Provided for non-commercial research and educational use only.

Not for reproduction or distribution or commercial use.

This article was originally published by IWA Publishing. IWA Publishing recognizes
the retention of the right by the author(s) to photocopy or make single electronic
copies of the paper for their own personal use, including for their own classroom use,
or the personal use of colleagues, provided the copies are not offered for sale and
are not distributed in a systematic way outside of their employing institution.

Please note that you are not permitted to post the IWA Publishing PDF version of
your paper on your own website or your institution’s website or repository.

Please direct any queries regarding use or permissions to waterpolicy@iwap.co.uk

 Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219

Public accountability and performance of two border water utilities

Ismael Aguilar-Beniteza and Jean-Daniel Saphoresb
a
Corresponding author. El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Técnicos 277 Colonia Tecnológico Monterrey, Nuevo León, México.
Tel: þ 52 (81) 8387-4475, Fax: þ 52 (81) 8387-4645. E-mail: iaguilar@colef.mx
b
Civil and Environmental Engineering; Planning, Policy and Design; and Economics Departments, University of California,
Irvine, 92697, USA.

Abstract

We analyze the performance of two water utilities located at the USA – Mexico border with a focus on public
accountability. We evaluate selected performance indicators and explain how public accountability mechanisms
can be associated with those outcomes. We find strong hierarchical accountability relationships between
policymakers and water services providers but weak feedback mechanisms from customers to policymakers;
moreover, structural barriers to political accountability resulting in weak accountability mechanisms may explain
different facets of the relatively poor performance of both water utilities. Our findings suggest the need for these
water utilities to build a closer relationship with their customers and to implement customer service indicators to
track their performance.

Keywords: Performance indicators; Public accountability; USA –Mexico border; Water management;
Water utilities

1. Introduction

Clean water and sanitation are the primary drivers of public health and therefore essential for
development. Yet, in many parts of the world, the performance of water utilities has long been
unsatisfactory (e.g. Yepes & Dianderas, 1996; Seidenstat et al., 2002; World Bank, 2003). In developing
countries, water services are characterized by low drinking water quality, slow service expansion, high
water losses, operational inefficiency and corruption (Spiller & Savedoff, 1999; World Bank, 2004). In
developed countries, the two main problems are the quality of water services and the financial health of
water utilities (e.g. see Ashley & Hopkinson, 2002; Ramsey, 2002).
While sufficient revenues and access to technical expertise are necessary to ensure adequate
maintenance, expansion, or to improve the quality of service, they are not enough to guarantee
satisfactory performance. Indeed, revenues and grants may be wasted on “political” jobs or on corrupt
practices, unless appropriate accountability mechanisms are in place. The new public management
doi: 10.2166/wp.2009.032

q IWA Publishing 2010

204 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219

literature argues that incorporating increased requirements for accountability leads to better performance
in governmental subunits (Cunningham & Harris, 2005). Furthermore, recent studies on performance
indicators for water services include serviceability, which entails accountability relationships as a key
performance criterion (Ashley & Hopkinson, 2002).
Although customer-provider interactions are deemed to be an important facet of the performance of
water services providers, in practice, they are usually not part of the framework used to evaluate the
performance of water utilities (see for example Yepes & Dianderas, 1996; Alegre, 2002; Lafferty &
Lauer, 2005). Even though water utilities usually acknowledge providing a public service, they rarely
see themselves as accountable to their customers.
In this paper, we adopt the public accountability concept proposed by Bovens (2005) to analyze how
weak public accountability mechanisms are associated with the performance of two water utilities
located in two cities separated by the Rio Grande at the USA – Mexico border: the Laredo Water Utility
Department (LWUD) and the Comisión Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado (COMAPA) in
Nuevo Laredo (see Figure 1). These cities have a common history, strong social and economic ties, but
different institutional frameworks for urban water services. They are located in an arid region where
population and economic growth stress limited water resources. As these utilities perform in similar
physical environments, our in-depth case study allows us to contrast the impact of institutions on the
performance of water utilities. We find that different aspects of the lackluster performance of both water
utilities can partly be explained by very limited customer-provider interactions and by weak or non-
existent accountability mechanisms.
We rely on four sources of information: documentary information, archival records, census data and
semi-structured interviews with local utility managers, community leaders and policymakers. Between
the end of October 2005 and August of 2006, we visited Nuevo Laredo ten times and conducted
approximately 20 formal interviews. Interviewees included COMAPA officials, members of the Nuevo

TEXAS

COAHUILA Rí
o
Br WEBB
av
o
(R
ío
G
ra
nd TEXAS
e)
Laredo
Nuevo
NUEVO LEÓN Laredo
TAMAULIPAS

MÉXICO

Fig. 1. Map of Laredo and Nuevo Laredo in the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley. Source: Schmandt et al. (2000).
 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219 205

Laredo planning department, a former bridge commissioner, activists concerned with the water situation
in colonias1 and elected officials. In addition, we collected and analyzed various documents provided by
COMAPA and by the city of Laredo. We also reviewed the 1997 Mexican Water Law and its 2004
amendments; documents from the Diario Oficial (2003); the 2006 Tamaulipas Water Law; parts of the
1996 Safe Water Drinking Act; and Title 30 of the Texas Administrative Code. Finally, we analyzed
available water articles published in three local newspapers: El Mañana and La Tarde, for Nuevo Laredo
and the Laredo Morning Times for Laredo.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses briefly our conceptual framework.
Section 3 presents our case study of LWUD and COMAPA and Section 4 contrasts selected performance
indicators for these two water utilities. In Section 5, we investigate how institutional differences and
different public accountability mechanisms may be associated with observed outcomes. Finally, Section
6 summarizes our recommendations and conclusions.

