32. Gomez vs. Court of Appeals, Dec.

15, 1988

Facts:

Petitioners herein applied for the registration of several parcels of land. The court
rendered its decision adjudicating the lots in favor of the petitioners herein and after the
finality of the decision has directed the chief of the general land registration office to
issue the corresponding decrees of registration. The chief submitted a report to the court a
quo stating that some of the lots were already covered by homestead patents and issued a
recommendation to set aside the order. Petitioners contested such action and now the
present case.

Issue:

WON the action of the chief of the LRA was valid.

Ruling:

Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in
convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate
technical description of the land. This requires technical men. Moreover, it frequently
occurs that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are ordered
registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly indicated in the
decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional
surveys become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be done
by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the Chief Surveyor of the General Land
Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).
Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to
the period before the court’s decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality
but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree.
 33. Laburada v. LRA, G.R. No. 101387 – Case Digest

FACTS
Spouses Marciano and Erlinda Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A,
located in Mandaluyong City, which was approved by the trial court, acting as a land
registration court. Upon the petitioners’ motion, the trial court issued an order which required
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the equivalent decree of registration. However,
the LRA refused. As a result, the petitioners filed an action for mandamus.

The LRA stated that the lot that the petitioners wish to register is a part of Lot No. 3 which was
already issued under TCT No. 6595. On the other hand, Lot 3-B of the same Lot 3 is covered by
TCT No. 29337 which was also issued as a transfer from TCT No. 6595. Lot 3-B was issued under
the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. De Buenaflor.

The LRA further stated that agreeing to issue the corresponding decree of registration would
result to a duplication of titles over the same parcel of land which would breach the policy and
purpose of the Torrens registration system.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Land Registration Authority (LRA) may be obliged through a
petition for mandamus to issue a decree of registration.

RULING
NO. The court ruled that the Land Registration Authority (LRA) cannot be obliged to do so. It is a
rule that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of a land which
was already issued in the name of another and in a previous land registration case. A second
decree for the same parcel of land would be considered

null and void because a land could only be registered once. Furthermore, the act of issuing a
decree of registration is a part of the judicial function of the courts, It is not a ministerial act
which may be obliged through mandamus.

As in this case, we find that the private respondents are transferees in good faith and for value
of the subject property and that the original acquisition thereof, although fraudulent, did not
affect their own titles. These are valid against the whole world, including the government.
34. Abrigo vs. De Vera, June 21, 2004

