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Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

d/b/a National Grid

Winter Storm Elliott


December 22, 2022

Storm Report

February 27, 2023

Submitted to:
New York State Public Service Commission
Table of Contents

Contents
1. Introduction/Overview/Executive Summary ........................................................................................................3
2. Advance Planning Activities .................................................................................................................................8
3. Damage Assessment .......................................................................................................................................... 15
4. Wires Down ....................................................................................................................................................... 17
5. Crewing .............................................................................................................................................................. 20
6. Restoration ........................................................................................................................................................ 23
7. Estimated Time of Restoration (ETRs) ................................................................................................................ 32
8. Communications ................................................................................................................................................ 35
9. Critical Customer/Life Support Equipment Customers (LSE)/Critical Facilities .................................................... 50
10. Storm Critique and Action Items ...................................................................................................................... 56
11. Appendices....................................................................................................................................................... 58

Appendix 1.1 – Detailed Weather Summaries


Appendix 2.1 - DTN and NWS Weather Forecasts
Appendix 3.1 - Damage Assessment Summary
Appendix 4.1 - Source Data from OMS
Appendix 5.1 - NY-PSC Resource Reports
Appendix 6.1 - Affected Feeder List
Appendix 6.2 - Road Clearing – Access Requests, Police Detail Requests
Appendix 6.3 - Road Clearing – Snow Plowing Zone Map
Appendix 8.1 – Customer Communications
Appendix 8.2 – NY-PSC EORS Reports
Appendix 11.1 - Pictures

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1. INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW/EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The December 2022 North American Winter Storm referred to as “Winter Storm Elliott” - likely the worst
blizzard in Buffalo’s history – delivered a punishing combination of heavy snow, extreme winds, blizzard
conditions, and bitter cold temperatures over a five-day period to upstate New York beginning on
December 231 and ending December 27.

National Weather Service Watches, Warnings, Advisories 12/22/2022

At one point on Friday, December 22, 2022, almost three quarters of the US population was under some
form of winter weather warning or advisory according to the National Weather Service (“NWS”).
Thousands of flights had been cancelled and millions were without power.

Winter Storm Elliott will be defined by the access and mobility issues created by the storm’s never-seen-
before, enduring intensity that completely paralyzed all forms of movement and transportation in the
region for days. The historic blizzard and lake effect snowstorm occurred northeast of Lake Erie and Lake
Ontario during the Christmas holiday weekend. Western, central, and northern New York were the hardest
hit areas within the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation d/b/a National Grid (“National Grid” or the
“Company”) service territory. Blizzard conditions diminished in intensity on December 25, 2022, but heavy
lake effect snow continued through Tuesday, December 27, 2022.

1
Although the storm began impacting the Company’s service territory on December 22, 2022, the conditions did
not meet the definition for “Start of Event” until December 23, 2022.
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At the onset, Winter Storm Elliott brought two inches of rain that later turned to snow and accumulated in
excess of 56 inches over the five-day period. To the north of Buffalo, Niagara Falls received nearly 20
inches of snow over the same
period, and in northern New York,
most notably Jefferson County,
Deferiet received 50 inches and
Henderson Harbor, near
Watertown, was buried by 48
inches of snow. Both areas in
northern New York experienced
blizzard conditions for a majority of
December 23 - 25. See Appendix
1.1 for detailed weather summaries
of the event.

Western New York bore the brunt


of the storm, experiencing over 37
consecutive hours of blizzard
conditions, which was the longest blizzard duration in the region’s history. Lasting nearly two full days, the
relentless storm drove zero-visibility (i.e., complete whiteout) conditions, blanketing the area in feet of
wind-driven snow and massive drifts that were not able to be cleared by conventional plow trucks. Instead,
large-wheel front-end loaders and heavy equipment were required to remove the snow, effectively
shutting down the City of Buffalo and surrounding areas and leaving hundreds of motorists stranded.

The winds in Buffalo during Winter Storm Elliott gusted over 45 mph for more than 24 consecutive hours
with gusts consistently exceeding 60 mph every hour on December 23, amplifying blizzard conditions to a
level never experienced before. The highest reported wind gust in Buffalo was 79 mph, recorded by the
NYS-Mesonet weather station in Lackawanna, New York.

Other parts of New York received moderate snowfall between zero and five inches, with New York City and
other coastal areas of the Northeast receiving only a dusting. A final noted anomaly associated with the
winds of Winter Storm Elliott was the seiche created on Lake Erie, resulting in record-low water levels in
the lake's western basin.

National Grid began planning five days in advance of Winter Storm Elliott initiating the following activities:
 Monitoring and planning, using the most conservative weather forecast that was obtained from
the Company’s third-party weather service provider, as well as the NWS, other media-based
weather sources, and publicly available apps in an effort to fully understand the severity and
confidence of potential weather effects;
 Preparing Company employees and Company contractors through various notifications and
activation of the Emergency Response Organization;
 Securing a substantial number of external resources including line, tree, service, damage
assessment, and public safety / wire guard resources;
 Pre-staging resources, materials, and equipment strategically across the National Grid upstate New
York Service territory in advance of impact from Winter Storm Elliott;
 Proactive outreach to county and State emergency management officials, local elected officials,
Critical Facility, Life Support Equipment ("LSE"), and Elderly, Blind, and Disabled (“EBD”) customers,
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regulatory authorities, and other key stakeholders to inform them of the Company’s planning and
preparation activities;
 Conducting pre-event community leader conference calls, and initiating the logistics associated
with procuring and establishing dry-ice and bottled water distribution locations in the areas
hardest hit by the storm;
 Issuing pre-event press releases noting planning and preparation efforts for the pending storm
along with key information around storm safety and how to contact the Company; and
 Utilizing traditional and social / digital media to provide customers with information on how to
report a hazard, an outage, or to check on the status of an outage, safety messaging that reminds
customers of what to do before and during a storm, how to enroll in programs for Life Support or
Special Needs customers, and a guide to how the restoration process works.

From the onset of the storm, it was clear that not only National Grid, but the entire first responder
community and public works personnel were going to be confronted with extraordinary circumstances,
topped by the unprecedented intensity of the continuous blizzard and severe winter storm conditions
bringing travel to a standstill for several days.

A limited number of National Grid personnel were deployed during the worst of the storm to mitigate
hazardous conditions, and, in doing so, were able to restore power to over 50,000 customers in the
communities within Erie and Niagara counties while the storm was still raging. These efforts included
selfless acts by crews who left their trucks when roads were impassable and carried ladders and tools
through several feet of snow and dangerous blizzard conditions to work locations.

The damage from Winter Storm Elliott was consistent with expectations for a sustained high-wind event
with blizzard conditions. Damage was incurred primarily in the NY-West and NY-Central Divisions, and
consisted of downed limbs and fallen trees, downed wires, broken poles, and damaged transformers. The
NY-East Division was impacted with similar damage but to a lesser degree. In total, the Company replaced
256 broken poles and 102 damaged transformers. No temporary facilities (i.e., portable sub-stations or
generators) were required or used during restoration.

National Grid outage statistics associated with Winter Storm Elliott were as follows:

Total
Customers
Affected Peak
New York
202,659 61,388
State
Total Total Total
Division / Customers Division / Customers Division / Customers
Region Affected Peak Region Affected Peak Region Affected Peak
NY-West 110,327 45,341 NY-Central 51,046 9,211 NY-East 41,286 9,500
Frontier 61,548 Northern 21,908 Capital 10,038
Southwest 20,499 Central 16,512 Capital W. 12,929
Genesee 28,280 Mohawk Valley 12,626 Northeast 18,319

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Public safety during an emergency or storm event is the Company's primary concern. The elimination of
hazards to the public takes precedence during emergencies, which includes plans to promptly secure
downed wires and make areas safe that are compromised with damaged electrical equipment. During
Winter Storm Elliott, National Grid’s response involved the dispatch of trained and qualified employees or
contractors to investigate reports of downed wires, and public hazards to fix, make safe, and/or arrange
for standby personnel if needed to protect the public.

The appropriate number of line, service, tree, and public safety full-time equivalents (“FTEs”) for Winter
Storm Elliott was determined from a situational assessment of factors that included the weather forecast,
known hazard conditions, and anticipated impact to the National Grid service territory, coupled with
information about the impacts of the storm in other areas around the country.

In Western New York, it was clear that access and mobility issues resulting from the storm were going to
play a significant role in the Company’s response to the event. National Grid determined additional
resources would be needed in the NY-Western Division to overcome the inability to travel, or extremely
slow travel. Using all available and appropriate channels through which incremental resources can be
obtained, National Grid continued to secure incremental resources, moved resources from other Divisions
as they completed restoration in lesser impacted areas, and moved resources from National Grid’s
Massachusetts affiliate to New York to support restoration activities. In all, National Grid amassed a
workforce that was nearly double the size of what it would take to restore the impacted number of
customers if travel, access, and mobility were not issues.

National Grid steadily secured the needed incremental resources throughout the event. The Company
constantly evaluated progress and strategically moved resources to Western New York as they became
available.

The Company’s process to restore power after a major event is recognized as an industry standard and
best practice for utilities to optimize restoration time. Repairs are generally made in the order of the path
that electricity takes from the power plants to the customer. Company resources begin with transmission
and primary circuits that can affect a large number of customers. Then, and often times in parallel, crews
restore lateral distribution lines that can affect many customers; secondary distribution lines that affect
fewer customers; and, finally, service lines to individual customer homes.

Working directly with the State, Erie County, and City of Buffalo, the Company established a process to
request snow removal for specific areas where damage to equipment had occurred, inclusive of a route to
get there. National Grid was provided access to large front-end loaders via coordination with the New York
State Department of Transportation and City of Buffalo that expedited the systematic clearing of roads on
a priority basis. Using the principles and fundamentals of the Company’s emergency response plan,
National Grid successfully adapted road clearing procedures to the challenges created by the storm to
efficiently respond to customers as quickly as possible.

National Grid provided timely and accurate information pertaining to the Company’s restoration efforts as
soon as possible. The Emergency Response Organization communicated effectively both internally and
externally to maintain a continuity of messaging to the general public, news media and local officials and
employees. To the greatest extent possible, National Grid provided extensive information across a wide
variety of traditional and digital channels leading up to and during our response to Winter Storm Elliott
with accurate messaging timed to coincide when possible with local news cycles.
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Information exchanged on a regular basis with local officials included a summary of customers interrupted,
customers restored, total customers affected, crewing information on-site and en-route, planned crew
relocation and mutual assistance activity, discussion of major damage, estimated restoration times,
summaries of work plans for restoring customers, listings of Critical Facility and LSE customers affected,
and a summary of dry-ice/bottled water distribution activities.

Following the storm, National Grid committed $500,000 to support the people of Western New York in
their recovery from this historic weather event. The funding, which was provided by the Company’s
shareholders, went to regional charitable organizations offering programs that directly benefited those
impacted by the storm, as well as organizations supporting community resilience for future emergencies.
The Company also provided customer bill credits and expeditiously processed reimbursement applications
from customer who experienced extended outages because of the storm, as generally outlined in Public
Service Law (“PSL”) §73. National Grid also performed a comprehensive After Action Review. The After
Action Review enables stakeholders to identify strengths and areas for improvement through a review of
the effectiveness of preparedness, planning, and response efforts associated with the event. Lessons
learned from the review are reinforced throughout the year as part of employee training, drills and
exercises to be better prepared to respond to and recover from future emergencies.

National Grid greatly appreciates the support from customers, the State, counties, and municipalities
during the storm restoration.

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2. ADVANCE PLANNING ACTIVITIES
National Grid’s NY Electric Emergency Response Plan (“NY-ERP”) provided the framework for the
Company’s actions with regard to preparation, operational response, coordination, and communication
for Winter Storm Elliott. The NY-ERP in force at the time of the event was approved by the New York State
Public Service Commission (the “Commission”) on May, 12, 2022, as part of Case 21-E-0567.

Weather Monitoring

It is important to closely monitor the weather, along with other incidents and events both locally and
around the country that might adversely impact National Grid’s electric system, particularly during periods
of impending adverse or severe weather conditions. As discussed below, weather forecasts are obtained
from the Company’s third-party weather service provider, as well as publicly available sources, to fully
understand the severity and likelihood of potential weather effects. Additionally, National Grid has a
relationship with the University of Albany, home to the NY-Mesonet, which is one of the nation’s most
sophisticated weather monitoring systems, capable of measuring temperature, humidity, wind speed (and
direction), pressure, solar radiation, snow depth, and soil information. The NY-Mesonet operates a
network of 126 weather stations across the State, with at least one site in every county and borough. While
the NY-Mesonet tracks vital weather data, the Mesonet also provides forecast information at each weather
station highlighting temperature, wind, and all forms of precipitation. The NY-Mesonet and its highly
credentialed scientists and meteorologists assist the State’s utilities with weather information and
forecasts when requested.

When planning for a severe weather event, the Company will consider the more conservative forecast (i.e.,
the forecast indicating the greatest potential impacts to the electric system) when developing plans for
response associated with the prediction of severe weather.

A comprehensive review of weather reports is a daily activity at National Grid that includes an assessment
of the potential for severe weather impacts. The Company monitors the National Weather Service (“NWS”)
forecast, other publicly available sources, and the forecasting from the Company’s third-party weather
service that provides detailed weather forecasts three times daily. The forecasts include a synopsis of
current conditions, a forecast for the remainder of the current day, current evening, a look ahead to the
next day, and a look ahead to a three-to-five-day and six-to-ten day weather outlook. Additionally, weather
forecasts from our third-party provider include up-to-date assessments specific to National Grid’s service
territory designed to report the threat of wind, snow, ice, rain, flooding, temperature, and thunderstorms.

Weather forecasts associated with the Company’s review and planning efforts for Winter Storm Elliott can
be found in Appendix 2.1.

The table below summarizes the most conservative elements for each of the forecasts provided by National
Grid’s third-party weather service regarding Winter Storm Elliott for each day leading up to and through
the storm.

