Lexxion Verlagsgesellschaft mbH

Climate Diplomacy and the Rise of ‘Multiple Bilateralism’ between China, India and the
EU
Author(s): David Belis, Simon Schunz, Tao Wang and Dhanasree Jayaram
Source: Carbon & Climate Law Review , 2018, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2018), pp. 85-97
Published by: Lexxion Verlagsgesellschaft mbH

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26489002

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CCLR 2|2018 85

Climate Diplomacy and the Rise of 'Multiple

Bilateralism' between China, India and the
EU
David Belis, Simon Schunz, Tao Wang, Dhanasree Jayaram*

This article focuses on the diplomatic relations between China, India and the EU in the de-
velopment of the international climate regime. It analyses whether and to what extent mul-
tiple bilateralism, that is, bilateral relations that are embedded into a broader multilateral
negotiation setting in a way that any actor – in its bilateral relations with one actor – takes
account of its bilateral relations with other (key) actors, has been a strategy employed by
each of the three players.Comparing their positions and behavior during the periods lead-
ing up to the 2009 Copenhagen and 2015 Paris climate summits, it provides clear evidence
of a shift to multiple bilateralism, particularly in the cases of China and the European Union.
This strategic turn contributed positively to the adoption of the Paris Agreement. The choice
for multiple bilateralism is explained with reference to internal and external driving forces.
The article concludes by arguing that multiple bilateralism – involving China, India, the EU
and other key emitters – holds the potential to develop into a networked form of co-leader-
ship that can effectively advance the implementation of the Paris Agreement despite US dis-
engagement from the global climate regime.

I. Introduction
This article examines the multiple bilateral relations
on climate change involving China, India and the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) as they have evolved over the two
time periods leading up to and including the 2009
Copenhagen and 2015 Paris summits. We argue that
DOI: 10.21552/cclr/2018/2/4
* Dr David Belis, University of Leuven (KU Leuven) <david
.belis@kuleuven.be>, Dr Simon Schunz, College of Europe,
Bruges <simon.schunz@coleurope.eu>, Dr Tao Wang, Climate-
Works Foundation <tao.wang@climateworks.org>, Dr Dhanasree
Jayaram, Centre for Climate Studies, Manipal Academy of Higher
Education, Karnataka <dhanasree.j@manipal.edu>.
1 Katharina Michaelowa and Axel Michaelowa, ‘Negotiating
climate change’(2012) Climate Policy 12, 527; Johannes Schmidt,
‘India’s Rise, the European Union and the BRICS: An Uneasy
Relation’, in Marek Rewizorski (ed) The European Union and the
BRICS: Complex Relations in the Era of Global Governance
(Springer 2015) 121.
2 For a partial exception focusing on the EU’s bilateral relations
with China and India respectively, see Diarmuid Torney, Euro-
pean Climate Leadership in Question: Policies toward China and
India (MIT Press 2015).
3 White House, 'Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate
Accord' (1 June 2017) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings
-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/>
a major change has taken place from the first period
(2005-2009) to the second period (2011-2015) and that
an important but understudied factor in explaining
the relative success of international climate diploma-
cy at Paris 2015 relates to the development and main-
tenance of multiple bilateral diplomatic relations.
This stands in contrast to existing accounts of cli-
mate diplomacy, which focus either on comparing
the positions of individual actors, specific blocs, key
bilateral relations, or the role of individual actors in
climate multilateralism only.1 It also adds to existing
debates in that it deliberately chooses to focus on the
triangular relationship China-India-EU, which the lit-
erature has so far largely omitted.2 While accounting
for the importance of the United States, a focus on
the other three top emitters seems warranted not on-
ly in view of their global shares of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, but also their importance for the
future of the multilateral climate regime under con-
ditions of multipolarity and the US disengagement
from that regime announced by President Trump in
June 2017.3
The concept of ‘multiple bilateralism’ (MB), al-
though often referred to especially within the EU con-

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86
text4, has not been widely used in the study of cli-
mate politics. It depicts bilateral relations that are
embedded into a broader multilateral negotiation set-
ting in a way that any actor – in its bilateral relations
with one actor – takes account of its bilateral rela-
tions with other (key) actors. Based on this under-
standing, the article answers two questions: first,
whether and to what extent MB has been a strategy
employed by each of the three actors, and, second,
why the three players did or did not resort to certain
forms of MB.
To do so, the article proceeds as follows: it first
outlines an analytical framework for examining the
multiple bilateral relations between China, India and
the EU in the context of global climate negotiations,
before discussing these actors’ strategies and behav-
ior in turn. It then extracts cross-time patterns pro-
viding evidence for a shift to MB and how this con-
tributed positively to the Paris Agreement, before ex-
plaining this shift. The article concludes that the
maintenance of multiple bilateral relations as a sub-
set of a multilateral negotiation process appears to
be an important, yet understudied explanatory fac-
tor for the success of multilateral climate negotia-
tions. This trend confirms findings of an earlier study
published in Carbon and Climate Law Review focus-
ing on the relations between the US, China and the
EU in global climate politics.5 It will have to be bet-
ter understood to grasp – and possibly better steer –
the negotiation dynamics in this and other domains
of global environmental politics impacted by increas-
ing multipolarity.
II. Analytical framework
Ever since the inception of the climate regime, the
decisive negotiations under United Nations (UN) aus-
pices were partially prepared in minilateral bodies,
such as the G-7, G-8(+5) or (later) the Major
Economies Forum/Meeting. In these contexts, bilat-
eral relations were regularly one component of the
climate negotiations. Such bilateral exchanges re-
mained for a long time much less important than re-
lations between the various negotiation coalitions,
such as the G-77/China or the Alliance of Small Is-
land States (AOSIS), however. Since the mid-2000s,
this has changed. Global (climate) politics has be-
come more multipolar, as the rise of the BASIC
(Brazil, South Africa, India, China) added new key
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CCLR 2|2018
players to the field, bringing with it new sets of bi-
lateral relations.
This stronger resorting to bilateral exchanges in
global climate politics underscores the generally ris-
ing importance of bilateralism in global politics. The
emergence of numerous intersecting bilateral rela-
tions has been particularly prominent in global trade
governance, where regional and bilateral agreements
have been concluded outside the realm of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) for at least a decade.6 In
a climate context, however, the reliance on bilateral-
ism is not just more recent, but also serving an open-
ly acknowledged preparatory purpose for achieving
general objectives at the multilateral level. We call
this phenomenon ‘multiple bilateralism’ and define
it as a strategy that entails the maintenance of sever-
al – cooperative or confrontational – bilateral diplo-
matic relationships in parallel as a subset of a multi-
lateral negotiation setting in order to reach policy ob-
jectives at that multilateral level.
