Social Change

Author(s): Morris Ginsberg

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sep., 1958), pp. 205-229
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 SOCIAL CHANGE*
MorrisGinsberg

Y SOCIAL CHANGE I understanda change in social

Kstructure, e.g. the size of a society,the compositionor balance
Jof its parts or the type of its organization.Examplesof such
changes are the contractionin the size of the family,or rather the
domesticunit, which has occurredand is occurringin manysocieties,
the breakingup of the domainaleconomywith the rise of cities, the
transitionfrom'estates'to socialclasses,or to go backto earlierstages,
the growthof a systemof publiclyadministered justicereplacingformer
personalor groupretaliation.The termsocialchangemustalsoinclude
changesin attitudesor beliefs,in so far as they sustaininstitutionsand
changewith them. The field of inquiryis thus very wide. Here I am
concernedwith certain fundamentalproblemsinvolved in all socio-
logical and historicalanalysis,but requiringreformulationfrom time
to timein the lightof currentthought.I havein mindsuchquestionsas
the following:is it true that in the last resortchangesare to be traced
backto desiresor purposesor, perhaps,unconsciousdrivesin individual
minds?If the real agentsare alwaysindividuals,what significanceis
to be attachedto the phrase'socialforces'?Are theseconcatenationsof
individualdesiresor volitionsas modifiedby interaction?Or is causal
agencyto be ascribedto changesin socialstructureconceivedas bring-
ing about other changes?Finally, there is the problemof teleology.
Changesoccurin societieswhich look as if they were designed,but in
fact have not been designed or foreseen.How do such functional
changes occur, and how are they related to consciouslydirected
changes?
These questionsin their turn suggestothersof an epistemological
kind, such as the natureof historicaland sociologicalexplanationand,
in particular,the questionas to the significanceof the causalrelation-
shipas usedin the socialsciences.In theirearlystagesthe socialsciences
had to make a case for the view that social phenomenawere subject
to laws, and this easilyled them to assumethat the laws they were in
searchof wereakinto the lawsof the naturalsciences.This, I takeit, is
* The Herbert Spencer Lecture, dcliveredat O>cSord
on the 27th February I958.
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 MORRIS GINSBERG

what is meant by the 'positivist'or 'naturalistic'trend in the social

sciences.In reactionagainstthistrendtherehavebeenrecurrentmove-
mentsof thoughtstressingthe independenceor autarchyof history,or
else maintainingmore generallythat the natural sciences and the
sciencesof culturedifferradicallyin aim and method.In Germanythis
movementfoundpowerfulexpressiontowardsthe end of the last cen-
tury and the beginningof this centuryin the workof such writersas
Windelband,Rickert,Dilthey,Troeltsch.In this countrythe problem
was very fully discussedby Collingwoodand is now againbeing taken
up vigorously both by philosophersand by the social scientists
themselves.
The movementhas many strains difficultto disentangle.It has
sufferedgreatly,I think, from the use of vague termslike positivism,
naturalism,determinismand, in particular,from the tendency of
methodologiststo tell historiansand socialscientistsdehautenbaswhat
it is that they are supposedto be doingratherthan to inquirewhat in
fact they actuallydo. In manytreatiseson historiography the number
of examplesof actual historicalinvestigationsis often very small. In
Rickert'sKulturwissenschaft undJ%aturwissenschaftthe only exampledis-
cussedat all fully is basedon a comparisonbetweenv. Baer'sstudyof
the developmentof the chick in the egg with Ranke'swork on the
Popesof the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturies,designedto illustrate
the diffierence betweenthe studyof repeatableand uniqueevents.The
impressionconveyed is that we can safely assume without further
inquirythat the sciencesof culturedo not in fact deal with recurrent
events. Perhapsa case can be made for this, but it is certainlynot
obvious.The use of termslike 'naturalists','determinists',again,makes
for much unrealpolemics.Men of straware thus erectedwhich it is
easy to knockdown. The Frenchsociologists,e.g. Comte and Durk-
heim, are often said to favour a 'naturalistic'approach.But if this
meansthat in the view of these sociologistssocial facts are similarin
natureto the facts dealt with by the physicalsciences,the claim will
not standa minute'sinvestigation.Comte'sclassification of the sciences
implies that there are differentlevels of being, each level having its
own laws. It is, he thought,'materialism'to interpretthe laws of the
higher levels in termsof the lower. The dynamicagenciesto which
Comteappealsin his analysisof socialdevelopmentare the instinctive
and emotionaldrives,egoisticand altruistic,guidedor directedby the
intellectualfaculties.His fundamentallawsof socialchangeare lawsof
mental evolution,though he did not think that these were psycho-
logicallaws, if by this was meantlaws that could be reachedby intro-
spection.They certainlywerenot lawsof 'nature'if this meansthe laws
of physicsor biology.The use of the term 'naturalist'in referenceto
Durkheimis equallyinapt. When he bids socialinvestigatorsto treat
social facts 'comme des choses',he is far from assertingthat they are
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 SOCIAL CHANGE
'material'.He is ratherwarningthem againstthe idea that the nature
of socialfactscan be ascertainedby lookingwithin,or that the functions
of socialinstitutionsare necessarilyidenticalwith the ideaswe have of
their ends or purposes.His view of 'collectiverepresentations' implies
a conceptionof societyas spiritualor mentalin character,thoughthe
laws governingthem cannot be reachedby introspectivepsychology.
His theoryhas much in commonunththeoriesof emergentevolution,
societiesconstitutingin his view a new level of beingwith lawsof their
own, not reducibleto the laws of biologyor of individualpsychology.
I think, further, that neither Comte nor Durkheimcan be fairly
regardedas determinists.Consistentlyor not, they are both moralists
believingthat social changescan and ought to be directedor guided
by moralideals.
To take another example, Spencer is often included among the
'determinists'.Yet he carefullyexplainsthat his theorythat institutions
evolvein conformitywith generallawsdoes not imply that the human
will is not an importantfactorin social evolution.The institutionsof
a peopleand the characterof its membersact and reacton eachother.
A changein the characterof the memberswill tend to be reflectedin
a change in the insti;utions,while converselychangesin institutions
will sooneror later affectthe characterof the members.Sincechanges
in the characterof individualscan only affectinstitutionsin so far as
they are expressedin action, it follows that the voluntary acts of
individualsare an importantfactorin bringingabout changesin the
structureof societies.l
Whetherthey are deterministsor not, historiansand socialscientists
alikecertainlyuse the languageof causality.Thus historiansof popula-
tionaskwhethertherewasa causalconnectionin the nineteenthcentury
betweenthe rate of populationgrowthand fluctuationsin economic
prosperity,and what it was that happenedin I880 to breakthe con-
nection.2A historianof Englishcivilizationis found to be asserting,
for example,that the e,ffiectof the NormanConquestwas to bringEng-
land back to the orbit of Latin cultureand to removethe chance of
Englanddevelopingan Anglo-Saxonlife of its own, or play a part as
a member of a ScandinavianEmpire. BertrandRussell, sceptical
though he may be of the value of the concept of causationto the
physicalsciences,has no hesitatiotlin using it in his study of social
dynamics,and he evenventuresto assignthe 'causes'of sucha complex
entity as the decay of liberalism.3Negativeassertionsare of interestin
this connectionas, for example,when it is arguedthat overpopulation
is not a causeof migration,or of war;4or when it is concludedthat the
riseof the rateof crimein a given areais not connectedwith the racial
compositionof the area.
In approachingthe problemsof the nature of social causation,I
shouldliketo beginbyputtingforwardcertainpreliminary observations.
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 MORRIS GINSBERG
(i) Firstly, in dealing with social changes historiansand social
scientistshave to face the same sort of problemsand are in searchof
the same sortsof explanation.When, for example,a historianasserts
that the risein populationratein Englandfrom I 760onwardswas due
mainlyto a fall in the death rate, broughtabout by improvementsin
medicalscienceand practice,and to betterliving conditionsattribut-
able to risingproduction,he is not doinganythingdifferentfromwhat
the demographerattemptsto do in explaininga contemporaryrise in
populationamongpeoplesnow in the earlystagesof industrialization.
It is true that the historianis not interestedin establishinggeneral-
izationsabout the rise of populations,but in determiningwhat hap-
pened in the periodunderreview.But in so far as he is able to specify
the conditionsinvolved,his statementis capableof being generalized,
or at least of suggestingexplanationsof populationincreasesin similar
circumstanceselsewhere.
(ii) It seemsto me that, as usedin historyand in the socialsciences,
causalityis not taken to consistin regularityof succession.Historians
quite frequentlybelieve that they have establisheda real connection
between events in a particularcase without claimingto have estab-
lisheda generalization.Likewisein the socialsciencesand in practical
life, regularityof succession,so farfrombeingidenticalwith causation,
rathersuggestsa searchfor causes.If we find,forexample,that changes
in the marriagerateare associatedwith changesin the volumeof trade
we do not forthwithasserta casual relation,but proceedto look for
factorsmediatingthe connection.Of course, the regularrecurrence
of a successionis importantin the discoveryof causalconnections;it
is one of the signsby whichwejudge that the causalrelationis present;
but the relationitself does not consistin the regularrepetitionof a
succession.On the contrary,whetheran eventoccursrarely,frequently
or constantlydependson the complexof the conditionswhich link it
to its causeand the rarity,frequencyor constancyof theseconditions.
(iii) Historiansare apt to considerthat the facts of historyare in
essencepsychologicalfacts.5The reactionagainst'naturalism'among
the Germanphilosophersreferredto above was in part due to the
importancethey attachedto mental causes. Troeltsch,for example,
arguedthat in the historicalspherenearlyeverythingpassesthrough
the mediumof consciousness andturnsuponthe interactionof conscious
efforts,in which, however,unconsciouselementsmay be absorbed.
Historians,of course,are frequentlyengagedin searchingout motives,
and this not only in diplomaticor politicalor militaryhistory,but also
in dealing with massivelarge-scalemovements.For examplein dis-
cussing the 'causes'of the Arab expansionin the seventh century,
Fisheris mainlyconcernedto disentanglemotives.Was the expansion
duc, he asks,to a desireto extendthe faith?If this is unlikelyin view
of the factthat in the carlystagesthe conquerorsdo not appearto have
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 SOCIAL CHANGE
been anxiousto make converts,can it be that the motive was just
plunder,and that findingvictoryeasy they were led to extend their
operationsand to maketheirempire'as otherstateshave madethem',
blindly?Thisis the explanationfinallyadopted,thoughit is addedthat
religiongave the movementcohesionand an impetuswhich it other-
wise would have lacked.6In this, as in other exampleswhich could
readilybe multiplied,historiansrely on implicitor unstatedgeneral-
izationsaboutthe motivesof behaviour.This, however,doesnot mean
that in their view historyis applied psychology.The psychologyis
that of daily life, usingmaximswidelyacceptedthoughfar frombeing
scientificallytested, or else appealingto a sort of insightinto human
nature,akin to that of the artistor of great statesmenendowedwith
the powerof knowingand understandingmen. As Bloch has pointed
out, historiansare not nearlyas carefulin checkingtheirpsychological
assumptionsas they are in ascertainingwhetheror not a particular
event has taken place, though it does not follow that they are
necessarilywrongin the attributionsthey make.
In so far as mentalfactorsplay a partin socialchange,socialcausa-
tion is in importantrespectsdifferentfromnaturalcausation.It is easy
to see, for example, that motives are not measurablein terms of
identical units, and that their comparablestrengthcannot be stated
in generalterms.Thus economicmotivesmay prevail over religious
motives,or nationalsentimentsmay prove more powerfulthan eco-
nomic interests,but, equally, they may not, and we cannottell how
many 'units'of the one will prevailover how many unitsof the other.
Again, as has frequentlybeen noted, in dealingwith motivesthere is
no law of the compositionof forces,sincesome of the motivesmay be
deprivedof any effect on action throughthe act of choice. In group
actionwe are nowherenear a knowledgeof the variousways in which
motivesmay be compounded,say in situationsof conflict,co-operation
or compromise.The processesof interactionare very complexand the
resultsvery differentfromthe transformation of energyin the physical
world.
(iv) By cause, I understanda set of factorsjointly sufficientand
necessaryto the productionof the effect.In practicallife we are usually
not interestedin statingall the conditionsmakingup the set, but single
out those which are, so to say, decisive. In some investigations,for
example,in medicine,a distinctionis sometimesdrawnbetweenproxi-
mate, excitingand predisposingcauses,or between'true' causesand
auxiliary.Thus in dealingwith tuberculosis,the causeis the tubercle
bacillus and the conditionsthose which favour infection,or lower
resistanceto infection.Whichconditionsare takenas decisivedepends
to a large extent on the perspectiveof the inquiry.Strictlythe cause
includesthe entireset of conditions.Butin practicemanyconditionsare
not specifiedeither because,being commonlypresent,they are taken
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 MORRIS GINSBERG

