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Energy Policy 129 (2019) 13–22

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Unveiling the heterogeneous effect of energy taxes and income on T


residential energy consumption
Djula Borozan
Faculty of Economics in Osijek, Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, Gajev trg 7, HR-31000 Osijek, Croatia

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: The paper investigates the effect of energy taxes in the European Union (EU) across different levels of residential
Residential final energy consumption final energy consumption (RFEC) in the period 2005–2016. The analysis is based on quantile panel regression
Energy tax models that directly and indirectly consider energy taxes. More precisely, the developed models provide a
Environmental Kuznets curve multivariate framework for evaluating their effects and, at the same time, for validating the existence of the
Panel quantile regression
energy environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) across the selected quantiles.
The results unveil significant heterogeneity in the RFEC responses across quantiles. Specifically, in less en-
ergy-consuming EU countries, an increase in energy taxes and energy prices influences stronger RFEC, and the
rebound effect of real income and tertiary education is greater than in their more energy-consuming peers.
Moreover, in the former, the energy EKC hypothesis holds, while in the latter, its existence is not clear, as well as
the rebound effect caused by highly educated people. Consequently, EU energy policy aiming at achieving
energy and environmental targets has to consider the heterogeneity in RFEC since the outcomes might be dif-
ferent for different energy-consuming groups of countries.

1. Introduction attention. They include taxes on energy products such as oil products,
natural gas and electricity. Energy taxes are the most important con-
Sensitivity of residential final energy consumption (RFEC) on en- tributor to total environmental tax revenues, with 76.94% of the EU-28
ergy taxes has attracted considerable research interest across the world total in 2016 (Eurostat, 2018a). Moreover, on average, they have ac-
(e.g., Berkhout et al., 2004; Oueslati et al., 2016; Feng et al., 2018). counted for slightly less than 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) and
This interest may be partially explained by uncertainty that exists about slightly less than 5% of total tax and social contribution revenues in the
the consequences of energy taxes. Energy tax is a policy tax instrument EU-28 in the last several years (Eurostat, 2018b). However, energy
introduced to reduce negative impacts of energy on the environment, taxes vary considerably across EU countries, reflecting thereby energy
facilitate its rational use and provide fiscal gains (see Bye and Bruvoll, and environmental policy priorities. This is a direct consequence of the
2008; Markandya, 2012; Gago et al., 2014). However, it increases the EU complex energy tax policy rules. Namely, they allow a variety of tax
price of energy, which may have unfavorable consequences for low rates, depending on the used type of energy, applied tax reduction and
income households in particular (OECD, 2006; Oueslati et al., 2016). In exemption schemes. Consequently, each EU country has its own en-
addition, since its rate varies widely from country to country and from vironmental/energy tax system. As a percent of GDP, the largest level of
sector to sector, it may reduce the country’s international competi- energy tax revenue was recorded in Slovenia, Latvia and Greece
tiveness and lead to a decrease in revenues, productivity and employ- (3.28%, 3.11% and 3.02%, respectively), while the smallest level was
ment in some economic sector (OECD, 2006; Aigner, 2011; Feng et al., recorded in Ireland, Belgium and Malta (1.46%, 1.42% and 1.12%,
2018). respectively) in 2016 (Eurostat, 2018a). The lowest energy tax revenues
The European Union (EU) has been committed to becoming a in relation to a country’s GDP (below 2%) were also reported, in ad-
competitive, low-carbon and energy efficient economy. To achieve that, dition to the aforementioned countries, in Austria, Spain, Germany,
it is important to design effective energy policies. The EU has used Luxembourg, Slovakia, Lithuania, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
several energy policy instruments and adopted a number of measures to France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the Czech Republic (Eurostat,
change the behavior of households and guide them towards meeting its 2018a).
energy targets. Among them, energy taxes have received significant The total energy tax revenues include taxes on energy use paid by

E-mail address: borozan@efos.hr.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.01.069
Received 14 September 2018; Received in revised form 29 January 2019; Accepted 31 January 2019
0301-4215/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
D. Borozan Energy Policy 129 (2019) 13–22

