E-FILED 2023 FEB 26 11:59 PM LINN - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR LINN COUNTY

STATE OF IOWA, NO. FECR141034

PLAINTIFF,

VS.

ALEXANDER KEN JACKSON, MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT AND

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO
DEFENDANT. IOWA COURT RULE 2.24

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Alexander Jackson, by and through counsel, and pursuant
to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24 hereby moves the Court for an order arresting judgment
and a new trial. In support of his motion, the Defendant states as follows:

BACKGROUND PROCEEDINGS
On July 13, 2021 the State filed the Trial Information charging the Defendant, Alexander
Jackson, in Counts One, Two, and Three with Murder in the First Degree.

Trial was held on January 10-13, 17-20, 23-25, 2023. On January 10, 2023, jury selection
began. On January 12, 2023, the parties selected a 12-person jury and two alternate jurors.

Counsel gave opening statements on Friday, January 13, 2023, and evidence commenced
January 13, 2023, ending on January 23, 2023. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, the
Defendant moved the court for a judgment of acquittal, and the motion was denied. At the close
of evidence, the Defendant renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, and the motion was
denied.

On January 24, 2023, the Court read the Instructions to the jury and counsel presented
closing arguments. Trial was submitted to the jury on January 24, 2023. On January 25, 2023, the
jury returned a verdict of guilty in Counts One, Two, and Three of Murder in the First Degree.

POINTS AND AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

NEW TRIAL
Iowa Rule 2.24(3) provides that a Defendant may file a motion in arrest of judgment
requesting that no judgment be rendered upon a verdict of guilty if “upon the whole record no
legal judgment can be pronounced.”

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2) states that a defendant may file a motion for a
new trial subsequent to a guilty verdict. In pertinent part, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure
2.24(2)(b) provides that a court may grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(2) When the jury has received any evidence, paper or document out of court not
authorized by the court.

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(3) When the jury have separated without leave of court, after retiring to
deliberate upon their verdict, or have been guilty of any misconduct tending to
prevent a fair and just consideration of the case.

(5) when the Court has misdirected the jury in a material matter of law, or has
erred in the decision of any question of law during the course of the trial, or when
the prosecuting attorney has been guilty of prejudicial misconduct during the trial
thereof before a jury.

(6) when the verdict is contrary to law or evidence.

(9) when from any other cause the defendant has not received a fair and impartial
trial.

The Defendant asserts the following errors occurred during trial of this matter:

(I) the Court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for mistrial based on jurors’
access to unauthorized media and misconduct;

(II) the Court erred in denying the Defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal
because the State produced insufficient evidence and the verdict is contrary to the
weight of the evidence; and

(III) the Court erred in admitting officers’ testimony regarding hearsay statements
to explain police officer conduct.

ANALYSIS
(I) THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
MISTRIAL BASED ON JURORS’ ACCESS TO UNAUTHORIZED MEDIA AND
MISCONDUCT
A fundamental component of a criminal jury trial is a defendant’s right to a verdict
“based upon the evidence developed at the trial.” See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472
(1965) (citation omitted). Further, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized:

“Among these ‘legal procedures' is the requirement that the jury's verdict be based
on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources. Thus, in Marshall v.
United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959), we set aside a
federal conviction where the jurors were exposed ‘through news accounts' to
information that was not admitted at trial. We held that the prejudice from such
material ‘may indeed be greater’ than when it is part of the prosecution's evidence
‘for it is then not tempered by protective procedures.’ At 313, 79 S.Ct. at 1173.

At the same time, we did not consider dispositive the statement of each juror ‘that
he would not be influenced by the news articles, that he could decide the case
only on the evidence of record, and that he felt no prejudice against petitioner as a

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result of the articles.’ At 312, 79 S.Ct. at 1173.

Likewise, in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961),
even though each juror indicated that he could render an impartial verdict despite
exposure to prejudicial newspaper articles, we set aside the conviction holding:
‘With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried
in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion * * *.’
At 728, 81 S.Ct., at 1645.” Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351, 86 S.
Ct. 1507, 1516, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966).

In the present case, on January 12, 2023, the Defendant moved for a mistrial on the basis
that jurors ignored the Court’s admonition. The Court and the parties were informed of specific
issues during individual voir dire:

A juror stated that he heard other jurors talking about the case.

A juror stated that other jurors had told him about the case. He heard another juror
say that the Defendant was “guilty as sin” while other jurors were around. This
juror also stated that he saw a male juror on Twitter.

A juror stated that he heard another juror talking about the case and put his
headphones in to avoid hearing anything.

A juror stated that he heard other jurors discussing the case, including what had
been in the media the last couple of days. This juror also stated that he had spoken
to another juror and an acquaintance of his about what they had heard in the news.

The State resisted and the motion was denied. These statements, further supported by the
record made during voir dire, make clear that jurors accessed news about the case and social
media. Therefore, the Defendant moves for a new trial pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(2), on the basis that the jury has received any evidence, paper or document
out of court not authorized by the court.