2. Public accountability and performance of water utilities

Originally, the concept of accountability was associated with the proper accounting and legal
expenditure of public funds (Posner, 2002). Nowadays, however, “accountability” has taken a number of
different meanings (Smith, 1980; Sinclair, 1995; Behn, 2001). The International Encyclopedia of Public
Policy and Administration defines accountability as “a relationship in which an individual or agency is
held to answer for performance that involves some delegation or authority to act” (cited in Behn,
2001: 4)2. However, a more specific definition is necessary to go beyond a metaphor for good
management.
The literature defines different types of accountability. For example, Smith (1980) identifies nine
forms of accountability that result from government and administrative developments: constitutional,
judicial, consultative, quasi-judicial, procedural, economic, commercial, professional and decentralized
accountability. From interviews with chief executives in the Australian public sector, Sinclair (1995)
proposes five forms of accountability: political, managerial, public, professional and personal.
Nevertheless, classifying types of accountability is insufficient for a systematic analysis of
accountability relationships since lists only describe the many fields in which the concept can be applied.
In practice, the implementation of accountability relationships involves several difficulties. For
example, Behn (2001) proposes four questions for implementing democratic accountability: Who
decides what results are to be produced? Who is accountable for producing these results? Who is
responsible for implementing the accountability process? How will that process work? (Behn, 2001: 63).

1
As stated by the Texas Department of Housing and community Affairs: “The term Colonia is a Spanish term for neighborhood
or community. A colonia is further defined as an unincorporated community located within 150 miles of the Texas-Mexico
border, or a city or town within said 150 mile region with a population of less than 10,000 according to the latest U.S. Census,
that has a majority population composed of individuals and families of low and very low income, who lack safe, sanitary and
sound housing, together with basic services such as potable water, adequate sewage systems, drainage, streets and utilities”.
(Source: http://maps.oag.state.tx.us/colgeog/colonias.htm, accesed May 2009).
2
It is noteworthy that in the Mexican and Latin American contexts there is no direct translation of the word “accountability”;
the closest equivalent is “Rendición de Cuentas” which usually refers only to the right for information without setting
responsibilities or requiring enforcement mechanisms (Schedler, 2004).
206 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219

In addition, accountability may become dysfunctional if too much emphasis on control leads to
proceduralism (a rigid adherence to established procedures); Behn calls this the accountability dilemma.
Therefore, accountability is strongly linked to bureaucracy, which led Gormley & Balla (2004) to call
for an analysis of bureaucratic accountability.
Because delegation has been associated with accountability, the principal agent model has been used
to model accountability relationships for public services (Besley & Ghatak, 2003; World Bank, 2004).
For example, in a simple principal-agent model of accountability, citizens as the main principals
delegate authority to politically elected representatives, who in turn transfer responsibility for the
provision of public services to public or private providers. This model includes two levels of
accountability relationships: between the citizens and elected officials on the one hand and between the
government and service providers on the other hand (see Figure 2). In this simple principal agent model,
users often view providers of public services as remote and bureaucratic organizations (World Bank,
2004). The main reason is that there is usually no direct accountability of the provider to the consumer,
and consumer consultation is seldom implemented (Foster, 2002). Bovens (2005) calls this relationship a
vertical form of accountability and he argues for horizontal accountability which implies publicizing the
performance of public agencies.
In a horizontal accountability framework, public participation means allowing users to provide
periodic input into service delivery and major policy decisions without interfering with the day-to-day
operations of a utility. For example, water users should be invited to provide feedback on implementing
new conservation measures, developing new water resources, improving water treatment, or changing
water rates (Speranza, 2003: 445). Meaningful forms of participation should also enhance the
monitoring of public service to improve performance: water users should be able to provide feedback on

The state

Politicians Policymakers

Voice Compact

Closer customer– Public and private

Citizens/Clients provider interactions utilities and
providers

Water services

Fig. 2. Accountability model for water services (adapted from the 2004 World Development Report, World Bank, 2004).
 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219 207

the service they receive, from water quality to payment convenience. Involving water users in a better
way would make them part of the solution rather than part of the problem.
Accountability relationships are needed in both the private and the public sectors. However, beliefs in
ideal microeconomic models lead some researchers to argue that accountability in the private sector is a
straightforward concept, as effective accountability relationships should imitate competitive market
relationships (Glyn & Murphy, 1996).
There is, however, a key difference between improving the accountability of a private firm via
regulation and improving the accountability of a water service provider (or any public service provider).
Indeed, whereas the former aims mainly to deal with market failures (by reducing, for example,
asymmetric information between a firm and its regulator), the latter seeks to level the playing field
between a powerful service provider and ordinary citizens, in addition to pursuing equity goals.
Furthermore, implementing accountability through regulation is a typical form of vertical
accountability, which suffers from several shortcomings: first, it dampens feedback from water users
because it is typically very slow and second it blunts their message by relaying it through public officials
who also worry about various interest groups. Besides, accountability through regulation is not an open
form of accountability; it is limited to public agencies or to politicians and it does not provide citizens
with a general right to inquire about the performance of services providers (Bovens, 2005: 201).
More importantly, even though there has been a widespread interest in more private participation in
the water services sector (National Research Council, 2002; Seidenstat et al., 2002), most water utilities
in the USA and Mexico are public.
Following the World Bank (2004: 1), Ackerman (2005) proposes “social accountability” to evaluate
public services. Social accountability is defined as “an approach towards building accountability that
relies on civic engagement”, that is in which ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations
participate directly or indirectly in exercising accountability. Unfortunately, “social” may have
controversial overtones in the context of water services because there is a widespread belief that access
to water services is a right and therefore it should be available and affordable (or even free) for all who
need it (see the literature review in Aguilar & Saphores (2007). Furthermore, this concept does not
specify what could be observed and evaluated to assess accountability.
We therefore adopt instead the concept of public accountability from Bovens (2005) who associates
the “public” character of accountability with public access to meaningful performance evaluation. More
generally, accountability is embedded in the concepts of democracy and of sustainable management
through participation.
Public accountability is also mentioned by other authors; for example Sinclair (1995: 226) defines it
broadly as a process where public administrators answer public concerns through diverse mechanisms
such as newspaper reports or hearings. However, this definition does not provide a basis for assessing the
adequacy of the “public” component. By contrast, Bovens (2005: 185) proposes that a real practice of
public accountability, defined as institutionalized practices of explaining past actions, should contain
five elements: (1) public accessibility of records; (2) explanation and justification of conduct;
(3) explanations directed to a specific forum; (4) obligation for the actor to come forward instead of
being at liberty to provide any account whatsoever; and (5) the possibility of debate and judgement
including sanctions by the forum. Bovens (2005) leaves the scope of accountability open, but he
identifies five key facets of accountability: democratic control, enhancing the integrity of public
governance, improving performance, enhancing the legitimacy of the government and providing public
catharsis after a tragedy.
208 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219