DTN Weather Forecast Summary –


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Most conservative elements for each of the three-times-daily weather forecast
Sustained Peak Wind Common
Date Wind Gusts Gusts Snow Accumulation Snow Consistency
12/19/2022 18-30 mph 50-55 mph 35-45 mph Trace – 1” Wet-Normal
12/20/2022 20-35 mph 55-65 mph 45-50 mph Trace – 3” iso. 4” Wet-Normal
12/21/2022 20-35 mph 55-65 mph 45-50 mph 2-6” iso. 6-10” Wet-Dry
12/22/2022 25-38 mph 55-65 mph 45-55 mph 2-6” iso. 7-8” Wet-Normal
12/23/2022 27-43 mph 57-72 mph 45-55 mph 12-24” iso. 30-50” Dry-Very Dry
12/24/2022 20-35 mph 45-55 mph 30-40 mph 12-30” iso. 30-36” Dry-Very Dry
12/25/2022 25-35 mph 30-45 mph 35-40 mph 8-18” iso. 18-24” Dry-Very Dry

Overall, the forecast did capture the enormity and severity of Winter Storm Elliott several days in advance
and the forecasts from the third-party weather service did align with those of the NWS forecast; however,
across Western New York the wind gusts exceeded the forecast in a few isolated locations coupled with an
overperformance of the actual sustained winds in similar areas contributing to the dangerous conditions
during the storm and an extremely difficult snow clearing and removal process.

Preparing Company Staff and Contractors and Pre-Storm Planning

National Grid complied with its NY-ERP and communicated with employees and contractors regarding
activation of the Emergency Response Organization, including emergency response assignments and
mobilization of resources, materials, and equipment.

Specifically, in accordance with NY-ERP Section 4.5, the Company activated required Emergency Response
Organization Leadership personnel, who subsequently notified employees that they had been activated to
their emergency response roles to prepare for and respond to the event. The following are key highlights
and activities performed by the Emergency Response Organization in advance of Winter Storm Elliott:

December 19, 2022

 National Grid began monitoring the weather system and forecast associated with Winter Storm Elliot
on December 18, 2022, and held its first planning meeting on Monday December 19, 2022.
 On December 19, 2022, more than four days prior to the anticipated initial impact of the storm, the
Company decided to secure the initial group of external resources that would be strategically pre-
staged in advance of the storm.
 Emergency Response Organization Leadership met and/or talked on a regular basis each day leading
up to the impact of the storm to review weather forecasts and status of planning activities.

December 20, 2022

 On Tuesday, December 20, 2022, emergency planning sent an early notification to all members of the
Emergency Response Organization, key stakeholders, and Company leadership informing them of the
anticipated severe weather threat along with a list of pre-event activities to be completed in
accordance with the requirements of the NY-ERP by the respective functions of the Emergency
Response Organization.

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o Early notifications are provided to the Company Emergency Response Organization as part of
our normal planning activities.
o Early notifications provide the Emergency Response Organization with a summary of the
threat, an overview of the resources plans, outreach and communication requirements
(inclusive of an activities matrix for each New York Division), a summary of any mutual
assistance activity, and detailed weather highlights around the most current forecast available
at the time of the notification.
 National Grid decided to place internal Company crews and Company contractors on hold with
instructions to remain on property effective December 22, 2022, until directed otherwise.
 The Company made the decision to cancel all employee vacation plans for critical resources to ensure
their availability for storm / emergency response.
 Schedules for internal Company crews and Company contractor crews were then finalized over the
course of the planning process.
 Decisions were also made about the staging locations for external resources that were being secured
ahead of the anticipated impact of the storm.
 NY Vegetation Management contractors were notified and advised to be prepared for a potential
multi-day event, affecting all upstate New York Divisions within the National Grid service territory. The
NY Vegetation Management contractors notified included:
o Asplundh Tree
o Nelson Tree
o Lewis Tree
o Ironwood
o K.W. Reese
o Tree Care of WNY
o O’Connell
o Davey Tree
o Wright Tree

December 22, 2022

 National Grid pre-staged the secured external crews, materials, and equipment as follows:
o 125 External Contractor Crews (approx. 315 FTEs) were pre-staged in the NY-Western Division.
 In addition to external overhead line crews, 50 wire guard contractors and 30 damage
assessment contractors were also secured ahead of the event and pre-staged in NY-
West.
o 100 External Contractor Crews (approx. 250 FTEs) were pre-staged in the NY-Central Division.
 In addition to external overhead line crews, 20 wire guard contractors and 34 damage
assessment contractors were also secured ahead of the event and pre-staged in NY-
Central.
o 100 External Contractor Crews (approx. 250 FTEs) were pre-staged in the NY-East Division.
 In addition to external overhead line crews, 30 wire guard contractors and 40 damage
assessment contractors were also secured ahead of the event and pre-staged in NY-
East.
o All external crews (line, wire guard, and damage assessment) arrived by Thursday, December
22, 2022, were on-boarded, and ready to work first thing the next morning.
 Upon impact of the storm, it was clear the event was going to be significant, as the intensity of the
weather and blizzard conditions quickly escalated.
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 National Grid decided to secure additional external resources and initiated plans to be ready to move
resources from areas that completed restoration to areas expected to be hit hardest by the storm.
 Company contractors and their respective supervision, and Company supervisors of external resources
(restoration crew supervisors) were put on notice to be prepared to move as directed by the
Emergency Response Organization leadership.

Mutual Assistance

As part of the pre-event planning activities, and consistent with Section 6 of the NY-ERP, National Grid
secured the commitment of additional support through direct contact with external contractors that were
not affiliated with any investor-owned utility companies to satisfy our original request for additional
resources.

All direct contact resources secured ahead of Winter Storm Elliott arrived in the designated pre-staging
locations by December 22, 2022, for on-boarding and were ready to work upon the start of restoration.

A North Atlantic Mutual Assistance Group (“NAMAG”) conference call was held during the planning stages
for Winter Storm Elliott. Because of the size and impact of the storm (across the country), and uncertainty
as to where the storm would cause the most damage as it made its way to the Northeast, all NAMAG
member companies were holding – subject to the event (meaning they were not offering any support to
requesting companies at that time). When requests for resources are not able to be filled within the
NAMAG by other member companies, the request for support is extended to adjoining Regional Mutual
Assistance Groups (“RMAG”), which was done as part of this event. Similar to the NAMAG, all RMAGs
contacted were either holding subject to the event or had been impacted by the event and were in the
process of repairing damage incurred by the storm and were not able to offer support. Because National
Grid had secured commitments for the desired number of resources the Company was looking to pre-stage
for the event, it did not place a request for resources with the NAMAG or RMAG at that time.

Customer Outreach

Consistent with Sections 17.3, 17.4, and 17.5 of the NY-ERP, and based on the weather forecast indicating
that the anticipated effects from the event were likely to result in a restoration period exceeding 48 hours
for at least 90% of the affected customers, and would encompass all three of National Grid’s upstate NY
Divisions, the Company coordinated pre-event calls to Critical Facility Customers, LSE, and EBD customers
ahead of the anticipated impact of the storm.

Pre-event outreach calls to Critical Facility Customers included Company contact information, a brief note
about what the Company was doing to prepare for the storm, safety tips associated with downed wires,
potential storm impact for geographic areas anticipated to be impacted, how to report an outage and check
for outage status, information about estimated times of restoration (“ETRs”), and the Company’s outage
central web site location so the Critical Facilities could view storm status and updates. Channels of
communication utilized to attempt to provide advance notice included automated calls, direct calls, or e-
mail notifications.

Pre-event outreach to LSE customers provides advance notice to potentially impacted customers that
includes the known information about the weather forecast, informs the customer that if emergency

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assistance is needed to call police, fire or 911, the National Grid Life Support hotline number is provided,
and the Company urges LSE customers to consider relocating to an alternate location.

An example of a typical LSE pre-event call script is noted below:

“This is National Grid with an important message. A winter storm with a wintry mix of rain, sleet,
and snow along with plummeting temperatures, ice buildup and extremely damaging winds is
expected to impact Upstate NY starting Thursday afternoon and continuing into the weekend. Our
records show that an individual who requires medical care or life sustaining equipment is at this
address. I am contacting you to make sure you and your household are prepared in the event of a
power outage. For the health and safety of you and your family we urge you to consult your local
media for more detailed weather information, and to determine if you should consider moving to
an alternate location during the anticipated event. Please contact 911 if you require emergency
assistance or your local public safety officials. If you lose power or if the phone number we are
reaching you on will not work during an outage, please contact National Grid at 1-800-460-0316,
that’s 1-800-460-0316 to report your outage or update your information. Once again it is critical
that you provide a contact number where you can be reached during the outage. For additional
power outage information, outage reporting, and storm safety information, you can also visit the
Outage Central section of our website Ngrid.com. You can also sign up for personalized text
message alerts by texting R-E-G to 6-4-7-4-3, that’s R-E-G to 6-4-7-4-3. Thank you for being a
National Grid customer.”

Pre-event outreach to EBD customers provides advance notice to potentially impacted customers that
includes the known information about the weather forecast through an outbound (pre-recorded) call
highlighting the known information about the weather forecast, informs the customer that if emergency
assistance is needed to call police, fire or 911, and provides the customer with the Company’s Contact
Center phone number, which they can use to report an electric outage and/or obtain status information.

The Branch Liaison Coordinator assigns liaisons to handle the interactions and response coordination with
county government and other stakeholders within the county emergency management organization.
Similar to the proactive, pre-event outreach to LSE, Critical Facility, and EBD customers, the National Grid
Liaisons contacted representatives within the respective county emergency management organizations in
advance of the storm to provide them with information about what National Grid was doing to prepare for
the event and to review any special communication and coordination expectations for the event. Where
applicable, the Liaison Coordinator will provide staffing to county (and municipal) emergency operations
centers to manage communications between the Company and the county during the restoration effort.
Situations can arise where the county emergency operations center does not activate and the Branch
Liaison Coordinator will work with the local authorities to support communications between the Company
and the agency during restoration efforts via, telephone, e-mail, text, or virtually.

Warehouse / Inventory

The planning process for a major event involves the confirmation of having the required materials on-hand
in pre-determined strategic locations throughout the Company’s extensive geographic footprint in upstate
New York.

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In the NY-West Division, it was confirmed that the warehouse in Buffalo, New York had 13 storm kits on
hand, which is the prescribed quantity in NY-ERP, Section 7.1. The Company determined that the number
of storm kits on hand, along with quantities of poles, vendor pole stock, transformer levels, and existing on
hand (truck) stock of ancillary items, were sufficient to support the anticipated scope of the event.

The Company met all material needs for the storm through the existing local storeroom stock and Western
NY warehouse stock. The NY-West warehouse operations were prepared to fulfill additional material
requests if such requests were made. All local storerooms were fully stocked with poles, and 100 additional
poles were brought in from the Company’s vendor within 24 hours of the request.

Most needed items were anticipated to be transformers, splices, connectors, crossarms and braces, fuses,
wire/cable, and miscellaneous hardware. Proactive deliveries of these supplies to do everything possible
to make sure adequate stock was on-hand when needed were made to the Niagara Falls, Tonawanda,
Dewey, Avon, Batavia, Angola, Fredonia, Albion, Stow, Olean, Franklinville, and Wellsville crew locations
Monday, December 19 through Thursday December 22.

Replenishment deliveries of transformers, splices, connectors, crossarms and braces were made to the
Tonawanda, Dewey, Avon, Batavia, Angola, Fredonia, Albion crew locations on Saturday, December 24 and
Sunday, December 25. Replenishment deliveries of poles were made to the Dewey crew locations on
Monday, December 26.

Additional proactive deliveries came from the Henry Clay Boulevard and Clifton Park warehouses to the
Buffalo warehouse. The deliveries included transformers, splices, connectors, crossarms and braces, fuses,
wire/cable, and miscellaneous hardware. All other material needs were met through the existing stock at
local storerooms.

In the NY-Central Division, the Company confirmed that the warehouse in Liverpool, New York, had 28
storm kits on hand, which is the prescribed quantity in NY-ERP, Section 7.1. The Company determined the
number of storm kits on hand, along with quantities of poles, vendor pole stock, transformer levels, and
existing on-hand (truck) stock of ancillary items, were sufficient to support the anticipated scope of the
event.

The NY-Central Warehouse operations were prepared for additional material requests if such requests
were made. All local storerooms were fully stocked with poles that included the delivery of 23 additional
poles secured from the Company’s vendor that were received within 24 hours of the request.

During the event, zero storm kits were deployed. All material needs were met through the existing local
storeroom stock and Central NY warehouse stock with any/all identified material needs transferred from
the upstate New York warehouse locations within 24 hours of request to the requesting storeroom.

Most needed items were transformers, splices, connectors, crossarms and braces, fuses, wire/cable, and
miscellaneous hardware. Replenishment deliveries of transformers, splices, connectors, crossarms and
braces were made to the Cicero, Rome, Watertown, Clayton and Volney crew locations on Friday,
December 23. All other material needs were met through the existing stock at local storerooms.

In the NY-East Division, the Company confirmed that the warehouse in Clifton Park, New York, had 42 storm
kits on hand which is the prescribed quantity in NY-ERP, Section 7.1. The Company determined that this
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number of storm kits on hand, along with quantities of poles, vendor pole stock, transformer levels, and
existing on-hand (truck) stock of ancillary items, were sufficient to support the anticipated scope of the
event.

The Eastern Division warehouse operations were prepared for additional material requests if such requests
were made. Poles were fully stocked at all local storerooms, and an additional 75 poles were secured and
delivered to the warehouse within 24 hours of being requested.

Most needed items are typically transformers, splices, connectors, crossarms and braces, fuses, wire/cable,
and miscellaneous hardware. Proactive deliveries of these supplies to do everything possible to make sure
adequate stock was on-hand when needed were made to the Saratoga, Schenectady, Albany, Gloversville,
Middle Falls, Warrensburg, Glens Falls and Hudson crew locations Monday, December 19 through
Thursday, December 22.

During the event, zero storm kits were deployed. All material needs were met through the existing local
storeroom stock and Eastern NY warehouse stock with any/all identified material needs transferred from
the upstate New York warehouse locations within 24 hours of request.

Transportation / Fleet

In the days leading up to the impact of Winter Storm Elliott, the Company’s Fleet Services organization
assessed and confirmed vehicle inventory and released vehicles from maintenance to best respond to the
anticipated event. The Fleet Services organization was also prepared to support nighttime fueling
requirements of vehicles at the hotels and staging locations while supporting any required vehicle
maintenance during the event. The amounts of snow and the continuous wind conditions created the
abnormal conditions of having snow build up inside the engine compartments that required daily checks
to mitigate any damage that could have impacted engines that would have prevented the vehicles from
being put into service.

