HELD: NO both issues.
The petitioners pointed out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite
Boac, et al. v. Cadapan and Empeño
GR 184461-62 ; May 31, 2011
BY: BACANI
Petitioner: Lt. Col. ROGELIO BOAC, Lt. Col. FELIPE ANOTADO, and Lt. FRANCIS
MIRABELLE SAMSON
Respondent: ERLINDA CADAPAN and CONCEPCION EMPEÑO
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.
DOCTRINE: An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal
liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit.
Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government
agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved
individuals.
FACTS: Armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeño (Karen) and Manuel
Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded onto a
jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.Spouses Asher
and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
Court, impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac,
Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson as respondents.
The Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals. By Return of the Writ, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that
abductees are in the custody of the military. Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition. The Court, however, further resolves to
refer the case to the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and
the Philippine National Police for separate investigations and appropriate actions as may be
warranted by their findings and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on the outcome
of their investigations and the actions taken thereon.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision. Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo With Prayers for
Inspection of Place and Production of Documents The petition impleaded the same
respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, then AFP Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then PNP Chief Gen.
Avelino Razon, Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, and Donald Caigas. Then President Arroyo was
eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while in office.
By Resolution the Court issued a writ of amparo returnable to the Special Former Eleventh
Division of the appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of the amparo petition with the
pending habeas corpus petition. By Decision of the appellate court granted the Motion for
Reconsideration and ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño may file for a writ of amparo on
behalf of Manuel Merino
2. Whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates in
an amparo proceeding
standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in
the following order:
a. Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and
parents of the aggrieved party;
b. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
c. Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no
known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known members of
the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order mandated
by the above-quoted provision must be followed. The order of priority is not without
reason—"to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo
which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.”
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas corpus
on Merino’s behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus proceeding, any
person may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party. It is thus only with respect to
the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen are precluded from filing the
application on Merino’s behalf as they are not authorized parties under the Rule.
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of
individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather,
it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government
agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved
individuals. Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis enlightens:
An amparo proceeding does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at
least accountability, for the enforced disappearance…for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance…
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to
determine criminal liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as
amparo cases are concerned. Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited
application of command responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining the
responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any
transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it
should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable
for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so
as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the
premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the
determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |1
criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for further investigation to
administrative issuances, if there be any. determine the respective criminal and administrative liabilities of respondents. All the present
petitions are REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, directed at monitoring
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order of the DOJ, PNP and AFP investigations and the validation of their results. SO ORDERED.
to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement
whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court
Marcos v. Fariñas, et al.,
does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in
GR No. 232395 ; Date: July 3, 2018
the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the
BY: CRUZ
responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal
liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government
Petitioner: MARIA IMELDA JOSEFA "IMEE" R. MARCOS, Co-petitioner
agency.
Respondent: THE HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE RODOLFO C. FARINAS, THE
HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE JOHNNY T. PIMENTEL, Chairman of the Committee
Relatedly, the legislature came up with RA 9851 to include command responsibility as a form of
on Good Government and Public Accountability, and LT. GEN. ROLAND DETABALI
criminal complicity in crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes.
(RET.), in his capacity as Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives,
RA 9851 is thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors
Respondents
who, despite their position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their
Ponente: Tijam, J.
power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. DOCTRINE:

The Court finds that the CA erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that it
FACTS:
found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and
House Resolution No. 882 was introduced by respondent Fariñas directing House Committee
Merino. For, from the records, it appears that the responsible and accountable individuals
to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, pertaining to the use by the Provincial Government of
are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and
Ilocos Norte of its shares from the excise taxes on locally manufactured virginia-type cigarettes
Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to comply with the CA Decision to
for a purpose other than that provided for by Republic Act No. 7171.
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
Allegedly, the purchases by the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte of vehicles in three
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of
separate transactions from the years 2011 to 2012 were in violation of R.A. No. 7171 as well as
merit as there is no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for
of R.A. 9184 and P.D. No. 1445.
the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. Since the right to life,
liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and
Because of petitioners' absence, a subpoena ad testificandum was issued by co-respondent
execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of
House Committee on directing petitioners to appear and testify under oath at a hearing set on
delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately
May 16, 2017.
protect.
Likewise, an invitation was sent to co-petitioner Marcos to appear on said hearing.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the Court renders
Petitioners failed to attend the hearing.
the following judgment: (1) The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 184461-62 and G.R. No. 184495 are
DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 17, 2008 is AFFIRMED
House Committee issued a Show Cause Order why they should not be cited in contempt for
with modification in that respondents in G.R. No. 184495, namely Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt.
their refusal without legal excuse to obey summons.
Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and
Additionally, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos were notified of the next scheduled hearing.
Donald Caigas are ordered to immediately release Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and
Manuel Merino from detention. The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino
In response to the Show Cause Order, petitioners reiterated that they received the notice only
are DISMISSED; (2) The petition in G.R. No. 187109 is GRANTED. The named respondents are
one day prior to the scheduled hearing date in alleged violation of the three-day notice rule
directed to forthwith comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court.
under Section 818 of the House Rules Governing Inquiries.
Owing to the retirement and/or reassignment to other places of assignment of some of the
respondents herein and in G.R. No. 184495, the incumbent commanding general of the 7th
On one hand, petitioners allege that at the hearing of May 29, 2017, they were subjected to
Infantry Division and the incumbent battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion, both of
threats and intimidation.
the Philippine Army, are enjoined to fully ensure the release of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño
and Manuel Merino from detention. Respondents Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle
According to petitioners, they were asked "leading and misleading questions" and that
Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas shall
regardless of their answers, the same were similarly treated as evasive. They alleged that such
remain personally impleaded in the petitions to answer for any responsibilities and/or
manner of questioning involving threats, intimidation and coercion caused them to be cited in
accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies. Let copies of this Decision
contempt and ordered detained.
and the records of these cases be furnished the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Philippine
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |2

Respondents aver that petitioners were evasive in answering questions and simply claimed not
to remember the specifics of the subject transactions.
According to respondents, petitioners requested to be confronted with the original documents
to refresh their memories when they knew beforehand that the Commission on Audit (COA) to
which the original vouchers were submitted could no longer find the same.
The next day, petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondent House
Sergeant-at Arms Lieutenant General Detabali before the CA, which issued a writ of
Habeas Corpus ordering Detabali to produce the bodies of the petitioners before the court on
June 5, 2017.