MB inserts itself in the middle of a continuum be-
tween bilateralism and multilateralism. Multiple bi-
lateralism is, on the one hand, a form of two-way bi-
lateralism, which – unlike one-way bilateralism that
involves an asymmetrical relationship in which one
actor ‘talks at’ one interlocutor – is about engaging in
a true exchange. On the other hand, MB is ‘multiple’
because an actor interacts bilaterally with one actor
in a way that takes into account its bilateral relations
with one or more additional players – with an eye to
the multilateral context. The exchanges that MB in-
volves can be cooperative and thus aimed at building
trust and identifying common landing zones in ne-
gotiations on a given issue, or it can be confrontation-
al, that is, aimed at openly confronting the interlocu-
tor, for instance to overcome obstructionist behavior
by this actor in the multilateral negotiation setting.
The article assumes various degrees to which MB
is developed and operates with a heuristic scale: no
4 Stephan Keukeleire and Hans Bruyninckx, ‘The European Union,
the BRICs, and the Emerging New World Order’, in Christopher
Hill and Michael Smith (eds), International Relations and the
European Union (Oxford University Press 2011), 380; Robert
Ross, Øystein Tunsjø and Zhang Tuosheng (eds) US-China-EU
Relations. Managing the New World Order (Routledge 2010).
5 David Belis, Paul Joffe, Bart Kerremans and Ye Qi, ‘China, the
United States and the European Union: Multiple Bilateralism and
Prospects for a New Climate Change Diplomacy’ (2015) Carbon
and Climate Law Review 9, 203.
6 Kenneth Heydon and Stephen Woolcock, The rise of bilateralism:
Comparing American, European and Asian approaches to prefer-
ential trade agreements (United Nations University Press 2009).
CCLR 2|2018
to very limited MB implies that an actor pays scant
attention to its bilateral relations and focuses on pro-
moting own positions; limited MB entails an actor
that engages in MB in view of specific contexts, but
does not employ it extensively; strong MB entails an
actor that during a significant period of time has de-
veloped an extensive MB strategy.
The concept of MB is used, first, to analyze the
three players’ foreign policy positioning vis-à-vis each
other and the conduct of their climate diplomacies
(behavior). Specific attention is paid to the way they
conducted their diplomacies vis-à-vis one actor (the
‘bilateralism’ component of the concept) while tak-
ing account of the third actor (the ‘multiple’ compo-
nent). Four central negotiation issues relevant to all
three actors are addressed, namely: the legal form of
the outcome (binding or not), the overall level of am-
bition in terms of emissions reductions, differentia-
tion between parties, and finance. For each actor and
issue area, key internal and external driving forces,
strategies and diplomatic actions are discussed.
Methodologically, the analysis is based on a triangu-
lation of data stemming from a set of interviews with
key EU, Chinese and Indian negotiators,7 document
analysis of official national, EU and United Nations
documents and non-participatory observation of the
Copenhagen and Paris summits.8 The findings are
complemented by drawing on the existing secondary
literature.
Second, to plausibly explain each player’s ap-
proach to MB by indicating which external and do-
mestic factors have determined its positions and be-
havior, four categories of variables are examined:
– Geopolitical concerns and power: geopolitics as
the study of the effects of human and physical ge-
ography on international relations has highlight-
ed for the climate context notably the importance
of changing shares of emissions for the power re-
lations among major players;
– Institutions: which body is in charge of climate
diplomacy? This factor can involve the instrumen-
7 Interviews were conducted with three EU, three Chinese and four
Indian climate negotiators between December 2009 and Decem-
ber 2015.
8 One of the authors attended both summits as a party delegate.
9 Robert O Keohane, and David G Victor, ‘Cooperation and discord
in global climate policy’ (2016) Nature Climate Change 6, 570; (n
5) Belis et al.
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87
talization of national institutions by individual
leaders to pursue a specific climate agenda;
– Interests: material (economic) interests in global
climate politics and how they motivate behavior;
– Ideas: understandings of climate change (e.g. fram-
ing in terms of environmental or equity concerns).
The study applies this framework to China, India and
the EU. While referring to the US where necessary,
this analysis does not explicitly include the US for
several reasons: first, the US-China relationship hav-
ing been a critical component in the build-up towards
the Paris Agreement, current academic studies have
already largely covered this relationship both from a
bilateral and a multiple bilateral perspective;9 sec-
ond, the strong focus on the G-2 tends to exaggerate
their importance and underestimate the role of the
relationships between other major players in the run-
up to Paris; third, the election of Trump as US Pres-
ident, his administration’s intended withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement as well as the continued uncer-
tainty surrounding this move signal the disengage-
ment of the United States from multilateral climate
policies at least for as long as Trump remains in of-
fice. This context makes it all the more important to
understand the quality, drivers and determinants of
the relationships between the remaining major emit-
ters as they engage in the challenging negotiations
of the Paris rulebook.
III. China and its Climate Multiple
Bilateralism with India and the EU
The last decade saw China significantly modify its
position in global climate negotiations, evolving
from an active participant when the Kyoto Protocol
became effective in 2005 to, first, a widely criticized
culprit at and after Copenhagen in 2009 and, later, a
generally applauded, constructive player at the 2015
Paris summit. This dramatic shift of China’s implica-
tion in multilateral climate talks came with marked
changes also in its bilateral climate diplomacy with
India and the EU, as well as with the US.
1. China’s Climate Diplomacy Positions
Before the 2009 Copenhagen summit, the rapid rise
of China’s economic power and GHG emissions
88
transformed its climate diplomacy into a very dy-
namic area of action. As a rising economic power and
– since 2006 – the world’s largest emitter, China felt
under pressure from the EU and the US to take on
greater responsibilities, adopt a (legally binding) tar-
get and break down the ‘firewall’ between develop-
ing and developed countries embodied in the com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) prin-
ciple under the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Given this con-
tinuous external pressure, and the internal debates
about the most appropriate climate policies, China
felt it necessary to align its positions and solidify its
ties with other emerging economies, especially In-
dia. As of 2007, this cooperation was partially insti-
tutionalized in the BASIC group (Brazil, South
Africa, India, China). Until COP 15, therefore, China
had a clear inclination to consider its climate diplo-
macy rather defensively. Its positions included
strengthening the ‘firewall’, no legally binding action
for non-Annex I countries, no cap on its emissions
and ensuring that industrialized countries provide
financial and technological support to developing
countries.
