Primicias vs Ocampo – Trial with aid of assessors

(Substantive vs Remedial)
- Facts
o Petitioner seeks to prohibit Judge Ocampo of CFI Manila to proceed with trial of two
criminal cases without assistance of assessors (Section 49 of the Revised Charter of
Manila)
 violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606 (for chartering a Philippine vessel
without approval of the President)
 violation of violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised
Administrative Cod (for failure to submit to Collector of Customs the manifests
and authenticated documents of vessel “Antartic” and failure to obtain clearance
from BOC prior to departure for a foreign port
o Petitioner filed motion praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court in
considering the questions of fact involved in said cases
o Respondents now contend that the right to trial with the aid of assessors, with all its
concomitant provisions, cannot now be invoked because, being procedural in nature, the
same must be deemed to have been impliedly eliminated
- CFI Manila
o denying the motion holding in effect that with the promulgation of the Rules of Court by
the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing were
not only superseded but expressly repealed,
o that the Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly
omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said
Rules of Court, and
o that the reference to said statute by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 on the provisions
regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage.
- SC
o If it were merely procedural, not having been incorporated in the Rules of Court, the
logical conclusion is that the rule- making power has deemed wise to eliminate it. But no
such presumption, nor conclusion, can be drawn for the reason that the right to a trial by
assessors is substantive in the sense that it must created and defined by express enactment
as opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress therefor.
o A substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or
property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of
public affairs, whereas rules of procedure are provisions prescribing the method by
which substantive rights may be enforced in courts of justice."
 Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights,
or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that
part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective
or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain
redress for their invasions
o The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and
as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
 Being substantive in nature, the provisions concerning trial by assessors
embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure have not been incorporated by the
Supreme Court in the present Rules of Court. To have done so, it would have
been a travesty of its rule-making power which, by direct mandate of the
Constitution, is limited to matters referring to pleading, practice and procedure

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  The claim that the provisions concerning trial by assessors embodied in the Code
of Civil Procedure are not wholly substantive but portions thereof are remedial is
true
 because said remedial provisions are inextricably interwoven with the
substantive part, it must have been deemed wise and proper to leave
them as they were for reasons of coordination and expediency, it being a
truism that the one cannot be detached from the other. Ubi jus ibi
remedium. Remedial measures are but implementary in character
and they must be appended to the portion of the law to which they
belong.
o Trial with aid of assessors: they had been reaffirmed and reenacted by Republic Act No.
409, which was approved in 1949, or nine years after the Rules of Court became
effective.
 This Congress can do, for, while our Constitution has given the power to adopt
rules of procedure to the Supreme Court, such grant did not preclude Congress
from enacting any procedural law or altering, amending, or supplementing any of
the rules that may be promulgated by the Supreme Court

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Ello v. Judge of First Instance of Antique, G.R. No. L-26802, 23 July 1926 – Municipal Election
Exercise of Jurisdiction
- FACTS
o Contention of Petitioner
 Respondent judge, in deciding the municipal election contest between the
petitioner Anselmo Ello and the respondent Inocencio Valdevin, candidates for
the office of municipal president of the municipality of Patanongan, Province of
Antique, adjudicated 291 votes to the respondent Valdevin and 289 to the
petitioner;
 that the respondent judge failed to adjudicate 3 ballots with detachable
coupon numbers to the respondent Valdevin, and likewise failed to
adjudicate 6 ballots, also with detachable coupon numbers, to the petitioner;
 that the failure of the respondent judge to count said 3 ballots, with detachable
coupon numbers, in favor of the respondent and 6 in favor of the petitioner
constitutes and excess of his jurisdiction.
o Respondents filled a demurrer to the herein petition upon the ground that the facts alleged
in the petition do not constitute a cause of action of certiorari
- SC
o The Election Law grants jurisdiction to Courts of First Instance to try and decide election
contests and their decisions are final with respect to municipal offices.
o A judicial error in the solution of a question of fact or law is not sufficient for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari; in addition, it is necessary that the court, in exercising
its powers in an irregular manner, should have exceeded its jurisdiction or should have
abused its legal powers. The fact that it may have decided it right or wrong makes no
difference so far as its jurisdiction is concerned.
o Certiorari is not a remedy for correcting errors of fact or law, but was created for the
purpose of protecting interested parties from acts which judges or courts, without
jurisdiction or acting in excess thereof as granted by the law, may commit.
o JURISDICTION vs EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
 When a court exercises its jurisdiction an error committed while engaged in
that exercise does not deprive it of the jurisdiction which it is exercising
when the error is committed.
 They are all decisions made in the exercise of its jurisdiction and however
erroneous they may be, if they or any of them are erroneous at all, it had power
and authority to make them and they cannot be attacked on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction
 Supposing that said ruling were erroneous, nevertheless, such error, if any,
appears to have been committed in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the
respondent judge.

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Radiowealth Finance Company v. Pineda, G.R. 227147, 30 July 2018 – Loan and Promissory Note
Jurisdiction vs Venue
- FACTS
o Petitioner extended a loan to respondents, as evidenced by a Promissory Note, in the
amount of P557,808.00 payable in 24 equal monthly installments of P23,242.00, which
was secured by a Chattel Mortgage (vehicle)
o Promissory Note states that "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under this
Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the] National Capital
Judicial Region or in any place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a
branch/office, a[t] its sole option.
o Petitioner filed Complaint for sum of money and damages with application for a Writ of
Replevin before the RTC of San Mateo Rizal, since it has branch therein
- RTC San Mateo Rizal
o Lack of jurisdiction due to: (a) petitioner's principal place of business is in Mandaluyong
City, Metro Manila; and (b) respondents' residence is in Porac, Pampanga, it has no
jurisdiction over any of the party-litigants
- SC
o "Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in
a case. In addition to being conferred by the· Constitution and the law, the rule is settled
that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant
allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the
character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted."
 Venue, which only pertains to the place or geographical location where a case is
filed.
o Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. Thus, an action may be filed only with the
court or tribunal where the Constitution or a statute says it can be brought. Objections to
jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be brought at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. When a case is filed with a court which has no jurisdiction over the
action, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the case.
 venue is "the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought." In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural
law. A party's objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the objection shall be
deemed waived. When the venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court
cannot motu proprio dismiss the case.
o Jurisprudence instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce
another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the
filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue
 Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may
be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties
may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed
by law.
 As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must
be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place
o venue stipulation found in the subject Promissory Note is restrictive. even if it appears
that venue has been improperly laid, it is well-settled that the courts may not motu

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 proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. Without any objection at the
earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is deemed waived
o RTC erred in motu proprio dismissing petitioner's complaint before it.

