that ended the country’s democratic
government. During this coup, Sheik Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman
was assassinated, along with most of his family members. This
was followed by another coup on November 3 and a counter coup
on November 7, during which Khalid Musharif was killed.
Awami League Established in June 1949 as the Awami (People’s)

Muslim League party. It is the first party to win the first general
elections and form the first elected government of independent
Bangladesh under the leadership of Sheik Mujibur Rahman. This
party is now led by his daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wajid.
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Formed in 1978 by the late

President Ziaur Rahman as a political vehicle of his rule. It is now
headed by his widow, Khaleda Zia.
Biswas, Abdur Rahman (1926–) Served as president of Bangladesh

during the Khaleda Zia regime (1991–1996). Biswas was elected
president following the change of the governmental system of
Bangladesh from the presidential rule to parliamentary governance
whereby the prime minister would be the head of the government.
Chowdhury, Abu Sayeed (1921–1987) President of Bangladesh

from January 1972 to December 1973. Earlier, he had been a jus-
tice of the Dhaka High Court and a vice chancellor of Dhaka Uni-
versity. He played a key role as a roving ambassador in Europe
and the United States on behalf of emerging Bangladesh.
277
Chowdhury, Anwar Bahar (1918–1987) A leading figure in

women’s education, both before partition in Calcutta and after
partition in Dhaka. She was a cofounder of the Bulbul Academy of
Fine Arts, and also began schools for dance and music.
Dhaka Founded in 1608 as the seat of the imperial Mughal

viceroys of Bengal and renowned for its fine silk and muslin, today
Dhaka is the capital and largest city of Bangladesh and home to
more than 4 million people. One of the enduring qualities of
Dhaka to this day is the preeminent role that three-wheeled, man-
driven rickshaws play in its urban transportation system. But
rickshaws are more than merely a mode of transportation in
Dhaka; they are a way of life and means of survival for countless
rural migrants who pour into the city year after year and in large
numbers. As many fail to find other jobs, they quickly join the
ranks of rickshaw drivers. Competing with rickshaws are thela
gaari, or push/pull (thela) carts (gaari), heavily loaded with
coconuts or other goods shoving their way to the bazaar through
the dense traffic of Dhaka. Unlike rickshaws that are individually
operated, the thela gaari may involve just one individual or sev-
eral pushers and pullers working together.
Dhaka has several historical sites. Suhrawardy Uddyan, for-
merly known as the Race Course, the popular park of the city
where the oath for independence of Bangladesh was taken on
March 7, 1971, and where the commander of the West Pakistani
occupation forces surrendered on December 16, 1971, thus giving
birth to Bangladesh; Shahid Minar, a martyr monument; Lalbagh
Fort, built in A.D. 1678 by Emperor Aurangazeb’s son Mohammed
Azam; the National Assembly Complex, or Jatyo Sangsad, an
architectural wonder designed by genius architect Luis Kahn; the
National Memorial, or Jatyo Sritee Shoudhow, built to honor all
those who were killed during the war for independence; and the
National Museum.
East Pakistan Official name for today’s Bangladesh when it

remained annexed to Pakistan following the partition of the
British Raj in 1947 until December 1971
Ershad, Hussain Muhammad (1930–) As lieutenant general,

Ershad led a military coup against the elected government of

Abdus Sattar in March 1982 and became president in December
1984. Later, he formed his own Jatiya Dal Party. He was pressured
to resign in December 1990. He was later jailed by the first
Khaleda Zia regime (1991–1996).
Grameen Bank Outcome of an experimental project launched by

Professor Muhammad Yunus to empower the poor through micro
credit for entrepreneurship. It offers collateral-free loans to the
poor to engage in small-scale commercial ventures. It has now
emerged as a creative model of rural poverty reduction programs
in many underdeveloped countries.
Hasina Wajid (Wazed), Sheikh (1947–) The late President Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman’s daughter, who survived the presidential mas-
sacre during the August Coup, merely because she was in Ger-
many at the time. She assumed the leadership of the Awami
League party following her return to the country in May 1981.
When her party won a plurality of the parliamentary seats during
the June 1996 elections, she was able to form the Awami League
government for the first time since her father’s assassination. How-
ever, her party suffered a major defeat during the October 2001
elections and relinquished the office of prime minister to her
archrival Khaleda Zia, whom she had replaced five years earlier.
Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 By-product of the war for independ-

ence (liberation) between West Pakistan and what was then East
Pakistan. In early December 1971, India intervened by engaging
in a war with Pakistan and helped the Mukti Bahini (liberation
army) defeat the West Pakistani military forces. Interestingly, the
opening for India’s intervention was provided by Pakistan when it
preemptively attacked India on December 3. As a result,
Bangladesh was born.
Khaleda Zia (1945–) Widow of the late President Ziaur Rahman. She
later assumed the leadership of her husband’s Bangladesh National-
ist Party (BNP) in May 1984. Following the BNP’s victory in the Feb-
ruary 1991 elections, she formed a popularly elected government,
thus paving the way for a renewed democratic experiment in
Bangladesh since the assassination of President Mujibur Rahman in

1975. Her party lost the June 1996 election, handing the govern-
ment over to the Awami League under the prime ministership of
Sheikh Hasina Wajid. However, she is back in power as prime min-
ister, following her party’s victory in the October 2001 elections.
Language Movement A defining chapter in Bangladesh’s libera-

tion history as it set the stage for independence. The language
movement of 1952 had its origin in 1948, when Urdu was
announced as the only national language of Pakistan. At that time,
Dhaka University students demanded that Bengali be declared the
official language of East Pakistan. When the central government
introduced the Urdu script for Bengali in 1952, violent reactions
erupted. A number of people, including university students, were
killed by the police. A monument named the Shahid Minar was
erected to commemorate the martyrs (shahid) of the movement,
thus laying the foundation of independence.
Mainamati About 5 miles to the west of Comilla town lie low hills
known as the Mainamati-Lalmai range. This area was once an
important seat of Buddhist culture. Large-scale excavations have
revealed valuable facts about Buddhist rulers during the seventh
and eighth centuries. It is believed that the area contains more
than fifty Buddhist archaeological sites. Comilla is also famous for
khadi (cotton dress) and bamboo products.
Mujibur Rahman, Sheik (1920–1975) Regarded as the father of

the nation of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman—or simply
Mujib as he was fondly called—was one of the most charismatic
leaders that Asia has ever seen rise from its fertile soil. His life is
truly a story of Bangladesh as this great leader turned people
power into a national revolution that brought liberation to a
nation suffering from years of external domination and subjuga-
tion. The birth of the sovereign state of Bangladesh in December
1971, after a heroic war against the Pakistani rule, marked a mar-
velous milestone in Mujib’s storied political career. It is no acci-
dent of history that in a society marred with militarism and dic-
tatorship, Mujib attained power through elections and mass
movement; he ushered in an era of democracy and human rights.
On that historic day of March 7, 1971, nearly 2 million free-

dom-loving people gathered at the Ramna Race Course, later
renamed Suhrawardy Uddyan, to hear Mujib’s command for the
battle for liberation. He proclaimed: “Our struggle this time is for
freedom. Our struggle this time is for independence.” On March
25, the Pakistani military arrested Mujib and whisked him away
to West Pakistan for imprisonment. Subsequently, the West Pak-
istani military went on a genocidal rampage, killing, by some
accounts, almost 3 million men, women, and children as well as
raping girls and women. As West Pakistan lost the war for inde-
pendence following India’s intervention and eventually surren-
dered on December 16, 1971, East Pakistan was freed. That was
the birth of Bangladesh. Mujib was released from the West Pak-
istani jail. On January 10, 1972, the triumphant leader returned
to his beloved land.
His life was cut short when he was brutally assassinated by mil-
itary officers. His regime and democracy ended suddenly in one
swift, bloody predawn coup on August 15, 1975. Along with him,
twenty-three of his family members and close associates were
murdered. Even his ten-year old son Russel’s life was not spared
by the assassins. The only survivors were his two daughters,
Sheikh Hasina Wajid and her younger sister Sheikh Rehana, who
were then away on a visit to Germany.
Musharif, Khalid (?–1975) A supporter of President Mujibur

Rahman, who led a counter coup on November 3, 1975, that
ousted the majors who orchestrated the August Coup of 1975, he
was killed by the army on November 7, an event (another coup)
that led to the rise of General Ziaur Rahman to presidency.
Mushtaque Ahmed, Khondakar (1918–1996) President of

Bangladesh from August to November 1975, following Mujib’s
assassination. As a conservative member of Mujib’s cabinet, it is
believed that he played a role in Mujib’s murder by betraying him.
A founding member of the Awami League, he was very outspoken
during the language movement. He gave up the presidency when
a counter coup led by Khalid Musharif took place.
Nazrul, Islam Syed (1925–1975) Head of the Bangladesh govern-

ment in exile in 1971 during the war for independence when

Mujibur Rahman was in West Pakistani jail, he was assassinated
during the Dhaka jail killing on November 3, 1975. As a student
leader, he actively participated in the language movement. He
joined the Awami League in 1953 and rose to be its senior vice
president.
Sattar, Abdus (1906–1985) President of Bangladesh from May 30,

1981, to March 24, 1982, when he was dismissed following the
coup led by Hussain Muhammad Ershad. He had a career both in
politics and law. In 1975 he was a special assistant to President
Abu Sadat Muhammad Sayem; he became law minister in 1977,
a post he retained until he was appointed vice president the same
year by President Zia.
Sayem, Abu Sadat Muhammad (1916–) President of Bangladesh

from November 1975 to April 1977. He was appointed president
as part of the compromise between Khalid Musharif and Khon-
dakar Mushtaque Ahmed over who should lead Bangladesh. At
the time he was chosen to be president, he was the nation’s chief
justice. Trained as a lawyer, he was essentially dismissed by Gen-
eral Zia, who took over presidency.
Suhrawardy, Husain Shahid (1893–1963) A member of a promi-

nent Bengali family, he was the founder of the Awami League in
1949. Educated at Oxford, he was first elected to the Bengal Leg-
islative Council in 1921. Subsequently, he held several other posi-
tions at various times. In 1949, when he took residency in India,
he floated the idea of a Muslim party that would include non-
Muslims and founded the Awami League, a party that never
gained any foothold in West Pakistan. He died in Beirut on
December 5, 1963.
Sundarban(s) Fascinating tropical forests of deltaic swamp, the

Sundarban is flanked by the coastal fringe of southwestern
Bangladesh. Its location is adjacent to West Bengal. The Sundar-
ban is a natural wildlife habitat rife with crocodiles, dotted deer,
pythons, wild bears, monkeys, and, of course, the world-famous
Bengal tigers, unparalleled in their beauty and elegance. The lit-
eral translation for the Sundarban is “the beautiful (sundar) for-

est (ban).” Adorned by many mangroves, it is a virgin forest that
spans 1,400 square miles and until recently owed nothing to
human endeavor.
Sylhet Nestled in the picturesque Surma Valley, fed by two rivers,

the Sylhet is the land of scenic tea gardens. It is a prime attrac-
tion for tourists visiting Bangladesh as well as a playground for
naturalists and game watchers. Lying between the Khasia and
Jaintia Hills on the north and the Tripura Hills on the south, the
Sylhet breaks the monotony of the flatness of Bangladesh with a
multitude of terraced tea gardens and rolling countryside. In addi-
tion, here the thick tropical forests abound with many species of
wildlife; scented orange groves and luxuriant pineapple planta-
tions spread their aroma across the valley and around the typical
hearth and homes of the Manipuri tribal maidens, famous for their
exotic dance. The Manipur dance is based on allegorical love
themes of the ancient mythology. It is a true cultural experience.
Tagore, Rabindranath (1861–1941) The most noted poet of South