Significant changes in its positions can be detect-
ed during the period after the Copenhagen summit,
when China felt that it was being scapegoated for
what was largely considered as a failed summit, and
decided to react to this by adopting a more proactive
stance.10 In particular, China’s leadership realized
that it could and should use its economic power to
engage bilaterally with the major Western powers to
build consensus to underscore its rise. This change
became obvious when the new Chinese regime un-
der President Xi Jinping took office in 2012. Shortly
thereafter, and in the context of the heavy smog that
prevailed in many parts of Northern China, political
pressure from China’s middle class contributed to
making the country’s leadership reconsider their po-
sition and the synergies that could be gained by joint-
ly tackling air pollution and mitigating carbon emis-
sions.11 China’s overcapacity in heavy industries
started to make it an urgent task to change the eco-
nomic structure towards a more consumption-driven
economy, mitigating the growth of coal demand. The
Chinese government thus made a pivotal turn to air
pollution control, realizing that it would have to re-
form its coal-dominated energy system earlier than
originally assumed.12 This realization, together with
China’s (and especially President Xi Jinping’s) new-
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CCLR 2|2018
ly gained confidence and ambition to play a leading
role in global climate governance made it depart from
the previous joint stance with India and the other
BASIC countries.
Unlike before 2009, China preferred to actively ad-
vance its positions and seek compromises with both
the EU and, particularly, the US to demonstrate lead-
ership. Regarding the EU, China observed that the
latter had started to review its strategy of being a
‘moral power’ ‘exporting’ GHG limitations,13 becom-
ing more pragmatic and accepting in particular the
bottom-up approach favored by China and the US,
which became embodied in the intended nationally
determined contributions (INDCs). This allowed the
two sides an unpreceded rapprochement of positions.
As a result, areas that used to be most contentious
between China and the EU could be advanced dur-
ing the 2011-2015 negotiations, including agreements
on Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV), the
partial watering down of the CBDR principle and Chi-
na’s commitment to provide finance to developing
countries.
2. China’s Climate Diplomacy Behavior
China’s rise of GHG emissions in the years before
Copenhagen entailed that it was subjected to exter-
nal pressures for taking on a stronger stance in the
global climate regime. Among its attempts to allevi-
ate this pressure was a stronger cooperation with the
EU, such as via the EU-China Partnership on Climate
Change launched in 2005 and the China-EU Cooper-
ation on Near Zero Emissions Coal (NZEC) started
in 2006, as well as a more political engagement dur-
ing EU-China summits and G-8 summits under UK
and German presidencies in 2005 and 2007.14 How-
ever, these interactions did not have any substantial
impacts on China’s positions on any of the major is-
10 Author’s interview with a member of the Chinese climate delega-
tion after the Copenhagen summit, December 2009.
11 Author’s interview with government officials in China’s NDRC
and academics from Tsinghua University, 2013-2015.
12 ibid.
13 (n 2) Torney, 21-22.
14 David Belis and Simon Schunz, ‘China and the European Union:
Emerging Partners in Global Climate Governance?’ Environmental
Practice 15, 190.
CCLR 2|2018
sues under negotiation at the time (binding target,
differentiation or finance). While engaging with the
EU, China also held, as of 2007, regular meetings
with the other BASIC countries at environment min-
isters' level to coordinate negotiation positions, as-
suming a leading role via its strong alliance with In-
dia, which showed most clearly at the Copenhagen
summit.
After COP 15, China initially focused more on the
BASIC group to defend its positions, while exploring
how to play a more important role in the G-20. Chi-
na-India relations continued to play a driving role
within BASIC, as greater divisions started to emerge
with Brazil and South Africa. However, China did not
intend to durably act in concert with India’s defen-
sive stance, as it aimed to communicate better about
its extensive efforts in promoting low-carbon devel-
opment, altering its image as ‘old and dirty coal user’.
Regional cooperation with Africa, South America
and Russia-Eurasia, where China’s overseas invest-
ment concentrated, also helped it to build more lead-
ership in aligning positions with and gaining support
from various developing countries in the Like-Mind-
ed Developing Countries (LMDC) group. This trend
became particularly evident when President Xi visit-
ed more than 40 countries in his first three years in
office.
In the years after Copenhagen, China arguably be-
came more inclined to focus on multiple bilateral re-
lations instead of the multilateral regime itself. Mul-
tiple bilateralism represented the new approach that
President Xi adopted for critical issues on which it
proved difficult to forge a global consensus, such as
the talks on a climate agreement.15 In an attempt at
limiting the damage after Copenhagen, China tried
to strengthen its relationship with the EU through
high-level meetings based on personal relationships
between top negotiators, and reinforced policy and
technological cooperation projects such as low-car-
bon pilot cities and carbon market pilots in China.16
This China-EU cooperation marks just one example
15 Ye Qi and Wu Tong, ‘China's 'yes' to new role in climate battle’
China Daily (4 December 2015).
16 Simon Schunz and David Belis, 'The EU, China and the Paris
Climate Summit’ (2015) EU-China Observer 4, 8.
17 Anjali Jaiswal, ‘Paris Climate Agreement Explained: India Focus’
(Natural Resources Defense Council, 12 December 2015)
<https://www.nrdc.org/experts/anjali-jaiswal/paris-climate
-agreement-explained-india-focus> accessed 22 May 2018.
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89
of numerous high-level bilateral agreements (Sino-
US, Sino-French, Sino-British etc.) that the Chinese
leaders concluded in the run-up to the Paris summit.
At the same time, the relationship with the BASIC
and India, while still officially kept up, lost in rela-
tive importance for China.
