‘STUDIA PHANOMENOLOGICA Ii (2003) 1-2, 179.194 HUSSERL AND THE INFINITE Carlo Tenna (Utrecht University) 1. Introduction Edmund Husserl began his academic career as a mathematician, studying with some of the best mathematicians of his time (like Weierstrass and Kronecker), Subsequently, he turned to philosophy, field in which he also had the extraordinary opportunity to work with one of the most influential philosophers of the nineteenth century: Franz Brentano. In Husser!’s early work these two influences gener- ate a unique mix and I think that itis very interesting to investigate the way in which Husserl deals with some of the most fundamental prob- lems of mathematics and philosophy of mathematics, like the prob- ems posed by concepts such as that of infinity. In this article! I will analyse Husser!’s conception of the infinite as ex- pressed in the paragraph Unendliche Mengen of his Philosophie der Arithmetil (PA)? Twill give a short exposition on his distinction be- tween proper and symbolic presentations and then proceed to the logi- cal distinctions that Husserl makes between finite and infinite symbolic collections. Subsequently (in section 2.3), Iwill discuss Husser!’s addition of sur rogate presentations as a sub-type of symbolic presentations in his short TT would like to thank Mark van Atten for his insightful comments and Richard ‘Tieszen forthe leerres that contributed to inspize ths article. | am also deeply in- debted 1 "mein groer Lehrer” Karl Schuhmann for everything he taught me and for providing me with the oportnity to publish this atl. 2'E Hussent, Philosophie der Aribmetit (Pychologiache wd Logiche Unter suchungen), CEM, fefer (Robert Sticker). Republished in Hva XIt (£4 L. Eley), Den Finag: Nijhoff 1970, pp. 246-250 / pp. 218-221. lenceorth quoted as BAT have spedhe srg edions af Hanes Pinphie dey Arba nd Ober des egy der Zabl. References to these two texts are complemented with thé co pages in the Husserliana edition in the following fashion: eg. E. HUSSERL, (1891), ‘original pages / p. Hlusserliana pages.180 CARLO IERNA treatise Zur Logik der Zeichen (Semiotik): In this later vext (which was originally intended as an appendix to the never published second vol- ume of the PA) Husserl gives a more detailed account of how we can conceive of the infinite, using surrogate presentations. Allow me to begin, however, with a brief survey of Husser!’s math- ematical background and of other important influences that he under- went in this early period. Especially interesting in this respect is the influence, both mathematical and philosophical, of Bernard Bolzano. I will not focus on the vast impact that the teachings of Brentano and Stumpf had on Husserl, since these have already been abundantly dis- cussed elsewhere.t 1.1 Husserl’s mathematical background Husserl began his studies in 1876 in Leipzig, attending “lectures in mathematics, physics, astronomy and philosophy”$ and continued with mathematics and philosophy in Berlin, where he studied under the great mathematician Weierstrass. Afterwards, Husserl studied in Vienna with former Weierstrass-student Kénigsberger and received his doctorate in January 1883 for his mathemati¢al-technical dissertation Beitrjge zur Variationsrechnung® ‘After a short period in which he worked for Weierstrass? (the sum- mer semester of 1883) and a year in which he volunteered for military service, Husserl returns to Vienna in 1884, where he began to study philosophy under Brentano. Following Brentano’s recommendation, Husserl wrote his habilitation thesis in Halle under the supervision of, YE, HUSSERL, Zur Logik der Zeichen (Semiott), ia Hua XII (Ed. L. Bley) Den Haag: Nijhoff 1970, CED. MONCH, Intention umd Zeichen, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhskamp 1993; R. ROLLINGER, Husser!’s Position in the School of Brentano (Phaenomenologiea 150), Dordreche: Kluwer 1999; L. ALBERTAZZI etal, The School of Franz Brentano, Dor- drecht: Khower 1996 and C. lean, The Beginnings of Husser!'s Philosophy, forth- coming. 9 CE. K. SCHUMANN, Husser! ~ Chronik, Den Haag: Nijhoff 1977, p. 4. Tansla- tions, unless otherwise specified, ae my own. ‘Contebutions to the Caleulus of Variations”, parally published in G. Scam, Analitia matematica ¢ fenomenologica in Edmund Husser, Bai: Edizioni Levante, 1978, 7 According to Schuhmann (in M. HUSSERL, Skizze eines Lebensbildes oon Ed- rend Husserl (Bd. Schubmann, K.), in Huser! Soudies 5, 988, p. 121. a chat time there was no offical “assistantship” at German universes, so Husserl could not have beens *Privatasistent” under Weierstrass as Malvine Husser reports. She probably projected a moze modern concept on the earlier situation. HUSSERL AND T; Brentano’s fort degree within a In this work the combined the r strass and Kéni of psychologica In his first w arithmetization Werasraass u analytical func sis) is a scienc While Weierstrs bea task that co thought that the in philosophy at under Weierstr: also in its philos give just such a concept of num with the analysi which the preses As to the pro 1880 there was < tence of certain Weierstrass took According to Se cies. In the studi ences become ap 9B. Hose, mann’sche Buchdr Haag: Nijhoff 1970. of, J. Minter, Haag: Nijhoff 1982, WPA, p.5n./p 1M Cf the Einleit 2 Te was my ge cal foundation of m Man, Husserl~ Ch 8 OBZ, p.8/p. YR Scuorr, Hie 8 Ibidem, p. 23.CARLO IERNA cer text (which was lished second vol- ant of how we ean 1s. of Husser!’s math- xces that he under- this respect is the Bernard Bolzano. ys of Brentano and en abundantly dis- siding “lectures in ind continued with lied under the great lied in Vienna with ved his doctorate in sation Beitriige zur erstrass’ (the sum- iteered for military he began to study recommendation, the supervision of XII (Bd. L. Eley) Den 2 Subrkamp 1993; R. taenomenologica 150), Franz Brentano, Dor a's Philosophy, forth- off 1977, p. 4. Transla- dished in G.Scrnaren, sari: Edizioni Levante, Lebensbildes von Ed 4p: 121 n.) at that time tusserl could not have reports. She probably [HUSSERL AND THE INFINITE 181 Brentano's former student Stumpf. Husserl obtained his habilitation degree within a year with the work Uber den Begriff der Zahl (OBZ) In this work the two most important influences eame together: Husserl combined the mathematical knowledge that he obtained with Weier- strass and K6nigsberger, with the (proto-phenomenological) method of psychological analysis taught by Brentano and Stumpf. Inhis first works Husserl tried to carry out Weierstrass’ project, the arithmetization of analysis.? Husserl says in the PA: ‘WeTERSTRASS used to begin his epoch-making lectures on the theory of analytical functions with the statement: pure arithmetic (or pure analy- sis) is a'science that is based solely on the concept of number.'9 While Weierstrass supposed that the arithmetization of analysis would be a task that could be carried out by and within mathematics, Husser! thought that the foundations for this project would have to be sought in philosophy and psychology.*t Thus Huser already while studying under Weierstrass, was not only interested in mathematics itself, but also in its philosophical foundations.12 In UBZ and PA Husserl tries to give just such a philosophical and psychological foundation for the concept of number. “Thus all philosophy of mathematics must start with the analysis of the concept of number. This analysis is the goal, which the present treatise establishes itself.” ‘Asto the problem of infinity in mathematics, in the years following 1880 there was a conflict berween Kronecker and Cantor on the exis- tence of certain mathematical entities, such as infinite collections.i# ‘Weierstrass took the side of his former student Cantor in this conflict. According to Schmit: “The PA shows explicit constructivist tenden- cies. In the studies, that were made following Cantor, platonist influ- ences become apparent.”15 Weierstrass could have played an important *E Hussent, Uber den Begriff der Zahl (Peychologische Analysen), Heyoe- ‘mann’sche Buchdruckerei (F. Beyer). Republished in Hua XII (Ed. L. Eky), Den Haag: Nijhoff 1970. Henceforth quoted as UBZ. Cf, J. MiLLER, Numbers in Presence and Absence (Phaenomenologica 90), Den Haag: Nijhoff 1982, p. 1 ff especialy p. 4 WPA, p. 5n./p. 12 mj Ch J. MILLER, Numbers in Presence and Absence, p.3. Ce the Einleitung to OBZ, p.4 f./p. 291 f 12 “Ic was my great teacher WeierstraB, who awakened [1] the interest fora ra cal foundation of mathematics in me.” Ms. B IL 23, p. 8a; quoted from K. SCHUH. MANN, Huser! ~ Chronik,p. 7. 1 OBZ, p. 8/ p.295. WR Scena, Hussers Philosophie der Mathemat, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag 1981,p.17. 5 Ibidem, p.23 sce tna182 CARLO IERNA, role here, since he probably directed Husser!’s attention to Cantor’s work.'6 Tes possible, even probable, that Cantor, who was a colleague of Husserl at Halle and a close personal friend!” (and like him a former Weierstrass student), influenced Husser!’s later work, but at the time of the writing of the PA this is hardly noticeable at all. In the PA Hiusserl certainly does not claim that actually infinite collections or sets do exist, nor does he claim the opposite." He tries to sidestep the issue by limiting his discussion to how we could conceive of the infinite, since such a concepts not directly intuitable. Husseel’s account would remain unchanged, regardless of whether actually infinite collections or sets do or do not exist. He does, however, admit potentially infinite collections and sets, as we will see in greater detail later on. 1.2. Bolzano. Bernard Bolzano had an important influence on Husset!’s theories about the infinite. In that early period it was mainly Bolzano’s work Paradoxien des Unendlichen'® (and not yet the Wissenschafislebre) that made a significant impression on Husserl. Because Husser! began his academic career as a mathematician, he became acquainted at first with Bolzano’s mathematical works, as he tells us: Twas made aware of Bolzano as mathematician (while Iwas a student of WEIERsTRASS) through a treatise by Stoiz in the Mathematischen An- nalen and above all through Brentano’s discussion (in his lectures) of the “Paradoxien des Unendlichen” and through G. Cantor.20 In Stolz’ article?! the Paradoxien are mentioned, but with hardly any reference to their contents and generally the article is purely a mathematical technical work. This article, however, accounts only for the mathematical influence Bolzano had on Husserl: we must turn 16 Tider, p. 16. CE. K. SCHUHMANN, Husserl ~ Chron, p. 22. 18 Inthe PA he does say that the collection of all numbers and the number of points ina line “is” infinite, but he does not go into the details of what kind of infinity or ex- istence this would be. These are quite simple and uncontroversial claims, certainly not ‘on the level of “Cantor's Paradise” of infinite sets. '9 B, BOLZANO, Paradoxien des Unendlichen, Leipzig: Meiner 1920. (Unchanged re-publication of the 1851 edition). Henceforth quoted as Paradoxien. 20 E, HusSERL, Zwei Fragmente 24m Enteurf einer Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage der Logischen Untersuchungen, Hua XX/1 Logische Untersuchungen: Erganzungs- band 1 (ed. U. Melle), Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002, p. 297 n. 21.0, STOLZ, B. Bolzano's Bedeutung in der Geschichte der Infinitesimalrechnung, ‘Mathematische Annalen XVIII (Ed. Klein, F. & Mayer, A.), 1881, pp. 255-279, HUSSERL AND THETD elsewhere for a me been “above all” 1884/1885 thar dire In the lectures or descriptive psych cxeative interpret Unendlichen 22 As reported by Sc started research o1 write the UBZ, so must have carried As I have previ already been any s Since Husserl si UBZ and the PA{ the Inbegriff throv read the original v knowledge only f there is no referen in the PA results t work (Cf. the note Especially the ¢ reminiscent of Bo construction prine ‘When a given In made aa such other part N that rule for all parts M, or M by its ‘its parts member. can be determine construction pit Bolzano calls thos: sor and are success which lack a succes 2K Scammer 3 Gi Peradason 26 Cf. W. ILLEMANI 132.p. iba. Wit Ohi Universiy res Parades p.5.(CARLO IERNA sation to Cantor's ho was acolleague {like him a former rk, but at the time, + at all, In the PAL collections or sets o sidestep the issue ive of the infinite, zis account would infinite collections potentially infinite later on. sn Hussed!’s theories inly Bolzano’s work issenschaftslebre) that ase Hussedl began his oquainted at first with hile Iwasa student © Mathematischen An- a (in his lectures) of Cantor ?? sned, but with hardly he article is purely a rer, accounts only for usserl: we must turn sand the number of points that kind of infinity or ex- rersial claims, certainly not Meiner 1920. (Unchanged >aradosien rede zur zueten Auflage Srouchungen: Erna der Infintesimalrechnung, ), 1881, pp. 255-279. HUSSERL AND THE INFINITE 1 elsewhere for a more philosophical inspiration. Indeed, it must have been “above all” Brentano's lectures in the winter semester of 1884/1885 that directed Husser!’s attention to Bolzano, since: In the lectures on elementary logic he < = Brentano > discussed the descriptive psychology of continua extensively and clearly with anew creative interpretation with special regard to Bolzano's Peradosien des Unendlichen.22 As reported by Schuhmann in the Husterl - Chronik, p. 17, Husser| started research on the continuity-problem even before beginning to write the UBZ, so these lectures and the literature referenced therein must have carried quite some weight in his work. As have previously remarked, its doubsful that there could have already been any significant influence by Cantor in this early phase. Since Husserl seems to have taken some of the central notions of the UBZ and the PA from Bolzano’s Paradoxien (as e.g. the definition of the Inbegriff through the copula “and”)?3 itis clear that he must have read the original work, since he could not have obtained his detailed knowledge only from Brentano's lectures While in the PA itself there is no reference to Bolzano’s Paradoxien, from later annotations in the PA results that Husserl does in fact refer quite directly to this work (CE. the notes to the PA in Hua XII, p. 516), Especially the description of infinite quantities in the PA is clearly reminiscent of Bolzano’s work, Bolzano defines sequences and their construction principles in the following way: ‘When a given Inbegriff of objects ... A, B, C, D, E, F... L, M, Nw. is made up in such a way, that for each part M there is one and only one other partN that we can indicate to be such that according tothe same rule for all parts of the Inbegriff we can determine N by its relation to M, or M by its relation to N: then I call this Inbegriff a sequence and its parts members of this sequence; such a rule, according to which N can be determined by its relation to M, or M by its relation to N, is the construction principle of the sequence 25 Bolzano calls those members of a sequence which both have a succes- sor and are successors themselves, inner members; and those members which lack a successor or are not a successor themselves, external mem- 22K. SCHUHMANN, Husserl ~ Chronik, p. 14. 