Asia, who is claimed by both India and Bangladesh. It is no won-
der that his works are equally admired and accepted by both the
Muslims and Hindus. He is a great source of pride in both coun-
tries. When his literary works were banned from Pakistani radio
in 1965, the artificial glue that loosely held East and West Pak-
istan together came apart, paving the path of eventual separation.
A Bengali by ethnicity, he is the first Asian to win a Nobel Prize
for literature (in 1913). His famous and nationalistic poem enti-
tled “Sonar Bangla” (Golden Bengal) is the national anthem of
Bangladesh, and another of his poems is the national anthem of
India. In addition to poems, he wrote novels and plays. Such was
the universality or cross-cultural and cross-national appeal of
Tagore, the literary giant of Asia.
Ziaur (Zia) Rahman (1936–1981) Although he officially assumed

the country’s presidency in April 1977, his effective leadership
began in 1975 following the coup of November 7, 1975, when
Khalid Musharif was killed. In 1978, he founded the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party as his political armament, and it has since
emerged as the leading party in the nation. He was instrumental in

the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooper-
ation (SAARC) in 1983. Dhaka was the site of SAARC’s inaugura-
tion in December 1985. Zia was assassinated on May 30, 1981.
Bangladeshi Language, Food,
and Etiquette
LANGUAGE
With 98 percent of its population speaking Bangla or Bengali,
Bangladesh is basically an unilingual country. The only excep-
tions are the tribal population and Biharis. Bengali is not only the
official language of the country, it has also served as a source of
nationalism and national pride. As noted earlier, the initial refusal
of the Pakistani government to treat Bengali as equal to Urdu as
the national language of Pakistan was one of the principal sparks
of the 1971 war for independence.
Bengali is a member of the Indo-European linguistic family and
is derived from Sanskrit. It evolved through Prakrit. It is written
in script that is a modification of the Devanagari or Sanskrit writ-
ing system. As such, it is akin to Hindi and Nepali scripts, but not
exactly the same. There are, however, several regional dialects in
Bengali. Most dominant of these are the dialects of Sylhet,
Noakhali, and Chittagong. Bengali has a distinguished history in
literature, music, and poetry. At least two Bengali poets are well
known in the West—Rabindranath Tagore, a 1913 Nobel laureate
in literature, and Kazi Nazrul Islam. Ill-advised attempts to stifle
Tagore’s writings by the Pakistani government added fuel to the
fire burning for a continuation of the Bengali heritage. Despite
Bengalization of all official activities after independence in 1971,
English remains important, however, as it almost acts as a second
national language.
In English the sentence (grammar) order is subject-verb-object,
but in Bengali the sequence is subject-object-verb. For instance, “I
go home” in English would be “I home go” in Bengali. It is,
nonetheless, important to bear in mind that there is enough flexi-
bility in the sentence formation both in speaking and writing.
Casual conversational Bengali can be even more flexible. It is com-
285
mon for people to converse in single words rather than in complete

sentences, yet be quite clear in communicating messages and
meanings. Most English-speaking people may find spoken Bengali
to be very fast, especially when Bengalis converse with each other.
The following are some useful survival Bengali expressions:
Kamon aachho? or Kamon aachhen? (latter more polite; both

are similar to something like “How are you?”)
Greetings!
Aabar dekha hobey.
(see you later) Goodbye!
Ki hochhey? What’s going on?
Kamon cholchhey? How are things going?
Dhonnobaad. Thank you.
Kothai . . .? Where is...? (as in “boi kothai,”
Where is the book?)
Ektu dakhan. Please show me.
Ak minet. Just a moment.
Ektu opekha koroon. Please wait.
Boshoon. Please sit down.
Khaan. Please eat.
Bhalo achhey. It’s good; it’s nice.
Bas. Enough.
Ha(n). Yes.
Na. No.
Maaph korain. Please pardon me.
Aabaar dain. Give me one more, please.
Bhalo lagay na. Don’t like it.
Ki holo? What happened?
Eta ki? What is this?
FOOD AND BEVERAGES

There are noticeable similarities between Bangladesh and Nepal or
India regarding the culture of food and eating. Even words and
phrases are sometimes the same. Similar to Nepal and India, shar-
ing food and drinks with guests is a time-honored cultural practice
among Bengalis regardless of their class status, social ranks, and
geographical backgrounds. This cultural practice at times seems
——Bangladeshi Language, Food, and Etiquette——287
like a social obligation in that one is expected to provide food and

drink whenever relatives or guests visit. In other words, if an indi-
vidual happens to visit a family during lunch or dinner hours, the
visitor is normally offered a full meal. Furthermore, with the pos-
sible exception of young children and elderly members, the host
family is expected to refrain from eating until the visitors are
served. In terms of family hierarchies, senior male members are
fed before female and junior members, except for school-age chil-
dren. In this hierarchical eating structure, daughters-in-law or
wives are usually the last ones to eat, and the cook rarely eats
until every member of the family is served. In group settings also,
seniority, which is defined in terms of either social rank, rela-
tionship, or age, takes precedence. That is, the senior member of
the group generally initiates and signals others to begin eating.
Such eating order and etiquette are closely observed across Ben-
gali society.
Most people sit on the floor, usually on a small carpet or mat
spread on the floor, while eating. As in India and Nepal,
Bangladeshis traditionally eat everything with their fingers. What,
after all, could be a better instrument to pick out treacherous fish
bones than fingers?
Common Bangladeshi Dishes

Rice. Similar to most countries in monsoon Asia, in Bangladesh
rice is king. Although wheat also is commonly consumed, nothing
can take the place of rice. Its prominence in Bengali society is
clearly reflected in the fact that nearly 75 percent of the nation’s
crop land is devoted to growing rice. Furthermore, it constitutes
almost 90 percent of all cereal production. Thanks to its con-
ducive climatic conditions, Bangladeshi farmers grow up to three
crops of rice per annum. Although it is consumed in various
forms, boiled rice often constitutes the main dish. It is an integral
part of the daily diet, some eating it as many as three times a day.
However, in Bangladesh (as in Nepal), rice is rarely consumed by
itself but rather is served with other foods, such as cooked dal
(lentils) and vegetables. If a family can afford fish or meat, it will
also be served. The higher the economic position of a household,
the greater the variety of side dishes to complement the rice.
Dal. Made from yellow, red, or black lentils or, on occasion, mung
beans, dal is a soupy accompaniment to most meals in
Bangladesh. As in Nepal and India, rice is rarely served without
this common—and almost essential—source of protein. Dal is the
most affordable protein among Bangladesh’s poor.
Fish and Meat. Fish is probably the most preferred source of ani-
mal protein among Bangladeshis (and Bengalis in general). It is
often stereotyped that when Bengalis see fish, they drool. They
love fish. Given its extensive river systems and ready access to the
sea, Bangladesh is a leading producer of fish, especially freshwa-
ter fish. Meat is also common—much more so than in neighbor-
ing Nepal. Unlike the restrictions against beef and other meats
among certain caste groups in Nepal’s Hindu society, Bangladeshis
tend to allow all kinds of meat to be consumed. The only excep-
tion is pork, which is prohibited also among high-caste Hindus.
However, as in other Muslim societies, meats have to be processed
in specific ways that follow religious practices so that they are
considered pure and acceptable. Fish cookery is one of the better-
known features of the country’s cuisine. Bangladeshis prepare fish
in innumerable ways—steamed or braised, stewed with greens or
other vegetables, and with sauces that are mustard based or
thickened with poppy seeds. Some of the Bengali fish dishes are
truly indigenous to the region.
Vegetables. As in Nepal, vegetables are an important part of diets

in Bangladesh, and it is common for farming families to grow
some vegetables to supplement their food supply. Many types of
vegetables are grown in the country, and they are consumed
widely across the nation. Most Bangladeshis prepare vegetables
with curry, in a style called tarkari. Sometimes the word tarkari,
which technically means garden vegetables, is used generically to
mean anything cooked in a curried fashion.
Curry. Not a particular dish or ingredient, curry is largely a

method of food preparation that involves using certain spices and
cooking on a stove. Most common among these spices are
turmeric, cumin, coriander, garlic, ginger, hot chili pepper, and
salt. Most vegetable and meat dishes are cooked as curry dishes.
In this respect, most of the curry dishes in Bangladesh are quite

similar in tastes and forms to those found in northern India,
although some local variations may be observed.
Roti. Flat, round dough bread, called roti, is often cooked in an

iron pan on top of the oven and made out of wheat flour. Its tex-
ture is similar to pita bread, although it is often somewhat thin-
ner. It is sometimes substituted for rice or used as a supplement
to rice, eaten with some dal and a vegetable dish and fish or meat,
if available. It is a common dish throughout the country. The word
is also used generically to mean any type of bread.
Rossogola. A sweet dish made from flour and other ingredients,

rossogola is first browned in hot oil, preferably ghee (purified but-
ter), and then dipped in sugar syrup. In fact, it is left in the syrup
until eaten. It literally means something round (gola) and juicy
(ross or rus). It is one of the most popular sweet dishes in
Bangladesh and India. In fact, the Bengal region is quite renowned
for sweet dishes.
Common Bangladeshi Beverages

Beer. As a Muslim nation, Bangladesh limits the purchase and use
of alcoholic beverages. With the sweeping tide of Westernization,
however, beer has made tremendous inroads in Bangladesh over
the past 15–20 years. It is now a popular drink and a status sym-
bol among the upwardly mobile and upscale urbanites and edu-
cated crowds.
Tea. As in India and Nepal, tea is the most common drink served
in both rural and urban areas of Bangladesh. Guests are invariably
served a cup of hot black tea, often mixed with milk and sugar,
along with a light snack. An average Bangladeshi drinks several
cups of tea a day, starting in the morning. Tea in Bangladesh is
both imported and exported.
Soft Drinks. Soft drinks have become quite popular within

Bangladesh and are now widely available. Although they have
become increasingly common, they are still considered luxury
drinks in most parts of Bangladesh, although not to the same extent

as beer. Soft drinks are both produced domestically and imported.
ETIQUETTE
Bangladesh can be thought of as a very structured and reserved
society, and there are certain expectations with regard to eti-
quette and manners. Although etiquette and manners change
over time, some seem timeless in terms of their practice. Some
examples follow.
Taking Shoes Off. Removing one’s footwear at the main entryway

into a house, temple, or mosque is required throughout
Bangladesh. As in Nepal, this tradition is rooted in the country’s
agrarian structure and stems from farmers’ desire to keep dirt
from their shoes out of their homes. It also has its roots in the reli-
gious belief system and practice.
Social Hierarchy and Respect. Elders and higher ranking individu-

als within Bangladesh are always treated with deference and
respect. Age, social status, or one’s official title can be used to deter-
mine the social hierarchy. Despite some breakdown in the practice
of social hierarchy in recent years, younger or lower-ranking mem-
bers of society are expected to show respect to others in terms of
their behavior and demeanor. Some examples of this are not eating
until others have begun to eat and not speaking first when elders
and higher-ranking individuals are present. In addition, one should
not be direct and opinionated or look directly into the eyes of eld-
ers and those of higher rank or status. Prolonged eye contact
between seniors and juniors should be avoided.
Compliments. Compliments are not commonly paid to one another

in Bangladesh. One must be careful to avoid excessive praise of
another individual, lest he or she be construed as phony and insin-
cere. Furthermore, compliments may not always be reciprocated
openly. Reciprocity is usually displayed in subtle forms.
Modesty and Humbleness. As in Nepal, a sense of modesty and

humbleness about one’s achievements when interacting with sen-
iors and strangers is expected behavior throughout Bangladesh.