IV. India and its Climate Multiple
Bilateralism with China and the EU
In past decades, India was frequently branded as a
‘spoiler’ in various international fora, including in
the context of the UNFCCC. At the Copenhagen sum-
mit, the country was instrumental in bringing togeth-
er the BASIC countries and ‘spoiling’ the industrial-
ized countries’ attempts to water down the strict de-
marcation between (developed) Annex I and (devel-
oping) non-Annex I parties. This strongly defensive
attitude softened somewhat in the run-up to the Paris
summit when India was even viewed by some as a
’bridging’ nation: bridging ‘the many nations across
the world’ as well as bridging ‘development with cli-
mate action’.17 By adopting a more moderate posi-
tion on issues such as equity, finance and sustainable
development, it sought to accommodate the interests
of both the developed and developing countries. This
represents no radical shift from its longstanding cli-
mate diplomacy positions, but does demonstrate a
visible change.
1. India’s Climate Diplomacy Positions
In the run-up to and during the Copenhagen sum-
mit, India’s interests resonated well with those of Chi-
na and were largely opposed to those of the EU. In
fact, from the very beginning of global climate poli-
tics, India shared many commonalities with China
on issues including differentiation, the CBDR princi-
ple, equity and justice, climate finance and technol-
ogy transfer. By contrast, its positions were directly
opposed to the EU’s during the period 2002-2009. It
refuted any initiatives to replace Kyoto with a new
treaty imposing binding emissions reduction targets
on the emerging economies. Not only did it demand
the enforcement of a second Kyoto commitment pe-
riod, but also an extension of its flexibility mecha-
nisms. India also argued strongly in favor of negoti-
ating a treaty based on per capita, while criticizing
90
the EU’s attempts to side-step its demands of setting
up an adaptation fund and reaching an internation-
al agreement on technology transfer.18 Differences
also emerged over MRV, as India insisted on non-in-
tervention in its domestic climate actions without in-
ternational financing.
Since COP 15, India’s and China’s positions have
begun to diverge on a few practical matters related
to the adoption of emissions reduction targets, peak-
ing of emissions and MRV. These divergences had an
impact on India’s climate diplomacy as well. Mea-
sures taken by China after Copenhagen, pointing at
its intention to play a leading role and, to do so, com-
promise with the industrialized countries, estranged
it from India. China’s changed attitude forced India
to also make fundamental compromises. This after
Prime Minister Modi had declared that India would
not be arm-twisted into climate action going against
its national interest just on account of other coun-
tries’ reinvigorated steps, clearly referring to China’s
joint communiqué with the US in 2014.19 While In-
dia’s positions slightly differed from China’s, diver-
gences with the EU’s positions remained stark. India
maintained that Annex I parties should enhance their
climate actions, including greater emissions reduc-
tion efforts and finance/technology provisions. It re-
peatedly clashed with the EU over the legally bind-
ing nature of the future agreement, stressing that the
latter should not only make mitigation commitments
legally binding but also bind parties to pay equal at-
tention to ‘adaptation, finance, technology, capacity
building and transparency’.20 The biggest impasse
concerned however the differentiation between de-
veloped and developing countries, as India did not
want a diluted version of the CBDR while the EU (and
other Western countries) sought recognition of the
‘current realities’.21
However, during the Paris summit, India compro-
mised on both historical responsibility and CBDR.
By consequence, the Paris Agreement received
mixed responses from the environmentalists and cli-
mate experts of the country. The former argued that
since the Agreement does not mention ‘historical re-
sponsibility’, it undermines equity and renders cli-
mate actions increasingly contingent on ‘respective
capabilities and national circumstances’. They also
think that India chose to pay little heed to the ab-
sence of strong legal guarantees that developed coun-
tries would provide support to developing countries.
The climate law experts, by contrast, insist that the
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CCLR 2|2018
Agreement establishes a clear relationship between
‘differentiation’, ‘ambition’ and ‘support’. Not only
does the Agreement reinforce the CBDR principle
across all aspects of climate action (mitigation, adap-
tation and support), but it also ensures that five-year
‘global stocktakes’ take into account ‘equity’ (burden-
sharing between countries). Moreover, it contextual-
izes ambitious (future) contributions by developing
countries not only in terms of mitigation contribu-
tions but financial contributions by developed coun-
tries.22 Thus, it was also a diplomatic coup on the be-
hest of India that managed to seal the Agreement
despite developed countries’ opposition. India’s
Union Minister of State (MoS) for Environment,
Forests and Climate Change, Javadekar, pointed out
after the deal was clinched that ‘to achieve big things
you need to be accommodating without changing
the meaning and thrust of agreement and that is suc-
cess’.23
2. India’s Climate Diplomacy Behavior
Where India’s climate diplomacy was practically
much aligned with that of China until 2009, it un-
doubtedly took a different turn when the BASIC’s
unity began to whither from the 2010 Cancun sum-
mit onwards, resulting in India being cornered by
the rest of the international community – due also to
the EU’s moves to repeatedly wean Brazil and South
Africa away from the grouping by putting pressure
18 Shoibal Chakravarty and MV Ramana, ‘India’s Evolving Climate
Change Strategy’ (2009) Climate Science and Policy 13.
19 ET Bureau, ‘Obama in India: PM Narenda Modi and Barack
Obama strike alliance on climate change’ The Economic Times
(Mumbai, 26 January 2015).
20 Terra Nova, ‘There is no binary view in tackling climate change,
says J. M. Mauskar’ (Observer Research Foundation, 18 January
2016) <http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/there-is-no-binary
-view-in-tackling-climate-change-says-j-m-mauskar/> accessed
22 May.
21 Urmi A Goswami, ‘UN climate talks: European Union and Like-
Minded Developing Countries trade accusations’ The Economic
Times (Mumbai, 23 November 2013).
22 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015
Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying
Politics’ (2016) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65,
493.
23 Noopur Tiwari, ‘What India Achieved At Paris Climate Summit
And Where It Had To Compromise’ (NDTV, 13 December 2015)
<http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/what-india-achieved-at-climate
-summit-and-where-it-had-to-compromise-1254436> accessed
22 May 2018.
CCLR 2|2018
on them through AOSIS and the Least Developed
Countries.
