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Student Politics
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Bristol University Press
Chapter Title: Student Politics
Book Title: Contesting Higher Education

Book Subtitle: The Student Movements Against Neoliberal Universities
Book Author(s): Donatella della Porta, Lorenzo Cini and César Guzmán-Concha
Published by: Bristol University Press. (2020)
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4
Student Politics
Introduction
When activists plan a mobilization campaign, decide the timing of

their actions, prepare their public discourses and design the modes in
which they will attempt to involve their constituencies, among other
crucial aspects of all protest movements, they show how agency is
at the centre of resistances and struggles. But protest movements are
situated historically. Activists do not decide in a vacuum. History,
institutions and cultures leave an imprint on the contemporaneity of
social movements, not only as structures that condition and limit but
also as sources of creativity and agency. To understand what student
activists do and how they do it, we must look at the characteristics of
the organizations in which they act, where these organizations come
from, their connections with the party system, and the traditions of
activism that feed and shape the new generations of students.
In this chapter, we focus on two dimensions to explain the ways in
which students react to changes in the HE sector. First, the extent to
which the student body has access to decision-making instances, at
levels that include university governance and the governance of the
HE sector, is examined. The question to be answered here is: how do
students relate to state and educational institutions? The recognition
of students as counterparts, stakeholders or customers signals different
ways in which the state regulates students’ access to key instances of
decision making. Similarly, access can be regular (institutionalized and
regulated by law) or exceptional (dependent upon the willingness of
university or political leaders to include students in their decisional
bodies). It is maintained that the degree of institutionalization of student
representation within HE fields shapes the ways in which students access
HE decisional bodies, organize their claim-making and other activities,
and helps form their interests and demands. The kind of relations
97
CONTESTING HIGHER EDUCATION
between student organizations and authorities constitutes an important

component of the structure of opportunities available to students.
The second dimension, which we call student politics, conceptualizes
the forms that student activism takes, irrespective of the degrees of
formalization and recognition from the state. The main question
here is: how do students do politics? It is contended that cultures of
political activism heavily influence the ways in which this happens.
The stronger the tradition of political activism, the more militant in
terms of tactics and demands the student movement is expected to be.
Associated with this, it is to be considered whether student politics
is organized centrally and nationally and/or exhibits a nationwide
scope of intervention by claiming, for instance, to represent the entire
student body and targeting, or not, central and national authorities.
If this is the case, we speak of a coordinated field of student politics. In
such a field, student governments become arenas in which groups
of students, organized by ideological, political or other common
features, attempt to represent and/or mobilize the student body.
Here, student governments (federations and unions) exert attraction
over a significant portion of activists, shaping the whole field of
student politics. In coordinated fields, an overlapping between formal
organizations (federations and unions) and informal organizations
(politico-ideological groups, affinity groups and even branches of
political parties) is noticeable. Activists often participate both in formal
and informal groups simultaneously, as ideological or affinity groups
consider formal organizations as tools and platforms to pursue their
agenda. Participation in various organizations sometimes amplifies
the effect of activism. Internal elections, congresses, caucuses and
assemblies set the clock of internal competitions. The institutions of
student government –student associations, federations or unions –are
important as they offer resources and legitimacy that allow the leading
groups to implement their agenda. When these institutions are well
established, they can become the vehicles through which students
attempt to influence HE or university policies, or even intervene in
national politics or transnational campaigns.
On the contrary, when no organization can successfully claim the
representation of significant parts of the student body, we refer to
fragmented fields of student politics. In this variety, there are no established
arenas of political competition, no group can voice student demands
in a coherent, structured manner, and authorities (university leaders,
politicians and governmental actors) can easily disregard students.
Normally, this scenario depicts the case of locally-based networks of
organizations connecting different subnational geographical areas and/
98
Student Politics
or university campuses, which can sometimes be accompanied by the

presence of a nationwide organization having, however, a low degree
of autonomy vis-à-vis state authorities and with secondary roles in
protest activities. Formal and informal organizations do not overlap, as
they tend to work with different agendas and pursue often divergent
goals, and activists choose one in which to invest their time and effort.
In coordinated fields of student politics, the existence of institutions
of student government recognized by the student base, provides
incentives for coordinated collective action among affinity or politico-
ideological groups. They tend to facilitate the building of coalitions
within the heterogeneous landscape of campuses. On the contrary, in
fragmented fields of student politics, the weakness or lack of student
governments makes more difficult the emergence of coalitions among
the plurality of groups. If they are recognized by their bases, student
governments can become a facilitating factor for the coordination of
various groups that populate university campuses. This facilitating
effect can occur irrespective of the specific forms these governments
might take (associations, unions or federations). Large protest campaigns
are more likely when the competition among groups (for leadership,
internal resources or support among the student base) is suspended
and movements voice a relatively coherent set of demands. Student
governments can perform this function more efficiently than other
sorts of bodies.
It is argued that, while higher degrees of institutionalization of
student organizations tend to channel the relationship between students
and institutions into a more conventional pattern, the structuration
of the field of student politics can offset this effect, leading students
towards rather confrontational stances. This outcome is more likely
when the perception of threat is high, the sector has endured policy
changes that undermine previous arrangements, and/or traditions of
activism predispose students to higher levels of politicization.
The four regions studied in this book represent different
configurations. While the centrality, resilience and strength of student
associations creates a unified field of student politics both in Quebec
and Chile, in England and Italy we observe a rather fragmented field,
as student unions have lost their former centrality and a plurality
of informal organizations constantly compete for the hegemony in
student politics. Similarly, a low level of formalization of student
representation, which translates as limited access to the policy-making
process, is characteristic of Italy and Chile. In contrast, in England and
Quebec, students have some channels to make their voice heard and
their organizations enjoy degrees of legal protection and resources. In
99
this chapter we offer a detailed account of these features and of the

ways they shape different modes of student activism.
Low institutionalization, coordinated field: Chile