Detabali again failed to attend.
A motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus was also filed on the ground that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the petition.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Provisional Release based on petitioners' constitutional right to
bail.
Detabali, through the OSG, opposed the motion.
The CA issued a Resolution denying Detabali's motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus
and granting petitioners' Motion for Provisional Release upon posting of a bond.
Accordingly, the CA issued an Order of Release Upon Bond. Attempts to serve said Resolution
and Order of Release Upon Bond to Detabali were made but to no avail.
The House of Representatives called a special session for the continuation of the legislative
inquiry.
Thereat, a subpoena ad testificandum was issued to compel co-petitioner Marcos to appear.
While the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before the CA, petitioners and co-petitioner
Marcos filed the instant Omnibus Petition.
During the congressional hearing which petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos attended, and
while the present Omnibus Petition is pending final resolution by the Court, respondent House
Committee lifted the contempt order and ordered the release of petitioners.
Consequently, petitioners were released on the same date.
The CA issued a Resolution in the Habeas Corpus Petition considering the case as closed and
terminated on the ground of mootness.
Arguments:
● Petitioners Pedro S. Agcaoili, Jr., et. al, all employees of the Provincial Government of
Ilocos Norte seek that the Court assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition
earlier filed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals, and upon assumption, to
direct the CA to forward the records of the case to the Court for proper disposition
and resolution.
● Respondents counter that the Omnibus Petition should be dismissed on the ground
of mootness as petitioners were released from detention.
● In any case, respondents argue that petitioners cannot compel the Court to assume
jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition pending before the CA as assumption of
jurisdiction is conferred by law. Respondents also argue that the Omnibus Petition is
dismissible on the grounds of misjoinder of action and for failure to implead
indispensable parties, i.e., the CA in the petition to assume jurisdiction over the
Habeas Corpus Petition and the Congress in the prohibition and Amparo petitions.
Respondents also argue that petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed
the present Omnibus Petition at a time when a motion for reconsideration before the
CA was still pending resolution
● Co-petitioner Maria Imelda Josefa "Imee" Marcos – the incumbent Governor of the
Province of Ilocos Norte – joins the present petition by seeking the issuance of a writ
of prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for purposes of declaring the
legislative investigation into House Resolution No. 8825 illegal and in excess of
jurisdiction, and to enjoin respondents Representatives Rodolfo C. Fariñas and
Johnny T. Pimentel and co-respondent Committee on Good Government and Public
Accountability from further proceeding with the same.
● Respondents counter that a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to enjoin
legislative actions. House Committee is not a tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising judicial or ministerial function but a separate and independent branch of
government.
● Petitioners contend that their rights to liberty and personal security were violated as
they have been detained, while co-petitioner Marcos is continuously being
threatened of arrest.
● In opposition, respondents maintain that the writ of Amparo and writ of Habeas
Corpus are two separate remedies which are incompatible and therefore cannot co-
exist in a single petition. Further, respondents argue that the issuance of a writ of
Amparo is limited only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
which are not extant in the instant case.
ISSUES: Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition sufficiently states a cause of action for
the issuance of a writ of Amparo?
HELD: No.
The filing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo before this Court while the Habeas
Corpus Petition before the CA was still pending is improper.
Petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos failed to show, by prima facie evidence, entitlement to the
issuance of the writ. Much less have they exhibited, by substantial evidence, meritorious
grounds to the grant of the petition. Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily admit
that the instant Omnibus Petition does not cover extralegal killings or enforced disappearances,
or threats thereof. Thus, on this ground alone, their petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo
is dismissible.
The alleged unlawful restraint on petitioners' liberty has effectively ceased upon their
subsequent release from detention. The apprehension of co-petitioner Marcos that she will be
detained is, at best, merely speculative. In other words, co-petitioner Marcos has failed to show
any clear threat to her right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo. It
appears that petitioners and co petitioner Marcos even attended and participated in the
subsequent hearings without any untoward incident. Petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos thus
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |3
failed to establish that their attendance at and participation in the legislative inquiry as resource
persons have seriously violated their right to liberty and security, for which no other legal
recourse or remedy is available. Perforce, the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo must
be dismissed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to
discuss the other issues raised in the Omnibus Petition. WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Petition is
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Razon, et al. v. Tagitis,
G.R. No. 182498;December 3, 2009
BY: GORDON
Petitioner: GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP);
Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief,
Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO,
Regional Director of ARMM, PNP
Respondent: MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P.
ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact
Ponente: BRION, J.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis is a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor
for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme
He was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.
Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’
fellow student counselor at the IDB reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.
More than a month later , the Mary B. Tagitis (Tagitis), Engr. Tagitis's wife, filed a Petition for
the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the Court of Appeals (CA).
The petition was directed against certain members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP):
Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen.
Avelino I. Razon, Chief, PNP; Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina,
Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao,
Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror
Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners].
The petition went on to state:
Soon after the Tagitis left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to
take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be
police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him
When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another
IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency.
Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to
locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the
police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis
could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group;
Information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified stated that
Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men; and according to reliable
information received by Tagitis, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police
intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr.
Tagitis with the different terrorist groups.
Tagitis filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and
in Jolo, seeking their help to find her husband, but Tagitis's request and pleadings
failed to produce any positive results.
The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to Tagitis's request for
help and failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support
and assistance in locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared
missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates
that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession and custody of Engr. Tagitis.
Tagitis has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and
under the circumstances, Tagitis has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches
of the [petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation
of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF
AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo. The
basis for the issuance by the Court of the Writ is as follows:
At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the Tagitis from the military, Lt. Gen
Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the
military, that was involved.
Thereafter, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis of the PNP did not
appear to be exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis’ disappearance.