Self-congratulatory statements of the kind that Westerners often
engage in is seen as boasting and is viewed as tremendously impo-
lite and uncultured by most Bangladeshis.
Public Display of Affection between Opposite Sexes. Physical

displays of affection in public are viewed as immoral, particularly
as it concerns unmarried females, who are perceived as having a
loose character that would bring disgrace to the family. Even hus-
bands and wives should not kiss or hug in public in Bangladesh.
Such norms apply to both Muslim and Hindu populations as well
as other groups.
Sitting. Most Bangladeshis sit on the floor, usually on mats or

small carpets spread on the floor. The cross-legged or squatting
position is the most common way to sit. However, modern and
wealthy houses are equipped with chairs.
Nose Blowing. As in Nepal, blowing one’s nose during meals is

considered extremely unsocial. One is expected to excuse oneself
from the table if it becomes necessary to use a handkerchief or
tissue.
Burping. Burping immediately after dinner is viewed as normal

and common. It is even thought to display satisfaction with the
meal served and so is not a social stigma as in the West.
Bargaining. Bargaining, or haggling, is expected and common

throughout Bangladesh. Few items have fixed prices in
Bangladesh’s open markets. Sellers and buyers, therefore, are
encouraged to engage in some back-and-forthing over price until
agreement is mutually obtained.
Business Cards. In formal settings (e.g., business meetings or offi-

cial visits), exchanging business cards is becoming quite common.
Clothes. Given Bangladesh’s subtropical climate, its residents fre-

quently wear light and white clothes. In most office and formal
settings they dress formally, avoiding shorts and short skirts as
well as exposure of thighs and cleavage. In addition, excessive

exposure of female arms is generally discouraged. Thus, women
often wear a shawl or scarf on top of their blouse. Use of western
clothing styles, except for skirts among school-age girls, is rare. As
a result, few women are seen in pants. Though sandals are accept-
able, most men wear shoes and socks during formal occasions.
Bangladesh-Related Organizations
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS

The following is a list of various Bangladeshi organizations related
to trade and commerce. Telephone calls to Bangladesh from out-
side the country require use of the country code, 880. The city
code for telephone numbers within Dhaka is 2.
American Chamber of Commerce in Bangladesh (AmCham)

Dhaka Sheraton Hotel
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Phone: (880-2) 8613391 or 8611191
Fax: (880-2) 8312915 or 8312975
E-mail: amcham@bangla.net
http://www.amchambd.org
The American Chamber of Commerce in Bangladesh
(AmCham) was formally established in 1996, having been duly
registered with the Joint Stock Companies of Bangladesh. Its pri-
mary purpose is to promote the economic relationships between
Bangladesh and the United States. AmCham used to operate as
the American Bangladesh Economic Forum. The membership of
the AmCham includes U.S. companies doing business in
Bangladesh; Bangladesh companies whose primary business is
representing U.S.-produced goods and services; and nonprofit
organizations of U.S. origin.
Bangladesh Bank
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Phone: (880-2) 7120106
The Bangladesh Bank is the central bank of Bangladesh. Its
broad functions are to regulate the issue of the currency and the
keeping of reserves; manage the monetary and credit system of
Bangladesh; preserve the par value of the Bangladesh Taka (unit
of currency); and promote and maintain a high level of produc-
tion, employment, and real income in Bangladesh.
293
Bangladesh Finished Leather & Leather Goods

Exporters Association
Dhanmondi R/A
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Phone: (880-2) 815529
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers & Exporters Association

7–9 Karwanbazar, BTMC Bhaban
Dhaka 1215, Bangladesh
Phone: (880-2) 8115597 or 8115751
Fax: (880-2) 8113951
E-mail: bgmea@bgmea.agni.co
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE)

10 Dilkusha C/A (15th and 16th Floors)
Dhaka–1000, Bangladesh
Phone: (880-2) 95688101
Fax: (880-2) 9563721
E-mail: dse@bol-online.com
http://www.dsebd.org
The DSE was incorporated on April 28, 1954, as the East Pak-
istan Stock Exchange Association Limited. On June 23, 1962, it
was renamed the Dhaka Stock Exchange Limited. Formal trading
began in 1956. Its major functions include listing of companies
(as per listing regulations); providing the screen-based auto-
mated trading of listed securities; settlement of trading (as per
settlement of transaction regulations); market administration
and control; market surveillance; publication of the Monthly
Review; and monitoring the activities of listed companies (as per
listing regulations).
Export Promotion Bureau

122–124, Motijheel C/A
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Phone: (880-2) 9552245 or 9560787
Fax: (880-2) 9568000
E-mail: epb.tic@pradeshta.net
http://www.epbbd.com
The main purpose of this organization is to promote exports of
——Bangladesh-Related Organizations——295
Bangladeshi products. Its Web site is a good source of information

on matters related to business and economics.
Foreign Investors Chamber of Commerce and Industry

35/1, Purana Paltan Lane
Inner Circular Road
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Phone: (880-2) 839448 or 839449
Fax: (880-2) 839449
International Chamber of Commerce in Bangladesh

65-66 Motijheel C/A
Phone: (880-2) 9557478
Fax: (880-2) 9557429
U.S.-Bangladesh Business Council

1615 H Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20062-2000
Phone: (202) 463-5732
Fax: (202) 463-3173
http://www.usbbc.com
The main purpose of the U.S.-Bangladesh Business Council is
to promote trade and business transactions between the two
nations. It offers advice and business-related information to
American and Bangladeshi companies doing or planning to do
cross-national business in these countries. In a way, its functions
overlap with those of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Bangladesh.
CULTURE, EDUCATION, AND EXCHANGE

American Club
Dhaka, Bangladesh
The American Club is an American enclave—a Little Amer-
ica—in Dhaka where one can participate in various sports such as
swimming, tennis, squash, volleyball, and basketball. It is
equipped with a restaurant serving a typical American menu. As
an exclusive club, its membership is restricted to Americans and

their families.
Bangladesh Showbiz
http://www.bangladeshshowbiz.com
“These days, you’re nobody in Dhaka ShowBiz until you have
a secret lover and a remarkable marriage coverage in publica-
tions.” This is the opening remark of this Web site. It clearly
reveals the deepening influence of the movie or celebrity culture
that mesmerizes Bangladesh’s urban youth—both males and
females.
Dhaka University (University of Dhaka)

www.univdhaka.edu
This is the oldest and most prominent university in Bangladesh.
Fulbright Program
http://exchanges.state.gov/education/fulbright
Although there is no Fulbright Commission set up in
Bangladesh, the program does offer educational or scholarly
exchange opportunities between Bangladesh and the United
States. Three types of Fulbright grants are available to Americans
to study/research in Bangladesh and to Bangladeshis for similar
opportunities in the United States: for scholars and professionals;
for students, usually master’s degree level and above; and for
teachers and administrators.
International University of Business, Agriculture, and Technol-

ogy (IUBAT)
Phone: (880-2) 9124226 or 9124201
Fax: (880-2) 8110494
http://www.iubat.edu
IUBAT has cooperation agreements with many institutions in
the United States, Canada, England, France, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Thailand, and Australia.
Islamic University
www.ugc.org
Established in1985 and located in Dhaka, the Islamic Univer-

sity combines different branches of humanities and modern sci-
ence with Islamic education and utilizes a curriculum of modern
education based on the ethical and moral values of Islam.
Matchmaking Services
Marriages among Bangladeshis usually are arranged marriages.
And marriage in Bangladesh is as much a cultural phenomenon as
it is a biological and social imperative. The institution of arranged
marriages seems to be getting further entrenched because of the
large and increasing volume of Bangladeshi workers leaving the
country to work in foreign countries. Many of these workers still
prefer to marry Bangladeshi women because of cultural compati-
bility and preference. This preference is further reinforced by the
fact that they often encounter difficulty finding marriage partners
in the countries where they work as foreign migrant workers,
some legally and others illegally. In order to meet this growing
demand, online matchmaking services have sprouted as a modern
cultural institution of arranged marriages, replacing the family as
an immediate agent of marriage negotiations. In other words,
while the institution of arranged marriage itself remains intact, its
medium has changed. The online service is basically the e-version
of the “picture bride” that is still common in East and Southeast
Asia. Two Web sites offering such services are:
http://www.badhon.com (Badhon is the largest matchmaking
agency based in Bangladesh); and
www.bangla-marriage.co.uk (based in England, it offers a wider
range of choices).
North South University (NSU)

12 Kemal Ataturk Avenue
Banani, Dhaka 1213, Bangladesh
Phone: (880-2) 9885611 or 8812951
Fax: (880-2) 8823030
http://www.northsouth.edu
Established in 1992, NSU is a private university. It attracts for-
eign students from China, Malaysia, Thailand, Sudan, and Nigeria,
along with those from other South Asian countries. Under the
Study Abroad and Group Exchange Program, students come from
many North American universities, such as Brown University,

University of Illinois, Smith College, Windsor University, and York
University to attend classes in Bangladesh. NSU also brings in
quality faculty from leading U.S., Canadian, and Australian uni-
versities.
BANGLADESH’S GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES
Bangladesh Embassy
2201 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 300–325
Washington, DC 20007
Phone: (202) 342- 8372 or 342-8376
Consulate General of Bangladesh

Los Angeles
10850 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1250
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Phone: (310) 441-9399
Fax: (310) 441-4458
http://www.bangladeshconsulatela.com
New York
211 East 43rd Street, Suite 502
New York, NY 10017
Phone: (212) 599-6767 or 599-6850
United Nations Permanent Mission of Bangladesh
821 United Nations Plaza, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Phone: (212) 867-3434
Fax: (212) 972-4038
E-mail: bangladesh@un.int
TOURISM
In the Western popular imagination, Bangladesh is hardly consid-
ered to be a famed and enchanting destination. There are few
exotic images, eye-popping landscapes, or mystical qualities and
aura affiliated with Bangladesh that are popularized in the West to
allure Western tourists. But behind this generally obscure image

of the country lies a relatively relaxed and enchantingly beautiful
land with a rich cultural history. One can visit a variety of mar-
velous sites from the bucolic hill tea gardens of Sylhet to the
world-renowned steamy Sundarbans and to the relaxing white
sandy beaches along the coast. Wherever one goes, there is no
shortage of good food and fabulous Bengali hospitality to satisfy
anybody’s appetite.
American Embassy
http://www.usembassy-dhaka.org
The U.S. Embassy provides valuable information to American
tourists and travelers planning to visit Bangladesh, along with
travel tips and alerts. Also included is plenty of information on the
business climate, investment opportunities, and trade rules and
regulations.
Bangladesh Homepage
http://www.bangladesh.freehomepage.com
This site provides useful information on a variety of topics and
issues related to Bangladesh, including travel and tourism.
http://www.betelco.com/bd
This site, hosted by the Bengal Telecommunication and Elec-
tric Corporation, is a good source of extensive information on
some popular tourist sites in Bangladesh.
Lonely Planet Online

http://www.lonelyplanet.com
A good Web site to visit for travel information on Bangladesh.
Travel Agencies and Associations

Anjali Tours & Travel
587 Main Street, Suite 104
New Rochelle, NY 10801
Phone: (914) 636-3333
Fax: (914) 636-3375
E-mail: info@anjlitravels.com
Association of Travel Agents of Bangladesh

5/A Eskaton Garden Road
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Phone: (880-2) 415987
The association’s purpose is to ensure that travel agents pro-
vide high-quality service to tourists and travelers to and from
Bangladesh.
Bangladesh Ecotours
Adventure Tour & Trek Specialists
263 Jubilee Road, Chittagong, Bangladesh
Phone: (880-1) 8318345
E-mail: info@bangladeshecotours.com
http://www.bangladeshecotours.com
Tourist Office Bangladesh Parjatan Corporation

233 Airport Road, Tejgaon
Phone: (880-2) 325155 or 325159
The tourist office’s main function is to assist tourists with per-
tinent services and information with respect to their visit to
Bangladesh.
Recommended Works on Bangladesh
GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

OF BANGLADESH
Baxter, Craig. 1984. Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Although somewhat outdated, this is a good source of informa-
tion about the history and political development of Bangladesh.