2 Gh. Paradorien,p.2 8 UBZ, p. 881.334 24 CE. W.ILLEMANN, Huser Vor phinomenologiche Pbilosophie Leipzig: Hireal 1932, p, 13 4 D. Whs.aRo, Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge, Athens (Ohio) Ohio Universy Press 1984, . 60: L- ALBERTAZ2, eal. The School of Prana Brentan, op. cit, p. 18m ® Bevadosien p.5184 ‘CARLO IERNA bers. Infinite sequences, then, are defined as sequences which have no last member (thus lacking one or both external members). Husser] employs a very similar terminology and phraseology in the PA, eg. where he speaks of the natural numbers as “members of a se- quence” and uses a construction principle (+1) to determine whether 1 and O are part of this sequence.% As we will see more in detail later on, Husserl also puts an unlimit- ed, continuing process of construction of concepts at the base of infi- nite quantities: In each case where we speak of an infinite qu: - bale preseution of prove of conseacon af eacepis whch a be continued without limitation. A clear principle is given, according to which we can transform every already generated concept of a certain kind [..] into a new one, sharply distinguished from the previous, and then [we can transform] this one again and so on..27 Husser]2# as well as Bolzano,2? uses the example of the sequence of nat- ‘ural numbers: these are all finite themselves, but the Inbegriff of all nat- ural numbers is an infinite quantity. For both Huusserl and Bolzano the essential characteristic of an infinite quantity or sequence is that “the concept of a last step [..] becomes meaningless.” (PA, p. 249 / p. 221). Furthermore, both agree that it would be impossible to actually construct such an Inbegriff, i. to observe the underlying sensuous quantity and apprehend (auffassen) all of its members one by one and comprehend them together (zusammenfassen) in a collection. However, according to Bolzano, we can imagine such a procedure being carried out, even if we cannot apprehend every single member: In fact, as soon as we have a presentation A, which presents nothing but each of the objects a, b, ¢, d..., we can proceed quite easily to a presen- tation of all of these objects together. Actually, nothing more is needed to that end, than to connect the concept that is meant by the word “In- begriff” with the presentation of A, in such a way as indicated by the words “the Inbegriff of all A”.3° Husserl is a bit more reserved on this point. Infinite quantities, as ac- tually constructed and completed wholes, are: ina certain sense, an imaginary concept, whose contra-logical nature is harmless in everyday thought, since the implicit contradiction does not 26PA, p. 146 /p. 132. 2 PR». 247 /p. 219. 2A, p. 247 £./ p. 220, 2 Paradoxien, p. 20. ¥ Paradoxien, p. 15. Quotation marks added for clarity. HUSSERL AND TH matter in the yuantity ina w Hnited ‘process thing that falls conceptual uni Thus Husser! th of “an essentiall: cept in the real s Let us now p. symbolic present 2. Infinite Ini 2.1 Proper an Husserl expla sentations at the bolic presentatio Agmbolicorit entation throu: what it is, but instead of a pro If some content infinite numbers scriptions, we ca acts that are dirs since in order to the object towan Husserl’s con components: the isa mental action content is typical owing one of th clause is about, a SPA, p.249/ p SDA, p. 249.7 3A, p.215/p 3 On satisfac ‘TueszeN, Mathemati ion to Husser, Caral 351m 1894, of. K. Edition der urspriingCARLO TERNA ences which have no embers). d phraseology in the as “members of a se- determine whether 1 also puts an unlimit- +s at the base of infi- 1, we find the sym- concepts, which can given, according to oncept of a certain a the previous, and the sequence of nat- ¢ Inbegriff of all nat- serl and Bolzano the sequence is that “the PA, p. 249 / p. 221). ipossible to actually inderlying sensuous bers one by one and collection. However, cedure being carried nber: resents nothing but texsly to a presen- ‘ing more is needed aby the word “In- as indicated by the ite quantities, as ac- sralogical nature is tradietion does not HUSSERL AND THE INFINITE 185 matter in the ordinary; eg. when we imagine “all $” to be a closed quantity ina univers judgement [~] The presentation ofa certain un- limited process is logically irreprehensible; similarly the idea of every- thing that falls within its scope, everything that is determined by its conceptual unity: Thus Husser! thinks that, with respect to infinite quantities, we speak of “an essentially new concept, which is not anymore a quantity con- cept in the real sense of the term.”22 Let us now pass on to Husser!’s own theories regarding proper and symbolic presentations and how to conceive of infinity in mathematics. 2. Infinite Inbegriffe 2.1 Proper and symbolic collections Husserl explains the distinction between proper and symbolic pre- sentations at the beginning of chapter XI of the PA. He defines a sym- bolic presentation in the following way: A symbolic ot improper presentation is, as the name already says, pres- entation through signs. When a content is not given dircetly to us as what it is, but only indirectly through signs, that characterize it univocally, instead of a proper presentation, we have a symbolic presentation ofi33 If some content cannot be given to us directly (like e.g. in the case of infinite numbers), but only indirectly through signs or univocal de~ scriptions, we cannot have a proper presentation of it. The intentional acts that are directed towards it could never be fulfilled or satisfied, since in order to satisfy an intention it is necessary to be presented with the object towards which it is directed. ‘Husserl’s conception of intentionality will later’ distinguish three components: the act, the content and the object of intentionality. The act is a mental action of believing, willing, fearing, hoping, and thelike. The content is typically something that can be stated in a “that”~clause, fol- lowing one of the just mentioned verbs. The object is that which the clause is about, at which it is directed. So, in mathematics, satisfying an PA, p.249/p. 221 32 PA, p. 249 6 p.221 38 PA, p.215 /p. 193 ales in the original spaced, % On satisfaction of intentional acts diveeted at mathematical objeas ef. R. TuHS2EN, Mathematis, in B. SMITE, and D.W. Sutra (eds), The Cambridge Comper ion to Husserl, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995, pp. 438-462. 351.1894 cK, SCHUEMANN, Husserl's Abbandlg “Intentionale Gegenstinde” Edition der wrspringlchen Druckfassung, in Brentano Sdien 3, 1992, pp. 137176,186 CARLO IERNA intentional act requires a presentation of its object, probably a numbs through calculation, a proof, a construction, ete. In other cases the wi vocal description can lead us towards a direct presentation of the object, thereby changing our symbolic presentation to a proper presentation. Husserl gives an example of this, by distinguishing the direct presenta- tion of a house and its description in someone’s directions (“The house at the corner of this and that streets and street sides”) If we follow the directions, which constitute a symbolic presentation, we will attain a di- rect presentation, which constitutes a proper presentation. ‘As far as numbers are concerned, Husserl thinks that a proper pres- entation of numbers beyond twelve is not possible. To be properly pre- sented with a number, means that we must be able to grasp all the separate elements along with their totality, the complete collection, in one act. ‘A symbolic presentation does not require this: an indirect contact through a univocal description is enough. A univocal description is a way of describing something in such terms as to identify only a single object or collection of objects, without need to access them directly. For example, I can describe Rome as “the present capital of Italy.” Shortly, pointing at (and thus being presented with) object X and saying “that is X” is proper and direct, while describing X in absentia and naming its properties (*X is such and such”) is indirect and sym- bolic. In mathematics, Husser! thinks chat we can have proper presenta- tions only of those numbers and collections which we can directly per- ceive and intuit as completed wholes. Only of this kind of objects proper presentations are possible, It is quite easy to check personally where the limit of proper presentations is situated: e.g. try and guess the number of words in this article, or on this page, or in this para graph. Iam not able to do anything but guessing, so indeed I cannot claim to have a proper presentation or knowledge of those numbers, bur only a symbolic one through the description I gave. The limit of what can directly and properly be presented is a very small number due to our psychological (and partly physiological) limits. Only in very fortuitous cixcumstances we can present concrete multi- plicities of about a dozen in the proper sense, i. facvually (as intend- ed) present all the single members individually and encompass them in fone act together with all the others.” 36 PA, p. 216 /p. 193 f PA, p.214/ p. 192 HUSSERL AND TH. Yet Husserl give namely by calcul on this page, Ic would nor yield tion of all words not intuit direct! calculation. In th tion and knowle: Yer we sill are ‘succession, but far as we still s pen only in as Even in the case i do not have a dis only guess these are not able to s: tions, which we ¢ guessing or caleu Obviously, th as completed wh. Hiusserl argues t] have a proper pr a symbolic conce words on this pa bolic description through all the s tion was exhaust entation. ‘The presented 1 ihensons of all succession, can tion for the ori lection.” We would have t late the exact am« tation, and this is umber of perso: Husser! prop numbers. Indeed SPA, p.218/p. SPA, p.223/p,CARLO IERNA cobably a number, ther cases the uni- ation of the object, ‘oper presentation. he direct presenta- sions (“The house 36 Tf we follow the ‘we will attain a di- ation. that a proper pres- ‘obe properly pre- le to grasp all the plete collection, in an indirect contact cal description is a sntify only a single cess them directly. apital of Italy.” with) object X and ibing X in absentia + indirect and sym- ve proper presenta- wecan directly per- ais kind of objects ‘check personally reg. try and guess ge, or in this para~ so indeed I cannot of those numbers, { gave. The limit of y small number due its. at concrete multi- zeually (as intend rncompess them in HUSSERL AND THE INFINITE 187 ‘Yet Husserl gives us another way of accessing numbers larger than this, namely by calculation. Even if I cannot but guess the number of words on this page, I could count them, adding them up one by one. This would not yield a proper presentation, but a symbolic one. The collec- tion of all words on this page is a finite, completed whole, which I can- not intuit directly, but which I can attain through successive steps of calculation. In this manner I can construct it and thus have a presenta- tion and knowledge of it albeit symbolic, ‘Yet we still are able to apprehend the single members of the quantity in succetion, But not anphore the comparhenve colesone aad 9 so far as we still speak of a quantity or multiplicity, this clearly can hap- pen only in a symbolic sense.38 Even in the case in which I am able to calculate the exact number, I still do not have a direct presentation of the quantity it stands for. We can only guess these quantities when we are presented with them, but we are not able to see their amount directly, as we are with small collec- tions, which we can conceive as completed wholes, without the need of guessing or calculating. Obviously, there are collections, which I cannot conceive properly as completed wholes. These are of two kinds, the finite and the infinite, ‘Husserl argues that even of large finite collections of which we could have a proper presentation, we often prefer or “intuitively” have only. a symbolic conception, like a crowd, or the stars or even the number of words on this page. All those numbers are given quite well in the sym- bolic description “a lot”. Even if we calculated their amount, by going through all the steps of adding one to one etc., until the entire collec- tion was exhausted, this would not constitute a basis for a proper pres- entation. ‘The presented unity of this process, which connects the distinct appre~ hensions of all the single members, even though not as an act but as a succession, can subsequently serve as the syrabolic substitute presenta- tion for the originally pursued, but unattainable, unity of the real col- lection.29 ‘We would have to be able to conceive of all the steps needed to calcu- Jate the exact amount in one single actin order to have a proper presen- tation, and this is clearly not possible with huge finite numbers like the number of persons in a crowd, the stars or all the words on this page. Hiusserl proposes another approach for those quasi-uncountable aumbers. Indeed, we can think of an idealised counting subject which 28 PA, p.218 / p. 195, PA, p.223 /p. 199.188 CARLO IERNA would be able to conceive of all those steps in one single act. This does not imply a qualitative, but a quantitative shift. Instead of being able to see that there are three holes in a bowling ball, this ideal subject could see that there are exactly 5.432.567.981 stars in a galaxy. So this would guarantee that similar (huge but finite) quantities are not altogether ab- surd or logically inconsistent, just because we cannot conceive them properly. Flowever, in principle we still have the ability to go through every single step. This guarantees that those huge numbers theoretical- ly are accessible to us, even if due to lack of time we could not reach them in a single lifetime by counting, 2.2, Endless collections Husserl purports to make a few fundamental distinctions between finite symbolic collections and infinite collections.#® One is that huge, finite collections can be exhausted by calculation, like I indicated in the preceding paragraph. There is a last step to be gone through, the calculation comes to an end, the computation halts at a certain point. ‘With infinite collections this is certainly not the case. The very notion of a last step in an infinite process leads to a logical contradiction. Thus, infinite collections cannot be conceived of as completed wholes. ‘They are endless in the sense that one can go on forever computing successor numbers according to a given rule. Husserl argues that the concept of such a collection poses a limit to every idealisation.