for granted,or becausethe phenomenaare so complexthat many of

the conditionsremainundeterminedand may evenbe undeterminable.
These are all familiarpoints. I mentionthem becausethey are of
specialrelevancein consideringthe causalrole of desires,voliiionsor
unconsciousmentaldrivesin the analysisof social changes.I take it
that no one seriouslydoubtsthat mentalfactorsare part conditionsor
causefactorsin socialchange.13utwhat is sometimesforgottenis that
they requirethe presenceof otherfactorsto be effective.Mentalpro-
cessesdo not occurin a racuum.They implya changein the situation,
internalor external,which acts as a stimulus.These changesin the
situationmustbe consideredas causefactors,sinceuponthemdepends
whichof the manypossiblereactionsshalloccurand in whatform.We
arenot entitledto relegatethe situationalfactorsto the rankof auxiliary
or precipitating.The weight to be attached to the differentcause
factorsmustclearlydependupon the natureof the availableevidence,
in each case.
A case in point is the hypothesisofferedby somepsycho-analysts of
the causesof war. They drawa distinctionbetweenthe economicand
politicalfactors,which they tend to consideras secondary,and the
psychologicalfactor,whichthey regardas 'fundamental'. But it is very
hard to see on what groundsgreaterweight is attachedto repressed
aggressionthan to, say, differencesin the level of economicdevelop-
ment betweencountries,which tend to encourageexpansionistten-
denciesand frictionsconnectedtherewith.In regardto motivationit is
abundantlyclearthat verysimilarmotiveswill expressthemselvesvery
differentlyin differentsocial structures.It has, for example, been
repeatedlyshownthat while economicrivalriesbetweenstatesare apt
to generatefrictionsconduciveto war, similar clashes of economic
interestbetweenlocalitieswithin a state produceno such effect.The
intensityof the competitivemotivemay be the samein the two cases,
but the behaviouris differentas we mourefrom one form of political
organizationto another.As faras thepsycho-analytic hypothesisis con-
cerned, we need to know how societiesdiffer from one anotherin
respectof the amountand intensityof repressionto whichthey subject
their membersand whetherthereis an ascertainablerelationbetween
such repressionand inter-groupconflict. For example, is there any
differencein amountor intensityof unconscioustensionbetween,say,
the Scandinavianpeoplesand the people of the Netherlands?If such
differencesexist, are they in any way relatedto the fact that the Nor-
wegiansand the Swedesmanagedto settle their disputesby peaceful
negotiationswhilethe Belgiansand the Dutchfoughta war?Or again,
can it be shownthat the declinein the intensityof warsin the eigh-
teenth and nineteenthcenturies,as comparedwith the fifteenthand
sixteenth,and the markedincreasein the twentieth,were correlated
with a correspondingrise and decline of inner tensionsin the indi-
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 SOCIAL CHANGE
mdualsconcerned?If suchinnertensionsarecausefactorsof war,it has
to be shownwith what other causefactorsthey have to be linkedto
issue in war, and it is quite arbitraryto dismissthese otherfactorsas
secondary.The problemis to showin whatwayseconomicandpolitical
factorsintertwineto produceconditionsof tensionor to arouselatent
tensions. Similar considerationsapply to the study of the rise of
nationalistmovements.Like wars, they no doubt originate 'in the
mindsof men', and a psychologicalanalysisof nationalistsentiments
is thereforenecessaryand important.But referenceto basic social
impulsesor to the need of stabilityand securityor devotionto a cause
or beinggreaterthan ourselves,will not accountfor the differentforms
of nationalismor for its formidablestrengthin moderntimes.
(v) In many investigationsit is naturalto take the individualand
his motivesas a datum. Yet even in economics,as F. H. Knight has
shown,7thishasits limitations.The theoryof marketcompetitionstarts
with the individual'stastesand wantsand productivecapacity.But the
tastes and wants are socially conditionedand productivecapacity
involvesnot only personalqualitiesas developedin a given environ-
ment, but externalagentsand materialsowned, recognizedand pro-
tectedby the existinglegal order.The family,the stateand evenlarger
unitsare importantnot only as interestgroupsbut in helpingto shape
the individualas a functioningunit. In any case economistswould
hardly regard their disciplineas a branch of psychology.They are
concernednot with the play of motivesas suchbut with resultsof given
psychologicalconditionsas they operateupon numbersof men in their
dealingswith one anotherwhenthe meansavailablefor the satisfaction
of needsarescarce.In othersocialsciencesthe mainconcernis not with
the intentionsof individuals,but with structuralrelationsin their
bearingon individuals.But we knowvery little of the way changesin
motivationcome about, or why certainmentalforcescome into play
at certainperiods,or certain types of characterdominatethe social
sceneat certaintimesandnot at others.It seemsthat the socialsciences,
includingpsychology,have not been historicalenough, and history
has not kept close enoughtouch with the socialsciences.The resultis
that our knowledgeof the ever-changingtensionsbetweenindividual
personalityand the collectivelife, which might furnishthe basis for
a theoryof socialdynamics,is still in its infancy.