This is a comprehensive source of historical, biographical, and
bibliographical information about key events and prominent fig-
ures of Bangladesh, both before and after independence.
Haque, C. E. 1997. Hazards in a Fickle Environment:

Bangladesh. Dordrecht, Neth.: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
This book clearly reveals the nature and danger of natural haz-
ards that Bangladeshis face on a routine basis.
Johnson, B. L. C. 1975. Bangladesh. New York: Barnes & Noble

Books.
A comprehensive source of information on Bangladesh, but it
is quite outdated.
Mitra, S. N., et al. 1997. Bangladesh Demographic and Health

Survey: 1996–1997. Dhaka: Mitra and Associates.
This book is quite revealing about the demographic trends and
health situations in Bangladesh. The data and information are
based on a survey.
Upreti, B. C. 1993. Politics of Himalayan River Waters: An Analy-
301
sis of the River Water Issues of Nepal, India and Bangladesh.

New Delhi: Nirala Publications.
This is an important book that clearly shows the complicated
nature of water sharing among Nepal, India, and Bangladesh as
well as many other issues related to the river systems that tra-
verse through these countries.
THE ECONOMY OF BANGLADESH

Ahsan, M. B., ed. 1996. Grameen Bank and Muhammad Yunus.
Dhaka: Mowla Brothers.
This book makes an important contribution to our under-
standing of the way the Grameen Bank operates in terms of pro-
viding micro credits to poor farmers for launching small entre-
preneurial businesses in villages. It includes a profile of Professor
Yunus, the creative genius who founded the bank.
Hossain, Akhtar M. 1995. Inflation, Economic Growth and the

Balance of Payments in Bangladesh: A Macroeconomic Study.
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
This book constitutes a macro economic treatment of the
national economy of Bangladesh.
Turner, Barry, ed. 2000. The Statesman’s Yearbook 2001. New

York: St. Martin’s Press.
A good source of overall economic/statistical information.
World Bank and BCAS (Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies).

1998. Bangladesh 2020: A Long-Run Perspective Study. Dhaka:
University Press Limited.
A good source of information in terms of gaining a long-range
perspective on where the economy of Bangladesh is headed and
what steps the government ought to take to further its goal of
national and local development.
BANGLADESHI INSTITUTIONS
Hashmi, Taj I. 2000. Women and Islam in Bangladesh: Beyond
Subjection and Tyranny. London: MacMillan Press.
Annotated Bibliography of Recommended Works on Bangladesh——
This book is filled with valuable information about the oppres-

sive role of Islam in women’s lives and women’s status in
Bangladesh society. It is quite revealing.
Heitzman, James, and Robert L. Worden, eds. 1989. Bangladesh:

A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
Perhaps the most comprehensive volume on Bangladesh, this
book covers a wide range of topics and issues concerning
Bangladesh—geography, history, social systems and institutions,
government and politics, and economic condition and outlooks. It
is a very thorough and readily accessible source of information on
Bangladesh.
Rahman, Mohammad H. 2000. “Human Rights in Bangladesh:

Diversity in Civil Society and NGO Action.” Asian Affairs 22: 5–28.
Although limited to contemporary events and conditions,
Rahman’s article provides a picture of what is going on in the
country in the arena of human rights and how nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) can curb human rights violations by fos-
tering civil society.
Rashiduzzaman, M. 2001. “Bangladesh in 2000: Searching for Bet-

ter Governance?” Asian Survey 41: 122–130.
The coverage in this article is basically limited to the events of
2000, but it clearly shows a grim picture of Bangladesh that
remains mired in the arbitrariness of governance, or rather the
lack of civil governance despite the practice of electoral politics.
BANGLADESHI SOCIETY AND

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
Bangladesh Showbiz
http://www.bangladeshshowbiz.com
A very good Web site for those who are interested in
Bangladesh’s celebrity and popular culture—everything one
wants to find out about the country’s movie actors and actresses.
Bangla2000
http://www.bangla2000.com
A relatively comprehensive source of information on different

issues regarding Bangladesh, including daily news and views.
Paul, Bimal K., and Syed A. Hasnath. 2000. “Trafficking in

Bangladeshi Women and Girls.” Geographical Review 90:
268–276.
Reveals the intensity and tragedy of international female traf-
ficking out of Bangladesh.
Schmidt, Maarten, and Thomas Doebele. 1999. That’s Why I’m

Working (documentary film). New York: First Run/Icarus Films.
A very moving documentary film that portrays the daily life of
Bangladeshi children as well as the gravity and prevalence of child
labor in the country.
Index
Abhiman Singh, General, 33 Anglo-Nepal War (1814–1816), 132,
Abraham (Ibrahim), 247 136–137, 149
Abu Taher, Colonel, 277 Aniko (Arniko), 26, 138
Acharya, Baburam, 137 Anjali Tours & Travel, 299
Acharya, Bhanu Bhakta, 137 Annapurna, 10 (photo), 138, 144
Acharya, Tanka Prasad, 137 Annapurna Hotel, 62
Acid violence, 260 Antipanchayat movement, 79
Adhikari, Man Mohan (Manmohan), Anti-Rana movements, 75, 103
39, 75, 81, 137, 139, 145 Ari Malla (Arimalla), 26, 131
Agricultural Development Bank, 67 Aruna Lama, 138
Agricultural Tools Factory, 50 Aryans, 18, 198
Agricultural University, 251 Ashok (Asoka), 199, 273
Agriculture, 22, 269 Asian Development Bank,
in Bangladesh, 185 (photo), 200, Bangladesh and, 258
212, 213–218, 227, 230, 250 Asian Regional Team for
dependence on, 55 Employment Production
dominance of, 51 (ARTEP), 43
growth for, 52, 217 Assam, 202, 206
Indo-Nepali, 87 Association of Travel Agents of
literacy and, 252 Bangladesh, 300
modernization in, 216–217 August Coup, 277, 279, 281
in Nepal, 50–55, 67, 70 Aurangzeb, 200, 274
self-sufficiency in, 55 Avatars, 98, 99
settlements, 15, 87 Awami League (AL), 205, 208, 235,
Ahmad, Khondakar Mushtaque, 233, 274, 275, 276, 279, 282
282 BNP and, 236, 237
Akbar, Emperor, 200, 273 described, 277
AL. See Awami League looting, 206
Ali, Chaudhuri Rahmat, 203 provisional government and, 207
Allende, Salvador, 81 support for, 233
All-India Muslim League, 202
Altitude, 8 Badhon, 297
American Chamber of Commerce in Bagmati River, battle over, 5
Bangladesh (AmCham), 293 Baise, 28
American Club, 295–296 Balaju Textile Industry, 50
American Embassy, 168, 299 Baluchistan, 203
American Express, 68 Bananas, selling, 53 (photo)
Amnesty International, Bangladesh Banaras Hindu University, 103
and, 258 Bang, 199, 273
Amsuvarman, 24 Bangabandhu Bridge, 237
305
Bangla (language), 183, 192, 194, Barind region, 187, 192, 242
285 Battle of Buxar (1764), 201
Bangla2000, 303–304 Battle of Plassey, 274
Bangladesh Bay of Bengal, 10, 11, 16, 184, 186
independence for, 206–208, 229, cyclones and, 190
231–232, 240, 242–243, 275–276 forests along, 191
Indian recognition of, 275 Seventh Fleet at, 241
Pakistani recognition of, 276 BBC. See British Broadcasting
size of, 184 Corporation
Bangladesh Bank, 293 Beer, 158, 289
Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Begum Khaleda Zia, 234–235, 238
Studies (BCAS), 227, 302 (photo), 276, 277, 279–280
Bangladesh constitution, 275 BNP and, 208, 236, 256
Bangladesh Ecotours, 300 rule of, 235, 237–238
Bangladesh Embassy, 298 women’s status and, 262
Bangladesh Finished Leather & Bengal, 201, 239, 273
Leather Goods Exporters migration to, 199
Association, 294 partition of, 274
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers Turkish conquest of, 246
& Exporters Association, 294 Bengal Telecommunication and
Bangladesh Homepage, 299 Electric Corporation, 299
Bangladesh Madrasa Education Bengali (language), 192, 194, 205,
Board, 252 232, 285
Bangladesh National Legislature, expressions, listed, 286
208, 234, 235 Bengalis, 183, 192, 241–242
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), civil war and, 206
208, 276, 277, 279, 283 culture of, 243
AL and, 236, 237 Beverages, 59, 154–159, 286–290
boycott by, 234 Bhadgaun (Bhaktapur), 26, 27, 30,
crimes by, 238 132
election of, 237 Bhaktapur (Bhadgaon), 12, 69
Islamic fundamentalists and, 256 (photo), 175
supporters of, 236 (photo) Bhardars, 31, 133
vote rigging by, 235 Bhattarai, Baburam, 138
Bangladesh Showbiz, 255, 296, 303 Bhattarai, Krishna Prasad, 20, 80,
Bangladesh University of Engineering 138–139, 146
and Technology, 251 constitution and, 39, 134
Bangladeshi boys, 253 (photo) Bhimsen Thapa. See Thapa Bhimsen
Bank of Kathmandu, 67 Bhojpuri, 151
Banking, 50, 164, 224–225, 258, Bhote, 90, 97
279, 293, 302 Bhrikuti Paper Mill, 50
Nepali, 66, 67–68 Bhutan, 7, 157
Bansbari Leather and Shoe Factory, Bhutto, Zulfakir Ali, 205, 206
50 Bihari (language), 242
Bargaining, 161, 291 Biharis, 19, 194, 201, 202, 285
Bari, 243, 244 migration of, 242–243
——Index——307
Bijaya Dashami, 101, 139 Buffalo, 217, 225 (photo)