six different consumer sectors – households, industry and construction, examines distributional heterogeneity existing in RFEC. Second, it as-
wholesale and retail trade, agriculture, forestry and fishing, transpor- sesses the effect of energy taxes and tests the validity of the energy EKC
tation and storage, and service sectors. In the period under study, i.e. in a multivariate setting across the conditional distribution of RFEC,
2005–2016, about 48% of the revenues collected by governments from which are also a novel contribution. Third, it confirms the hetero-
energy taxes came from households (Eurostat, 2018b). Thereby, the geneous effect across different quantiles of the conditional RFEC dis-
governments in Luxembourg and Slovenia collected from households tribution and the fact that the energy EKC does not hold at each RFEC
the smallest and the highest amount (7.13% and 68.73%), respectively. level in the EU.
Sterner and Koehlin (2003) observed that environmental taxation, The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly
which includes energy taxation, has a more important role in Europe introduces the main research strands on which the paper draws and
than in other countries, partially due to greater reliance on and ac- reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data and the
ceptance of taxes and a larger public sector in general, as well as more model framework. Section 4 presents and discusses the results, while
ambitious energy and environmental goals. From the research and Section 5 gives the conclusions, policy implications and directions for
policy perspective, it is very important to find out whether energy taxes further research.
have the expected effect on energy consumption and consequently on
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Energy taxes should be set at the level 2. Conceptual background with a literature review
which ensures economically efficient, cost- and environmentally effec-
tive effects. Previous studies on the effects of energy taxes on energy To achieve the aims, the present paper synthesizes knowledge ac-
consumption in the EU provide inconclusive results. Some studies re- quired from three research strands. The first research strand is related
ported energy taxes lead to a decrease in energy consumption and GHG to energy taxes. It primarily explains the motivation for their in-
emissions or an increase in energy efficiency (Berkhout et al., 2004; troduction and evaluates their effects. Energy tax is introduced due to
Filipovic et al., 2015; Lapinskiene et al., 2017), while other studies the following: (i) environmental reasons, i.e. to reduce environmental
(Morley, 2012; Borozan, 2018a) show that RFEC is not directly and impacts by decreasing energy consumption; (ii) energy security reasons,
statistically significantly attributable to energy taxes. However, most of i.e. to enhance energy security by redirecting energy use towards a less-
them failed to investigate the energy tax effect within the integrated dependent energy supply structure; iii) social reasons, i.e. to compen-
framework which takes into account socio-economic and contextual sate for market failures such as negative externalities generated by
factors. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, no previous study economic activities; and (iv) fiscal reasons, i.e. to increase government
addressed the issue of distributional heterogeneity of RFEC and pro- revenues. See Bye and Bruvoll (2008), Markandya (2012) or Gago et al.
vided a more comprehensive picture of how the socio-economic and (2014) for an overview of the reasons behind energy tax introduction.
contextual variables affect RFEC. Taxation affects volumes and society experiences an efficiency loss
The present paper aims to evaluate the direct and indirect effects of in competitive markets according to neoclassical microeconomic
energy taxes for different quantiles of the conditional distribution of theory. Namely, it constraints the effects of the market mechanism,
RFEC across EU countries spanning the period 2005–2016. The former which commonly leads to a Pareto optimal allocation of production
is investigated by including the energy tax variable into the empirical factors, i.e. market efficiency. As Franck Ramsey underlined in 1927
model, while the latter is investigated through the energy price and (according to Bye and Bruvoll, 2008), the least elastic goods should be
income elasticity of household energy demand. Energy taxes internalize burdened by such taxation to minimize the efficiency losses. Since en-
adverse external costs of energy generation and consumption and in- ergy goods generally show a low elasticity of demand (Morley, 2012),
crease the price of energy. They change relative prices of final con- they are suitable goods for taxation.
sumption goods and relative returns to production factors such as labor. According to the theory of optimal taxation, any tax (except lump-
Consequently, they also affect income through the transfer of resources sum alternatives) influences the behavior of individuals and leads to
between the private and public sector (Gago et al., 2014; Oueslati et al., distortions of market behavior (Gago et al., 2014). Taxation generates
2016). In addition, the paper tests for the validity of the residential two effects: an income redistribution effect and a substitution effect.
energy environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) in a multivariate frame- The former refers to a transfer of money between the private and public
work. It aims to reveal whether a continuous increase in GDP per capita sectors and wealth worsening, particularly of lower income households.
in EU countries will tend to decrease RFEC and hence environmental The latter refers to a transition of preferences of households towards
pressures at different levels and at some point in time. goods that are cheaper, i.e. less affected by taxation.
For that purpose, the paper employs a quantile regression for panel Jacobs (2012) underlined the government has to choose its tax in-
data (QRPD) method proposed by Powell (2016). This method has struments to optimize social welfare while taking into account all re-
particularly two benefits compared with the conventional panel esti- levant tax-induced behavioral responses. Thereby, social welfare, which
mation techniques. It enables one to take into account individual and also includes environmental quality and security of energy supply, will
distributional heterogeneity simultaneously and hence get a more increase if the government corrects market failure, internalizes ex-
complete picture of RFEC determinants. Namely, it estimates the sig- ternalities and provides public goods (Jacobs, 2012). Considering the
nificance of explanatory variables throughout the conditional dis- social, environmental and energy security reasons, an energy tax in-
tribution, including the countries with the most and the least RFEC. By troduction is justified and most empirical studies have corroborated
contrast, ordinary least square (OLS) regression methods consider only that (for a review, see Bosquet, 2000; see also Morley, 2012).
the mean effect and hence fail to consider useful information arising The double-dividend hypothesis occurred in the 1990s. According to
from the heterogeneous effect (Powell, 2016). In addition, the panel it, a double benefit, environmental and economic, is achievable by
quantile regression method provides results that are robust to outlying imposing (or increasing) an environmental tax and decreasing other
observations of the explanatory variables and are more effective than taxes, while keeping the same government revenues. Freiere-Gonzales
OLS regression (Zhu et al., 2016; Chen and Lei, 2018). The quantile (2017), who conducted a survey on environmental taxation, underlined
regression method has already been used in the energy and environ- that empirical studies confirmed the environmental effect, which
mental literature (e.g., Kaza, 2010; Niu et al., 2016), but the literature cannot be clearly said for the size of the fiscal/economy effect.
on the application of the panel quantile regression method is quite However, although energy taxes or environmental taxes in general
limited in this field (e.g., Chen and Lei, 2018; Sarkodie and Strezov, may generate the double dividend, they may also generate the re-
2019), particularly because of its novelty. gressive effect on income distribution (Aigner, 2011; OECD, 2006) and
Overall, the paper contributes to the literature referring to the fol- the adverse effect on international competiveness of some sectors
lowing three aspects. First, employing the QRPD for the first time, it (OECD, 2006; Oueslati et al., 2016). Many energy products are essential

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D. Borozan Energy Policy 129 (2019) 13–22