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3. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
National Grid Emergency Response Organization leadership and the various functions within the
Emergency Response Organization use the information from damage assessment surveys to assist with the
formulation of plans for appropriate corrective action, which includes the development of ETRs. The
determination of damage sustained from a severe weather event is made as soon as possible once field
personnel can be dispatched without unacceptable safety risks from continued severe weather conditions.
The access and mobility difficulties caused by the storm that impacted first responders and public works
resources likewise affected the Company’s damage assessment function.

Damage assessment surveys are performed to assess the physical damage from a storm. The surveys
provide key situational awareness as to the extent and location of damage from the storm, such as primary
wires down, down trees, broken poles, damaged transformers, etc., on overhead distribution feeders or
transmission lines. Damage assessment surveys are conducted by experienced personnel and may be done
by vehicle or helicopter as conditions dictate.

Although still facing significant access and mobility challenges, the Company was able to deploy damage
assessment personnel into the field at the “start of restoration” (i.e., the point in time defined as when
field personnel are able to be dispatched without unacceptable safety risks from continued severe weather
conditions (where adverse weather conditions are applicable) and when the potential additional damage
to the electric system from the storm would be low in proportion to the expected level of damage already
sustained) and complete Phase-I surveys in less than 24 hours as required by the NY-ERP.

The Phase-I Survey is a concentrated survey intended to cover a sizeable portion of what is usually a highly
populated area affected by the storm in a rapid manner to assess the impact to the mainline, three-phase
circuits. The Phase-I Damage Assessment Patrol identifies physical damage such as primary wires down,
poles broken, and transformers down on three-phase circuit mainlines or transmission lines, as assigned
by the Branch Planning Coordinator working in coordination with the Damage Assessment Field
Coordinator.

Determining the patrol sequence for feeders to survey involves a variety of criteria that are in most cases
specific to the circumstances of the event. Considerations include feeder restoration priority rankings,
Critical Facilities affected, total customer outage counts on the feeder, and coordination of priorities both
internal and external to the Company.

National Grid deployed damage assessment survey personnel consistent with the procedures outlined in
NY-ERP, Section 11. Results from the assessments allowed for the development of work-packets and the
assessment of infrastructure damage that assisted with the development of ETRs.
 Phase-I damage assessments were mobilized, deployed, and completed within 24 hours of the start
of restoration as assigned in NY-Central and NY-West Divisions.
 No Phase-I damage assessments were required within the NY-East Division.
 Damage Surveyor Personnel were staffed in all three National Grid NY Divisions during the event
(see table below for daily detailed information).
 111 feeders were surveyed within 24 hours of the start of restoration.

Page 15 of 58
Final feeder sweeps were incorporated in areas that incurred the heaviest damage to obtain any final
damage assessments while nearing the completion of restoration and prior to the release of restoration
resources.

Feeder sweeps were performed to check that all services were restored and that all temporary repairs
were noted and/or completed. This type of patrol allows for overhead line crews and other qualified
resources to be more efficient at the end of an event by avoiding any unnecessary time re-patrolling circuits
when they could be performing work that is better aligned with their qualifications. The Company’s
Damage Assessment Summary can be found in Appendix 3.1.

Staffing for the Damage Assessment Patrols was supported by internal Company employees and external
contractors. Damage assessment staffing by region is summarized in the table below.

Date
Region 12/23/2022 (Friday) 12/24/2022 (Saturday) 12/25/2022 (Sunday)
Company Contractor Total Company Contractor Total Company Contractor Total
Capital 70 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 0
East

Northeast 17 42 59 5 0 5 0 0 0
Mohawk
13 24 37 14 24 38 0 0 0
Central

Valley
Central 29 16 45 21 16 37 0 0 0
Northern 36 38 74 36 38 74 0 0 0
Southwest 14 20 34 14 20 34 14 20 34
West

Genesee 14 20 34 26 62 88 26 62 88
Frontier 22 20 42 22 20 42 40 98 138

Grand
215 180 395 138 180 318 80 180 260
Totals

Date
Region 12/26/2022 (Monday) 12/27/2022 (Tuesday) 12/28/2022 (Wednesday)
Company Contractor Total Company Contractor Total Company Contractor Total
Capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
East

Northeast 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mohawk
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Central

Valley
Central 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Northern 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Southwest 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
West

Genesee 8 0 8 8 0 8 0 0 0
Frontier 64 138 202 62 138 200 61 136 197

Grand
73 138 211 71 138 209 62 136 198
Totals

Page 16 of 58
4. WIRES DOWN
Public Safety during an emergency or storm event is the Company's primary concern. The elimination of
hazards to the public takes precedence during emergencies, which includes plans to promptly secure
downed wires and make areas safe that are compromised with damaged electrical equipment. During
Winter Storm Elliott, National Grid’s response to wires down involved the dispatch of trained and qualified
employees or contractors to investigate reports of downed wires, and public hazards to fix, make safe,
and/or arrange for standby personnel if needed to protect the public.

The type of resources that National Grid will dispatch to mitigate safety concerns includes trained and
qualified overhead line resources, Customer Meter Services (“CMS”) resources, and/or trained and
qualified contractor resources. Wire Guard personnel are typically comprised of trained CMS
representatives, meter readers, revenue collectors, gas mechanics, and contractors that have all been
provided training for wire guard protection measures to maintain safety of the public.

Overhead Line resources (Company and contractor) are dispatched from the Company’s Emergency
Operations Center (“EOC”), sometimes referred to as the “Storm Room”. CMS resources are trained and
qualified to work up to a certain voltage. CMS resources are dispatched from National Grid’s centralized
Upstate Dispatch and Scheduling (“UDS”) Center. Wire Guards are dispatched from the local storm rooms.
Collectively, these resources are commonly referred to as “Wire Responders” when dispatched to a down
wire condition.

National Grid recorded 92 wires down incidents throughout the NY-West and NY-Central divisions
impacted by Winter Storm Elliott during the storm response period from December 23 through December
28. National Grid responded to 100 percent of the recorded wire down incidents within the required 18-
hour time frame from when the Company was notified of the wire down condition to the time a National
Grid representative arrived on location with the intent to fix, make-safe, or stand by the downed wire.

Winter Storm Elliott – Down Wire Summary


Number of Wire Responded Responded
Division Down Reports < 18 hrs. > 18 hrs.
NY-West 31 31 0
NY-Central 61 61 0
92 92 0

For non-911 wire down calls, the initial order is generated from the Contact Center through our customer
service system. The order is directed to either the Division Control Center, or if a local storm room is open,
to a local Overhead Line Supervisor who is charged with managing the orders for a specific area. The
Overhead Line Supervisor will coordinate the response as a function of priority and severity of the wire
down order and direct the appropriate resource to be dispatched to the location. The order will be
dispatched to an overhead line crew or transferred to Upstate Dispatch for communication to a CMS
representative. In instances where downed wires are being guarded by a Wire Guard crew and the
overhead line crew arrives on the scene to assess and correct the issues, the Wire Guard unit is redirected
to any additional open wires down requests to continue response to any open orders until such time they
are completed and closed.

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The activity managed by this process is reported and tracked within two National Grid electronic systems.
One system, commonly referred to as “Salesforce,” is utilized by the centralized upstate dispatch (i.e., CMS)
workforce; while the other system is used by the Division or Regional Control Center (overhead line)
workforce, and is referred to as the Outage Management System (“OMS”). Depending on which resource
type arrives on scene first and completes the work order, the completion remarks, inclusive of dates and
times, are stored in the system used by that resource type.

The process for recording and reviewing 911 response time data is as follows:

1. All 911 calls come to Upstate Dispatch for which they will deploy the CMS resource and in parallel
send the 911 order to the local Division Control Center (or Storm Room) for dispatch of an overhead
line crew:
a. For all 911 calls, National Grid will dispatch at least two crews, a CMS crew and an overhead
line crew; and
b. The responding crew will advise either Upstate Dispatch or the Storm Room that they have
arrived on scene and the information is then recorded in either Salesforce or OMS.
2. Following completion of restoration, Upstate Dispatch provides a report to Emergency Planning
for all 911 calls received for the area in question.
3. Upstate Dispatch will note calls responded to by CMS resources and the associated response times.
4. Emergency Planning will send the report to the local Division Control Center and Local Operations
leadership for review of 911 calls that appear to have taken longer to respond to than 18 hours,
and operations will update the report with OMS data as appropriate.

On February 14, 2023, the Company filed updated data regarding wire down response times. The
Company's initial Emergency Performance Metrics New York Storm Scorecard filed January 27, 2023
("Scrorecard") included wire down response time metrics that required further corroboration among the
Saleseforce reporting for NY-West and the OMS data. The source data from the OMS system can be found
in Appendix 4.1

Page 18 of 58
The flowchart below depicts the pathway for 911 call data associated with wire-down activity:

Page 19 of 58
5. CREWING
An integral part of National Grid’s preparation and response to this event included the review of internal
staffing levels for all necessary disciplines across the service territory to determine if it should acquire
additional restoration and support resources.

The appropriate number of line, service, tree, and public safety FTEs for Winter Storm Elliott was
determined from a situational assessment of factors that included the weather forecast, known hazard
conditions, and anticipated impact to the National Grid service territory, coupled with information about
the impacts of the storm in other areas around the country.

Because every event or emergency is unique, it is important to have a strong working knowledge of the
Company’s infrastructure and experience of how prior events impacted the system to estimate the need
for incremental resources. National Grid pre-staged a substantial number of resources in the three upstate
New York Divisions, including line, tree, service, public safety, and damage assessment crews, in
anticipation of a significant impact from the storm.

In Western New York, it was clear that access and mobility issues resulting from the storm were going to
play a significant role in the Company’s response to the event. National Grid determined additional
resources would be needed in our NY-West Division to overcome the inability to travel, or extremely slow
travel. Using all available and appropriate channels through which incremental resources can be obtained,
National Grid continued to secure incremental resources, move resources from other Divisions as they
completed restoration in lesser impacted areas, and move resources from National Grid’s Massachusetts
affiliate to New York to support restoration activities. In all, National Grid amassed a workforce that was
nearly double the size of what it would take to restore the impacted number of customers if travel, access,
and mobility were not issues.

National Grid steadily secured the needed incremental resources as we progressed through the event. The
Company constantly evaluated progress and strategically moved resources to Western New York as they
became available. The table below highlights the daily resource activity and crew movement that enabled
restoration of service to our customers once we were able to travel. Refer to Appendix 5.1 NY-PSC
Resource Reports, regarding the specific resources moves and the associated FTEs that accompanied each
item.

Date Resource Acquisition / Resource Move


12/20/2022 Foreign (External) OH-line resources have been secured and are expected to arrive on or
before 12/22 at 1800.
12/20/2022 Foreign (External) tree resources have been secured and are expected to arrive on or before
12/22 at 1800.
12/20/2022 Foreign (External) resources - Damage Assessment and Wire Guard have been secured and will
arrive on or before 12/22 at 1800.

12/22/2022 Foreign (External) resources – additional OH-line have been secured. Final number of crews
will be arriving on 12/22 at 2200.
12/22/2022 Foreign (External) tree resources secured have arrived on 12/22 prior to 1800.
12/22/2022 Foreign (External) resources - external Damage Assessment and Wire Guard secured have
arrived 12/22 prior to 1800.

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12/23/2022 Foreign (External) resources previously secured are on property ready to work
Additional OH-line FTE secured are expected to arrive on 12/24 at 1800.
12/23/2022 Foreign (External) OH- Line moved from Central Division are being moved to West Division
12/23/2022 Foreign (External) OH-Line moved from East Division to Central Division

12/24/2022 Foreign (External) OH-Line moved from the East Division to West Division
12/24/2022 Company Tree FTEs moved from NY East to NY West
12/24/2022 Incremental OH-line resources secured - Foreign (External) and are being deployed to the NY-
West Division expected ETA of 12/24 at 1800
12/24/2022 Moved External Damage Assessors from NY-Central Division to NY-West Division
12/24/2022 Moved Foreign (External) OH-Line Crews from NY-Central Division to NY-West Division
12/24/2022 Secured incremental External OH-Line FTE to be deployed to NY-West
12/24/2022 Moved Company Contractor FTEs from the NY-East Division to NY-West Division with an ETA
of 12/25 1000.

12/25/2022 All available Damage Assessors and Wire Guards from NY-Central and NY-East are being
moved to the West Division to support restoration efforts.
12/25/2022 Acquired additional Foreign (External) OH-line FTE and moved National Grid Massachusetts
OH-line resources to NY-West with an expected arrival time of 12/25 1600.
12/25/2022 Moved OH-Line FTE from NY-East Division to NY-West Division
12/25/2022 Moved OH-Line FTE from NY-Central Division to NY-West Division
12/25/2022 Moved Foreign (External) OH-Line FTE from NY-Central Division to NY-West Division

12/26/2022 Acquired incremental OH-Line FTE from Foreign (External) contractors who were deployed to
NY-West
12/26/2022 Acquired incremental OH-Line (External) FTE which were deployed to NY-West Division.
12/26/2022 Wire Guards were moved from NY-East to NY-West
Company Service FTE were moved from NY-East and NY-Central to NY-West
12/26/2022 Moved remaining available Foreign OH-Line FTE and Company OH-line Contractor FTEs from
NY-Central to NY-West, expected to arrive 12/27 1200
12/26/2022 Moved Tree FTEs from NY-East and NY-Central to West on 12/25 w-ETA of 12/26

12/27/2022 Final arrival for all incremental secured resources and Internal company resource moves - ETA
12/27 1200

Throughout the event, there was a steady acquisition of incremental support and a shift of resources from
East to West that resulted in all available resources having been efficiently mobilized into the hardest hit
areas of Western New York in a timely manner. There were several Mutual Assistance Calls conducted
during the event that produced very few available resources through the Edison Electric Institute (“EEI”)
Mutual Assistance Process from the NAMAG member companies. NAMAG Conference Calls were
conducted on the following days:

Page 21 of 58
North Atlantic Mutual Assistance Group Conference Calls

Call # Date of Call Comment


1 Tues. December 20, 2022 Situational Awareness Call
2 Fri. December 23, 2022 National Grid – Open Request (400 FTE)
3 Sat. December 24, 2022 National Grid – Open Request (400 FTE)
National Grid – Open Request withdrawn (275 FTE)
4 Sun. December 25, 2022
Resource request satisfied through other means
5 Mon. December 26, 2022 Call canceled – no future calls scheduled

Because of the size and impact of the storm, and widespread and broad impact to many utilities in the
Northeast and across the country, all NAMAG member companies were holding – subject to the event
(meaning they were not offering any support to requesting companies at the time). Because National Grid
had secured commitments for the number of resources we were looking to pre-stage for the event, the
Company did not place a request for resources with the NAMAG on the December 20, 2022 conference
call.