Petitioners appealed the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court/They mainly dispute:
1. the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed
before the CA;
2. the sufficiency of the legal remedies the Tagitis took before petitioning
for the writ;
3. the finding that the rights to life, liberty and security of Tagitis had
been violated; t
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |4
 4. the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was
abducted;
5. the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the
abduction; and,
6. generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of
proving the allegations of the petition by substantial evidence
ISSUES:
1. WON the petition for writ of amparo filed is sufficient in form and substance;
YES
2. WON an enforced disappearance is a proper ground for issuance of a writ of
amparo; YES
3. WON there was an enforced disappearance in this case; YES
HELD:
1. In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent’s Amparo
petition, the petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of
the Amparo Rule.
a. SPECIFICALLY, the petitioners allege that Tagitis failed to, in her petition:
i. allege:
· any ACT or OMISSION the petitioners committed in violation of
Tagitis’ rights to LIFE, LIBERTY, and SECURITY
· in a complete manner HOW Tagitis was ABDUCTED, the persons
RESPONSIBLE for his DISAPPEARANCE, and the respondent’s
SOURCE of INFORMATION;
· the abduction was committed at the petitioners’ instructions or
with their consent;
· any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the
performance of their duties in the investigation of Tagitis’
disappearance;
ii. implead the members of PNP-CIDG regional office in Zamboanga
alleged to have custody over her husband;
iii. attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
iv. specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or
whereabouts of her husband.
b. The petitioners state that a petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed
and verified and shall allege, among others, as stated in Section 5 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
i. “(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with
the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;”
ii. “(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority
or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;”
iii. “(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and”
c. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) of the Rule to
be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a
victim’s rights.
i. As in any other initiatory pleading,the pleader must of course state the
ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary
details.
ii. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light
of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a
situation of uncertainty; hence the one filing the petition may not be
able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or
who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where
the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be
hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance.
d. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the
unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to
determine whether it contains the details available to the one filing the
petition under the circumstances, WHILE presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security
through State or private party action.
i. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, to determine if the
required elements-–-namely, of the disappearance, the State or
private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to
life, liberty or security-–- are present.
e. Applying these rules in the present case, the petition amply recites in its
paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly
dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was
nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him.
i. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to
paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police
operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction.
ii. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security
were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor
vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents’ police
intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the
CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest
attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different
terrorist groups."
f. If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of
supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule.
i. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one
that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly
followed.
g. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the
requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts
relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit
represents is essentially fulfilled.
h. Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an
alleged disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner and
results of the investigation.
i. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the Tagitis's petition
did not comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule,
as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his
companions immediately reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |5
 authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain that he
indeed had disappeared.
2. The present case is one of first impressions in the use and application of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo in an ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE situation.
a. The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."
i. However, while the Rule covers "enforced disappearances" this
concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction.
b. The Court clarifies that it does not rule on any issue of criminal culpability
for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that
requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on existing penal
laws.
i. Its intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance
has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this
disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to
address it.
c. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations,
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold.
i. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are
undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when
governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations
require.
ii. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the
victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored.
d. The absence of a specific penal law in the Philippines, however, is not
a stumbling block for action from this Court through the issuance of a
writ of amparo.
i. Because UNDERLYING every enforced disappearance is a
violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security
that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to
protect through its rule-making powers.
e. Furthermore, the Court has surveyed international law and states that
enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the
international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted
principle of international law, which should be considered a part of the law
of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed
under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.
i. This should serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
f. Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through
substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition
of "enforced disappearance," some material, among others, provide ample
guidance and standards on how, through the medium of the Amparo Rule,
the Court can provide remedies.
g. The Court also states that certain evidentiary difficulties are present
in the Amparo proceeding:
i. First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the
direct perpetrators.
· Experts note that abductors are well organized, armed and
usually members of the military or police forces.
ii. Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the
disappearance;
· The central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance-–-
i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim’s body-–-is usually concealed
to effectively thwart any investigation
· The problem for the victim’s family is the State’s virtual
monopoly of access to pertinent evidence.
iii. Third is the element of denial;
· In many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the
enforced disappearance ever occurred.
· "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances,
as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to
escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victim’s
human rights.
h. The characteristics an amparo proceeding of being summary and of
the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in
contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond
reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveals the clear intent of the
framers of the Amparo Rule to have it become similar to an
administrative proceeding.
i. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly
comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo
petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial
evidence.
3. The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance
within the meaning of this term under the UN Declaration we have cited?
a. The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such
a person outside the protection of the law."
b. Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced
disappearance are essentially fourfold:
i. arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
ii. carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State;
iii. followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a
concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and
iv. placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of
the law.
c. There is no DIRECT evidence indicating how the victim actually
disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out
of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel
desk and was never seen nor heard of again.
d. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned-–-the petitioner,
Engr. Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities-–-is that Engr
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |6
 Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen
again.
e. Likewise, there is no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG
Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis.
f. Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the Tatigits and her friends, and
that he provided them information that Tagitis was being held by police
officials.
i. However, this is based on the input of an unnamed asset.
ii. He simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal letter" he
received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in
the custody of the CIDG.
iii. He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was
merely a "raw report" from "barangay intelligence" that still needed
confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity.
g. To be sure, Tagitis’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies were far from perfect,
as the petitioners pointed out.
i. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than
anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the
respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material
points.
h. To consider also that some pieces of evidence are incompetent and
inadmissible evidence of is to state that in the absence of any direct
evidence, a court should dismiss the petition.
i. An immediate dismissal for this reason would make the Amparo Rule
ineffective, since it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties
that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
ii. To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects,
the Court declares that courts in amparo proceedings should at
least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the
correct import of every piece of evidence; and this should include
those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence
· But the Court must take into account the surrounding
circumstances and the test of reason which shall be used as a
basic minimum admissibility requirement.
i. The Court gleans from all these admitted pieces of evidence and
developments a consistency in the government’s denial of any complicity
in the disappearance of Tagitis, which is disrupted only by the report made
by Col. Kasim to Tagitis about her husband. Even Col. Kasim, however,
eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under
custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism.
j. Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure,
made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government
complicity in the disappearance.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: we DENY the petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari for lack
of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the
following terms:
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced
disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring
the government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin
Kasim accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly
responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their
offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct
of proper investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show
investigation results acceptable to this Court;
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him
accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets"
in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed
at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of
their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a
plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of
Appeals for consideration and action;
g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as
petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter
counted from the finality of this Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their
investigations; the Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of
this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals’ made pursuant to this Decision shall
be given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent
Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, under pain of contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at
disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique
nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, these directives –
particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA – are specific to this case and
are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism
Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is hereby AFFIRMED.