goods, and an increase in their prices induced by energy taxes has consumption are made.
unfavorable consequences, particularly on low income households. An The third research strand, on which the present paper draws, is
adverse distributional effect and an increase in energy poverty may related to the relationship between environmental quality and income
appear. Moreover, since energy taxes vary widely across countries and level. Empirical research thereon began with Grossman and Krueger
sectors, they may reduce the country’s and sector’s international com- (1995), who discovered that the relationship has an inverted U-shape.
petitiveness and hence lead to losses of jobs and revenues. Oueslati This hypothesis was called the EKC after Simon Kuznets. He stated in
et al. (2016), who analyzed the relationship between energy taxes and the 1950s that income distribution and income level can be described
income inequality for 34 OECD countries from 1995 to 2011, found out by an inverted U-curve.
that its size and direction depend on the presence of explicit tax revenue Over the last two decades, many empirical studies have been con-
recycling mechanisms. ducted to test for the existence of the EKC at the cross-national level
Since the early 1990s, energy taxes have been considered in the EU (Mazur et al, 2015; Lapinskiene et al., 2017; Auci and Trovato, 2018).
as market-based instruments which should ensure a cost-effective way Thereby, some of them used the amount of pollutants or the level of
for the reduction of energy demand, fostering energy efficiency and GHG emissions as indices of environmental pressures (Mazur et al,
thus the reduction of environmental impacts of energy use. For the 2015; Lapinskiene et al., 2017; Auci and Trovato, 2018), while others
history on energy taxation in European countries, see Speck (2008). used energy consumption for the same purpose (Suri and Chapman,
Using cross-sectional regression and panel dynamic regression, Miller 1988; Luzzati and Orsini, 2009; Morley, 2012; Pablo-Romero and
and Vela (2013) explored the effectiveness of environmental taxes for Sanchez-Brada, 2017; Borozan, 2018b).
50 countries from all world regions (including most of EU countries) for Several empirical studies with environmental quality as the de-
the period 1995–2010. They revealed that countries with higher rev- pendent variable were focused on European countries and provided
enues from environmental taxes exhibit higher reductions in adverse evidence of the EKC existence (e.g., Auci and Trovato, 2018 for 25 EU
emissions, energy consumption and production from fossil sources. countries for the period 1997–2005; Lapinskiene et al., 2017 for 20 EU
Morley (2012) unveiled the negative relationship between environ- countries for the period 2006–2013). By contrast, some of them failed
mental taxes and pollution by using a dynamic panel analysis for EU to do that (e.g., Mazur et al., 2015, who did not confirm the EKC ex-
countries and Norway for the period 1995–2006. But, he failed to reveal istence for all 28 EU countries, but only for 16 older EU countries for
the relationship between environmental taxes and energy consumption the period 1992–2010). With respect to energy consumption as the
as well as the evidence on the EKC existence. dependent variable, Morley (2012) did not find any evidence of the
The second research strand is related to RFEC, which may be un- existence of the energy EKC in the EU for the period 1995–2006.
derstood as the synergic interplay between a socio-economic and a However, Pablo-Romero and Sanchez-Brada (2017) corroborated its
contextual domain (Borozan, 2018a). However, the majority of the existence for the residential sector for the period 1990–2013 by using a
previous studies on the relationship between energy taxes and RFEC multilevel mixed-effects model for parameter estimation. Borozan
failed to examine it within an integrated framework. They mostly fo- (2018b) confirmed the existence of the residential electricity EKC in
cused on economic determinants. A more integrated approach to its multivariate settings in the period 2005–2016.
studying requires an evaluation of the effects of economic, sociological, To summarize, the majority of empirically oriented studies have
institutional and contextual variables, i.e. the integration of knowledge already studied the effects of energy taxes, energy prices, GDP on RFEC
arising from different theoretical approaches: conventional economics including the existence of the EKC for the EU. But, they did that within
and behavioral economics as well as social and environmental psy- a narrow conceptual framework which primarily addressed economic
chology and sociology. For a review of these approaches, see Karatasou variables. No study has considered the possibility that the effects of
et al. (2014). regressors can be different across the conditional distribution of RFEC
According to conventional economics, individuals behave as ra- and in a more integrated framework.
tional and independent actors in a predictable way to policy-induced
measures, financial incentives and generally economic variables such as 3. Data and methodology
prices or income. They try to maximize utility and their own interest.
However, empirical studies demonstrated that they often behave and 3.1. Data and the empirical model
respond in unexpected, undesirable and irrational ways (Gillingham
et al., 2009). So, behavioral economics, enriched with psychological In this paper, the dependent variable is final energy consumption in
knowledge and empirical evidence, highlights the importance of com- households per capita (energy), as shown in equation (1). It includes
plexity, multiple choices, risk and uncertainty in explaining, predicting total energy consumed by households as final users. It is calculated by
and guiding consumer behavior including households towards more transforming RFEC expressed in 1000 tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) into
sustainable consumption patterns (Sterner and Koehlin, 2003). Social kilowatt hour (kWh), and then dividing by average population. Table 1
and environmental psychology emphasizes the role of information and (the first column) presents summary information on the data. The ex-
incentives, and more recently values, attitudes and norms in individual planatory variables cover the socio-economic and contextual domains:
decision making, including energy consumption (Sterner and Koehlin,
energy = f(prices, tax , gdp , poverty, educ , recession, climate ). (1)
2003; Alberini and Filippini, 2011). Moreover, findings in this field
indicate that individual consumer behavior also varies due to external Energy taxes (tax) refer to total energy tax revenues collected for a
conditions (e.g., financial, legal, social or climate) that directly and calendar year. They entered the model as a percentage of GDP. Energy
indirectly either support or hinder energy-related behavior (Labandeira prices (prices) are calculated as a weighted average of prices for elec-
et al., 2017). Environmental psychology and sociology consider energy tricity and natural gas for a medium-sized household. The shares of
use as a social phenomenon that can be studied at the household level. electricity and gas in total final energy consumption in households were
Thereby, particular macro-level societal factors such as education level taken as the weights. Tertiary education (educ) captures the percent of
or poverty also determine household energy use. population from 15 to 64 with tertiary education provided by uni-
Empirical studies covering the EU (e.g., Borozan, 2018a, 2018b) versities and other higher education institutions. The risk of poverty
confirm that human capital, labor market, poverty and economic (poverty) or social exclusion refers to the percentage of population who
variables are important drivers of energy consumption among socio- are either at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living in
economic determinants, while the context, presented through the level households with very low work intensity.
of economic development, the state of the economy and climate in Climate conditions (climate) and recession (recession) are the time-
particular, also play an important role within which decisions on energy varying dummy variables. The former were determined according to

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D. Borozan Energy Policy 129 (2019) 13–22

Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Symbol Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis VIF

Final energy consumption in households per capita (kWh per capita) energy 336 6791.42 2295.28 1815.79 13116.18 − 1.00 3.88 4.01
Real GDP per capita (const EUR) gdp 336 26523.32 17340.8 4379.77 91500.00 − 0.11 2.35 5.78
Energy prices for medium-sized households (const EUR_cents per kWh) prices 336 8.758 5.93 1.19 36.11 − 0.09 2.88 3.58
Tertiary education (% of population from 15 to 64 with tertiary education) educ 336 23.56 7.41 9.10 39.60 − 0.032 1.92 1.55
Recession dummy (1 if the years are 2008–2012; 0 otherwise) recession 336 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.34 1.11 1.04
Climate conditions (1 if a country has more than 4200 HDD; 0 otherwise) climate 336 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 2.76 8.61 1.32
Energy taxes (% of GDP) tax 336 1.94 0.46 1.12 3.32 0.72 3.31 1.20
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (%) poverty 336 24.98 8.58 13.30 61.30 1.48 5.63 2.35

Note: The missing values for the risk of poverty rate for Croatia (2005–2010) and Romania (2005–2006) were interpolated using STATA. Energy prices for Cyprus,
Finland, Malta (2005–2016) and Greece (2005–2012) refer to the weighted prices for electricity. The log form of the energy, gdp and price variables are used to
calculate VIF, skewness and kurtosis.