Chile is a case showing low levels of institutionalization of student
governments within a coordinated field of student politics. As we
explain in this section, the prevailing political culture gives high
relevance to traditional student associations as privileged arenas
of activism. These associations act as if they had the monopoly of
representation of the student body. This compensates for the lack of
recognition of student federations in the governance of HEIs and as
legitimate counterparts of the student body before the authorities.
This latter characteristic in particular distinguishes the Chilean case
from the Quebecoise one.
College students in Chile have traditionally been organized through
associations. At the level of schools, faculties or departments, these
organizations are called student centres (Centros de Alumnos, Centros
de Estudiantes), while at the university level they are called federations
(Federaciones de Estudiantes). The existence of these organizations dates
back to 1906, when FECH was born. These organizations have been
significant actors in social justice campaigns through the 20th century,
including the struggle against Pinochet’s dictatorship. This historical
background shapes them in profound ways even today.
Federations are not legally recognized. Their elections are based
on customary rules which vary from federation to federation. Some
organizations have internal acts that regulate their governance, but these
have little or no legal value. Almost all practices of decision making,
and the rights and obligations of members of executive committees,
student centres and single students, are regulated on a conventional,
customary basis.
Federations do not collect fees from their members and do not
receive direct state subsidies, even though most universities offer
some financial assistance, facilitating venues and resources such as
the use of computers, telephones, or the refund of travel expenses.
Some federations organize parties, events or celebrations to generate
some income from the sale of drinks, food or tickets. Others establish
partnerships with private companies for sponsorship for merchandising
products such as T-shirts or agendas, but this is an option restricted
to the most established federations, or to those in universities with a
numerous (or rich) student population. Overall, for economic matters,
federations are dependent on the funding provided by their home
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Student Politics
institutions. However, no binding agreements exist between federations

and universities, and their relationship is based on mutual recognition
and trust. Therefore, there can be a significant disparity in terms of
the resources they have at their disposal.1
The path towards acceptance by authorities in private universities
has not been without difficulties. Authorities in these institutions are
susceptible to being heavily influenced by the ideological agendas
of their owners who, in many cases, are not sympathetic to the idea
of students organizing, or who simply fear that federations would
politicize academic life in an improper manner. Some institutions have
also attracted students from the upper echelons of society, not known
for being eager to organize themselves in student unions. Nevertheless,
federations were eventually created in most of these institutions,
especially after 2011, including in those oriented to the social elite.
Federations’ executive committees are elected in competitive
elections based on the principle of one student, one vote. Some
federations have statutes that establish minimum quorums of turnout
to validate elections; in FECH, for example, the quorum is 40 per cent
of students enrolled in undergraduate programmes, while in FEUC
it is 50 per cent. Yet other federations, such as FEUACH (Federación
de Estudiantes, Universidad Austral de Chile) and FEC (Universidad
de Concepción) have not established quorums of validation. In most
federations, the most important decision-making body is the student
board (in FECH it is called pleno de federación, in FEUC consejo de
federación, in FEC consejo general de estudiantes). The board is integrated
by members elected by study programmes, schools or faculties
(consejeros, or vocales), representatives of the student centres (one for
each school or faculty). The executive committee –a body of five to
seven students –presides over the board and proposes the agenda for
every meeting. Decisions in this body are made by majority (consensual
decision-making practices are uncommon in student federations),
although for some especially sensitive issues qualified majorities or
other mechanisms (such as referendums) can be accepted. This has
been the case, for example, when it comes to deciding on general
strikes. Elections in all these bodies are held on a yearly basis. Overall,
the most important decisions are discussed in this instance, thus it plays
a key role in managing internal differences and building consensuses
and alliances among groups that participate in student governments.
In universities with well-established traditions of unionism, and
considering all the different bodies of student representation from the
local (student centres) to the university level, there can be between one
and two hundred elected positions. The elected student delegates, plus
101
those who participate in the politico-ideological groups (Autonomists,