Since accountability involves control it is intimately connected with performance (Gormley & Balla,
2004). In fact, Cunningham & Harris (2005) argue that accountability acts as a control that leads to
greater effectiveness of governmental subunits. Consequently, they propose a performance reporting
system to improve results. However, they also warn that the mere adoption of performance reporting is
not enough for improving performance based on field studies in Canada, England and the USA.
A closer link between consumers and water services quality could be implemented by improving
customer communication (Speranza, 2003) and introducing performance indicators to evaluate and
compare achievements (Ogden, 1997; Ashley & Hopkinson, 2002). Graphically a more direct and closer
customer–provider relationship is indicated by a double headed arrow in Figure 2, which symbolizes
stronger interactions. In their analysis of the performance assessment of water services delivery in the
United Kingdom, Ashley & Hopkinson (2002) propose extensive customer consultation via surveys and
established committees to assess serviceability targets. They suggest that it is theoretically possible to
empower customers through consultation and other accountability forums to improve performance.
Likewise, Ogden (1997) examines new forms of accountability that could create a “place for customers” in
the privatized water industry of the UK. He finds that measures of levels of service, including customer
contact, make workable the concept of customer service. After the privatization of water services in the UK,
two specific service indicators were implemented: responses to billing enquiries and answers to written
complaints. Service indicators could benefit customers by preventing overcharging and by protecting
standards of services, so an effective performance reporting system may help improve performance.
Nonetheless, empowering customers is not a panacea. Particularly because of its public good
characteristics and a belief in the right for water, water services are very susceptible to “clientelism”
(Foster, 2002). In weak institutional contexts, politicians can use at least three clientele influenced forms
for the provision of water services: controlling the construction of public works projects, keeping prices
for infrastructure services below recovery costs and rationing access to water services for unconnected
people (who are generally among the poorest). Citizens then respond by supporting politicians who favor
them as their clients, either with projects, with low rates or with access. As a result, clients do not
complain about low performance since they are not paying enough; accountability is displaced by
patron/client relationships (World Bank, 2004).
In summary, our literature review suggests that inadequate venues for customer participation, a lack of
information and the absence of feedback loops often go hand in hand with poor service. In addition, the
concept of public accountability—defined as a social relationship where water services providers must
justify their decisions to water users in specific forums—is useful for analyzing the performance of water
services providers. This is especially important for our case study, which is located in an arid area at the
USA-Mexico border.

3. Case study background

The USA – Mexico border region is a fertile place for studying water services because it allows
contrasting “twin cities” that share water resources, enjoy strong economic historical and social ties, but
have different institutions. This is particularly true for Laredo, Texas and Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas.
They form a single metropolitan area, as their central shopping districts are only one-half mile apart and
many local residents travel daily from one city to the other. Over the past few years, both cities have
experienced an explosive population growth (41% for Nuevo Laredo and 45% for Laredo between 1990
 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219 209

and 2000) that has stressed their water infrastructure and regional water resources3. The Rio Bravo
region, where these two cities are located, now faces declining water availability and a high level of
annual water stress4. For example, the storage volumes for the main dams in the region fell from 60% of
their capacity in 1990 to only 20% in 2000 (Comisión Nacional del Agua, 2003). It is therefore urgent to
improve water management in this region.
Currently, both cities obtain their water supplies from the Rio Grande River (Rio Bravo). The City of
Laredo recently experimented with the private provision of water services. Until 2002 it provided its
own water services, but on October 1st 2002, seven years after private participation was first proposed,
the city of Laredo entered into a five year contract worth more than US$46 million with United Water, a
private company based in New Jersey. However, when United Water experienced higher-than-average
water lines breaks (eight times the national average) and higher costs related to Laredo’s aging system, it
requested an additional US$5 million but the city refused. In March 2005, Laredo and United Water
dissolved their contract after United Water agreed to give Laredo some equipment and a US$3 million
compensatory payment5.
Water and wastewater services are now provided by the city of Laredo Water Utilities Department
(LWUD). In 2005, the LWUD served a population of approximately 215,000. It pumped an average
of 45 millions gallons (approximately 117,352 m3) of water per day from the Rio Grande River6.
With 180 full time employees, the LWUD manages 56,045 accounts; domestic accounts represent
90% of total accounts; commercial and industrial users, which are not recorded separately, account
for the remaining 10%. In 2005, households paid for water according to an increasing block schedule
with eight tiers; they were charged for sewer services depending on how much water they consumed,
based on an increasing block schedule with five tiers. Commercial users were charged according to
an increasing block schedule with nine tiers for water and with no fewer than 26 tiers for sewer
services.
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas is located in North-eastern Mexico, on the Rio Bravo directly across from
the City of Laredo, Texas (see Figure 1). The Nuevo Laredo water utility (known as COMAPA by its
Spanish initials: Comisión Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado), has 632 full time employees
and provides water services to a population of 481,000 (see Table 1). Metered households face an
11 block water schedule with a flat rate for the first block and increasing marginal rates thereafter; the
rate schedule for industrial users also has 11 blocks, while that of commercial users has 15 tiers.
A noteworthy feature of these water schedules is that marginal and average price are equal for blocks
two and above, which creates small jumps in water bills as consumption moves from one block to
the next. A 40% surcharge is added to water bills for sewer costs.