II
Withthesegeneralconsiderations in mind,I shouldliketo bringout,
in the light of examplesdrawnfromdifferentfieldsof inquiry,the kind
of explanationsthat have in fact been offeredof socialchangesand, in
particular,the sortof factorsto whichcausalagencyhasbeenattributed
by competentauthorities.
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 MORRIS GINSBERG

(i) We may beginwith a casein which a socialchangeis attributed

mainlyto desiresand decisionsof individuals.I referto the riseof the
small family system in Westerncountriesin the latter part of the
nineteenthcentury. There is general agreementehat this has been
brought about in the main by voluntaryrestrictionof births. The
evidenceshowsthat the declinein the birthrateis not to be accounted
for by changesin the amountof marriageor age at marriage,nor by
an increasein involuntarysterilityor spontaneousabortion.On the
other hand, there is positiveevidencein favourof the view that the
declineis due to increasingpracticeof birthcontrol.Firstly,the decline
becomesmoremarkedwith the spreadof propagandain favourof birth
control.Secondly,that the declinevarieswith the knowledgeof the
use of contraceptives is evidencedby the negativecorrelationbetween
socialstatusand fertilityand by differencesin fertilitybetweenurban
and rural areas,differenceswhich are much reducedin areaswhere
the ruralpopulationis suburbanized. Thesedifferencessuggeststrongly
that the declineis associatedwith the spreadof the knowledgeof con-
traceptivesfromthe uppersociallevelsto the lower,and fromtown to
country.There is negativeevidencein supportof this, for it appears
that among women who do not use contraceptivesthe number of
pregnanciesis about the same in all classes.8There are furthercases
suchas thoseexaminedby Methorstin Hollanddealingwith the vari-
ations in the intervalsbetween births which do not permitof any
explanationotherthan that of deliberatecontrol.9Granted,however,
that the declinein the size of the familyis to be attributedmainlyto
voluntarydecisions,the questionremainswhy these come into play
during the last part of the nineteenthcentury. The problemis to
account for the changes of attitude to the bearing and rearing of
childrenwhich made these decisionspossible.The answeris foundin
numerousinterlockingchangesin the social and economicstructure.
Among these may be mentioned,the establishmentof compulsory
educationwhich removedchildrenfrom .he labourmarketand made
the rearingof largefamiliesmorecostly;the provisionof educational
facilitiesfor women,which contributedgreatlyto raisingthe statusof
women;the wideropportunitiesfor the employmentof womenoutside
the home,the increasein socialmobilitywhichfacilitatedthe spreadof
influencesfirst felt by the upper economicgradesto the lower, and
strengthenedthe desireof parentsto help their childrento rise in the
social scale by giving them a better educationthan they had them-
selves;the immenseincreasein leisureand of amusementsoutsidethe
home.Theseand no doubtotherfactorsconnectedwith changesin the
economicstructureconstitutedstronginducementsfor the restriction
of births. To these must be added changesof moral and religious
outlook,and the fact that, for variousreasons,the movementfor the
emancipationof womencame in manycountriesto be associatedwith
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 SOCIAL CHANGE

propagandain favourof birth control.The factorsvary from country

to country.But everywherethe changingstructureof the familyseems
to be conditionedby changesin the economicand socialstructureand
the changesin mode of life associatedwith them, which have come
aboutin recentdecades.
(ii) In the casejust brieflyexamineda changein the social system
seemsto have come about as a resultof decisions,howevermotivated,
to bring about a particularresult.In this as in other casesthe conse-
quencesresultingfrom individualacts go far beyondwhat is directly
aimed at. As an exampleof a somewhatdifferentkind, considerthe
changesthat took place in ruralsocietyin Englandbetweenthe years
I300 and I500. In I300 the majorityof countrymenwere graded as
villeins.By I500 only a small minoritywere servileand the systemof
demesneagriculture,in whichmostof the workdoneon the lords'land
was done by tenantsin villeinage,was all but extinct. How did this
happen?It seemsthat withoutany formalbreakthe practiceof leasing
land for life or for a termof yearsspreadrapidlyduringthe thirteenth
century,replacingthe elaboratearrangementsof tenure and service.
Contemporaneously the practice of commutationbecame more fre-
quent.Eventuallythe lawyerstooka handin giving the villein greater
protectionthroughthe recognitionof 'copyhold'tenure.l° Here we
have a tremendouschange effected through countlesstransactions
betweenindividuals,each pursuing,as he no doubtthought,his own
ends. Weretheseindividualacts the sole causeof the change?Clearly
not, for they would not have occurred,had not the circumstances
favouredthe transitionfrom an arrangementbased primarilyon a
naturaleconomyto one based increasinglyon commercialand con-
tractualrelations.The causesarethe motivatedacts,but the motivesare
shapedby the change in the conditions.There is no groundfor dis-
missingthesechangesin theconditionsasmerelysecondaryorsubsidiary.
(iii) These examplessuggesta furthergroupof causefactorswhich
may be describedas structuralchanges and structuralstrains. By
structuralchangesI mean changesin the partsof a structuredue to
changesin otherpartsor to a changein the balanceof forces.By strains
I meantensionsset up in a societyby a lackof equilibriumbetueen its
parts.The two arecloselyrelated.Thusthe domaineconomywasmade
impossiblein Europein the eleventhand twelfthcenturiesby the rise
of the towns.The urbanpopulationcouldnot feeditselfand had there-
fore to obtain the means of subsistenceby purchasefrom the rural
areas.This meantthat the domainsno longerrestrictedtheir produc-
tion to meet theirown needs.As productionbecameremunerative,the
idea of workingfor profit began to exercisepeople'sminds. On the
other hand, the landowners,restrictedto customaryrevenues,foundit
difficultto satisfy their growing needs. In this way the moral and
economic foundationsof the domainalsystem were shaken by the
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 MORRIS GINSBERG