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Dy v. Hon. Bibat-Palamos, et. al., G.R. No. 196200, 11 September 2013 – Supervening event of
sinking of ship
(Judicial Hierarchy)
- FACTS
o Spouses Dy were proprietors of Limchia Enterprises, shipping business
 They obtained loan to fund the acquisition of M/V Pilar-I
 Limchia Enterprises executed the Deed of Chattel Mortgage over M/V Pilar-I
o M/V Pilar-I was attacked by pirates, Spouses Dy failed to make the scheduled payments
as required in their promissory note
 Spouses Dy applied for the restructuring of their loan.
o Respondent filed the Complaint and Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred
Ship Mortgage under Presidential Decree No. 1521 with Urgent Prayer for Attachment
with the RTC. RTC ordered the seizure of M/V Pilar-I
o Respondent transferred all of its rights, title to and interests, as mortgagee, in M/V Pilar-I
to Colorado Shipyard Corporation (Colorado)
- RTC Makati
o RTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Dy, ruling that they had not yet defaulted on
their loan because respondent agreed to a restructured schedule of payment.
o The RTC ordered that the vessel be returned to Spouses Dy. This was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals (CA), with the modification that Spouses Dy be ordered to reimburse
the respondent for repair and dry docking expenses while the vessel was in the latter’s
possession.
o SC affirmed upholding the findings of the CA but deleting the order requiring Spouses
Dy to reimburse respondent
o Petitioners filed motion for execution. But Colorado filed its Manifestation that M/V
Pillar-I had severely damaged and sunk, and requesting that vessel be cut into pieces and
sell its parts and deposit the proceeds
 Comment/Objection: petitioner insisted that he had the right to require that the
vessel be returned to him in the same condition that it had been at the time it was
wrongfully seized by respondent or, should it no longer be possible, that another
vessel of the same tonnage, length and beam similar to that of M/V Pilar-I be
delivered
- SC
o Hierarchy of courts
 Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is
improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to
be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby
allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket. 16 Nonetheless, the
invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been
allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons
clearly stated in the petition, such as,
 (1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public
policy;
 (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
 (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or
 (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called
for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.
 This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Justice demands that this Court take cognizance of this case to put an end to

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 the controversy and resolve the matter which has been dragging on for more
than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in light of the fact that what is involved is a
final judgment promulgated by this Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call
upon its original jurisdiction and seek final clarification.
o Ordinary Appeal vs Petition for Certiorari
 The remedy for errors of judgment, whether based on the law or the facts of the
case or on the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision, is an ordinary appeal.
 A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action designed to correct
errors of jurisdiction, defined to be those "in which the act complained of was
issued by the court, officer, or quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of in
excess of jurisdiction.
 A court or tribunal can only be considered to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion if its exercise of judgment was so whimsical and
capricious as to be equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be
extremely patent and gross that it would amount to an "evasion of a
positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility
 a misappreciation of evidence on the part of the lower court, as asserted
by petitioner, may only be reviewed by appeal and not by certiorari
because the issue raised by the petitioner does not involve any
jurisdictional ground.
o Immutability of Judgements
 When a supervening event renders the execution of a judgment impossible or
unjust, the interested party can petition the court to modify the judgment to
harmonize it with justice and the facts.
 A supervening event is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance which
develops after a judgment has become final and executory. This includes matters
which the parties were unaware of prior to or during trial because they were not
yet in existence at that time.
o It would be the height of injustice to permit there turn of M/V Pilar-I to petitioner in
pieces, especially after a judgment by this very same Court ordering respondent to restore
possession of the vessel to petitioner. Respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the value of
M/V Pilar- I at the time it was wrongfully seized by it.

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Panlilio, et. al v. Salonga, G.R. No. 113087, 27 June 1994 – Habeas Corpus in Makati while case is in
Cavite
(Doctrine of Non Interference or Judicial Stability)

- FACTS
o Honorable Josefina Guevara Salonga, Presiding Judge of Branch 149 of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region acceded to the writ of habeas
corpus filed by the natural mother albeit the grandparents of the minor child had been
previously designated guardians ad litem by another coordinate court in Naic,
Cavite
o Petitioners were grandparents and father of Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio
- RTC Makati
o petitioners moved to dismiss the habeas corpus petition on the basis of litis pendentia as
well as lack of cause of action
- SC
o The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of
a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable
barrier to the competencia of the Makati court to entertain the habeas corpus case on
account of the previous assumption of jurisdiction by the Cavite court, and the
designation of petitioners as guardians ad litem of the ward.
o Doctrine of non-interference has been regarded as an elementary principle of higher
importance in the administration of justice that the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent
jurisdiction
o While habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of minor children, yet
this principle is understood to presuppose that there is no other previous case whose
issue is necessarily interwoven with the nature of a habeas corpus proceeding.
Verily, the existence of an anterior suit, such as the termination of private respondent's
parental authority in the Cavite court, coupled with the order appointing principal
petitioners as guardians ad litem of the ward, is sufficient to momentarily stave off
private respondent's short-cut and subtle attempt to regain custody of her son at another
forum, by reason of the corollary principle that initial acquisition of jurisdiction by a
court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction
o it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate
authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-
ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action.

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Aquino et. al., v. Quiazon, et. al. G.R. No. 201248 March 11, 2015 – Quieting of Title
(Cause of Action)
- Facts
o Petitioners were heirs of the late Epifanio Makam and Severina Bautista, who acquired a
house and lot situated in Magalang, Pampanga, consisting of 557 square meters, by virtue
of a Deed of Sale, dated April 20, 1894
 they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, adverse, and
notorious possession for more than a hundred years
 sometime in June 2005, they received various demand letters from the
respondents
 upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga, they
confirmed that the property had been titled in the name of respondents
o Respondents asserted that they had inherited the same from their predecessor-in-interest,
Fausta Baluyut, one of the registered owners under Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. RO-1138 (11376), as per the Project of Partition and Deed of Agreement, dated
January 2, 1974;
 that petitioners had been occupying the property by mere tolerance.
- Respondents’ arguments
o Petitioners have no valid, legal, and sufficient cause of action because their deed of sale
was spurious and could not prevail over Land Registration Decree No. 122511 issued on
June 28, 1919 in Land Registration Case No. 5, LRC Records No. 128, by the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, in favor of their predecessor-in-interest.
o The action was barred by prescription and guilty of laches (OCT issued in 1922; Land
Registration Decree in 1919). Petitioners instituted the action after more than 80 years.
o Title registered under Torrens system could not be defeated by adverse, open, and
notorious possession.
o Barred by res judicata and forum shopping because of earlier civil case dismissed by
RTC
- Petitioners’ arguments
o Lack of cause of action due to spurious deed of sale can only be resolved in a full-blown
trial.
o The deed of sale was genuine and authentic and was issued and certified by the Deputy
Clerk of Court of the RTC
o An action to quiet title did not prescribe if the plaintiffs were in possession of the
property in question.
o they were neither guilty of laches nor were they in possession of the property by mere
tolerance, their possession being in the concept of owner for more than a hundred years.
o they were not the same plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5487 and that the case was dismissed
without prejudice.
- RTC Angeles City (Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses)
o Respondents presented witnesses and documents offered as evidences
o Petitioners manifested that they were opting to submit the incident for resolution without
presenting evidence, relying on their position that only the facts alleged in the complaint
should be considered.
o RTC Angeles City dismissed the complaint
 It found that based on the decision, dated June 28, 1919, in Cadastral Case No. 5,
the Baluyut siblings, respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, were declared the
absolute owners of the subject property, over the claim of Jose Makam, the