Not only did jurors access information not authorized by the Court, but they took it one
step further by discussing amongst themselves. The fact that a juror expressed that the Defendant
is “guilty as sin” in the earshot of another juror before any evidence was presented shows a
blatant disregard for the Court’s admonition and the Defendant’s right to a fair trial. Therefore,
the Defendant moves for a new trial pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(3),
which provides, in pertinent part, that the Court may grant a new trial when the jury have been
guilty of any misconduct tending to prevent a fair and just consideration of the case.

The Defendant asserts that the Court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for mistrial
on the basis that jurors ignored the Court’s admonition. The Defendant moves for a new trial
under both causes provided under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure and 2.24(2)(b)(2) and (3).

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(II) THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
In a criminal case, the prosecution bears both the production burden and the persuasion
burden. State v. Lewis, 242 N.W.2d 711, 717 (Iowa 1976). In other words, the ultimate burden of
persuasion by proof beyond a reasonable doubt is on the prosecution. Id. A reasonable doubt is
one that fairly and naturally arises from the evidence in the case, or from the lack or failure of
evidence produced by the State. Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 100.2.

In order to sustain a conviction, the State must produce legally sufficient evidence. See
The People v. Brewster, 473 N.Y.S.2d 984, 987 (1984). For evidence to be sufficient, the State
must present either direct or circumstantial evidence, or both, on each and every essential
element in order to obtain and keep a conviction. State v. Brown, 172 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Iowa
1969), citing State v. Manly, 233 N.W. 110 (Iowa 1930) and State v. Heinz, 275 N.W. 10 (Iowa
1937). The proof, whether by circumstantial or direct evidence, must generate something more
than suspicion, or speculation, or conjecture. Id., citing State v. Daves, 144 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa
1966).

After the close of the evidence in a criminal case, the trial court has two separate and
distinct scales to weigh the evidence of the State. These scales are the sufficiency of the evidence
standard and the weight of the evidence standard. The sufficiency-of-the evidence standard views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Iowa
1999). Substantial evidence is required to support the verdict. State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d
337, 338-340 (Iowa 1980). If the evidence could convince a rational trier of the fact the
defendant is guilty of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt, it is substantial. Greene, at
29.

On a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence, the trial court is not
obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and has broad power to
weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses. State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658
(Iowa 1998); States v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 2003). “If the court reaches the
conclusion that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence and that a miscarriage of
justice may have resulted, the verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted.” 3 Charles A.
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 553, at 245-48 (2d Ed. 1982) [cited in Ellis at
658-659].

ELEMENTS OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE

In order to prove that the Defendant committed Murder in the First Degree, the State
must prove all of the following elements:

THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF IDENTITY BEYOND A

REASONABLE DOUBT
First and foremost, the State is required to prove identity. The State must prove that
Alexander Jackson committed the offenses of Murder in the First Degree in Counts One, Two,
and Three. Mere knowledge and presence at the scene of a crime are not enough to prove the
defendant committed the offense or that he did aid and abet its commission. State v. Brown, 172
N.W.2d 152, 156 (Iowa 1969).

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THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF MALICE

AFORETHOUGHT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
Malice aforethought is an essential element of the offense of murder that the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 896 N.W.2d 770, 780. (Iowa 2017). In order to
support a conviction for first degree murder, Iowa requires that malice must be “formed before
and continue to exist at the time of the injury.” State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 257, 265 (Iowa
2008). This statement captures the essential meaning of the “aforethought” component of the
malice requirement. Bentley, at 265.

Malice aforethought is a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that
exists before the act is committed. State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Iowa 2002). Like
premeditation, it does not have to exist for any particular length of time. Myers, at 579. In State v.
Green, 896 N.W.2d 770, 779 (Iowa 2017), the Iowa Supreme Court said, “malice means the
condition of mind which prompts one to do a wrongful act intentionally, without legal
justification or excuse.” When an individual acts on that state of mind, the individual is said to
have acted with malice aforethought. Green, at 799.

THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF PREMEDITATION

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
This element is crucial because it separates murder from other lesser included offenses.
State v. Inger, 292 N.W.2d 119, 121-22 (Iowa 1980). Malice is required for both degrees of
murder. Iowa Code Section 707.1. ("A person who kills another person with malice aforethought
either express or implied commits murder."). However, first-degree murder requires proof of
deliberation and premeditation in addition to malice aforethought. Iowa Code Sections 707.1,
707.2(1)(a).

Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 700.5 provides:

“‘Willful’ means intentional or by fixed design or purpose and not accidental.

‘To premeditate’ means “to think or ponder upon a matter before acting.”
‘To deliberate is to weigh in one’s mind, to consider, to contemplate, or to
reflect.”

Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 700.5. State v. Gramenz, 126
N.W.2d 285 (Iowa 1964). State v. Hofer, 28 N.W.2d 475 (Iowa 1947).

Deliberation requires a cool mind that is capable of reflection, and of premeditation that it
requires that the one with the cool mind did in fact reflect, at least for a short period of time
before his act of killing. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 267-8 (Iowa 1979). However,
premeditation and deliberation need not exist for any particular length of time. State v. Gilroy,
199 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Iowa 1972).