growth of cities and the change in the relationsbetween town and

country. With variationsthis transformationof the social structure
occurredeverywherein Europein muchthe sameway, as Pirennehas
shown.In the Russiaof the eighteenthand nineteenthcenturiessimilar
factorsbroughtaboutthe declineof the relativelyself-containednatural
economyof the estates.The landownerswantedthingsthat the estates
couldnot produce,the growthof townsand urbanindustriesincreased
the supplyof suchgoods,whileat the sametime a marketwas created
for any agriculturalsurplusthe estatesmight offer,and new channels
were being openedfor internationalexchange.ll
Closelyconnectedwith the interactionsbetweenthe differentparts
of the socialstructureare what I have calledstructuralstrains.By this
I mean tensionsset up within a societyby changesin size, by clashes
between the forces makingfor centralizationand the spirit of local
independence,by the failureof changesin differentpartsof the struc-
ture to keep pace, or by the fact now illustratedvividlyin the move-
ment for Europeanunity, that units which have developedto meet
certain requirements,e.g. political, are not suited for others, e.g.
economic.These strainsset up disturbances,latent or overt, which
sooneror laterfindexpressionin movementsforchange.Societiesdiffer
greatly in plasticity.They may be too rigid to meet changingcon-
ditions,or expandto a size which threatensinner cohesion,or adopt
principlesof organizationwhich sap the vitalityof their members,or
fail to makethe correctionsin the structureas a whole,necessitatedby
changesin the parts.The majorsourcesof socialchangeare, it seems
to me, conditionsgeneratingthese strainsor 'contradictions', and the
effortsmade to overcomethem. The Marxistshave concentratedon
the contradictionsthat arisebetweenthe forcesof productionand the
relationsof production.Butit seemsclearthat the sourcesof strainare
many and varied,and indeedhardlyreducibleto system.
(iv) Changesof socialstructurecan of coursealso be broughtabout
by externalinfluencesdue to contactwith other societies,peacefulor
warlike.The changesbroughtabout by conquestmay be very drastic
indeed. The Norman Conquest,for example,was accompaniedby a
completeupheavalof politicalinstitutionsand the whole organization
of the state. On the culturalside its importanceis immense.Not only
did it link Englandagainwith Latinculture;it was responsiblefor the
makingof the Englishlanguage.On the politicalside it createdthe
conditionswhichwereto shapethe courseof changefor centuries,and
largelydeterminedthe particularformwhich the strugglefor popular
freedomwas to takein England.l2The role of warin the consolidation
and expansionof states was emphasizedby Spencer.DiSusion and
borrowingare processesoccurringagain and again in the historyof
culture.Imitation,consciousor unconscious,has been used to explain
changesin constitutionsand legal systems.
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 SOCIAL CHANGE
(v) We may next considerthe contributionof outstandingindi-
vidualsor groupsof individuals.Theirimportancehasbeenexaggerated
as frequentlyas it has been underestimated. An interestingexampleis
providedby the accounts given of the of Japan from
industrialization
I868 to I938. The impressionis sometimes conveyed that this process
was initiatedand sustainedby a powerfuloligarchysharinga common
and clearlydefinedend and commandingthe disciplinedobedienceof
a docilepeople.Recentworkshowsthat the activitiesof the politicians
at mostaccelerateda processwhichwaSlatentin the wholeconjuncture
of forcesat work.Withoutminimizingthe greatcontributionsmadeby
the big concernsin associationwith the governmentin developingnew
sourcesof power and long-distancetransportand providingcredit
facilities,it remainsthat the expansionof industryduringthis period
owes much to the enterpriseand energyof millionsof small business
men, farmersand workers.As to the relativeimportanceof the various
cause factors, however, opinions diffierwidely. Accordingto some
authoritiesnearlyeveryindustrystartedbetweenI870 and I900 did so
on the initiativeof the government,and mostlyin factoriesopenedand
operatedby the governmentand sold to privateenterprise,when they
had got overtheirinitialdifficulties.l3ProfessorWilliamW. Lockwood,
on the otherhand, takesa very diffierent view. He arguesthat someof
the basic industries,e.g. coal and electric power, were developed
mainlythroughprivateinvestmentand enterprise,and that in respect
of a very wide rangeof industry,both largeand smallscale,therewas
little director activeinterventionon the part of the State.l4The diffi-
cultiesof dynamicanalysisare evidentlyformidablein this, as in other
instancesof growth.
The part played by the 'greatman' in social change has been dis-
cussedad nauseam by historiansand philosophers.Spencerarguedthat
the great man had firstto be made beforehe could remakesociety.l5
Others say that, howevermade, he is rarely the arbiterof events.
Bismarck,who by all accountsmustbe reckonedas havingexercisedan
enormousinfluenceon the politicaleventsof the nineteenthcentury,
remarked:'The statesmancan do nothingof himself.He can only lie
in wait and listenuntil amid the marchof eventshe can hearthe foot-
stepsof God.Then he leapsforwardandgraspsthe hemof Hisgarment.
That is all he can do.' In the caseof the foundersof the greatreligions
it may be noted that, whateverview be taken of the originalityand
noveltyof theircontributions,they rarelysucceededin imposingtheir
ideasuponlargemassesof men in theirown lifetime.By the time their
influencecomes to be widely felt their teachinghas been profoundly
transformedand has assimilatedmany elementsquite foreign to its
originalspirit. It is what 'history'has made of them ratherthan, or
more than, what they actually were that counts in the long run.
Nevertheless,it is foolish to deny the great importanceof men of
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genius whetheras innovatorsor as the vehiclesof large and massive

forces.
It is unfortunatethat so little is knownas yet of the geneticbasisof
geniusor exceptionalability.Are they to be thoughtof as mutations?
If so, underwhatconditionsdo theyoccur?Or aretheydue to 'acciden-
tal' combinationsof genes carriedin the stock?Is the proportionof
exceptionalability produced by a given stocksconstant over long
periodsof time?If so, are we to accountfor the apparentvariationsin
their distributionover time by differencesin the opportunityoSered
for theirdevelopmentor expression? Is it possiblethat thereare always
the same qualitiespresentin a population,but that some of them
remain dormant, unknown even to their possessors,awaiting the
stimulusof exceptionalcircumstances?In more general terms, the
questionmay be raisedwhethersocialchangesare effectedby changes
in inborncharacteristics, for examplein qualitiesmakingfor leader-
ship, innovationor conservatism,or whethersocial changesare, as
seemslikely,in the main,independentof geneticchanges.Only a com-
parativesociologygiving the life historyof differenttypes of society
accompaniedby a geneticanalysisof mentalcharacteristics and of the
actionof selectioncan supplyan answerto thesecomplicatedquestions.
An interestingvariantof the problemsthusraisedis suggestedby the
varioushypothesesthat have been put forwardof the part played by
'new men' in effecting social changes. To give but one example,
Pirenne'sstudyof a thousandyearsof Europeancapitalismled him to
the conclusionthatwe can tracewith a 'trulyastonishingregularity'an
alternationbetween periods of economic freedom and periods of
economiccontrol,and a similaralternationbetweenperiodsof ener-
getic innovationand periodsof conservatismand stabilization.The
explanationsuggestedis that each phase is introducedby 'new men'
who maketheirway by audacityandindependence.Theirdescendants,
on the otherhand,lose the impetusof the earlyphases,are anxiousto
preservewhat has been won and are inclined,therefore,to give their
supportto any authority,houever stringent,capableof giving them
the necessarysecurity.This explanationis confirmedby an analysisof
the socialoriginsof the men who wereinfluentialin initiatingthe new
phases,supportedby an appealto a sortof commonsensepsychology
of the mentality of the 'parvenu'turned respectable.lBSomewhat
similarviews are put forwardby Paretoin the analysishe gives of
politicaland other social culturalchangeswith the aid of his theory
of residuesand derivations.Pareto'sdiscussionis of specialinterestin
thatit raisesthe problemof the relationsbetweenindividualpsychology
and sociologyin an illuminatingmanner.He is far from suggesting
that the courseof eventsis completelydeterminedby what goes on in
the mindsof particular'speculators'.Their policy is the resultantof
a complexset of forcesand an indefinitenumberof acts, leadingcol-
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lectivelyto resultswhichindividuallythey do not foresee,even though
they may have a clearerconceptionof theirown endsthan the masses
have of theirs.In this, as in othercontexts,Paretois anxiousto replace
the notionof a one-sidedcausalityby thatof mutualdependenceamong
the factorsinvolved.
(vi) Social changesare often due to a confluenceor collocationof
elementsderived from differentsourcesbut convergingat a given
point. Exampleswill readilysuggestthemselvesto historians.Thus the
institutionsof feudalismwere the productof many differentlines of
development,some of them coming from widely different places.
Among these were the Germaniccomitatus, the Roman patrocinium,
combinedwiththe systemofprecaria, the deliberateeffortsof the French
monarchsto remodel these institutions,the associationof military
service with tenure and of landholdingwith jurisdiction.All these
played their part in differentEuropeancountriesshaped by local
conditionsand varzringgreatlywith them.l7
Anotherstrikingexampleis to be foundin the greatsocialandindus-
trialchangesin Englandin the 'age of invention'.Thesechangeshave
been tracedbackto a remarkableconjunctionof circumstances. There
wasthe stimulusderivedfromthe Continent,whetherby directimpor-
tation of machinesor by the immigrationof skilledartisans,itselfthe
resultof long social and religiousdisturbances.Therewas the driftof
able natives and immigrantsto the towns in the north, which were
relativelyfree from the restrictionsof the corporationsand guilds.
There were the socialfermentstendingto dissolvetraditionsopposed
to change.Therewas the riseof experimentaland appliedscienceand
the interestshownin applyingtheseto the 'usefularts'.Finally,there
were the economicfactorsmakingfor an expansionin the demandfor
Englishgoodsand an increasein purchasingpower,thesein theirturn
being due to complexcollocationsof causes.l8Anotherexamplefrom
our own time is providedby the RussianRevolution.In this case, too,
therewas a verycomplicatedcombinationof circumstances. Therewas
firstthe prolongationof the war of I9I4 and the inabilityof the Czarist
regimeto sustaina large-scalewar. Therewas the land-hungerof the
peasantryand the presencetogetherof a depressedpeasantrywith
a relativelyadvancedproletariat.There was the fact that in Russia
capitalistindustryhad developedas a resultof foreignpressureand
underthe patronageof the state,with the resultthat a proletariathad
been createdwithoutan independentclassof bourgeoisentrepreneurs.
There was the furtherfact that the Russian intelligentsiadid not
possesssocial roots in the commercialbourgeoisieand was not com-
mitted to any deep-seatedbourgeoisallegiance.To all this must be
added the existenceof a small and determinedgroupof men, able to
seize power and, above all, the 'accident'of the great personalityof
Lenin.
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(vii) The nodon of collocationor concurrenceraisesthe question