De Lima, et al. v. Gatdula,
G.R. No. 204528, 19 February 2013
BY: LANZON
Petitioner: SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and
DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA,
Respondent: MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA
Ponente: LEONEN, J
DOCTRINE: The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to
safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. The Rule on the Writ was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power to
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |7
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to
address such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is a
special proceeding which seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
FACTS: From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B.
Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R.
Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE
LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist from framing up
Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder
against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident."
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo or not, the judge issued summons
and ordered the petitioners to file an answer. He also set the case for hearing.
The counsel for petitioners manifested that a Return and not an Answer is appropriate for
Amparo cases but the Judge opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied
since an Amparo case is summary in nature, thus, required an Answer.
The hearing was conducted and the judge ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda.
RTC then rendered a decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and interim reliefs
prayed for namely: Temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The production
and inspection orders were in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going
investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from
the records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty
or security of the respondent Gatdula.
The decision was assailed by the petitioners (De Lima) through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari via Rule 45 as enunciated in Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20
March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45
SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
ISSUES: 1. W/N the decision of the RTC could be a “judgment or final order that is
appealable via Rule 45 as expressed under Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
2. W/N there are procedural irregularities in issuing the writ of amparo in the RTC
3. W/N the decision granting the privilege of the Writ and the interim reliefs was correct?
4. W/N the petition should be dismissed
HELD: 1. It is the Court’s view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of
Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition
for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard
the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
The Rule on the Writ was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It
aims to address such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. It is a special proceeding which seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact. Hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously
misplaced.
The “decision” pertained to the issuance of the writ under Sec. 6 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, not the judgment under Sec. 18. The decision is an interlocutory order, as suggested
by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together
with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim relief
that may be granted by the court upon the filing of the petition but before final judgment is
rendered. Hence, a petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this
time since such remedy can only be availed for a final order such as a judgment under Sec. 18
of the Rule on Amparo.
2. YES. The filing of the answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an
Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose
right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated.
The holding of the hearing without the Return or prior to the issuance of the writ and the
filing of a Return was not proper. There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is
filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the
Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.
A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
3. . No, the decision was not correct. This gives the impression that the decision was the
judgment since the phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the
Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo. The judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will
mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or
security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.
4. NO. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order. A
Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present petition,
however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes
for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated
The SC still nullified the writ of amparo issued by Judge Pampilo Jr. in favor of the former NBI
director Magtanggol Gatdula because of procedural irregularities committed by the judge
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |8
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the
irregularities committed by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII,
Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr.
after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this
Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition
and its attached affidavits.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on Judge
Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper guidance
together with a WARNING that further deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC shall be meted with severe consequences. SO ORDERED
Castillo, et al. v. Cruz, et al.,
GR No.182165 ; Date: November 25, 2009
BY: ABRIGO
Petitioner: P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS,
RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA,
and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA
CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and
JOHNDOES, Petitioners,
Respondent: DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ,
Respondents.
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.
DOCTRINE: The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G.
Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land.
2. They refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial
Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local
projects.
3. The Province filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz
before the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.
4. The MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, and it became final and
executory.
5. The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent
writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment
against them.
6. The RTC, found a merit in the Spouses Cruzes’ allegation that subsequent
events changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the
execution of the final and executory judgment. RTC issued a permanent writ of
injuction.
7. The Province returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. The MTC, and
ruled that the permanent injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective.
8. The Spouses Cruz filed a motion before the RTC for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 on which
date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented.
9. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO.
10. Petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed
by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor
Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to "protect, secure and maintain the
possession of the property," entered the property.
11. Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property.
12. They insist that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province
from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them
and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of
light threats.
13. Respondents later filed a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo
and Habeas Data," docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008.
14. Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners
unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the
barbed wire fences and tents, 6 and arrested them when they resisted petitioners’
entry; and that as early as in the evening of February 20, 2008, members of the
Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property.
15. RTC issued writs of amparo and habeas data.
16. “…..police officers, some personnel from the Engineering department, and some
civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and
with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and stone-throwing of the
roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext of an
ordinary police operation when interviewed [sic] by the media then present, but
at 8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the
petitioners, subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the
debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police brutality,
sending chill in any ordinary citizen.”
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,
2. Whether or not Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already
filed.
HELD:
1. No. The petition is impressed with merit.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
● Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
● Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |9
 ● From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the
protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual
but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:
● To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the
threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy
arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents.
Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on
respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety
of petitioners’ entry into the property.
Apropos is the Court’s ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:
● What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported
by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
● The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.
● It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation,
imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations
that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then
willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered
and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested
the herein petitioners (respondents)" will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In
fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
● The respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights.
● Respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even
alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information
regarding their person, family, home and correspondence.
2. No.
● Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, petitioners even
instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic.
● Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for
writs of amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they allegi the
commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the
RTC, which petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.
● It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full
advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative
charges.
● It need not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and habeas
data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution
of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.
● At all events, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas
data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had
commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against
in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest
or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by
respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas
data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the
aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4,
2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID,
and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 53-M-
2008 is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Tapuz, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al.,
GR No.182484 ; Date: June 17 2008
BY: ANDAL
Petitioner: DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.
ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ,
IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS
Respondent: HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the
RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the
PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18
DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON
Ponente: Brion
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Private respondents, Sps. Sanson filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages with prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners, Tapuz et. al. and
other John Does totaling to 120 persons before Aklan MCTC.
Private respondents alleged that they are the (1) registered owner of the disputed land; and (2)
prior possessors, when Tapuz et. al., armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms
together with unidentified persons, entered the disputed land by force and intimidation without
their permission and build thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
Petitioners, in their answer, denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that they are
the (1) actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) private respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed
land is spurious, asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for
damages.
MCTC decided in private respondents’ favor, finding prior possession through the construction
of perimeter fence in 1993. Such was appealed by petitioners to RTC.
On appeal, Judge Marin granted private respondents’ motion for issuance of writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction upon posting of a bond but the writ authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by public respondent Judge Del
Rosario after private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration, while private respondents filed a motion for demolition.
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |10
Public respondent judge denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration to defer enforcement of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Meanwhile, petitioners opposed the motion for demolition, but public respondent judge
nevertheless, issued a special order – a Writ of Demolition to be implemented within 15 days
after the Sheriff’s notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their houses to allow private
respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and the Order of
Demolition before the CA.
Meanwhile, Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate and for Demolition; hence, petitioners filed before
SC a petition for Certiorari with prayer for Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.
