Fernan Joshua A.

Bantiding
1. GSIS vs PAUIG (January 30, 2017, G.R. No. 210328)
Facts:
Apolinario C. Pauig (Pauig), the respondent, served as the municipality's
agriculturalist in San Pablo, Isabela. On February 12, 1964, he began working for the
government as a casual emergency laborer. Later, from July 5, 1972, through July
18, 1977, he worked as a contract worker, a temporary employee. He started
working permanently on July 19 of that year, and on August 1 of that year, he joined
GSIS.

On November 3, 2004, he retired from the service upon reaching the mandatory
retirement age of 65 years old. But when he filed his retirement papers with the
GSIS-Cauayan, the latter processed his claim based on a Record of Creditable
Service and a Total Length of Service of only twenty-seven (27) years. Disagreeing
with the computation, Pauig wrote a letter-complaint to the GSIS, arguing that his
first fourteen (14) years in the government service had been. erroneously omitted.

The GSIS ruled that Pauig's first fourteen (14) years of employment with the
government were disregarded for calculating his retirement benefits because no
premium payments were made to it during those years.

Aggrieved, Pauig filed a case before the RTC. The RTC rendered a Decision in
favour of Pauig. GSIS then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was later
denied. Thus, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the GSIS should include Pauig's first fourteen (14) years in
government service for the calculation of the latter's retirement benefits claim.
Ruling:
No. Retirement benefits are given to government employees to reward them for
giving the best years of their lives to the service of their country. This is especially
true with those in government service occupying positions of leadership or positions
requiring management skills because the years they devote to government service
could be spent more profitably elsewhere, such as in lucrative appointments in the
private sector.

The doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in this case, where the law
invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or construction.
To uphold Pauig's position will contravene the very words of the law, and will defeat
the ends which it seeks to attain.

Pauig claims that his service in the government from February 12, 1964 to July 18,
1977 should be credited for the purpose of computing his retirement benefits is
unmeritorious. Compulsory coverage under the GSIS had previously and
consistently included regular and permanent employees, and expressly excluded
casual, substitute or temporary employees from its retirement insurance plan.
Based on the records, Pauig began his career in the government on February 12,
1964 as Emergency Laborer on a casual status. Then, he became a temporary
employee from July 5, 1972 to July 18, 1977. However, the Court notes that it was
not until 1997 that the compulsory membership in the GSIS was extended to
employees other than those on permanent status. Therefore, Pauig is not entitled to
benefits during those years when he was still a temporary employee.

2. MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (MPSTA), et. al vs

MR. WINSTON F. GARCIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND
GENERAL MANAGER OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (GSIS) et. al. (G.R. No. 192708)
Facts:
By virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 186, a government service insurance
system was established on November 14th, 1936, with the goal of enhancing
employee productivity and welfare. A Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146 revising,
extending, raising, and combining the social security and insurance benefits of
government employees and expediting their payment under C.A. was signed by
then-President Marcos on May 31, 1977. No. 186. Over two decades later, P.D.
1146 was changed, and the "The GSIS Act of 1997," or Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8291, took effect.

One of the modifications made to R.A. The employer's contribution increased from
9.5% to 12% in the year 8291. However, the budget appropriation did not rise
concurrently. DepEd was consequently unable to reimburse GSIS for the 2.5%
increase in the employer's portion. DepEd has premium shortfalls according to the
data in the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that was signed on September 11,
2012, by DBM, DepEd, and GSIS.