In reaction to this, and while upholding its tradi-
tional positions on climate change, India began to
build channels with different (groups of) countries
to conduct its climate diplomacy and play a proac-
tive role in negotiating the post-2020 treaty. Modi in
particular took charge of setting the diplomatic agen-
da. During all his foreign visits, climate change
formed an integral part of talks. For instance, when
in Germany, France and Canada in 2015, he inked sev-
eral bilateral deals on clean energy, clearly linked
with the climate negotiations. Similarly, during Oba-
ma’s visit to India earlier in the same year, several
crucial steps were taken in the direction of reaching
consensus at the Paris summit. Moreover, India
reached out to Africa and the Pacific Island nations
before the Paris summit, starting talks on the Inter-
national Solar Alliance (ISA) of 120 countries, which
was launched with the active support of France at
COP 21.24
With clean energy at the center of India’s climate
diplomacy, it also intended to collaborate with Chi-
na. With the EU, too, and especially some member
states, hands-on cooperation has been on the rise. An
example is Germany, exemplified by launching vari-
ous initiatives such as the Indo-German Working
Group on Climate Change under the Indo-German
Environment Forum.25
Altogether, India’s alignment with China during
the period 2005-2009 was thus gradually trans-
formed into a more active diplomatic behavior, in-
volving numerous bilateral relations with developed
and developing country partners, including the EU,
in view of actively contributing to the negotiations
of the Paris Agreement. The country’s climate diplo-
macy can therefore be said to have evolved from a
strongly confrontational stance in the Copenhagen
24 Prime Minister’s Office, Government of India, ‘PM’s closing
remarks at Forum for India Pacific Island Countries (FIPIC) sum-
mit’ (21 August 2015).
25 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘Indo-German
Joint Statement on Climate Change and Energy Technology
Cooperation’ (5 October 2015).
26 Simon Schunz, European Union Foreign Policy and the Global
Climate Regime (Peter Lang 2014).
27 (n 2) Torney.
28 Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on EU position for the
Copenhagen Climate Conference (7-18 December 2009).
2968th Environment Council meeting, Luxembourg, 21 October
2009.
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91
period to that of a more cooperative player in the
Paris period. Nonetheless, India’s employment of
multiple bilateralism as a strategy generally re-
mained limited.
V. The EU and Its Climate Multiple
Bilateralism with China and India
Similar to China, the European Union’s climate diplo-
macy has gone through a remarkable evolution over
the past ten years. From a principled actor promot-
ing its own model as well as legally binding, ambi-
tious, top-down global climate policies, it developed
into a much more pragmatic climate diplomat.
1. The EU’s Climate Diplomacy Positions
Prior to the Copenhagen summit, the EU’s positions
in the global climate talks tended to be relatively
rigid. Its desire to adopt a global legally binding treaty
for the post-2012 regime that would enshrine its long-
standing 2°C target and end the differentiation be-
tween developed and developing countries was un-
derpinned by finance proposals, which were howev-
er tabled quite late in the negotiation process.26 Its
positions vis-à-vis China and India followed a one-
size-fits-all approach, taking as a starting point the
Union’s own model, while paying limited attention
to other players’ positions, nor to differences in their
specific national circumstances.27 Inter alia it formu-
lated clear expectations for these countries in terms
of mitigation targets in the range of a 15-30% devia-
tion from business-as-usual.28 Although the EU had
thus clearly grasped the importance of China, India
and their GHG emissions in global climate politics,
its positions did not really address them in conjunc-
tion with each other.
After 2009, this one-size-fits-all approach relying
on general strategic partnerships was complement-
ed by greater à la carte components, in recognition
of the two countries’ differences and its own (limit-
ed) leverage over them. With China, more significant
hands-on cooperation projects were designed; with
India, initiatives remained more limited and driven
by individual member states. While understanding
the importance of BASIC (and the emergent LMDC),
the EU also gained better insights into the differences
inside that group: China and India shared relatively
92
similar positions, which differed – content-wise and
in terms of rigidity – from those of Brazil and South
Africa. In its positions, the EU maintained its prefer-
ence for a Kyoto Protocol-like treaty, but with much
less fervency. It also continued to advocate the end
of differentiation, while accepting the INDCs as bot-
tom-up components of a future reformed climate
regime, at least since the November 2014 US-China
agreement had endorsed this idea.29 During this pe-
riod, the Union abstained from prescribing particu-
lar action to the emerging economies, but did call on
them to provide funding for mitigation and adapta-
tion.30
Altogether, the EU thus moved towards an aware-
ness of the importance of China and India as a pair
inside the BASIC group and inside the UN regime’s
LMDC group, while also recognizing their differ-
ences. As of 2010, positions were consequently
geared toward the two countries in conjunction with
each other.
2. The EU’s Climate Diplomacy Behavior
Before COP 15, the EU conducted its bilateral rela-
tions with key partners mostly in isolation from each
other. By forging bilateral climate partnerships with
both China and India, it had sought to draw them in-
to a policy dialogue that was to advance the multilat-
eral negotiations, while promoting hands-on bilater-
al cooperation around climate and energy themes.
These efforts led only to limited progress in China
and were virtually without success due to greater do-
mestic resistance in India.31 A few attempts at engag-
ing the two countries in the G-8+5 format (e.g.
L’Aquila summit 2009) and the US-led Major
Economies Forum were also observable. These forms
of engagement arguably facilitated the deal on the
reference to the 2°C target that found its way into the
Copenhagen Accord.32 Generally, however, the EU’s
bilateral climate relations were not really instances
of deliberate MB, yielding no positive effects for COP
15.
After Copenhagen, the EU took greater account of
the reality of the BASIC bloc. While reinforcing its
bilateral relations with China and India individually,
it did also develop a stance towards these two togeth-
er (as part of the BASIC group). Its approach can best
be characterized as a mixed cooperative-confronta-
tional form of multiple bilateralism.
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CCLR 2|2018
On the one hand, the EU attempted to engage the
two parties more actively in the post-2020 negotia-
tion process by reaching out to them and frequently
applauding their advances in the climate change do-
main. Moreover, by accepting the notion of INDCs
and thus the possibility of a bottom-up post-2020
regime to be developed in Paris, the EU crossed some
of its previous red lines to signal its availability for
compromises and move into the direction of the two
countries (and the US), which had been the most fer-
vent advocates of bottom-up climate governance.
This was not only a highly pragmatic move, intend-
ed to ensure an outcome of the Paris summit, but al-
so a step that was facilitated by years of trust-build-
ing exercises through bilateral engagements with
China and India.33
On the other hand, this novel and cooperative form
of MB was paralleled by a clear strategy of confronta-
tional MB. The EU had realized at and after Copen-
hagen that the power of the BASIC needed to be coun-
terbalanced, especially when it came to their recalci-
trant positions on the legal form and differentiation
in the future global climate regime. This, in turn, im-
plied an active attempt to mobilize a coalition with
the small island nations and developing countries
from the G-77/China to confront India and China at
both the 2011 Durban and the Paris summits.34 At
both COPs, the High Ambition Coalition, co-spon-
sored by the EU, helped to split the BASIC, with Brazil
joining the EU’s camp.35
In conclusion, since the mid-2000s, the EU has in-
vested ever greater efforts into its bilateral relations
with China and India, but engaged in deliberate mul-
tiple bilateralism primarily after Copenhagen, and
this in two ways: offering them cooperation while,
at times, confronting them jointly through coalition-
building.