Communists, Trotskyists, Feminists, and so on) and other affinity
groups, make up the critical mass of the student movement in
each university.
The student body has no right to vote in university governance. The
centre-left governments of the 1990s and 2000s did not restore, in fact,
the institutions of democratic, collegial governance that, suppressed
by the military in 1973, had granted student representation in the
senates and the right to vote in the elections of rectors. University
leaders have limited themselves to recognizing federations as legitimate
representatives of students, thus inviting them to official bodies such as
university boards and councils of deans –but only with speaking rights.
While this is customary, it is not an institutional practice regulated by
law, the only exception being the University of Chile, whose 2006
statute created a senate with the participation of seven students out of
36 members. At the time of the writing of this book, the parliament
was discussing a new law that would regulate this aspect.
CONFECH is the organization of students at the national level. It
was created in the 1980s as the platform of the so-called ‘democratic’
federations (as opposed to the federations controlled by the dictatorship
as a way to neutralize student activism) that participated in the
struggle against the Pinochet regime. Technically, CONFECH is a
confederation of federations, and not a supra-organization of rank and
file students. Its speakers are nominated based on a principle of rotation,
rather than elected. CONFECH does not possess headquarters or
offices, does not collect fees and does not receive any kind of subsidy.
The very existence of this organization is based on collective informal
rules, which in turn stem from the memory and identity of the student
movement. Each federation has one vote irrespective of the number
of students of its organization or university. Decisions are made by
majority, based on a public agenda which is previously communicated
to its members. The meetings are open to the public, and since 2011
CONFECH often invites other organizations that belong to the so-
called ‘social movement for education’, such as those that represent
secondary students (like the Coordinating Assembly of High-School
Students [ACES] and the Centre of Social Conflict and Cohesion
Studies [COES]). However, these organizations have only speaking
rights, as only federations can vote to make CONFECH’s official
decisions. In 2017, as many as 57 student federations were members
of CONFECH, of which 21 came from state-owned universities, 14
from private universities created before 1980 (which, along with the
state-owned institutions, belong to a group of so-called ‘traditional
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Student Politics
universities’), and 19 from private (created after 1980) universities. In

contrast, in 2011, it had 30 federations, all of them from state-owned,
traditional universities.
For most of its history, student politics has been dominated by
organized groups that respond to specific ideologies along the left-
right cleavage. During most of the 20th century, there were strong ties
between national political parties and student politics. Groups on the
left have been significant at various moments in the history of student
federations (Moraga Valle, 2007; Muñoz Tamayo, 2012), as happened
in the 1960s, or during the struggle against the dictatorship. However,
Catholic, reform-oriented students have also played an important role.
In the Catholic University of Santiago, right-wing gremialistas have
been strong since the late 1960s, leading the FEUC in several periods.
But overall, right-wing or conservative groups have been traditionally
a minority in student politics.
The ties between the student movement and the party system started
to weaken immediately after the transition to democracy (Aguilera
Ruiz, 2016; Thielemann Hernández, 2016). In the early 1990s, scandals
of petty corruption and lack of autonomy from the government
led several federations (including FECH) to collapse. The crisis was
overcome with a shift in the preferences of students; the youth sections
of centre-left parties were seen with increasing mistrust, while groups
located on their left became more relevant in student politics. This
shift was the consequence of a more profound cultural change that
developed from the 1990s throughout the 2000s.
Against a hegemonic narrative that depicted the youth as apolitical
and apathetic (Duarte, 2006), new forms of politicization emerged
among high school adolescents and college students (Aguilera Ruiz,
2016). They built upon the politicization of a variety of subcultural
and countercultural groups, coalescing around a range of musical
(metal, punk, cumbia), artistic, social and communitarian inclinations.
Common to all these cases was dissatisfaction with political and
economic elites and challenges to the status quo. These different
forms of associational patterns triggered different routes of potential
politicization. Educational institutions (universities and schools) were
the social spaces in which these groups coalesced, proud of their
distance from the political establishment. The politicization of the
young started to become apparent with the protests staged by secondary
students in 2001 (the mochilazo), which opposed the high costs of the
student transportation pass. The protest campaign was led by ACES, a
new association of secondary students that challenged the old logics of
participation and played a crucial role during the Penguin Revolution
103
of 2006. This was a series of protests staged by secondary students,

which included the occupations of several schools, demanding free
public transport passes, the abolition of the Organic Constitutional Act
of Teaching and the end of the municipalization of education (both
approved during the dictatorship).
Although some of the leaders of the Penguin Revolution became
(or were already) members of political parties, those who occupied
their schools and demonstrated in the streets were less inclined to
institutional politics. Many were to continue their activism during
their post-secondary education, feeding the various politico-ideological
groups of the field of student politics, and actively participating in the
events of the Chilean Winter. Several groups would prosper, such as
Izquierda Autónoma (Autonomous Left), Nueva Izquierda (New Left),
Movimiento Marginal Guachuneit (Marginal Movement Guachuneit),
Frente de Estudiantes Libertarios (Libertarian Students Front) and many
‘colectivos’, which are smaller groups that emerged at school or university
level. After 2011 a new wave of organizations was to emerge: Unión
Nacional Estudiantil (National Student Union), Somos (we are), and
Revolución Democrática (Democratic Revolution), among others.
All these groups have a strong ideological identification with the left.
Most recently, groups of students related to new centre-r ight and liberal
parties (such as Amplitud and Ciudadanos) have been successful in
some new federations in private universities (for example, in Adolfo
Ibanez University and UDD).
The Communist Party –through its youth section (la jota) – remains
the only established, old political party with significant presence and
influence in student politics. The youth sections of political parties
represented in parliament have become residual forces in many
federations, being displaced to marginal positions (Von Bülow and
Bidegain Ponte, 2015). Even though the communists led FECH and
FEUSACH in 2010 and 2011, and one of the main leaders of the
2011 strikes was a party member (Camila Vallejo), la jota paid a price
for being in that position, losing both federations in the elections held
after the strike. Later, the Communist Party joined the centre-left
alliance New Majority (Nueva Mayoría), supporting Michelle Bachelet
as presidential candidate. This decision, to a certain extent, divided
the student movement. As shown by Mella Polanco (2016) in a study
about the balance of power in CONFECH, the federations controlled
by the new forces of the left have increased since 2011, a surge that
occurred basically at the expense of the communists and other minor
forces affiliated to the New Majority.
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Student Politics
These changes in the balance of power at the level of CONFECH