Premeditation and deliberation may not be presumed. State v. Fryer, 226 N.W.2d 36, 41
(Iowa 1975). It may not be inferred from intent. Fryer, at 41. The mere opportunity to
premeditate and deliberate is not enough. State v. Wilson, 11 N.W.2d 737, 754 (Iowa 1943).

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Because premeditation and deliberation are elements of first-degree murder, the State must prove
them beyond a reasonable doubt. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Deliberate and
premediate are not synonymous with intentional.

“Intentional killing is not necessarily deliberate or premediated, nor even malicious, for
the crime may be only manslaughter, though the act be intentional of death... To (hold
otherwise) would be to strike out of the statute the words deliberate and premediated, and
to leave only the word willful, to distinguish murder in the first degree.” State v. Gillick, 7
Clarke 287; 7 Iowa 287, 297-298 (1858).

Insufficient evidence of premeditation entitles the defendant to a judgment of acquittal

under 707.2(1)(a). See State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 48 (Iowa 2003), holding
“Insufficient evidence of premeditation would bar submission of the first alternative of the
first-degree murder charge.”

(III) THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING OFFICERS’ TESTIMONY REGARDING

HEARSAY STATEMENTS TO EXPLAIN POLICE OFFICERS’ CONDUCT
The Defendant asserts the Court erred when it allowed Officer Korie Barber and
Investigator Ryan Dunbar to testify regarding statements allegedly made to them by workers and
neighbors in the area.

In analysis of hearsay and the use of out-of-court statements to prove responsive conduct,
the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 2021) stated:

“The rule prohibiting hearsay evidence only forbids an out-of- court statement
used ‘to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.’ Iowa R. Evid.
5.801(c). So, when the out-of-court statement is used to prove something other
than the truth of the matter asserted, such as responsive conduct, the statement
may be admissible as nonhearsay. See State v. Mitchell, 450 N.W.2d 828, 832
(Iowa 1990). However, ‘the court must determine whether the statement is truly
relevant to the purpose for which it is being offered, or whether the statement is
merely an attempt to put before the fact finder inadmissible evidence.’ Id.”
Dessinger, at 603.

In the specific context of out-of-court statements to explain police officer conduct, the
Iowa Supreme Court has been critical and recognized that:

“Several times we have rejected the use of out-of-court statements because they
‘explained responsive conduct of law enforcement officers.’ State v. Plain, 898
N.W.2d 801, 812 (Iowa 2017) (providing the example of State v. Tompkins where
the officer's testimony was inadmissible because the officer's account ‘went
beyond the mere fact that a conversation occurred and instead actually stated what
the witness said.... [and] did not merely explain the investigation’ and instead
directly challenged the defense's argument. (quoting State v. Tompkins, 859
N.W.2d 631, 636, 643 (Iowa 2015))).” Dessinger, at 603.

The Defense contends the exact issues cited by the Iowa Supreme Court occurred in the

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present case. Similarly, the testimony of both Officer Barber and Investigator Dunbar went
beyond the mere fact that conversations with the workers and neighbors occurred. Officer Barber
testified that there were construction workers working on a house in the area. He testified that he
talked to the workers to see if they saw anything. Along the same lines, Investigator Dunbar
testified that he stopped at houses in the neighborhood. He testified that he talked to neighbors to
see if they saw anything. During the testimony of Officer Korie Barber and Investigator Ryan
Dunbar, the Defense made timely and repeated objections based on hearsay. Despite the
Defense’s objections, the Court allowed Officer Barber and Investigator Dunbar to testify as to
what the witnesses actually stated: that they did not see anything. There is no doubt that this
testimony directly challenged Mr. Jackson’s argument that an intruder was responsible. In sum,
the Court erred in overruling the Defendant’s repeated objections during the testimony of Officer
Barber and Investigator because the statements were inadmissible hearsay.

Further, the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, “(I)n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy all the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” This bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions. Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,43 (2004), the United States Supreme Court read
“witnesses against” a defendant to mean those who actually testify at trial, those whose
statements are offered at trial, or something in-between. The text of the Confrontation Clause
applies to “witnesses” against the accused–in other words, those who “bear testimony.” Id., at 51.

Testimony, in turn, is typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose
of establishing or proving some fact. Id. An accuser who makes a formal statement to
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not. Id. The constitutional text thus reflects an especially acute concern with a
specific type of out-of-court statement. Id.

In the present case, the State could have called the workers and neighbors to testify.
Instead, the State cut corners and inserted the alleged statements of the workers and neighbors
through its officers. As a result, the Defendant’s right to confront those witnesses has been
violated.

CONCLUSION
Each error, in and of itself, resulted in the denial of the Defendant’s constitutional rights
to due process and a fair trial pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of Iowa. Further,
when the errors are taken together as a whole, the Defendant did not receive a fair and impartial
trial.
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests the Court enter an order
granting the Defendant a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Tyler Johnston, Lindsay Garner, & Amber Foley

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Tyler Johnston, Lindsay Garner, & Amber Foley

Attorneys for Defendant
425 Second Street SE, Ste. 802
Cedar Rapids, IA 52401
Phone: 319-398-3690
tjohnston@spd.state.ia.us
lgarner@spd.state.ia.us
afoley@spd.state.ia.us