Lechtenboehmer and Schuering (2009), who outlined that a cold cli- is obtained by using the adaptive Markov Chain Monte Carlo procedure.
mate zone has more than 4200 heating degree days (HDD). The latter Because of the potential endogeneity problem in equation (3), the
was included into models to capture the Great Recession effect. empirical model is developed in a robust instrumental variable frame-
The monetary variables (GDP per capita and energy prices) were work (see Uyar and Uyar, 2018). To conduct a panel quantile regression
deflated by using the harmonized indices of consumer prices analysis, the user-written qregpd command by Baker et al. (2016) in
(2015 = 100) to remove the effect of inflation therefrom. All data were Stata 13.0 was used in this paper.
provided by Eurostat. The logarithmic values of the following variables
are used in further econometric analysis: energy, gdp and prices. The
study uses balanced panel data which observe the behavior of EU 4. Results with discussion
countries across time. Each country has its own specificities (individual
effects) and there is heterogeneity across countries; hence, the panel 4.1. Preliminary analysis
econometric technique is well suited to the paper aims as stated by
Borozan (2018b). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in
The observed period is 2005–2016 primarily due to data avail- empirical analysis. Considerable heterogeneity across EU countries can
ability. The data on the poverty variable has been available for most of be observed in the data. All variables are more or less skewed, which
the EU countries since 2005. additionally supports the usage of the quantile regression approach to
estimate the effect of independent variables on the quantiles of RFEC.
3.2. Method Specifically, RFEC per capita varies significantly across countries,
whereby more developed EU countries with colder climate use more
The present paper uses a nonadditive fixed effect panel quantile energy than less developed countries or countries with milder climate.
regression model to estimate the direct and indirect effects of energy In addition, energy prices as well as the share of highly educated people
taxes and other explanatory variables on RFEC throughout the condi- in total population are smaller in less developed EU countries. By
tional distribution. The quantile regression method was proposed by contrast, the percentage of people at risk of poverty is higher in this
Koenker and Bassett (1978). It is a generalization of mean regression group of EU countries.
analysis to other quantiles. Hence, it is a very useful method for in- Considering the dependent variable, the lower quantiles (i.e. below
vestigating asymmetric features of the variables of interest. The con- the 20th percentile), refer to countries with lower RFEC per capita such
ditional quantile of the dependent variable yi given a vector of re- as Malta, Portugal, Spain, Romania or Bulgaria. The quantiles between
gressors, xi, can be presented in the following way: the 20th and the 50th percentiles refer to countries such as Cyprus,
Greece, Croatia, Slovenia, Italy or Poland. The quantiles between the
Qyi ( x i) = x iT , (2) 50th and the 70th percentiles refer to countries such as the UK, the
Netherlands, France, the Czech Republic, while higher quantiles, i.e.
where the subscript i denotes an individual (i = 1, …, N), i.e. a country
above the 70th percentile, refer to countries such as Finland,
in this paper, β is the vector of parameters to be estimated and τ refers
Luxembourg, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden or Austria.
to the τ–th quantile, τ ϵ (0, 1). However, this method does not consider
Before conducting panel data analysis, a test for stationarity in a
the unobserved individual heterogeneity. Hence, panel quantile re-
panel dataset should be conducted. In this paper, stationarity is tested
gression was used in this paper. Based on the results of the Hausman
by the Levin-Lin-Chu test and the Pesaran CIPS test. Table A1 in the
test, a fixed effect model for regression is employed. Thereby, a con-
appendix presents their results. According to the former, all variables
ditional panel quantile regression model is given as follows:
are stationary at the 1% or 5% significance level during the sample
Qyit ( k i, x ii ) = i + xitT ( k ), i = 1, …, N ; t = 1, …, T , (3) period, while according to the latter, there is a doubt about the real
energy price and poverty variables. After we applied the additional test,
where N and T are the numbers of observations on the individual i and i.e. the Fisher-type Phillips-Peron unit root test, we decided to continue
the time t, respectively. αi stands for the unobserved individual het- with the variables at level. Powell (2016) observed that differencing,
erogeneity. The effects of the explanatory variables xit are permitted to which is valid in mean regressions, does not necessarily account for
depend upon the quantile τ of interest. To estimate the coefficients of fixed effects in a quantile framework.
explanatory variables, we applied the estimation method proposed by As presented in Table A2 in the appendix, there is no strong cor-
Powell (2016), QRPD with nonadditive fixed effects. This is a special relation between dependent variable and explanatory variables. This
case of the generalized quantile estimator. As stated by Powell (2016), reduces the possibility that regression results would be inconsistent and
this estimator solves an interpretation problem posed by an alternative biased. Correlation coefficients together with variance inflation factors
fixed-effect quantile estimator, allowing an arbitrary correlation be- (VIF) (Table 1, the last column) suggest that multicollinearity is not
tween the fixed effects and the instruments. Detailed information on the present in regression analysis.
method is given in Powell (2016). Numerical optimization in this paper

16
D. Borozan Energy Policy 129 (2019) 13–22

Table 2
Panel quantile regression results.
Independetn variable Estimated coefficients for different quantiles (dependent variable: ln(energy)