GSIS issued the assailed Resolutions were not published in a newspaper of general
circulation and were enforced before they were even filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register.
1. Resolution No. 238 - In 2002, the GSIS Board introduced CLIP, by which the
arrears incurred by members from their overdue loans are deducted from the
proceeds of their new loan or retirement benefits. CLIP also involves the collective
suspension of the loan privileges of the member when a loan account is in default,
except when its proceeds are used to pay for the arrearages.
2. Resolution No. 90 - In 2003, the GSIS Board adopted the PBP whereby for the
purpose of computing GSIS benefits, the creditable service of a member is
determined by the corresponding monthly premium contributions that were timely
and correctly remitted or paid to GSIS.
3. Resolution No. 179 - In 2007, the GSIS Board approved the APL, which is "a
feature of a GSIS life insurance policy that keeps the policy in force in case of
nonpayment of premiums by taking out a loan amount against the unrestricted
portion of the policy's accumulated cash value (CV) or the termination value (TV)"
until the total APL and policy loan balances exceed the CV of the Life Endowment
Policy or the TV of the Enhanced Life Policy. A 6% interest per annum compounded
monthly is imposed on the APL, which is independent of the 2% interest per month
compounded annually charged to the agency for delayed remittances.
Issue:
Considering that the parties participated in the public consultation of GSIS’ policy
resolutions on PBP, APL and CLIP, was its non-publication validly dispensed with?

Ruling:
No. According to the Court in Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes,
interpretative regulations that do not add anything to the law or affect substantial
rights of any person do not entail publication. This is because “they give no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.” However, “when
x x x an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially
adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord
at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.”

In this case, the resolutions additionally obligate member-employees to ensure that

their employer-agency includes the GS in the budget, deducts the PS, as well as
loan amortizations, and timely remits them; and that the GSIS receives, processes,
and posts the payments. These processes are beyond the control of the employees;
yet they are being made to bear the consequences of any misstep or delay by either
their agency or GSIS. As aptly observed by the CA, “the fault lies with how the
deficiencies in payment by the DepEd, real or imagined, are attributed to the
employees-members.” Surely this was not the scenario contemplated by law. The
statutorily prescribed mechanism – through salary deduction – is a clear indication
that the law’s intent is precisely to make contribution by members less cumbersome.
Considering the heavy burden imposed, the requirements of notice, hearing, and
publication should have been observed.

3. JAIME LOOT vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (G.R.No.

86994 June 30, 1993)
Facts:
On January 19, 1965, respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
granted petitioner Floro Mercene (Mercene) a loan in the amount of ₱29,500.00.
Mercene's property in Quezon City was mortgaged as security and filed under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90535. On March 24, 1965, the mortgage was noted
on the title and registered. On 14 May 1968, Mercene contracted another loan with
GSIS for the amount of ₱14,500.00. The loan was likewise secured by a real estate
mortgage on the same parcel of land. The following day, the loan was registered and
duly annotated on the title.

On 11 June 2004, Mercene opted to file a complaint for Quieting of Title against
GSIS. He alleged that: since 1968 until the time the complaint was filed, GSIS never
exercised its rights as a mortgagee; the real estate mortgage over his property
constituted a cloud on the title; GSIS' right to foreclose had prescribed. In its answer,
GSIS assailed that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that
prescription does not run against it because it is a government entity.

Petitioner, a lawyer, retired at age sixty-five (65) as Special Assistant in the

Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) on September 27, 1980. He started
serving the government in 1939 as a clerk in the Bureau of Health and had a short
stint as a military officer from 1941 to 1947, after which, he started working as a
stenographer at the DBP. Sometime in 1969, when he was branch manager of the
DBP in Puerto Princesa, he began complaining of headache and chest pain. He
consulted physicians at the DBP but he was referred to the St. Luke's Hospital where
he was diagnosed as suffering from hypertensive cardiovascular disease.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to total permanent disability benefits.

Ruling:
Yes. In view of the GSIS' stand that the law applicable in petitioner's case is the
Workmen's Compensation Law or Act No. 3428, as amended, and not Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended, we shall first determine said issue. Art. 206 of the said
Presidential Decree specifically provides that it shall apply "only to injury, sickness,
disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975." The records indisputably
show that petitioner became ill as early as 1969. Workmen's Compensation cases
are governed by the law in force at the time the claimant contracted his illness.
Therefore, petitioner's case is clearly excluded from the application of P.D. No. 626
and he can invoke the doctrine of compensability under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

Although it appears that the GSIS granted the petitioner's claim under P.D. No. 626
as shown by the fact that its counsel contends herein that the GSIS should be
refunded by the DBP with whatever amount of the claim it had paid to petitioner
because liability under the Workmen's Compensation Law is chargeable to the
employer, it is not too late in the day to correct such erroneous application of the law.