35. ABRIGO VS DE VERA

36. Gloria Villafania sold a hosue
and lot to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar
and Rosita Cave-
37. Go. BEcuase of a suit between
them Villafania was given 1 year to
redeem the
38. property by failed to do so.
Salazar and Go sold the property to
Noel and Julie
39. Abrigo. On the other
hand,because of the free patent
issued to Villafania, she was
40. able to sell the same to Romana
de Vera and registered the sale and
a TCT was
41. issued in her name.
42. The CA, on reconsideration,
heldd that De Vera is a purchaser
in good faith and for
43. value and must thus be
protected.
44. ISSUE:
45. Who between the petitioners and
respondent has a better title over
the property
46. in question.
47. RULING:
48. We have consistently held that
Article 1544 requires the second
buyer to acquire
49. the immovable in good faith and
to register it in good faith. Mere
registration of
50. title is not enough; good faith
must concur with the registration.
We explained the
51. rationale in Uraca v. Court of
Appeals, which we quote: “Under
the foregoing, the
52. prior registration of the disputed
property by the second buyer does
not by itself
53. confer ownership or a better
right over the property. Article
1544 requires that
54. such registration must be
coupled with good faith.
Jurisprudence teaches us that
55. ‘(t)he governing principle is
primus tempore, potior jure (first in
time, stronger in
56. right). Knowledge gained by the
first buyer of the second sale
cannot defeat the
57. first buyer’s rights except
where the second buyer
registers in good faith the
58. second sale ahead of the first, as
provided by the Civil Code. Such
knowledge of
59. the first buyer does not bar her
from availing of her rights under
the law, among
60. them, to register first her
purchase as against the second
buyer. But in converso,
61. knowledge gained by the second
buyer of the first sale defeats his
rights even if
62. he is first to register the
second sale, since such
knowledge taints his prior
63. registration with bad faith. This
is the price exacted by Article 1544
of the Civil
64. Code for the second buyer being
able to displace the first buyer; that
before the
65. second buyer can obtain priority
over the first, he must show that he
acted in
66. good faith throughout (i.e. in
ignorance of the first sale and of
the first buyer’s
67. rights)—from the time of
acquisition until the title is
transferred to him by
68. registration, or failing
registration, by delivery of
possession.’
69. ABRIGO VS DE VERA
70. Gloria Villafania sold a hosue
and lot to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar
and Rosita Cave-
71. Go. BEcuase of a suit between
them Villafania was given 1 year to
redeem the
72. property by failed to do so.
Salazar and Go sold the property to
Noel and Julie
73. Abrigo. On the other
hand,because of the free patent
issued to Villafania, she was
74. able to sell the same to Romana
de Vera and registered the sale and
a TCT was
75. issued in her name.
76. The CA, on reconsideration,
heldd that De Vera is a purchaser
in good faith and for
77. value and must thus be
protected.
78. ISSUE:
79. Who between the petitioners and
respondent has a better title over
the property
80. in question.
81. RULING:
82. We have consistently held that
Article 1544 requires the second
buyer to acquire
83. the immovable in good faith and
to register it in good faith. Mere
registration of
84. title is not enough; good faith
must concur with the registration.
We explained the
85. rationale in Uraca v. Court of
Appeals, which we quote: “Under
the foregoing, the
86. prior registration of the disputed
property by the second buyer does
not by itself
87. confer ownership or a better
right over the property. Article
1544 requires that
88. such registration must be
coupled with good faith.
Jurisprudence teaches us that
89. ‘(t)he governing principle is
primus tempore, potior jure (first in
time, stronger in
90. right). Knowledge gained by the
first buyer of the second sale
cannot defeat the
91. first buyer’s rights except
where the second buyer
registers in good faith the
92. second sale ahead of the first, as
provided by the Civil Code. Such
knowledge of
93. the first buyer does not bar her
from availing of her rights under
the law, among
94. them, to register first her
purchase as against the second
buyer. But in converso,
95. knowledge gained by the second
buyer of the first sale defeats his
rights even if
96. he is first to register the
second sale, since such
knowledge taints his prior
97. registration with bad faith. This
is the price exacted by Article 1544
of the Civil
98. Code for the second buyer being
able to displace the first buyer; that
before the
99. second buyer can obtain priority
over the first, he must show that he
acted in
100.good faith throughout (i.e. in
ignorance of the first sale and of
the first buyer’s
 101.rights)—from the time of
acquisition until the title is
transferred to him by
102.registration, or failing
registration, by delivery of
possession
Facts:
Gloria Villafania sold a hosue and lot to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. BEcuase of a
suit between them Villafania was given 1 year to redeem theproperty by failed to do so. Salazar
and Go sold the property to Noel and JulieAbrigo. On the other hand,because of the free patent
issued to Villafania, she wasable to sell the same to Romana de Vera and registered the sale
and a TCT wasissued in her name. The CA, on reconsideration, heldd that De Vera is a purchaser
in good faith and forvalue and must thus be protected.

ISSUE:
Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title over the propertyin question.

RULING:

We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquirethe
immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith. Mere registration oftitle is not enough;
good faith must concur with the registration. We explained therationale in Uraca v. Court of
Appeals, which we quote: “Under the foregoing, theprior registration of the disputed property
by the second buyer does not by itselfconfer ownership or a better right over the property.
Article 1544 requires thatsuch registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence
teaches us that‘(t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger
inright). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat thefirst buyer’s
rights except where the second buyer registers in good faith thesecond sale ahead of
the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge ofthe first buyer does not bar her from
availing of her rights under the law, amongthem, to register first her purchase as against the
second buyer. But in converso,knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats
his rights even ifhe is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints
his priorregistration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the CivilCode for
the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before thesecond buyer can obtain
priority over the first, he must show that he acted ingood faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of
the first sale and of the first buyer’srights)—from the time of acquisition until the title
is transferred to him byregistration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession
 35. Republic vs. Court of Appeals & Bayona, Aug. 22, 2002