can be partially explained by its enlargement into the private university
sector (it has almost doubled in size since 2011). Despite initial
hesitations, the politico-ideological groups in competition eventually
saw enlargement as an opportunity to expand their influence and/or
to compensate their weaknesses. This happened not only on the left.
Also for the gremialistas, a group based in PUC, with strong ties with
the right-wing party UDI (Unión Demócrata Independiente), doing
politics outside CONFECH was not a viable option. According to
one of the leading figures of the gremialista movement, which presided
FEUC in 2015:
‘a body that represents all university students in Chile

is a positive thing, we see a value in being part of the
CONFECH. We don’t like how it works today; there are
many things we would like to change there and we lack
enough votes to do it. But we believe that CONFECH is a
good body for students and FEUC must be there. … This
year new federations have entered CONFECH, such as
those from Andrés Bello University, Finis Terrae University,
Universidad del Desarrollo, and we expect that soon other
federations will come from the so-called cota mil [referring
to private, elite-oriented universities], we are very much
in favour of the admission of new federations from worlds
not previously represented there.’ (CHI 5)
The Chilean case shows that, despite their political and ideological
differences, very diverse groups recognize both CONFECH and the
student federations as legitimate, necessary arenas of political exchange.
This normative disposition helps to configure a unitary field of
student politics, to the extent that it helps compensate for the negative
effects of a closed institutional setting that does not grant federations
access, recognition or resources. Competitions for leadership and
hegemony are relatively contained within the framework provided
by CONFECH and federations, with an overlap between formal
and informal organizations favouring coordinated collective action
at larger levels.
High institutionalization, fragmented field: England

England is a case of high institutionalization of student politics,
especially in terms of union organizing and student governments,
105
which have regular access to all HE governing bodies and authorities,

and in principle are entitled to negotiate with them. Yet, historically,
the English field of student activism has been politically weak
and organizationally fragmented, lacking a nationally recognized
coordination of activists and only able to address demands at the local
level, mainly on issues related to individual colleges and universities
(Blackstone and Hadley, 1971). These features of student politics have
been heavily reflected in the protest and organizational field of the
2010 student mobilizations.
The low level of political militancy of student union politics in
Britain is a historical legacy of the creation and development of a
nationally coordinated student union, NUS, constitutionally lacking a
political mission. NUS was founded in 1922 as a national confederation
uniting the local student unions (SUs), which had been active in the
various British universities since the beginning of the 20th century to
provide opportunities for social activity and leisure.2 NUS developed its
infrastructure and bought its own headquarters thanks to fundraising from
distinguished figures across the political divide. Therefore, its leadership
did not initially see the organization as ‘propagandist’; the focus was
on practical activities such as organizing travel, student exchanges and
debating tours. The ‘apolitical’ status of NUS was then formalized in
1944, when its council delegates agreed on ratifying a constitutional
change stating that the union should not discuss any action which does
not concern the students of England and Wales as such (NUS, 1944).
Put otherwise, since 1944 NUS has been constitutionally obliged to
avoid tackling political or religious issues and thus becoming a hotbed
of student activism. When, for instance, the Radical Student Alliance
and Vietnam Solidarity Campaign came along in 1966 to promote
the first real massive student protest campaign (more than 100,000
students attended a rally in the wake of the sit-in and hunger strike
at the London School of Economics [LSE]), the NUS played a very
marginal role. In 1967 and 1968, one third of the demonstrations
were concerned with student demands to participate in university or
college government, and the remainder were divided in roughly equal
proportions between issues of student discipline, guest speakers, and
curriculum reform (Blackstone and Hadley, 1971). All in all, the British
student movement of the sixties was held together by shared ideas and
ideals rather than by formal organizational structures. Hierarchy was
firmly rejected, and participation by all who wished to express a view
was seen as not just desirable but essential: ‘[c]‌ommunication between
activists was achieved through informal networks rather than formalized
meetings or structures’ (Byrne, 1997, p 32).
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Student Politics
This situation came to an end at the NUS National Conference in

1969, when the motion on the possibility of adopting the tactics used
in student protest was won. Pressure from radical left groups operating
within NUS-UK led to a constitutional change that removed the ‘no
politics clause’. This allowed delegates at NUS conferences to discuss
broader issues, whether related to students or not. The delegates
broadened the aims and objectives of the constitution to include
‘political’ discussion.3 From this moment onwards, two apparently
opposing tendencies have characterized the history of NUS and of
its politics, both contributing, however, to weakening its political
potential. On the one hand, a process of professionalization of its
leadership and institutionalization of its organizational structures and
practices started to take place; on the other, a dynamic of political
factionalism within the whole organization was triggered.
The process of institutionalization/p rofessionalization was
strengthened by the attempts by national governments and university
leaderships to regulate and/or constrain the funding channels and
the decision-making process of the SUs to neutralize their most
political and, therefore, potentially most dangerous activities. Such
an ‘anti-political’ view of the SU was laconically expressed by the
director of HEPI who, in describing the role British SUs should have,
confided to us:
‘when [NUS] tries to be a commentator on global affairs,

namely, more politicized, it is not influential. NUS
should be a service provider not a protest movement. At
the local level student unions are great (they are service
providers). The national leadership is only interested in
protesting. If they want to have an impact, they should be
less [of a] protest movement and focus on student matters.
For instance, all the times NUS leaders speak in favour
of Palestine, they alienate many students and potential
supporters. They should represent seven million students.
Every time leaders take on a contested view, they alienate
part of these students.’ (EN 12)
Attempts to neutralize the political potential of SUs have been taking