When requests for resources are not able to be filled within the NAMAG by other member companies, the
request for support was extended to adjoining RMAG. Similar to the NAMAG, all RMAGs contacted were
either holding subject to the event or had been impacted by the event and were in the process of repairing
damage incurred by the storm and were not able to offer support.

The NAMAG leadership team met with the leaders of the adjoining RMAGs and key members of EEI staff
regularly to review the overall impact from Winter Storm Elliott and the opportunity to provide assistance
to member companies. Throughout the event, there were no resources available from the EEI Mutual
Assistance process until December 26, 2022, when a small contingent of resources were offered and
allocated within the NAMAG.

Despite resources from the investor owned utilities not being available for this event, there was a
significant number of unaffiliated (non-investor owned utility) resources secured by member companies in
the Northeast part of the United States and Canada. The daily NAMAG calls were used to provide
awareness to where these external resources were and information around their potential release as
restoration activities were completed. On December 26, 2022, all NAMAG member companies had
satisfied their open requests for resources and future calls were canceled. By December 27, 2022, all
available resources secured by National Grid or moved from within the upstate New York and
Massachusetts jurisdictions were located in the hardest hit areas of the NY-West Division and ready to
work.

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6. RESTORATION
Definitions
Several of the metrics used to assess utility performance in preparing for and responding to a storm are
based on different points in the lifecycle of the event. These different points are based on a variety of
factors, and the Company restates them here for clarity and convenience.

Start of Event - The point in time when more than 5,000 customers are interrupted within a division
for more than 30 minutes, or more than 20,000 customers are interrupted companywide for more
than 30 minutes. If the event affects less than the customer counts listed, the start time shall be
the earlier of the peak level of interruptions or start of utility restoration.

Peak Outage - Peak outage is the highest number of customers whose service was interrupted at
the same time.

Widespread Prolonged Outage - For an electric outage, an event in which service is interrupted to
at least 20,000 customers at the same time and having one or more customers who remain without
power for 72 hours or more due to utility-owned equipment unable to provide power.

Start of Restoration - The start of utility restoration is the point in time when field personnel are
able to be dispatched without unacceptable safety risks from continued severe weather conditions
(where adverse weather conditions are applicable) and when the potential additional damage to
the electric system from the storm would be low in proportion to the expected level of damage
already sustained. The start of the restoration period may be different for distinct areas where the
effect of a storm limits access to facilities (e.g., severe flooding).

Total Customers Affected - Customers that have been interrupted and restored one or more times
during the period are counted for each time they have been interrupted and restored. This amount
is an estimate based on data from the outage management system and is subject to change. This
number has the potential to exceed the total number of customers in the district, region, or division
impacted.

Customer Restoration - Customer restoration will be considered complete when for each
customer, service has been restored or service is available but would be unsafe to restore due to
damage with customer-owned equipment or a compromised structure (e.g., condemned).

Given the widespread nature of Winter Storm Elliott, all three upstate New York Divisions were impacted
by the event.

Key Data for Winter Storm Elliott


The timing or sequence of events associated with a typical storm is such that the severe weather will impact
an area over several hours and within 8 – 12 hours of being impacted by the storm and incurring physical
damage to the electric infrastructure serving customers, the utility can systematically move from “Start of
Event” to “Start of Restoration” in a reasonable amount of time.

In Winter Storm Elliott, “Start of Event” occurred early on December 23, 2022, and because of the extended
duration of dangerous blizzard conditions, “Start of Restoration” could not commence until mid-day on
Page 23 of 58
December 25, 2022. The fact that “Start of Restoration” occurred more than two days after the “Start of
Event” in the NY-West Division is unprecedented; however, given the access and mobility issues resulting
from the storm (e.g., no other form of emergency services or public works were able to move about the
area to provide essential or emergency services to the community for a similar period), it is clear that the
region was confronted with extraordinary circumstances.

The outage data and key “points in time” associated with Winter Storm Elliott are illustrated in the tables
below for New York State, each Division, and each Region:

Total Cust.
Affected Peak
New York State 202,659 61,388
Total Total Total
Cust. Affected Peak Cust. Affected Peak Cust. Affected Peak
NY-West 110,327 45,341 NY-Central 51,046 9,211 NY-East 41,286 9,500
Frontier 61,548 Northern 21,908 Capital 10,038
Southwest 20,499 Central 16,512 Capital West 12,929
Mohawk
Genesee 28,280 12,626 Northeast 18,319
Valley

Duration – Hours
Start of Final From From Start of
Start of Event Restoration Publication of ETR Restoration Start of Event Restoration
New York State 12/23 - 0425 12/23 - 1400 ETR Time 12/28 – 1648 132 hrs. 48 min. 122 hrs. 48 min.

NY-West 12/23 – 0920 12/25 – 1200 12/28 – 1648 127 hrs. 28 min. 76 hrs. 48 min.
Frontier 12/23 - 0920 12/25 - 1200 Regional 12/26/1900 12/28 - 1648 127 hrs. 28 min. 76 hrs. 48 min.
Southwest Local ETR 12/24 - 1100
12/23 - 0920 12/25 - 1200 12/26 – 07001 69 hrs. 40 min. 19 hrs.
Genesee Regional 12/25 - 1100
NY-Central 12/23 – 0425 12/23 – 1400 12/28 - 0242 118 hrs. 17 min. 108 hrs. 42 min.
Northern 12/23 – 0425 12/25 – 1300 Regional 12/25 - 1100 12/28 – 0242 118 hrs. 17 min. 61 hrs. 42 min.
Central Local ETR 12/24 - 0700
12/23 - 0425 12/23 – 1400 12/25 – 15002 58 hrs. 35 min. 49 hrs.
Mohawk Valley Local ETR 12/24 - 0700
NY-East 12/23 – 1430 12/24 – 0700 12/24/1900 28 hrs. 30 min. 12 hrs.
Capital Local ETR 12/24 - 0700
Capital West 12/23 - 1430 12/24 - 0700 Local ETR 12/24 - 0700 12/24/1900 28 hrs. 30 min. 12 hrs.
Northeast Local ETR 12/24 - 0700

Note
1 Final Restoration time used is from the 12/26 EORS Report when restoration was stated to be complete
2 Final Restoration time used is from the 12/24 EORS Report when restoration was stated to be complete

Page 24 of 58
Restoration Process - General
National Grid’s first priority when responding to a storm event is the safety of the public and the Company’s
personnel. The Company first works to mitigate electrical hazards – such as downed (and potentially
energized) wires and related electrical equipment that has been damaged – and make them safe. National
Grid also works to prioritize relief to first responders (police and fire department personnel) who are
guarding downed wires and electrical hazards.

The Company’s process to restore power after a major event is recognized as an industry standard and
best practice for utilities to optimize restoration time. Repairs are generally made in the order of the path
that electricity takes from the power plants to the customer. Company resources begin with transmission
and primary circuits that can affect a large number of customers. Then, and often times in parallel, crews
restore lateral distribution lines that can affect many customers; secondary distribution lines that affect
fewer customers; and, finally, service lines to individual customer homes.

Following an interruption of service or widespread prolonged outage, restoration priorities are established
with the intention of safely restoring power to the most customers in the shortest time possible. Outages
(or cases of trouble) can vary in terms of the number of customers associated with each outage or case of
trouble from thousands of customers to just one customer. By assigning resources to outages with the
highest number of customers first, restoration can progress efficiently and typically in an order of priority
that aligns with community priorities.

At the same time, the Company works to restore service to Critical Facilities such as hospitals, police
departments, firehouses, and other public health and safety facilities that are critical to the well-being of
the community on a priority basis, as warranted. When possible, and safe to do so - the actions connected
with these progressive steps of the restoration process are performed in parallel.

While the restoration process cannot guarantee or provide for priority restoration, National Grid conducts
specific outreach programs to Critical Facility Customers, LSE customers, and other customers with special
needs to help them prepare for power outages and remain informed of the Company’s response
throughout the event. These programs provide designated customers with an expanded level of
communication that includes pre-event notifications (for forecasted events) and daily outreach during the
Company’s response and restoration to help customers with continuity planning that they are responsible
for. That said, National Grid works with county and State Emergency Management Officials if there is a
need to shift the Company’s restoration priorities to important, emergent matters in an impacted
community.

It also is not uncommon for some customers to have their service restored while a storm is just beginning
and/or growing in intensity, or even when a storm is at its worst. Such service restorations may be the
result of the Company’s efforts to mitigate electrical hazards, or may be the result of switching in the
electrical system, which may enable the Company to serve customers from a variety of sources. When the
Company is working to mitigate electrical hazards, even during dangerous field conditions, the outcome
from cutting and clearing debris from the system, or automatically or manually switching circuits, can result
in interrupted customers having their service restored.

The restoration phase of a storm begins when resources are able to fully and safely carry-out all work
practices connected with the assessment and repair of damage to the electric system. This point in time is
typically aligned with the expiration of weather warnings or advisories coupled with the first light of day
Page 25 of 58
following a severe weather event. Once it is safe to deploy crews into the field, the decision of where to
dispatch resources first follows the restoration prioritization framework described above to make the area
safe and restore as many customers as possible as quickly as possible.

Winter Storm Elliott Restoration Process


The unprecedented intensity of blizzard conditions over an extended and uninterrupted period significantly
influenced the timing and restoration efforts associated with Winter Storm Elliott. A limited number of
National Grid personnel did deploy during the worst of the storm to mitigate hazardous conditions, and in
doing so were able to restore power to over 50,000 customers in the communities within Erie and Niagara
counties between the “Start of Event” and “Start of Restoration” (these terms are explained above). This
included selfless acts by crews who left their trucks when roads were impassable and carried ladders and
tools through several feet of snow and dangerous blizzard conditions to work locations. These actions
helped mitigate the impacts of the storm for many customers; however, as explained above, these discrete
actions should not be construed as part of what is commonly referred to as the restoration phase of the
storm.

Facility Damage
The damage from Winter Storm Elliott was generally consistent with expectations for a sustained high-
wind event with blizzard conditions. Damage was incurred primarily in the NY-West and NY-Central
Divisions, and consisted of down limbs and fallen trees, down wire, broken poles, and damaged
transformers. The NY-East Division was impacted with similar damage but to a lesser degree. A summary
of the damage incurred in the three upstate New York Divisions is noted in the following table:

NY-West Genesee Frontier Southwest Total


Broken Poles 52 82 14 148
Transformers 18 25 8 51

NY-Central Central Mohawk Valley Northern Total


Broken Poles 26 24 18 68
Transformers 8 10 16 34

NY-East Capital Capital West Northeast Total


Broken Poles 10 16 14 40
Transformers 6 3 8 17

No temporary facilities (i.e., portable sub-stations or generators) were required or used during
restoration.
Affected feeders by Region in the impacted Divisions where customer restoration exceeded 72 hours are
as follows:
Distribution
Number of Number of
Number of Transmission Sub-Trans.
Number of Affected Feeder Circuits Circuits
Region Outages Feeders Lockouts Impacted Impacted
Frontier 604 300 88 0 16
Genesee 289 76 10 1 2
Page 26 of 58
Southwest 186 59 11 0 3
Central 138 59 6 1 8
Mohawk
96 42 3 0 1
Valley
Northern 320 84 8 1 26

A listing of affected feeders can be found in Appendix 6.1.

Road Clearing
Winter Storm Elliott created significant access and mobility issues. The storm’s impact on the ability to
travel was not isolated to utilities. The unprecedented long duration blizzard conditions produced a snow-
pack that was essentially un-plowable by traditional snow removal equipment and required the use of
heavy equipment (front loaders) and dump trucks to clear enough of the roads to allow access for first
responders and utility equipment.

In the hardest hit areas of Western New York, specifically Erie County, which includes the City of Buffalo,
Winter Storm Elliott paralyzed the region from an access and mobility perspective during the storm and for
several days following. All forms of first responders – police, fire, emergency medical, department of public
works, the National Guard, and the utilities – were effectively unable to travel.

National Grid relied on the strength of relationships built over the years through regular coordination
meetings, training, and exercises with external local and State partners using the framework and
procedures outlined in the NY-ERP to establish a coordinated task force to assist with gaining access to
areas in Erie County and the City of Buffalo where the Company’s infrastructure was damaged. Working
directly with the State, Erie County, and City of Buffalo, the Company established a process to request snow
removal for specific areas where equipment damage occurred, inclusive of a route to get there. National
Grid also was provided access to several large front-end loaders from the New York State Department of
Transportation and the City of Buffalo to enable snow removal and clearing where traditional snow removal
equipment was inadequate.

The process developed in this event (that will be transferrable to future storms exhibiting similar
challenges) included the following actions:

Intake of road clearing request was able to be received in two different ways:
Preferred method - mark-up a feeder map showing what needed to be plowed to gain access to an area
which was then assigned and dispatched to heavy equipment operators; and
Phone calls/text message stating what needed to be plowed, which was then assigned and dispatched to
heavy equipment operators.

Log request for tracking purposes

 The log defined specific parameter about each request including which entity or agency was to
fulfill the request;
 Established accountability of plowing contractors;
 Status updates were provided hourly to the leadership / decision makers in the Emergency
Operation Center;

Page 27 of 58
 Completion of the work was tracked so utility resources could be dispatched to the areas
immediately once the snow removal was complete;
 Individual request numbers were created for each job for easy reference and tracking;
 Precise location and route were provided to minimize chance for confusion; and
 A system of “Zones” was developed for ease of dispatch and prioritization of areas.

Dispatch request to a single point of contact


 A standardized and concise format was developed to be used in a “text message” format for ease
of forwarding and tracking; and
 A system to highlight a street map was created for use on phones to avoid having to distribute
confidential feeder (circuit) maps of our system to outside entities.
 An additional benefit from the process was the availability of law enforcement support where
crew safety was a concern.
Dispatching of support was processed through National Grid’s point of contact at the Emergency
Operations Center via an e-mail and follow up by telephone call to ensure a timely response; and
New York State Troopers satisfied the request providing the appropriate support.