Permanent total disability or "total and permanent disability" under Sec. 15 of the
Workmen's Compensation Law means "disablement of an employee to earn wages
in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that (s)he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of her (his) mentality and
attainment could do." The Court further explained in the Gonzaga case that such
disability "does not mean an absolute helplessness but rather an incapacity to
perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent x x x. Total disability does
not require that the employee be absolutely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is
necessary is that the injury must be such that she cannot pursue her usual work and
earn therefrom x x x. It is not the injury which is compensated but the incapacity to
work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity x x x."

In the same manner, the strain and tension caused by managing a branch of a bank
may have aggravated petitioner's ailment, such that aggravation persisted even after
he had retired from the service. His longevity inspite of a debilitating ailment should
not stand in the way of his availment of the benefits provided for by the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Being a social legislation, said law should be liberally construed
to attain its objective of amelioration of workmens' plight to prevent them from
becoming objects of charity. Worth quoting is the portion of the decision in Laginlin v.
WCC, wherein the Court said:

"The fact that petitioner received a retirement benefit from his employer does not bar
him from being entitled to a disability compensation benefit under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, having in mind that the purpose of the disability benefit is
separate and distinct from the retirement benefit given to an employee upon
reaching the age of retirement. The disability benefit under the Act is to compensate
the worker for his actual loss, for his disablement to earn wages in the same kind of
work which he is engaged in, or work of similar nature. On the other hand, the
retirement benefit is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his
life, lessening the burden of worrying for his financial support and as a form of
reward for his loyalty and service to the employer."

4. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. GABRIEL MORALDE (G.R. No. 211077,

August 15, 2018) PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL vs. GABRIEL
MORALDE (G.R. No. 211318, August 15, 2018)
Facts:
Moralde's services were engaged as a Dental Aide in the Province's Provincial
Health Office. He was assigned to the municipalities of Villanueva and Claveria.
According to the Province, he had a history of falsifying public documents by forging
his immediate supervisor's signature onto his Daily Time Record. The Province also
noted that he had a track record of "frequent absences without leave, and habitual
tardiness."

Moralde was formally charged with falsifying his Daily Time Records. Atty. Rubio, the
Provincial Attorney recommended that Moralde be dismissed from service. Unknown
to the Province's officials, Moralde went to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) while the administrative case against him was pending. He filed an
"application for retirement" under Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as the
"Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977."

The very next day, Governor Calingin issued a Memorandum finding Moralde guilty
of Falsification of Public Documents and dismissing him from service. There was no
showing that Moralde informed any of the province’s officials about his pending
retirement application with GSIS. Moralde filed an appeal before the CSC because
he was supposedly dismissed in violation of due process.

GSIS approved Moralde’s application for retirement. The Province filed before the
CSC a Motion for New Trial and/or Modification of Judgement upon discovering that
Moralde bypassed his administrative case through retirement.

CSC: denied the Province's Motion for New Trial and/or Modification of Judgement.
The
issue of Moralde's reinstatement to the service with payment of back wages has
become moot and academic.

Moralde filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. He maintained that
the Civil Service Commission's ruling on his reinstatement was immutable and that,
in any case, he had never retired, but merely received separation pay.

CA: ruled in favor of Moralde. It noted that a judgment or order becomes final without
a perfected appeal or duly filed motion for reconsideration. Moralde's reinstatement
was not rendered moot and academic.

Issues: WON he is entitled to retirement benefits.

What is the difference between retirement benefits and separation benefits.
Whether he is entitled to separation or retirement benefits.

Ruling:
Moralde willfully severed his employer-employee relationship with the government.
This is the inescapable implication of his deliberate petitioning for benefits
occasioned by what he mistakenly thought was retirement, but which was more
accurately a simulation of resignation. In any case, regardless of the technical
nomenclature that flawlessly encapsulates every nuance of his voluntary act of
ending his employment, the naked truth and the pivotal element of voluntary
termination of employment remain.