ISSUES:
Whether petition for Certiorari with Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data, is proper? (NO)
HELD:
On Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the
petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost
on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the " CA petition")
for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although the
petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending
CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007,
which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated
assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the
other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA petition
was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of
the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of
sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a
seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.
On Writ of Amparo
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations
heretofore quoted, 23that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These
allegations are supported by the following documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong,
Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of
the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior possession, private respondents' intrusion and
the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 19
April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of
guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors - descendants of Antonio
Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating
Nemia's affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod
regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating
the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private
respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the
security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a
house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was
accidentally burned by a fire."
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical
possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to
life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past
violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent
of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist"
and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia
Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by
Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by
one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses
was "accidental."
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible
entry case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are significantly
complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after
examination and evaluation of the contending parties' positions, evidence and arguments and
based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute
(with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and
ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending;
still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to
us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if
decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of
terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents
alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if
the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable,
the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of
the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
On Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of
ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |11
 (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and
the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression
or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the
PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the
acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the
Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;
[…]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine
National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the
houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if
an investigation was conducted by the PNP."
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum,
thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of
unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for
information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as
integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the
insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum,
the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the " fishing
expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in
defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of
the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for
deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and attachments.
In Re: Rodriguez
GR 191805 ; November 15, 2011
BY: BACANI
Petitioner: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ
Respondent: GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS
AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT.
AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an
officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name
"HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN
Ponente: Sereno, J.
DOCTRINE: The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides
rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It
serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment
of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
FACTS: Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant organization
affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the
military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the state, making its members an easy target of
EJKs and enforced disappearances. On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a
tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him
and forced him to get inside a car where more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was
holding a .45 caliber pistol).
The men started punching him inside the car, and forced him to confess that he is a member of
the NPA. Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging to the 17th
Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. He was then subjected to beatings and torture by
members of the Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA
member and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot
answer, he was repeatedly beaten and tortured. He was also coerced to sign several
documents to declare that he is a surenderree.
On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him (accompanied by
members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They insisted to take Rodriguez home
with them to Manila. Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military
members went inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s
effort to stop them. On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend noticed that several
suspicious-looking men are following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT.
On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of
Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of
Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo,
Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa,
P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac,
Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their
informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels. Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
through the solicitor-general, insisted on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as
president). The Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently
alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC directed
the Court of Appeals to hear the petition.
CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino, Santos, De
Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture. As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was
dismissed for lack of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her
immunity from suits.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo and
habeas data cases
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |12
HELD: YES.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were
promulgated to ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security. The
rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. It is
an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes
of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.
It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it
serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of
impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and
action.
As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.” Although originally
used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found
application in civil cases for human rights abuses. It may plausibly be contended that command
responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings,
enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory
that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or
customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it
should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable
for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so
as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the
premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.
In the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine
whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of
Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in
amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine:
a. responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence
to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, and
b. accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those --
i. who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing
the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
ii. who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance
and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
iii. those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the
doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain
responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
Command Responsibility of the President
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements
must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior
and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command
responsibility doctrine. On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although
international tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, such may nonetheless be
established through circumstantial evidence.
In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with
constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226,
otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all
Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and
other Law Enforcement Agencies. Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable
for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that
a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his
subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge,
he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after
its commission.
Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the
acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been
repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his
immediate staff or office personnel are involved. Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent
or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the
president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the military.
PGMA’s accountability/responsibility
She is not responsible or accountable for Rodriguez’ abduction. In the case at bar, we find no
reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the same being supported
by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals that the
totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and
accountability of some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and
security.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly
contradictory, contention of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had
complained of his exhaustion from his activities as a member of the CPP-NPA, he
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |13
nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the NPA to become a double-
agent for the military.
Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention
and torture of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and
threatened the former’s right to security when they made a visual recording of his house,
as well as the photos of his relatives.Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced
by Rodriguez, as well as the contradictory defenses presented by respondents in G.R. No.
191805, give credence to his claim that he had been abducted, detained and tortured by
soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military.
It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there
was no substantial evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation,
Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security. Despite the dearth of evidence to show the CHR
officers’ responsibility or accountability, this Court nonetheless emphasizes its criticism as
regards their capacity to recognize torture or any similar form of abuse. The CHR, being
constitutionally mandated to protect human rights and investigate violations thereof, should
ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to and address human rights
violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably showed their insufficient competence in
facilitating and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez after his ordeal.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to
life, liberty and security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public official.
Moreover, in the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of
the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other
hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.
In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo that the right
to security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the
observance of the duty to investigate. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
has interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving
liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty. The
ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European
Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons.
In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or
accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on account of
their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the
hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen.
Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting no
efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events into consideration. Rather, these respondents
solely relied on the reports and narration of the military. The ruling of the appellate court must
be emphasized:
In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina are
accountable, for while they were charged with the investigation of the subject incident, the
investigation they conducted and/or relied on is superficial and one-sided. The records disclose
that the military, in investigating the incident complained of, depended on the Comprehensive
Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by 1Lt. Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer
of the 501st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Philippine Army. Such report, however, is
merely based on the narration of the military. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s
version of the subject incident and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged
abduction of petitioner.
Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of RA
6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the governmental office
with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal
offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." In this case, PDG
Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary investigation to unmask the
mystery surrounding petitioner’s abduction and disappearance. Instead, PDG Verzosa
disclaims accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no cause of action against him.
Palpable, however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to effectively and
aggressively investigate the violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security by
members of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 17th Infantry Division, Philippine Army.
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of
Rodriguez violated his right to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be
held responsible or accountable. Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable
to establish any responsibility or accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino,
P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had already retired
when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt. Santos had
already been reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six
months before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were
maintained against respondents Calog and Palacpac.
From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial
evidence that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig.
Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the
violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction,
detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and
effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no longer any need to issue a
temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect of enjoining
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.
It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in
the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command
responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove
through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for
the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through
substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in
G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The case is dismissed with
respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin
Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit. This Court directs the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate action
with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal competence, that
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |14
may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen.
Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and
Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the
results of their action within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision. In the event
that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated in
this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials
holding the relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of
court. SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL WRITS: WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Castillo, et al. v. Cruz, et al.,
GR No 182165. ; Date: November 25, 2009
BY: CRUZ
Petitioner: P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS,
RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and
GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ,
MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and JOHN DOES
Respondent: DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Respondent Amanda Cruz along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Sps. Cruz), leased a
parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos, refused to vacate the property, despite
demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan which intended to utilize it for local
projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Sps. Cruz before the (MTC) of
Bulacan, Bulacan.
MTC Ruling: against Sps. Cruz,
RTC Ruling: affirmed decision of MTC against Sps. Cruz, became final and executory
Sps. Cruz filed cases against the Province and the judges who presided over the case. Those
cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged before the RTC of
Malolos, and a civil case for injunction before RTC Malolos.
Sps. Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to
prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them.
RTC Ruling: in favor of Sps. Cruz, granted the MR of Sps. Cruz The trial court issued a
permanent writ of injunction. It remanded that the case on the issues raised by the petitioners
on the issued writ of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan.
MTC Ruling: approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction which the RTC
issued is ineffective.
On motion of the Province, MTC issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.
Then Sps. Cruz filed a motion before RTC for the issuance of a (TRO) however, the demolition
had, earlier in the day, been implemented.
RTC issued a TRO.
Sps. Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, entered the property,
placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the
property which was for lease.
Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in
compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to
"protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property," entered the property.
Respondent Cruz filed a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data,"
before the RTC Malolos.
Respondents Cruz allegations: despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully
entered the property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and
tents, and arrested them when they resisted petitioners’ entry; and that as early as in the
evening of, members of the PNP had already camped in front of the property.
RTC Ruling on the motion for the petition for the Writ of Amaparo and Habeas Data:
granted and issued writs of amparo and habeas data.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to sec. 19 of The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC), which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).
ISSUES:Whether or not the writ of Habeas Data is proper?
HELD: No.
Petitioners alleged that: insufficient in substance as the same involves property rights; and
criminal cases had already been filed and pending with MTC.
In the case respondents seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged
that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their
person, family, home and correspondence.
Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008,
petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and
academic by Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied.
Respondents filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan,
they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs
by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.
Respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the legal system
with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.
Respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies
which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a
property dispute.
Thus, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have
been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |15
arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with sec. 6, Rule 112
ROC
Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up
by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The
reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion
in the criminal proceeding
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of
rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of
unlawful acts or omissions.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4,
2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID,
and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 53-M-
2008 is DISMISSED.
Tapuz, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al.,
G.R. No. 182484; June 17, 2008
BY: GORDON
Petitioner: DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.
ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ,
IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS
Respondent: HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC,
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP
STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18 th DIVISION,
SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON
Ponente: BRION, J
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Private respondents, Sps. Sanson filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages with prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners, Tapuz et. al. and
other John Does totaling to 120 persons before Aklan MCTC.
Private respondents alleged that they are the (1) registered owner of the disputed land; and (2)
prior possessors, when Tapuz et. al., armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms
together with unidentified persons, entered the disputed land by force and intimidation without
their permission and build thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
Petitioners, in their answer, denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that they are
the (1) actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) private respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed
land is spurious, asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for
damages.
MCTC decided in private respondents’ favor, finding prior possession through the construction
of perimeter fence in 1993.
Such was appealed by petitioners to RTC.
On appeal, Judge Marin granted private respondents’ motion for issuance of writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction upon posting of a bond but the writ authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by public respondent Judge Del
Rosario after private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration, while private respondents filed a motion for demolition.
Public respondent judge denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration to defer enforcement of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Meanwhile, petitioners opposed the motion for demolition, but public respondent judge
nevertheless, issued a special order – a Writ of Demolition to be implemented within 15 days
after the Sheriff’s notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their houses to allow private
respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and the Order of
Demolition before the CA.
Meanwhile, Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate and for Demolition; hence, petitioners filed before
SC a petition for Certiorari with prayer for Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.
ISSUES: Whether petition for Certiorari with Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data, is proper
HELD: NO.
While Certiorari is dismissible on the grounds of (1) filed out of time; (2) forum-shopping; and (3)
substantive deficiencies, the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data cannot be granted on the
following grounds:
(1) On the Writ of Amparo – what is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither it is a writ that shall be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
In this case, what is involved is a property issues rooted from physical possession disputed by
the parties. No issues relating to life or liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that
the occurrence of the past violence has been alleged. Right to security, on the other hand, is
alleged only to the extent of threats and harassment implied from the presence of “armed men
bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons, however, none of the
supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the right to life, liberty and security of
the petitioners is imminent or continuing.
(2) On the Writ of Habeas Data – there are no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy related to the petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security.
In this case, petitioners failed to allege, much less, demonstrate, any need for information under
the control of the police authorities other than those already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on insufficiency of efforts made to
secure information has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Data is nothing more than a “fishing expedition” that the SC, in drafting the Rule on
Habeas Data, had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for
deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and attachments.
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |16

In Re: Rodriguez
G.R. No. 191805, 15 November 2011
BY: LANZON
Petitioner: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ
Respondent: GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS
AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT.
AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an
officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name
"HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN
Ponente: Sereno, J
DOCTRINE: The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. The writs of amparo and
habeas data were promulgated to ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and
security.
FACTS: Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant organization
affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the
military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the state, making its members an easy target of
EJKs and enforced disappearances. On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a
tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him
and forced him to get inside a car where more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was
holding a .45 caliber pistol).
The men started punching him inside the car, and forced him to confess that he is a member of
the NPA. Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging to the 17th
Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. He was then subjected to beatings and torture by
members of the Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA
member and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot
answer, he was repeatedly beaten and tortured. He was also coerced to sign several
documents to declare that he is a surenderree.
On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him (accompanied by
members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They insisted to take Rodriguez home
with them to Manila. Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military
members went inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s
effort to stop them. On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend noticed that several
suspicious-looking men are following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT.
On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of
Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of
Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo,
Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa,
P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac,
Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their
informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels. Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
through the solicitor-general, insisted on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as
president). The Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently
alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC directed
the Court of Appeals to hear the petition.
CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino, Santos, De
Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture. As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was
dismissed for lack of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her
immunity from suits.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of habeas data
cases
HELD: Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of
Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data do not determine criminal,
civil or administrative liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were
promulgated to ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security.
The rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information
is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy – especially the right to
informational privacy – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not
entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition
are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database
or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information
contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and
allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data
proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President
Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property.