place for over 30 years. With respect to funds, in 1980 the Conservative
government changed the way in which SUs were funded, incorporating
the SU fee into the per capita fee received by universities and colleges
for tuition, with the hope that institutions themselves would restrict SU
finances. Henceforward, SUs were compelled to negotiate with their
107
institutions for a grant to support their activities. More specifically, SUs

are today paid by the university management to provide services that
universities want and also have large numbers of full-time staff whose
job is precisely to prevent any bad feeling with the people who pay
them. As a student officer at LSE in 2010/11 told us when describing
his personal and professional experience in the SU:
‘The university pays me £27,000 per year: it’s another

problem, that is, being paid by the university. Only four
people who are elected are paid. I don’t have any decision-
making power. We just organize events and stuff. We are
a kind of democratic union. [The] [u]‌niversity gives a
block grant to the student union, only to the extent that
the student union produces value for the university, by
offering a gamut of student services. So, this stimulates a
process of commodification of the student union itself.
For instance, we provide academic advice, immigration
advice, [and a] series of activities during the term. We
have 60 people working full time for our union. Then we
provide commercial activities. We rent a bar, a gym. We
make money out of the gym, out of the bar, out of the
shops. That money goes to the staff (our salaries) and to
the activities of the student union.’ (EN 9)
To avoid full financial (and decisional) dependence on their institutions,

most SUs have started to supplement this grant with income derived
from commercial activities such as shops, bars and nightclubs.4 In their
research on the current attitudes and practices of British student officers,
Brooks et al. (2015a) found out that they consider the profit derived
from commercial activities as very important in helping to protect
their independence by giving the SUs some autonomy in deciding
how to spend their money. As a result, some conceptions and practices
of entrepreneurialism are beginning to spread within the British SUs
precisely as a form of opposition to the invasive interventionism of the
university leadership over their financial activities.
As for the institutional transformation of SUs, the wave of
governance restructurings of the late 1980s led to the introduction
of external trustees – often business and university heads – in
their governing bodies. A quasi-corporate model seemed thus to
emerge in the SUs, generating an organizational culture that was
fundamentally antagonistic to the grassroots model. Accordingly, the
NUS leadership started to see itself as a national level lobbying group,
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Student Politics
with local unions as service providers, members as consumers, and

democracy as expendable (Kumar, 2011). The number and scale of
services provided intensified with the establishment of NUS Services
Limited (NUSSL) which was a separate corporate entity purchasing
products collectively and providing various support and marketing
packages. SUs are today large potential markets as they manage over
200 different premises across Britain, including shops, cafés, bars and
music venues, with a total turnover of at least £120 million per year
(NUS, 2015). The service side of the union involves a structure of
unelected managers and paid employees that runs in parallel to the
elected student positions. Although technically unions are not profit-
making enterprises, the logic of running such services tends towards
profit maximization. This can encroach on the interests of students,
in particular relating to activism.
The NUS and the affiliated SUs have undergone a series of significant
changes that have limited political activism over the last three decades.
Turning points in such changes were the 1994 Education Act and the
2006 Charities Act. These acts formalized the structures of SUs and
then forced them to become registered charities, which further shifted
the balance away from activism towards service provision. More notably,
the 1994 Education Act placed duties on the university governing body
to ensure that the SUs were run in a free, fair and proper manner.
Additionally, all major office-bearers were to be elected by a cross-
campus ballot of members and the financial affairs of the union were
to be properly conducted.5 In 2006, the Charities Act definitively
transformed NUS into a ‘quasi-corporate’ organization with the
creation of a Board of Trustees (made up of students, elected officers,
and some lay advisors who would hold legal and financial liability),
whose aim was to exert a bureaucratic control over its organizational
and financial activities in order to reduce the likelihood of it developing
a militant attitude among its ranks. The move to charitable status was
accompanied by widespread changes to the constitutions and internal
democracy of SUs. The leadership of NUS did not fight the attacks
on internal democracy but rather, it saw them as an opportunity
to restructure the union in the consumer services direction. In this
respect, the political document, Manifesto for Partnership, launched by
the NUS leadership in 2012, with its call for a ‘partnership working’
with senior institutional managers represented the culmination of such
a managerialist approach (NUS, 2015). The manifesto was indeed
considered an attempt to develop a political agenda with student
leaders conceived of as co-producers within institutional governance
(Brooks, 2016).
109
The second (and only apparently divergent) tendency accompanying