The road clearing process modified procedures developed from previous storm recommendations
involving road clearing activities and the establishment of task forces. By allowing for greater flexibility,
the process was successfully adapted to the road-clearing situation presented in this event and efficiently
implemented in a timely manner.

The average completion time of road clearing requests from time of dispatch is captured in the table
below. Details around all road clearing requests can be found in Appendix 6.2.

Plowing Requests 12/26/2022 12/27/2022 12/28/2022


Average completion time
174 Minutes 375 Minutes 319 Minutes
from time of dispatch

National Grid recommends that this topic be discussed at the next annual meeting between the liaison
teams and the county emergency management staff.
Restoration Priority; Substations
Consistent with the general restoration process described above, the Company prioritized resources to
restore power to the greatest number of customers most quickly. As a result, areas within the region with
the highest population density affected by the storm, including a substantial portion of the City of Buffalo,
were the early focus of restoration efforts. The Company also prioritized Critical Facilities and other
sensitive customers as appropriate or when asked to do so by State and county partners.
As described above, the access to impacted facilities was a major factor in the Company’s ability to restore
service, and the road clearing task force process was key to restoration efforts. In the first communication
to the task force, the Company stated that “Priority #1 is East Buffalo.” (Scorecard, App. 7, p. 131 of 225).
The Company then identified specific streets and locations in East Buffalo that needed to be plowed to
enable it to restore service to customers. Subsequent plowing priority requests, including street names
and locations, are included in Appendix 7, pp. 131-203, of the Scorecard filing. The plowing priority field
map developed for the road clearing task force process is provided in Appendix 6.3.

Page 28 of 58
The sustained blizzard conditions from Winter Storm Elliott also impacted some of the Company’s
substation facilities in unprecedent ways. National Grid has 43 indoor substations that are part of highly
interconnected underground cable electrical network serving customers in the City of Buffalo. The Buffalo
indoor substations are among the longest serving assets in the Company’s system, and National Grid has
been implementing a long-term refurbishment program for these facilities. Thirty of the substations have
been rebuilt so far, with the remaining 13 included in future capital investment plans. The substations
impacted by Winter Storm Elliott included already rebuilt facilities, as well as facilities that have not yet
been rebuilt.

Although much of the equipment for these stations is entirely enclosed in structures, some equipment
(e.g., transformers) is only partially enclosed for cooling purposes (this is the case for both the rebuilt
facilities and the older designs). In this event, when the long duration blizzard conditions, significant
snowfall, cold temperatures, wind-driven snow, and ice accumulated on and around the externally exposed
electrical equipment at four of the substations in the areas hit hardest by the storm, the electrical
protection equipment operated as designed. Specifically, the substations tripped (i.e., shut off) the local
equipment, as well as interconnected equipment at other substations, to avoid more significant damage
to the system. The Company’s control room personnel isolated and reconfigured the interconnected
network, restoring the non-tripped transformers/substations that were able to be restored to service
safely, leaving the four substations with significant snow and ice buildup out of service.

As with other restoration efforts in this storm, simply getting to


the impacted substations was extremely difficult. Once the
Company was able to get to the substations, they needed to be
dug out from the massive snow-packed drifts to return them to
service. Drifts caused by hurricane force wind packed snow that
was 12-15 feet in height at some of National Grid’s substations.
To return the substations to service, the accumulated snow and
ice on the exposed equipment had to be removed while the storm
was still raging.

National Grid used what are referred to as “concrete blankets” (special blankets or tarps that lock heat in
while keeping the cold out, used in construction to prevent water from freezing during the curing of
concrete) along with regular tarps and torpedo heaters (another device used in the construction industry
to provide temporary heat) to blow hot air into the impacted transformer bays to melt the ice and snow
from equipment. 
Once the ice and snow was melted, and the substation was deemed safe to reenergize, feeders were
restored to service systematically based on the amount of load present on the feeders to safely return
service to the impacted customers, while being careful not to overload or damage the equipment as it was
returned to normal operation. In total, just over 10,000 customers were affected by the substations that
were impacted by Winter Storm Elliott. The customers affected by these substation-related outages were
returned to service by 9:00 pm on December 25, 2022.

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Wellesley Island
In National Grid’s NY-Central Division, customer restoration exceeded 72 hours on Wellesley Island
because resources could not reach the island due to dangerous water conditions, which made transport of
resources and equipment to the island by barge unsafe. When the barge was able to travel, resources
were transported to the island, damaged infrastructure was repaired, and customers were restored in a
timely manner.

Other Restoration Information


The type of damage in this storm did not require the activation of the Company’s expedited inspection
procedures because customer equipment requiring repairs before their service could be reconnected was
minimal. National Grid was able to work closely with those customers that did sustain damage to their
equipment on a case-by-case basis to expedite the reconnection of their service.

The Company maximized the use of daylight when in the restoration phase, noting the hazards and safety
concerns associated with working at night. Night operations were generally covered by one person line
crews to make safe or repair when possible down wires and safety concerns. Two person line and tree
crews worked into the night on outages where completion was either imminent or necessary due to safety
concerns or deemed critical to the community.

Summary of Standard Shift Schedule for Responding Crews*


Transmission and Distribution Line Mechanics 06:00 to 23:00 daily
1st shift OPCs 06:00 to 23:00 daily
2nd and 3rd shift OPCs 13:00 to 06:00 daily
Forestry 06:00 to 23:00 daily
Wire Down Organization 06:00 to 23:00 daily
*Actual schedules for individual crews may vary depending on conditions, local plans, the jobs they are working on,
and or access and mobility issues associated with the particular circumstances.

The Company’s safety specialists and environmental personnel maintained a presence in the field by
conducting numerous field safety observations of Company, mutual assistance, and external contractor
crews. Consistent safety messaging, work practice expectations, and issue follow-up was coordinated
through the Branch Operations organization. Safety specialists provided material for daily safety briefings
that highlighted inherent hazards that individuals might encounter during the restoration process and
provided assistance and coordination for safety expectation briefings with foreign crews as they arrived.

Public safety information was provided by the Safety and Health organization to the Public Information
Coordinator for use in the materials published throughout the various communication channels.
Throughout the restoration process, National Grid maintained a strong community presence and outreach
with key stakeholders and customers. This included:

Contacting Critical Facility customers, LSE customers, and customers with special needs to check on their
status and provide updates as to ETRs.
 Automated customer calls to provide updates on the status of the restoration.
 Frequent press releases and participation in radio and TV interviews as requested.
 Embedding personnel at county Emergency Operation Centers as required.
 Updated the Company’s external website with important safety and storm updates.
Page 30 of 58
 Facilitated a total of nine Community Leader Conference Calls with key members of local
government, municipal, and other public officials.
 Updated the Company’s internal website to keep employees informed.
 Provided updates to customers through Facebook, Twitter, and other social media channels.
 Utilized the Company’s interactive text service and various social media tools.
 Distribution of dry ice and bottled water at various distribution locations in the impacted areas.

Page 31 of 58
7. ESTIMATED TIME OF RESTORATION (ETRS)
National Grid is committed to meeting the customer’s expectation for providing prompt and accurate ETRs
as soon as possible using the best information available at the time while responding to an emergency or
widespread prolonged outage. The Company follows the Estimated Time of Restoration Protocol set forth
in NY-ERP, Section 15.2.

National Grid utilizes information from the OMS, customer calls, information associated with 911 calls,
damage assessment surveys, and feedback from resources working in the field to best understand the
extent of the damage incurred to develop estimated restoration times that are as accurate as possible.
ETRs are then published through a variety of communication channels and are used by customers and
stakeholders for planning purposes.

Types of ETRs
ETRs are based on National Grid’s latest analysis of the data inputs around sustained damage and available
resources to reflect a general assessment of when the last customer in the specified area (Global, Regional,
Local) is expected to be returned to service. There are several types of ETRs that a customer will see during
the lifecycle of the storm response:

 Assessing – an ETR of Assessing is typically used at the onset of a severe weather event or impact
to an area that will require extensive restoration activities during the timeframe leading up to
publishing the initial ETR (i.e., the Global or Regional ETR). Thus, when the ETR is noted as
“Assessing,” an ETR is not available at that time.
 Global - Global ETRs may be used initially for outage events expected to last greater than 48 hours
for at least 90 percent of the affected customers. Global ETRs apply at the Division level. Once a
Regional ETR is published, the Global ETR shall no longer be referenced. National Grid did not
publish Global ETRs as we were able to accelerate the issuing of ETRs at the regional and Local
Levels ahead of the stated times listed in NY-ERP 15.2, Estimated Time of Restoration Protocol
 Regional – Regional ETRs are applicable to the National Grid Regional level which can be analogous
to the County’s served within that Region. National Grid published Regional ETRs for Frontier,
Genesee, and Northern ahead of the requirements states in the NY-ERP Section 15.2 to offer a
more granular view of restoration times.
 Local – Local ETRs are applicable to the National Grid District level which can be analogous to the
towns and cities within that District. National Grid did not publish Local ETRs as we bypassed the
provision of local ETRs and provided Ticket Level ETRs after Regional ETRs.
 Ticket – Ticket level ETRs are associated with the individual customer.

Given the severity of the forecast associated with Winter Storm Elliott, the Company decided very early in
the planning process that the restoration period for the anticipated impact from such a powerful storm
would be greater than 48 hours in duration for 90 percent of the affected customers. With this decision,
the timeline, and associated requirements of the ETR protocol for such an event was determined and
followed by National Grid, meeting or exceeding applicable milestones.

The ETR Protocol is activated when more than 5,000 customers are out of service in a Division or more
than 20,000 customers are out of service companywide for more than 30 minutes. Each of the three New
York Divisions met the criteria to initiate the ETR Protocol for which National Grid activated the Emergency

Page 32 of 58
Outage Reporting System (“EORS”). The Company submitted the first report to the Commission on
December 23, 2022, at 1900 hours. EORS reports are also referred to as four-hour reports.

The ETR Protocol establishes a specific set of activities that must be performed within a certain number of
hours from the “Start of Restoration.” Start of Restoration is explained in Section 6, above, and is the point
in time when field personnel are able to be dispatched without unacceptable safety risks from continued
severe weather conditions and when the potential additional damage to the electric system from the storm
would be low compared to the expected level of damage already sustained. The Start of Restoration is a
reference point to assess compliance of the utility against the time bound requirements associated with
the ETR Protocol used for the event. These include:

 Determining whether customer restoration for the event will be greater than or less than 48 hours
in duration for 90 percent of the affected customers. The utility has six hours from “Start of
Restoration” to do this. National Grid made this determination early as part of the advance
planning, pre-event activities.

 12 hours from “Start of Restoration” the Company must provide:


o Department of Public Service (“DPS”) Staff and the public with any available regional/county
ETRs and any available local/town or municipal ETRs. Update customer representatives,
Interactive Voice Response (“IVR”) systems, and websites.
o Issue a press release that includes known ETRs for the next upcoming news cycle.
o Communicate with affected municipal and elected officials. This communication may or may
not be by way of a municipal conference call.

 18 hours from the “Start of Restoration” the Company must provide:


o DPS Staff and the public remaining regional/county ETRs. Update customer representatives,
IVR systems, and websites.
o Provide DPS Staff and the public with any additional local/town or municipal ETRs. Update
customer representatives, IVR systems, and websites.

The ETR Protocol tables within NY-ERP, Section 15.2 include a complete list of all time bound requirements.

The ETR Protocol is structured to enable the utility to conduct the activities needed to provide customers
with the most accurate information available at that particular time. While the term “Start of Restoration”
may create confusion when looking at where this “point in time” lands on the outage / restoration curve,
it is the point of reference for all time bound requirements associated with the ETR Protocol. Requiring
utilities to develop and communicate ETRs pursuant to the ETR Protocol provides for a consistent,
repeatable, and sustainable process that is widely understood and accepted by the utility, the regulator,
State and County Emergency Management officials, and key stakeholders, and enables utilities going into
an emergency to know what to expect in terms of timing around the publishing and communication of
ETRs. The ETR Protocol process to enables utilities to assemble the best information available at the time
to provide the most accurate estimate as to when service will be restored.

Page 33 of 58
The following table illustrates defining points in time associated with our response and ETR information.

Publication of ETR
Start of Published Actual3
Location Start of Event Restoration ETR Time ETR Restoration Time
NY-West 12/23 – 0920 12/25 – 1200 N/A2 N/A2 N/A2 N/A2

Frontier 12/23 – 0920 12/25 - 1200 Regional 12/26 - 1900 12/28 – 23:30 12/27 - 12:00
Southwest Local ETR 12/24 - 11001 Ticket N/A1
12/23 – 0920 12/25 - 1200
Genesee Regional 12/25 - 1100 12/26 - 23:30 12/26 - 07:00
NY-Central 12/23 – 0425 12/23 – 1400 N/A2 N/A2 N/A2 N/A2

Northern 12/23 – 0425 12/25 – 1300 Regional 12/25 - 1100 12/25 - 23:30 12/25 - 12:00
Central Local ETR 12/24 - 07001 Ticket N/A1
12/23 – 0425 12/23 – 1400
Mohawk Valley Local ETR 12/24 - 07001 Ticket N/A1
NY-East 12/23 – 1430 12/24 – 0700 N/A2 N/A2 N/A2 N/A2

Capital Local ETR 12/24 - 07001

Capital West 12/23 - 1430 12/24 - 0700 Local ETR 12/24 - 07001 Ticket N/A1

Northeast Local ETR 12/24 - 07001

Note
1 ETRs first published at the ticket level (or individual customer level)
2 National Grid skipped the publishing of a Global ETR, advancing more granular information in the
form of the Regional or Local / Ticket Level ETR
3 Actual Applies to 90% of Affected Customers (Global), 95% of Affected Customers (Regional / Local)

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8. COMMUNICATIONS
The need to communicate with customers, the general public, news media and local officials is critically
important during emergency conditions. During an extended power outage, National Grid recognizes that
customers without lights or heat can become frustrated and expect restoration within a few hours after
calling the Company. Unfortunately, this cannot always be accomplished, often due to widespread damage
to the electric system. When impacted by a severe weather event, large numbers of customers may be
without service for many hours or even days before restoration. In addition to system damage resulting in
the interruption of service to customers, Winter Storm Elliott brought an unmatched combination of snow,
wind, and cold temperatures that paralyzed the region for days.