* We cannot even conceive of an idealised intellect capable of exhausting an infinite process or of conceiving of an infinite collection as a complet ed whole, since only an infinite intellect could properly present an ac- tual infinity. Here a quantitative shift is not enough. How, Husserl asks, can we get to such an idea and what could its content be? The answers are quite clear: we get the idea of an infinite collection through an unlimited process that generates an infinite se- quence and the content of the idea of an infinite collection is given by the generation principle underlying such a sequence. Husserl argues that we can have a clear and distinct conception of what is meant by the concept of an “infinite collection”. The ever ex- panding mass of numbers that we could compute without ever ex- 49 Fiusserl seems to limit himself to the infinite sequence of the natural numbers. He does not seem to take into account the real numbers, whose set constitutes the con- tinoum. Husserl speaks indifferent of the infinity of the narural numbers and that of the real numbers, and thus seems to be concerned exclusively with the psychological aspects of infinity and not the mathematical ones. “UDA, p. 2477 p.219, HUSSERL AND THE hausting the wh sense exactly bee: putable. The rule puting numbers ‘ever-expanding c In each case wt bolic presentati becontinued wi which we cant kkind [...] into a then [we can tr: The construction ber whether it be If this principle « ed, then, due tot meaningful and ¢ Taking into ace ing presentatior surugtion pane contiguity ‘The fact that sor tained by means subsuming the w or definition, as bers”. For any principle can be) This possibility + object, without “ in the infinite. Sharp concepww uantity com Srery gen ob ‘whether it coul or not. Even if we cannc can intelligibly v and every given r PA, p.247/p 8 PALp 247/p 4 PALp.247/CARLO IERNA act. This does of being able to I subject could So this would taltogether ab- conceive them 1 to go through ers theoretical- ‘ould not reach tions between ne is that huge, 2 Lindicated in ae through, the a certain point, ‘he very notion \ contradiction. pleted wholes. wver computing argues that the valisation.t We ‘f exhausting an nas a complet- y present an ac- what could its ea of an infinite an infinite se- tion is given by 1 conception of 1. The ever ex- ‘ithout ever ex- xe natural numbers. constitutes the con- rumbers and that of h the psychological HUSSERL AND THE INEINITE 189 hausting the whole set of possible computable numbers, obtains a sense exactly because of the means by which those numbers are com- putable. The rule that we follow and the principle that we use in com- puting numbers are the ones that give a (symbolic) unity to such ever-expanding collections. In each case where we speak of an infinite quantity, we find the sym- boli presenation ofa proces of constuction of concepts, which can be continued without limitation. A clear principle is given, according to ‘which we can transform every already generated concept of a certain, kind [..] into a new one, sharply distinguished from the previous, and then {we can transform] this one again and so on 42 ‘The construction-principle permits us to decide for every given num- ber whether it belongs to the endlessly progressing collection or not. If this principle defines clearly what can and what can not be includ- ed, then, due to the given definition, such a collection can constitute a meaningful and clear mathematical object. ‘Taking into account the results of this process, we construct succeed- ing presentations of quantities, that are ever expanding, and if the con- struction principle really is @ definite one, then the concept of this continuously expanding quantity of concepts acquires a definite con- The fact that something could or could not be a possible result ob- tained by means of a computation, guarantees that there is a way of subsuming the whole of the infinite collection under a single concept or definition, as we indeed do with e.g. the words “the natural num- bers”. For any given number, a decision based upon the construction principle can be made, whether or not itis a member of the collection, This possibility warrants that the collection is a distinct, well-defined object, without “fuzzy borders” of any kind, even though progressing in the infinite. Sharp conceptual moments determine a priori what this ever expanding guantity comprchends or can comprehend and what nots. regarding every given object of thought itis possible to decide unambiguously whether it could be a member of this process of quantity construction or not. Even if we cannot complete the collection of the natural numbers, we can intelligibly use the concept of a natural number, because for each and every given number we can decide whether or not it belongs to this “2A, p.247/p.19. PA, p.247/p.296 PA, p.247/ p. 220,190 ‘CARLO IERNA collection, We can do so in the case of the natural numbers by check- ing whether a given number could be obtained as a possible result by the operation “add one”, performed on the first natural number and its successors. By such a(n) (inductive) definition we can compute the re- sult of any such question, not for all numbers (since there are infinite numbers), but for any given number. ‘The conceptual determination: “a possible result of this process”, like the concept thereof, i a sharp one, and thus the possible results of the indicated succeeding construction of concepts possess a common char- acteristic, which bunds them together; anclogously like the collective [--] unity of the members of a quantity.45 Huser individuates a certain intrinsic, logical contradiction in the fact that we tend to treat infinite symbolic collections in the same way as fi- nite symbolic collections, that is to say, as if they were completed wholes. Like I said above, this cannot be the case with infinite collec- tions, the very idea of a last step being logically inconsistent with their being infinite. Nevertheless, since we intuitively sense a unifying pow- er in their symbolic definition through a principle or rule, we treat them as completed wholes. This leads to an imaginary entity (thus not a real mathematical object) that often is used in ordinary daily life, where it does not do much harm.6 In logic and mathematics we can- not admit similar, logically speaking, contradictory concepts. ‘There is no more to the definition of an endless collection than that itis indeed endless. This separates the concept of a finite collection from that of an infinite collection. Where the completeness of the first is perfectly ad- missible and warranted by an idealization, the second cannot be con- ceived of as a completed whole without leading to an inadmissible logical contradiction. Tndeed the distinction between proper and symbolic presentations plays a very important role here. The symbolic presentation I can have of infinite collections (like the natural numbers) is based upon the proper presentation I can have of the first natural numbers (one, two, three, ete. up to twelve) and on the proper, clear and distinct, knowl- edge I have of the construction principle on which further numbers would have to be based in order to be natural numbers. The proper thus constitutes the foundation for the symbolic. This is not a type of naive generalized induction, since it clearly states that we could not even in principle check the whole domain of an infinite collection. It only claims that we can check any given number and decide whether or not it is a natural number. Even if we cannot have a proper presenta- 8 PA, p. 248 /p. 220, 46 E.g, when we use expressions like “always”, “never, “all” ete. HUSSERL AND THE tion of them, we subset of an infin construction prir individuates, be i symbolic present not conceive of | symbolic unity i that we can in fac ‘Weccan now p Zur Logik der Z, pendix to the sec gives a much mo particular interes Hiusserl introduc: tations, which ac: that infinity belo: Husser! begins proper presentati Improper present: to us indirectly J properly and dire refers given indi: the categorizatior signs. He introdu text: Every sign that or less) permanc 1) serve as mere oper presentat [2 1 imprope Proper ones a8 5 Haag: Nijhoff 1976-1 48 Semiotik, p. 35 Hussent, Early Writ Kluwer 1994, pp. 20+ choices. I have tried « convey not only the ¢ possible.CARLO IERNA ambers by check- possible result by tal number and its ncompute the're- z there are infinite ais process”, like dlerresuls of the common chat= ke the collective adiction in the fact che same way asfi- 7 were completed ith infinite collec- nsistene with their sea unifying pow- + or rule, we treat ry entity (thus not ufnary daly life, tthematics we can- concepts. There is an that itis indeed ion from that of an irst is perfectly ad- rad cannot be con- to an inadmissible bolic presentations entation I can have is based upon the rumbers (one, 60, ad distinct, knowl- hh further numbers mbers. The proper ‘his is not a type of that we could not finite collection. It decide whether or 4 proper presenta- UP ete. [HUSSERL AND THE INFINITE 191 tion of them, we can have a symbolic presentation of any partial, finite subset of an infinite set (at least in principle). Husser! claims that ifthe construction principle is clear and distinct, then so is the collection it individuates, be it infinite or not. This implies that a clear and distinct symbolic presentation is possible of such a collection, even if we can- not conceive of the collection as a completed whole. We can see the symbolic unity in those principles and in those proper presentations that we can in fact access. \ (23 aoe prisons \\ . ot We can now proceed to the analysis and discussion of Hussec’s text Zur Logik der Zeichen (Semiotik)4? In this text, conceived a5 an ap- pendix to the second volume of the PA, but never published, Husserl gives a much more detailed account of signs and symbols. What is of particular interest to us with respect to che concept of infinity, is that Husser] introduces here a new class of presentations, surrogate presen- tations, which account exactly for the class of symbolic presentations that infinity belongs to. Housserl begins with the definition and distinction of proper and im- proper presentations, in almost exactly the same words as in the PA. Improper presentations are those presentations where a content is given to us indirectly through use of signs. These signs are obviously given properly and directly to us, but the content to which we take them to refer is given indirectly and thus improperly. Husserl focuses at first on the categorization of and on the distinctions between different types of signs. He introduces surrogate presentations in the second half of his text: Every sign that serves as a proxy of the signified matter, is an improp~ ¢x presentation, Now this proxy canbe either «temporary or (more co less) permanent one. In fact, improper presentations can: 1) serve as mere intermediaries for the generation of the corresponding proper presentations. E.g. conventional markings, mnemotechnical wor sequences, mechanically learned verses and such function in this way. 2) The improper presentations can also to the contary, seplace the Proper ones as surrogate presentations. 7 E, Husseal, Zur Logik def Zeich) (Semiotik), in Hua XII (Ed. L. Eley) Den Haag: Nijhoff 197 as Semiotk. 4 Semiotik, p. 351. I have compared my own translation with Willards’s (in E. Hussar, Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics Dordrecht: Kluwer 1994, pp. 20-51). However, I do mor agree with some of his terminological choices. I have tried to remain as close as possible ro the German original, trying to convey not only the denotation but also the connoxations of Husser!’s words whenever possible192 CARLO IERNA Hiusserl introduces here for the first time a subdivision of improp- er presentations in wo kinds: those that mediate the proper presenta- tions and those that cllectively subsite them: Ta the fist-case eg acronyms do not substitute the verses or sentences they stand for, but only act as a helpful tool in order to remember them. Through the first kind of improper presentations we can reach and are in effect direct- ed towards the proper presentations that are intended by the signs. In the second case Husser! introduces a further distinction: Improper presentations serve merely as convenient replacement for proper ones, o relieve a higher peychical activity. [ol Cy ‘The class of surrogate presentations, which we discussed up to now, 6 characterised by the fact that the proper presentations for which the surrogates stand in, are at our disposal at any moment, When our in- terest can only be satisfied by the proper presentations themselves, hey surface in our memory again. Its also clear that the previous existence of the proper presentations is a requirement for the improper ones that, replace them. This is completely different in all these respects in, the \ case of rxemnations oF th ‘of the second class. These do not just | serie g mere. ‘convenience of thought, they are not signs or abbrevia- Sons/or the orginal and-atany inpmene liye copes Pre- | jentations. The symbols tothe contrary regard matters, whose proper resentation is denied to us, bee temporanly or permanent ee eeEeEeeeeee ‘This quotation clearly reveals the role of surrogate presentations. ‘The first kind of surrogate presentations (A) is employed in everyday reasoning when we use simpler, instead of more complex presenta- tions. Huser! gives various examples and in all cases it comes down to using only sketches and rudiments instead of the whole real thing. E.g. instead of properly presenting a quantity, we only present it improp- erly by presenting its very first members properly and then proceeding with an “and so on ..”. Instead of really calculating the amount of ap- ples in a basket, we look at the first two, three apples and then imme- diately jump to the conclusion: “a lot of apples” 5° As we saw at the end of section 2.1, Husserl suggested two ap- proaches for huge numbers: for huge finite numbers, we could con- ceive of them as completed wholes and thus countable quantities by appealing to an idealised subject. With a small quantitative shift, we can imagine someone capable of seeing the amount of stars in a galaxy. However, we were left with one unanswered question: what about in- finite numbers ? Certainly, the first kind of surrogate presentations (A) can easily account for huge finite numbers. For infinite quantities, *® Semioti, p. 351 5° In German the expression “cine Menge” can mean “a quantity” as wellas “alot”. HUSSERL AND THE however, we must in principle have a symbolic presenta rather use symbo quantitative shift Thus we must use we always had th whenever the sym infinite, we have n Husser gives n sentations (apart | also clarifies that : case(B) of surrog: propeY-conceptior tion could bring w of the moon), and ever be possible (t would be the pro, earth” 51 Ultimat conceivable or not space, real time, a is more or less exa fle science and hur origins of philoso; These last exan the infinite, Husse and infinite perfec increases, an inde infinite [..