the development of NUS over the last 30 years has been the process of
politicization of its internal organizational structures. Also as a result
of the dynamics of institutional co-optation, a process of political
factionalism between a moderate and lobbyist leadership and militant
networks of activists has begun to take place within the organization,
witnessing peaks of high divergence and antagonism during the national
conferences, held regularly every year to decide the political orientation
and agenda for the next year. In other words, the neoliberal HE reforms
of the last three decades, affecting in several respects also the mode of
student organization, have brought about a process of political division
and factionalism among the English students themselves, disputing the
ways such reforms could be fought back and/or accepted. The political
divergence was particularly strong in NUS, as reforms over education
funding policy were planned to be discussed and implemented by the
British government. In this sense, the 2010 protests were only part of a
larger story of dispute over student financial issues between competing
student political factions dating back to at least 1997 and the electoral
triumph of Tony Blair’s New Labour government, rehearsed repeatedly
during the HE funding debates of 1997–8 and 2002–4 and continuing
to shape both ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ student politics today. In all these
debates, the central contentious issue was indeed the political position
to adopt towards the introduction (1996–8) and then increase (2002–4;
2008–11) of student fees. Arguments over education funding were
formulated to define political affiliations and defeat or marginalize
opponents within student politics as much as they were formulated
to influence decision makers. Student funding has represented and
still represents the main cleavage on which English students politically
coalesce and divide themselves in SUs, in NUS and, more broadly, in
the student movement (Hensby, 2016).
More specifically, the political history of NUS over the last 20 years
can be depicted as a history of confrontation and division between a ‘left’
wing faction, supporting free HE and militant tactics of contention, and
a ‘right’ wing faction, adopting a pragmatic approach towards graduate
tax as a way to also have political influence in the national public debate
of those years. Much as Tony Blair sought to modernize the Labour
Party, the moderate factions within NUS sought to adopt a funding
policy that it was believed would ensure the relevance of NUS in the
debates that were to follow. The NUS Conference in 1996 voted to
abandon a long-standing policy of returning student maintenance grants
(non-repayable and intended to help cover living and study costs) to
1979 levels and instead conceded that students could fund their own
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Student Politics
maintenance. This position on grants was informed by an intent on

the part of NUS to be perceived as relevant in the political debate. As
the Labour Student, Douglas Trainer, elected NUS President in 1996
declared at the time: ‘what we decide will determine what role we have
in shaping the future of HE in this country. The further we get from 1979
grant levels, the further we get from the negotiating table’ (Miller, 1997).
In this sense, the introduction of student fees and loans was “a
compromise [between the NUS leadership and New Labour] not written
in the Dearing recommendations. The president of NUS negotiated
with the government about that outcome.” (EN 18) For the Blairities
of Labour Students, who in those years had the political majority in the
NUS national conference, such a new political orientation ‘represented a
rejection of the politics of occupation and conflict in favour of building
a new centre-left consensus between politicians, educationist and unions’
(THES, 1996). Overall, the 1996–8 HE funding campaign established
the terms of the funding debate within the student movement. The
moderate NUS leadership took an approach to defeat tuition fees based
on a pragmatic analysis of the political environment, and in doing so
attempted to marginalize the radical left factions. The latter responded by
attacking the morality and motivations of the moderate NUS leadership
and reiterating their principled commitment to free education as well
as to protest and direct action. In their view, the NUS leadership was
timid, passive, and more interested in securing a safe Labour seat than
in fighting for social change (Kumar, 2011).
In 2007–9, again under the leadership of the Labour Students, NUS
developed a long-term plan to win the funding debate, a plan that was
tied closely to the reforms of NUS governance passed in 2009 that
were widely perceived to be designed to minimize the influence of
radical factions. With respect to the funding issue, the NUS leadership
was still in favour of a graduate tax model, while the left was always in
favour of free education. In doing so, the moderates
adapted policy positions, political rhetoric, and tactics to the

context, while radicals stuck to well-established positions
and tactics that were framed as a rejection of all the aspects
of the status quo. The left accused the moderates, and
their tactics of policy research, direct lobbying of political
elites, and limited student mobilization, of selling out to
the establishment. The moderates accused the left, with
their tactics of direct action, protest, and occupation, of
sacrificing real influence for cosy moral attitude. (McVitty,
2016, p 101)
111
In the same token, Woodcock (2014) depicts NUS as a politically

very contradictory (and controversial) organization based upon three
competing interests: activism, lobbying and service provision.6 For
him, the activism and lobbying components must be understood as
two conflicting perspectives on how change can be achieved, which
can be identified respectively with a ‘from-above’ and a ‘from-below’
option. Lobbying is an elitist approach that attempts to persuade those
in power to introduce change ‘from-above’. It stands in contrast to
activism, which for this purpose is assumed to require mass participation
to force change ‘from-below’.
Table 4.1 illustrates the set of student organizations, identified and
grouped by their own distinct political strategic orientation (that
is, main political goal and main tactic of action), which were active
between 1996 and 2011. As is seen, these organizations constitute the
two main political factions within the English field of student politics,
competing for the NUS leadership and, more broadly, for the political
leadership of the English student movement.
The aleatory and changing nature of these organizations shows the
absence of a formally organized position within the English field of
student politics (this holds especially for the radical groups). ‘Radicals’
are the student groups sharing a free HE agenda and the adoption of
radical tactics of action, and ‘moderates’ are those that adopt a more
pragmatic agenda of HE (graduate tax) and are united by their shared
Table 4.1: The main organizations/political factions within the English

student movement and National Union of Students, classified according
to the political and strategic orientation adopted during the three cycles of
reforms on student fees (1996–2011)
Radicals Moderates
Political goal: free education Political goal: graduate tax
Tactic of action: disruption Tactic of action: lobbyism
1996–1998 Student Broad Left (SBL), National Organization of
Campaign for Free Education Labour (NOLS),
(CFE) Organised Independents
(OIs)
2002–2004 Student Broad Left (SBL), National Organization of
Education Not for Sale (ENS) Labour (NOLS),
Organised Independents
(OIs)
2008–2011 National Campaign Against Fees National Organization of
and Cuts (NCAF), Labour (NOLS),
Education Activist Network (EAN) Organised Independents
(OIs)
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Student Politics
concern to minimize the influence of the ‘left’. In the first group,

organizations such as CFE, EAN, ENS, NCAF are included, while in
the second NOLS and the OIs. The ‘radicals’ tend to prefer disruption
as a main political strategy, while the ‘moderates’, lobbyism.
Traditionally, the student factions with a radical orientation are the
front organizations of various far-left parties (such as, for instance, the
Alliance for Workers’ Liberty and the Socialist Worker Party, see again
Chapter 2), whereas the moderate factions are affiliated to the Labour
party and their leaders are deemed to be the future politicians of said
party. Unlike Chile (2011) or Quebec (2012), processes of aggregation
or coordination among these factions have not been successful. In
this sense, the division between radicals and moderates constitutes a
permanent feature of English student politics.
High institutionalization, coordinated field: Quebec