10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th

Model 1
ln(prices) 0.026*** − 0.390* − 0.440* − 0.414* − 0.478* − 0.320* − 0.367* − 0.353*
tax − 0.301 0.113* 0.086* 0.138* 0.090* 0.036 0.025 0.125***
ln(gdp) − 0.361 0.484* 0.570* 0.606* 0.628* 0.375* 0.484* 0.592*
Model 2
ln(prices) − 0.562* − 0.565* − 0.466* − 0.385* − 0.403* − 0.228* − 0.372* − 0.123* − 0.319*
tax 0.148* 0.124* 0.116* 0.095* 0.107* 0.063 0.140* 0.132* 0.073**
ln(gdp) 1.437* 2.266* 2.394* 1.292* 1.239* − 1.180*** 3.498* 0.195 0.648
ln(gdp2) − 0.044* − 0.085* − 0.092* − 0.039* − 0.033* 0.076** − 0.153* 0.001 − 0.007
Model 3
ln(prices) − 0.524* − 0.512* − 0.385* − 0.392* − 0.355* − 0.323* − 0.338* − 0.344* − 0.365*
tax 0.135* 0.129* 0.082* 0.061* 0.108* 0.074* 0.062* 0.001 − 0.019*
ln(gdp) 0.421* 0.488* 0.508* 0.514* 0.504* 0.401* 0.333* 0.325* 0.380*
poverty − 0.009* − 0.004* − 0.002* − 0.002** − 0.008* − 0.010* − 0.010* − 0.010* − 0.006**
educ 0.006* 0.006* 0.003* 0.003* 0.000 0.001* − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.003*
recession − 0.077 0.105* 0.060* 0.033 0.119* − 0.001 0.019 0.046* − 0.039
climate 0.228* 0.124* 0.292* 0.200* 0.175* 0.196* 0.378* 0.398* 0.403*
Wald test (p = 0.000) 24555.70 45589.22 52093.48 71321.16 99502.10 1.1e + 05 15982.72 1.0e + 05 36905.08
Model 4
ln(prices) − 0.509* − 0.549* − 0.451* − 0.400* − 0.336* − 0.332* − 0.303* − 0.320* − 0.393*
tax 0.120* 0.116* 0.111* 0.064* 0.057* 0.084* − 0.020 0.005 − 0.005
ln(gdp) 1.003* 1.922* 0.868* 0.295* 0.417* 0.824* − 1.090*** 0.330 1.208***
ln(gdp2) − 0.026** − 0.067* − 0.018** 0.010* 0.002 − 0.021* 0.071** − 0.002 − 0.043
poverty − 0.003* 0.001 − 0.004* − 0.006* − 0.006* − 0.009* − 0.002 − 0.011* − 0.008*
educ 0.007* 0.000 0.004* 0.002** 0.001* 0.000** 0.001 − 0.001*** 0.000
recession 0.059* 0.119* 0.093* 0.051* 0.070* 0.076* 0.179* 0.052* 0.018
climate 0.180* 0.180* 0.293* 0.261* 0.249* 0.234* 0.081 0.378* 0.373*
Wald test (p = 0.000) 2.7e + 05 65258.84 86521.40 62952.44 1.6e + 05 1.5e + 05 96684.54 18898.52 24283.46

Note: .
Parameter estimations were run in a robust instrumental variable framework in all models. The results are insignificant for Model 1, the 10th quantile.
* indicate significance at the 1% levels, respectively.
** indicate significance at the 5% levels, respectively.
*** indicate significance at the 10% levels, respectively.

4.2. Results economic and contextual variables plays a statistically significant role
across the whole distribution of RFEC.
For comparison purposes, empirical model (1) is first estimated by
the panel model with fixed effects and robust standard error (Model 1A 4.3. Discussion
and Model 3A). Their results are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix.
In short, real energy prices, poverty and tertiary education statistically The estimated coefficients of the share of energy tax in a GDP
negatively affect RFEC, while both dummy variables affect it positively. variable (tax) are significantly positive at lower quantiles, while they
The results corroborated the presence of individual heterogeneity and become insignificant at higher quantiles and negative at the 70th and
Hausman tests corroborated the application of panel regression models 90th percentiles. This implies that higher energy taxes increase energy
with fixed effects. However, the effects of regressors may follow a consumption in lower energy-consuming EU countries, which can be a
nonlinear pattern indicated by descriptive statistics, which may escape consequence of government efforts to achieve fiscal gains and at the
linear modeling. Thus, to consider distributional heterogeneity, panel same time mitigate the negative effects on low income households by
quantile regression models with nonadditive fixed effects were run. The using a broad set of subventions, exemptions or reduction schemes. By
results of four different models are presented in Table 2 for the contrast, in higher energy-consuming EU countries, i.e. at higher
10th–90th percentiles of the RFEC conditional distribution. Models 1 quantiles (the 70th and 90th percentiles), energy taxes lead to a de-
and 2 show the results only for main variables of interest, while Models crease in energy consumption; nevertheless, their effect is not statisti-
3 and 4 show the results for the full model specification presented by cally significant.
equation (1). Poor efficiency of energy or environmental taxes in European
Bearing in mind the aims of the paper, we consider the estimated countries has already been implicitly detected in the literature (e.g.,
coefficients from Model 4 to be the most reliable, particularly in the Ekins and Speck, 1999 for Western European countries in the 1990s,
case of statistically significant quadratic form of the gdp variable. Table Morley, 2012 for EU countries and Norway for the period 1995–2006 or
A3 in the appendix also presents the results of the pooled panel quantile Borozan, 2018b for the EU over the period 2005–2018). Lapinskiene
regression models (Models 2A and 4A). A comparison of the OLS and et al. (2017) provided evidence that higher energy taxes together with
quantile regression methods results supports the hypothesis on the ex- research and development and a number of sustainable enterprises
istence of distributional heterogeneity across countries. Moreover, it decreased the level of GHG in 20 EU countries in the period 2006–2013.
shows that the relationship between RFEC and selected regressors is Similarly, Kosonen and Nicodeme (2009) concluded that fiscal instru-
more complex than assumed in the literature so far. ments such as taxation may be important for achieving the EU energy
Different specifications of the panel quantile regression models with targets alone or in combination with other market-based instruments
nonadditive fixed effects, that were run to check for the robustness of and regulatory measures.
the results, corroborate generally the results obtained. The values of the This paper shows that energy tax is not efficient alone; changes in
joint Wald test statistics confirm the overall effect of both socio- energy policy measures are necessary therefor. Distributional