4. Performance indicators for water services in Laredo-Nuevo Laredo

There are many ways of assessing the performance of water utilities. Indeed, many facets are relevant
when monitoring the quality of water services, including coverage, water quality, the state of the

3
Border Environmental Cooperation Commission, Laredo Certified Project; Laredo Morning Times, February 21, 2004.
4
Water stress is the ratio of water withdrawals minus water returns to the stock of renewable water resources.
5
Laredo Times, March 19, 2005.
6
LWUD Web Page, http://www.cityoflaredo.com/other/public_works.html accessed May 2009.
210 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219

Table 1. Performance indicators for Nuevo Laredo (COMAPA) and Laredo (LWUD) utilities.
Indicator COMAPA LWUD
Coverage
Population , 481,000 , 215,000 (Laredo MSA)
Water (%) 97* 98
Sanitation (%) 91 98
Annual system input (m3) 50,281,137 52,497,950
Number of residential connections 90,300 50,659
Average charge (US$/m3) 0.52 0.37 (year 2005)
Metered accounts (%) 55 100
Personnel
Staff productivity index (Employees/1,000 accounts) 6.8 3.6
Administrative (%) 37 20
O & M (%) 63 80
Physical indicators: distribution and collection system
Non-revenue water 1-(billed water/water delivered 50 29
to the system) (%)
Annual number of broken water mains 1,452 536
Average time to complete work orders (days) 3 1
Commercial efficiency
Commercial efficiency (volume of water paid/volume 60 95
of water billed)*100 (%)
Global commercial efficiency (volume of water 30 67
paid/volume of water sent to the distribution
system)*100 (%)
Financial indicators
Total costs/total revenues 1.18 (year 2004) 0.73 (year 2006)
Percentage contribution to investments (%) NA 54
Operational costs/total costs (%) 18 50

infrastructure, or financial health, for example. In addition, different entities (water utilities but also
policy-making bodies, regulatory agencies, financing institutions and supranational organizations) are
interested in different aspects of performance. As a result, multiple systems of performance indicators
have been created. For example, the International Water Association proposes 133 indicators grouped in
six sets: water resources, personnel, physical, operational, quality of service and financial (Alegre,
2002). Nevertheless, the use of standardized data in the water sector is recent and still not widely used in
most countries; it started in 1996 with the publication by the World Bank of its Water and Wastewater
Utilities Indicators.
To select performance indicators (PI), we focus on simplicity and general efficiency to summarize
key aspects of the performance of COMAPA and the LWUD. Most of the selected indicators are
adopted from the IWA PI system (Alegre, 2002), although several of these indicators are also used in
other performance systems (see Yepes & Dianderas, 1996; Comisión Nacional del Agua, 2002;
Lafferty & Lauer, 2005). The data to calculate the selected PI were collected directly from water
utilities. Unfortunately, not all requested data were available (e.g. water service disruptions). The
performance indicators selected for this study are classified in seven groups: coverage, personnel,
physical, commercial, financial, customer service and miscellaneous. Let us now summarize our
main findings.
 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219 211

4.1. Coverage performance indicators

Both water utilities report similar coverage for water services (97% of households for COMAPA and
98% for LWUD). The LWUD provides drinking water and sewage services for 98% of households in the
Laredo Metropolitan Statistical Area (Business Report, December 2005). In Nuevo Laredo, only 91% of
the population has sewage services but this number compares favourably with the Mexican average:
10.8% of Mexicans lack water services and 14.4% do not have sewage services (Comisión Nacional del
Agua, 2006).
In Laredo all but 0.2% of water accounts are metered. By contrast, although approximately 75% of
accounts in Nuevo Laredo have meters, only 64% of domestic accounts were effectively metered in 2005
because approximately 10,000 water meters were reportedly not working properly (Comisión Nacional
del Agua, 2006)7.
Monthly average per capita water consumption for residential users does not differ markedly: 27 m3 in
Nuevo Laredo (metered only) versus 30 m3 in Laredo8. The annual water input for the LWUD system is
slightly higher than for COMAPA, although it serves only half as many people (see Table 1); this
difference is probably due to commercial and industrial users.
Surprisingly, however, the average price of a cubic meter of water is lower in Laredo than in Nuevo
Laredo (US$0.37 vs. US$0.52) even though the median income in Laredo is five times larger than in
Nuevo Laredo. In fact, water rates in Laredo are not only lower than in similar-sized cities in Texas, such
as McAllen, but they are also lower than the Texas average9. Until recently, keeping the price of utility
services low was part of regional pro-growth policy10.
However, keeping the price of water artificially low is problematic in such an arid region for many
reasons: first, it gives a distorted signal about the scarcity of water; second, overuse leads to excessive
withdrawals of water from the environment, which harms local ecosystems; and third, under-pricing
water deprives water utilities of much needed resources to maintain their infrastructure, which
compound water losses and is at the root of wastewater discharges because of insufficient sanitation
coverage.