of the fortuitousor accidentalin social change. Cournot,who was
amongthe firstto deal with this problem,attributesfortuitousevents
in historyto the concurrence,or intersectionat a givenpoint,of several
series of causes and effects which are mutually independent.l He
arguesthat were there no factsof this kind therewould be no history
but only science:while on the otherhand,if all factswereof this kind,
there would equally be no historybut only annals.The real task of
historyis in fact to deal with this comminglingof the fortuitouswith
the necessaryand to distinguishbetweenthem. It is interestingto note
that in Cournot'sview the fortuitousor accidentalis most commonly
to be met with in politicalchangesbut is not so frequentor important
in the historyof science,philosophyor religion.It is perhapsfor this
reasonthat he thought political historyto be of all departmentsof
historythe mostsuperficialand the one least likelyto revealthe most
deep-rootedforcesat workin socialchange.Cournot'sdiscussionis rich
in suggestion,thoughthe applicationto particularcasespresentsinsur-
mountabledifficulties.Much in the FrenchRevolutionwas according
to him 'inevitable'.Yet he speaksof it as a 'grandaccident'and he
claimsthat in the long runits effectwas ratherto retardnormaltrends
of change, particularlyin the economic field.20 Another striking
exampleis the caseof the NormanConquestto whichI referredabove.
Withoutthe Bastard'sconquest[he says],andwithoutthe feudalsquabbles
which followedit for four centuries,that fruitfulhybrid, the Englishtype,
whichgives it its real value and which, by approximatingto the Frenchtype
in some ways, is the secretand deeplyrootedsourceof antagonismbetween
the two peoples,would never have come into being. The Saxon of Great
Britainwould have resembledthe Dutch or the Dane.2l
Who can tell what was accidentalin all this?Accordingto Pirenne,at
any rate, the incidentswhich led immediatelyto the conquestwere
indeed fortuitous,yet the orientationof the island to the Continent
'respondedso profoundlyto the natural circumstancesthat it must
have been accomplishedsooneror later'.22
We may take anotherexamplefromthe social effectsof epideniics,
which must, I suppose,be considered'fortuitous'on Cournot'stests.
The repercussionsof the Black Death on the economicstructureof
Europeancountrieshave been broughtout by historians.Anotherof
its consequenceswas the lettinglooseof a wave of superstitiousterror.
This expresseditselfin manyGermantowns,forexample,in barbarous
attacksonJewsin the beliefthat the plaguewas a malignantdevicefor
the confusionof Catholics.The savage attacksled to an exodus to
Polandwhere,underCasimirthe Great,theJews foundprotection.In
this way a seriesof eventsoriginatingin the far east was an important
factorin the formationof an East EuropeanJewry, whichin the cen-
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 SOCIAL CHANGE
turiesto comewas to developdistinctivecharacteristics of its own and
to play an importantrole in the historyof the entireJewishpeople.
(viii) An importantfactor in social change is the emergenceof a
commonpurpose.This termis unfortunately highlyambiguous.It may
standfor an end or objectthoughtto be desirablefor the community
as a wholeor for everymemberof it. It may alsostandfor a common
processof willing,the reachingof a decisionby the membersof a group
afterjoint deliberationand discussionin the courseof whichthe desires
of each are modifiedand adjustedto meet the desiresof others.It is
clear that a commonpurposein this latter sense is only possiblein
highlyintegratedsmallcommunities.In the largercommunities'what
is will is not generaland what is generalis not will'. What we find is
rathera numberof partialgeneralwills, varyinggreatlyin clearness
of conception,unityof aim and knowledgeof conditions.The largerthe
commuriityand the wider the diversityof the groupswithin it, the
greateris the difficultyof forminga truly commonwill.
Nevertheless,it is true,I think,that in communitiesof long standing,
at any rate in the democraticworld,a generalwill does developboth
in the sensethat thereare moreobjectscommonlywilled and that the
processof willing becomesmorecommonin the sensethat increasing
numbersshare, more or less consciously,in its formation.The same
point may be put by saying that there is a gradualextensionof the
sphereof public responsibility,involvingan extensionof public super-
vision. The historyof education,of public health, of the reliefof the
poorand morelatelyof the regulationof the economicsystemwill bear
this out. In all thesecasesa commonpurposehas slowlyemergedand
the main stagesin its growthhave been or can be indicatedby his-
torians.On the other hand, we have as yet no detailedpsychological
analysisof the processesinvolvedin changesof groupmentality.Las-
salle used to speakof the accursedwantlessnessof the poor.But we do
not know at what point submergedneeds becomearticulate,or under
what conditionsthe senseof injusticeand the dawningof an ideal of
what justice might be rousesmen to action. We know little of the
factorswhich separateideals and practice,or of the extent to which
ideals are infectedby group or sectionalinterests.Even at advanced
levelsthe directeffectof socialtheoryon practiceis a matterof dispute.
Commonor concertedpurposesno doubt operate,but in referenceto
largecommunitieswe oughtperhapsto speakof driftor tendencyrather
than of settled or articulatewill. The communityconsistsof many
'publics'convergingat some pointsand divergingat othersand their
mentaltexturevariesfromcase to case. There are thus differentlevels
of purposiveness in collectiveaction.It usedto be saidthat the function
of democraticgovernmentis to expressthe generalwill. It is perhaps
more to the point to say that its businessis to do what it can to bring
a generalwill into being.
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III
(i) I proposenow to bringtogetherthe main conclusionssuggested
by my survey and then to discusstheir bearingon the problemof
teleology.Firstly,then, it seemsto me to followfrom the examplesI
have tried to analysethat the causalrelationshiphas much the same
significancein the social sciencesas in the naturalsciences.It is best
describedperhapsas a relationof immediacyor continuityin transition.
A cause is an assemblageof factorswhich, in interactionwith each
other,undergoa changeof characterand are continuedinto the effect.
In practicallife and in the scientificstudiesarisingout of practical
needswe are alwaysin searchof suchcontinuities.We assumethat one
differenceimplies anotherand that changesdo not occur in isola-
tion, but are linked without gaps in time or space with other
changes.
(ii) Secondly,despitethisfundamentalsimilaritythereareobviously
importantdiffierences betweensocialand physicalcausation.To begin
with, owing to their greatercomplexitysocialfacts are morevariable
and lesslikelyto be repeatedin identicalfashionthan physicalevents.
Becauseof this, and the ensuingdifficultyof isolatingcause factors,
causalrelationshipsin the socialsciencescannotbe statedin the form
of uniformsequencesor connectionsbetweenspecificevents,but in the
formof changesof patternwithin a seriesof interlinkedevents.Next,
the fact that socialcausationinvolvesthe actionof mentalfactors,such
as desires,volitions,carrieswith it importantqualifications.For the
relationbetweenthe conditionsin the physicaland socialenvironment
and the mental acts they stimulatediffersgreatlyfrom the relations
between purely physical conditions and their effects. Individuals
'respond'ratherthan reactto theirenvironmentand they do so select-
ively; and thoughin manyinvestigations,suchas thosethatlendthem-
selves to statisticaltreatment,individualvariationsmay be assumed
to cancelout or neutralizeeachother,in othercasesthe variationsmay
be all important.Again, the presenceof mental factorsaffects the
'intelligibility'of the causal relationship.In the physicalworld the
causalrelationshipis not a necessaryrelationshipin the senseof logical
entailment.Whateventsare causallyconnectedcan only be discovered
by experience,and we cannotconstructthe effectby combiningwhat
we knowof the constituentelements.Up to a point the factualnature
of the causal relationshipholds also of mental or psycho-physical
events.It is truethat in voluntaryactivitywe have directexperienceof
a causalconnection.But this is not to say that we 'understand'it. As
Humepointedout, we do not knowwhy we can controlour outward
bodily movements,but not our visceralactivitiesor our pains. We
establishthe connectionor absenceof connectionby experienceand
try to define the relationshipmore closelyby varyingthe conditions
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 SOCIAL CHANGE
and eliminatingthe irrelevant.Similarlywe know empiricallythat
memoryis strengthenedby repetition,but the scientificexplanationof
this is still to seek.Nevertheless,it remainsthat in so far as behaviour
becomesmore rationala good deal of it becomesintelligiblein the
sensethat the variousstagesin a chain of acts are logicallyconnected.
(iii) Next we may notethat the methodsusedin the searchforcausal
connectionsin the socialsciencesfollowwell-knownrulesof inductive
procedurealsofollowedin othersciences.It is assumedthat (a) nothing
is the cause of a phenomenonin the absenceof which it nevertheless
occurs,or in the presenceof which it neverthelessfails to occur;and
(b) that nothingis the causeof a phenomenonwhichvarieswhen it is
constant,or variesin no proportionatemannerwith it. The examples
cited can readilybe analysedto show that these are in fact the rules
implicitin socialinvestigaiions,but one or two examplesmay be given
in furtherillustraiion.Considerthe way in whichhistorianshave dealt
with the problemof the increaseof pauperismin ruralEnglandin the
early part of the nineteenthcentury.This has been attributedto the
adoptionby the Poor Law administrationof the practiceof usingthe
rates to supplementinsufficientwages. That this was an important
causal factor was shown by citing instances(I) of areas or parishes
which had decidedto changeover to a policy of grantingreliefonly
when a full task of workwas exacted,with the resultthat pauperism
diminished;(2) instancesof significantdifferencesin pauperization
withinthe sameparishesas between'non-settled'labourerswho could
not get relieffrom the parish,and, therefore,had to maintainthem-
selves by their labour, and the settled labourerswho could rely on
reliefin supplementation of theirwages;(3) instancesof parisheswhich
had neveradoptedthe practiceof relievingable-bodiedmen out of the
workhouse,in which the pauperizationwhich occurredelsewheredid
not happen.It seems,alsomoregenerally,thatin areaswherethesystem
was adopted,e.g. in Scotlandand the North of England,the agricul-
tural labourerdid not suffierthe same degradation,though there too
timeswere oftenvery hard.23This sort of reasoningdesignedto show
that the eSect occurredwhenthe allegedcausewaspresentand did rlot
occurwhen it was absentwas supplementedby argumentsdesignedto
excludealternativeexplanations;such as the rise in the priceof corn,
which musthave aSectedall the areasin the sameway and could not
thereforeaccount for the differencesin degree of pauperizationas
betweendifferentparishes,or for variationswithin the sameparishes,
followingupon the abandonmentof the poorlaw practicein question.
Anotherexamplemay be taken from the historicalanalysisof the
riseof the populationwhichoccurredin Englandfrom I 760 onwards.
The risehas beenattributedto technicalimprovements in industryand
agriculturein this period.The case of Irelandappearsat firstsight to
providea negativeinstance;for in this case a great increaseoccurred
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in the absenceof any markedimprovementeitherin industryor agri-
culture.This and other similarinstancessuggestthat the causationis
morecomplexand that the risein the populationis to be lookedupon
as one phaseof a changein the entirepatternof livingassociatedwith
the industrialand agriculturalrevolution.Significantin this changeof
patternis the fall in the deathrate.But this reductionof mortalitywas
made possibleby improvementsin the standardof living attributable
to the new mechanicalinventions,to changesin agriculturesuchas the
introductionof root cropswhich, by supplyingwinterfood for cattle,
increasedthe supplyof freshmeat, and above all by improvementsin
medicalscienceand practice,which lessenedthe dangersof infection
and in many ways strengthenedresistanceto disease.The chain of
causationis evidentlyvery intricate;the medical improvementsled
directlyto the increaseby reducingmortality,but the increasedpopu-
lation could not have been maintainedwithout the agriculturaland
industrialchanges.This type of explanationis not invalidatedby the
caseof Ireland.There,it is true,therewas no markedindustrialdevel-
opmentand the improvementin healthconditionswas not so greatas
in England.The decisivefactorseemsto have been the absenceof a
potatofaminein the eighteenthcentury.As Trevelyanpointsout, 'The
potatois the easiestmethodof supportinglife at a verylow standard-
until a year comeswhen the crop completelyfails.'24An examination
of these and similarproblemswill show the vital connectionbetween
historicalstudiesof particulareventsand the more generalinvestiga-
tions undertakenby social scientists.Both history and the social
sciences,in so far as they arein searchof causes,relyupona comparison
of instances designed to eliminate irrelevantconcomitantsand to
disentanglecommonfactors.The conclusionsreachedrarelyachieve
a lligh degreeof certainty.This is due in the mainto the greatercom-
plexity of social facts, their greatervariability,and the difficultyof
isolatingone factorat a time, and of makingsurethat a changein one
factorhasnot beenaccompaniedby changesin a greatmanyothers.In
varyingdegreesthesedifficultiesare commonto historyand the social
sciences,and they accountin large measurefor the diffierences in uni-
versality,certainty and precisionas between them and the natural
sciences.
(iv) Philosopherslike Rickert,Troeltschand Diltheyhave argued,
as we have seen,that in historyand the sciencesof cultureourconcern
is not with generallaws but with the interpretationof concreteoccur-
rences.These being complexand unique can only be grasped,they
say, by a sort of sympatheticinsightor imagination.The subjectsof
inquiryare therefore,accordingto them, not repeatableelementsbut
individualwholes(Historische Totalitaton).
It will be seen that thereis a
certainambiguityin the use of the termindividualwholewhichsome-
timesstandsfor concreteparticularsor eventslike the Renaissanceor
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the IndustrialRevolution,and sometimesfor type concepts,like capit-