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 predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, who was one of the oppositors in the said
case.
 Deed of sale had become invalid by virtue of the June 28, 1919 decision
 RTC Br. 59 ruled that under Section 2 in relation to Section 6, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense in the answer
might be had at the discretion of the court, during which the parties could present
their arguments and their evidence.
 It stated that the court may consider evidence presented in hearings
related to the case, which was an exception to the general rule that only
the complaint should be taken into consideration.
 “the complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of
action”
o CA
 Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a court is allowed to conduct a
preliminary hearing, motu proprio, on the defendant’s affirmative defenses,
including the ground of "lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of
action."
 Since the rule allows the trial court to conduct a preliminary hearing on this kind
of an affirmative defense, it follows then that evidence could be submitted and
received during the proceedings which the court may consider in forming its
decision.
o ISSUE
 Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint on the
ground of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action.
o SC
 Failure to State a Cause of Action vs Lack of Cause of Action
 distinction between the two grounds for dismissal of an action: failure to
state a cause of action, on the one hand, and lack of cause of action, on
the other hand. The former refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the
pleading, the latter to the insufficiency of factual basis for the action.
Failure to state a cause may be raised in a Motion to Dismiss under Rule
16, while lack of cause may be raised any time. Dismissal for failure to
state a cause can be made at the earliest stages of an action. Dismissal for
lack of cause is usually made after questions of fact have been resolved
on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.
 it can be gleaned from the decisions of both the trial court and the CA
that respondents’ defense of "lack of cause of action" was actually
treated as a "failure to state a cause of action," which is a ground for a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16.
 The ground of "lack of cause of action," as already explained, however,
is not one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, and
hence, not proper for resolution during a preliminary hearing held
pursuant to Section 6. On this point alone, the trial court clearly erred in
receiving evidence on the ground of "lack of cause of action" during the
preliminary hearing. The factual matters raised by respondents in their
affirmative defense arguing the non-existence of a cause of action,
should have been duly resolved during a trial on the merits of the case.
 Test if complaint fails to state a cause of action
 The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state
a cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting

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 hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the
complaint, a judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the
complaint.
 In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in
the complaint may properly be considered. It is error for the court to
take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to
determine their existence. If the allegation in a complaint furnish
sufficient basis by which the complaint may be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed
by the defendants
 in determining the existence of a cause of action, only the allegations in
the complaint may properly be considered. For the court to do
otherwise would be a procedural error and a denial of the plaintiff’s right
to due process
 Quieting of Title
 In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites
must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title
or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
 It is readily apparent from the complaint that petitioners alleged that (1)
they had an interest over the subject property by virtue of a Deed of Sale,
dated April 20, 1894; and that (2) the title of respondents under TCT No.
213777-R was invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable.
Hypothetically admitting these allegations as true, as is required in
determining whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action,
petitioners may be granted their claim.
 Clearly, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. In resolving
whether or not the complaint stated a cause of action, the trial court
should have limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the allegations
in the complaint. It was proscribed from inquiring into the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or the authenticity of any of the documents
referred or attached to the complaint, as these were deemed
hypothetically admitted by the respondents.
 Exceptions and Section 6 not applicable
 there are exceptions to the general rule that allegations are hypothetically
admitted as true and inquiry is confined to the face of the complaint.
o First, there is no hypothetical admission of (a) the veracity of
allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice; (b)
allegations that are legally impossible; (c) facts inadmissible in
evidence; and (d) facts which appear, by record or document
included in the pleadings, to be unfounded.
o Second, inquiry is not confined to the complaint if culled (a)
from annexes and other pleadings submitted by the parties;
(b) from documentary evidence admitted by stipulation
which disclose facts sufficient to defeat the claim; or (c) from
evidence admitted in the course of hearings related to the case.
 It has been held, however, that such a hearing is not necessary when
the affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action, and that it

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 is, in fact, error for the court to hold a preliminary hearing to determine
the existence of external facts outside the complaint. The reception and
the consideration of evidence on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, has been held to be improper and impermissible.
Thus, in a preliminary hearing on a motion to dismiss or on the
affirmative defenses raised in an answer, the parties are allowed to
present evidence except when the motion is based on the ground of
insufficiency of the statement of the cause of action which must be
determined on the basis only of the facts alleged in the complaint and
no other.
 The exception of "hearings related to the case," therefore, pertains to
hearings other than the hearing on a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action.
 Other affirmative defenses
 affirmative defenses of prescription and res judicata, it appears that this
case could not have been dismissed on these grounds.
o First, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are
in possession of the property, which is the situation prevailing in
the present case.
o Second, there appears to be no res judicata nor a violation of the
prohibition against forum shopping considering that Civil Case
No. 5487 had been dismissed, without prejudice, years before
petitioners initiated their complaint for quieting of title.
 In sum, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action.
 The case is ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for trial on
the merits of the case

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Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran, G.R. No. 197380, 8 October 2014
(Insufficient basis not a ground for motion to dismiss)
- RTC San Mateo Rizal
o Petitioner Eliza Zuñiga-Santos filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of
title against respondents and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City before the RTC.
o In her Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged, among others,
 that she was the registered owner of three (3) parcels of land located in the
Municipality of Montalban, Province of Rizal, prior to their transfer in the name
of private respondent Gran;
 she has a second husband by the name of Lamberto C. Santos (Lamberto), with
whom she did not have any children;
 she was forced to take care of Lamberto’s alleged daughter, Gran, whose birth
certificate was forged to make it appear that the latter was petitioner’s daughter;
 pursuant to void and voidable documents, i.e., a Deed of Sale, Lamberto
succeeded in transferring the subject properties in favor of and in the name of
Gran;
 despite diligent efforts, said Deed of Sale could not be located;
 Accordingly, petitioner prayed, inter alia, that Gran surrender to her the subject
properties and pay damages, including costs of suit.
o Gran filed motion to dismiss
 (a) the action filed by petitioner had prescribed since an action upon a written
contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action
accrues, or in this case, from the time of registration of the questioned documents
before the Registry of Deeds;
 (b) the Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action as the void and
voidable documents sought to be nullified were not properly identified nor the
substance thereof set forth
o Dismissed the Amended Complaint for its failure to state a cause of action, considering
that the deed of sale sought to be nullified – an “essential and indispensable part of
[petitioner’s] cause of action” – was not attached
- CA
o CA sustained the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended Complaint but on the ground of
insufficiency of factual basis
 Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was not attached to the Amended Complaint,
it was impossible for the court to determine whether petitioner’s signature therein
was a forgery and thus, would have no basis to order the surrender or
reconveyance of the subject properties.
- SC
o Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to
dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the
pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal
for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings
through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack
of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved
on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.
o Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The
remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the
second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been
eliminated in this section.