}, conce tally infinite, for In the PA, whe Husserl in fact de limitless, but whic principle, as we hi that the concepti« means by actual ir pleted whole. Thi 51 Semiotib, p. 355 52 Semiotb, p. 356 53 *Vereigentlichu Semiatih, p. 356(CARLO IERNA. sdivision of improp- the proper presenta Trike frst case 0 s they stand for, but m. Through the first «are in effect direct aded by the signs. In notion: ent replacement for Tbe up 2 now ‘Sons for which the nent. When our in- yas themseves, they Tprevious existence improper ones that tare respects inthe ss. These do not, t signs or abbrevia- ropes Pre- itters, whose proper emanate —— . jogate presentations. mployed in everyday ze complex presenta- ases it comes down to whole real thing. E.g. ly present it improp- and then proceeding ing the amount of ap- pples and then imme- 3 srl suggested two ap- nbers, we could con~ suntable quantities by antitative shift, we can ¢ of stars in a galaxy. sstion: what about in- gate presentations (A) or infinite quantities, quantity” aswell as “aloe”. HUSSERL AND THE INFINITE 193 however, we must turn to the second type (B). Since we cannot even in principle have a proper conception of infinity, surely we do not use symbolic presentations merely as convenient, temporal substitute, but rather use symbolic presentations permanently. No idealisation, no quantitative shift can account for a conception of infinite quantities, ‘Thus we must use a substitute, a fake, a surrogate. In the first case (A), we always had the possibility of reverting to a proper presentation, whenever the symbolic one would not suffice. Now, in the case of the infinite, we have nothing but the surrogate. Husserl gives many examples of this case of usage of surrogate pre- sentations (apart from infinity), like the memory of a past event. He also clarifies that further distinction can be made within the second case(B) of surrogate presentations. In fact, there is the case in which a proper conception is not possible here and now, but which future ac- tion could bring within our reach (e.g. the presentation of the dark side of the moon), and the case wherein no proper conception at all could ever be possible (both in practice, for a human, and in principle). What ‘would be the proper presentations of concepts like “Africa” or “the earth” 5! Ultimately, at the far end of this slippery slope of what is conceivable or not, we have the concepts of “God, external object, real space, real time, another's soul etc.” It is striking to notice that this is more or less exactly the same set of concepts which continues to baf- fle science and human understanding in general ever since the very first origins of philosophical thought. ‘These last examples bring us back to the main point of this article: the infinite. Husserl points out that these examples, the notion of God and infinite perfections, contain “as properties the concepts of infinite increases, an indeed not just in the sense of unlimited, but of actually infinite (...], concepts, whose appropriation’ would presuppose an ac~ tually infinite, for us totally incomprehensible, psychical capacity."54 In the PA, when speaking of sequences progressing in the infinite, Husserl in fact describes a form of potential infinity, which is simply limitless, but which we can understand by appeal to the construction principle, as we have seen. Here, in the Semiotik he clearly points out that the conception of actual infinity goes a step further. What he means by actual infinity proceeds from his examples: an infinite com- pleted whole. This kind of quasi-contradictory concepts ean only be 3 Semiotk, p. 355 82 Semiotik, p. 356. 5 “Vereigentlchung’, literally “making proper”. H Semiotk, p. 356.194 CARLO IERNA STUDIA PHANOME accounted for by the weakest form of presentations, ie. surrogate pre~ sentations. Lerus finally take a brief look at how we operate with these surro- gate presentations. According to Husserl, in most cases, we are not aware of the fact that we use surrogate presentations instead of proper Hu ones. “One must not confuse the fact that we use surrogate presenta~ tions with the knowledge of this usage. The latter lacks in many, if not most, cases”.55 This indicates that in operations with surrogate presentations, even though the thoughts are directed at che objects and not at the signs, the sign-relation between signifier (i. the sign or mode of presentation) and signified (ie. the object or denotation) does not play any role atall. | In short, when operating with surrogate presentations, we operate ac- | cording 10 blind psychological rules.%6 » Very similar to this account is Huusserl’s account of imaginary num- bers, according to Da Silva: THE 1896 Lecrt 1. Introduction ‘Among Franz. his attempt at a re Standpoint he forn basis for the refort details of the refor tured on the reforn most prominent st jected it in the 18% student, Alois Héfl The theory of judy from Brentano’s In PA Husserl had already faced the problem of justifying computa- tions with big numbers, numbers that could not be obtained *y, a process of abstraction from manageable collections, that is, reasonably Small collections that actually could be counted by a human agent, Imaginary numbers, however, pose a stil more difficuk problem. Tf “huge” natural numbers are non-intuitable due only to our minds’ lim- ited powers, imaginary numbers are not accessible to intuition in a much stronger way. No matter how mich we free our mental process es of their natural limitations, imaginary numbers cannot be generated by abstraction from given cllecuons of obec, Imaginary number are only symbols. Symbolic reasoning is justified in PA by appealing to idealization, which guarantees that to any symbolic computation there isan ne onsen dat cl we bt om ou ere mental limitations, give tt inutive support. In the case of imaginary fambers nothing ofthe sorts the case snd Hlusced] ymust find another ‘way of justifying their use. He chooses to see these “numbers” as pure symbols to which nothing can correspond in our intuitions, and com- ulations with them as mere formal manipulations 27 1 BRENTANO, Piel Humble, 1874), pp. 26 Roderick’ M, CHistot Rodopi, 1982), pp. 17- “Broan Rel of “Judging Correctly: By (eh) The Cambriige« Pres, forthcoming) Tn the summer se “Old and New Logie" a caer in philosophy, the Necessary Reforms reform of logic in the course on logie hes be ROLLINGER, Husser's P don: Kluwer, 1999), Kept much closer tor HORE in cole Tempsky / Leipzig: ( of Philosopbische Props Indeed, as we have seen, with regard to infinite collections, we have reached the very same conclusions. They are presented in the weakest | form, almost devoid of any content, unimaginable by any idealisation, and operations with them are merely formal manipulations according to blind psychological rules. ik, p. 357. inde peychologische Gesetze”: Semiotik, p. 357 57 JJ. DA SILVA, Husser?’s Two Notions of Completeness, in Synthese 125, 2000, p. 434.CARLO IERNA ons, i. surrogate pre~ rate with these surro- ost cases, we are not ions instead of proper se surrogate presenta- rlacks in many, if not te presentations, even ad not atthe signs, the node of presentation) rot play any role atall. ations, we operate ac- int of imaginary num- justifying computa~ 2t be obtained bya is, thats, reasonably iby a human agent. difficult problem. If Ty to our minds’ lim- ble to intuition in a + our mental process- ‘cannot be generated Imaginary numbers a PA by appealing to ‘ic computation there at from our inessental ine case of imaginary must find another “numbers” as pure intuitions, and com- 37 ve collections, we have ssented in the weakest ile by any idealisation, snipulations according snSynthese 125,2000, p. 434, STUDIA PHNOMENOLOGICA Ill (2003) 1-2, 195-213, HUSSERL’s ELEMENTARY LOGIC ‘THE 1896 LECTURES IN THEIR NINETEENTH CENTURY CONTEXT Robin D. ROLLINGER, (Husserl Archives, Leuven) 1. Introduction Among Franz Brentano’s ambitious philosophical enterprises Was his attempt at a reform of logic. In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint he formulates the theory of judgment which was to be the basis for the reform,! though he never published a logic in which the details of the reform might have been presented. Nevertheless, he lec- tured on the reform. In spite of their awareness thereof, Brentano’s two most prominent students, Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl, re- jected i in the 1890s? Already in 1890 Meinong collaborated with his student, Alois Héfler, on a logic textbook for the gymnasia of Austria? The theory of judgment that is formulated in this textbook diverges from Brentano's considerably and therefore met with extreme disap- T BRENTANO, Prychologie vom empirixchen Standpunkte 1 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1874), pp. 266-305. For a diseussion of Brentano's theory of judgment see Roderick’ M. CHISHOLM, Brenteno and Meinong Studies (Amsterdam / Atlanta Rodopi, 1982), pp. 17-37, For an exposition of Brentano's reform see Peter SIMONS, “Brentano's Reform of Logie", in Topoi 6 (1987), pp. 25-37. See also Peter SIMONS, ‘Tudeing Corey: Brenan and the Reform of Syllogiic, in Dale Tacqustrs (Gh) The Cambridge Companion co Brentano (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 2 in the summer semester of 1875 Meinong attended Brentano's leecure course “Old and New Logic”. In the winter semester of 1884/85, when Husserl embarked on 4 career in philosophy, he attended Brentano's lecture course “Elementary Logic and the Necessary Reforms in It". In Halle Husserl was agein exposed to the Brentanian reform of logic in the lecvures of Carl Seumpf. The syllabus for Seumpf's lecture Course on logic has been wanalatelinco English as Appendix Three mt Robin D. Routincen, Husser!’s Postion in the School of Brentano (Dordrecht / Boston / Lon- don: Kluwer, 1999), pp. 311-337. Stumpf was among the students of Brentano who kept much closer to orthodoxy than did the wayward Meinong and Huser. 3 HoFLER, in collaboration with MEINONG, Logik (Prague: F. Tempsky / Vienna: F, Tempsky / Leipzig: G. Freytag), 1890), This work was published as the first part (of Philosophische Propidentk.196 ROBIN D. ROLLINGER proval from Anton Marty: A decade later Husser!’s Prolegomena to Pure Logic, the first volume of his Logical Investigations, was pub- lished. In this volume Husserl altogether rejected the Brentanian view that elementary logic is concerned with judgments, understood in the sense of acts of consciousness which come into being and pass away.* Husser!’s elementary logic, in which timeless propositions were to take the place of time-bound judgments, had already been presented in lec- tures in 1896,7 which were by no means fully taken up in the Prole- gomena to Pure Logic In the following presentation an attempt will be made to examine some of the essential points of these lectures. In- sofar as the present framework allows, they will be discussed here in their historical context, including considerations of influences on Huser! as well as his criticisms of other positions. Before entering into this discussion the question will no doubt arise why the 1896 lectures are of any interest at all. Since lectures on logic as well as ones on related matters that Husserl presented to his students at later dates,? when his views were presumably much more “mature”, “ David F. LiNDENFELD, The Transformation of Positivism: Alexius Meinong and Enropean Though, 1880-1920 (Berckely / Los Angeles / London: University of Cali- fornia Press, 1980), p. 66. About a year after Hfler'’s logic textbook appeared, a small book by Franz Hillebrand le Marty a loyal follower of Brentano, was published, Die neuen Teorien der kategorischen Seblisse. Eine logische Untersnchung (Viena: Allred Holder, 1891, in which Brentano's proposed reform of logic is briefly presented, 5 This work, first published in 1900, ean be found in Husserliana XVII, edited by Elmar HOLENSTEIN (The Hague / Boston / Lancaster: Martinus Nijhofl, 1984). Brentano found Husser’s pure logic and the concomitant rejection of psychologism objectionable, in spite of Husser's (perhaps disingenuous) attempt to “exonerate” Brentano from peychologism. See ROLLINGER, Huster’s Postion in the School of Brentano, pp, 19 ff. A concise discussion of Fusse’ relation to Brentano isto ap- pear in ROLLINGER, “Brentano and Huser, in Dale JACQUETTE, The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. 8 See Husserliang XVII, pp. 177 7"The text of this lecture is published, under the editorship of Elisabeth ScHUH- MANN, in Husserliana-Materialien I (Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer, 2001). ‘This volume willbe indicated in the footnotes and main text as “Hua-Mat "The parts cof Husser’s 1895 lectures “On Modern Investigations in Deductive Logic”, which are also published in the same volume (pp. 265-322), will not be discussed here Regarding the relation of the 1896 lectures and the Prolegomena see the editor's introduction in Hua-Mat 1 9 See the following volumes: Hlusserlina XXIV: Einleitung in die Logik und Exkenninisbeorie, edited by Ullrich Melle (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), Hsserliana XXVI: Vorleswngen iiber Bedeutungslebre. Sommersemester 1908, edited by Ursula Panzer (Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), Husser ligna XXX: Logik wn allgemeine Wissenschafsebre. Vorleswngen 1917/18, edited by Ursula Panzer (Dordrecht / Boston / London, 1996). See also Husserliana-Materialien 1; Logik Vorlesumg 1902/03, edited by Elisabeth Schuhmann (Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer, 2001), in which Husserl utlized much of the 1896 lectures. Husser's HUSSERL’S ELEN are already ava belong to a ve philosophical « development i: though this car if one leaves th great interest | Husser!’s later lectures he off Tegard they are 2. Logic as ‘The most ir the lectures w Theory of Scier dation-laying ¢ and modern ti here speaks on for Bolzano’s « this, What Hu: sented in the masterpiece.!! all of Bolzano? did not see the out, much of nonetheless, H 1908/09 lectures, peared as Husser ©The terms * in the 1896 leceur 1 Thus ina le fitful approache of Science, very m (Edmund FUssen collaboration wit 1994], p.29), Hus és in the school « Position in the Sch 2 Husserl. Eine ‘ngslebre (Doras full-lengeh seudy Husser!'s NachlasDBIN D. ROLLINGER U's Prolegomena to igations, was pub- xe Brentanian view ‘understood in the ag and pass away. sitions were to take zn presented in lec sn up in the Prole~ on an attempt will F these lectures. In- ¢ discussed here in of influences on will no doubt arise ce lectures on logic ted to his students ich more “mature”, 2: Alexins Meinong and Jon: Univesity of Cali shook appeared, «smal “ano, was published, Die chang (Wa: Aled S briefly presented. “se iret by arinus Nijhoff, 1984). ction of paychologism dation isthe Scho! of in to Brentano i 0 ap- etre, The Cambridge sip of Elisabeth ScHUH- vondon: Kluwer, 2001). “Hlua-Mat I”. The parts ‘uctive Logic”, which are discussed here sgomena see the editor's itung in die Logite und fartinus Nijhoff, 1984), nersemester 1908, edited ‘Nijhoff, 1987), Musser lnigen 1917/18, edited by Haserliana-Materialien 1n (Dordrecht / Boston / 21896 lectures. Husser!'s [HUSSERL'S ELEMENTARY LOGIC 17 are already available, it may seem that the lectures to be discussed here belong to a very immature and perhaps even negligible phase of his philosophical development. However, the presumption that Husse:!’s development is one of progressive improvement may be challenged, though this can hardly be done in the present Context. Moreover, even if one leaves this presumption unchallenged, the 1896 lectures are of great interest because they are considerably less programmatic than Hiusser!’s later attempts to circumscribe the concerns of logic. a lectures he offers us a logic, not merely a philosophy of logic: In this ‘¥egard they are highly exceptional among Husserl’s writings. Letting Negedd vine, 2. Logic as Theory of Science Mihue « 8 ry of. ne ‘The most important influence on Husserl’s conception of logic in the lectures under consideration is Bernard Bolzano “from whose Theory of Science there is more to learn in matters of descriptive foun- dation-laying of formal logic than from all other logical works of old and modern times” (Hua-Mat I, p. 96).10Ieis noteworthy that Husserl here speaks only of the descriptive foundation-laying of formal logic, for Bolzano’s enterprise in the Theory of Science is much vaster than this, What Husserl has in mind here is the elementary logic that is pre- sented in the first two volumes of Bolzano’s massive four-volume masterpiece.!! This is of course not to say that Husserl simply adopts all of Bolzano’s views in elementary logic. Nor is itto say that Husserl did not see the entire Theory of Science as a model for logic. Asit turns out, much of Husserl’s elementary logic diverges from Bolzano’s; nonetheless, Husserl conceives of logic as a whole very much in terms 1908/09 leccores, Alte wnd neue Logit, edited by Elisabeth Schobmann, have just p= peared as Husserliana-Materialin VI (Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer, 2003), 10 The terms “formal logic’, “elementary logi’, and “pure logic" as they are wsed in the 1896 lectures, are used to designate the same discipline, 1 Thus ina letter to Brentano (3 January 1905) Husserl wrote: “Extraordinarly fruicful approaches in the treatment of a pure logie are offered by Boleanc's Theory of Science, very much admired by me, in its first two (and only significant) volumes” (Edmund Hussens, Brieftvecbrel I: Die Brentanoschule, edited by Karl Schuhmann in collaboration with Elisabeth Schuhmann (Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer, 1994], p. 29). Husserl’s relation to Bolzano, insofar as it concerns his relation to 0 ers inthe school of Brentano, has been diseussed in Robin D. ROLLINGER, Hster’s Postion in the School of Brentano, pp. 69-@2. See also Chistian BEYER, Von Bolzano 2a Huser. Eine Untersuchung iiber den Unsprang der phinomenologischen Beden tungslebre (Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer, 1996). There is sulla need for a full-length stady of Husserl and Bolzano that takes all the relevant material from Husserls Nachlass into account. leehisbe198 ROBIN D, ROLLINGER of the work just mentioned. Though the divergences from Bolzano cannot fully be treated here, Husser!’s conception of logic and how it relates to Bolzano’s can be briefly discussed ‘According to Husserl, elementary logic is pure logic, That is to say, \ “it is indepencene {rom peyehology. "The fistand maik foundation of all logic” says Husser, “is the objective, ie., non-psychological theo- ry of the condition-relations among propositions” (Hua-Mat I, p. 23). ‘These relations are for him the basis for the laws of inference which have been the central concern of elementary logic since its beginnings in Aristotle (Hua-Mat I, pp. 22 f,) Iwill soon be seen that for Husserl this branch of logic is concerned not only with propositions and in- ferences, but also with concepts. Important to us here is Husser!’s | view that secur agin awe Sa gic, jie doctrine of method (Methodenlebre), ‘hick does infact inclu in fact include | Bsycholo answer to the question whether Togie 1s an inde pendent science, Husser! says, “If logic is understood as the theory of science or method of cognition, there is of course nothing to be said of its independence. On the one hand, logic presupposes the objective science that we have briefly designated se the seme of ferences; on the other hands payehologyssince the methodical arrangements that we jigs Grr io male cognition ofthe pnulartes and les of the objective useful ject for the progress of human cognition are obviously ‘based.on the paychology of intellectual activite Sie” (Hua Mat, p32). “The same point can be found in Bolzano’s Theory of Science. In an- swer to the question whether logic is an independent discipline, he says, Logic isto teach us in what way our instances of cognition can be uni- fied in a genuinely scientific whole; itis for this very reason also to teach us how truth is found and error discovered, and so forth. It can- not do allthis without also precisely taking into account of the way in ‘which the human mind arrives at its presentations and instances of cognition. It must therefore necessarily adopt propositions which treat, for example, our faculty of presentation, memory, the ability to associate ideas, the faculty of imagination, etc. in order to prove the theories and rules it provides. However, we have a special self-sulfi- cient science, empirical psychology, in which the object of concern in these propositions, namely the human soul with its faculties, is con- sidered. This entails that logic is dependent on psychology at least, if not on any other science, and must consequently once and for all forego any boast of being a completely independent science." 12 Wissenschaftslebre, Versuch einer ausfbrlichen smd gréftentels neuen Dar- stellung der Logik mit steter Riicksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter, edited by Wolf- ‘gang Schulz (Leipzig: Felix Meines, 1929/30/31; reprint: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1981), vol. 1, §13, pp. 53 f HUSSERL'S ELEME While psycholo Which is restrict eis, namely Ob} ar oF logic ist invention (Erfin ‘Wissenithaftsleb- sentations, judgr “When one speak: foremost in the! “logic” is simply The conceptic the Bolzanian which psycholo the late nineteen: little attention nc triumph of Freg contrast with the See Jan BERG, Wiel, 162). The hibited by the fact lished in German, Be ns der Wissenschafe Felix Meiner, 1978), English there are re (Gerkeley and Los A recht / Boston’ D. the fre rwo volumes 1 The crucial "0 throughout Fie, "2 Sigware publi Hetime The fest swith the doctrine of» of this work Feibur heavily marked and cation of paychology Sble here vo dscost a these letures concere auch needed, for a fal German logician ¢ yond the German sp teeond edion of Sip Logie (London: SwanROBIN D. ROLLINGER ances from Bolzano 1 of logic and how it logic. Thatis to say, RBI foundation of -psychological theo- * (Hua-Mat I, p. 23). s of inference which since its beginnings seen that for Husserl opositions and in- Us here is Hussers aotHer part of logic, “does in fact include ther logic isan inde~ tod as the theory of se nothing to be said apposes the objective Be oT inefenees, on arrangements that we ies and Tas of the ‘nition are obviously © fua-Mat I, p. 32). sory of Science. In an- ent discipline, he says, cognition can be uni- very reason also tO and so forth. Itc ccount of the way in ons and instances of propositions which smory, the ability 10 y order to prove the 2a special sef-suffi- object of concern in it acute, is cone sychology at least, i tly once and for all ent science.!? 4 grftenteis nenen Dar Sebteter eed by Wok Sona Vtg Aan, 198), HUSSERL’S ELEMENTARY LOGIC While psychology cannot be found in Bolzano’s elementary logic, hich is restined wo nomial ood FORE poe piel subject mat~ Tas, Taney objective presentations, propositions and inlerenes, this art of ut of logic is followed by an epistemology (Erkenntnislebre), art of invention Efindiopomey aaa ey ok science proper (eigentliche Wassenschaftslehre), all of which are very much concerned with pre- sentations, judgments, and inferences as real actions of mental entities. foremost in the ist ro volumes of the Theory of Scance™™ Te taen “logic” is simply not being used in the! nse. ‘The conception of logic that Husserl advocates, in accordance with the Bolzanian model, is thus contrary to the Brentanian model, in which psychology is present in both elementary logic and other branches of the feciglnes™ just like many of the prominent logics of the Tate nineteenth century, e.g., Christoph Sigwart’s,15 which receive little atvention nowadays even from a historical perspective due to the triumph of Frege. However, Husserl’s view of logic also stands in contrast with the one that Frege advocated, for Frege wishes “to sep- '3 See Jan BERG, Bolzano's Logic (Stockholm / Géteborg / Uppsala: Almqvist & ‘Wiksell, 1962). The contemporary lack of concern with the last two volumes is ex- hibited by the face thatthe readily available collection of excerpts of the work pub- lished in German, Berard Bolzanos Grundlegung der Logik. Ausgewiblee Passagen ‘aus der Wissenschaftslebre, Band I und I, edited by Friedrich Kambartel (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1978), consists exclusively of material from the first two volumes. In English there are two translations of parts of Theory of Science, by Rolf Geroge (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1972) and by Jan Berg (Dor- drecht / Boston: D. Reidel, 1973), both of which contain much more material from the first ewo volumes of Bolzano’s work thaa from the lat two. The crucial role of psychology in Brentano's elementary logic is made clear throughout HILLEDRAND, op cit 'S Sigwart published a two-volume Logik that went through three editions in his lifetime. The frst volume is concerned with elementary logic and the second one withthe doctrine of method. In Husser’s library there i a copy of the second edition of this work (Freiburg i B.:J.C.B. Mohs, 1889/1893). His copy ofthe fist volume is heavily marked and annotated, In his 1896 lectures Sigwartis criticized for his applic cation of psychology to elementary logic (Hua-Mat I, p. 136). By no means is it pos- sible hereto discus all the numerous remarks and criticisms which Husse makes in these lectures concerning Sigwart’s logic. A study of Husser and Sigwartis sil very much needed, for Husser is right in his assessment of Sigwart as “the most influen- tial German logician of the present” (Hua-Mat |, p. 175). This influence extended be- yond the German speaking world, s evinced by the fact that both volumes of the second edition of Sigwart’s Logik were translated by Helen Dendy into English as Logie (London: Swan Sonnenschein 8 Co,, 1895),\ | | | } 200 ROBIN D. ROLLINGER arate the psychological from the logical”,!6 not just from one part of the logical. Husser!’s point of view on this matter, in spite of his deep appreciation for objectivity in logic, is thus as different from Frege's asitis from Brentano's Before we proceed to discuss the particulars of Husser!’s elemen- tary logic of 1896, it may be noted that the Bolzanian model was to be adopted in his later writings on the topic as well, albeit with at least ‘vo important alterations.'7 First of all, on the later view pure logic ‘was not to be limited to elementary logic, but also to be expanded to include formal ontology. Secondly, the theory of science in the full sense, according to Husser!’s later programmatic statements, isto find its fulfillment in transcendental phenomenology rather than psychol- ogy.!? Be that is as it may, Husser!’s early conception of a theory of | science, a5 consisting of pure logic and a psychologically oriented the- wooeee ae ory of method, cari be appretiated on its own term ‘ould certainly beamiss to say, along with one of the most prominent commentators on Husser!’s work in logic, thar the later motifs of his wanscendental- ism, such as the view that “scientific objectivities are idealization of the We-world”, were already present n his early logic” 3. Concepts ‘The distinction berweerkconcepts and{ proposition} is introduced by Husser! in terms of the distinction berweernirordistinct classes of linguistic expressions: names and statements (Hua-Mat I, pp. 50 ff). Corresponding to names and statements are two distinct types of ob- 16 Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logitch mathematische Untersuchung ier den Begriff der Zabl (Breslau: Wilhlem Koebner, 1884), p. x. Frege's name occurs cally once in the 1896 leetures (Hua-Mat I, p.134), namely in a reference to his “Uber Sinn und Bedeurung”, Zeitschrift fir Philosophie und philowphische Kritie 100 (1892), pp. 25-50. Ie-will be seen below, however, chat his influence is detectable, though certainly not pervaive inthe lectres under consideration hee. See especially Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritke der lo~ gischen Vernunft in Husseliana XVII, edited by'Paul Janssen (The Hague: Martinus ‘Nijhoff, 1974) 18 See ibid, pp. 80 ff, This distinction was already made in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic. See Hua XVIif, pp. 244 ff. While the 1896 lectures represent what is called “apophantic logic” in the later tezminology, they do contain some assertions which ‘would properly belong to formal ontology. 