17
D. Borozan Energy Policy 129 (2019) 13–22

heterogeneity should not be ignored and energy policy should not apply same time, they should not support growth that goes to the environ-
the same policy mix to different levels of RFEC. mental determinant, expecting that after some point of time, environ-
In line with traditional economic theory, real energy prices affect mental damage will be compensated.
RFEC negatively at all quantiles of its conditional distribution. Technological innovations are extremely important for energy effi-
Compared with the fixed effects panel model (Table A3 in the ap- ciency improvements and growth and highly educated and trained
pendix), which estimates the real energy price elasticity of −0.18, labor force is of crucial importance therefor. In fixed effects panel
panel quantile regression models (3 and 4 in Table 2) yield a higher model results (Models 1A and 3A), tertiary education statistically sig-
absolute mean estimate of about −0.36. The effect is evidently stron- nificantly and negatively affects the dependent variable which supports
gest in EU countries with lower level of energy consumption, while it the hypothesis that more educated people behave in a more en-
becomes weaker in more developed EU countries, i.e. countries whose vironmentally friendly way and consume less energy. Though, in panel
households consume more energy. quantile Models 3 and 4, the effect is not as straightforward. At almost
Surveying the literature, Labandeira et al. (2017) found out that the all quantiles, except the highest one, the results show that people with
price elasticity of energy products in the short-run ranges between tertiary education rebound; although they probably have higher dis-
−0.09 and −0.76. The same authors also performed a meta-analysis posable income and better financial capacities to realize energy re-
for energy demand from around the world for the period 1990–2014 duction and the energy efficiency improvement potential than less
and unveiled that, on average, the short-run price elasticity amounted educated people or poorer people, they demand more energy services
to −0.2. Consistently with the results of the present paper, they ob- (Borozan, 2018a). Moreover, tertiary education turned out to have a
served that price elasticities of energy demand are significantly higher very weak influence on RFEC in all models. Borozan (2018b) concluded
in developing countries compared with their more developed peers. that the favorable effect of tertiary education on electricity consump-
Moreover, they concluded that price elasticities of energy demand are tion must be strengthened by policy measures such as, for example,
quite similar among different energy products. Espey and Espey (2004) fostering intensive awareness-raising programs on electricity appliance
carried out a meta-analysis for residential electricity demand from labels or green energy and energy efficiency educational workshops and
around the world over the period 1947–1997 and reported that the programs in schools. The other studies covering the EU have also
short-run price elasticity amounted to −0.35. Azevedo et al. (2011) confirmed a significant effect of education level on pro-environmental
found out that the short-term price elasticity for residential electricity behavior and/or energy use (e.g., Meyer, 2015).
demand was −0.2 for the EU in the period 1990–2004, while Borozan Recently, energy poverty has started to attract more attention in the
(2018b) provided evidence of very low price elasticity of residential EU energy literature. Auci and Trovato (2018) and Mazur et al. (2015)
electricity consumption in the EU (around −0.1) in the period provided evidence that some areas within Europe, particularly in
2005–2016. Central Eastern and South Europe, are also deprived of access to a se-
Low estimated values of energy price elasticity for different per- cure supply of clean and affordable energy, and that their choice of fuel
centiles of the conditional distribution of RFEC suggest that energy is more limited. This paper shows that the effect of the poverty variable
policy cannot be effective from the environmental and social point of on RFEC is significantly negative at all quantiles except in Model 4,
view in the short-run. An increase in energy prices caused by policy- particularly the 20th and 70th percentiles, where it turns out to be
induced measures such as an increase in the energy tax rate or exo- insignificant. Still, the magnitude of this effect is small regardless of the
genous factors will not provoke a considerable decrease in energy quantiles considered. The recession made the economic situation even
consumption. Namely, it seems that households will not have much worse, particularly for low income and other vulnerable households. It
incentive to invest in energy efficient or energy conservation innova- did not leave a lot of room for considerable financial investments in
tions to decrease energy consumption, as Borozan (2018b) already energy efficiency improvements and innovations. However, it turns out
pointed out. that this variable positively influences RFEC across most of the quan-
As for real GDP per capita, its estimated coefficients are significantly tiles. This could be a result of the government assistance programs and
positive at all quantiles. This may be a result of the rebound effect, measures designed and implemented at different levels (local, regional,
which assumes that improvements in energy efficiency caused by national, EU) to mitigate the consequence of the hard economic situa-
technological innovations and higher GDP lead to an increase in de- tion. For a review of energy poverty polices and measures in the EU, see
mand for energy. The rebound effect is stronger at lower quantiles, Bouzarovski (2018). Further research should check this relationship
probably because of greater unsatisfied demand for energy, which and explore more deeply the reasons therefor.
could stem from a greater elasticity of energy demand to energy price Finally, it can be observed that the estimated coefficients of the
changes. It is observed from Models 2 and 4 that an increase in real GDP climate variable are statistically significantly positive throughout the
per capita leads to greater energy consumption rather than to energy conditional distribution (except in the 70th percentile in Model 4),
reduction, which also suggests the presence of the rebound effect. implying that households in countries with colder climate (e.g.,
Furthermore, negative coefficients of the ln(gdp2) variable in Model 4 Finland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden or Austria) use more energy
are significant at lower quantiles supporting thereby the inverted U- than households in countries with milder climate. The effect of colder
shaped energy EKC hypothesis. In countries with lower RFEC, it in- climate on energy consumption is already observed in the literature
creases up to a certain level as real GDP goes up; after that, it decreases. (e.g., Kavousian et al., 2013; Borozan, 2018a, 2018b), and hence it is
By contrast, at higher quantiles, the validity of this hypothesis is not not unexpected.
clear. This finding is not completely consistent with Mazur et al. (2015), In a nutshell, the quantile panel regression models indicate that
who corroborated the existence of the EKC only for 16 older EU energy tax generates more fiscal than environmental gains across al-
countries for the period 1992–2010, but not for the newer EU countries, most all levels of RFEC. In this form, it seems it is not an effective policy
or with Pablo-Romero and Sanchez-Brada (2017) and Borozan (2018b), tool for decreasing RFEC directly and hence achieving the double di-
who supported its validity in the EU by empirical data. However, all of vidend. However, its efficiency can be increased if the governments use
them assessed the mean effect, and the existence of distributional het- collected energy tax revenues for example, to invest or support research
erogeneity may be one reason for mixed results. EU countries with and development of new, energy-efficient technologies and practices. A
different levels of RFEC per capita evidently follow a different growth negative sign of the estimated coefficient for the energy tax variable for
path which has to be respected by policy authorities. However, at the the highest quantile of RFEC speaks in favor of this hypothesis. Namely,