4.2. Personnel performance indicators

Usually, the staff/connection indicator is used as a measure of productivity. However, this indicator
alone does not give a satisfactory picture of efficiency because an improvement in this ratio does not
necessarily imply an increase in efficiency (Kemper et al., 1999). Higher values are desirable, although
hiring temporary employees makes comparisons difficult.
The staff/connection indicator for COMAPA, 147 accounts per employee, is lower than the average
for Mexican water utilities of approximately 200 accounts per employee (Comisión Nacional del Agua,
2006). Two reasons explain this number: almost 37% of COMAPA’s staff have administrative positions,

7
COMAPA billing report for February 28, 2006 and personal interview with Alfonso Velasco, COMAPA consultant, October
31, 2005.
8
Water rates recently increased, however; see http://www.cityoflaredo.com/Utilities05/Water_Rate_Increase-English.pdf,
accessed June 12, 2006.
9
LWUD Customer Service Report, December, 2005.
10
See The Los Laredos Incentives, http://ldfonline.org/products.asp?cat¼62&hierarchy¼0
212 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219

which suggests overstaffing and the presence of “political” jobs (revealed by our interviews and
newspaper stories)11.
The LWUD has a much higher ratio of 311 accounts per employee, but this number is also small
compared to the American Water Works Association (AWWA) median for southern water utilities in
the USA of 476 accounts per employee (Lafferty & Lauer, 2005). COMAPA’s and the LWUD’s
statistics are not directly comparable since their ratios of labor to capital costs are likely to be
different, but these statistics suggest that both the LWUD and especially COMAPA have relatively
low labor productivity.

4.3. Physical performance indicators

“Non-revenue water” measures the difference between the annual volumes of produced water and
billed authorized consumption (or water sold) (Alegre, 2002); it includes physical water losses, metering
inaccuracies and illegal use. This indicator is often a good proxy for the overall operational efficiency of
a water utility.
For COMAPA, non-revenue water, which also includes public use, is a staggering 50% of water
production (Comisión Nacional del Agua, 2006)12. By contrast, estimated non-revenue water for the
LWUD represents 29% of the water delivered to the system (see physical indicators on Table 1). This
percentage is high when compared with the upper bound of the median range of USA utilities reported
by the AWWA, which is approximately 15% (Lafferty & Lauer, 2005). In fact, Laredo set a goal of
reducing unaccounted-for water to 15% by the year 201513.
In 2005 COMAPA recorded 1,452 leaks in its distribution system. Nuevo Laredo has several water
lines older than 50 years in addition to lines built with inadequate materials14. LUWD water losses are
likely to be associated with a high number of broken water mains (536 in 2005), which also is one of the
main causes of customer complaints.

4.4. Commercial performance indicators

Although water and sanitation services require large investments and consequently need good
collection rates for financial viability, most PI systems do not collect payment data. This is surprising
since non-payment and affordability are of concern all over the world and not only in developing and
transition countries (see Aguilar & Saphores, 2007).
COMAPA bills 50% of the water delivered to its system and collects 60% of the water it bills
(Comisión Nacional del Agua, 2006), so it receives compensation for only 30% of the water delivered
to its system. Unfortunately, low collection is not uncommon for Mexican water utilities: the average
for water utilities serving cities with populations over 50,000 is only 34.5% (Comisión Nacional del
Agua, 2006).

11
Personal interviews with Carlos Canturosas Villareal, COMAPA’s administrative Council member and Jorge Salinas Falcon,
Nuevo Laredo Council member; February 17, 2006.
12
For example, water consumption from public schools started being metered only in September 2006.
13
Water Conservation Plan, City of Laredo Texas, amended on December 19, 2005.
14
“Se pierden 200 mil litros de agua al dı́a”, El Mañana, March 21, 2006.
 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219 213

By contrast, the LWUD bills 71% of the water delivered to its system and collects 95% of it, so it gets
paid for 67% of the water delivered to its system (see commercial efficiency data on Table 1).
Unfortunately, we could not find payment statistics for American water utilities in order to gauge this
performance. Relatively low total revenue water and low charges suggest problems with the financial
viability of both water utilities, but especially for COMAPA.

4.5. Financial performance indicators

The ratio of total costs to total revenues is a proxy for the financial health of a water utility. In
spite of a relatively low revenue water indicator, the LWUD collects more than enough revenues
(US$44 million) to cover its operating costs (US$32 million). Its situation is much better than
COMAPA’s for which total costs exceeded operational revenues by 18% in 2004 (see financial
indicators on Table 1).
However, the LWUD’s revenues can only cover 54% of the investments needed to improve and
expand its aging system. About half of the LWUD’s total costs are related to operations, which suggests
that maintenance and other necessary operating expenses for the current level of service are met.
However, this ratio is smaller than the average for industrialized countries, where operating costs are
60% of total costs (Kemper et al., 1999).
Surprisingly, COMAPA’s operational costs represent only 18% of total costs (and investments make
up a mere 12% of total costs) as the bulk of total costs (,70%) is spent on salaries and administration.
A high ratio of personnel costs to operating costs can lead to an increasing need for external funds and it
affects the sustainability of water infrastructure investments. This situation can also create dependencies
on local or federal transfers.

4.6. Customer service performance indicators

In general, limited attention has so far been paid to measures of the quality of water services
(Speranza, 2003; Holt, 2005). It is therefore not surprising that neither water utility has specific
mechanisms to get customer feedback on perceived drinking water quality or on service delivery
expectations. However, customer service is a clearly defined sub-division for the LWUD and it produces
monthly reports.
The most frequent types of inquiries received by the LWUD customer subdivision are about high bills,
sewer back-up leaks, broken pipes and low water pressure; this illustrates that administration,
maintenance and quality of service are important concerns for Laredo water users. Regrettably, the
LWUD provides limited information to its customers. Water bills show previous meter readings and
charges, but they provide no information on the rate structure, which probably weakens the price signal.
In Nuevo Laredo, COMAPA lacks a well-defined customer service subdivision. The only mechanism
available for customers who wish to complain is a phone number where they can leave a message;
unfortunately, COMAPA does not record complaints nor does it keep track of how these complaints are
handled. In fact, the six employees who deal with costumer service issues at COMAPA’s offices mainly
work on billing inquiries.
On its residential water bills, COMAPA reports water consumption for the past year in addition to
quantity consumed, price and overdue charges (if any), but it gives only partial information about its
water rates. Furthermore, COMAPA does not provide its residential costumers with information on
214 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219

water quality, its financial health or the physical state of its infrastructure. Surprisingly, even some
members of the administrative council claim insufficient access to financial data or to water quality
information15.