It is important, therefore, to provide timely and accurate information pertaining to the Company’s
restoration efforts as soon and as widely as possible. The Emergency Response Organization must
communicate effectively both internally and externally to maintain a continuity of messaging to the general
public, news media and local officials. To the greatest extent possible, National Grid provided extensive
information across a wide variety of traditional and digital channels leading up to and during our response
to Winter Storm Elliott with accurate messaging timed to coincide, when possible, with local news cycles.

Activities taken to communicate with public, municipal and government offices

The Company’s Branch Liaison, Public Information, and Contact Center teams initiated a broad set of
outreach activities to establish contact with the state and local department of emergency services, Critical
Facility customers, LSE customers, and key local and elected officials to communicate the Company’s plans
for the event.

Information exchanged on a regular basis with local officials included a summary of customers interrupted,
customers restored, total customers affected, crewing information on site and en-route, planned crew
relocation and mutual assistance activity, discussion of major damage, ETRs, summaries of work plans for
restoring customers, listing of Critical Facility and LSE customers affected, and a summary of dry ice/bottled
water distribution activities.

Community Leader Conference Calls

Consistent with Section 18.5 of the NY-ERP, the Company held daily Community Leader Conference Calls
until more than 90 percent of the total affected customers were restored. In addition to the Community
Leader Conference Calls, communication and coordination efforts were maintained throughout the event
with county and municipal officials that included community liaisons making individual calls to county and
municipal officials to provide responses to requests by phone, text message, email, and general
informational e-mail communications. Each county was assigned a dedicated Community Liaison with local
knowledge of the area that they were supporting.

The Community Leader Conference Calls conducted leading up to and during the preparation and response
to Winter Storm Elliott are listed in the table below by Division and date performed.

Page 35 of 58
Community Leader Conference Calls
Division Date
West 12/22/2022 (Pre-Event Call)
West 12/23/2022
West 12/24/2022
West 12/25/2022
West 12/26/2022
West 12/27/2022
Central 12/22/2022 (Pre-Event Call)
Central 12/24/2022
East 12/22/2022 (Pre-Event Call)

The Company took questions at the end of each call and responded accordingly. National Grid liaisons
were available to all county emergency operations personnel and subsequently to other utilities and/or
municipal departments of public works and their agencies for communication and coordination as
required.

Interaction with Emergency Management Offices

As part of the Company’s outreach and communication efforts, every county Emergency Manager in the
affected areas was proactively contacted during the planning and preparation phase of the event. During
the event, Community liaisons worked with county Emergency Management officials either physically
located in the county Emergency Operations Center (“EOC”) or virtually to address road closures, critical
infrastructure outages, and any issues of concern to counties. Community liaisons conducted proactive
outreach to counties by sharing updates that included press releases, number of outages by town in their
counties, and ETRs.

Monroe County requested National Grid to physically locate a community liaison at their EOC on Friday,
December 23, 2022, and Saturday, December 24, 2022, from 8:00 AM – 6:00 PM. A National Grid
community liaison was present at the facility both days to provide communication and coordination.

Erie County requested National Grid to physically locate a community liaison at the EOC beginning Sunday,
December 25, at 7:00 PM. National Grid maintained a 24-hour presence until Wednesday, December 28,
at 11:00 PM. The primary role of the community liaison was to provide a point of contact for coordination
of snowplowing and road clearing in cooperation with the New York State Police and New York State
Department of Transportation.

The snowplowing / road clearing procedures were initiated to allow road clearing to take priority in areas
where National Grid needed access to areas within the communities to repair damage to our infrastructure.
This is discussed more in Section 6, above. No other counties in the NY-West Division opened their EOCs.
Additionally, no counties in NY-Central or NY-East opened their EOCs.

Traditional and Social Media Activity

The Company has worked over the years to enhance its customer communication channels and is
continuously evaluating new opportunities to advance the effectiveness and value of our messaging efforts
to keep our customers informed. Currently, the Company is utilizing the following media to communicate
with customers.
Page 36 of 58
 Automated text alerts
 Website Outage Map for outage reporting
 Website banners
 Storm-related website pages
 Facebook
 Twitter
 Email Notifications
 Press Releases
 News interviews

Leading up to and throughout National Grid’s response, the Company took immediate action with all media
platforms to ensure customers and community leadership were aware of how the Company was preparing
for and responding to this event. Overall, these initial actions set the stage for effective communications
throughout the event. As described later in this report, National Grid maintained regular contact
throughout the outage restoration process with local municipal officials, including mayors and town
supervisors.

National Grid’s comprehensive outreach efforts are designed to utilize traditional and social media
platforms to keep customers informed of restoration progress, ETRs, and how to contact the Company to
report an outage or any unsafe conditions in the field. This strategy is depicted in the summary information
provided below.

Table 10 –Media Activities

From Thursday, December 22 to December 28, National Grid wrote, circulated, and
distributed 11 press releases. Focus included details on safety messages, how customers
can connect to National Grid, field force status, the emergency response plan, updates on
storm damage in hardest-hit areas, priorities, dry ice locations and ETRs. Press releases were
posted on the Company’s website and were distributed within National Grid and to key
News Releases external stakeholders. The releases were made available to digital communications for use
in social media and web updates, email and text messages; to the Customer & Community
Engagement team for outreach to additional key stakeholders & customers; and to the
customer contact center to be used as an IVR update and talking points for representatives.
In addition to the above, our final four storm press releases highlighted the claims process
for eligible customers.

Published messages to employee communications channels based on messages from the


Company's news releases. The posts included safety messages, news releases, and photos
Key Internal Messages from work sites. They provided detail on storm damage, restoration efforts and progress.
Press releases were also shared with all employees tasked with stakeholder outreach
responsibilities; key messages were provided to contact center reps.

Media representatives were always available for in-person, taped and telephone interviews,
before, during and after the storm. This included at least 72 media interviews featuring a
Media Availability
National Grid spokesperson. The media team also identified crew locations for television
interviews, newspaper photography, web/social media content.

Page 37 of 58
Repurposed key messages from press releases and approved internal communications to
provide consistent updates on restoration progress, photos of storm damage, localized
restoration efforts and information about how power is restored. The focus was on
Social Media customer safety, restoration progress, assistance with locating individual estimated
restoration times and customer responsiveness. The Company used Twitter and Facebook
to share these key updates. In addition, the Company highlighted dry-ice locations.
Following restoration, the Company shared thank you messaging via all social channels.

A customer email was distributed on Thursday, December 22 to upstate New York


customers - alerting them of the incoming storm. The email included information on
National Grid's storm response, electric and gas safety reminders, how to report outages
and how to stay connected during the event. Links were given for outage reporting via the
E-mail mobile website, and the Company promoted the option for customers to receive
restoration updates by email, phone and/or text. Separately on Tuesday, December 27, the
Company sent two emails, one for Western New York and one for Northern New York, to
update customers on the Company’s storm response, safety reminders and highlighting the
claims process for eligible customers.

Upstate New York customers who are registered to receive emergency broadcast alerts
Text Messages received a storm preparation and safety text message starting on Thursday, December 22.

Web Messaging The Company transitioned the upstate New York website to "storm mode" on Thursday,
December 22 in anticipation of the forecasted weather event. Throughout the storm and
restoration process, National Grid updated web banners, which appear on all pages of the
National Grid upstate New York website, with the latest information from press releases.
The banners included links to news releases, restoration progress, outage reporting tools,
outage map, dry-ice locations and the claims process. Web banners were updated at least
every 4 hours daily from 7am through 11pm. The Outage Central map, updated every 15
minutes, showed when crews were assigned to an outage, available ETRs by county and
town, dry ice and warming shelter locations.

Summary of Press Release Activity

Below is a summary of the Company’s storm-related press release activity. In addition, all press releases
were distributed to key internal personnel with functions responsible for customer, community, municipal
and media contact.
Date Subject
December 22, National Grid Increases Staffing, Stages Crews Across Upstate New York in Anticipation of High Winds,
2022 Heavy Snow, Ice Buildup through Holiday Weekend

December 24, National Grid Restores Power to Most Eastern New York Customers Impacted by Severe Wind, Rain,
2022 Ice Storm

December 24, Western New York: National Grid Crews Battling Blizzard, Treacherous Conditions as they Work to
2022 Restore Service to Affected Customers

Page 38 of 58
December 24, National Grid Crews Battling Blizzard, Treacherous Conditions as they Work to Restore Service to
2022 Affected Customers in Northern NY

December 25, National Grid Restores Power to 99% of Central and Northern New York Customers Impacted by Multi-
2022 Day Blizzard

December 25, National Grid Restores Power to 95 Percent of Eastern New York Customers Impacted by Damaging
2022 Storm

December 26, National Grid Continues to Partner with Multi-Agency Coalition to Prioritize Road Clearance, Gain
2022 Access for Power Restoration in Western New York

December 26, National Grid Restores Power to 93,600 Western New York Customers Impacted by Historic Blizzard;
2022 Crews Will Continue to Work Around the Clock Until Every Customer has Service; Company announces
claims process for spoiled food and medication due to power loss

December 27, National Grid Crews Work to Restore Final Northern New York Customers Affected by Blizzard;
2022 Company announces claims process for spoiled food and medication due to power loss

December 27, 98% of Western NY Customers Have Service Restored After Historic Blizzard; claims process for spoiled
2022 food and medication due to power loss

December 28, National Grid to Restore Power Today to all Western New York Customers Impacted by Historic
2022 Blizzard; claims process for spoiled food and medication due to power loss

Page 39 of 58
Distribution & Links
https://www.nationalgridus.com/News/2022/12/National-Grid-Increases-Staffing,-Stages-Crews-Across-Upstate-New-
York-in-Anticipation-of-High-Winds,-Heavy-Snow,-Ice-Buildup-through-Holiday-Weekend
https://www.nationalgridus.com/News/2022/12/National-Grid-Restores-Power-to-Most-Eastern-New-York-Customers-
Impacted-by-Severe-Wind,-Rain,-Ice-Storm
https://www.nationalgridus.com/News/2022/Western-New-York-National-Grid-Crews-Battling-Blizzard,-Treacherous-
Conditions-as-they-Work-to-Restore-Service-to-Affected-Customers-
https://www.nationalgridus.com/News/2022/12/National-Grid-Crews-Battling-Blizzard,-Treacherous-Conditions-as-they-
Work-to-Restore-Service-to-Affected-Customers-in-Northern-NY
https://www.nationalgridus.com/News/National-Grid-Partnering-with-Multi-Agency-Coalition-to-Prioritize-Road-
Clearance,-Facilitate-Power-Restoration-in-Western-New-York
https://www.nationalgridus.com/News/National-Grid-Partnering-with-Multi-Agency-Coalition-to-Prioritize-Road-
Clearance,-Facilitate-Power-Restoration-in-Western-New-York
https://www.nationalgridus.com/News/National-Grid-Continues-to-Partner-with-Multi-Agency-Coalition-to-Prioritize-
Road-Clearance,-Gain-Access-for-Power-Restoration-in-Western-New-York
https://www.nationalgridus.com/News/2022/12/National-Grid-Restores-Power-to-93,600-Western-New-York-Customers-
Impacted-by-Historic-Blizzard-Crews-Will-Continue-to-Work-Around-the-Clock-Until-Every-Customer-has-Service-
https://www.nationalgridus.com/News/2022/12/National-Grid-Crews-Work-to-Restore-Final-Northern-New-York-
Customers-Affected-by-Blizzard
https://www.nationalgridus.com/News/2022/12/98-of-WNY-Customers-Have-Service-Restored-After-Historic-Blizzard-
https://www.nationalgridus.com/News/2022/12/National-Grid-to-Restore-Power-Today-to-all-Western-New-York-
Customers-Impacted-by-Historic-Blizzard-

Summary of Traditional Media Activity/Interviews

41 Western New York Media Interviews


Date Media Outlet Reporter Topic
WNY New Now Alyssa Wright Storm prep
WIVB TV Hope Winter Storm prep
12/20/2022
WKBW TV James Kattato Storm prep
Buffalo News Matt Glynn Storm prep
WIVB TV Jackie Walker Storm prep
WBEN-AM Max Farey Storm prep
12/21/2022
WIVB TV Jeff Preval Storm prep
WGRZ-TV Kelly Dudzik Storm prep
WKBW-TV Tim Wenger Storm prep
WIVB-TV – Live Interview Kristen MiIrand Storm prep
12/22/2022 WIVB-TV – Live Interview Various Storm prep
The Batavian.com Jaurdyn Johnson Storm - restoration progress
WGRZ-TV Jeff Preval Storm - restoration progress
WKBW-TV Chris Horvatits Storm prep
WIVB-TV – Live Interview Joanne Beck Outages/ETR/restoration progress
12/23/2022 WIVB-TV – Live Interview Brynne Deppas Outages/Buffalo Mayor media event
TheBatavian.com Abby Fridmann Outages - restoration progress
WGRZ-TV Susan Wenger Outages - restoration progress
WIVB-TV – Live Interview Nicholas Lippa Outages - restoration progress
12/24/2022 WBEN-AM – Live Interview Abby Fridmann Outages - restoration progress
Spectrum Susan Wenger Outages - restoration progress
WIVB-TV – Live Interview Maki Becker Outages - restoration progress
12/25/2022
WBEN-AM – Live Interview Dan Gilbert Outages - restoration progress
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Buffalo News Brian Quinn Outages - restoration progress
Washington Post Morgan Scott Outages - restoration progress
Batavia Daily News Joe Goldstein Outages - restoration progress
WSTM - Syracuse Brian Quinn Outages - restoration progress
NY Times Michael Benny Outages - restoration progress
Batavia Daily News Kevin Hayes Outages - restoration progress
12/26/2022
WUTV Fox 29 – Live Interview Brian Quinn Outages - restoration progress
Spectrum News Abby Fridmann Outages - restoration progress
Batavia Daily News Jacob Tierney Our prep/outside crews brought in
WIVB-TV – Live Interview Dave Greber Outages - restoration progress
Buffalo Business First Filmed footage of crew/bucket truck
Harry Scull - Louisiana St.
12/27/2022
WUTV Fox 29 – Live Interview Photographer Field crew interview - Sobieski St.
Buffalo News Jonathan Epstein Outages – restoration
progress/substation details
Spectrum News Rudy and Ken - restoration nearly
Dave Greber complete
Buffalo News Harry Scull Field crew interview - Sobieski St.
WIVB-TV – Live Interview Restoration/new claims PSL 73
12/28/2022
Kate Welshofer process
Buffalo News Scott May Field crew interview - Sobieski St.
WGRZ-TV – Live Interview Susan Wenger Restoration - complete
WGRZ-TV Kelly Dudzik PSL 73 process
12/29/2022 WBEN-AM – Live Interview Alyssa Wright Storm prep
1/5/2023 WGRZ-TV Hope Winter Storm prep