18
D. Borozan Energy Policy 129 (2019) 13–22

this quantile includes countries such as Finland, Sweden, Denmark or while for the higher quantiles the results are not clear. The results also
Belgium that are well known as countries whose governments devel- show that people with tertiary education rebound at almost all quan-
oped and implemented a range of environmental revenue recycling tiles, except the highest one. However, it turned out that their effect on
policies and measures (see Anderson, 2010; Oueslati et al., 2016). RFEC is weak as well the effect of the risk of the poverty variable.
Further research should examine the impacts of alternative tax revenue Poverty and hard economic times require special energy policy pro-
recycling options. grams and measures. Climate conditions affect RFEC and this paper
As a policy-induced instrument, energy tax increases prices of en- demonstrated that their effect is predominantly statistically sig-
ergy services, making them more expensive. Many governments are nificantly positive throughout the conditional distribution, implying
hoping that this will encourage households to use energy in a more that households in countries with colder climate use more energy than
rational way. However, in the short-run, an increase in energy prices those in countries with milder climate.
will not motivate enough households to conduct energy-efficient or It is plausible to assume that final energy consumption in each
energy-saving innovations regardless of the quantiles considered. country is heterogeneously distributed as income and welfare are in
Energy is irreplaceable in the life of households and RFEC is energy- general. Hence, the effect of energy taxes on RFEC might be different at
price inelastic in the short-run. To change energy consumption behavior different household income and consuming levels. This paper in-
towards more sustainable energy practices, energy and environmental vestigated the effect of distributional heterogeneity of RFEC across EU
policy should combine energy taxes with other measures such as countries in a multivariate framework, but further research should test
stronger energy efficiency standards like building codes or energy ap- the validity of this hypothesis in other economic sectors, regions or
pliance standards, particularly in more developed EU countries, as countries with different ambitions considering energy and environ-
shown in this paper. At the same time, they should take care of low mental goals.
income households since these measures are an additional economic Confirming the existence of heterogeneity in the conditional dis-
burden to them. Poverty, including energy poverty, is omnipresent to a tribution of RFEC, the results imply several policy implications. First, to
greater or lesser extent. However, informational, educational and achieve the energy targets, the EU energy policy authorities have to
awareness-raising programs on energy efficiency and energy savings in design different programs for different energy-consuming groups of
households are always needed, particularly in low income households, countries. Further research should provide a useful classification of
since they empower households with human capital without jeo- these countries that takes into account socio-economic and contextual
pardizing their quality of life. For a review of policy targets, measures variables. Second, considering the existence of the energy EKC in less
and progress regarding household energy use, see Eichhammer and energy-consuming countries, governments should empower economic
Lapillone (2015), European Commission (EC, 2016) and European En- growth and development and ensure their energy greening across dif-
vironment Agency (EEA, 2018). ferent stages of their development path. Several measures that can be
tailored to that end are mentioned in continuation as additional policy
5. Conclusions and policy implications implications. Third, to be more efficient and effective from the eco-
nomic and ecological point of view, energy taxes, which gain seemingly
In this paper, the relationship between energy taxes, including other more fiscal benefits than environmental ones due to inelastic energy
important socio-economic and contextual variables, and the conditional prices in the short-run, particularly in less energy-consuming countries,
distribution of the RFEC variable was investigated for EU countries in should be recycled in a more environmental way. Its efficiency can be
the period 2005–2016. Most previous studies that examined this re- increased if governments use these revenues, for example, to invest or
lationship failed to do that in a multivariate setting and particularly support research and development of new energy-efficient technologies
consider distributional heterogeneity of RFEC. However, the results are and practices. Further research should discover the effects of different
likely biased if the model considers only institutional or economic recycling options. To change energy usage behavior towards more
variables. Moreover, the effects of these variables on the mean of the sustainable energy practices, energy and environmental policy should
RFEC distribution are incomplete in the presence of distributional combine energy taxes with other measures such as stronger energy ef-
heterogeneity. Since the effects of energy taxes and other important ficiency standards, particularly in more developed EU countries.
variables vary across countries over time and along the conditional Fourth, although the paper shows that people with tertiary education
RFEC distribution, the usage of the quantile panel regression model to rebound more at lower levels of energy consumption and that the effect
examine the relationship of interest is justified in this paper. By looking is generally weak across quantiles and even negative and insignificant
at different points of the distribution of the RFEC variable, a more at the highest quintile, empowering human capital is not an option with
comprehensive picture of the effects of socio-economic and contextual alternatives. Human capital is of crucial importance not only for new
variables thereon is achieved. technological developments and innovations, but also for its usage in
The results show that the share of energy tax in the GDP variable practice. Hence, informational, educational and awareness-raising
significantly increases energy consumption in lower energy-consuming programs on energy efficiency and energy savings in households are at
EU countries, while at higher quantiles, it leads to a decrease in energy least equally required as an increase in investments in advanced energy-
consumption, but not significantly. However, it increases the price of efficient technologies and innovation to decrease RFEC without threa-
energy and influences RFEC. This effect is stronger in EU countries with tening the quality of life. Finally, knowledge on new energy technolo-
a lower level of RFEC and it is weaker in richer EU countries, i.e. gies and sustainable practices should be shared across countries and
countries whose households consume more energy. A decrease in RFEC energy policy authorities should create a supportive and encouraging
and consequently an environmental effect that may occur with an in- environment for its transfer and knowledge sharing as well as an in-
crease in energy prices will not be of great magnitude since RFEC is crease in absorptive capacity in their countries. Further research should
energy-price inelastic in the short-run. By contrast, an increase in RFEC address this topic.
will be stronger with an increase in real GDP per capita at all quantiles.
A positive effect of real GDP per capita may be a result of the rebound Declarations of interest
effect that becomes weaker at higher quantiles. Moreover, the inverted
U-shaped energy EKC is validated, particularly for the lower quantiles, None.

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D. Borozan Energy Policy 129 (2019) 13–22

Appendix

See Appendix Table A1–A3.