FACTS:

A lot title was issued to Abundia Romero in 1944 and that the OCT issued to
her was not signed but merely indicated (SGD) Raf. R. Alunan. Private
respondents Sepe are the heirs of Abundia and Bayona was a purchaser of
the lot. Government petitioner filed for the annulment and revision of the lot
based on the discrepancies cited. RTC dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reversal of the lot is proper in lieu of the discrepancies of
the title held by Abundia and heirs.

RULING:

The Civil Code provides that in the absence of any intestate heirs, the State
shall inherit the whole estate. While the signature of the Register of Deeds
does not appear but only (SGD) such is not sufficient to invalidate all title
considering that the same public depository issued a certificate affirming the
existence of the original OCT in the name of Abundia.
 36. Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of Agusan, March 20, 1968

FACTS:
In June 1961, Petitioner Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land
situated in Esperanza, Agusan, and covered by OCT P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo,
married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May 1962, Almirol will cause the registration of
the deed of sale and to secure in his name a TCT. Registration was refused by the Register of
Deeds since the property was a conjugal one and that Agusan cannot dispose such property even
if his wife has already died. Almirol the filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of First
Instance of Agusan to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale, to issue the TCT
and damages. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform
the acts required of him, and that Almirol has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

ISSUE

W/N a petition for mandamus is the remedy to compel the respondent to register the deed of sale
in question.

RULING

Yes. It is the ministerial duty of respondent Registry of Deeds to register the deed of sale in
question. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this
function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. The supposed invalidity of the
contracts of lease is no valid objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their
non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does not
require that only valid instruments shall be registered. The registry of deeds is precluded by
section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when
confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is
invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with
respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed
to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall,
after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.
 37. Balbin vs. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur, May 8, 1969

FACTS:
Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate copy
of the registered owner’s certificate of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos, requesting that the
latter be annotated on the title. The registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated inter-
vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being
“legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law.” It appears that previously annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are three separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio
Balbin in favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each received their
co-owner’s duplicate CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owner’s copies of CTs had not been presented
by petitioners, the register of deeds refused to make the requested annotation. Petitioners referred
the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who upheld the action of the Register of Deeds
in a resolution.
 

ISSUE:
W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is proper

HELD:
YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence, their integrity may be affected if an
encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. If different
copies were permitted to carry different annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would
cease to be available.
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is, property of donor Cornelio
and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina, “there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before
the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance.” Assuming the conjugal nature of the property,
the donation bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the fact
that 2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than ½ his share,  not to say more
than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.

Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelio’s civil status, character of land and
validity of conveyances are in issue, the registration may await the outcome of said case and parties
may protect their rights by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
 38. Director of Lands vs. Danao, February 21, 1980

FACTS
: Ida Dano, representing the heirs of Francisco Dano,filed an application for the registration of a
parcel of land in Misamis Occidental, praying “in case the land may not be
registered as private land, she requests that her imperfect or incomplete title to the property
may be confirmed in favor of the heirs of Francisco Dano”. Petitioner opposed the application
because the land sought to be registered is foreshore landwhich is part of the public domain
and hence cannot be thesubject of private ownership. The lower court decided in favorof Dano
on the basis of open, continuous, adverse, exclusive, andnotorious possession dating back to
more than 30 years.Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first timethe issue that
respondent filed her application for registrationbeyond the time prescribed in Sec. 45 and 47 in
of CA 141,which said the application was “not to extend beyondDecember 31, 1968” (she filed
the application January 8, 1969).