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 o it is apparent that the CA based its dismissal on an incorrect ground. From the preceding
discussion, it is clear that “insufficiency of factual basis” is not a ground for a motion to
dismiss. Rather, it is a ground which becomes available only after the questions of fact
have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the
plaintiff.
o without any presentation of evidence even conducted, it is perceptibly impossible to
assess the insufficiency of the factual basis on which the plaintiff asserts his cause of
action, as in this case.
o A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3)
essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
 (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created;
 (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and
 (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
o plaintiff’s cause of action should not merely be “stated” but, importantly, the statement
thereof should be “sufficient.”
 only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts are considered
for purposes of applying the test. This is consistent with Section 1, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court which states that the complaint need only allege the ultimate facts
or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential
if they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action
inadequate. Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material allegations, it follows that the analysis should be confined to the four
corners of the complaint, and no other.
o the allegations therein do not proffer ultimate facts
 Amended Complaint does allege that petitioner was the registered owner of the
subject properties in dispute, nothing in the said pleading or its annexes would
show the basis of that assertion, either through statements/documents tracing the
root of petitioner’s title or copies of previous certificates of title registered in her
name.
 the filing of the motion to dismiss assailing the sufficiency of the complaint does
not hypothetically admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice of
to be not true, nor does the rule of hypothetical admission apply to legally
impossible facts, or to facts inadmissible in evidence, or to facts that appear to
be unfounded by record or document included in the pleadings
 A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or
defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions
of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal,
ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity,
are mere conclusions of law.
 By merely stating a legal conclusion, the Amended Complaint presented no
sufficient allegation upon which the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed
for.
o Prescription
 If there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in
possession, the action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in ten

14 | P a g e
 (10) years, the reference point being the date of registration of the deed or the
issuance of the title.
 On the other hand, if the real owner of the property remains in possession of the
property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property
does not run against him and in such case, the action for reconveyance would be
in the nature of a suit for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
o AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the Amended Complaint be dismissed on the
grounds of (a) failure to state a cause of action, and (b) prescription as herein discussed.

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Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, 13 August 2012
- Facts
o Case involves the estate of late spouses Baylon
o Petitioners are 2nd wife of Ramon and their children
o Respondent Florante (son of Ramon on 1st wife) is grandson of late spouses Baylon
o Rita and Panfila were children of late spouses Baylon
o Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition, accounting and damages against
Florante, Rita and Panfila.
 They alleged therein that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime, owned 43 parcels
of land all situated in Negros Oriental.
 After the death of Spouses Baylon, they claimed that Rita took possession of the
said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income from the same.
 Using the income produced by the said parcels of land, Rita allegedly purchased
two parcels of land situated in Canda-uay, Dumaguete City.
 The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a partition of the said parcels of
land.
o Respondents claimed that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 were acquired by Rita
using her own money.
o During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997,
conveyed Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 to Florante. Rita died.
o Petitioners filed a Supplemental praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent
be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. They further alleged
that Rita was already sick and very weak when the said Deed of Donation was
supposedly executed and, thus, could not have validly given her consent thereto.
- RTC Tanjay City Negros Oriental
o The donation inter vivos executed by Rita Baylon in favor of Florante Baylon is
rescissible for the reason that it refers to the parcels of land in litigation x x x without the
knowledge and approval of the plaintiffs or of this Court
- CA
o Reversed and Set aside RTC ruling
o before the petitioners may file an action for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable
judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 actually belonged to the estate
of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA asserted, an action for rescission is
premature.
o Further, the CA ruled that the petitioners’ action for rescission cannot be joined with their
action for partition, accounting and damages through a mere supplemental pleading.
- Issue
o whether the CA erred in ruling that the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of
Lot No. 4706 in favor of Florante may only be rescinded if there is already a judicial
determination that the same actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon
- SC
o involves two separate, distinct and independent actions – partition and rescission.
 First, the petitioners raised the refusal of their co-heirs, Florante, Rita and
Panfila, to partition the properties which they inherited from Spouses Baylon.
Second, in their supplemental pleading, the petitioners assailed the donation inter
vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante
pendente lite
o Joinder of Actoin

16 | P a g e
  joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the
uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of
more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil
causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the
same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain
circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in
one declaration, complaint or petition.
 objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the
same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a
complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the
parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation
at minimum cost.
 such joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the
joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules.
 an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil
action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure.
o Misjoinder not ground for dismissal
 misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts
have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to
order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with
separately.
 the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over all
of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same.
o A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as it has some relation
to the original cause of action set forth in the original complaint.
 a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary
pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace
that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the
original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with the original pleading
remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a continuation of the
complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change
the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy
referred to in the original complaint.
 The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts
which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled;
hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original right of action,
or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even
though they themselves constitute a right of action
 supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or events
which had transpired after the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented,
even if the said supplemental facts constitute another cause of action.
o rescission of the Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997 is hereby REINSTATED. The case
is REMANDED to the trial court for the determination of the ownership of Lot No. 4709
and half of Lot No. 4706 in accordance with this Decision