The availing of retirement benefits differs from the availing of separation benefits with
respect to the requisite age and length of service. For retirement, the applicant
needs to be at least 60 years old and must have served for at least 15 years. For
separation benefits, the applicant must be below 60 years old. There are further
distinctions for availing of separation benefits under Section 11, paragraphs (a) and
(b). Under paragraph (a), the applicant needs to have served for at least three (3)
years, but less than 15 years. Under paragraph (b), the applicant must have served
for at least 15 years.

Retirement and separation benefits differ on the availability of monthly pensions, and
the computation of the amount that will be immediately released to an approved
applicant. For retirees, with their two (2) options specified in Section 13(a)(1) and
Section 13(a)(2), an old-age or basic monthly pension is always assured. It is for the
applicant to choose between starting to receive it five (5) years after leaving the
service, as provided for by Section 13(a)(1), or immediately upon retiring, as
provided for under Section 13(a)(2). For recipients of separation benefits, a basic
monthly pension can be obtained only by those who have served for at least 15
years, as expressed in Section 11(b). Even then, they may only avail of this pension
upon reaching the age of 60.

As to the computation of awards, the amounts that can be granted to a retiree far
exceed those that can be given to a recipient of separation benefits. This is because
one's number of years in service is a key component of the computations for both
retirement and separation benefits.

As to the receipt of Republic Act No. 8291's separation benefits, it is true that a
public officer or employee who avails of separation benefits is not irreversibly
precluded from again rendering service to the government at a later time.
Nevertheless, at that moment that a public officer or employee manifests intent to
avail of separation benefits, that public officer or employee concedes his or her intent
to actually "separate from" government, that is, to put an end to his or her
employment. By Section 11's own text, availing of such benefits demands specific
action on the part of the applicant, i.e., that he or she "resigns or separates from the
service."

On availing of retirement benefits, neither is availing of Republic Act No. 8291's

separation benefits predicated upon the forcible termination of a civil servant's
employment. Section 11's benefits are very clearly available to a civil servant who
voluntarily or willfully ends his or her employment. An employee's own "resign[ation]
or separat[ion] from the service" is the necessary precondition to avail of separation
benefits.

The Court of Appeals was correct in noting that Moralde was in no position to receive
retirement benefits. At 38 years of age, he was not qualified for Section 13's benefits.
Logically, what he qualified for and received must have been in the nature of
Republic Act No. 8291's separation benefits.

However, the distinction that the Court of Appeals harps on hardly works to turn the
tide in Moralde's favor. It is clear, whether he received retirement or separation
benefits, that he voluntarily and personally intended to put his public employment to
a complete and unequivocal end.

5. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM BOARD OF TRUSTEES

AND CRISTINA V. ASTUDILLO vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS -
CEBU CITY AND FORMER JUDGE MA. LORNA P. DEMONTEVERDE (G.R.
No. 230953, June 20, 2018)
Facts:
Private respondent, retired Judge Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde served in the
government agencies for a total of 32 years. On June 30, 1995, she joined the
Judiciary as Presiding Judge of the MTCC of Bacolod City until her retirement on
February 22, 2011. She requested from the GSIS a refund of the retirement
premiums she paid under P.D. No. 1146 and R.A. No. 660 in excess of the
retirement premiums that she should pay under R.A. No. 910, the law on retirement
benefits for Judges and Justices. However, instead of issuing a refund only of the
excess of the contributions paid, the GSIS, refunded to her the amount of
P16,836.60 representing her retirement premiums under R.A. No. 660.

Demonteverde filed with the Supreme Court her retirement application under R.A.
No. 910 She likewise filed an application with the GSIS for retirement benefits under
R.A. No. 8291. The manager of the GSIS Bacolod informed her that the retirement
laws covering her service in the government from July 1, 1963 to June 29, 1995
were P.D. No. 1146,R.A. No. 660, and R.A. No. 1616. The GSIS thus returned the
application of Demonteverde so that she may choose from the modes of retirement
enumerated. On May 18, 2012, GSIS Bacolod informed her of the COC's issuance of
Resolution No. 021-2012 denying her request to retire under R.A. No. 8291. She
then appealed the COC's Resolution to the GSIS Board of Trustees (GSIS BOT)
which was granted. Demonteverde filed a Motion for Execution of the Decision of the
GSIS BOT.