4.7. Overall performance assessment

The two main water issues for Laredo are low water pressure and two areas without water services. In
2005 the LWUD recorded 288 low pressure complaints16. About 3,600 people who live in colonias in
two areas do not have water service or access to a centralized wastewater system17. The Texas Water
Development Board (TWDB) gave a grant of US$16 million in August 2002 for the colonias water and
wastewater improvement project, which was complemented by an additional grant of US$6 million from
the North American Development Bank (NADB), so that no local cost share was required18.
Water quality, low pressure and financial needs are the main issues facing COMAPA. COMAPA
conducts more water quality tests (1861 tests in 2005 instead of 1776) than required by the Secretarı́a de
Salubridad y Asistencia (SSA, a health agency), but this does not mean that water quality is adequate.
Indeed, water users receive no information about water quality from COMAPA. Tellingly, a 2005
customer survey conducted by the Institute of Marketing and Opinion for COMAPA reveals that 63% of
Nuevo Laredo residents do not drink tap water directly; they prefer buying bottled water, which is up to
175 times more expensive! Low water pressure is also a problem in several Nuevo Laredo colonias19.
However, COMAPA is not required to issue boil water notices because of low water pressure.
COMAPA is also unable to expand its water infrastructure to meet the demand of an increasing
population. As a result, many households without sanitation services discharge their wastewater directly
into the Rio Grande River. COMAPA relies on state and NADB funding for improving wastewater
collection. In 2006 for example, NADB provided a US$20 million grant for improving Nuevo Laredo’s
wastewater collection system20. This is another illustration of COMAPA’s dependency on external
transfers, which again removes incentives to improve service efficiency. Let us now examine the
institutional contexts under which accountability relationships for water services take place.

5. Public accountability of water services in Laredo-Nuevo Laredo

The analysis of accountability contexts for water services highlights significant institutional
differences between the United States and Mexico. A key aspect of public accountability is access to
information.
In the United States, the Freedom of Information Act, which guarantees an explicit right to
information, was implemented in 1966. Moreover, the 1996 Amendments to the Safe Water Drinking

15
Personal interview with Carlos Canturosas Villareal, council member, Nuevo Laredo. February. 17, 2006.
16
“Quick fix sought for mounting water pressure problems”, Laredo Morning Times, July 19, 2005.
17
Source: http://borderhealth.cr.usgs.gov/datalayers.html, accessed on May 2009.
18
Source: http://www.nadbank.org/pdfs/state_projects/FS%20Laredo%2007-02.pdf, accessed on May 2009.
19
La Tarde, Local section p. 4, January 24, 2006.
20
North American Development Bank, factsheet http://www.nadbank.org/pdfs/state_projects/FS%20Nuevo%20Laredo%20Eng.
pdf, accessed in May 2009.
 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219 215

Act recognize that the right to public information about water quality, so that water systems serving the
same people all year round must provide annual consumer confidence reports on the source and quality
of their tap water. Mexican citizens also have an explicit right to information, but transparency is a much
more recent concept there: the “Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública
Federal” (Federal Law for Transparency and Access to Public Government Information) was only
passed in 2002.
Public participation is another important facet of public accountability. There are several venues for
citizens to participate in both countries, but more in the USA than in Mexico. In the USA, for
example, citizens can participate through notice and comments processes, advisory committees, public
meetings or public hearings (Gormley & Balla, 2004). In Mexico, citizens can participate through
public meetings, although they are less common, as well as through councils and advisory committees
for local governments.
The institutional contexts for public accountability also differ for COMAPA and for the LWUD.
In the USA, responsibility for adequate, safe and reliable services ultimately rests with state and local
agencies. By contrast, although urban water systems in Mexico were decentralized in 1983, two federal
agencies (CNA, the Comisión Nacional del Agua and SSA, the Secretarı́a de Salubridad y Asistencia)
still regulate water systems by setting official standards for water services and the quality of water for
human consumption (Comisión Nacional del Agua, 2003)21. However, the responsibility for enforcing
these standards is not clearly defined; they are expected to be enforced by SSA, State Governments and
CNA according to their “corresponding spheres of authority”.
At the state level, there are significant differences between Texas and Tamaulipas. While in Texas
operational standards for water utilities are clearly defined, the Tamaulipas Water Law (TWL) focuses
on administrative rules. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) sets the water
standards and reporting requirements for public water supply in the state and it is responsible for
enforcing these rules22. Title 30 of the Texas administrative Code (30 TAC) includes detailed standards
and norms for water sources, minimum pressures and water treatments. Water systems are subject to
periodic inspection and they must submit information to TCEQ. Moreover, rule 290.271 mandates
public water systems to submit annual reports with clear water quality information.
By contrast, operational standards are poorly defined on the Mexican side. The TWL rules municipal
water utilities but it says little about performance or quality of service. For example, although Article
138 broadly references water quality, it does not state clearly who should set standards or enforce them.
The TWL also refers to public participation (Article 18, paragraph XIII and Articles 40 and 41), but
water users have no role in the decision-making process because representatives are typically appointed
by politicians or captured by various interest groups rather than elected by customers.
Paradoxically, even though institutional contexts are significantly different, there are similarities in
the organization of COMAPA and the LWUD. In general, both water utilities operate mostly under a
vertical accountability system. The Mayor of Laredo appoints the director of the LWUD, who reports