Rule 3. Parties to Civil Action

Navarro v. CA, G.R. No. 100257. June 8, 1992. -Proper Party

17 | P a g e
(Priority is given to legal administrator, only in cases of extrajudicial settlement and delay for
heirs)
- Facts
o applicants Marcelo Yadno (now deceased) and Filmore Laoyan, respectively, sought to
register certain parcels of land
o Marcelo Yadno seeks to register a parcel of land situated at Barrio Pico, Municipality of
La Trinidad, Province of Benguet
o Filmore Laoyan applied for the registration of a parcel of land situated at Sitio Longlong,
Barrio Pico, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet,
o Notices of initial hearing were published in Official Gazette
o Director of Lands and Director of Forestry seasonably filed an opposition on the ground
that neither the applicants nor their predecessor-in-interest possesses sufficient title to
acquire ownership in fee simple of the parcels of land applied for: that they have not been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in
question for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the present application;
o Private individual Michael Amos, among others, opposed as well.
 Evaristo Tiotioen, a former clerk of the Municipal Treasurer’s Office of La
Trinidad, Benguet, testified that during the time the tax receipts were issued to
the Laoyan family, they were paying taxes but on another land and not the one
applied for by them
 Atty. Crisogono S. Bartolo, Jr. of the Bureau of Lands also stated in his
testimony that he had made an inspection of the land in question, that the
applications of Marcelo Yadno and Filmore Laoyan overlapped the area surveyed
by Michael Amos. He also found out that Michael Amos has made permanent
improvements on the land while applicants Yadno and Laoyan did not introduce
any
 Yadno and Laoyan were not able to show any improvements made by them,
whereas, Amos was able to show houses, dirt roads, fences, plants and canals
 The late Tulinga Pul-ot, and his widow, Signao Pul-ot, possessed the land applied
for, located at Bo. Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, Mountain Province, since 1932.
They declared the land before the Second World War for tax purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 209. Then, Signao Pul-ot, because of old age, relinquished her
rights thereto in favor of Evaristo Tiotioen. Evaristo declared that the spouses
occupied the property as early as 1932. After the Second World War, the
property was occupied by Michael Amos, after acquiring the same from him
(Tiotioen) who received as consideration for the transfer "cash", "some
seedlings", and also "helped me in my survey." That Amos has made permanent
improvements on the land, is borne out by the testimony of Atty. Crisogono S.
Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands, corroborated by Generoso Javier, a forester
of the Bureau of Forestry
- RTC Baguio and Benguet
o Court renders judgment dismissing the applications of Marcelo Yadno and Filmore
Laoyan, and awarding the parcel of land under PSU-198528 to oppositor Michael Amos
as the true and lawful owner and ordering the registration of the same in his name
- CA
o Marcelo Yadno appealed with the Court of Appeals but during the pendency of the
appeal Marcelo Yadno died
o Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court

18 | P a g e
 o Atty. Jose Edward Navarro filed a pleading denominated as a notice of substitution and
motion for reconsideration. It prayed, among others, that Atty. Felipe Navarro, the
counsel of the late Marcelo Yadno, take the place of Marcelo Yadno as a substitute
- ISSUE
o whether or not Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, the petitioner, is the proper party to represent
Marcelo Yadno, the deceased.
- SC
o SUBSTITUTION
 Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court sets the rule on substitution of parties in
case of death of any of the parties. Under the Rule, it is the court that is called
upon, after notice of a party’s death and the claim is not thereby extinguished, to
order upon proper notice the legal representative of the deceased to appear within
a period of thirty (30) days or such time as it may grant.
 Section 16 Rule 3 provides that it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the
court promptly of such death . . . and to give the name and residence of the
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative of the deceased.
 Navarro did not give any explanation why he failed to give the name and
residence of the executor, administrator or guardian of the deceased, if there was
any, and in their absence at least the name and residence of the heirs of Yadno
who shall take the place of the deceased
 Priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased, that is, the executor
or administrator of his estate. It is only in cases of unreasonable delay in the
appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs
resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, that the court may adopt the
alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased
o being conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals, this Court finds them to be final and
binding. Decision of CA is affirmed.
-

19 | P a g e
Briones v. CA, G.R. No. 204444, 14 January 2015
- Facts
o Briones is the owner of a property covered by TCT No. 160689 (subject property)
o His sister informed him that his property had been foreclosed and a writ of possession
had already been issued in favor of Cash Asia.
o Upon investigation, Briones discovered that: (a) on December 6, 2007, he purportedly
executed a promissory note, loan agreement, and deed of real estate mortgage covering
the subject property (subject contracts) in favor of Cash Asia in order to obtain a loan in
the amount of ₱3,500,000.00 from the latter;12 and (b) since the said loan was left
unpaid, Cash Asia proceeded to foreclose his property.
o Briones claimed that he never contracted any loans from Cash Asia as he has been living
and working in Vietnam since October 31, 2007. He further claimed that he only went
back to the Philippines on December 28, 2007 until January 3, 2008 to spend the holidays
with his family, and that during his brief stay in the Philippines, nobody informed him of
any loan agreement entered into with Cash Asia.
o Briones assailed the validity of the foregoing contracts claiming his signature to be
forged.
o Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
o Subject contract states "all legal actions arising out of this notice in connection with the
Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof shall only be brought in or submitted to the
jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati City."
- RTC Manila
o Denied motion to dismiss
- CA
o Anulled RTC ruling without prejudice to refiling in Makati
- Issue
o whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the outright dismissal of
Briones’s complaint on the ground of improper venue
- SC
o the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the
venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
o As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils. instructs that the parties,
thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising from
such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive
venue
o Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed
only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their
suitnot only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law.
o In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this
purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the
exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation should be
deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum
o venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature, considering
that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati
City.
o Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his
compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence,

20 | P a g e
 pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a
court in the City of Manila where the subject property is located.
o GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 5, 2012 and the Resolution dated
October 4, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117474 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE

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Ley Construction and Development Corporation v. Sedano, G.R. No. 222711, 23 August 2017
- Facts
o Ley Construction leased a 50,000-square meter (sq.m.) parcel of land located at Financial
Center Area, Pasay City (now, Lot 5-A Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard, Pasay City)
from the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC)
o Ley Construction subleased portion to Marvin Medel Sedano for a monthly rent
o Sedano failed to pay the rent due for August to December 2011 and refused to settle
o Sedano paid the rent to PNCC when it demanded that the rent be directly paid to it
because of Ley Construction’s eviction by court order
o “Lease Contract” states "[a]ll actions or case[s] filed in connection with this case shall be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others."
o Sedano pointed out that venue is improperly laid.
 Third Party Claim: Should he be found liable to petitioner, respondent
maintained that the RTC should hold PNCC liable to reimburse to him the
amounts he paid as rentals
 Counter Claim: reimburse the overpayment to him, and to pay him moral and
exemplary damages, including litigation expenses, in view of petitioner's filing of
such baseless suit
- Valenzuela RTC
o Dismissed on ground of improper venue
 Sec 21 of Contract void insofar as it limits the filing of cases with the RTC of
Pasay City, even when the subject matter jurisdiction over the case is with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts.
 stipulation validly limits the venue to the RTC of Pasay City
 collection of sum of money in an amount that is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, petitioner should have filed the case with the RTC of Pasay City
o improper venue was among the defenses raised in respondent's Answer. As such, it was
timely raised and, therefore, not waived.
- ISSUE
o Valenzuela-RTC erred in ruling that venue was improperly laid
- SC
o exclusive venue stipulation is valid and binding, provided that: (a) the stipulation on the
chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent; (b) it is expressed in writing by the
parties thereto; and (c) it is entered into before the filing of the suit.
o Provision in contract shows the parties' intention to limit the place where actions or cases
arising from a violation of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease may be
instituted. This is evident from the use of the phrase "exclusive of all others" and the
specification of the locality of Pasay City as the place where such cases may be filed
o clearly dismissible on the ground of improper venue, without prejudice, however, to its
refiling in the proper court.
o The prevailing rule on objections to improper venue is that the same must be raised at the
earliest opportunity, as in an answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it is deemed
waived.
o Since his counterclaim and third-party complaint are not covered by the venue
stipulation, respondent had, therefore, every right to invoke the same whilst raising the
ground of improper venue against petitioner's complaint, which action was, on the
contrary, covered by the stipulation.

