Cortal vs Inaki Larrazabal

Facts
Private respondent owned parcels of land which was placed under the
Compulsory Acquisition scheme with petitioners as beneficiaries. In 1999,
Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these parcels against
the Department of Agrarian Reform and the petitioners before the Office of
the Regional Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB).

It alleged that no price had been fixed, much less paid, for the
expropriation of its properties, in violation of the just compensation
requirement under Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended. Thus, it prayed
for the recovery of these lots and the cancellation of petitioners’ transfer
certificates of title.

In their Answer, petitioners denied nonpayment of just compensation.

They presented certifications issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines
(Landbank) that the amounts of P80,359.37 and P95,691.49 had been
deposited as payments in the name of Larrazabal Enterprises.11 They added
that since they had paid, the cancellation of Larrazabal Enterprises’ transfer
certificates of title, the subdivision of the parcels, and the issuance of
emancipation patents in their favor were all properly made.

Regional Adjudicator ruled in favor of Larrazabal. Petitioners

appealed to the DARAB which reversed the decision of the Regional
Adjudicator. It ruled that Larrazabal’s action is barred by prescription and
laches. Larazzabal filed a MoR which DARAB reversed its own decision.

Petitioners filed a petition for review to the CA, but dismissed their
petition due to formal errors. Petitioners filed a MoR but said petition was
denied hence this petition of review to the SC.

Issue: WON the dismissal of petitioners appeal is justified.

Ruling
No, the dismissal of petitioners appeal is not justified. Appeal is the
remedy available to a litigant seeking to reverse or modify a judgment on the
merits of a case.26 The right to appeal is not constitutional or natural, and is
not part of due process27 but is a mere statutory privilege.28 Thus, it must
be availed in keeping with the manner set by law and is lost by a litigant
who does not comply with the rules.

Procedural rules “are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of

cases [so] [c]ourts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by
the rules.”31 They provide a system for forestalling arbitrariness, caprice,
despotism, or whimsicality in dispute settlement. Thus, they are not to be
ignored to suit the interests of a party. 32 Their disregard cannot be justified
by a sweeping reliance on a “policy of liberal construction.”

Lack of verification of the affiant is not fatal to the case as per

jurisprudence as it is a formal defect not a jurisdictional defect.
 Alma Jose vs Javellana

Facts
Alma Jose sold to Javellana 2 parcels of land. After Alma Jose died
her sole surviving heir Priscilla was left with the repsonsibility of the
undertaking of the vendor. Priscilla did not abide with the undertaking of the
vendor causing to build improvements on the parcels of land.

Faced with Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on

February 10, 1997 an action for specific performance, injunction, and
damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC).

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss averring that the complaint is barred

by laches and does not contain a cause of action. RTC initially denied the
motion but after MoR of Priscilla the decision was reversed. Javellana filed
MoR on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint were
hypothetically admitted and only the allegations in the complaint should be
considered in resolving the motion but the RTC denied such motion on the
ground that the assailed decision need not to be disturbed.

Priscilla countered that the appeal was not perfected and that Javellana
is guilty of forum shopping. CA ruled in favor of Javellana that the
complaint has stated a cause of action.

Issue: WON the appeal of Javellana is filed on time and is not guilty of
forum shopping.

Ruling
It is filed on time. Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new

trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for
new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.”

Under the Neypes rule, the fresh period, by which an aggrieved party
desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC
reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It

has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a
more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of
cases.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford

litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

No forum shopping was committted. Forum shopping is the act of a

party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum,
other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution
of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.

Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here

even if the orders of the RTC being challenged through appeal and the
petition for certiorari were the same. The unjustness exists because the
appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought different objectives. In
his appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTC’s
erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his
judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and determined in due
course by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective
“to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from
proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved,” as
the CA explicitly determined in its decision in CAG.R. SP No. 60455.
 Mateo vs DAR

Facts
The Mateos owned a parcel of land in sorsogon which was brought
under the coverage of CARP of the Government which the DAR entered the
premises.The Mateos rejected the valuation of the LBP with regards to their
lot in question, thus leading them to file a case against LBP and DAR.

The LBP and DAR filed their respective answers arguing that since no
summary administrative proceedings to determine the amount of just
compensation had been conducted yet, the complaint of the Mateos was
premature.