alism, feudalism,revolution,proletariat,which refer to clustersof
eventsor formsof groupingof whichthereare manyinstances.Despite
the criticismto whichconceptsof boththesekindshavebeen subjected
historiansand social scientistscontnue to use them. They are un-
doubtedlyhelpfulas firststepsin synthesis,providingthey can be freed
fromthe emotionalovertoneswith whichthey tend to be chargedand
providingthat they do not discouragefurtheranalysis.Thus,the term
'the IndustrialRevolution',for example,will no doubtsurvive;but no
historianwould nowadayspretendto graspthe movementthis desig-
natedin its entirety.Beforea synthesisis attemptedthe movementhas
to be brokenup into a numberof concurrentseriesof changes,e.g. the
rise of new towns,the improvementsin transport,the growthof the
populationand the changesin the age structureof the population,the
increasingdivision of labour and specializationof occupations,the
removalof legislativeimpedimentsto enterprise,the rise of experi-
mentaland appliedsciences,and the greaterreadinessto use them in
agricultureand industry,the moral and intellectualchangestending
to breakdown oppositionto change,and so forth.To understandthe
meaningofthesechangesandtheirinterconnections we requiredetailed
studies and the help of economics,politics, demographyand other
social sciences.To establishinterconnectionsis a particularlytricky
matter.As Blochhas pointedout in anothercontext,we have no right
to rejectthem with closedminds.'We simplymustnot postulatesuch
connectionsin advance.Certainlythe tidesare relatedto the successive
phasesof the moon.In orderto knowthis,however,it wasfirstnecessary
to determinethe periodsof the tides and those of the moon, quite
apart from one another.'25In general,then, effectivesynthesismust
wait upon prior analysis.Nevertheless,in some cases, a stroke of
imaginationmaysuggesta synthesiswhichthen servesto stimulateand
guide analyticinquiry.In both analysisand synthesisgeneralizations,
psychologicalor sociological,are implicit and until these are dis-
entangledand tested furtherthere is no real extensionof systematic
knowledge.28
(v) Thereis anotheraspectof socialcausationto whichI shouldlike
to draw attention, namely its cumulative and frequentlycircular
character.It is easy to give examples.Thus in the historyof anti-
semitismwe find that persecutionand restrictivelaws and practices
of variouskindsencouragedthe tendencyof theJewstowardsisolation,
and isolation in turn encouragedfurther discrimination.Similarly,
WhiteprejudicecausesdiscriminationagainstNegroesand keepsdown
their standardof living, and the low standardsin turn stimulate
antipathy.27Other examplesare the following:populationpatterns
with low birthratesand low deathratesare in part causesand in part
consequencesof higher standardsof living; the inventions which
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furtheredthe IndustrialRevolutionwere at once causesand effectsof
the growingdivisionof labourand specializationof functions.28 Again,
changesin the systemof educationlead to changesin economicand
politicalstructureand these in turn modifythe systemof education.
In all these cases the 'cause'does not disappearwhen the 'effect'is
producedbut continuesand is modifiedby its effects.The circular
characterof social causationmay be very importantfrom a practical
point of view. When the circle is 'vicioussit may be necessaryor
advisableto interveneat variouspointssimultaneously,so as to break
the connectionsand arrest the cumulativeaction and reaction of
causesand effects.
(vi) I come now to the problemof teleology.The causesleadingto
social changes so far enumeratedall include as factorsdesiresand
purposiveactsof menstimulatedand shapedin variouswaysby factors
in the physicaland social environment.It followsthat in one sense
social changesare teleological,since they dependon acts initiatedto
bring about a preconceivedend; though we shouldhave to add the
qualificationthat the claritywith which the ends are foreseenvaries
from case. But purposiveor, more generally,conativeaction, is only
one kindof teleology.Thereis alsoin additionthe functionalteleology
of living organisms,which certainlydoes not depend on conscious
contrivanceon the part of the mindsanimatingthem. Suchfunctional
teleologymay be describedas teleologybelow consciousness.Is there
also a functionalteleologyabove consciousness,a patternor scheme
emergingout of the linkedaction of innumerableseparatemindsbut
not as such designedby any of them?
To deal with this questionwe need some furtherdefinitionof tele-
ology. For my purposehere I should like to adopt the definition
suggestedby Dr. Broad.29A systemis teleologicalif (a) the arrange-
mentsof its partsis such as might have been expectedif it had been
constructedby an intelligentbeing to fulfil a certain purpose,and
(b) if the hypothesisof designhelps us in furtherinvestigation,e.g. to
discoverhithertounnoticedpartsor hithertounnoticedrelations,which
in their turn are foundto accordwith the hypothesis.It seemsto me
that,judged by these requirements,the use of teleologyis justifiedin
the biologicalsciences.In physiology,for example,the assumptionthat
organsservecertainfunctionshas led to importantinvestigationsand
discoveries,e.g. in researchesconcerningthe functionsof the thyroid,
the parathyroids,the suprarenalbodies and many organs of the
invertebrates.30Is the use of teleologicalcategoriesequallyjustifiedin
dealing with the long-rangetrendsof social change?I am not here
concernedwith theologicaltheoriesof the 'waysof Providence'.These
wouldcomeunderthe categoryof consciousteleology,sincetheywould
refer changes to the mind of God. Whether they would satisfy
Dr. Broad'ssecondrequirementmay be doubted.It does not seem to
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have beenshownthat the assumptionof providentialguidancehas led
to any historicalresearchesor discoveries.If I understandDr. Butter-
field aright,he does not think that the historianas such would be led
to find the 'handof Godin secularhistoryunlesshe has firstfoundthat
he has an assuranceof it in his personalexperience'.3lFor similar
reasonsthe metaphysicaltheoriesof an absolutemind, utilizing the
passionsof men in the realizationof a purposewhich is not their
purpose,are not helpful. I am not aware that they have suggested
fruitfulhistoricalinvestigationsor led to the discoveryof new social
relationscongruentwith the hypothesis.Our concernhere is not with
the notion of a single over-ridingprinciplegoverningthe historical
processto whichfew, if any, would now committhemselves,but with
the much morelimitedproblemof the natureof the patternsthat are
discerniblein socialand culturalhistorywhich are not attributableto
consciousdesign.The form or structureof languages,for example,is
certainlynot the productof consciousdesign,andis therebeforeanyone
is aware of it. Again, the changes that languagesundergoare not
randombut have 'direction'.We learnthat changesat particularpoints
oftengive riseto chainsof supplementarychanges,so as to correctthe
'disturbances', and that these tendenciesmay spreadover centuriesor
even millennia.32Very little, however,seemsto be knownabout the
origin of the variationsor of the natureof the selectiveforceswhich
makefortheirsurvivalor elimination.In thiscaseexplanationin terms
of consciouscontrivancebreaksdown, and a problemarisesakin to
that whichbiologistshave to facein dealingwith the originsof species.
I believe, however,that a functionalapproachhas been found to be
empiricallyuseful by linguists,and, since language is certainlynot
a purely physical phenomenon,the appeal to what I have called
supra-conscious teleologymay in this case be justified.
In dealingwith other spheresof social or culturalchangethe issue
is moredoubtful.Of any set of changesit is easyto say that they were
designedto bring about the resultswhich we find they actuallyhave
broughtabout.Butit doesnot followthat this givesus a clue to a closer
understanding of the processesinvolvedor to enableus to predicttheir
futurecourse.I give one examplefrom amongthe many that might
be offeredto illustratethis point. In commentingon the emancipation
of the serEsin Russiain I86I, ProfessorE. H. Carrremarks:'The his-
toricalfunctionof the reform,as of the enclosuresin Englishhistory,
was to drive from the land into the towns and factoriesthe labour
necessaryfor the industrializationof the nationaleconomy.'33Apart
from the question whether the agriculturalworkerswere in fact
'driven' by the enclosuresabout which there are differencesof
opinion,34does it help us to understandthe enclosuresto say that this
was theirfunction?
Goodexamplesof the use of teleologyotherthan that of consciously
5