22 | P a g e
 o petition is DENIED. Valenzuela RTC affiemd

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Racpan v. Barroga-Haigh, G.R. No. 234499, 6 June 2018
- Facts
o Rudy Racpan filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of sale before RTC
Davao
o After his wife’s death, their daughter discovered a Deed of Sale with Right to Purchase
dated March 29, 2011. The Deed of Sale was purportedly signed by him and his late wife
and appeared to convey to respondent Sharon Barroga-Haigh a real property registered in
his name located in Tuganay Carmen Davao de Norte
o Deed of Sale was falsified and fictitious as he never signed any contract, not even any
special power of attorney, for the sale or conveyance of the property which is still in his
possession.
o Respondent contended that venue was improperly laid
- RTC Davao
o Dismiss the complaint
- CA
o Affirmed the dismissal because it is real action as it wants the court to abrogate and
nullify. whatever right or claim the respondent might have on the property subject of the
Deed of Sale.
o Complaint should have been lodged with the RTC of Davao del Norte and not the RTC-
Davao
- Issue
o whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's Complaint
- SC
o What determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case. On
one hand, if the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a
contract or the recovery of damages, his complaint is a personal action that may be filed
in the place of residence of either party. On the other hand, if the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of real property, or if the action affects title to real property or for the recovery
of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property, then the complaint is a real action that must be brought before the court where
the real property is located.
o Where the action is not intended for the recovery of real property but solely for the
annulment of a contract, it is a personal action that may be filed in the court where the
plaintiff or the respondent resides
o ownership of the parcels of land subject of the questioned real estate mortgage was never
transferred to petitioner, but remained with TOPROS. Thus, no real action for the
recovery of real property is involved. This being the case, TOPROS' action for annulment
of the contracts of loan and real estate mortgage remains a personal action.
o Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 34, 742-2012 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE

24 | P a g e
Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, G.R. No. 104649, 28 February 1994
- Facts
o Philippine Banking Corporation, filed a complaint below with prayer for preliminary
attachment on December 5, 1991 against private respondents herein, Brinell Metal Works
Corporation and Spouses Jose and Nally Ang, for collection of a loan evidenced by two
(2) promissory notes
o Respondents filed with the respondent court a motion to dismiss on the grounds of (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (b) improper venue.
 They claim that summons was served on defendant corporation’s customer who
was not authorized to receive the same for and in behalf of the corporation.
 They likewise object to the venue claiming that the plaintiff’s complaint is based
on two promissory notes which commonly declare, among
 "I/WE HEREBY EXPRESSLY SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURTS OF MANILA, ANY LEGAL ACTION WHICH MAY
ARISE OUT OF THIS PROMISSORY NOTE.
- RTC Makati
o Dismissed on improper venue
- Issue
o whether or not the respondent court erred in holding that the venue of the action was
improperly laid
- SC
o Venue relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court.
o In other words, venue is waivable. It is procedural, not a jurisdictional matter. It is
intended to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the
courts. The rules on venue simply arrange for the convenient and effective transaction of
business in the courts and do not relate to their power, authority or jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action.
o the philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the
convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the end of justice.
o While the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to the jurisdiction of the Manila
courts, there is nothing in the language used in the aforecited stipulation which clearly
shows that the intention of the parties was to limit the venue of the action to the City of
Manila only
o Restating the rule, venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and
enforceable, do not as rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be
considered merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive.
o GRANTED and the orders of respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 146, at Makati, dated February 28, 1992 and March 11, 1992 dismissing the
complaint and denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby REVERSED

25 | P a g e
RULE 6

Kinds of Pleading

1. Galvez v. CA, G.R. No. 157445, 3 April 2013

 Facts
o The case involves a parcel of land (property) located in Barangay District II, Babatngon,
Leyte, which used to be owned by Spouses Eustacio and Segundina Galvez.
o After their marital relationship turned sour, Eustacio and Segundina separated and
cohabited with other partners.
o On January 6, 1981, Eustacio sold the property to their daughter Jovita without the
knowledge or consent of Segundina.
o After the sale, Jovita constituted a mortgage on the property on March 9, 1981 to secure
her loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
o Jovita failed to pay her obligation. Hence, PNB had the property extrajudicially
foreclosed.
o In the ensuing foreclosure sale, PNB was the highest bidder. There being no redemption,
the property became PNB’s acquired asset.
o On June 10, 1992, respondents Spouses Honorio and Susana Montaño purchased the
property from PNB.
o Thereafter, the Montaños tried to get the actual possession of the property, but Segundina
refused to vacate. Accordingly, the Montaños sued Segundina for recovery of ownership
and possession, and damages in the Municipal Trial Court of Babatngon, Leyte (MTC).
o Segundina countered that the sale of the property by Eustacio to Jovita was null and void
for having been done without her knowledge and consent; that the sale to PNB as well as
to the Montaños were consequently void; and that the Montaños were also buyers in bad
faith.
 MTC Babatngon, Leyte
o MTC ruled in favor of the Montaños, holding that the sale by Eustacio to Jovita was
merely voidable, not null and void;
o that because Segundina had not brought an action for the annulment of the sale within 10
years from the date of the transaction, as provided in Article 173 of the Civil Code, the
sale remained valid;
o that Segundina did not establish that the foreclosure proceedings, auction sale, and the
acquisition of the property by the Montaños were void;
o and that in view of the valid acquisition of the property by PNB during the foreclosure
sale, the subsequent sale to the Montaños was also valid.
 RTC Tacloban
o RTC affirmed MTC’s decision; MR was also denied
 CA (Petition for Review)
o Dismissed the petition due to failure to attach the pleadings
 ISSUE
o Whether or not CA erred in requiring that all pleadings filed before the lower court be
attached to the petition
 SC
o Considering that Segundina attached the certified true copies of the MTC decision dated
February 4, 2000, the RTC decision dated November 29, 2000, and the RTC order dated
April 22, 2002, the mandatory nature of the requirement of attaching clearly legible
duplicate originals or certified true copies of the judgments or final orders is not in issue

26 | P a g e
 here. What is in issue was her failure to attach "the pleadings and other material portions
of the record as would support the allegations of the petition."
o it is settled that the petitioner’s failure to append the pleadings and pertinent documents
to the petition can be rectified by the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration to
which is attached the omitted pleadings and documents as required by the CA.
o the mere failure to attach copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record
as would support the allegations of the petition for review is not necessarily fatal as to
warrant the outright denial of due course when the clearly legible duplicate originals or
true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the
clerk of court of the RTC, and other attachments of the petition sufficiently substantiate
the allegations.
o three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching the pleadings and portions of
the records to the petition
 First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the
petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The
test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the
material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a
prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give
due course to the petition.
 Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not
be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also found in
another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material
allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will
suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
 Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still
be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that
petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the
higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.
o Besides, even had the CA actually believed that the proper consideration of the petition
for review would be requiring another look at the factual issues, it could still resolve
such issues by relying on the accepted principle that the factual findings of the lower
courts were entitled to great weight.
o Likewise, were a reference to the records of the trial court be held by the CA to be still
necessary to settle any remaining doubt as to the propriety of the factual findings of the
lower courts, the CA could have itself called upon Segundina to submit additional
documents, or could have itself directed the clerk of court of the RTC to elevate the
original records to enable it to make a complete adjudication of the case. Outright
denial of due course under the circumstances contravened Segundina's right to be heard
on her appeal, and constituted a gross error on the part of the CA.
o Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
assailed resolution