Biratnagar, high school in, 102 Bureaucracy, Nepali, 78, 87
Biratnagar Jute Mill, 57–58 Burping, 161, 291
Birendra, King, 77, 133 Business cards, 161, 291
challenge to, 38–39, 80 Bustees, 198
death of, 73, 81, 134 Butwal Power Company, 50
panchayat system and, 37, 134
Birganj, roads in, 65 Calcutta, 84
Birth rate, crude, for Bangladesh, 195 British in, 200, 201
Biswas, Abdur Rahman, 277 brothels in, 261
BNP. See Bangladesh Nationalist provisional government in, 207
Party Candy vendors, 265 (photo)
Bollywood, 255 Carpet industry, 46–47, 59, 61,
Bombay 66–67, 78
brothels in, 261 child labor for, 116
showbiz world of, 255 Castes, 27, 43, 95, 156, 175, 192, 245
Boycotts, 80, 85, 203 described, 90, 92–93
B. P. Koirala. See Koirala, education and, 102, 103, 115
Bishweshwar Prasad Nepali, 85, 87–88, 90, 92–93, 95
Brahmans, 18, 87, 88, 92, 95, 98, purity of, 92–93, 98
151, 174 Catmando.com, 168
meat and, 156 Central Carpet Industries
revival of, 200 Association, 163
Brahmaputra River, 184–185, 189 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
British Broadcasting Corporation guerrilla bands and, 11
(BBC), 66, 171 Cereals, 213, 287
British East India Company, 132, 274 Chakmas, 243
Mughal governors and, 201 Chandra Shamsher Rana, 34, 149
Sepoy Mutiny and, 202 education and, 101–102
British Empire, 82–83, 201, 239, 267 Chandragupta, 199
British India, 32, 133 Char khose jhari, 14
partition of, 204, 239 Chaubise, 28, 30
trade with, 56, 57 Chhetris, 87, 88, 92, 95, 174
British Raj, 14, 82, 118, 239, 274 meat and, 156
Sepoy Mutiny and, 202 Chhwa-la, 157
Brothels, 115, 261 Child labor
Buddha. See Gautama, Siddhartha in Bangladesh, 256, 264–266, 304
Buddha Jayanti, 101 class character of, 265–266
Buddha yuga, 99 in Nepal, 116–117, 126
Buddhism, 23, 199, 248 protesting, 117, 266
in Bangladesh, 192, 245, 267 Children
Hindus and, 97 Bangladeshi, 224 (photo), 304
in Nepal, 18, 99–100 education and, 114, 252
Tantric version of, 93 health issues and, 265
Buddhist temples, 29 (photo), 97, poverty and, 117
100 (photo) street, 117
Chili peppers, drying, 69 (photo) Confucian system, women/social

China status and, 112
Bangladesh and, 241 Congress Party, 202, 203
Nepal and, 82, 83–84 Constituent Assembly, 275
China South West Airlines, 65 Consulate General of Bangladesh, 298
Chittagong, 194, 200, 208, 219, 273 Consulate General of Nepal, 167
export zone in, 221 Consumerism, 7, 43, 120, 263
Chittagong dialect, 285 Contraception, 196
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Corruption, 37–39, 40, 237
186–187, 191, 192, 243 in Bangladesh, 209, 227, 229, 253,
Chitwan, 48, 118 (photo) 256–258
Chowdhury, Abu Sayeed, 277 culture of, 256–258, 260–262
Chowdhury, A. F. M. Ahsanuddin, Cottage industries, 219
234 Cow, 139
Chowdhury, Anwar Bahar, 278 CPN. See Communist Party of Nepal
Christ yuga, 99 Crematorium, 5
Christianity, 99, 248 Crime, in Bangladesh, 238
in Bangladesh, 192, 245, 247 Cultivated land, Nepali, 20 (table)
in Nepal, 101 Cultural diversity, 126, 267
Chure Hills, 14 Cultural history, 176, 266
Chutney, 155 Cultural landscape, 7, 62, 66, 125,
CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency 126, 267, 269
Citibank, 68 Cultural practice, Nepali, 119, 154
Civil disorder, 37 Cultural values, 118, 109
Civil liberties, 134, 183 Culture
Civil service, 87, 88, 109, 204 Bengali, 243
Civil society, 78, 303 Nepali, 12, 107, 155
Civil war, 206 Curry, 157, 288–289
Class structures, feudalistic, 104 Curzon, Lord, 202
Climate, 8, 9, 187–191 Cyclones, 188, 189, 190, 237
Clinton, Bill, in Bangladesh, 241
Clothing, 161, 291–292 Dal (lentils), 155, 156, 287, 288
CNN, 7, 66, 268 Damai man, 91 (photo)
Coca-Cola, 43, 45, 159 Dance, women and, 115
Cold war, Nepal and, 83 Dang, Maoists in, 135
Colonialism, 45–46, 183 Dashain, 101, 110, 139–140, 149
education and, 249 Daughters-in-law, 113, 154
Comilla, 187, 199 Daulah, Siraj ud, defeat of, 201
Commercialization, 78, 120, 269 Death rate, crude, for Bangladesh,
Communication, 47, 48, 87, 126 195
in Bangladesh, 235, 240, 269 Deepawali, 101
in Nepal, 50, 65 Delhi sultanate, 273
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), Deltas, 186
38, 39, 75, 79, 80, 136, 139, 145, Democracy
148 in Bangladesh, 232, 235, 238, 261,
Compliments, 160, 290 270
dawn of, 75–80 Diwali, 101

death of, 37, 75–80, 133 Diwani, 201
demand for, 77, 80 Dolpos, 18
in Nepal, 35, 49, 79 Dowries, 195, 245, 264
return of, 38–40, 80–82, 104, 134, Dravidians, 192, 198–200, 241–242,
139, 146, 147 273
Demography, Nepali, 15, 17, 175 Dravya Shah, 28
Deuba, Sher Bahadur, 39, 81 Droughts, 183, 188, 190
Dev Shamsher Rana, Durbar High Drug culture, 121, 198
School and, 102 Durbar High School, 102
Devanagari, 151, 285 Durbar Square, 124 (photo)
Development consultant firms, 95 Durga, 110
Devkota, Laxmi Prasad, 140
Dhaka, 199, 200, 202, 206, 207, 219, East Bengal, 183, 202, 274
255, 273, 278 independence for, 204
child labor in, 264 renaming of, 275
demonstration in, 205, 259 East Pakistan, 206, 278
(photo), 275 civil disturbances in, 205
export zone in, 220 independence for, 183, 204, 275
freedom fighters in, 275 Indian invasion of, 275
illegal arms in, 258 linguistic/cultural issues in, 231
industrial decline for, 201 second-class status for, 204
photo of, 193, 224, 236, 265 East Pakistan Industrial
population of, 198 Development Corporation
university in, 251 (EPIDC), 218
Dhaka ShowBiz, 255 East-West Highway, 65
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), 294 Eating structure, hierarchical, 154,
Dhaka University (University of 287
Dhaka), 296 Economic development, 7–8
violence at, 258 in Bangladesh, 183, 196, 197,
Dhallywood, 255, 264 204–205, 211–213, 221, 224–225,
Dharma, 98 226, 227–230, 241, 253, 270, 303
Dhimals, 85 in Nepal, 10, 20, 43, 45–63, 65–68,
Dinajpur, 187 70, 75, 78, 82, 83, 95, 104, 173,
Dipendra, Crown Prince, death of, 174
73, 74, 134 Economic embargo, 7, 13, 38, 84,
Diplomatic relations, 25 240
Bangladeshi, 239–240, 241 Economic planning, 47, 50–63,
Nepali, 82, 83, 85 65–68, 75
Dishes foreign aid and, 45–46
Bangladeshi, 241, 287–289 Ecotourism, 63
Nepali, 155–158 Education, 48, 269
Newari, 157–158 in Bangladesh, 198, 249–252, 256,
Divide and rule policy, 201, 231 258
Division of labor, 263 castes and, 102, 103, 114, 115
Divorce, 197, 260 children and, 114, 252
colonialism and, 249 Family planning, in Bangladesh,

English, 102 195–196, 256
in Nepal, 101–104 Farming, 51 (photo), 212 (photo)
postsecondary, 250 Bangladeshi, 183, 215–217, 287
primary, 102, 103, 252 dependence on, 55
problems in, 251, 258 geographical limitations on, 9
religious, 252–253 monsoons and, 11
Sanskritic, 102 Nepali, 12, 108, 109–110
scientific, 253 technology, 19
secondary, 250 tenant, 216
women and, 104, 113–114, 115 women, 16 (photo)
Eightfold Path, 101 Farming People’s Party, 203
Elders, respect for, 290 Farmland, 6 (photo), 12 (photo), 13
Electricity, export of, 68 Federation of Nepali Chambers of
Elites, 203 Commerce and Industry, 163
education and, 249 Festivals, 101, 110, 124 (photo)
Kathmandu, 14 Feudalism, 76, 104, 107, 113, 270
Nepali, 48, 118 Films, 264
Energy development, 67, 68 Hindi, 85, 118–119, 120
English, 102 Hollywood, 115
replacing, 232 Indian, 269
Entertainment, 126, 267 Financial sector, 68, 230
Environmental issues, 5, 8–9, 63, 70, Fish, 288
191–192 Fishery sector, Bangladeshi, 217–218
Ershad, Husain Muhammad, 208, Fishing, 211 (photo)
234–235, 276, 278–279, 282 Bangladeshis and, 211
Ethnic groups freshwater/marine, 218
attacks on, 261 Floods, 17, 190, 218, 237
Bangladeshi, 241–245 damage from, 188–189
Nepali, 17, 85, 87–88, 90, 92–93, 95 women and, 188 (photo)
Tibeto-Nepali, 88, 90 Fodors, 168
Etiquette, 159–160, 290–292 Food, 17
Everest Bank, 67 Bangladeshi, 286–290
Export Promotion Bureau, 294–295 Nepali, 154–159
Exports, 59 production of, 53–54, 229
agricultural, 217, 218 shortages of, 13, 52, 195
Bangladeshi, 215, 220 Food-for-Work (FFW) program, 224
duties on, 135 Foreign affairs, Bangladesh and,
industrial, 220 239–241
Nepali, 57, 60, 66–67 Foreign aid
Eye contact, 160, 290 Bangladesh and, 220, 226, 227,
228, 240
Fakirs, 248 dependency on, 226, 227–228
Family networks economic planning and, 45–46
Bangladeshi, 244, 287 Nepal and, 47, 48–49
Nepali, 107–110, 126 Foreign debt, Nepali, 48–49
Foreign direct investment (FDI), Nepali, 74–85