21
The 1983 amendments to Article 115 of the Mexican Constitution transferred the responsibility for water services from the
federal government to municipalities.
22
TCEQ, Rules and Regulations for Public Water Systems (http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/rules/indxpdf.html, accessed on May
25, 2006).
216 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219

City council
city manager

Utilities director
Customers

Administrative
secretary

Business
manager Engineering Operations
manager manager
Customer
Utilities
service
administrator
superintendent

Customer
service
supervisor

Fig. 3. LWUD flowchart (adapted from LWUD’s official flowchart).

to the City Council. The director of LWUD is usually a water official with several years of experience in
water resources, which allows some degree of professionalism in the utility’s management. The LWUD
flowchart has a pyramidal form with a general director and three well-defined divisions (operations,
engineering and business), each with its own director (see Figure 3). The staff have to follow specific
rules and operational standards23. However, the LWUD does not use performance indicators to monitor
performance.
In Nuevo Laredo, Article 27 of the TWL sets the composition and function of Municipal
Administrative Councils (MAC) for water utilities in Tamaulipas. It states clearly that MACs must
include three municipal officials, three state officials, a representative of the state congress and three
representatives of the social and private sectors. However, there are no well-defined operational rules
and standards, enforcement is unclear and regulation is done at the state level.
COMAPA’s manager reports to the municipal government (Article 34), which in practice means the
mayor, who is also the president of the MAC. Therefore, COMAPA’s manager is accountable to
policymakers, politicians and business groups but not directly to customers. The three administrative
council members who represent the “social” and “private” sector belong to business or professional
groups and they are appointed by the mayor. Furthermore, since appointed utility managers are usually
local politicians, it is very common for COMAPA managers to run for city mayor after a few years of
service24. This politicization is likely to affect the professionalism of COMAPA. The lower part of the
COMAPA’s flowchart (Figure 4) shows a structure with three separate divisions for the management of
technical, commercial and financial areas; in this case, each division has its own manager. However,
COMAPA lacks a clearly defined customer service section.

23
Personal interview with Adrian Montemayor, LWUD’s interim director, October 30, 2005.
24
Personal interview with Jorge Salinas Falcon, council member, Nuevo Laredo, February 17, 2006.
 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219 217

Administrative
council

State´s
watchdog

General
manager

Customers Administrative Legal

consultant department
Training
Technical
department
consultant
Systems
department

Commercial Engineering Business

manager manager manager

Customer
service

Fig. 4. COMAPA flowchart (adapted from COMAPA’s official flowchart).

6. Conclusions

Although to different degrees, both water utilities suffer from inadequate accountability relationships
resulting from structural barriers to political accountability and, in Mexico, from ambiguous laws and a
tradition of patronage politics. Some differences in performance reflect the utilities’ different
accountability environment rather than their own initiatives. For example, water quality is perceived to
be adequate in Laredo thanks to clear standards and annual consumer confidence reports that provide
information about tap water quality25. By contrast, in Nuevo Laredo many people do not drink tap water
directly because its quality is perceived to be poor.
The lack of accountability results in unsustainable practices sustained by external budget transfers that
require neither cost recovery nor clear commitments to improve performance. These budget transfers
allow the continuation of relatively poor performance characterized by large numbers of main breaks,
low water pressure, large water losses and difficulties in meeting the growing water demand of an
increasing population. This situation illustrates the challenge of implementing sustainable institutions at
the local level, as recommended, for example, by UNEP; it shows that structural reforms are even more
necessary than additional resources.
In Mexico, a necessary first step is to clarify water law. On both sides of the border, professionalizing
the utilities’ staff may also help improve their performance; COMAPA appears to be particularly
overstaffed with administrative employees but it lacks qualified maintenance personnel. In addition,
requiring periodic performance audits of each utility by independent firms may help boost their
performance and improve their public image.

25
Nevertheless, the US Tap Water Quality Database, which includes water quality data from 1998 through 2002, shows that
Laredo’s tap water contains up to 24 pollutants (http://www.ewg.org/tapwater/yourwater/system.php?pwsid¼TX2400001).
218 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219

However, these measures are not sufficient. As emphasized above, neither water utility provides
enough information to its customers, so one important element of public accountability is missing. More
direct accountability relations between utilities’ managers and water customers could offer opportunities
for both. On one hand, providing consumers with feedback opportunities and understandable
information on water quality, the state of the infrastructure and financing needs would likely increase
public trust in public water suppliers and foster community support for major investments. It may give
water users more confidence that tap water is safe and that water services are provided in a fair and cost-
effective way. On the other hand, water utility managers could propose their own benchmarks and
publicize strategically their successes (Speranza, 2003; Bovens, 2005).
Better accountability relationships between water utilities and users also require specific forums to be
implemented. One possibility would be to set up consumer panels, similar to the consumer councils that
represent water & sewage companies costumers in England and Wales26. Water utilities should also
consider adopting performance indicators to assess how they are doing and compare their performance
to those of similar water utilities.
Ultimately, more participation and accountability would enable water utilities to switch to adaptive
management, so they could better adapt to changing demand and learn from their mistakes. They would
become service-oriented organizations rather than non-responsive bureaucracies. This will take time but
it is necessary to manage scarce water resources better, especially at the USA– Mexico border.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank water utilities officials from Laredo, Texas and Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas
who patiently answered our many questions and kindly provided us with the available data at their
disposal. Helpful comments from David Feldman, Helen Ingram and Jose Luis Castro, as well as from
participants at the LESAM 2007 conference in Lisbon are gratefully acknowledged. We also thank
Rosalı́a Chávez, a research assistant from El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, for her valuable assistance.
As usual, we are responsible for all remaining errors.