Quebec is a case in which student associations exhibit a significant
degree of institutionalization, thanks to a legal framework that sanctions
their roles and provides them with resources which guarantee their
functioning. However, unlike the English case, the field of student
politics is more coordinated. This occurs despite the existence of
various nationwide associations that compete for the leadership of
the student body, and for the enrolment of local-based associations.
The fact that only one association retains the legal representation of
the student body at the local level (schools and universities) contributes
to the unity of the field. This has helped to consolidate one arena of
political competition common to all groups.
The French-speaking province of Canada exhibits a dense network
of student organizations in colleges (CEGEPs), in department and
faculties at universities, and at the provincial level. These levels are
interconnected, forming a system in which the provincial (or higher)
levels of representation depend on the local associations (schools and
colleges). Thus, the core of the system is the associations of students
in faculties, schools and departments. Provincial SUs, in turn, are
formed by associations. Some local associations can have a few dozen
members only (in small departments with a low number of students)
while others can have thousands of members.
Four provincial student associations existed in 2012: FEUQ, FECQ,
ASSÉ and TaCEQ. FEUQ was founded in 1989 and is formed by
associations from several universities. FECQ was founded in 1990,
representing students at the college level only. ASSÉ was founded
in 2001 by activists that drew inspiration from the anti-globalization
113
movement of the time, introducing practices of horizontality and

direct democracy to the student organization. While ASSÉ works with
spokespersons (a man and a woman, one from the CEGEP sector and
the other from the university sector), FEUQ and FECQ work through
elected delegates. The fourth provincial association was the Quebec
Student Roundtable (TaCEQ). This was a federation of associations
founded in 2009 that had little influence in the events of 2012 onwards.
Following the strike, both TaCEQ and FEUQ underwent severe crises,
with various local associations criticizing their leadership and eventually
disaffiliating. TaCEQ dissolved in 2014, while FEUQ did so in 2015.
Thus, FECQ and ASSE are the only national SUs that survived the
2012 strike, ASSE being the only one at the university level. New
national associations have emerged in recent years: Union Étudiante
du Quebec (Quebec Student Union [UEQ]), and the Association for
the Voice of Education in Quebec (AVEQ), both founded in 2015.
The divides within student unionism can be explained by the
history of the student movement in the province. In the aftermath of
the Quiet Revolution, some SUs embraced a model of militant trade
unionism, others adopted an approach of social concertation instead
(Theurillat-Cloutier at al., 2014). The Union générale des étudiants
du Quebec (General Union of Students of Quebec [UGEQ]) was
founded in 1964 with the purpose of defending the democratization
and accessibility of HE. It adopted the principles of the Charte de
Grenoble, the declaration of the French student movement at the end
of the Second World War. The contents of this charter were heavily
influenced by the ideas of the French Communist Party, which saw
students as ‘young intellectual workers’ and assumed that in pursuing
their goals students had the right to strike. UGEQ acted in a period
of accelerated socio-economic change and nationalistic revival, the
Quiet Revolution, with demands concerning language and recognition
acquiring great centrality in public debate. The Quiet Revolution also
institutionalized social corporatism as a way to accommodate various
and often diverging interests under the direction of a developmentalist
state that assumed a modernizing programme (Montpetit, 2007). Thus,
HE policy started to be guided by corporatist modes of concertation.
The student strike of 1968 triggered the creation of the first five
seats of the Université du Québec to meet the demands for tertiary
education from a growing population of francophone students.
However, UGEQ dissolved amid its incapacity to deal with its various
internal trends. After a few years without a provincial organization,
the Association Nationale des Étudiants du Québec (National
Association of Students of Quebec [ANNEQ]) was founded in 1975.
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Student Politics
ANNEQ attempted to follow the historical and foundational precepts