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2. Bungcayao v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings, G.R. No. 170483, 19 April 2010-on counterclaim
 Facts
o Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of the two entrepreneurs who
introduced improvements on the foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978 when
Fort Ilocandia Hotel started its construction in the area.
o Thereafter, other entrepreneurs began setting up their own stalls in the foreshore
area. They later formed themselves into the D'Sierto Beach Resort Owner's Association,
Inc. (D'Sierto).
o In July 1980, six parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (now Calayad) were transferred
to the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1704.
Fort Ilocandia Resort Hotel was erected on the area.
o In 1992, petitioner and other D'Sierto members applied for a foreshore lease with the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and was granted
a provisional permit.
o Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation (respondent) filed
a foreshore application over a 14-hectare area abutting the Fort Ilocandia Property,
including the 5-hectare portion applied for by D'Sierto members.
o The foreshore applications became the subject matter of a conflict case, docketed
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Case No. 5473, between
respondent and D'Sierto members.
o DENR Regional Executive Director Victor J. Ancheta denied the foreshore lease
applications of the D'Sierto members, including petitioner, on the ground that the
subject area applied for fell either within the titled property or within the foreshore
areas applied for by respondent. The D'Sierto members appealed the denial of their
applications. In a Resolution dated 21 August 2003, then DENR Secretary Elisea G.
Gozun denied the appeal on the ground that the area applied for encroached on the
titled property of respondent based on the final verification plan.
o In a letter dated 18 September 2003, respondent, through its Public Relations Manager
Arlene de Guzman, invited the D'Sierto members to a luncheon meeting to discuss
common details beneficial to all parties concerned. Atty. Liza Marcos (Atty. Marcos),
wife of Governor Bongbong Marcos, was present as she was asked by Fort Ilocandia
hotel officials to mediate over the conflict among the parties. Atty. Marcos offered
P300,000 as financial settlement per claimant in consideration of the improvements
introduced, on the condition that they would vacate the area identified as respondent's
property. A D'Sierto member made a counter-offer of P400,000, to which the other
D'Sierto members agreed.
o Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who attended the meeting,
manifested that he still had to consult his parents about the offer but upon the undue
pressure exerted by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment and signed the Deed of
Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of respondent
o Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag, City, Branch 13 (trial court), docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 12891-13, against respondent. Petitioner alleged that his son had no authority to
represent him and that the deed was void and not binding upon him.
o Respondent countered that the area upon which petitioner and the other D'Sierto
members constructed their improvements was part of its titled property under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-31182. Respondent alleged that petitioner's sons, Manuel, Jr.
and Romel, attended the luncheon meeting on their own volition and they were able to
talk to their parents through a cellular phone before they accepted respondent's offer. As
a counterclaim, respondent prayed that petitioner be required to return the amount

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 of P400,000 from respondent, to vacate the portion of the respondent's property he was
occupying, and to pay damages because his continued refusal to vacate the property
caused tremendous delay in the planned implementation of Fort Ilocandia's
expansion projects.
 RTC Laoag City
o In an Order dated 6 November 2003, the trial court confirmed the agreement of the
parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and the return
of P400,000 to respondent. Petitioner's counsel, however, manifested that petitioner
was still maintaining its claim for damages against respondent.
o Petitioner and respondent agreed to consider the case submitted for resolution on
summary judgment.
o The trial court considered the case submitted for resolution. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that he manifested in open court that he was withdrawing his
earlier manifestation submitting the case for resolution. Respondent filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. The trial court rendered a Summary Judgment dated 13 February
2004.
o the only issue raised by petitioner was his claim for damages while respondent's issue
was only his claim for possession of the property occupied by petitioner and damages.
The trial court noted that the parties already stipulated on the issues and admissions had
been made by both parties. The trial court ruled that summary judgment could be
rendered on the case.
o The trial court ruled that the alleged pressure on petitioner's sons could not constitute
force, violence or intimidation that could vitiate consent. As regards respondent's
counterclaim, the trial court ruled that based on the pleadings and admissions made, it
was established that the property occupied by petitioner was within the titled property of
respondent.
 CA affirmed trial court’s decision
o the only issue to be resolved is whether the subject property was within the titled property
of respondent. Hence, summary judgment was properly rendered by the trial court
o the counterclaims raised by respondent were compulsory in nature, as they arose out of or
were connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and did not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court could not acquire jurisdiction
 Issue
o Whether respondent's counterclaim is compulsory
 SC
o A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending
party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is
necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the plaintiff's complaint.
 It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court,
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not
set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case.
 Any other counterclaim is permissive.

o The Court has ruled that the compelling test of compulsoriness characterizes a
counterclaim as compulsory if there should exist a logical relationship between the
main claim and the counterclaim. The Court further ruled that there exists such a
relationship

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  when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would
entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court;
 when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues;
 or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the
parties.
o The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory are as follows:
 (a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely
the same?
 (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim, absent the
compulsory rule?
 (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well
as defendant's counterclaim?
 (d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim?
o In this case, the only issue in the complaint is whether Manuel, Jr. is authorized to sign
the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of respondent without
petitioner's express approval and authority. In an Order dated 6 November 2003, the trial
court confirmed the agreement of the parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim and the return of P400,000 to respondent. The only claim that
remained was the claim for damages against respondent. The trial court resolved this
issue by holding that any damage suffered by Manuel, Jr. was personal to him. The trial
court ruled that petitioner could not have suffered any damage even if Manuel, Jr. entered
into an agreement with respondent since the agreement was null and void.
o Respondent filed three counterclaims.
 The first was for recovery of the P400,000 given to Manuel, Jr.;
 the second was for recovery of possession of the subject property; and
 the third was for damages.
 The first counterclaim was rendered moot with the issuance of the 6
November 2003 Order confirming the agreement of the parties to cancel
the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and to return
the P400,000 to respondent.
 Respondent waived and renounced the third counterclaim for damages.
 The only counterclaim that remained was for the recovery of possession
of the subject property. While this counterclaim was an offshoot of the
same basic controversy between the parties, it is very clear that it will not
be barred if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case.
Respondent's second counterclaim, contrary to the findings of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, is only a permissive
counterclaim. It is not a compulsory counterclaim. It is capable of
proceeding independently of the main case.
o The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. Any decision rendered
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal
before this Court. In this case, respondent did not dispute the non-payment of docket fees.
Respondent only insisted that its claims were all compulsory counterclaims. As such, the
judgment by the trial court in relation to the second counterclaim is considered null
and void without prejudice to a separate action which respondent may file again

o Summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to
decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where
the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper.