He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of
respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.”
To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that
the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v.
Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the “responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict.” Although originally used for ascertaining
criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |17
cases for human rights abuses. In the United States, for example, command responsibility was
used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia — civil actions filed under the Alien Tort Claims DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in
Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act. This development in the use of command G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the
responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility
may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
held in Rubrico: P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or
threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary (DOJ) to take the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. their respective legal competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen.
should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the
accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action within a period of six months
complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be from receipt of this Decision.
appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As
intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives
liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to mandated in this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent
administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if officials holding the relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute
there be any. contempt of court.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to
determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the SO ORDERED.
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to
protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of
command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in
Lee v. Ilagan
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the Separate Opinion of
GR No. 203254 ; Date: October 8, 2014
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:
BY: ABRIGO
That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal,
civil or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of
Petitioner: DR. JOY MARGARTE LEE, Petitioner
command responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon
Respondent: P/SUPT. NERI A ILAGAN, Respondent
v. Tagitis in proper context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
command responsibility to Amparo cases.
From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial DOCTRINE: The petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to
evidence that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the
violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction,
FACTS:
detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and
1. Ilagan filed a Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data and alleged that he
effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of the writs of amparo and
and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners.
habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no longer any need to issue a
2. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter's condominium, rested for a
temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect of enjoining
while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.
his digital camera was missing.
3. Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter's office regarding a purported sex video
It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in
(subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and
the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command
another woman.
responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove
4. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail.
through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for
5. During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall
the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through
inside his office and walked away.
substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz,
6. Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints
Pasicolan and Callagan.
against Ilagan.

SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |18

 7. Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and
threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the
NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to
life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and
thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.
8. RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data.
9. In her Verified Return, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the memory card of
the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she only
did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan.
10. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was only
aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed;
and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data
regarding the person of Ilagan.
11. The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor, and
accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject
video to him, and enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same.
12. The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense as she violated the latter’s right
to privacy in life and caused him to suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this
relation, the RTC opined that Lee’s use of the subject video as evidence in the
various cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its
reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC clarified that it is only ruling on the return of
the aforesaid video and not on its admissibility before other tribunals.
13. Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
favor of Ilagan
HELD: NO.
● As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands
as "a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party." Thus, in order to support a petition for the
issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the
petition sufficiently alleges, among others, "[t]he manner the right to privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of
the aggrieved party." In other words, the petition must adequately show that there
exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be
supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing
out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague and doubtful.
● In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right
to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan
purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or
contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence
on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s
privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data
cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data
petition dismissible, as in this case.
● In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would
equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the
records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving
testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by
the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee
actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right
to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a
reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to
achieve unlawful ends - say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin
Ilagan' s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the
only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the
same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against
Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring
absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the R TC
Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.
MERALCO, et al. v. Lim
GR No. 184760 ; Date: October 5, 2010
BY: ANDAL
Petitioner: MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A.
SAPITULA
Respondent: ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM
Ponente: Carpio-Morales
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, an administrative clerk at the Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO), learned of an anonymous letter that was posted at the door of
the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at
which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
“Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON
NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO,
WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…”
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |19
By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing,
directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as “A/F
OTMS Clerk,” in light of the receipt of “… reports that there were accusations and threats
directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her]
safety and security.”
Respondent questions the propriety of MERALCO’s action in a letter as “highly suspicious…”
and being “punitive”, but the latter never responded. Respondent filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s transfer until such
time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case
and cannot restrain MERALCO’s prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its
employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute,
petitioners argue that "although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is
essentially questioning the transfer of her place of work by her employer" and the terms and
conditions of her employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the
Memorandum transferring respondent’s place of work which is purely a management
prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-2003 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or
injunctive writs in labor-related cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of
the writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s
person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such
activities.
ISSUES:
W/N the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data? (YES)
HELD:
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum
directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or
data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas
data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against
abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats
to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under
prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario that the writs of
amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what
prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such
concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty
or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly
received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at
best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown
individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious,
doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all." And she even suspects that her transfer to
another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive
move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the
Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO AND
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN FAVOR OF ALICIA JASPER S.
LUCENA;
G.R. 252120 ; Date: September 15, 2020
BY: ABRIGO
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |20

Petitioner: RELISSA SANTOS LUCENA AND FRANCIS B. LUCENA
Respondent: SARAH ELAGO, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; ALEX DANDAY,
NATIONAL SPOKESPERSON OF ANAKBAYAN; CHARY DELOS REYES, BIANCA GACOS,
JAY ROVEN BALLAIS VILLAFUENTE, MEMBERS AND RECRUITERS OF ANAKBAYAN; AND
ATTY. MARIA KRISTINA CONTI, respondent
Ponente: PERALTA, C.J p:
DOCTRINE: The remedy of amparo, in its present formulation, is confined merely to instances
of "extralegal killings" or "enforced disappearances" and to threats thereof.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are the parents of Alicia Jasper S. Lucena (AJ) (19 yrs old)
2. Sometime in 2018, AJ enrolled as a Grade 11 student in FEU.
3. AJ joined the FEU Chapter of Anakbayan — a youth organization supposedly
advocating ideals of national democracy. She informed the petitioners that
she had joined and was now an official member of Anakbayan.
4. The next day, AJ left the family home without any explanation. She did not
return until three (3) days later.
5. On March 10, 2019, AJ once again left the family home. This time, she did not
return until more than two (2) months later, or on May 25, 2019. Petitioners
learned that during the time AJ was not at home, AJ was in the custody of
respondents Charie Delos Reyes (Reyes), Bianca Gacos (Gacos) and Jay
Roven Ballais Villafuente (Villafuente) — national leaders of Anakbayan.
6. AJ was then conducting recruiting activities on behalf of Anakbayan and was
also campaigning for the Kabataan Partylist and Neri Colmenares.
7. On July 10, 2019, AJ left the family home for the third time and never came
back. She has since dropped out from FEU.
8. On August 7, 2019, the Senate Committee on Public Order and
Dangerous Drugs conducted a hearing amidst reports that Anakbayan
had been recruiting students and inducing them to abandon their homes.
Among those invited in the committee hearing was petitioner Relissa,
who testified about her experience with AJ.