29 Author’s interview with Jos Delbeke, Director-General, European
Commission’s DG Climate Action, Leuven, October 2015.
30 Council of the EU, EU position for the UN climate change confer-
ence in Paris: Environment Council conclusions, Brussels, 18
September 2015, point 14.
31 (n 2) Torney.
32 (n 26) Schunz.
33 (n 29) Author’s interview with Jos Delbeke.
34 Sebastian Oberthür, ‘Where to Go from Paris? The European
Union in Climate Geopolitics’ (2016) Global Policy 2, 119.
35 European Commission, ‘COP21: Brazil joins high ambition
coalition; group pushes for strong deal as Paris talks enter final
stretch’ (January 2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news> ac-
cessed 22 May 2018.
CCLR 2|2018
VI. Evolving Patterns of Multiple
Bilateralism and their Significance
for the Negotiations of the Paris
Agreement
While each of the three powers employed or were
confronted with less confrontational strategies in
Paris compared to Copenhagen, it was especially the
EU that adopted a strong MB strategy (see Table 1).
If one traces its climate-specific engagement with
China and India over time, the trend is relatively un-
equivocal. Where it did not really seem to think in
multiple bilateral terms until 2009, it adopted a de-
liberately mixed (ie cooperative-confrontational) MB
strategy thereafter.
Table 1: Degrees of China-India-EU multiple bilat-
eralism in the global climate regime (2005-2015)
2005-2009 2010-2015
China Limited Strong
India Very limited Limited
EU Very limited Strong
Source: compiled by the authors.
China shifted from a form of confrontational MB
in which relations with India were used to defend its
positions vis-à-vis the EU as the most ‘pushy’ bilater-
al partner in 2005-2009 to a much more cooperative
and extensive form of MB as of 2010.
India’s position, until 2010, had been absolutely
clear in terms of its opposition to entertain any dis-
cussion on adopting emissions reduction targets. Al-
though the India/China cooperation that opposed
these two to the EU could be categorized as confronta-
tional MB, this MB should – from an Indian perspec-
tive – not be considered as strategic, but rather lim-
ited and ad hoc. However, before and during the Paris
summit, as the industrialized countries and LDCs
made continuous efforts to ensure that India could
be brought on board of a strong legally binding deal,
India made conscious efforts to be seen as a construc-
36 (n 5) Belis et al.
37 UNFCCC, Paris Agreement (2015) FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1.
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93
tive geopolitical player whose role in global gover-
nance was not secondary to that of China. Hence, a
form of cooperative MB vis-à-vis China and the EU
could be detected under the Modi government.
Given that prior to the Copenhagen summit key
emitters made limited use of MB, the potential for
agreement on crunch issues had not been explored
to the necessary extent. This may serve as one ex-
planatory factor of the failure of COP 15. By contrast,
a more extensive use of MB prior to Paris, especially
by the EU, China and the US36, but also India con-
tributed significantly to the outcome at the multilat-
eral level embodied in the Paris Agreement.37 This
can be observed clearly by tracing the process lead-
ing to this outcome regarding three key components
of the treaty relevant to all three actors analyzed in
this article.
First, on the legal form of the outcome, and as ex-
amined, the fact that China and the US struck their
2014 bilateral deal, which was then extended to In-
dia and – especially by China – also unequivocally
communicated to the EU, allowed for the ‘landing
zone’ to emerge on this item. Exchanges based on
MB were thus quintessential for the fundamental
shift from top-down to bottom-up climate gover-
nance.
Second, on the overall level of ambition in terms
of emissions reductions, the outcome embodied in
Article 2 of the Agreement, namely to hold the tem-
perature increase ‘well below 2°C … and to pursue ef-
forts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C’ (UN-
FCCC 2015: Art. 2) provides direct evidence of strong
(EU-led) multiple bilateralism involving key emitters
at the Paris summit itself. In this case, the EU first
built support through the High Ambition Coalition,
reached out to Brazil and the US, and then success-
fully confronted China and India in parallel. Where
the latter had obtained the EU’s commitment to the
bottom-up nature of the regime, MB allowed the EU
(and its coalition partners) to co-determine these
overarching regime targets.
Third, and again involving MB between China, In-
dia, the US and the EU, parties managed to consoli-
date and extend the compromise on differentiation
that originated from the 2014 US-China deal and is
captured by the phrase ‘in the light of different na-
tional circumstances’ (UNFCCC 2015: Art. 2). In this
case, the multiple bilateral groundwork that China
and especially India did vis-à-vis the EU and the US
was instrumental to the outcome.
94
In synthesis, and while all these individual out-
comes intersect as part of a package deal, evidence
for the impact of increased MB by the three players
analyzed here is strong. The historical counterfactu-
al of COP 15 shows that in a multipolar context and
in the absence of a dense web of interrelations be-
tween key emitters, mutual understanding and the
preparation of compromise solutions become chal-
lenging to the point of being unsolvable under con-
sensus restraints within the multilateral system on-
ly.
VII. Explaining China’s, India’s and the
EU’s approaches to multiple
bilateralism
This section plausibly explains the evolution towards
forms of MB between China, India and the EU when
comparing the periods 2005-2009 and 2011-2015.
We argue that four factors contributed to the de-
velopment of multiple bilateralism between China,
India and the EU in the post-Copenhagen period:
geopolitical, institutional, material interest-related
and ideational factors.
1. Geopolitical concerns in the wake of
the Copenhagen summit
Geopolitical (re-)positioning represents a major fac-
tor for all three actors. China’s relative power gains
result from its considerable economic clout, and the
fact that is has become the world’s largest emitter,
carrying considerable weight in the decision-making
processes on a global emissions target. It took China
some time to realize its own power, but at least since
COP 15, it no longer wishes to be a rule-taker on an
important global governance issue like climate
change.