However, on January 6, 2014, Demonteverde filed a Partial Motion for

Reconsideration and Withdrawal of Motion for Execution. She questioned the accrual
date of her retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291, arguing that the date of her
retirement should be the date when she reached sixty (60) years of age, even when
she was still in active government service at that time. She likewise denied receiving
a copy of the GSIS BOT Decision, and denied that the later Notice of Decision dated
November 19, 2013 contained a copy of the GSIS BOT Decision. GSIS BOT denied
Demonteverde's Partial MR and Withdrawal of Motion for Execution, for allegedly
having been filed out of time.
Demonteverde filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and
Prohibition under Rule 65 which was dismissed on the ground that the course of
action taken was erroneous as the proper mode of appeal from a decision of a quasi-
judicial agency such as the GSIS is by filing a verified petition for review with the CA
under Rule 43. Upon Demonteverde's motion for reconsideration, the CA reversed
itself. It agreed with Demonteverde that the case may be classified as an exception
to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.

Issue: Whether Demonteverde is eligible to receive retirement benefits even after her
actual retirement.

Ruling:
In the instant case, the CA itself, in its June 19, 2014 Resolution, initially dismissed
Demonteverde's special civil action for certiorari, reasoning that Demonteverde had
the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA even
categorically ruled that the present circumstances in Demonteverde's case did not
warrant the application of the exceptions to the general rule provided by Rule 43,
thereafter proceeding to identify the aforementioned procedural defects in the
petition. Yet, when the CA reversed itself and reinstated the latter's Petition for
Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition it failed to substantiate its decision to grant
the said motion. Apart from Demonteverde's bare allegations in her pleadings and
her own testimony that her case falls under the exception to the general rule that if
appeal is available, certiorari is not a remedy, there is nothing on record that
would warrant the grant of her motion for reconsideration and the setting
aside of the CA's June 19, 2014 Resolution.

It should be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the

application of procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled
principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice.40
While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well settled that
these are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The relaxation of
procedural rules in the interest of justice was never intended to be a license for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules can be invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Demonteverde's claim of public policy as a justification of her inability to comply with

the general rule on appeal is unacceptable in the absence of legal and factual bases
for its invocation. Demonteverde failed to substantiate through clear and well-
established grounds exactly how her case warrants a deviation from the general rule
that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to an
aggrieved party. Moreover, Demonteverde failed to overcome in her petition the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions of public officers.
Applying this to the instant case, there is nothing dubious about the GSIS BOT's
denial of her Partial Motion for Reconsideration and Withdrawal of Motion for
Execution on the ground that the said motion was filed out of time. Thus, the CA
should have dismissed her petition outright on the ground of erroneous cause of
action as the remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or cumulative.

The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the

government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to
encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service. These benefits
are meant to reward them for giving the best years of their lives in the service of their
country.However, the right to retirement benefits accrues only upon certain
prerequisites. First, the conditions imposed by the applicable law must be fulfilled.
Second, there must be actual retirement. Prior to retirement, an employee who has
served the requisite number of years, such as Demonteverde, is only eligible for, but
not yet entitled to, retirement benefits. Retirement means there is a bilateral act of
the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employees
whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees and/or consents to sever his
or her employment with the former.

Severance of employment is a condition sine qua non for the release of retirement
benefits. Retirement benefits are not meant to recompense employees who are still
in the employ of the government; that is the function of salaries and emoluments.
Retirement benefits are in the nature of a reward granted by the State to a
government employee who has given the best years of his life to the service of his
country.

While Demonteverde met the two conditions for entitlement to benefits under R.A.
No. 8291 in 2001, i.e., she had rendered at least fifteen (15) years in government
service as a regular member, and she turned sixty (60) years of age, she continued
to serve the government and did not, at that time, sever her employment with the
government. Thus, not having retired from service when she turned 60 on February
22, 2001, she cannot claim that her right to retirement benefits had already accrued
then.