66–67, 219, 229, 230 Grameen Bank (GB), 224–225, 279,
Foreign Investors Chamber of 302
Commerce and Industry, 295 Green Revolution, 213, 214, 223
Forest Department, 191 Gross domestic product (GDP)
Forests, 14, 187, 191–192 agriculture, 218
Four Noble Truths, human condition Bangladeshi, 212, 213, 218, 221
and, 99, 101 Nepali, 49, 51
Freedom fighters, 239, 275 tourism and, 61
Fulbright Program, 166–167, 296 Guerrilla operations, 11, 81, 233
Fundamentalist organizations, 256, Gundruk, 157
261, 267 Gupta dynasty, 199, 273
Gurkha. See Gorkha
Gagan Singh, murder of, 33 Gurungs, 17, 90, 97, 114–115, 151
Gaine, 122 (photo) Gyanendra, King, 73
Gandaki, 14 corruption and, 74
Ganges River, 14, 185, 186, 189, state of emergency and, 134,
190, 198 183–184
battle on, 201
forests along, 191 Hagen, Toni, on ironworks, 57
treaty over, 237 Hajj, 248
Garment industry Handicraft Association of Nepal, 163
in Bangladesh, 219–220, 229 Handicraft industry, Nepali, 61, 163
child labor for, 266 Hanuman Dhoka, 124 (photo)
exporting, 66–67 Haq, Fazlul, 203, 204
women and, 220, 262 Hardwood forests, 187, 191
Gas reserves, 220 Harisidhi Brick and Tile Factory, 50
Gautama, Siddhartha, 99, 131, 140 Harsha, 199, 273
human condition and, 99, 101 Hartals, 221, 227, 235
GDP. See Gross domestic product Harvesting, 17, 113, 212 (photo),
Gender relations, 114–116, 126, 176, 214 (photo)
258, 260–261, 269 rituals of, 101
Geography women and, 112
Bangladeshi, 184 Hasina Wajid (Wazed), Sheikh, 240,
Nepali, 15, 21, 25, 70, 83, 171, 172 276, 277, 279, 280
Geopolitics, 82 AL and, 208, 235
Ghee, 289 rule of, 236–237
Globalization, 60, 120, 264, 266 women’s status and, 262
Golden Age, 131 Health issues, 63, 195, 198, 223–224
Gopala, 199 children and, 265
Gopalavamshi, 22 women and, 262
Gorkha, 28, 82, 90, 132, 136 Heitzman, 26, 30
military power of, 30, 82, 103 Hierarchies
Gorkhapatra, 140 caste, 93
Government eating structure, 154, 287
Bangladeshi, 232–241, 303 social, 159–160, 290
socioeconomic class, 93 Identity

High-yielding varieties (HYV) seeds, national, 82
213 Nepali, 174–175
Hill man, 44 (photo) Immigrants, Indian, 19, 269
Hill Region, 11–12 Imports, 60, 220, 228
Himalayan Bank, 67 duties on, 135
Himalayan Buddhist Education protection against, 56
Foundation, 165 Independence, 45–46, 82, 83, 183,
Himalayas, 8, 9, 185, 190 204, 206–208, 229, 231–232,
crossing, 18 240, 242–243, 275–276
functions of, 10–11 India
tourism and, 63 Bangladesh and, 240
Hindi (language), 151, 194, 285 independence for, 204, 231
Hinduism, 18, 85, 87, 93, 95 Nepal and, 66, 82, 84
in Bangladesh, 192, 202, 245, 262, Pakistan and, 207, 231
267 partition of, 274
Buddhists and, 97 India Independence Act (1947), 204
Indo-Nepalis and, 92 Indian Embassy, 35
looting, 206 Indian National Congress, Muslims
low-caste, 246, 247 and, 202
meat and, 156, 288 Indian National Congress Party, 202
migration and, 261–262 Indo-Aryans, 18, 192, 241, 243
Moslems and, 201 Indo-Nepalis, 85, 87, 88, 151
in Nepal, 97–99 Newars and, 93
theological/philosophical precepts Indo-Pakistan War (1971), 279
of, 97–98 Indus Valley, 198
Turkish invasion and, 246 Industrial development, 21, 48,
Hippies, popular culture and, 120 54–55, 78, 173
History in Bangladesh, 218–221, 230
Bangladeshi, 198–208, 301 child labor and, 266
Nepali, 21–28, 30–39, 171, 172 domestically oriented/export
Hotels, 62 based, 59
Nepali, 61 (photo) erosion of, 57
House of Gorkha, 28, 30 growth of, 55, 59
Houses, Bangladeshi, 189 (photo), nationalization of, 219
268 (photo) in Nepal, 50, 55–60, 66
Human geography private investment in, 219
Bangladeshi, 184–192, 194–198 Shah dynasty and, 56
Nepali, 7–21 Infrastructure, 229
Human rights, 303 industrial, 56, 57
Human-development relations, social, 60
Nepali, 176 International Chamber of Commerce
Humbleness, 160, 290–291 in Bangladesh, 295
Hydro-electric power, 57, 68 International University of Business,
Agriculture, and Technology
Id al Fitr, 248 (IUBAT), 296
Internet, 65, 119, 125–126, 269 Kathmandu, 5, 12, 19, 27, 57, 61
popular culture and, 126 (photo), 84, 120, 141, 175
Iqbal, Sir Muhammad, 203 air service to, 65
Ironworks, 57 British residency in, 83, 150
Irrigation, 54, 213, 214 as capital city, 132
Islam, 192, 246–249, 273 Christmas in, 101
Hinduism and, 201 cultural landscape of, 66
origin of, 247–248 high school in, 102–103
sects of, 192, 248, 256, 257 Indo-Nepali population of, 87
Islam, Kazi Nazrul, 194, 285 kingdom of, 132
Islam, Syed Nazrul, 207 roads in, 65
Islamic fundamentalism, 256, 267 shutdown of, 136
Islamic University, 296–297 tourism in, 62–63
Isolation, 7–8, 82 Kathmandu Valley, 5, 11, 21, 23, 24,
70, 79, 118, 120, 175, 176
Jafar, Mir, 201 attacks on, 26, 30, 32, 131, 135
Jahangar, land taxes and, 200 Buddhism in, 97
Jakat, 248 centrality of, 12
Jamaat e Islami, 208, 232, 235, 256 cultural landscape of, 62
Jamuna River, 185, 187, 237 development consultant firms in, 95
Janakpur, 140–141, 145 drugs in, 121
Jang Bahadur Rana (Kunwar), 32, environmental problems in, 63
33, 133, 142, 145 external dependency of, 13
economic policy of, 56 Malla kingdom of, 28, 132
English education and, 102 Newari communities in, 26–27,
power/authority for, 34 157
Jatiya Dal party, 235 origin of, 22, 85
Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini, Mujib and, 233 pastoral dynasties in, 131
Jatyo Sangsad, 278 urban areas in, 54
Jatyo Sritee Shoudhow, 278 western influences on, 121
Jayasthiti Malla, 26, 27 Kathmandu-Kodari Highway, 65
Jhum, cultivation of, 186 Kathmandu-Pokhara Highway, 65
Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, Muslim Khagrachhari, 243
League and, 203–204 Khalji dynasty, 200
Joint ventures, 58, 67 Khan, Muhammad Ayub, 205
Judaism, 247 Khan, Tikka, 206, 207
Juddha Match Factory, 58 Khans, 24
Jute, 204–205, 214–215, 219, 220 Khatri, Mohan Singh, 135
Kinship networks, 18, 107–110, 244
Kachi-la, 157–158 Kipat system, 18, 19
Kali, 110 Kirata dynasty, 17, 22, 23, 131
Kali Gandaki River, 90 Koirala, Bishweshwar Prasad (B. P.),
Kalkin (Kalki), 99 35, 36, 39, 75, 80, 141, 143
Kangra, 31 coup against, 37, 76, 133
Karma, 98, 101 Koirala, Girjia Prasad (G. P.), 39, 80,
Karnali, 14 134, 141–142
Kosi, 14 for women, 113–114, 252

Kot Massacre, 32, 33–34 Lonely Planet Online, 168, 299
Kot Parba, 32–38, 133, 142, 145 Lumbini, 99, 142
Krishak Praja Party (KPP), 203
Kublai Khan, 26 Machhapuchhre, 10 (photo),
Kumari, 96 (photo), 142 142–143, 144
Kunwar clan, 33 Madhesi, 87
Madhupur Tract, 187
Labor, 267 Madrasas, 252, 253 (photo)
division of, 263 Magars, 18, 88, 90, 97
excess, 54 Mahabharat Range, 11
female, 263 Mahabharata, 23
household, 110, 116 Mahendra, King, 35–36, 38
Indian, 58 death of, 77, 133
productivity, 218 democracy and, 80
sharing, 109–110 manipulation by, 36, 76
shortages, 50 panchayat system and, 133
skilled, 197, 221 Mahisapalavamshi, 22
See also Child labor; Strikes Mainamati, 280
Lahore Resolution, 203–204 Maithili, 151
Lakshmidevi, Queen, 33 Majhi, 211–212
Lalbagh Fort, 278 Makwanpur, battles in, 32
Lalitpur (Patan), 12, 175 Malla kingdom, 25, 26–28, 131, 132
Lalmai Hill, 187 Malnutrition, 225
Land productivity, Nepali, 53, 54, 70 women and, 113, 262
Land resources, 50, 52, 218 Mamluk dynasty, 200
population growth and, 54 Manadeva I, 23–24, 27
productivity of, 53, 54, 70 Manadeva IV, 25, 131
Landholdings, 93, 108, 215–218 Manjusri, 22
in Bangladesh, 216 (table) Manufacturing sector, 59, 67, 198,
Language 221
Bangladeshi, 285–286 Maoists, 40, 135
Nepali, 151–153 revolutionary movement of, 81
official/vernacular, 87 strike and, 136
Language Movement, 280 Marathas, 200
Lawlessness, in Bangladesh, 256–258 Market liberalization, 68, 219
Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Marmas, 243
Aid (PLHRLA), 261 Marriages
Laxmi, 110 arranged, 244–245, 297
Laxmi puja, 110 in Bangladesh, 195, 197, 243, 244,
Leisure time, in Nepal, 121, 123, 125 255, 260
Lepchas, 18 caste, 27
Licchavi monarchy, 23–25, 82, 131 contraception and, 196
Limbus, 17, 22, 23, 88, 90, 97 intercaste, 92, 93
Literacy, 103, 227, 251–252 love, 244
agricultural development and, 252 in Nepal, 107–108, 114
parental families and, 113 192, 243

social status and, 264 Monsoon, 11, 15–17, 51, 187,
Martyrs’ Day, 205, 275 188–189, 190
Martyrs’ Memorial, 205, 278 Morang Electricity Supply Company,
Matchmaking services, 297 58
Mauryan empire, 199, 273 Morang Sugar Mill, 58
Maya, 98–99, 101 Mosque, 246 (photo)
Meat, 155–156, 288 Mothers-in-law, control by, 112
gender/consumption and, 156 Motorcycle, as status symbol, 94
taboos against, 156 (photo)
Meghna River, 184–185, 186 Mt. Everest. See Sagarmatha
mosque on, 246 (photo) Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 204
Merchants, 10, 23, 83–84 Movement for the Restoration of
Micro entrepreneurship, 224, 229 Democracy, 38, 79
Middle class, 95, 125 Mros, 243
Middle East countries, Bangladesh Mughal (Moghul, Mogul) Period,
and, 241 200–201, 204, 239, 273, 274
Migrants, 18 Muhammad, Prophet, 247, 248
Bangladeshi, 197 Mujibism, 232
female, 112, 261 Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman, Sheikh,
foreign, 196–197 275, 277, 279, 282
Hindu, 261–262 assassination of, 276
household economic strategy and, described, 280–281
109 rule of, 232–233
male, 195 Mukti Bahini, 206, 207
Nepali, 17, 19, 88, 109 Muktinath, 143
rural-to-urban, 108, 109, 197 Multiparty system, Nepali, 80–82
social status and, 264 Musharif, Khalid, 277, 281, 282, 283
Mineral resources, 67 Mushtaque Ahmed, Khondakar, 281
Mini gangs, 117 Music, Bengali, 194
Minorities, attacks on, 261 Muslim League, 202, 203–204
Mirza, Iskandar, constitution and, Muslims, 200
205 in Bangladesh, 192, 202, 231, 241,
Mobility, women and, 112–113 245, 247 (photo), 267
Modernization, 5, 117, 125, 175 Indian, 202, 203
agricultural, 216–217, 230 meat and, 156
Bangladesh and, 255, 256, 264 in Nepal, 97
Nepal and, 28, 46, 120, 132, 176 Punjabi, 204
women and, 114 Myanmar, 184, 186, 191
Modesty, 160, 290–291
Mohan Shamsher Rana, 34, 35 Namaste (Namaskar), 159
Moksha, 99 Narayanghat, 118 (photo)
Momocha, 157, 158 Narendradeva, 24–25
Monarchical system, 39, 73, 135 National Assembly Complex, 278
Monghyr, 199 National Defense Force, 233
Mongoloid people, 17, 18, 19, 28, National development, 77, 302
National Planning Commission, 48 Nepali House of Representatives, 80