The Misamis CFI denied the MR on the basis of Rule 9.2 of theROC (defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a Motion toDismiss or the Answer are deemed waived) and the doctrinein
Vicente v. Lucas (where the defendants never pleaded thestatute of limitations they
are deemed to have waived it andit is error for the lower court to dismiss the proceeding
onthat ground). Petitioner filed a second MR arguing the issue isjurisdictional and can
henceforth be raised at any stage in theproceeding, though this 2nd MR was denied.
The CFI held thedate prescribed in Secs. 45 and 47 of CA 141 is notjurisdictional but a limitation
to file an application. It upheld itsearlier decision.

ISSUE(S)
: Whether or not the CFI had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal for registration of land past the
deadline set in CA141

Ruling:
YES, because the period indicated in Sec. 47 is a timelimitation petitioner did not aver in his
answer, and becausethe intent of the law was to give as much leeway as possible toapplicants
of judicial confirmation of imperfect or incompletetitle.)
1. The period fixed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act
CA141, as amended, is not jurisdictional but is more of a timelimitation. It is a defense or
objection which should have beenset up either in a Motion to Dismiss or in an Answer.
Sincepetitioner had never pleaded the statue of limitations, he isdeemed to have waived the
same.

2. The defense of prescription cannot be pleaded for the firsttime at the trial or on appeal.

Petitioner raised that issue forthe first time only in his MR.

3. Even bearing in mind that prescription does not run againstthe State (Art 1108 (4), Civil Code)
and the rights of the Statemay not be waived by mistakes of officers entrusted with theexercise
of such rights, the intendment of the lawmaker torecord as much leeway as possible to
applicants for judicialconfirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles is evident fromthe statutory
history of section 47 of the Public Land Act.a. In the original text, the time limitation was not to
extendbeyond December 31, 1938
 39. Republic vs. Alconaba, April 14, 2004

Facts:
the respondents filed... an application... for registration of title over five parcels of land... in
Cabuyao, Laguna... stated... they... that they are the sole heirs of Spouses Melencio E.
Melendez, Sr., and Luz Batallones Melendez, original owners
Their parents had been in possession of the said property since 1949, more or... less.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application... on the following grounds: (a)
neither the respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to the
property or have been in open, continuous,... exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the muniments of title, i.e.,
tax declaration and tax receipts, presented by the respondents do not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of a bona fide... right to registration of the land under Section 48(b),
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land Act
(c) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant... can no
longer be availed of by the respondents; and (d) the land is part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines... the trial court found that the respondents have
sufficiently established their family's actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession
of the subject property for more than fifty-seven years, commencing from the possession of
their... predecessors-in-interest in 1940, and that such possession was in an adverse and
public manner.
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
that the subject property was classified as within the alienable and disposable
Ruling:
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that
the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain;
and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and...
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial
or since 12 June 1945.
There is no doubt that the subject property is part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain. But it is not clear as to when it was classified as
alienable and disposable by proper authorities.
In a nutshell, the respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title over the land
subject of the application at the time MTC LRC Case No. 06 was filed with the trial court.
They failed to prove that (1) Lot 2111 was classified as part of the disposable and alienable...
agricultural lands of public domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier; (2) they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owners from 12 June 1945 or earlier.
40. Director of Lands vs. Buyco, Nov. 27, 1992
 41. Republic vs. Court of Appeals & Naguit, Jan. 17, 2005

Facts:
Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC
of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy.
Union, Nabas, Aklan.
The application Seeks judicial confirmation of respondent's imperfect title over the aforesaid
land.
he administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut... and
gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and
paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of
owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed
her application for registration.
e MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation
of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title
thereto registered and confirmed in the name of
Naguit
The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on
October 15, 1980
RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.[... appellate court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of...
the RTC.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land
should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Issues:
whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant's possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership could even... start.
Ruling:
he OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945... would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to... reclassify public
agricultural lands as alienable and disposable.
The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before
June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.
an applicant must establish the existence of a... positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute
In that case, the subject land had been... certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in
1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the land,... Considering that the
possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her
predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is
indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which... may be
properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in
possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without
any opposition from any private person and the government itself makes her right thereto
undoubtedly... settled and deserving of protection under the law.
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED
 42. Palomo vs. Court of Appeals, Jan. 21, 1997

FACTS:
                Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40.
On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio
and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of
Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive
Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management,
protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of
the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The
Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and
introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971,
petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual
mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine
Islands.