19 See the entire second section of Formale und transzendentale Logic in Husser- ana XVII, pp. 135-298, 20], N. Mowtanry, Logic, Truth and the Modalities from a Phenomenological Per- spective (Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer, 1999), p 7. HUSSERL’S ELEMET jective presentatic presented and thc name “Socrates, t object that is the sented in the stat latter object is a Husserl speaks 0 jective presentati« sentations are of qualification or * tive presentations though the dist in distinguishing gards “this distir presentation and (Hua-Mat 1, p. the so-called “lin Presentations concepts in the n distinction to be ject of a concept to that between t confusing to spe: no distinction be tinction between a crucial one, for the correspondin the fact that the p object. The conci cludes the conce} object obviously Granted that sense and its obj consequence, the are to be underst matter, it is nece an attribute (Bes 21 Etusserl took 1 from Scumpf, who i from its object. See ¥ 2 This example iROBIN D.ROLLINGER ust from one part of «yin spite of his deep ifferent from Frege’s of Husser!’s elemen- aian model was to be 1, albeit with at least later view pure logic 30 to be expanded to of science in the full statements, is to find rather than psychol- sption of a theory of of his transcendental- ire idealization of the a sition} is introduced fistinct classes of ua-Mat I, pp. 50 ff). distinct types of ob- ische Untersuchung itber >. x. Frege's name occurs aa reference this “Uber thilosophische Kritik 100 i inne deal vation here srauch einer Krtik der lo- on (The Hague: Martinus de in the Prolegomens to es represent what scaled in some assertions which adentale Logic in Husser- 14 Phenomenological Per- 7. LHUSSERL/S ELEMENTARY LOGIC 201 jective presentations: those in which objects in the narrower sense are presented and those in which states of affairs are presented. When the name “Socrates, the wisest of the Athenians”, for example, is used, the object that is thereby presented is quite different from the one pre- sented in the statement “Socrates is the wisest of the Athenians”. The latter object is a state of affairs! whereas the former is not. When Hiusserl speaks of concepts in the broad sense he means all those ob- jective presentations whose objects are not states of affairs. Such pre~ sentations are often referred to as “presentations” without further qualification or “presentations in the broad sense”, whereas the objec tive presentations of states of affairs are called “propositions” (Satze). ‘hough the distinction between names and statements may be of use in distinguishing between presentations and propositions, Husserl re- gards “this distinction between object and state of affairs, between presentation and proposition as an ultimate and undefinable one” (Hua-Mat | p. 133) Such a remark should discourage attempts to find the so-called “linguistic turn” in early Husserl. Presentations are also called “concepts”, not to be confused with concepts in the narrow sense that will be discussed below. There is a distinction to be made, says Husserl, between the matter and the ob- ject of a concept (Hua-Mat I, pp. 55 ff.. The distinction corresponds to that between the sense and the reference of a name. Itis, however, confusing to speak of a concept having a matter, since there is in fact no distinction between a concept and its matter. Nonetheless, the dis- tinction between a concept and the corresponding object is of course a crucial one, for one can say things of a concept that are not true of the corresponding object and vice-versa, This is alzeady to be seen in the fact that the parts of a concept do not correspond to the parts of its object. The conicept of a country without mountains, for example, in- cludes the concepts “country” and “mountains” as parts, whereas the object obviously does not have mountains (Hua-Mat I, pp. 58 ff.) 22 Granted that there is a distinction between a concept in the broad sense and its object, and further that this distinction is one of great consequence, the question remains how concepts in the narrow sense are to be understood. In order to understand Husserl’s views on this ‘matter, it is necessary to make clear his notion of an abstractum and an attribute (Beschaffenbeit). 3 Huseerl took she term that is here translated as “state of affairs” Sachoerhalt) from Stumpf, who introduced it in order to distinguish the content of a judgment from is object. See ROLLINGER, Hlse!’s Position inthe School of Brentano, 313. 2 This example is taken from BOLZANO, Wisenschafsebre I, § 63, p. 26202 ROBIN D. ROLLINGER An abstractum, according to Husserl, inheres in an object, as red inheres in a red thing or virtue in a virtuous person (Hua-Mat I, pp. 59 £,). As such it is dependent on the object in which it inheres. While he makes no objection to calling the presentations of abstracta “ab- stract presentations” as a distinct class of individual presentations, he also says that attributes are not to be identified with abstracta. An ab- stractum: is in each case a dependent part of the object in which it in- heres and can actually be noticed in the object. One can, for example, see a red thing and at once notice the abstractum “red” in the thing.3 “If, however, we designate the house smaller than the church”, Husserl continues, “what was said [of abstracta) is not true of the at- tribute ‘smaller than the church’, which is nothing inherent in the house, to be grasped as a constituent part thereof, and yer it is some- thing that belongs to the house” (Hua-Mat I, pp. 60 f.). While attrib- utes are accordingly not to be identified with abstracta, it may seem plausible to assert that there is in each case a one-to-one correspon- dence between the two (Hua-Mat I, pp. 61). Thus, the abstractumn called “red” corresponds to the attribute “being red”, the abstractum “virtue” to “being virtuous”. Yet, this correspondence cannot be found in the example of the house being smaller than the church. How- ever much one focuses on the house, one cannot grasp in it an abstrac- tum corresponding to being smaller than the church as one can grasp red in the red thing (Hua-Mat I, p. 62). One can, to be sure, see the house and the church together and grasp therein the abstractum corre- sponding to the house being smaller than the church, but this abstrac- tum inheres in the house and the church as a unity, not in the house as, such, An attribute of this kind may be called an “external” or “relative” one, also simply a relation (Verbalinis), whereas attributes such as red can be called “internal” ones or “properties” (Eigenschaften). “Attributes,” Husser! explains further, “are in our sense objects no less than abstracta or individuals are. But they have the peculiarity that they, different from the latter, are merely objectivizations of predicates, 0 to speak” (Hua-Mat I, p. 64). In this regard Husserl emphasizes that attributes are not as such predicates. While it may sometimes be said 2 Fase fails to mention chat one does not notice virtue in a virtuous person in any way comparable tothe way in which one notices red inthe red thing 2 Soe there is no cate in which X and being-X, whether they eorespond or not would be deni ic may be concluded that for Huss abstract and aeibues are fever enc Thovgh here an anet negbleempan zh uncon in quesion a aleady present in Arstole,aamely in the Categoria, Chapter 2 where thats ina subject dingushed from what sid of a sbjeceeamustbe emphasized that Aviso also allows for things that are both ina subjet and alto sid ofa sbjece HUSSERL'S ELEME that coloredness, that “colored” is tion (Hua-I, p. 6 In the follow concepts in then ta and attributes One says, for wise” there is speaks of the ce equivocation di distinguished: paoperty, and ¢ cept as object, the proper sens concept as obje predicate thep, rather a constitt Hon of a state i since the predic in contrast to th in the propery This very difficul row sense are tho icate terms. Accc The resulting cor one advocated by to his writings in wanes a notion of object duced by contras sense is that whic Given Husserl objective presenta tion of concepts is sponding to predi confront in his ele ercan be said of c the narrow sense, it follows that pre 2 See Frece, “Ub: liche Philosophie 16 (11 1896 leccures, a copy ofROBIN D. ROLLINGER + in,an object, as red son (Hua-Mat I, pp. sich it inheres. While ins of abstracta “ab- val presentations, he ith abstracta, An ab- abject in which it in- ne can, for example, “ted” in the thing? et than the church”, js not true of the at- hhing inherent in the f, and yer it is some- ‘60 £.). While aterib- Sseracta, it may seem \e-to-one correspon- “hus, the abstractum red”, the abstractum pondence cannot be tan the church. How- grasp in it an abstrac- irch as one can grasp 1, to be sure, see the the abstractum corre- itch, but this abstrac- y, not in the house as sxternal” or “relative” attributes such as red yenschaften), ‘our sense objects no ve the peculiarity that izations of predicates, asserl emphasizes that ay sometimes be said sue in a virtwous person in 1 the red thing. er they correspond or not, srracta and atributes are sson fo set thedinnction ‘egories, Chapter 2 where ject, it mast be emphasized ‘rand also said ofa subject HUSSERL'S ELEMENTARY LOGIC 203 that coloredness, for example, is a predicate, it is more accurate to say that “colored” is the predicate of which coloredness is the objectiviza- tion (Hus-I, p. 65). In the following passage Husserl faces the question concerning concepts in the narrow sense in light of what has been said of abstract ta and attributes: One says, for instance: In the categorical proposition “Socrates is wise” there is as subject an object, as predicate a concept. One also speaks of the concept of being-wise, of wisdom. What is harmful in the equivocation disappears as soon as we have clarified the situation and distinguished: predicate in the proper sense, objectivizing predicate or peoperty, and the inherent abstractym. If we want t0 ine the ton- Sept as object, we must ell the property “concept”. The predicate in CSC" the proper sense would thos not bea concep, but here corresponds 4 | concept as objectivization to it. If, however, we identify concept and} \be. predict, the presentation ofthe concep nota ful presentation, but - rather a constituent part of one, namely constituent part of apresenta- | fc! tion of a suite of atbire Tahal prelerihe Later manner ‘of speal Se. i since the predicates without a doubt to be seen as something primary |» in contrast to the property, as this makes clear that the predicateis pare Ty. in the property (Hua-Mat I, pp. 65 f.). v . This very difficult passage seems to indicate that concepts in the nar- row sense are those objective presentations which correspond to pred- icate terms. Accordingly, they are neither Gropertits nor Gbstracta, The resulting conception of concepts i sikingly commpardble to te one advocated by Frege, though Husserl makes no explicit reference to his writings in the present context2° Moreover, as Frege had con- trasted Soncepts with objects, Husserl does so as well and thereby uses a notion of object that is yet narrower than the one that he had intro- duced by contrasting objects, with states of affairs. An object in this sense is that which is neither a state of affairs nor a concept. Given Husser!’s characterization of concepts in the broad sense as, objective presentations corresponding to names and his characteriz tion of concepts in the narrow sense as objective presentations corre- sponding to predicate terms, there arises a problem that he does not confront in his elementary logic. The implication here is that whatev- er can be said of concepts in the broad sense can be said of concepts in the narrow sense, though not vice-versa. If, however, this is the case, it follows that predicates correspond to names’as do other concepts. 35 See Faece, “Ober Begriff und Gegenstand”, Vierteljahrssebrift fir wissenschafi- liche Philosophie V6 (1892), pp. 197 f. Though Hiassel does aot cite this are in the 1896 lectures, copy ofits to be found in hisibrary and ears markings fom his hand. Duce dragon jegplews ae ek ae iG 4 Oy 4) Jd204 ROBIN D. ROLLINGER This would mean that in a statement such as “This man is virtuous”, the term “virtuous” in fact functions as a name. The proposition in questin would thus consist of two names “this man” and “virtuous”. This Kerang teow of predication poses great difficulties which can hardly be discussed here?" though it is already evident that this theory is called into question by observing that one cannot simply use the predicate term “virtuous” as a subject.” To be sure, the mere fact that Husserl finds that predicates are peculiar enough to mark them off as concepts in the narrow sense indicates that he was on his way to rejecting the two-name theory. A complete rejection, however, would of course consist in not only marking them off, but also in abandon- ing any talk here of a broad and narrow sense of “concept” 38 Husser’s reflections in his elementary logic on abstracta, attrib- utes, and concepts in the narrow sense are in fact an attempt to find a place for notions which come from three distinct sources. As already suggested, his notion of concepts in the narrow sense is very Fregean and may very well have been taken from Frege. The notion of an ab- stractum, however, is to be found in Brentano under the heading “metaphysical part” and in Stumpf under the heading “psychological part”29 Moreover, Bolzano’s Theory of Science appears to be the source for Husserl’s notion of attribute as well as the distinction be- tween internal and external attributes.29 While Hussez!’s utilization of three distinct historical sources may make his view look rather eclec- tic, his ability to bring the three notions in question into a synthesis may also be regarded as a feature of his genius. 4. Propositions While concepts in the broad sense correspond to names and are all those presentations which refer to objects in the narrow sense, name- ly objects that are not states of affairs, propositions correspond to statements and refer to states of affairs. The division between concepts, and propositions is, once again, emphatically regarded by Husserl as 2 See Peer GEACH, “History of the Corruptions of Logie: An Inaugural Lecture 1968", in Peter GEACEE, Logic Matters (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of Califor- nia Press, 1980), pp. 44-61 2 The theory seems more plausible, however, for cases such as “Cicero is Tully”. 