Nationalism, 151, 219, 232 Nepal Indo-Suez Bank, 67
Natural disasters, 227, 301 Nepali (language), 151–153, 194, 285
Natural gas, 227, 229 expressions in (listed), 153
Nazrul, Islam Syed, 281–282 social class and, 152
Ne Muni (Nemuni), 22 Nepal-USA Chamber of Commerce &
Neoliberalism, 49, 70 Industry, 165
Nepal Arab Bank, 67 Networks
Nepal Association of Travel Agents, building, 154
168 commerce, 25, 66
Nepal Bangladesh Bank, 67 family, 107–110, 126, 244, 287
Nepal Bank, 50, 67 kinship, 18, 107–110, 244
Nepal Bank of Ceylon, 67 social, 154, 155
Nepal Chamber of Commerce, New Delhi, British in, 201
163–164 Newari, 26–27, 86, 151, 152,
Nepal Education Foundation, 165 157–158, 175
Nepal Garment Association, 164 Buddhism and, 97
Nepal Grindlays Bank, 67 Indo-Nepalis and, 93
Nepal Home Page, 164, 169, 171–172 Vaisya and, 92
Nepal Industrial and Commercial women, 112
Bank, 164 NGOs. See Nongovernmental
Nepal Plywood and Bobbin organizations
Company, 58 Niazi, A. A. K., 207
Nepal Press Digest, 88 Nightclub culture, 115–116, 125
Nepal Rastra Bank, 67, 164 Nirvana, 99, 101
Nepal SBI Bank, 67 Noakhali, 194, 285
Nepal Stock Exchange Limited, Nonalignment Movement, 83
164–165 Nongovernmental organizations
Nepal Tea Development Corporation, (NGOs), 223, 225–226, 303
50 family planning, 196
Nepal Telecommunication Authority, North Bengal, 242
66 drought in, 190
Nepal Telecommunications North Bengal Alluvial Fan, 187
Corporation, 50 North South University (NSU),
Ne-pala, 22 297–298
Nepal-Anglo War (1814–1816), 32 Northwest Frontier Province (NFP),
Nepal-China War (1792), 132 203
Nepali Chamber of Commerce— Nose blowing, 161, 291
USA, 165 Nyatapola (pagoda) temple, 29
Nepali Congress Party, 36, 37, 75, (photo)
79, 80, 133, 134, 139, 143, 148
division within, 39 Oil boom, 261
election of, 76 Orissa, 201, 202
formation of, 38
Nepali constitution, 39, 134 Padma River, 184–185, 186
Nepali Embassy, 167 Pahar, 11, 12, 13, 112
Paharis, 95, 112 Poetry, Bengali, 194

domination by, 87–88 Pokhara, 11, 120, 138, 144
resettlement by, 15 roads in, 65
Pakistan Pokhara-Sunauli Highway, 65
Bangladesh and, 183, 241, 274 Politics, 40, 48, 176, 261
East Pakistan and, 204–206 in Bangladesh, 183, 209, 229, 230,
independence for, 231 232–241, 253, 301, 303
India and, 231 in Nepal, 74–85, 93, 95, 171, 172
naming, 203 women and, 104
Pakistan constitution, 205 Pollution, 7, 64, 159
Pakistan National Assembly, Yahya social, 92–93
and, 206 water, 218
Pakistan People’s Party, 205 Polyandry, 110
Pakistan Resolution, 203–204 Polygamy, 110
Pala dynasty, 199, 273 Popular culture
Palace Massacre, 143, 146, 147 in Bangladesh, 239, 255, 264,
Panchayat system, 76, 77, 133, 140, 266–269
146, 147 Internet and, 126
demise of, 37–38, 79, 80, 134 Japan and, 269
described, 143–144 in Nepal, 117–121, 123, 125–126
Pande, Damodar, 31 Population
Pande faction, 33 Bangladeshi, 184, 192, 194–198,
Paras, 74, 244 213, 227, 243
Paribar, 107, 243, 244 economic resources and, 20
Parijat, 144 land resources and, 54
Parma, 110 Nepali, 19–20, 20 (table), 50, 52,
Pashupati (Temple), 5, 125, 144 95
Patan, 12, 27, 30, 175 rural, 52, 55, 95
high school in, 102 urban, 197, 198
kingdom of, 132 Poverty, 198
shutdown of, 136 alleviating, 45, 47, 223–226, 256
Patna University, 103 in Bangladesh, 197, 212, 223–224,
Patriarchal families, 107, 113, 244 226, 227, 229, 231, 250, 256,
purdah and, 262–263 263, 264
Peace Corps volunteers (PCVs), 61, children and, 117
120 in Nepal, 43, 46, 68, 70
Peacock window, 13 (photo) rural, 21, 43, 223, 229
Peasantry, 183 women and, 113
rebellion by, 47 Powell, Colin, 135
People’s War, 135, 136 Pradhan, Sahana, 144–145, 148
Permanent Settlement Act (1793), Prithvi Narayan (Prithvinarayana)
274 Shah, 73, 147
Physical geography leadership of, 28, 75
Bangladeshi, 184–192, 194–198 Malla kingdoms and, 132
Nepali, 7–21 motives of, 30–31
Pirs, 248 trade policy of, 56
Privatization, 49–50, 58–59, 67, 70, Reciprocity, 160, 290

219 Recreation, 121, 123, 125, 266–269
Pro-democracy movement, 38–39, Refugees, 240
79, 134 Regmi, Dilli Daman, 87, 145
Production Religion
domestic, 56 in Bangladesh, 192, 194, 245–249
food, 53–54, 229 in Nepal, 95, 97–99, 101, 123, 175
social relations of, 93 Remittances, 226
Prostitution, 7, 63, 115–116, 198 Resettlement, 15, 48
Protests, 79, 259 (photo) Respect, 159–160, 290
Public displays of affection, 160–161, Restaurants, 123, 125, 154, 158
291 Rice, 155, 287–288
Purdah, 262–263, 264 cultivating, 16, 16 (photo), 186
drought and, 190
Raghavadeva, 25, 131 harvesting, 101, 212 (photo), 214
Rahman, Mujibur (Mujib), 205, 206, (photo)
207, 208 high-yielding varieties (HYV), 213
assassination of, 219, 233, 240 husking, 111 (photo)
rule of, 232–233 planting, 16–17, 248
Rainfall, 187–191 transporting, 215 (photo)
Rais, 17, 22, 23, 88, 90, 97 Rickshaw, photo of, 64, 193, 222
Rajputs, 18 Roads, 65
Raksi, 155, 158 constructing, 48, 63
Ramadan, 248 repairing, 228 (photo)
Ramayana, 145 Rodi ghar, 115
Rana, Chandra Shamsher. See Rossogola, 289
Chandra Shamsher Rana Roti, 289
Rana, Jang Bahadur. See Jang Royal massacre, 73–74
Bahadur Rana (Kunwar) Rubber plantations, 191
Rana regime, 58, 82, 83, 145, 147, Rudeness, 160
149
British India and, 56–57 Sagarmatha, 8, 146
corruption of, 37–38 Sake, 155
economic development and, 46 Sakya (Shakya) dynasty, 131
education under, 101–102 Sal forests, 187, 191
end of, 46, 75, 76, 102, 103, 133 Salat, 248
opposition to, 35, 133 Salt Trading Corporation, 50
pro-democracy revolution against, Samaj, 244
133 Samatata, 199
rise of, 32–38 San Miguel (beer company), 158
Shah system and, 38 Sanskrit, 92, 102, 151, 194, 285
Westernization and, 117–118 Santals, 192, 242
Rangamati, 243 Sarangi, 122 (photo)
Rangpur, 187 Saraswoti, 110
Rapti Valley, settlement of, 48 Saskyapa Lama, 26
Rastriya Banijya Bank, 67 Satellite culture, 255
Sati, 34 Singh, Ganeshman, 37, 75, 143, 148

Satlej (Sutlej) River, 132 Sitting, 161, 291
Sattar, Abdus, 234, 276, 279, 282 Sivadeva I, 24
Sawm, 248 Siwalik Range, 14
Sayem, Abu Sadat Muhammad, Slave dynasty, 200
233–234, 282 Slavery, 148–149
School of International Training, Slums, 198, 223
165–166 Slusser, Mary, 26
Senas, 199–200, 246 Social change, 23, 28, 104, 174, 175,
Sepoy Mutiny (1857–1858), 176
201–202, 274 Social classes, 85, 87–88, 90, 92–93,
Service sector, 95, 212, 221–223 95, 152, 245
Seventh Fleet, 241 Social conflicts, 36, 46, 174
Sex ratio, 195 Social institutions, 104, 174, 232
Sexual bondage, 260, 261 Social landscapes, 46, 232
Shah, Birendra Bir Bikram, 133, Social obligation, 154, 287
146–147 Social order, 7, 76, 79, 108
Shah dynasty, 30–32, 132 Social problems, 119, 229, 253
political environment of, 34, 35, Social services, 48
73, 77–78 Social status, 93, 287
Rana system and, 38 marriage and, 264
revitalization of, 34–38, 75–76, 133 migrants and, 264
rule of, 33–34 Nepali, 90, 95, 155
trade/industrial infrastructure and, women and, 263
56 Social systems, 126, 241–245
Shah, Gyanendra Bir Bikram, 147 Socialism, 232
Shah, Mahendra Bir Bikram, 133, 144 Socialization, 123, 154
Shah, Prithvi Narayan. See Prithvi male/female, 114, 115, 119
Narayan (Prithvinarayana) Shah middle class and, 125
Shah, Tribhuvan Bir Bikram. See Society
Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah in Bangladesh, 245–249
Shahabuddin Ahmed, Justice, 208, interdependencies of, 109
235 in Nepal, 95, 97–99, 101, 107, 175
Shahadah, 248 women and, 126
Shaheed Minar, 205, 278 Sociocultural bonds, 107, 117
Shams ud-din Ilyas, Sultan, 131 Soft drinks, 158–159, 289–290
Sharecropping, 216–217, 223 Songs, Hindi, 119, 120
Sherchan, Bhupi, 147–148 South Asian Association for Regional
Sherpa, Tenzing Norgay, 146, 148 Cooperation (SAARC), 83, 135,
Sherpas, 18, 88 146, 240
Shiva, 98 South-Asia.com, 172
Shrestha, Marichman Singh, 77, 148 Squatters, 198, 223
Shrestha, Puspa Lal, 35, 75, 136, Sri Lanka, 199
139, 144, 148 Standard Chartered Bank, 68
Silent Cry, The (Stiller), 32 Standard of living, Bangladeshi, 223,
Singapore, 194, 213 227
Star TV, 268 Terrorism, 257, 258