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  A "genuine issue" is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
 Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be
proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the
amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary
judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
 A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
 A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to
raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving
party show that such issues are not genuine.

Rule 7. Parts of Pleadings

3. Fernandez v. Villegas, G.R. No. 200191 August 20, 2014-verification

- FACTS
o petitioner Lourdes C. Fernandez (Lourdes) and her sister, Cecilia Siapno (Cecilia) filed a
Complaint for Ejectment before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Dagupan
City(MTCC)
o Respondent Norma Villegas (Norma) and any person acting in her behalf including her
family (respondents), seeking to recover possession of a parcel of land situated in Guilig
Street, Dagupan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 191706 (subject
property).
o In their complaint, Lourdes and Cecilia(plaintiffs) averred that they are the registered
owners of the subject property on which both Lourdes and respondents previously lived
under one roof. However, when their house was destroyed by typhoon "Cosme," Lourdes
transferred to a nipahut on the same lot, while Norma, Cecilia’s daughter-in-law, and her
family were advised to relocate but, in the meantime, allowed to use a portion thereof.
o Instead, respondents erected a house thereon over plaintiffs’ objections and, despite
demands, refused to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property. The dispute
was referred to the Barangay Office of Pugo Chico and the Public Attorney’s Office, both
of Dagupan City, but no settlement was reached.
o Respondents averred that the complaint stated no cause of action, considering that
Lourdes has no standing to question their possession of the subject property as she had
already donated her portion in favor of Cecilia, adding too that the latter is bound by her
declaration that "the house and lot belong[s] to Eddie," who is Norma’s late husband.
o Respondents further asserted that there was no compliance with the required conciliation
and mediation under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law as no Certificate to File
Action was attached to the complaint, thereby rendering the complaint dismissible.
- MTCC Dagupan City
o MTCC found that respondents failed to impugn the validity of plaintiffs’ ownership over
the subject property.
- RTC
o RTC granted respondents’ appeal and ordered the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint based
on the following grounds: (a) there was no substantial compliance with the mandatory
conciliation and mediation process before the barangay, especially considering that the
parties are very close relatives; and (b) respondents are builders in good faith and cannot
be summarily ejected from the subject property without compliance with the provisions
of Articles 448, 546, and 548 of the Civil Code

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 - CA
o In response to plaintiffs’ CA petition, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on
the grounds that: (a) Cecilia failed to personally verify the petition; and (b) the appeal
is dilatory.
o In their comment, plaintiffs maintained that Lourdes, as co-owner of the subject
property, has the right to file an ejectment case by herself, without joining her co-
owner, Cecilia, as provided under Article 487 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Lourdes was
specially authorized by Imelda to file the CA petition.
o CA granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal, holding that the verification and
certification against forum shopping attached to the CA petition was defective since
it was signed only by Lourdes, one of the plaintiffs in the case, in violation of Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which requires all the plaintiffs to sign the same. There was
also no showing that Lourdes was authorized by her co-plaintiff, Cecilia, to represent the
latter and to sign the said certification, and neither did the submission of the special
powers of attorney of Cecilia and Imelda to that effect constitute substantial
compliance with the rules. The CA further noted that plaintiffs failed to comply with its
prior Resolution dated October 11, 2010 requiring the submission of an amended
verification/certification against forum shopping within five (5) days from notice,
warranting the dismissal of the CA petition on this score.
- SC
o Guidelines with respect to noncompliance with the requirements on or submission of a
defective verification and certification against forum shopping
 As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that
the ends of justice may be served thereby.
 Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged
in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
 As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons."
 The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign
will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense,
the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
 Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of
Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
o Lourdes is not only a resident of the subject property but is a co-owner thereof together
with her co-plaintiff/sister, Cecilia. As such, she is "one who has ample knowledge to

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 swear to the truth of the allegations in the x x x [CA] petition" and is therefore qualified
to "sign x x x the verification" attached thereto
 [W]here the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interestin
the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners
executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the
court from proceeding with the action.
o under reasonable or justifiable circumstances - as in this case where the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense -
the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against forum
shopping may be relaxed
o the petition is GRANTED. Resolution by CA is Set Aside and Reversed.

4. Victoriano v. Dominguez, G,R. 214794, 23 July 2018-verification and non-form shopping

5. Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc., G.R. NO. 207970, 20
January 2016- on material averments

6. Far East Marble v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94093 August 10, 1993- ultimate facts v. evidentiary
facts

7. Salita v. Magtolis-G.R. No. 106429 June 13, 1994-ultimate facts

- Facts
o Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic Church
in Ermita, Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They
separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of
Joselita’s psychological incapacity.
o Bill of Particulars by Edwin states that she was unable to understand and accept the
demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon
petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to
her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job
o Salita argued that this is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and
not an averment of ‘ultimate facts
- RTC QC
o trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her
responsive pleading
o Salita filed a petition for certiorari and SC referred the petition to CA
- CA
o the aforesaid specification more than satisfies the Rules’ requirement that a complaint
must allege the ultimate facts constituting a plaintiff’s cause of action. To require more
details thereof, to insist on a specification of Salita’s particular conduct or behavior with
the corresponding ‘circumstances of time, place and person’ indicating her alleged
psychological incapacity would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters.
- SC
o Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal
conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital
obligations she allegedly was not able to perform
- Issue

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 o whether the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient definiteness
or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading
or for trial
- SC
o A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or
causes of action."
o Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected evidence will
support."
o As stated by private respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established."
 It refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the
evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts." And a
motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very
definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. A motion for bill
of particulars may not call for matters which should form part of the proof of the
complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other means.
o the Bill of Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action,
and to require more details from private respondent would be to ask for information on
evidentiary matters.
o On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already
prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that
"she (petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his
profession . . . upon his time and efforts . . . " Certainly, she can respond to this. To
demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts —
facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts.
o Petition denied, resolution of CA is affirmed

Rule 8. Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings

Rule 9. Effect of Failure to Plead

8. Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell, G.R. No. 131471, 22 January 2003

9. Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corporation and the Philippine Bank of Communications G.R.
No. 193494, 7 March 2014- Rules on Default and Effect

10. Villareal v. CA, G.R. No. 107314, 17 September 1998-On Default

Rule 10. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

11. Central Bank Board Of Liquidators v. Banco Filipino Savings And Mortgage Bank, G.R. No.
173399, 21 February 2017
12. Constantino v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-16853 , 29 June 1963- on amendment of pleadings

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