ISSUE:
                Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.

HELD:
                The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law
governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private
property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is
no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the
public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the
government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for
petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
 43. Republic vs. Court of Appeals & Bernabe, March 16, 1987

FACTS:
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastrewas declared public land in a decision rendered before
the last war. On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest zone and released
and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under the
Public Land Act.On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Bataan a
petition to perfect their rights and register their titles to said lots, having allegedly
acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the original
owners thereof, whose possession of the same including that of the herein Respondents, has
always been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse, and in the concept of owners
thereof for more than 30 years.The Acting Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the
Director of Lands, filed his opposition to the petition alleging that the land is still, in truth and in
fact, public land and as such cannot be the subject of a land registration proceeding under Act
496.

ISSUE:
Whether the lots claimed by respondents could legally be the subject of a judicial
confirmation of title under the aforequoted provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended.

RULING:
No.Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural
land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. They are incapable of
registration and their inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued during the Spanish
sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title.Thus,
possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private. A parcel of forest land is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.Thus, even if the
reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not
qualified for a grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that
private respondents could only be credited with 1year, 9 months and 20 days possession
and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965, the date when the land area in
sitio San Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No. 267,
which includes the lots claimed by respondents, had been segregated from the forest
zone and released by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under
the Public Land Act. Consequently, under the above mentioned jurisprudence, neither private
respondents northeir predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots for the requisite
period of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.
 44. Susi vs. Razon, Dec. 9, 1925

Facts
 Nemesio Pinlac owned a land which he used as fish pond.
 In 1880, he sold it to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for P12.
 In 1899, they sold it to Valentin Susi for P12.
 The possession and occupation of the land was in open, continuous, adverse and
public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance.
 In 1914, Director of Lands sold the land to Angela Razon. (The Director of Lands
alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of the United
States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands.)

Issue
 Was the sale of the land by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon valid?

Ruling
 No. When Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore
is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus
made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
 The land had already become, by operation of law, private property of the Valentin
Susi, who, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, has the right to bring an
action to recover possession thereof and hold it.
 45 Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, Aug. 31, 1946

FACTS:

Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they
openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for
registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land
and also because he was an alien.

ISSUEs:

Whether or not Oh Cho had title

Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration

HELD:

Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration
Act.

All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first
predecessor in interest began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an
alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration had they applied for
the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not
complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This
possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right
could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title
over public land by prescription.
 46. Mesina vs. Sonza, May 25, 1960

FACTS:
Plaintiff Mesina claimed to be the owner of a parcel of land located in SanAntonio, Nueva, Ecija.
He has been in possession of the subject land openly,publicly and peacefully since 1914. The
said lot was subject of registrationproceedings. Surprisingly, the defendant Pineda without
knowledge of thePlaintiff was able to procure a homestead patent in the same court were
theregistration of property was pending of the same land by the plaintiff,despite of the fact that
defendant had not complied with the requirementsof CA 141. That the said title was procured
by defendants through frauds,deception and misrepresentation since they knew that the lot
belong to theplaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff sought to annulled and cancelled the patent issuedto
defendant and prayed that this registration case pending in the samecourt be given due course.

ISSUE:
WON the homestead patent given to defendant Pineda be declarednull and void.

RULING:

In view of the fact that plaintiff was able to proved his open,continuous, exclusive possession of
the disputed land for more than thirtyyears or since 1914 and that lot is at present subject of
registrationproceeding. Plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by grant of thestate, it
follows that the same had ceased to part of the public and hadbecome private property and
therefore beyond the control of the Director ofLand. The homestead patent issued to
defendant therefore is null and voidand for having it issued through fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation. Thecase was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
ACTS:
ACME Plywood & Veneer
Co. Inc., a corporation
represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario and duly
organized in accordance with
the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines, acquired five (5)
parcels
of land from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, who are members of the
Dumagat tribe and as such are
cultural minorities. These five
lands are sought to be registered
by ACME Plywood.
The Director of Lands opposes
the registration on the grounds
that the land is of public domain
and that corporations are
prohibited by the 1973
Constitution to lands of public
domain except
in lease not exceeding 1,000
hectares. ACME Plywood
averred that the lands sought
to be
registered are private lands
pursuant to Republic Act
3872 granting absolute
ownership to
members of the non-Christian
tribes on land occupied by them
or their ancestral lands, whether
with the alienable or
disposable public lands or
within the public domain.
Ownership and
possession of the land sought to
be registered was duly
recognized by the government.
Intermediate Appellate Court
rendered a decision in favor
of ACME which the Court of
First
Instance of Isabela affirmed.
Thus, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the
lands are part of the public
domain. Whether or not the
constitutional
prohibition against acquisition
by private corporations will
apply.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative.
The lands are already private
lands not only in the right of
grant
but also by operation of law.
For the grant to be honoured by
the court, it is not necessary that
they have a certificate of title,
an application for registration
would suffice. The same being
said,
the lands are already private
lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the
corporation’s
predecessors and the realistic
solution would be to consider
the application for confirmation
as
filed by the natural persons-
transferors. There is also
nothing to prevent ACME from
reconveying
the lands to the Infiels and
the latter from themselves
applying for confirmation of
title and,
after issuance of the certificate/s
of title in their names, deeding
the lands back to Acme.
The constitutional prohibition
does not apply in the case at
bar because the lands are
already
private lands when ACME
acquired them from the Infiels.
This is supported by a legal,
sufficient
and transferable title over the
land on October 29, 1962. Since
the land acquired by them is a
private land to begin with,
ACME has a perfect right to
make such acquisition. There is
nothing
the Constitution that prohibits
private corporations to acquire
private lands. The 1973
Constitution and the present
Constitution only gives
prohibitions on private
corporations in
47. Republic vs. Intermediate Appelate Court & Acme Plywood,
 48. Natividad vs. Court of Appeals & Republic, Oct. 4, 1991

Facts:

October 2004, Victoria applied for registration of a 1,729-m2 lot in Bambang,

City of Taguig, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of that city. The OSG opposed
the application. To prove her ownership, Victoria offered the Conversion/Subdivision Plan,
which showed that the land is inside the alienable and disposable area under Project 27-B as
per L.C. Map 2623, as certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968.
Victoria testified that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely, and in the concept of
owners since the early 1940s or for more than 30 years and have been declared as owners
for taxation purposes for the last 30 years. The Republic did not present any evidence in
support of its opposition.

In January 25, 2006, the MeTC rendered a decision, granting the application for
registration and finding that Victoria sufficiently established her claim and right under the
land registration law to have the subject property registered in her name. The OSG
appealed the decision and during the appeal Victoria submitted a DENR Certification,
verifying the subject property as within the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. In 2007, the CA reversed the MeTC’s decision because allegedly Victoria f ailed to
prove that the subject lot is alienable and disposable. Furthermore, the CA ruled that it
could not take cognizance of the DENR Certification since it was not offered as evidence
during the hearing in the trial court.

Issue/s:
Whether or not Victoria amply proved her claim of ownership of the property.

Ruling:
Yes.
The Court is convinced that Victoria sufficiently proved her ownership of the land. To
prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant may
secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and
that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy
of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the
DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.
In the present case, Victoria was able to submit the DENR Certification, verifying that
the land is alienable and disposable. The only reason why the CA reversed the lower court’s
decision is that the said Certificate was only submitted during the appeal and not during trial
in the lower court. To further support its ruling, the Court cited its decision in Llanes v.
Republic, where it allowed consideration of a CENRO Certification though it was only
presented during appeal to the CA to avoid a patent unfairness. The Court also stated that
the rules of procedure being mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, the
Court is empowered to suspend their application to a particular case when its rigid
application tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. Therefore, it would be
more prudent to recognize the DENR Certification and resolve the matter.
49. Republic vs. Court of Appeals & Baloy, Nov. 26, 1986