3 Unless otherwise pei the term “concept” will heneforth be used in re erence to concepts in the narrow sense 2 See ROLLINGER, Husser!s Position inthe School of Brentano, pp. 43 8 106 f 3 BOLZANO, Wistenschafislebre I, §§ 80, pp. 378-389; §§ 110-113, pp. 517-530. HUSSERL'S ELEW an ultimate anc objects and sta Though Hi guishes berwee (complex pro} tions) (Hua-W. tion is to be m and others tha conjunctions. tion, not a stat ever, the props the statement‘ is the largest n proposition ju sition indicate: of Berlin in th cated in each ¢ independent F obviously obt: the ease, for € thoughts live « dependent par propositions, conjunctive (FE 138-141), and ‘As regards complex ones least four outs ory of judgm propositions « are mortal” = view that the « “b” indicates a ness, etc.) wor a fundamental tential judgme 31 Suieely spe he speaks of Sat Housserl discusse others, a if they1D. ROLLINGER nis virtuous”, proposition in nd “virtuous”, ficulties which’ ident that this tnot simply use z, the mere fact to mark them ws on his way to rowever, would \so in abandon- cept” 28 bstracta, attrib tempt to find a rees. As already is very Fregean aotion of an ab- der the heading 3 “psychological pears to be the e distinction be- «I's utilization of ook rather eclec- into a synthesis names and are all row sense, name- 1s correspond to between concepts ted by Husserl as ‘An Inangural Lecrre Onivesityof Catone as “Cicero is Tully". forth be used in ref- sano, pp-43 8 106 f 10-113, pp. 517-530. HUSSERL'S ELEMENTARY LOGIC 205 an ultimate and undefinable one, no less so than the division between objects and states of affairs. “Though Husserl regards all propositions as complex, he distin- guishes between those which have more than one proposition as parts, (complex propositions), and those which do not (simple proposi- tions) (Hua-Mat I, pp. 133 £.). Among the complex ones, a distinc- tion is to be made between the ones of the form “S is a proposition” and others that would nowadays be acknowledged as complex, e.g., conjunctions. It is to be noted that in the former case it is a propo: tion, not a state of affairs, that is named by “S”. In some cases, how- ever, the proposition is part of a presentation in the narrow sense, In the statement “Berlin, which was a minor city two hundred years ago, is the largest major German city” the relative clause corresponds to a proposition just as well as the whole statement does. Yet, the propo- sition indicated in the relative clause is dependent on the presentation of Berlin in this case. In hypothetical statements the proposition indi- cated in each clause is indeed dependent, although each one implies an independent proposition. In other instances, however, propositions obviously obtain as independent parts of a single proposition. This is the case, for example, in “Socrates died a hero’s death, but his noble thoughts live on”. If we disregard the cases of propositions which are dependent parts of a presentation in the narrow sense as well as named propositions, Husserl allows for three types of complex propositions: conjunctive (Hua-Mat I, pp. 135-138), disjunctive (Hua-Mat I, pp. 138-141), and hypothetical (Hua-Mat I, pp. 140 £.). As regards the elementary forms of simple propositions (of which complex ones ultimately consist), Husserl was confronted with at least four outstanding alternativefé 1) On the basis of Brentano’s the- ory of judgment, according to Which all judgments are existential, propositions can likewise be interpreted as existential (e.g,, “All men are mortal” = “There is no man who is not mortal”) 2) Bolzano’s view that the elementary form of a proposition is “A has-6”, in which “b” indicates an attribute (including existence as well as redness, round- ness, etc.) would be another approach(3) Herban’s view that there a fundamental distinction between categorical (predicative) and exis- tential judgments was also vividly present in Husserl’s situation and. 1 Surictly speaking, Brentano did not have a theory of propositions atl. When. he speaks of Sitze he means a certain class of linguistic expressions. Nonetheless, Husser! discusses various theories of judgment, put forward by Brentano as well as others, as if they were theories of propositions.206, ROBIN D. ROLLINGER thus an alternative way of approaching propositional form.¢&4) Frege's analysis of propositions by means of the argument-functidr’structure ‘would be a yet another alternative, though Husser, in spite of his fa- iarity of Prege’s Begriffsschrift and other related writings,® also in spite of his aformentioned adoption of a Fregean notion of concepts in the narrow sense, does not take this alternative into account in his attempt to examine propositional form. Insofar as Husserl accepts the view that predicative (categorical) propositions are ultimate and not to be explained or defined, be lained or defined, he is more closely allied ¥o Bolzano and Herbart than he is to Brentano. Another opponent of Husser! in this regard is John Stuart Mill, who attempted to explain the predicative form by means of classifying the various types of predication (Hua-Mat I, pp. 145 #f.).4 Such an at- tempt, according to Husserl, fails to give us any understanding of what must already be understood at the outset. In the same spirit Husserl rejects the “subsumption theory” of predication®$ and all oth- 32 See Mori, Wilhelm DRomsct, Nene Daneliong der Logik nach tren ei fachstn Verhalinisen mit Racksicht anf Masbemath und Netwrainenscft (Leipeigs Leopold Voos, 187%), p61. Though Droblach stems to develop loge Slong Herbardan ines, he alo exis divergence rom Elerbare These ae of coure nov be dacuned inthe present coment, spec since Flsser fee vo the so 1d work of Drobuch” only once in the 1896 eens (HuaeMat 1 p37), Hesbars however, is mentioned fn numerous passages ofthis estae (Fun Na I, pp. 18,24 40, 6, €5, 18, 185, 21,298 e268), A study of Fused elaionship 9 Herbert ‘ould indeed be welcome ine leratae on Fuss 3 Besides copy of Begriff ine dr arhrretxben nacgebldet Formel- space des een Benen (ale x8: Lous Nebes 1979) copie of he loving Trkings, which Frege atempted to elaborate on and defend the Begfiscrfi, ae toe found in usses ibrar: “Anwendungen der Beg, Stzwngen der Jena then Garelichefe fr Medicr und Natareisenschft (1879), pp. to “ber den oweck der Beprfeachrt, Sitzamgen der Jenaschen Gerelicef fr Medicis und [Nacerwsnenshet (1882), pp 112s “Usber die wisenshafiche Berecgung einer Begalschrt' Zeischft fir Phibsophie nd phitopbacke Krk 81 (882), pp. 4855, Among the momarous statis of Pegs ta be resommncnded is especially YN Morass ster and Pege (1982), though there sa focus in his Work om later Father than early Ffuser, See fohn Stuart MILL, A System of Logic Retocinaive and Inductive: Being « Connecied View o the Prine Evidence andthe Method of Scenic hoerige: fiom 8 ds (New ork larper 8 Brothers, 1874), Bk Chap. § 1 Hoste rele to this wotk in German ranlation, Ins library & copy ofthe station by Com Sz in the fist ewo volumes of ob Stuart HilPs Couunmete Werke, edited by Ficodor Gompers (Lebpig: Furs Wesag R. Risand), 1873), cn be found. The copy bears numerous muekngs and annotations. ¥s See Benno ERDMANN, Logiche Elementriebre (Halle a S: Max Niemeyer 1892), pp- 246281. Though Hussents 18% lctresconain only afew references v9 this work (Huw-Mat i pp75, 138 8 208), Huser copy of ris heavy masked and Ennotaed, Already i’ eiter of 3 October 1891 he wrore to Brestano, apparently ‘With some enthasigem, *Pethaps it wil interest you thatthe firse volume of logic by HUSSERL'S ELEMED er extension theo he rejects intensi predicative form ‘According to asses of catego! Mat, pp. 155-16 ers (1) the view t negative predicate mortal")() chev affirmative one, a firmed and in neg: is attributed 10 Le most important 0 (Hua-Mat I, pp. 1 low" is affirmed, t gold is yellow”, w ed as “Ivis not va alfirmation that + valid”, and so on | mulated as “Ie is « view that negative ative predicate, wt because if *S is nor inisnotp. Accordi involve negative p which Husserl att contemporary log negation allegedly does (Hua-Mat I, Benno Erdmann (Elen (Briefwechsel I, p. 7) Because i contains nv 102, 109, 181, 191 825 shed light on Hussed! 36 Loree, Logik. D (Leipzig: Hirzel, 18, this work. In the marg tary Logic and the Ref 1896 lectures (Hua-M: rodetect any influence There is still anced for ¥ See BOLZANO, 38 See Siawart, LoROBIN D. ROLLINGER al form {©4) Brege’s structure zl in spite of his fax ced writings, also in a notion of concepts ¢ into account in his dicative (categorical) ied or defined, he is ic is to Brentano. ohn Stuart Mill, who ans of classifying the 45 f£.)34 Such an at- ny understanding of +. In the same spirit Jication®® and all oth- der Logik nach ihren gin- tind Naturwissenschaft attempts t0 develop logic ecbare These are ofcourse Hlusser cefers to the “sol ‘uarMat I, p37). Herbart, te (Hua-Mat L, pp. 18,24, I's relationship to Hierbart hen machgebildete Formel- '9), copies ofthe following fend che Begrifschrif, are ffs, Sitzwngen der Jenais £79), pp. 1-5; "Uber den sellscheft fir Medicin und aftliche Berechtigung einer ische Krtik 81 (1882), pp. ‘mended is especially JN. ‘oeus in this Work on later joan Induces Ben Sods of Scientific vestige Chie re ater of the ranslaion by Gom- fammelte Werke, edited by 1872), ean be found. The fale SMox Niemeyer, Snonly afew references fit is heavily marked and see to Brentano, apparently ne firsevelume of logic by HUSSERL'S ELEMENTARY LOGIC 207 er extension theories of propositions (Hua I, pp. 147-151). Likewise, he rejects intension theories, which are also attempts to explain the predicative form (Hua I, pp. 151-154). Ca According to Husserl, there are two fundamental and irreducible lasses of categorical propositions: affirmation and negation (Hua- Mat pp. 155-163). In his defense of this view he criticizes three oth- exs(A) the view that negative propositions are affirmative ones with negative predicates (“S is non-p”, as in the example of “The soul is im- mortal”)(2) the view that» negative proposition is the rejection of an affirmative one, and3) the view that in affirmation a proposition is af- firmed and in negation a proposition is negated, The third view, which is attributed to Lotze,% is rejected by Husserl for various reasons, the most important of which is that this view involves an infinite regress (Hua-Mat I, pp. 156 £). If, for example, the proposition “Gold is yel- low” is affirmed, this affirmation is to be formulated as “Iti valid that, gold is yellow”, while the corresponding negation would be formulat- ed as “Itis not valid that gold is yellow”. Yet, “It is valid” is again an affirmation that must again be formulated as “It is valid that it is valid”, and so on into infinity. Likewise, “It is not valid” must be for- mulated as “It is valid that it is not valid”, as so on into infinity. The view that negative propositions are affirmative propositions with neg- ative predicate, which is attributed to Bolzano,” is rejected by Husser! because if “S is non-p” is trucit is also true that S has the property that itis not p. Accordingly, negative predicates, Husserl maintains, always involve negative propositions (Hua-Mat I, p. 159). Finally, the view, which Husserl attributes to Sigwart# (and is in essence the view of contemporary logic), that it is a whole proposition that is negated in negation allegedly succumbs to an infinite regress just as Lotze’s view does (Hua-Mat I, pp. 159 £). Benno Erdmanin (Elementary Doctrine) has been published with Niemeyer in Halle” (Briefvechsel I, p. 7). This work is of particular interest in connection with Husser! because it contains numerous references to Bolzano (Logische Elementarlebre, pp. 102, 109, 181, 191 & 276), A study of Husserl's relation to Erdmann would no doubt shed light on Hussen’s carly philosophical development. 3 Lotze, Logik. Drei Bicher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1880), p, 61. The relevant pasage is marked in Hlusse’s copy of this work. In the margin there is also a reference to Brentano's lectures on “Elemen: tary Logic and the Reforms Necessary in Ie”, Though Flusserl refers to Lotze in his 1896 lectures (Fua-Mat , pp. 152, 153, 155-157, 162, 211, 241, & 271), cis dificale t0 detect any influence of Lotze on these lecwues, contrary to what one might expect, There is still a need fora dealed study of Husserl's relation to Lotze. ¥ See BOLZANO, Wissenscheftslebre I, § 136.2. 38 See SiowaRt, Logit I, p. 154 }208 ROBIN D. ROLLINGER It is, however, highly questionable that Husserl effectively eriti- cizes Sigwar’s view of negation, “The sense of ‘S is not P”, says Husserl, “would be ‘« Sis P» is not valid’, whose sense [is] again ‘Itis not valid that «$ is P» is not valid’, and thus in infinitum” (Fua-Mat I, p. 159). Here Husser! is plainly wrong in his charge of an infinite regress. The regress of negations stops with “‘S is P" is not valid”. To be sure, one can go on with “It is valid that ‘S is P” is not valid”, but this is not another negation. Since Husserl accordingly fails to refute the view that a whole proposition, not the predicate or the copula, is that which is negated in negation, he does not successfully argue for the view “that there are two coordinate forms of a categorical propo- sition, the affirmative and negative, and that the concept of denying and assenting, of affirming and negating, or whatever one calls it, are coordinate with each other” (Hua-Mat I, p. 161). ‘While a third class of categorical propositions, alongside affirma- tive and negative ones, have been sometimes also identified and desig- nated as “limitative” (“S is non-P”), Husserl does not find this threefold classification acceptable, for the limitative ones have for him as well as others “the character of affirmative propositions with spe- cial, namely negative predicates” (Hua-Mat I, p. 162). However, against Lotze, who brands them as “absurd products of scholastic cleverness”,>? Husserl maintains that there are indeed such proposi- tions as well as the concepts which are found in their predicates (e.g. “non-human”). “The question still remains how Husserl wishes to deal with exis- tential propositions, especially in view of the fact that Brentano had taught him that all judgments can be regarded as existential. In his considerations of universal affirmative propositions (“All S$ is P”) Husserl is confronted with the traditional view that such propositions imply the existence of the subject, Herbart’s view that such proposi- tions are not existential? and Brentano’s view that they are in fact, negative existential propositions (“There is no S which is not P”). Ieis, the traditional view that Husserl adopts here. The counter-examples which may be pointed otit in defense of Herbart’s position (“All tri- angles have three sides” and “All centaurs have cloven hooves”), says Hlusserl, “do not pose the slightest difficulry when they are correctly interpreted” (Hua-Mat I, p. 183). In such cases the propositions im- ply existence “under assumption”, e.g, the existence of triangles un- 3 Lorae, Logik, p. 61. 4 Flusserl only me fesring to a particular work of is or anyone from his school. is Herbart in this context (Hiua-Mat I, p. 183) without re- * THUSSERL’S ELEM der the assump the existence 0 (Hua-Mat I, pr While Huss and of univers: affirmative pro cording to whit with “Only on bility does not reject traditior propositions in ‘As regards pan position as he pp. 189 ff.) Mention she propositions, n: maintains that U1 “All gold is yc equivalence her positions (Hua function invoh judgments, the thetical propos general objects ample, is hus r ticular instance In view of | gorical proposi concept of exis color or horse analogous to th Brentano, he r tence, especiall that is “extrao: 227). As Bren things, bur alse 4° This view he tentional objects. ROLLINGER, Huss: Though Hu: ‘most likely rferrit elhingen. Eine pr)BIN D. ROLLINGER, 1 effectively criti- 3 is not P”, says nse [is] again ‘Tt is, nritwm” (Hua-Mat arge of an infinite » js not valid”.. 