State of emergency, 76, 135, Textiles, 50, 219
183–184 child labor for, 266
Stone sculpture, Hindu, 86 (photo) Thakali, 88, 90, 97, 174
Stratification, Nepali, 93, 95 Thakuri dynasty, 24
Strikes, 136, 221, 227, 235 Thapa, Amar Singh 132
Sudra, 92 Thapa, Bhimsen, 31, 32, 132, 133,
Sufism, 248, 249 149
Suhrawardy, Husain Shahid, 203, Tharu, 85, 151, 175
274, 282 That’s Why I’m Working (film), 264
united Bengal and, 204 Those, infrastructure of, 57
Suhrawardy Uddyan, 278 Tibet, 9, 84
Sundarbans, 186, 191, 282–283 Tibetan guerrilla bands, 11
Surendra, King, 34 Tibetan plateau, 8, 9, 18
Swadeshi movement, 203 Tibeto-Burman language family, 152
Swayambhu, 149 Tibeto-Himalayans, 18
Syeds, 245 Tibeto-Nepali, 85, 89 (photo), 93,
Sylhet, 186, 187, 192, 194, 243, 283, 114–115, 151, 152
285 agro-pastoralism of, 90
Buddhism and, 97
Ta, 153 subethnic groups of, 88, 90
Taboos, cultural/religious, 115, 156 women, 110
Tagore, Rabindranath, 194, 283, 285 Tihar, 101, 110, 149
Taking shoes off, 159, 290 Tipperas, 243
Tamang, 88, 151 Tista River, 31
Tarai region, 9, 10, 12–15, 19, 48, Tourism, 48, 120, 175
58, 85, 99, 118 (photo), 131, 175 air transportation and, 65
Buddhism in, 97 Bangladesh and, 221, 298–300
farming in, 16 (photo), 52, 70 Coca-Cola and, 45
immigration to, 19 GDP and, 61
Indo-Nepali population of, 87 Nepal and, 50, 60–63, 66, 67, 70,
paharization of, 15 115, 123, 126, 176, 177
population growth in, 20 Tourist Office Bangladesh Parjatan
resettlement scheme for, 15 Corporation, 300
road networks in, 63, 65 Trade, 9
sociopolitical standing of, 14 Bangladesh and, 200, 229, 240
Tarkari, 288 embargo on, 7
Tea, 158–159, 219, 289 entrepôt, 25, 27
Tea stalls, 125 foreign aid and, 226
Technology, 28, 47, 218, 250 long-distance, 23
agricultural, 21, 54 Nepal and, 56, 57, 66–67, 83–84,
Television, 115, 119, 267–268, 269 121, 174
Temples, 5, 29 (photo), 97, 100 Shah dynasty and, 56
(photo), 125, 144 trans-Himalayan, 173
visiting, 125 Trade and Transit Treaty (1989), 84
Terraces, 12 (photo), 13 Traditionalists, 7, 176, 256
environmentalists and, 5 Muslims as, 247

Trafficking, female, 216, 260–261, 304 Upreti, Lok Raj, 135
Transformation, 115 Urban family, 94 (photo)
economic, 23, 28 Urbanization, 21, 197–198
Transparency International- Urdu (language), 194, 203, 205, 243,
Bangladesh (TIB), 258 285
Transportation U.S.-Bangladesh Business Council,
air, 65, 197 295
in Bangladesh, 197, 218, 235, 240, USEF/NEPAL—The Fulbright
269 Commission, 166–167
in Nepal, 50, 57, 60, 63, 65–66, 84
Treaty of Commerce (1792), 132 Vaisya, Newars and, 92
Treaty of Sagauli (Sugauli) (1816), Vedas, 5, 97–98, 151
32, 83, 133, 138, 149–150 Vegetables, 156–157, 287, 288
Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah, 35, Vendor, 62 (photo)
75–76, 133, 147 Vikrampur, 199
Tri-Chandra College, 101–102 Violence, 260–262
Tripura, 186, 206 acid, 260
Turkish invasion, 245, 273 campus, 256, 257–258
Two-Nation Theory, 203 gender, 258, 260–261, 269
political, 237, 253, 257
Udayadeva, 24 Vishnu, 24, 35, 98, 99
Ulemas, 248–249 Visit Nepal.com Travel Information
UML. See United Marxist-Leninist Network, 169
party Vrasadeva, 131
Unemployment, 197, 227
Union European de CIC, 68 War for Independence (1971),
United Marxist-Leninist Party (UML), 206–207, 285
39, 80, 81 Water, 66, 68, 198
United Nations arsenic in, 190–191
Bangladesh and, 240–241 bottled, 159
Nepal and, 83 pollution, 218
status of women and, 110 sharing, 302
United Nations Permanent Mission of waiting for, 224 (photo)
Bangladesh, 298 West Bengal, 19, 202, 206, 274
United Nations Permanent Mission of early history of, 199
Nepal, 167 West Pakistan, 204, 206, 274
United States Agency for Westernization, 5, 7
International Aid (USAID), Nepal Bangladesh and, 255
and, 49 Nepal and, 107, 115, 121
Universities Ranas and, 117–118
in Bangladesh, 250, 251, 258, Wheat, high-yielding varieties (HYV),
296–298 213
in Nepal, 103 Women
Untouchables, 43, 92, 192, 245, 246 Bangladeshi, 212 (photo), 263
meat and, 156 (photo)
domination of, 262–263, 264 World Congregation of Islamic

economic contribution of, 104, 113 Preachers, 247 (photo)
education and, 113–114, 115 World Health Organization (WHO),
equal rights for, 262 190
farming by, 16 (photo)
floods and, 188 (photo) Yahya Khan, General, 205, 206, 207
garment industry and, 220 Yaksha Malla, 27
in government, 237 Yellung Kirata, 22, 131
health issues and, 113, 262 Yuga, 99
literacy rates for, 113–114 Yunus, Muhammad, 224–225, 302
migration and, 112–113, 261
modernization and, 114 Z Force, 208
Newari, 112 Zakat, 248
poverty and, 113 Zamindar class, 200
protest by, 259 (photo) Zee TV, 268
status of, 110, 112–114, 256, Zhou (Chou) Enlai, on British
262–264, 269, 303 Empire, 231
Tibeto-Nepali, 110 Zhu Rongji, in Bangladesh, 241
trafficking of, 260–261, 270, 304 Ziaur (Zia) Rahman, 235, 276, 277,
World Bank, 227, 302 279, 281, 283–284
Bangladesh and, 258 Mujib’s murder and, 233
Nepal and, 43, 51, 83 rule of, 208, 233–234
on poverty, 223
About the Author
Nanda R. Shrestha was born and raised in Nepal. With the help of
Jon Magnuson, who served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Nepal,
Shrestha received a scholarship from Gustavus Adolphus College
(Minnesota), where he earned a B.A. in 1974. He completed an M.A.
at Temple University in 1976 and received a Ph.D. in geography
with an emphasis on population and development from Indiana
University in 1982. He is currently professor of resource and
cultural management in the School of Business & Industry at
Florida A & M University (FAMU). Prior to joining FAMU, he was an
associate professor of geography at the University of Wisconsin–
Whitewater and a lecturer at Georgia State University.
In addition to his personal knowledge of and experience with
Nepal, Shrestha has conducted extensive field research in Nepal
funded by research grants from the National Science Foundation
and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. He has published
numerous articles in geography and economic development jour-
nals, including World Development, Economic Development and
Cultural Change, and Annals of the Association of American
Geographers. His books include The Political Economy of Land,
Landlessness, and Migration in Nepal (2001; first published
under the title Landlessness and Migration in Nepal, 1990) and
In the Name of Development: A Reflection on Nepal (1997; 1999).
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NEPAL and

Japan, Lucien Ellington

Santa Barbara, California—•—Denver, Colorado—•—Oxford, England

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an e-book.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Series Editor’s Foreword—xi

Religion and Society—95

PART TWO: REFERENCE MATERIALS—129

PART TWO: REFERENCE MATERIALS—271

It is imperative that as many Americans as possible develop a basic

increasingly popular in the United States. Asian-Americans, while

Indeed, “hearing, understanding, and following the heartbeat of the

On the Nepal-Bangladesh front, there are no inherent links like

Map of South Asia

The Bagmati is a river that flows right next to Pashupati, one of

medieval times be experiencing the world of high-tech and mate-

PHYSICAL AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

economic life, and diplomatic navigation. In other words, the way

Ecology and Regional Division

reaching the soaring heights of the Himalayas and then taking a

Machhapuchhre (fish tail mountain) as seen from Pokhara. Part of the

in a significant change in the regional economy and human geog-

tion is bounced back in the form of monsoon rains that determine

throughout the country for their farming skills. Containing

The famous ancient peacock window in Bhaktapur. Crafted from a single

The hill landscape is a cultural mosaic, a masterpiece of agrar-

is a lowland subtropical belt straddling the Nepal-India border,

picture began to emerge, as this internal colony was converted

The Monsoon and Nepali Life

richly nurturing as ravagingly punishing. It all depends on the

A Sketch of Human Habitation

Magars, whose geographical domain within Nepal is found in the

In all likelihood, the communal mode of production found

existing economic resource base. The simple population density,

Table 1. Regional Distribution of Population and

Total Area Density Based

The situation is further complicated by the fact that Nepal

country’s history can be segmented into three distinct periods:

Mahabharata . . . as a hill-tribe with remarkable skill in archery

Lord Vishnu, he was believed to be instrumental in constructing

ing as a gateway from India to China, both for merchandise and

ment. In short, at this juncture of history, the country suffered a

has no parallel among the kings of Nepal throughout its history. In

But Nepal’s very territorial success became its military liability,

result, factional feuds subsided, though not necessarily intrafam-

of the Rana regime resulted from the confluence of many concur-

orchestrated them like a bamboo dance. He changed the govern-

the pretext of such fabricated civil disorder, Mahendra launched a

vidually and collectively, thus failing to outshine the previous sys-

Shrestha, Nanda, Dennis Conway, and Keshav Bhattarai. 1999. “Population

The people of Nepal have a life and economy of their own. “A

GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN THE ECONOMY

Economic Planning and Foreign Aid

development. One time-honored source of capital formation in

omy. To be sure, Nepal was hardly a command economy. Between

Planning and Some Key Economic Sectors

edly the single most important economic activity in the country; it

longer enjoys the agricultural surpluses of the past. Food deficits

First, the agricultural sector is lopsidedly tilted toward the pro-

demands for manufactures. As a consequence, the industrial

economic system reliant on itself for its requirements. “Such