Table A1
Stationarity test results.
Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test Pesaran (2007) CIPS test

Constant only Constant + trend Constant only Constant + trend

Adjusted t*stat p-value Adjusted t*stat p-value Zt-bar stat p-value Zt-bar stat p-value

ln(energy) − 8.2028 0.000 − 10.0686 0.000 − 0.003 0.499 − 1.475 0.070


ln(prices) 1st difference − 2.9954 0.0014 − 6.1078 0.000 − 1.758 0.039 − 0.302 0.381
− 0.362 0.359 1.414 0.921
Fisher-PP: Fisher-PP: Fisher-PP: Fisher-PP:
− 0.3543 0.3616 − 0.3962 0.3460
tax − 1.9274 0.0270 − 10.6402 0.000 − 0.982 0.163 1.204 0.886
poverty 1st difference − 6.2667 0.000 − 8.9342 − 1.916 0.028 − 2.241 0.013
− 0.563 0.287 − 0.665 0.253
Fisher-PP: Fisher-PP: Fisher-PP:
− 5.0048 0.0000 − 1.3277 0.0921
educ − 5.6141 0.000 − 11.2721 0.000 − 0.722 0.235 1.285 0.901
ln(Y) − 13.3522 0.000 − 12.8018 0.000 2.334 0.990 1.717 0.957

Note: H0 for CIPS tests: series is I(1), while H0 for LLC test: panels contain unit roots. The stationarity is also tested by the Fisher-type Phillips-Peron unit root test. Its
statistics refers to inverse normal, and H0 is: all panels contain unit roots. To mitigate the effect of cross-sectional correlation which may appear because EU countries
share some similarities, the version of the test with the removed cross-sectional means was employed.

Table A2
Pearson correlation coefficients.
Variable energy prices tax gdp poverty educ recession climate

energy 1.000
prices − 0.2147* 1.000
tax 0.1159* − 0.2847* 1.000
gdp 0.5340* 0.5520* − 0.2511* 1.000
poverty − 0.4304* − 0.4617* 0.1817* − 0.7296* 1.000
educ 0.3912* 0.2215* − 0.099 0.5229* − 0.2888* 1.000
recession 0.0493 0.0291 − 0.0611 − 0.0125 − 0.0353 − 0.07 1.000
climate 0.3265* 0.095 0.0623 0.1617* − 0.1907* 0.2924* 0.0548 1.000

* indicates significance at the 5% level.

Table A3
Panel quantile regression results.
Model 1A (fixed effects panel model) Model 2A (pooled panel quantile model)

Estimated coeff. Robust std.err. Estimated coefficients for different quantiles

Independent variables 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th

* * * * * * * * *
ln(prices) − 0.174 0.035 − 0.513 − 0.507 − 0.434 − 0.393 − 0.362 − 0.341 − 0.339 − 0.350 − 0.362*
tax 0.023 0.029 0.173* 0.134* 0.113* 0.100* 0.102* 0.086* 0.071* 0.004 − 0.029***
ln(gdp) 0.102 0.068 0.487* 0.491* 0.521* 0.487* 0.455* 0.395* 0.358* 0.310* 0.335*
poverty − 0.003*** 0.001 − 0.004*** − 0.004 − 0.004** − 0.006* − 0.008* − 0.010* − 0.011* − 0.011* − 0.010*
educ − 0.006** 0.002 0.008* 0.006*** 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 − 0.001 0.000 − 0.001
recession 0.040* 0.006 0.056*** 0.068*** 0.080* 0.068* 0.060* 0.045** 0.023 0.047** 0.054*
climate 0.038* 0.010 0.151* 0.143 0.247* 0.190* 0.208* 0.236* 0.389* 0.384* 0.378*
const 8.242* 0.715 4.194* 4.359* 4.155* 4.544* 4.921* 5.604* 6.098* 6.778* 6.645*
Pseudo R2 0.4079a 0.6072 0.5589 0.5418 0.5212 0.4947 0.4644 0.4417 0.4342 0.4488
Hausman test 71.53; p = 0.000
(continued on next page)

20
D. Borozan Energy Policy 129 (2019) 13–22

Table A3 (continued)

Model 1A (fixed effects panel model) Model 2A (pooled panel quantile model)

Estimated coeff. Robust std.err. Estimated coefficients for different quantiles

Independent variables 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th

Model 3A (fixed effects panel model) Model 4A (pooled panel quantile model)
ln(prices) − 0.175* 0.035 − 0.523* − 0.538* − 0.446* − 0.392* − 0.357* − 0.338* − 0.352* − 0.364* − 0.368*
Tax 0.022 0.029 0.166* 0.131* 0.110* 0.101* 0.095* 0.088* 0.076* 0.010 − 0.015
ln(gdp) 0.496 0.880 0.981 1.734*** 0.819 0.372 0.903 0.589 1.512*** 1.101* 1.775*
ln(gdp2) − 0.020 0.044 − 0.024 − 0.059 − 0.015 0.006 − 0.023 − 0.010 − 0.056 − 0.038** − 0.071**
poverty − 0.003** 0.001 − 0.003 − 0.002 − 0.003 − 0.006* − 0.007* − 0.010* − 0.009* − 0.010* − 0.009*
educ − 0.006** 0.002 0.008* 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 − 0.003 − 0.001 − 0.003
recession 0.039* 0.006 0.066** 0.063** 0.069* 0.070* 0.067* 0.038*** 0.030 0.039*** 0.052*
climate 0.041* 0.012 0.137* 0.139 0.258* 0.188* 0.210* 0.244* 0.404* 0.394* 0.388**
const 6.301 4.440 1.689 − 2.040 2.668 5.114** 2.702 4.622 0.163 2.688 − 0.600
Pseudo R2 0.4086 a
0.6078 0.5623 0.542 0.5212 0.4956 0.4646 0.4438 0.4377 0.4525
Hausman test 71.53; p = 0.000

Note:
The dependent variable is ln(energy). A robust standard error was used in models 1A and 3A to account for the possible problem of heteroscedastic and autocorrelated
error structure.
* indicate significance at the 1% levels, respectively.
** indicate significance at the 5% levels, respectively.
*** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
a
denotes R2 within statistics.

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