9. Representatives of the Kabataan, Bayan Muna, ACT Teacher and Gabriela
Party-lists conducted a press conference where they presented and appeared
alongside AJ and another allegedly missing student.
10. AJ, in that press conference, explained that she was never abducted, but
rather joined Anakbayan voluntarily.
11. Seeking mainly to regain custody of AJ, petitioners instituted the present
petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas corpus. Impleaded
along with Reyes, Gacos and Villafuente as respondents in the petition are:
Sarah Elago, who is a representative of the Kabataan Party-list; Alex
Danday, who is the spokesperson of Anakbayan; and Atty. Maria Kristina
Conti, who is a known counsel of Anakbayan.
12. The petition, in particular, prays the Court to issue the following reliefs:
a. A writ of amparo in favor of AJ and petitioners.
b. In the interim, a temporary protection order "prohibiting the
respondents, and the [Anakbayan] and [Kabataan] Party-list from
recruiting, influencing, indoctrinating, immersing and threatening
the life, liberty and security of [AJ], or from committing or
attempting to commit any act which are violative of the rights of
[AJ], and abusive of her physical, mental, psychological and
emotional development."
c. A writ of habeas corpus ordering the respondents to produce the
person of AJ in Court.
d. An order immediately placing AJ under the custody and care of the
petitioners.
e. An order requiring the conduct of a medical and psychological
examination on, and the conferment of medical and psychological
assistance to AJ in order to determine the extent and gravity of the
abuse, exploitation and prejudice to her mental, physical, emotional
and psychological state.
13. The petitioners concede that AJ is already at the age of majority — eighteen
(18) years old to be precise.
14. However, they argue that AJ's decision to stay with the Anakbayan cannot be
considered to have emanated from a valid and informed consent as the same
had been a product of the radicalization and indoctrination AJ received from
Anakbayan when she was still a minor.
15. According to petitioners, this radicalization and indoctrination at such a
young age prejudiced AJ's "mental, psychological, emotional or spiritual
development" which, in turn, hindered her ability to freely give consent even
after reaching the age of majority.
16. Hence, for all intents and purposes, AJ cannot be considered to have
freely consented to joining the Anakbayan, to participating in the
activities of Anakbayan and, ultimately, to staying with the Anakbayan.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas corpus is
proper
HELD: No.
Writ of Amparo
● Petitioners' plea for the issuance of a writ of amparo is not proper. The remedy of
amparo, in its present formulation, is confined merely to instances of
"extralegal killings" or "enforced disappearances" and to threats thereof. As
illuminated in Agcaoili v. Fariñas:
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. — The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
● The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
● In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,
the Court categorically pronounced that the Amparo Rule, as it presently
stands, is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to
threats thereof, and jurisprudentially defined these two instances, as follows:
● The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |21
 confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are
killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards
or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are
attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction
of a person by a government official or organized groups or private
individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law.
● The above definition of "enforced disappearance" appears in the Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and is as statutorily
defined in Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 9851. Thus, in Navia, et al. v. Pardico, the
elements constituting "enforced disappearance," are enumerated as follows:
o that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
o that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
o that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the
person subject of the Amparo petition; and,
o that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
● Here, there is not much issue that AJ's situation does not qualify either as an
actual or threatened enforced disappearance or extralegal killing. AJ is not
missing. Her whereabouts are determinable. By all accounts, she is staying with
the Anakbayan and its officers which, at least insofar as AJ's case is concerned,
are not agents or organizations acting on behalf of the State. Indeed, against these
facts, petitioners' invocation of the remedy of amparo cannot pass.
Writ of Habeas Corpus
● Petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is, moreover,
dismissible for lack of merit.
● The Rules of Court envisions the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy applicable to
cases of illegal confinement or detention where a person is deprived of his or
her liberty, or where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.
● In this case, however, it did not at all appear that AJ had been deprived of her
liberty or that petitioners had been excluded from their rightful custody over the
person of AJ.
● First. The petitioners failed to make out a case that AJ is being detained or is being
kept by the Anakbayan against her free will. To start, there was never any
accusation that the Anakbayan employed violence, force or threat against AJ that
would have influenced her in deciding to stay with the Anakbayan. Neither is there
an allegation that the Anakbayan is employing such violence, force or threat so as
to prevent AJ from eventually changing her mind and from possibly leaving the
Anakbayan in the future.
● The only argument raised by the petitioners to support the view that AJ is being
detained — i.e., AJ's decision to stay with the Anakbayan is not a product of free
and informed consent but of the indoctrination and brainwashing she endured from
the group when she was still a minor — fails to persuade for it rests on pure
speculation and assumption. If anything, such an argument has been discredited
by the established facts and even by AJ herself.
● As mentioned, AJ already categorically denied being abducted by the Anakbayan
during a press conference conducted by the representatives of the Kabataan,
Bayan Muna, ACT Teacher and Gabriela Party-lists on August 14, 2019.
● In a Sinumpaang Salaysay, AJ disputed the allegations of being brainwashed as
she relayed that her decision to leave the custody of her parents for Anakbayan
was reasoned and a conscious one on her part.
● Second. It also cannot be said that petitioners were being excluded from their
rightful custody over the person of AJ. As it was established, AJ has already
reached the age of majority and is, thus, legally emancipated. The effect of such
emancipation is clear under the law. It meant the termination of the petitioners'
parental authority — which include their custodial rights — over the person and
property of AJ, who is now deemed qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life
save for certain exceptions provided by law.
● As she has already attained the age of majority, AJ — at least in the eyes of the
State — has earned the right to make independent choices with respect to the
places where she wants to stay, as well as to the persons whose company she
wants to keep. Such choices, so long as they do not violate any law or any other
persons' rights, has to be respected and let alone, lest we trample upon AJ's
personal liberty — the very freedom supposed to be protected by the writs of
amparo and habeas corpus. While we understand that petitioners may feel
distressed over AJ's decision to leave their home and stay with the Anakbayan,
their recourse unfortunately does not lie with the Court through the instant petition.
The writs of amparo and habeas corpus were never meant to temper the
brashness of youth. The resolution of the conflict besetting petitioners and their
daughter AJ is simply beyond the competence of the writs applied for.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the prayers for the issuance of the writs of
amparo and habeas corpus are hereby DENIED. The instant petition is DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.
SCA | Special Writs: Amparo & Habeas Data| Feb 15 |22