24 Central New York Media Interviews


Date Media Outlet Reporter Topic
CNY Central Sean Carroll (ND) Storm prep (proactive outreach)
Spectrum Local News Andrew
Henderson/Matthew
Storm prep (proactive outreach)
Nerber (assignment
12/21/2022 desk)
Syracuse.com Steve Billmyer (ME) Storm prep (proactive outreach)
WKTV-TV Newsroom Storm prep (proactive outreach)
WSYR-TV James Campagna (ND) Storm prep (proactive outreach)
WWNY-TV Jeff Cole (ND) Storm prep (proactive outreach)
CNY Central Katelyn McCarthy Storm prep
Plattsburgh Press-Republican Joe LoTemplio Storm prep
Spectrum Local News – Live Interview Julie Chapman Storm prep
Spectrum Local News Andrew Henderson
Storm prep
(assignment desk)
12/22/2022
Urban CNY Ken Jackson Storm prep
WKTV-TV Katrina Smith Storm prep
WKTV-TV Earl Hall (photog) Storm prep
WSYR-TV Callihan Marshall Storm prep
WWNY-TV Chad Charette Storm prep
WSYR-TV – Live Interview (AM) Nicole Somavilla Storm prep
12/23/2022 WSYR-TV – Live Interview (PM) Jeff Kulikowsky Storm response
Spectrum Local News – Live Interview David Tunis-Garcia (EP) Storm prep

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WSYR-TV Andrew Donovan Storm response
12/24/2022 WWNY-TV Lexi Bruening
NNY dry ice details
(assignment editor)
12/25/2022 Spectrum News Jeff Goldberg NNY restoration update
CNY Central Sean Carroll (ND) Outages/restoration
12/26/2022
Spectrum News Andrew Henderson NNY restoration update
12/27/2022 WVNY/WFFF TV Michael Miller NNY restoration update/PSL 73

6 Eastern New York Media Interviews


Date Media Outlet Reporter Topic
Albany Times Union Larry Rulison Storm Prep
WNYT NBC 13 Stella Porter Storm Prep
12/22/2022 Spectrum News Patrick Tine Storm Prep
CBS 6 Camera Operator Storm Prep
WTEN ABC/Fox Matt Ryan Storm Prep
WNYT NBC 13 Sarah Darmanjian Storm response
12/23/2022
WTEN ABC/Fox Mikaela Singleton ENY Crew Interview

Summary of Social Media Activity

Consistent with Section 17 of the NY-ERP, the National Grid Public Information team issued key messages
in press releases and approved internal communications to provide consistent updates on restoration
progress, photos of storm damage, localized restoration efforts and FAQs about how power is restored.
The focus was on customer safety, restoration progress, assistance with locating individual ETRs and
customer responsiveness. The Company utilized Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook to share these key
updates until all customers were restored. The Company also highlighted dry-ice and bottled water
distribution locations and their hours of operation. Examples of National Grid’s Social Media Activity are
illustrated in the following pages:

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See Appendix 8.1 for more of the Company’s social media communications.

Summary of Broadcast E-mail Activity

Date Target Audience Total Sent Message(s)


12/22/2022 UNY 867,971 Message included storm preparation, gas and electric
safety tips, how to stay connected, how to report/check
outages
12/27/2022 WNY 272,726 Storm update from Chief Customer Officer (“CCO”), how
to report/check outages and info on food/Rx
reimbursement, where to find latest storm updates
12/27/2022 NNY 64,805 Storm update from CCO, how to report/check outages
and info on food/Rx reimbursement, where to find
latest storm updates

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Summary of Text Messaging

Broadcast Text Messages


Date Target Audience Total Sent Message(s)
12/22/2022 All of UNY- 753,098 NGRID: Our increased staffing is prepared
Eastern Division: Capital -Albany, for the damaging storm expected tonight
Schenectady, Rensselaer, Columbia into Saturday. Stay informed:
Northeast - Schoharie, Montgomery, ngrid.com.connect Reply STOP to
Fulton, Warren, Washington, unsubscribe.
Saratoga, Essex, Hamilton
Central Division: Central –
Onondaga, Oswego, Cortland,
Madison, Cayuga Mohawk Valley –
Oneida, Herkimer, Hamilton Northern
– Lewis, Jefferson, St. Lawrence,
Franklin, Clinton
Western Division: Southwestern –
Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Allegany,
Erie (parts of) Genesee – Orleans,
Genesee, Wyoming, Livingston,
Niagara, Monroe, Ontario Frontier –
Erie and Niagara (parts of)

Proactive Automated Text Messages Sent


Date Target Audience Total Sent Message(s)
12/23/2022 UNY - counties listed above 133,318 Power out, ETR update, power restoration texts
12/24/2022 UNY - counties listed above 28,555 Power out, ETR update, power restoration texts
12/25/2022 UNY - counties listed above 26,310 Power out, ETR update, power restoration texts
12/26/2022 UNY - counties listed above 23,183 Power out, ETR update, power restoration texts
12/27/2022 UNY - counties listed above 12,808 Power out, ETR update, power restoration texts
12/28/2022 UNY - counties listed above 8,614 Power out, ETR update, power restoration texts

Example of Broadcast Text Messages sent out

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Web/Mobile Communications
Example of storm homepage enabled on residential website 12/22/2022 at 10:00 AM.

Additional information can be found in Appendix 8.1.

Page 45 of 58
Web/Mobile Communications Cont.

Based upon a review of National Grid's website availability log, from Wednesday, December 21, 2022,
through restoration, the Company’s website experienced no known issues that prevented it from being
available around the clock during the storm event. Throughout the storm and during the restoration
process, National Grid updated its web banners, which appear on all pages of its website, with the latest
information from press releases.

The banners included links to news releases, restoration progress, outage reporting tools, outage map, and
phone numbers. Web banners were updated every 3-4 hours daily from 7am through 11pm. The Outage
Central map was updated every 15 minutes and showed when crews were assigned to an outage, outage
start times and ETRs by county and town. An outage summary table was also available so customers could
view status of their county/town/area in a table format - this also was updated every 15 minutes. The
National Grid mobile app also received continuous updates of outage information if customers chose that
digital method to receive updates.

The website included all the required baseline restoration information:


 Safety Tips
 Geographic areas impacted
 Number of customers out of service
 Number of crews activated
 How to report an outage
 How to check on an outage
 Estimated times of restoration
 Location and times for dry ice and water distribution
 How to contact the Company (phone, web, e-mail, social media, text messaging, etc.)
 Outage map that is updated every 15-minutes with system outages
 All press releases posted to the National Grid website

A collection of the Company’s communications and associated material is provided in Appendix 8.1. In
addition to the communications efforts from the Company’s Public Information group, there was extensive
messaging and communication that emanated from the Contact Center. Outgoing messages for customers
contacting National Grid were updated within two hours following communication release, and the new
messages coincided with information contained in the releases as noted below. Additionally, messages
were updated no less than every 8 hours with date and time stamps to ensure customers were aware of
the timeliness of the messages they were hearing.

National Grid Outgoing Messages – Press Release / IVR Updates


Date Press Release Time IVR Update
12/22 10:00 10:02
12/24 16:45 16:46
12/25 18:45 18:59
12/26 11:59 12:00
12/26 19:50 19:46
12/27 10:19 10:47
12/27 19:45 19:46
12/28 16:30 16:31
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Call Answer Performance

Winter Storm Elliott – Call Answer Rate


Calls answered Percentage of calls
Date Total Calls within 90 seconds answered within 90 seconds
12/23/22 5,481 5,196 94.80%
12/24/22 3,504 3,210 91.61%
12/25/22 2,195 2,158 98.31%
12/26/22 1,393 1,390 99.78%
12/27/22 690 689 99.86%
12/28/22 469 469 100%
Total 13,732 13,112 95.48%
 NOTE 1: Data represent only storm calls answered by a live representative and do not include any calls managed through
the IVR.
 NOTE 2: Live call answering was staffed with internal resources.

The Contact Center maintained appropriate staffing throughout the course of National Grid’s planning and
preparation and response to the event.

There are many variables that drive staffing level decisions during an emergency response such as the call
answer rate, number of customers affected, and calls in queue. To respond to these variables, the Contact
Center has the following resources available to assist in matching staffing to call volume:
 Primary Contact Center Staff;
 Home Agents;
 Other departments within National Grid;
 Third party vendor assistance;
 The ability to transfer calls to the National Grid Contact Center in Massachusetts;
 National Grid’s contracted IVR application that automatically initiates support as a function of
wait time allowing time to activate home agents and internal back-up strategies to meet
demand; and
 Location specific messaging to help manage queue.

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Dry-Ice Distribution, bottled water, and other humanitarian efforts

Consistent with the Section 18.10 of the NY-ERP, the weather forecast indicated that the anticipated effects
from the event were likely to result in a restoration period exceeding 48 hours for 90 percent of the
affected customers, therefore the Company proceeded with initiating the activation and implementation
of the dry-ice and bottled water procedures. The Company’s Branch Liaison coordinator initiated a broad
set of outreach activities to establish contact with county Emergency Management Officials to coordinate
locations for the opening of dry ice and bottled water distribution sites.

Two dry-ice distribution sites were stood up for this event within the first 12 hours of restoration activities,
where dry ice and bottled water was ready for distribution to customers during the course of three days.
The distribution site locations and hours of operations were made public by incorporating this information
into the Company’s website, mobile application, press releases and social media outlets.

Dry ice and bottled water distribution sites were activated in the West and Central Divisions as follows:

# of Customer
Date Division Location/Times Assisted
Watertown CitiBus Garage - 544 Newell St,
Central 1
Watertown Hours of Operation 11am-3pm
12/25/2022
National Grid had opened a bottled water and Dry-Ice distribution location in NY-Central
(Northern Region) which closed due to the progress of restoration in that area

# of Customer
Date Division Location/Times Assisted
City of Niagara Falls Fire Department Fire Station located at
12/26/2022 West 0
320 Hyde Park Blvd - Hours of operation 12:00pm –4:00pm
City of Niagara Falls Fire Department Fire Station located at
12/27/2022 West 0
320 Hyde Park Blvd - Hours of operation 12:00pm –4:00pm
Total – 1
Customer
utilized the Dry
12/28/2022 Concluded Concluded for event ice & Bottled
Water
Distribution
location.

National Grid opened a bottled water and dry-ice distribution center in NY-West on December 26 closest
to the impacted areas where the most customers were affected, taking into consideration unplowed roads
and driving bans so as not to put customers or employees at risk when staffing the center or traveling to
it.

National Grid did not run out of, or fall short on any of the supplies associated with the process. In total,
one customer visited the Dry-Ice and Bottled Water Distribution facilities in each of the NY-Central and NY-
West Divisions.

Following the storm, National Grid committed $500,000 to support the people of Western New York in
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their recovery from this historic weather event. The funding, which was provided by the Company’s
shareholders, went to regional charitable organizations offering programs that directly benefited those
impacted by the storm, as well as organizations supporting community resilience for future emergencies.
The Company also provided customer bill credits and expeditiously processed reimbursement applications
from customer who experienced extended outages because of the storm, as generally outlined in PSL §73.
In addition to National Grid’s communication and coordination efforts, all regulatory reporting was
provided to DPS Staff in accordance with requirements associated with the ETR Protocol described in
Section 15.2 of the NY-ERP. The reports can be found in Appendix 8.2.

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9. CRITICAL CUSTOMER/LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT CUSTOMERS (LSE)/CRITICAL FACILITIES
Critical Facilities are defined as those facilities from which essential services, functions for the continuation
of public health and safety, and disaster recovery are performed or provided such as hospitals, water
plants, and fire stations. Critical Facility Levels were used as a guide in the development and execution of
the restoration plan and related priority rankings consistent with the restoration priorities in the NY-ERP;
however, such categorization does not require or guarantee priority restoration.

Consistent with Section 17.3 of the NY-ERP, National Grid will provide advance notice of an impending
storm or storm-like electric emergency that is likely to result in a restoration period that exceeds 48 hours
for 90 percent of the applicable customers, which allows for the opportunity to raise awareness of the
potential for interruption of service to Critical Facilities. The Liaison Coordination team contacts the Critical
Facilities prior to the event as directed by the Branch Director / Branch Liaison Coordinator. National Grid
made outbound (pre-recorded) calls to provide advance notice to all Critical Facility customers in National
Grid’s three upstate New York Divisions that the anticipated storm was expected to result in a restoration
period that could exceed 48 hours for at least 90 percent of the affected customers. The intent of the pre-
event outreach is to raise awareness of the potential for interruption of service, which will help Critical
Facilities prepare for the chance of an extended power interruption that could affect them.

These calls included providing Critical Facility customers with a Company contact, information around the
Company’s planning and preparation activities, including, safety tips associated with downed wires,
potential storm impact for the areas expected to be impacted, how to report an outage and check outage
status, where to find ETRs, and information about the outage central web site to view storm status and
updates. Channels of communication used to provide advance notice included automated calls, direct
calls, or e-mail.

National Grid Community Liaisons conducted such outreach to Tier I, II, and III critical facility customers
beginning Thursday, December 22, 2022. The Company also initiated a daily attempt to contact Critical
Facility customers that had experienced an interruption of service and had not been restored utilizing
automated calls, direct calls, or e-mail throughout the duration of our response. These contacts were made
daily regardless of the tier.

A listing of all Critical Facility customers is maintained by National Grid, which is organized based on the
type and purpose of the facility. As referenced in Section 17.3 of the NY-ERP:

Critical Facility Level 1:


Those facilities critical to public health and safety. These include:
a). Hospitals and Emergency Medical Facilities
b). Emergency Shelters and Cooling Centers
c). Fire, Police, Paramedics, and Rescue Facilities
d). Emergency Management Offices
e). Water and Wastewater
f). Critical Utility and Communications Facilities
g). Fuel Transfer and Fuel Loading Facilities (ports)

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h). Mass Transit (tunnels, bridges, ferry terminals, major rail facilities)
i). Airports
j). Military Bases
k). Critical Flood Control Structures

Critical Facility Level 2:


May include some of the same types of facilities described for Level 1 depending on the event type.
These facilities provide significant public services but are considered to some extent less critical by
government agencies. These include:
a). Nursing Homes and Dialysis Centers
b). Facilities to support other critical government functions
c). Prisons and Correctional Facilities
d). Communications (radio, TV, etc.)