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 MORRIS GINSBERG

purposiveacts of individualminds are to be found in the work of

Durkheim.To explaina socialfactit is necessary,accordingto him, to
discoverits efficientcause,i.e. the socialfactswhichprecedeit, and to
indicateits function,or the social needs which it meets. 'Function-
alists' nowadays are generally non-historical,but Durkheim uses
functionalteleologyto accountfor importanthistoricaltrends.Thus,
for example,he triesto showthat the causeof the growingdivisionof
labourwhich we observehistoricallyis to be foundin an increaseof
the densityof the populationand that its functionis to bring about
the kind of solidaritywhich he calls organic.He is concernedto show
that, as is also the case in physiology,it is not enoughto indicatethe
function.Functionsdo not bring about their own fulfilment.A satis-
factoryexplanationmustgive an accountof the mechanismby which
the end is achieved.In other words,both the final and the efficient
causemustbe given.
The questionwill be raisedhow it comesaboutthat the meansare
presentfor the fulfilmentof the functions.In biologicaltheory the
answeris foundin the hypothesisthat structureand functionare both
shaped by natural selection. Durkheim'sexplanationof the con-
junction of mechanismand functionin the growthof the divisionof
labouris somewhatsimilar.An increasein the densityof population
sharpensthe strugglefor existence.In suchcircumstances of intensified
strugglethe group could not survive in a given area, unless there
existedsufficientindividualdifTerences in capacityto make economic
difTerentiation possible.The explanationis, it seemsto me, at best
incomplete.Selectioncan only operateon what is given and is not
itself a source of variation.It followsthat individualdifferencesin
aptitudeand interestpresupposedin the divisionof labourstillremain
to be accountedfor. So far the difficultyis akin to that which, as I
understand,evolutionarytheoryhas so far not succeededin resolving.
Durkheim'sattitude to the problem thus raised is not clear. In a
somewhatcrypticfootnote35he speaksof a possiblereconciliationof
mechanicaland teleologicaltheoriesof life. He suggeststhat wherethe
cause does not cease to exist with the productionof the effect, as is
often the case in social change, there would be a backwardreaction
of the effecton the cause.Thus, for example,divisionof labourleads
to increaseof produciionbothin qvlantityand quality,andthisincrease
in turn providesthe energyrequiredand the meansto makepossible
further differentiation.The general philosophicalproblem of the
relationsbetween mechanismand teleologyis, however,not further
pursuedby Durkheimeither in this context or, so far as I know,
elsewhere.
Durkheim'sanalysisof the socialfunctionsof the divisionof labour
has attracteda good deal of attention,but it is very doubtfulwhether
he has succeededin makingout his case. It is true, as Comtebefore
e26