According to the evidences of the Mateos, the valuation of the land is

more than the value offered by the LBP which was at the time of purchase is
at least 250,000 per ha. According to the LBP the total valuation of the lands
in question is only 600,000. The SAC ruled in favor of the Mateos ruling
that such valuation is proper as the Mateos introduced improvements thereon
and due to the location of the lot within the city limits.

LBP and DAR filed notices of appeal. Arguing that the complaint of
the Mateos are immature due to the DARAB not yet made an administrative
valuation of the subject property. The Mateos sought the dismissal of the
appeal. They claimed that had the DAR promptly sent them notices of
acquisition and made preliminary valuation of the subject property, they
would have complied with the administrative procedures and found no need
to institute an action before the SAC.

CA rendered a decision setting aside the decision of the SAC without

prejudice to the complaint of the Mateos, ruling that Since the DARAB is
clothed with quasi-judicial authority to make a preliminary determination of
just compensation of lands acquired under R.A. No. 6657, x x x and it
appearing from the records and [the Mateos’] own admission that [the] said
administrative agency had not yet taken cognizance of, and passed upon the
issue of just compensation when [the Mateos] prematurely filed with the
court.

CA denied the MoR filed by the Mateos.

Issue: WON the CA erred in ruling that the RTC as SAC does not have
jurisdiction to to determine in the first instance and in the absence of the
conduct of prior administrative proceedings, questions of just compensation
to be paid to landowners.

Ruling
Yes, the CA erred in ruling the RTC as SAC does not have
jurisdiction to determine just compensation in absence of admin proceedings
by the DARAB. While the Court recognizes the primacy of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies in our judicial system, it bears
emphasizing that the principle admits of exceptions, among which is when
there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that irretrievably prejudices a
complainant.46 This exception is attendant herein where the LBP and the
DAR entered the property of the Mateos sometime in 1994,47 but deposited
cash and Agrarian Reform Bonds as payment therefor only on December 13,
1996 and February 11, 1997.48 The LBP and the DAR were indisputably
aware that the Mateos rejected the price offered as just compensation for the
subject property. Still, at the time the Mateos filed their suit before the SAC,
no summary administrative proceeding was yet initiated by the DAR to
make further valuation.
 Bustos vs Lucero

WON: Rule 108, Sec. 11 infringes Sec.13 Article 8 of the Constitution.

Ruling
NO. Section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law
and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates
substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which
one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. (60 C. J. 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts
are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion.
Panay Railways vs HEVA Management and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 154601

Topic: Procedural laws applicable to actions pending at the time of

promulgation.

Ponente: Justice Sereno

Facts
On 20 April 1982, Panay Railways Inc. executed a real estate
mortgage covering several parcels of land in favor of Traders Royal Bank
(TRB). Petitioner exluded certain portions of a Lot No. 6153 that was sold to
Shell Co. Petitioners failed to pay their obligation which propted TRB to
extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage properties including Lot No 6153.
On January 20, 1986 a certificate of sale was issued in favor of the bank as
the highest bidder and was registered on January 28, 1986 and annotated at
the back of the TCT covering the mortgaged properties.

TRB consolidated the titles in its name and thereafter was issued TCT
issues in its name. On 12 February 1990, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of
Possession against petitioner. During the proceedings, Petitioner filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for Suspension of the
Petition for the issuance of a writ of possession on the ground that Petitioner
recognizes TRB as the registered owner of the lots in question and that the
mortgage is validly foreclosed.

In 1994, Petitioner discovered that the extra-judicial foreclosure

included some excluded properties in the mortgage contract. In August 19,
1994, it filed a Complaint for Partial Annulment of Contract to Sell and
Deed of Absolute Sale and Declaration of Ownership of Real Property with
Reconveyance plus Damages.

Respondents filed Motions to dismiss on these grounds: 1. petitioner

has no legal capacity; 2. there was a waiver on the part of petitioner’s claim
or demand; 3. petitioner failed to state a cause of action; 4. and as an
indespensable party, TRB was not impleaded.