Critical Facility Level 3:


Facilities provide public services but are considered to some extent less critical than Level 2 by
government agencies. These include:
a). Event Specific Concerns
b). High-Rise Residential Buildings
c). Customers providing key products and services (food warehouse)
d). Managed Accounts, Large Employers, and Other Key Customers
e). Other Government Buildings, Schools, and Colleges
f). Residential developments with large elderly populations or other similarly vulnerable
establishments

Beginning Thursday, December 22, 2022, and running through Tuesday, December 27, 2022, National Grid
utilized an automated phone messaging system to conduct Critical Facility customer outreach and
notifications. All Critical Facility customers, regardless of Level designation, were contacted by National
Grid until the end of restoration activity. The details of the first call initiating the daily notifications can be
referenced below along with the script used in the message. Scripts were tailored to each Division; the
example below was for the NY-Central Division:

Hello. This is a message from National Grid. Today is Thursday, Dec. 22, 2022. The weather forecast for
portions of Central and Northern New York and the Mohawk Valley beginning Friday, Dec. 23 includes
the possibility of severe wind gusts, snow, and ice. In preparation for potential power outages National
Grid has engaged storm response personnel, is adding supplement crew resources, and is extending
crew coverage hours. The Company will continue to closely monitor the weather, and has activated
its comprehensive emergency response plan, including:
 Securing extra resources and mobilizing crews.
 Proactively reaching out to elected, municipal and emergency management officials to keep them
updated on our preparations and provide safety information.
 Reaching out directly to customers through traditional and social media, email, and texts and on
our website to provide safety information and to urge them to be prepared.
 Conducting outbound calls to life support and critical facility customers to ensure they are
prepared.

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In anticipation of the adverse weather, National Grid also provides customers with the following safety
reminders:
 If a power outage occurs, customers can notify National Grid online to expedite restoration.
 Never touch downed power lines; always assume they are carrying live electricity. Downed lines
should be immediately reported to National Grid at 1-800-867-5222 or by calling 911.
 Customers with active electricity accounts who text ‘REG’ to 64743 can receive personalized alerts
via text, email, or phone call when we detect an outage on their premises. Customers also can text
‘OUT’ to 64743 to report an outage.
 For real-time power outage information, online outage reporting, and in-depth storm safety
information, visit National Grid’s Outage Central website. Customers who create an online profile
also can sign up for email alerts. Thank you.

Outreach to affected Critical Facility customers continued until they were all restored.

Life Support Equipment Customers


LSE customers are defined in the Commission’s regulation 16 NYCRR §105.4(b)(9) as customers who require
electrically operated machinery to sustain basic life functions. This includes designated electronically
operated medical equipment prescribed by a qualified physician to be used on a continuous basis or as
circumstances require as specified by the physician to avoid the loss of life or serious medical complications
requiring immediate hospitalization.

The following is the LSE list:


 Home Kidney Dialysis Machines
 Continuous Ventilation Devices
 Suction-Aspiration Devices
 Apnea Monitors for infants
 Other (Certified by a physician)

Recognizing the importance of electricity to their well-being, National Grid made every effort to notify LSE
customers of the potential severe weather event as soon as possible. Advance notification of severe
weather events that could interrupt electric service to an LSE customer’s dwelling allows them to prepare
or make the necessary arrangements to secure/relocate to a safe environment during such events.

National Grid has a team dedicated to maintaining the list of LSE customers. When an LSE customer cannot
be reached using the contact information provided by the LSE customer upon enrollment or recertification
for the program, the team utilizes internal and external tools and resources to obtain updated customer
information, including contact information and eligibility status. The team subsequently follows
established regulatory protocols for requesting approval to remove customers from the program if it is
determined they are no longer eligible due to death, removal of equipment, or an incomplete application.

Given the weather forecasted for Winter Storm Elliott and the potential severity of its impact, the Company
made pre-event outbound calls, texts, and e-mails (for LSE customers who provided such contact
information to the Company) to its LSE customers in all Divisions within the National Grid service territories
(West, Central, and East Division). These pre-event calls also included notification to EBD customers in all
Divisions.

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On December 22, 2022, at 11:19 AM, an electronic blast-call was made to all LSE customers (3,638
customers - which represents 100 percent of LSE customers on record with the Company) that stated the
following:

“This is National Grid with an important message. A winter storm with a wintry mix of rain, sleet,
and snow along with plummeting temperatures, ice buildup and extremely damaging winds is
expected to impact Upstate NY starting Thursday afternoon and continuing into the weekend. Our
records show that an individual who requires medical care or life sustaining equipment is at this
address. I am contacting you to make sure you and your household are prepared in the event of a
power outage.

“For health and safety of you and your family we urge you to consult your local media for more
detailed weather information, and to determine if you should consider moving to an alternate
location during the anticipated event.

“If you lose power or if the phone number, we are reaching you on will not work during an outage,
please contact National Grid at 1-800-460-0316, that’s 1-800-460-0316 to report your outage or
update your information. Once again it is critical that you provide a contact number where you can
be reached during the outage.

“For additional power outage information, outage reporting, and storm safety information, you
can also visit the Outage Central section of our website Ngrid.com. You can also sign up for
personalized text message alerts by texting R-E-G to 6-4-7-4-3, that’s R-E-G to 6-4-7-4-3. Thank you
for being a National Grid customer.”

During the event, the Company also made an electronic blast-call in parallel with the LSE customer calls to
EBD customers. The script for the EBD calls was the same for all pre-event EBD calls as follows:

“This is a courtesy call from National Grid with an important message. I am contacting you to make
sure you and your household are aware of how to report a power outage along with how to check
the status of any outages should you lose power. For the health and safety of you and your family
we urge you to consult your local media for more detailed information, and to determine if you
should consider moving to an alternate location.

“National Grid has increased its Upstate New York field force to more than 2,800-line, service, tree,
damage assessment and public safety workers in preparation for a major storm forecasted to begin
Thursday afternoon and continue into the holiday weekend. The storm is expected to bring a
wintry mix of rain, sleet, and snow, along with plummeting temperatures, ice buildup and
extremely damaging winds. In addition to ensuring all National Grid field and office-based
employees are available for this storm, the company has secured external resources, including
hundreds of contractor crews, some coming from as far away as Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas, and
Canada. The company also has activated its comprehensive emergency response plan.

“Please keep safety a priority with the following and contact 911 if you require emergency
assistance. For additional power outage information, outage reporting, and storm safety
information, you can also visit the Outage Central section of our website Ngrid.com. You can also

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sign up for personalized text message alerts by texting R-E-G to 6-4-7-4-3, to report an outage or
get status updates you can also contact National Grid on 1-800-867-5222.
Thank you for being a National Grid customer.”

The Company sent the message to 37,561 EBD customers (100 percent of the customers on record with
the Company at that date and time) throughout all service Divisions (West, Central, East).

The criteria for contacting LSE Customers when they are predicted or verified out of service is outlined
below:
1. For LSE customers affected in the first 12-hrs from the start of event, 80 percent of the LSE Customers
affected in the first twelve hours from start of event will be contacted within this 12-hour period.
2. The Company will make at least two contact attempts within the first 12 hours from start of event,
with at least one hour separating attempts to those LSE Customers not contacted in the 12-hour period
from the start of event.
3. 100 percent of LSE Customers affected in the first 12 hours from the start of event will be contacted or
referred to an emergency services agency (e.g., EOC, police, or fire) within 24 hours from the start of
event.
4. The Company will contact affected LSE customers daily during the time when they remain in the
dwelling without electrical service.

The Company’s performance against the criteria for contacting LSE customers is summarized in the table
below.

Winter Storm Elliott - LSE Customer Contact


First 12-Hrs. From Start of Event 23-Dec
No. of those LSE Cust.
Percent Contacted No. of LSE
Affected in the First 12 hours
80 percent of the LSE Customers affected in the first 89.4% Cust. Affected
Contacted within the First 12
twelve hours from start of event will be contacted First 12 hours
hours
within this 12-hour period.
180 161

No. of LSE Cust. that received at


Percent Contacted
No. of LSE Cust. least two contact attempts within
LSE Customers not contacted in the 12-hour period
not Contacted in the First 12 hours from start of
from the start of event; will receive at least two 100%
the First 12-hrs. event, (that were not contacted in the
contact attempts within the first 12 hours from start
first 12-hrs.)
of event, with at least one hour separating attempts
will be made. 19 19

Percent Contacted No. of LSE


No. of LSE Cust. Contacted or
LSE Customers affected in the first 12 hours from the Cust. Affected
100% Referred to Emergency Services
start of event will be contacted or referred to an First 12 hours
emergency services agency (e.g., EOC, police, or fire)
180 180
within 24 hours from the start of event.

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Winter Storm Elliott – LSE Customer Contact
The Company will contact the affected LSE customers daily during the time when they remain in the dwelling
without electrical service.
24-Dec 100% 25-Dec 100% 26-Dec 100%
LSE Cust. LSE Cust. LSE Cust.
Contacted or Contacted or Contacted or
LSE Cust. Referred to LSE Cust. Referred to LSE Cust. Referred to
Affected Emerg. Srvcs. Affected Emerg. Srvcs. Affected Emerg. Srvcs.
264 264 63 63 20 20

27-Dec 100% 28-Dec 100%


LSE Cust. LSE Cust.
Contacted or Contacted or
LSE Cust. Referred to LSE Cust. Referred to
Affected Emerg. Srvcs. Affected Emerg. Srvcs.
3 3 0 0

National Grid complied with NY-ERP, Sections 17.4 and 17.5, in its implementation and coordination of
activities with its LSE and EBD customers, respectively. The Company identified all LSE customers affected
by the electrical emergency in a timely manner and established a regular channel of communication to
monitor the well-being of these customers until their electrical service was restored. National Grid
attempted to contact LSE customers known to be served by circuits affected by the damage caused by
Winter Storm Elliott as soon as possible after the circuits had been identified.

At the onset of the event, the Company made attempts to contact those LSE customers affected in the first
12 hours from “Start of Event” and then daily thereafter. In many instances, National Grid made several
attempts per day, during the period that the Company had reason to believe the LSE customer may have
been in their dwelling without electrical service.

If the Company could not make contact by telephone, National Grid arranged for either a Company
resource to perform a wellness check, or referred the wellness check to local police, fire, and emergency
medical services agencies, to physically visit the premises.

This process to contact the affected LSE customer by telephone or conduct a wellness check was performed
daily throughout the event. All LSE customers identified to be without power during the duration of the
event were either contacted by telephone, personally visited by a Company representative, or referred to
a first responder, or municipal official as coordinated by the Company during the restoration process for
each 24-hour period during the response. After the emergency had concluded, the Company contacted
LSE customers affected by the emergency to confirm power had been restored to their residence.

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10. STORM CRITIQUE AND ACTION ITEMS
Below is a summary of areas being evaluated by National Grid as part of its After Action Review. The
Company strives to learn from every event to enable it to perform better or more efficiently in future
events.

1. National Grid – Service Center Logistics


a. Support National Grid employees during weather events when employees are stranded on
Company property for an extended period:
1. Develop a plan to support National Grid employees during weather events when employees
are stranded on Company property for an extended period of time.
2. Identify what logistical considerations need to be included when developing the plan.
3. Identify key components such as proper sleeping, hygiene, and nutritional products to
support extended periods of operations while stranded at National Grid facilities.
4. Identify key locations for the storage of material for extended periods of time.
5. Establish an employee count that could be working in each location under consideration.
6. Develop a system or process to perform and annual review of equipment and account for the
issuance and replenishment of materials when released for emergency .
2. Improved State – County – City Coordination; Road Clearing Task Force
a. First implemented post March 2018 storms with County dictating priority. WS Elliott brought to
light there are times when the Utility needs to take the lead and provide direction to County
around what roads to clear.
1. Discuss / identify scenarios when road clearing could be needed as part of our emergency
response
2. Maintain flexibility as to which entity would lead the effort
3. Discuss road clearing process at each of the annual required meetings with the County
officials and key stakeholders. (if meetings have been conducted already, included the topic
at the next regularly scheduled meeting)
3. New York State Thruway Coordination
a. We have identified key contacts at NYS Thruway Authority who have pledged to work with us on a
process for emergency travel on the thruway when it is safe to access but closed.
1. Review and finalize process / procedure at the spring-2023 meeting between the NY-Joint
Utilities, NYS DOT, and NYS-Thruway Authority
4. Research Specialty Equipment
a. Conduct a review of additional specialty equipment that would improve our access and mobility
when roads are impassable due to snow as in WS Elliott
1. Complete review of specialty equipment by July 31, 2023
2. Provide recommendations – if any to pursue identified equipment
5. Deep Dive – Public Service Law 73: customer bill credits & claims for spoiled food and medicine
a. New law (Apr. 2022) implemented for the first time in Winter Storm Elliott
b. Perform detailed review to refine process to ensure effective implementation
1. Conduct workshop / focus group with representatives of all company departments
responsible for implementation of PSL 73.
2. Identify and document roles and responsibilities for each group to provide for an accurate
and timely implementation of the process during an emergency
6. Proactive Positioning of Materials and Equipment in Substations for Equipment De-icing

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a. Evaluate substations that could be at risk of snow accumulation and icing to determine if the
strategic placement of substation de-icing kits is warranted
b. Assemble and place kits in the designated substations
c. Inspect and maintain the materials and equipment in the kits on a regular basis

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11. APPENDICES
Appendix 1.1 - Detailed Weather Summaries
Appendix 2.1 - DTN and NWS Weather Forecasts
Appendix 3.1 - Damage Assessment Summary
Appendix 4.1 - Source Data from OMS
Appendix 5.1 - NY-PSC Resource Reports
Appendix 6.1 - Affected Feeder List
Appendix 6.2 - Road Clearing – Access Requests, Police Detail Requests
Appendix 6.3 - Road Clearing – Snow Plowing Zone Map
Appendix 8.1- Customer Communications
Appendix 8.2 - NY-PSC EORS Reports
Appendix 11.1 - Pictures

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