162). However, ducts of scholastic deed such proposi- teir predicates (c.g, s to deal with exis- that Brentano had s existential. In his ons (“All S is P”) xt such propositions that such proposi- hat they are in fact hich is not P*). Iris e counter-examples s position (“All tri- oven hooves”), says an they are correctly he propositions im- :nce of triangles un- acl, p- 183) without re- 1 HUSSERL'S ELEMENTARY LOGIC 209 der the assumption that space is defined as the geometer defines it and the existence of centaurs under the assumption of Greek mythology (Hua-Mat I, pp. 182 £41 While Husserl tales a traditional view of categorical propositions and of universal affirmative ones in particular, his view of particular affirmative propositions diverges considerably from the tradition, ac- cording to which “Some $ are P* is compatible with “All § are P” and with “Only one S is P”, Husserl maintains that this alleged compati- bility does not obtain (Hua-Mat I, pp. 187 ff.). Yet, Husserl does not reject tradition insofar as he maintains that particular affirmative propositions imply the existence of their subject (Hua-Mat I, p. 189). As regards particular negative propositions, Husserl adopts the same Position as he does with regard to the affirmative ones (Hua-Mat I, pp. 189 ff.). Mention should be made here also of another class of categorical propositions, namely general ones, eg., “Gold is yellow”. While Husserl ‘maintains that these are not identical with universal propositions, e.,, “All gold is yellow”, he nonetheless concedes that there obtains an equivalence here as well as an equivalence with certain hypothetical pro- positions (Hua-Mat I, pp. 197-201). In spite of the peculiar psychical function involved in the presentations which accompany the relevant judgments, the equivalence with corresponding universal and hypo- thetical propositions allows us to avoid “the misleading doctrine of general objects in logic” (Hua-Mat I, p. 202). Gold as such, for ex- ample, is thus not regarded by Husserl as an object in addition to par- ticular instances of gold. In view of Husser!’s results regarding the various classes of cate- gorical propositions it is indeed understandable that he says “that the concept of existence is not a logically irrelevant one, as the concept of color or horse is, for example, but is one of the basic logical concepts, analogous to the concept of truth” (Hua-Mat I, pp. 215). Along with Brentano, he rejects various attempts to analyze the concept of exis- tence, especially Sigwart’s (Hua-Mat I, pp. 216 ff.), and reaches a view that is “extraordinarily close to the Brentanian one” (Hua-Mat I, p. 227). ‘As Brentano had allowed for not only the existence of real things, but also for that of “a past and a future, an empty space and a 41 This view had alteady been developed by Hussel in his 1894 masuscript on in- tentional objects. An English translation ofthis tex is published as Appendo« One in ROLLINGER, Husser's Postion inthe School of Brentano, pp. 251-286 +? Though Hiusserl does not mention anyone who advocates this doctrine, he s here ‘most likely referring wo TwaxDowsts, Zur Lebre vom Inbal end Gegenstand der Vag stellangn. Eine psychologische Uncersnching (Viena: Aled Ede, 198) pp210 ROBIN D.ROLLINGER lack as such, a possibility, an impossibility, and so on and so forth”, Husserl does so as well. Moreover, he adopts the Brentanian view that subjectless propositions (also called “impersonalia”), such as “It is raining”, are equivalent to existential ones. While Husserl certainly cannot allow for existence to be seen in terms of correct acceptance (and non-existence to be seen in terms of correct rejection), he nonetheless rejects any conception of existential propositions as pred- ications. In this respect his view is indeed close to Brentano's, but aso very close to Herbart’s, for Husserl regards existential and predicative Propositions as two fundamental classes of propositions (Flua-Mat I, pp. 229 ff.). He differs from Herbart, however, insofar as he maintains that existence is implied in all forms of predication. 5. Inferences Hiusser!’s treatment of inferences starts from the consideration of a class of complex propositions which he had left unmentioned in the part of his lectures that was especially concerned with propositions (Hua-Mat I, pp. 232 f.). The propositions in question are called “causal propositions” and have the form “Because A,B”. Such propo- sitions are obviously closely related to hypothetical ones. In this re- gard it is understandable why “most logicians'S seem to interpret the causal proposition as the corresponding hypothetical one, merely linked with a further proposition; namely, they seem to believe that the proposition ‘Because A, B’ is identical with the combination of the ‘two propositions ‘If A, then B’ and ‘A is” (Hua-Mat I, p. 232), al- though Husserl himself says that this is a case of equivalence rather than identity. The causal propositions accordingly make up “a special “© BRENTANO, Vom Ursprung sitlicher Evkenntnis (Leipzig: Duncker & Hum- bor, 1889), p. 62 40 This view had been worked out in detail by Anton MARTY in the following se- ries of articles: “Uber subjektlose Sitze und das Verhalinis der Grammatik zur Logik tnd Poychologie, Viereiabrchnf fir eisenschatche Philosophie 8 (18), FE, 56-94, 161-192, 292-240; 18 (1894), pp. 320-356, 421-471; 19 (1895), pp. 19-87, 265- 334, Hsser cites these articles ete the 1896 lectures. A discussion of his re~ lation to Marty can be found in ROLLINGER, Hasser!’s Postion in the School of Brentano, pp. 209-244 4 Hete Husser! does not give a single example of a logician that holds the view in question. In hs treatment of inferences in the 18% lectures there is indeed hardly any ‘mention of particular predecessors or contemporaries, except for a passing reference to Leibniz and Lowe regarding their conception of number theory as part of general logic (Hua-Mat I, p. 241), HUSSERL’S ELEMED class of propositi form of interwea one that constitu I, p. 233). This f than any proposi of believing one (Hua-Mat I, pp. ences are to be “Caius is mortal tion, but not as « less, he sees cav reflection on infe Here Husser! “because” beside Socrates is morts age of “because” ence. Yer, if ic is off the table”, th tion between tw propositions. He the term in ques of the real. Since correct to say ly causal ones. A is questionable i incomplete infer “Caius is a man* ditional premise equivalent to thi rectly regarded drawn between there is between is either valid o proposition is tr cordingly be pre because he is ar plete) inference, complete) prope Itis obvious! “The single caus cas of science. ¥ROBIN D. ROLLINGER >on and so forth”, Brentanian view that dia”), such as “It is ile Hrussed certainly if corréct acceptance erect rejection), he >ropositions as pre: rentano’s, but also mntial and predicative psitions (Hua-Mat I, sofar as he maintains on, he consideration of a unmentioned in the ed with propositions question are. called € A, B®. Such propo- tical ones. In this re- seem to interpret the thetical one, merely seem to believe that 1e combination of the aa-Mat I, p. 232), al- of equivalence rather ly make up “a special “ipzig: Duncker &e Hum- Iaxry in the following se- der Grammatik zar Logik Philosophie 8 (1884), pp- 19 (189), pp: 19-87, 63- res. A discussion of his re- Position in the Scboot of cian that holds the view in there is indeed hardly any zptfor a passing reference theory as part of general HUSSERL'S ELEMENTARY LOGIC m1 class of propositions”, in which there occurs “a completely peculiar form of interweaving of actual or presented truths, and precisely the one that constitutes the objective content of al inferences” (Hua-Mat J, p. 233). This form of interweaving, moreover, is no less objective than any proposition and is not to be construed as a psychical process of believing one proposition on the basis of believing another one (Hua-Mat I, pp. 233 £.). Yet, Husserl does not simply say that infer- ences are to be identified with causal propositions, for he regards “Caius is mortal because he is a man” as a complete causal proposi- tion, but not as a complete inference (Hua-Mat I, p. 234). Nonethe- less, he sees causal propositions as the right starting point in the reflection on inferences. Here Husserl seems to go astray by not considering other uses of “because” besides the inferential one. If it is said, for instance, that Socrates is mortal because he is a man and all men are mortal, the us- age of “because” in this statement does, to be sure, indicate an infer- ence. Yet, if itis said, “The glass broke because someone knocked it off the table”, the term “because” in this case indicates a causal rela- tion between two real events rather than a logical one between two propositions. However “ideally” Husserl wishes to regard inferences, the term in question obviously concerns such relations in the sphere of the real. Since these relations are indeed causal ones, it would be correct to say that the propositions about them are indeed the proper- ly causal ones. Another respect in which Husser!’s theory of inference is questionable is to be found in the alleged correspondence between incomplete inferences and complete propositions. The inference from “Caius is a man” to “Caius is mortal” is, to be sure, in need of an ad- ditional premise, namely “Every man is mortal” or a proposition equivalent to this, in order to be valid. Nonetheless, it cannot be cor- rectly regarded as incomplete. There is simply no distinction to be drawn between complete and incomplete inferences any more than there is between complete and incomplete propositions. Aa inference is either valid or invalid, not complete or incomplete. Likewise, a proposition is true or false, not complete or incomplete. Itwould ac- cordingly be preferable to say that the proposition “Caius is mortal because he is a man” is an example of an invalid (rather than incom- plete) inference, bur at the same time an example of a true (rather than complete) proposition, Itis obviously not the job of logic to make note of all inferences. “The single causal judgments”, says Husserl, “belong in the single ar~ cas of science. What belongs in logic can obviously only be the law- Pe{\ 212 ROBIN D. ROLLINGER fulness which governs the causal judgments, independently of the par~’ ticularity of the area, provided that there is here something like law- fulness” (Hua-Mat |, p. 235). This lawfulness (Geserzlichkeit) is vo be “Found not in the connection itself between various truths, but rather in the forms of the propositions which make up the premises and the conclusion of an inference. ‘With this conception of lawfulness in mind, Husserl maintains that a law of inference has the following form: “It is universally the case that a causal proposition ‘Because A, B’ is a truth if A in it has the in- ternal attributes F, and B has the corresponding attributes F, or if there obtains between them a certain relation F (AB) grounded by these internal properties” (Hua-Mat I, p. 237). The upshot of this con- sideration is that the laws of inference are to be formulated in hypo- thetical propositions in which the attributes in question are to be clearly designated. Yet, not all such laws are properly logical ones (Hua-Mat I, pp. 238-241). The hypothetical proposition “If A is larg- er than B and if B is larger than C, then A is larger than C”, for exam- ple, is such a law, but it is not a logical one, since the variables in question (A, B, C) can only be replaced by symbols which represent magnitudes. In the case of the inference “If every man is mortal and if Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal” there is indeed a logical law of inference at work, for the terms “man”, “mortal”, and “Socrates” can be replaced with absolutely any other symbols and the inference will remain valid. Inferences of this latter kind, says Husserl, “are pos- sible for the objects of the highest logical categories, thus objects, co cepts, propositions as such and are grounded in these categories” (Hua-Mat I, p. 240). Since Husserl sees the concepts of objects, concepts, and proposi- tions as the three areas in which logical laws of inference are to be iden- tified, it is only natural that he divides up the tasks of the theory of inference accordingly (Hua I, pp. 241 f.). The logical laws of inference are first to be sought within the category of propositions. This investi- gation is to be followed by one regarding those laws which are found in the category of concepts, though Husserl leaves it unclear whether the investigation of the laws that are grounded in the category of ob- jects is to be sharply distinguished from the second step. Husser!’s lec- tures close with an attempt to formalize some of the propositional and conceptual rules of inference (Hua-Mat I, pp. 254-264), though his re- sults are hardly to be regarded as novel. In this respect it is indeed un- derstandable why Husserl chose to publish the Prolegomena to Pure Logic instead of the 1896 lectures in their entirety. HUSSERL'S ELEMENT? 6. Conclusion Husser!’s early Ik address fundament sources that were Brentano in the bac] the 1896 lectures, bt Brentano and Bolza also makes an effort taken in psychologi another dimension 1 later work. An exar an instructive look philosophy which a umph of Frege. WI would be a serious « of the past.OBIN D. ROLLINGER andently of the par” omething like law- etalichkeit) is to be s truths, but rather xe premises and the sserl maintains'that universally the case if A in it has the in- , attributes F, or if (AB) grounded by upshot of this con- ormulated in hypo- question are to be coperly logical ones sition “If A is larg- + than C”, for exam- tace the variables in vols which represent man is mortal and if indeed a logical law tal”, and “Socrates” ils and the inference 1s Husserl, “are pos- 2s, thus objects, con- in these categories” cepts, and proposi- srence are to be iden- sks of the theory of ical laws of inference ssitions. This investi- aws which are found 2s it unclear whether \ the category of ob- d step. Husser!’s lec- ‘he propositional and 264), though his re- spect itis indeed un- Prolegomena to Pure HUSSERL’S ELEMENTARY LOGIC 213 6. Conclusion Husser!’s early logic is of great interest because it is an attempt to address fundamental issues in response to theories from various sources that were seldom considered in conjunction. Not only is Brentano in the background and sometimes even in the foreground of the 1896 lectures, but Bolzano is as well. The resulting combination of Brentano and Bolzano alone is a fascinating one. The fact that Husser! also makes an effort to respond in detail to various positions that were taken in psychologistic logics from the nineteenth century adds yet another dimension to his logical reflections that is hardly found in his later work. An examination of the 1896 lectures accordingly gives us an instructive look into many aspects of nineteenth century logic and philosophy which are unfortunately often overlooked due to the tri- umph of Frege, While there very well may be progress in logic, it would be a serious error to take this as a license for ignoring the logic of the past.