For India, climate change represents a cornerstone
of the Modi government’s reinvigorated foreign pol-
icy that strives to project India as a power that has
already ‘risen’ and whose influence cannot be re-
stricted to the subcontinent.38 It is reflective of In-
dia’s gradual shift from a nation that strictly holds
on to strategic autonomy to a power with global re-
sponsibilities. At the same time, India also wished to
signal that China’s understanding with the US could
not be replicated in its case.
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CCLR 2|2018
Compared to China and India, the EU’s relative
power has remarkably declined in the global climate
regime. A key emitter until the mid-2000s, the rise of
the emerging economies has diminished the Union’s
clout. While it had not fully understood (the impli-
cations of) these geopolitical changes before and at
Copenhagen, and consequently had no adequate
strategy, it learnt its lessons. Its documented at-
tempts, since 2009, to reach out to China, India (and
the US), but also to balance their power by forging
coalitions with the island nations and least developed
countries to confront especially the emerging
economies on issues related to the level of ambition
and differentiation testify to this.
Geopolitical concerns provide thus, for all three
players, major scope conditions for the turn towards
MB. In the case of China and India, leadership ambi-
tions imply enhanced cooperation with others,
whereby India is yet more timid. For the EU, geopo-
litical concerns point to the necessity to combine co-
operation and confrontation. At COP 15, the chang-
ing (perceptions of) geopolitics of climate change
constituted a key reason for the summit’s failure.
Copenhagen thus essentially functioned as a ’shock
event’, a critical juncture in the climate regime, which
subsequently triggered and interacted with a num-
ber of internal processes in China, India, and the EU
in terms of institutional change, material interests
and climate-related ideas to lead to the development
of MB.
2. Institutional changes
During the periods discussed here, the institutions
in charge of climate diplomacy in China changed
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the
top economic planning authority. China also estab-
lished a national leading group on climate change
headed by the President himself. The decision-mak-
ing on China’s positions and behavior in global cli-
mate negotiations became thus embedded into a well-
coordinated structure, and more closely reflected the
will of China’s top leadership. The strong personal
ambition of President Jinping reinforced this dynam-
38 Author’s interview with MD Nalapat, Editorial Director, The
Sunday Guardian and ITV Group.
CCLR 2|2018
ic in favor of a vigorous and more cooperative, MB-
based climate diplomacy.
In India, the command baton for climate change
was passed from the Special Envoy of the Prime Min-
ister on Climate Change to the Ministry of Environ-
ment, Forest and Climate Change during the Copen-
hagen summit. Slowly, but surely, the role of diplo-
mats thus decreased. However, the Prime Minister’s
Office’s (PMO) grip over climate policy and diploma-
cy remained untouched. At the same time, the Indi-
an government felt the need for a coordinated ap-
proach to this critical issue and therefore involved dif-
ferent ministries, including Power, External Affairs,
Earth Sciences and Agriculture, under the PMO’s con-
trol.39 Especially Modi’s imprints on Indian climate
diplomacy have arguably contributed to enabling In-
dia’s more cooperative stance at the Paris summit.
Where the EU’s institutional apparatus for climate
diplomacy was long characterized by high degrees of
path-dependency and an aversion to strategy40, lead-
ing to rather sterile and technocratic bilateral part-
nerships on climate change, this changed after Copen-
hagen. Long in the hands of environment ministries,
EU climate diplomacy now allowed greater owner-
ship for foreign ministries, and efforts were made by
the environmental community to think strategically.
This allowed the Union to adopt an approach that
was less centered on exporting its own model. New
incentives provided by the entry into force of the Lis-
bon Treaty in late 2009 and a greater awareness of
the role of BASIC led to these institutional adapta-
tions. Another factor was that the EU realized that it
had to disband its rigid adherence to the legally bind-
ing nature of GHG mitigation commitments.41 Essen-
tial for the EU’s strategic turn was the observation
that China was serious about its domestic commit-
39 Navroz K Dubash and Neha B Joseph, ‘Evolution of Institutions
for Climate Policy in India’ (2016) LI Economic and Political
Weekly 44.
40 (n 26) Schunz.
41 (n 29) Author’s interview with Jos Delbeke.
42 Author’s interview with Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu, chair of the LDC
negotiation group, Bonn, September 2015.
43 (n 29) Author’s interview with Jos Delbeke.
44 Author’s interview with Ambassador Shyam Saran, Special
Envoy of the Indian Prime Minister on Climate Change (SEPM).
45 Mayank Aggarwal, ‘India, China to enhance cooperation on
climate change’ (Live Mint, 15 May 2015) <http://www.livemint
.com/Politics/zwQOzCEziKyqaNeuhRArLP/India-China-to
-enhance-cooperation-on-climate-change.html> accessed 22 May
2018.
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95
ments and had strong historical sensitivities when it
comes to encroachments on its sovereignty (e.g. in
relation to international supervision over domestic
policies and targets).42 Additionally, key EU decision-
makers came to acknowledge that in an internation-
al context ‘legally binding’ may not necessarily mean
that much, as exemplified by Canada’s withdrawal
from the Kyoto Protocol in December 2011.43
Altogether, these institutional changes reinforced
the move toward MB of all three actors. They were
themselves strongly intertwined with reinforced po-
litical leadership on climate change in China and In-
dia, and novel strategic thinking about global climate
politics in the EU. The institutional adaptations thus
constitute reactions to geopolitical changes, but were
also fueled by material motivations and changing un-
derstandings of climate change.
3. Material Interests
China perceives tackling climate change as an oppor-
tunity to develop its low-carbon industry, an engine
for its economic growth. Bilateral cooperation on
technology with the EU, the leading bloc in renew-
able technology, is therefore of particular interest.
China is also interested in the EU’s low-carbon poli-
cy framework such as feed-in tariffs for renewable
energy and the carbon market. When it comes to In-
dia, China has political rather than economic inter-
ests in cooperating on climate change, although pro-
ducers of low-carbon technologies from China also
eye the vast market in India.