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 SOCIAL CHANGE
him pointedout, that the divisionof labourservesto makemen realize
their dependenceon one another. It does not follow that by itself
division of labour would sufficeto bring about an organic type of
societyin Durkheim'ssenseof the word. For the term organicis used
by Durkheimto describea systemin whichthe partsnot only perform
specialfunctionswhile at the same time complementingeach other,
but do so withoutloss of individuality.The term thus comesto have
ethicalimplicationsrootedin Durkheim'srespectfor the valuesof the
individual.He recognizesthat these values are not necessarilyserved
by mere differentiationof functionsand that the divisionof labour
may work so as to defeat them. If the divisionof labouris to make
possibleorganicsocietiesin the ethical sense,it must conformto the
idealsof equalityand liberty.But sincetheseidealsare not necessarily
involvedin the divisionof labour, they cannot be said to constitute
ltStunctlon.
* .

Whetheror not we recognizethe operationof teleologybelow or

above consciousnessthere is no reasonfor doubtingthe importance
of consciouspurposes.Idealistphilosophersand their Marxistvariants
are fond of emphasizingthe blindnessof social processes.But they
vastlyoverstatetheir case. Legal systems,educationalinstitutionsand
economicstructuresdo not make themselves.It is true that decisions
oftenlead to consequencesotherthan thoseintended,and that institu-
tions that have come into being to serve certain ends, come in the
courseof theirgrowthto serveothers.But, generally,thereis no great
mysteryabout this, and nothing is gained by referringsuch trans-
formationsto 'hiddeninner laws' 36 or to reasons'lying deeperin the
roots of things'.37Primogeniture,for example,originatedto meet a
particularfeudalrequirement.But it becamepart of the land law and
affectedthe class structureof England.This no doubt was not fore-
seen, but the processesinvolvedin the change have been or can be
traced by historians.38To take another well-knownexample. The
Crusadesoriginatedin religiousmotives.But they led to the develop-
ment of Italian maritime commerceand the establishmentof the
colossalempireof Venice and Genoain the Levant.39Here again no
illuminationis shed on the processinvolved by referenceto hidden
purposesof nature. The positionof Marxistsis especiallyambiguous
in thiscontext.Engels,forexample,tellsus that though'nothingoccurs
withoutconsciousintentor willedend', the resultsthat followfromthe
interactionsof wills are not willedand resemblethe operaiionswe find
in the 'unconsciousnaturalworld'.At the same time the humanwill
is not helplessin the face of theseforces.
The forcesoperatingin society work exactly like the forcesoperatingin
nature; blindly, violently, destructively,so long as we do not understand
them and fail to take them into account.But when once we have recognized
them and understoodhow they work, their directionand their effects,the
227

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228 MORRISGINSBERG
gradual subjectionof themto ourwillandtheuseof themfortheattainment
ofouraimsdependsentirelyuponourselves.40
Wemay well ask whether it is seriouslymaintainedthat this self-
affirmation of the humanwill has to wait until the dialecticallaws of
socialchangehave been finallydiscovered.Surelythe processof self-
affirmation goes on all the time, with variationsin clarityand vigour,
inthe effortsthat men maketo solvethe problemsof socialorganization
asthey arise.History,we have been told, is the 'registerof the crimes,
folliesand misfortunes of mankind'.It is also the registerof muchelse,
heroicself-sacrifice, flashesof insight,patientcontrivingand persistence
of effort.Neitherregisterdisclosesa single pattern,both point rather
to a seriesof gropingeffortsof men slowly becomingaware of their
commonneeds and the possibilitiesof harmoniousco-operation.The
resultsof their effortsare embodiedin socialstructureswhich,in turn,
react upon the individual concerned,creating new situationsand
generatingnew wants and strainswhich in their turn stimulatenew
efforts.Socialforcesthus consistof the energiesof men in consciousor
unconsciousinteraction.The individualwill may be often powerless,
largelybecauseit is thwartedor unaidedby other wills, though on
occasions,when opposingforcesare equallybalanced,the contribution
of one or more determinedmen may be decisive. Slowly the inter-
relationsenterinto consciousness, makinga commonpurposepossible.
That consciouspurposeplays an increasinglyimportantpart in the
shapingof eventsseemsto me beyonddoubt. But it is limitedby the
natureof the will and the conditionsin whichit has to work,including
the consequencesof its own action. Social processesare thus neither
fatallypredetermined norfreefromlimitingconditions.Butthe greater
the knowledgeof the limitingconditions,the largeris the scopeoffered
to consciousdirectionand control.
NOTES
1 Cf. TheStudyof Society,pp. 4I I-I3. 9 Cf. Pirenne, Historyof Europe,p. 254.
2 Cf. T. H. Marshall, 'Revision in 13 Cf. Arthur Lewis, T7ic Eheory of
EconomicHistory',TheEconomic History Economic Growth,p. 350.
Re^iew,vol. V, I 935. lg Ne EconomicDevelopmentof siapan,
3 Power,p.I22. pp. 57 I-92.
4 Carr-Saunders,ThePopulation Prob- 15 Ehe Studyof Society,p. 35.
lem,p. I88. 16 Les pSriodesde l'histoire sociale du
5 Cf. M. Bloch, The Historians Craft, capitalisme. Bulletin de la classe des
p. I94. lettres et des sciences morales et poli-
ch. XII.
Historyof Europe,
6 tiques, I 9 I 4, No. 5.
Freedom
7 andReform,p. 383. 17 For a brief discussion, see T. F. T.
Pearl.
8 Plucknett, A ConciseHistoryof theCommon
9 Cf. Carr-Saunders,World Popula- L<w.
tion,p. I04. 18 Cf. W. Bowden, *ndustrialSocietyin
10J. Clapham,A Concise His-
Economic Englandtowardsthe End of the Eighteenth
toryof Britain,ch. IV. Century.
11Cf. G. T. Robinson, RuralRussia 19Considerations sur la marchedes idees,
undertheOldRegime,p. 55 seq. I872, vol. I, p. I seq.

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 SOCIAL CHANGE 229
20 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 246 and 295. 29 7U Mind and its Place in Nature,
21 De l'enchainement des ideesfondamen- p. 8I.
talesdanslessciences et dansl'histoire,
nouv. 30 Cf. L. Cuenot, in Sciencect Loi,
ed. I9I I, p. 672. p. I3I
22 History of Europe, p. 248. 31 Christianity
andHistory,p. I07.
23 T7iePoorLaw Commissioners' Report, 32 Cf. Sapir,Language,
I 834, and e.g. Trevelyan,History
p. I 95.
of Eng-
land,p. 6I2. For a full analysisof this p. 33IO.A Historyof SovietRussia,vol. II,
example,see W. H. B. Joseph, An Intro-
34 Cf. Ashton, 4 Eighteenth Century,
duction to Logic,ch. XX.
24 Ibid., p. 603, footnote. P 47
25 Ne Historians Craft,p. I85. 35 Rigles de la rnethode sociologique,
26 See M. R. Cohen, Reason and p. I I 8.
36 Engels
Nature,Bk. III, ch. I, for a valuabledis-
cussion. 37 Bosanquet.
27 Cf. especiallyMyrdal, An American 38 Trevelyan, History of England,
Dilemma,ch. III. p. I9I.
28 Cf. Ashton, Ehe Industrial Revolu- 39 Pirenne,Historyof Europe,p. I96.
tion,p. I5. 4°Anti-DiAring,Eng. trans.,p. 307.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS
MORRIS GINSBERG iS EmeritusProfessorof Sociologyat the London
Schoolof Economicsand PoliticalScience.
LORRAINE LANCASTER iS Lecturerin Anthropologyat the London
Schoolof Economicsand PoliticalScience.
E. MICHAEL MENDELSON iS doing researchinto Buddhistsociologyin
Burma.
J. A. BANKS iS Lecturerin Sociologyat the Universityof Liverpool.

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