References

Ackerman, J. M. (2005). Social Accountability in the Public sector. A Conceptual Discussion. Social Development Papers,
Paper 82, The World Bank.
Aguilar, I. & Saphores, J.-D. (2007). An Analysis of Non-Payment of Water Services in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. Working Paper,
University of California, Irvine.
Alegre, H. (2002). Performance indicators as a management support tool. In Urban Water Supply Handbook. Mays, L. W. (ed.).
McGraw Hill, New York, Chapter 7.
Ashley, R. & Hopkinson, P. (2002). Sewer systems and performance indicators into the 21st century. Urban Water, 4, 123– 135.
Behn, R. D. (2001). Rethinking Democratic Accountability. Brooking Institution Press, Washington, DC.
Besley, T. & Ghatak, M. (2003). Incentives, choice and accountability in the provision of public services. Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 19(2), 235–249.
Bovens, M. (2005). Public accountability. In The Oxford Handbook of Public Management. Ferlie, E., Lynne, L. & Pollit, C.
(eds). Oxford University Press, Oxford, Chapter 8.

26
See http://www.ccwater.org.uk/index.php, accessed on 12/17/07.
 I. Aguilar-Benitez and J.-D. Saphores / Water Policy 12 (2010) 203–219 219

Comisión Nacional del Agua (2002). Planeación de Acciones de Incremento y Control de la Eficiencia en Sistemas de Agua
Potable. CNA, México.
Comisión Nacional del Agua (2003). Compendio Básico del Agua en México. CNA, México.
Comisión Nacional del Agua (2006). Situación del subsector agua potable, alcantarillado y saneamiento. CNA, México.
Cunningham, G. M. & Harris, J. E. (2005). Toward a theory of performance reporting to achieve public sector accountability.
A field study. Public Budgeting & Finance, 25(2), 15 – 42.
Foster, V. (2002). Ten years of water service reform in Latin America. Toward an Anglo– French model. In Reinventing Water
and Wastewater Systems. Global Lessons for Improving Water Management. Seidenstat, P., Haarmeyer, D. & Hakim, S.
(eds). John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Glyn, J. J. & Murphy, M. P. (1996). Failing accountabilities and failing performance review. International Journal of Public
Sector Management, 9(5/6), 125–137.
Gormley, W. T. & Balla, S. J. (2004). Bureaucracy and Democracy. Accountability and Performance. CQ Press, Washington, DC.
Holt, L. (2005). Utility service quality—telecommunications, electricity, water. Utilities Policy, 13, 189– 200.
Kemper, K., Yepes, G. & Garn, M. (1999). Personnel costs as an indicator for W & S utility performance in developing
countries (Annex). In Indicators: Water & Wastewater Utilities, 2nd edn. Yepes, G. & Dianderas, A. (eds). World Bank,
Washington, DC, pp. A1 –A3.
Lafferty, A. K. & Lauer, W. C. (2005). Benchmarking Performance Indicators for Water and Wastewater Utilities: Survey Data
and Analyses Report. American Water Works Association, Denver, CO.
National Research Council (NRC) (2002). Privatization of Water Services in the United States. An assessment of Issues and
Experience. National Academy Press, Washington, DC.
Ogden, S. G. (1997). Accounting for organizational performance: the construction of the customer in the privatized water
industry. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 22(6), 529– 556.
Posner, P. L. (2002). Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Government. The Tools of Government: A guide to the New
Governance. Salamon, L. (ed.). Oxford, University Press, Oxford, pp. 1 –48.
Ramsey, S. (2002). The pursuit of efficiency through benchmarking. In Reinventing Water and Wastewater Systems. Global
Lessons for Improving Water Management. Seidenstat, P., Haarmeyer, D. & Hakim, S. (eds). John Wiley & Sons, New York,
pp. 99 – 115.
Schedler, A. (2004). Qué es la rendición de cuentas? Cuadernos de transparencia num. 3, Instituto Federal de Acceso a la
Información, IFAI.
Schmandt, J., Aguilar-Barajas, I., Mathis, M., Armstrong, N., Chapa-Alemán, L., Contreras-Balderas, S., Edwards, R., Garcı́a-
Ramirez, M. E., Hazleton, J., Lozano-Vilano, M. de L., Navar-Chaidez, J. de J., Vogel, E. & Ward, G. (2000). Water and
Sustainable Development in the Binational Lower Rio Grande/Rı́o Bravo Basin. Final Report to EPA/NSF Water and
Watersheds grant program (Grant No. R 824799-01-0), Houston Advanced Research Center, Center for Global Studies, The
Woodlands, Texas.
Seidenstat, P., Haarmeyer, D. & Hakim, S. (2002). Reinventing Water and Wastewater Systems. Global Lessons for Improving
Water Management. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Sinclair, A. (1995). The chameleon of accountability: forms and discourses. Accounting Organization and Society, 20(2/3),
219– 237.
Smith, B. C. (1980). Control in British Government: a problem of accountability. Policy Studies Journal, 9(8), 1163 –1174.
Speranza, E. M. (2003). Death of the Silent Service: Meeting Customer Expectations. Drinking Water Regulation and Health.
Pontius, F. W. (ed.). John Wiley & Sons, New York, pp. 433–448.
Spiller, P. T. & Savedoff, W. D. (1999). Government opportunism and the provision of water. In Spilled Water. Institutional
Commitment in the Provision of Water Services. Spiller, P. T. (ed.). Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC,
pp. 1 – 34.
World Bank (2003). Efficient, Sustainable, Service for All? An OED Review of the World Bank’s Assistance to Water Supply
and Sanitation, Operation Evaluation Department, World Bank Report No. 26443, Washington, DC.
World Bank (2004). World Development Report 2004 Making Services Work for Poor People. World Bank, Washington, DC.
Yepes, G. & Dianderas, A. (1996). Water & Wastewater Utilities. World Bank, Washington, DC.

Received 26 February 2008; accepted in revised form 13 August 2008. Available online 9 November 2009