India had traditionally differentiated between its
domestic and international policies on climate
change – enforcing national policies such as the Na-
tional Action Plan on Climate Change while main-
taining the equitable per capita emissions stance on
emissions reduction commitments. This stance was
reflective of the government’s acknowledgement of
the grave dangers posed by climate change and the
need to fulfil developmental goals. While it cooper-
ated with China in UN negotiations, India preferred
bilateral hands-on cooperation with the US and the
EU, as it felt that it had a better chance of building
own capacities by following the West’s leadership in
cutting-edge technology.44 This changed consider-
ably after the Modi government took charge and sub-
stantially enhanced India’s cooperation with China
in the renewable energy sector.45
96
As pointed out, the EU and China increasingly de-
veloped a joint vision about the importance of reduc-
ing pollution in general and a common interest when
it comes to enhancing their energy security. This
makes bilateral cooperation per se, as evidenced by
the China-EU Partnership on Climate Change, much
more probable (including, e.g., a five-million euro ca-
pacity-building project on emissions trading). More-
over, climate change provides economic opportuni-
ties for low-carbon technology sectors in key mem-
ber states (Germany, France). In the EU-India rela-
tionship on climate change, material interests remain
largely overshadowed by debates about the norma-
tive foundations of the issue, however.
In synthesis, for all three players, the importance
of shifting to a low-carbon economy has become more
evident over time, and each of them realizes that this
interest can best be pursued through relations among
key emitters, further reinforcing the move towards
MB identified in the run-up to the Paris summit.
4. Ideational Factors
When it comes to ideas about climate change, com-
pared to the EU’s desire for precautionary action, Chi-
na has traditionally prioritized its development space,
which resonates with India’s desire for freedom of
energy choice. At the same time, China and the EU
share concerns over long-term energy security, which
prompted China to invest heavily in energy diversi-
fication. China shares thus the attachment to the idea
of equity with India, and to that of security with the
EU. These shared understandings of climate change,
in turn, enabled the country to adopt a cooperative
MB strategy vis-à-vis both India and the EU in recent
years, which was also reciprocated by both.
The bilateral relations between India and the EU
are more complicated: the Union’s long-standing,
principled approach based on precaution, clashes
with India’s insistence on equity. The importance
that the EU attached to getting to an agreement on
climate change at Paris, and the growing awareness
of the significance of the climate threat in India
paired to its desire to avoid being blamed as a ‘spoil-
er’, nevertheless allowed for a minimum of ideation-
al convergence that led to cooperative behavior in the
most recent climate negotiations.
Altogether, geopolitical changes and the COP 15
‘shock’ triggered and interacted with several impor-
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CCLR 2|2018
tant domestic processes related to institutional and
leadership changes, evolving interest-based motiva-
tions and understandings of climate change. Institu-
tional adaptations related to diplomatic strategies
and leadership changes in all three cases may weigh
more importantly on the observed move toward MB
than fundamental economic interests or value con-
vergence, although in the Chinese case, the restruc-
turing of its economy definitely enhanced the coun-
try’s willingness for international cooperation.
VIII. Conclusion
Multiple bilateralism involving key emitters is an
emerging trend in global climate politics. This arti-
cle demonstrates that while during the run-up to and
at the 2009 Copenhagen summit only limited evi-
dence points towards the active deployment of MB
by either China, India or the EU, things changed con-
siderably during the period 2011-2015. In the run-up
to and at the Paris summit, especially China and the
EU (but also the US, as explained elsewhere)46
turned to MB as a vehicle to reach policy objectives
at the multilateral level. China’s active diplomatic
engagement and rising willingness to embrace a
leadership position is easily underestimated, per-
haps due to its preference for a ‘sober’ diplomatic
style. However, the range of important, presidential-
level bilateral agreements with the US, the EU and
individual EU member states on climate change
clearly indicates a significant change compared to
its previous diplomatic strategy. The post-COP 15
change of the EU’s diplomatic strategy was equally
significant: real lessons were drawn from Copen-
hagen, based on a much better understanding of the
positions of its counterparts. India, finally, adopted
a comparatively more unilateral modus operandi,
but launched some initiatives that can be interpret-
ed as marking the beginning of a MB strategy in the
course of 2015.
Several important factors contributed to the ob-
served changes between the two studied periods. The
failure of the Copenhagen summit to produce a glob-
al agreement, which was largely due to changes in
the geopolitics of climate change that had not been
sufficiently understood at the time, provided an ex-
46 (n 5) Belis et al.
CCLR 2|2018
ternal trigger for a series of internal processes that
interacted to produce the Paris outcome. In China,
growing geopolitical and economic importance,
greater assertiveness over time and evolving internal
interests and ideas regarding climate change result-
ed in a desire for leadership and a certain conver-
gence with the EU’s position. By contrast, although
India also desired to avoid being a spoiler in Paris,
no fundamental shift in position occurred. It gener-
ally held true to its strongly principled position em-
phasizing equity. As a result, a certain normative dis-
connect between India and the EU can be observed,
while India’s ideational gap with China increased, to
a large extent due to the latter’s different level of de-
velopment. The EU, finally, underwent a strategic
readjustment primarily in reaction to the changing
climate geopolitics embodied in the negative Copen-
hagen experience, and an increased understanding
of the interests and ideas underpinning China’s and
India’s (and others’) positions.
47 Climate Change News, ‘Leaked EU-China Climate Statement’
(Climate Change News, 1 June 2017) <http://www
.climatechangenews.com/2017/06/01/leaked-eu-china-climate
-statement-full/> accessed 22 May 2018.
48 Anjali Jaiswal, ‘India Leads on Climate Action as Trump Exits Paris
Agreement’ (Natural Resources Defense Council, 1 June 2017)
<https://www.nrdc.org/experts/india-leads-climate-action-trump
-withdraws-paris> accessed 22 May 2018.
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97
Overall, it can be argued that MB has served trust-
building and the identification of ‘landing zones’ well
before the start of the Paris summit, for example
through the invention and formulation of INDCs. It
thus also facilitated the adoption of the Paris Agree-
ment, even if fundamental conflicts at the position-
al level may remain (e.g. on CBDR). MB will now need
to be sustained to successfully implement the Paris
Agreement – in the absence of the United States. This
might work out: at their summit the day after
Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the Agree-
ment, the EU and China discussed a draft joint dec-
laration on climate change characterizing the Paris
Agreement as ‘an historic achievement further accel-
erating the irreversible global low greenhouse gas
emission and climate resilient development’ and out-
lined further joint actions.47 This move may be sup-
ported by India, which has unequivocally reiterated
its support for the Agreement.48 If the three players
can pursue a MB pattern, collaborate with other sup-
portive countries such as Canada, and also bind in
non-state actors (especially in the US), multiple bilat-
eralism will form the nucleus of a form of networked
co-leadership that may render the US administra-
tion’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement much
less detrimental for the future of the multilateral cli-
mate regime than initially assumed following
Trump’s ascent to power.