RTC: Granted the motion to dismiss and held that the Manifestation and
Motion filed by petitioner was a judicial admission of TRB’s ownership of
the disputed properties. The trial court pointed out that the Manifestation
was executed by petitioner’s duly authorized representative with the
assistance of counsel. This admission thus operated as a waiver barring
petitioner from claiming otherwise. In August 11, 1997 Petitioner filed a
notice of appeal without first paying the docket fees. Then respondents filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-payment of docket fees. Petitioner
contended that its counsel was not yet familar with the revision that requires
the payment of docket fees which became effective on July 1, 1997 and that
the payment of docket fees is not mandatory.

RTC: Dismissed the appeal citing Rule 41, Sec. 4 (Within the period for
taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees.) Petitioner moved for
reconsideration alleging that RTC lost jurisdiction over the case and that the
court failed to lax the procedural rules for substantial justice.

RTC: Denied the motion. Petitioner filed with CA, a Petition for Certiorari
with mandamus under Rule 65 alleging RTC has no jurisdiction to dismiss
the Notice of Appeal and acted with grave abuse of discretion in strictly
applying theprocedural rules.

CA: On November 29, 200 the CA Set aside the order of the RTC, citing
that under Sec. 1, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the CA not the trial
court has the jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal. Respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration.

CA: The CA granted the motion for reconsideration and based on A.M. No.
00-2-10-SC which came into effect prior to the promulgation to the decision
of the CA, amended the Revised rules of court. The circular expressly
provided that trial courts may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss an
appeal for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.

CA: Dismissed the motion of petitioner. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue: 1. Whether the CA has the jurisdiction to dismiss a Notice of Appeal.

2. Whether the procedural rules should be relaxed on the ground of
substantial justice.

Ruling
1. No. The RTC has jurisdiction to dismiss a Notice of Appeal. Statutes and
rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and
rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC
became effective before the promulgation of the case and is applicable to the
case. Thus, the CA committed no reversible error when it sustained the
dismissal of the appeal, taking note of its directive on the matter prior to the
promulgation of its Decision.

2. No. The procedural rules should not be relaxed. As early as 1932, in

Lazaro v. Endencia, the court have held that the payment of the full
amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection of an
appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees. Moreover, the right to appeal is not a
natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with the law.
Procedural rules are required to be followed and may be relaxed for the most
persuasive of reasons.
 Bermejo vs Barrios

Facts
Petitioners in this case was charged with perjury and falsification of
public or official documents by the city fiscal. Relying on the certification of
the city fiscal that a preliminary investigation had been conducted by him
and that he had examined the witnesses under oath before filing the
information, the City Judge, Hon. Isidro 0. Barrios, issued, on August 24,
1963, an order for the arrest of accused Bermejo. To prevent his
incarceration, said accused put up the necessary bond.

Upon arraignment, Bermejo filed a motion to quash the information,

alleging in substance: (1) that the information did not charge an offense
because the amended petition for habeas corpus (in Special Proceeding No.
V-2669 of the Court of First Instance of Capiz), allegedly falsified, is not a
document contemplated under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code.

The city fiscal filed his opposition to the motion to quash, contending
that the petition for habeas corpus is a public document; that the provisions
of Republic Act 3828 are applicable only to municipal judges and not to city
judges; and that the principle of res judicata, or collusiveness of judgment,
cannot be invoked by the accused.

On October 14, 1963, Bermejo filed his motion for reconsideration,

but th«e same was denied for lack of merit. Thereupon he filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Court of
First Instance of Capiz, naming as respondents City Judge Isidro Barrios and
City Fiscal Quirico Abela, contending that City Fiscal Abela committed a
grave abuse of discretion in filing an information against him without
conducting the proper preliminary investigation.

After the city fiscal has filed his opposition to the motion to quash,
and the accused, her reply, on October 15, 1963, City Judge Barrios issued
an order denying the motion to quash. Carmorin’s motion for
reconsideration having been denied, she likewise filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of First
Instance of Capiz.

During the hearing of the two cases, which was held jointly, Atty.
Bermejo appeared and testified in his behalf and in behalf of his coaccused
Carmorin, while Fiscal Quirico Abella testified for the prosecution.
Thereafter, the parties filed their memoranda. On June 3, 1964, the Court of
First Instance of Capiz rendered a decision dismissing the two petitions,
without pronouncement as to costs. Their joint motion for reconsideration
having been denied, herein, petitioners brought the present appeals to this
Court.

CA