of student syndicalism, but soon had to accept the appearance of the
Rassemblement des Associations Étudiantes Universitaires (RAEU)
in 1976 and its separation as an independent association in 1979. In
1982, the Fédération des Associations Étudiantes collégiales du Québec
(Federation of Quebec College Student Associations [FAECQ])
emerged. This consolidated the process of institutionalization of an
area that pursued an approach of social concertation with the state.
The entire field of student associations at all levels is regulated by Law
32 (adopted in 1983) about the accreditation and funding of the student
associations (Loi sur l’accréditation et le finacement d’élèves ou d’etudiants).
This law was inspired by the Rand formula (or automatic check-
off) that regulated labour unions in Canada and Quebec. However,
similar provisions have never been applied to the university sector in
any other Canadian province. According to this law, students become
automatically affiliated to unions and fees are collected on their behalf
with their enrolment. Law 32 aims at providing student associations
with financial resources to ensure their autonomy from the CEGEPs
and university administrations. Before that, student associations had
to ask for financial aid, which was understood as compromising their
independence. Following the Rand formula, universities charge and
collect SU fees at the beginning of the academic year, and transfer
these resources to the student associations. Moreover, this law obliged
colleges and universities to provide the associations with office space
and other facilities. However, to benefit from these provisions, student
associations must apply and be accredited. To do so, associations must
hold a referendum among their members according to strict predefined
rules and be approved by the Accreditation Officer of the Ministère de
l’Éducation of Quebec (Ministry of Education of Quebec [MEQ]).
One of the consequences of Law 32 is that student associations have
secured a constant stream of revenues, which in some cases can reach
hundreds of thousands of dollars (Poirier St-Pierre and Éthier, 2013).
Law 32 was controversial. Some federations were in favour of
receiving accreditation, but others feared that this would compromise
their autonomy from the government. The amount of the union fee,
and whether or not students can opt-out from paying the fee, depends
on each association.7
A number of student associations have permanent staff paid by the
union and have resources to hire personnel on a temporary basis for
specific positions. Provincial associations have the capacity to fund
specific projects from students or local associations. In 2006, ASSÉ
established a funding scheme for social projects from members and
115
non-members (in this case the group should have the support from a
member association). These are subsidies of up to C$600 for projects
that promote or are aligned with ASSÉ’s main goals. The Student
Faculty Association of Human Sciences at the University of Quebec
in Montreal (AFESH) also offers small subsidies to projects run by
their members (up to C$1,000 per project). AVEQ has set up a
Community Action Fund which distributed C$39,000 to 44 projects
across Quebec in 2017.
In addition to SUs, a number of other associations connected to
them have been established, thus contributing to the activist scene in
Quebec. The Public Interest Research Groups are examples of this.
These groups act as advocacy groups engaged in campaigns on issues
that go beyond the student experience, taking inspiration from the
North American model of student activism of the 1960s. For example,
the Quebec Public Interest Research Group at Concordia (QPIRG
Concordia) works in campaigns for migrant rights, in favour of first
nations and sexual minorities rights, as well as against extractivism,
war and consumerism. The Public Interest Research Group of the
University of Quebec in Montreal (GRIP UQAM) promotes popular
archives, popular education, alternative media and environmental
activist projects, among other issues. Thus, these groups are key nodes
of social and political activism in the province. These groups receive
funding from the associations or from students directly (who pay a
small fee).
Associations differ with regard to their organizing models and
practices. ASSÉ embraces the principles of horizontality and direct
democracy. The prime decision-making body is the congress, which
is held every year (Poirier St-Pierre and Éthier, 2013). Associations
of faculties and campuses send three representatives with the right of
voice and vote, while associations at the department level send one
delegate. The annual congress decides the goals of the organization for
the coming year, while the Conseil Central oversees the execution of
these decisions. To join ASSÉ, local associations must adopt the general
assembly as its central decision-making body. Through its principles,
organization and agenda, ASSÉ attempts to differentiate itself from
the student federations existing at the national level by promoting the
concept of student syndicalism.
FEUQ and FECQ instead adopt a more classical model of
organizing. The head of the organization is the executive committee,
elected by their members, which concentrates several functions.
Central to this model is the role of the president of the federation,
who usually makes decisions on behalf of the student base without
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Student Politics
consultation. These organizations were not only more moderate in

ideological terms, but also assumed that their role was to act as interest
groups, lobbying politicians in parliament and the government. The
verticality of these practices and the lack of responsiveness of their
leaders in relation to the student base have been strongly criticized not
only by ASSÉ but also by their own members. These organizations
have often been accused of being too close to the PQ. In particular,
these criticisms were very significant in the aftermath of the 2012
strike, and indeed they led FEUQ to a terminal crisis which triggered
the appearance of new organizations at the provincial level (UEQ
and AVEQ).
In their declaration of principles, both UEQ and AVEQ took these
criticisms into account and thus placed strong emphasis on transparency
and accountability. UEQ appears as the natural successor of FEUQ,
as the eight associations that concurred to found it were previously
members of the FEUQ. Although UEQ and AVEQ differ in their
political identity, they are similar in their organizational aspects.
UEQ places the caucus at the centre of the organization, which is
the meeting of the association members of the union. In AVEQ, this
body is called the Members’ Assembly. UEQ’s caucus meets every three
months, with decisions being taken by a double majority system: that
of the associations and that of the number of students represented
by the associations. These provisions aim at preventing the takeover
of the organization by small groups that are unrepresentative of the
student base.
In ideological terms, AVEQ is closer to ASSÉ. Its programme of
action recognizes a crisis of accessibility in HE in Quebec as caused
by tuition fee hikes but assumes that students must make their voices
heard on other issues too. It takes the demands of feminism on
board, fights against discrimination, and promotes the protection of
the environment. For example, Concordia Student Union (CSU),
one of the main associations of AVEQ, campaigned for years for
the divestment of the university endowment funds from the fossil
fuel industry. Despite ideological convergence at the level of general
orientations, the requirement of adopting the general assembly as the
main decision-making body makes it difficult for AVEQ to converge
with ASSÉ. Similarly, ASSÉ and their associations have spokespersons,
instead of presidents, with specific mandates taken collectively in the
assembly. This, for example, impedes spokespersons from commenting
on issues that fall outside the mandate given to them by the assembly.
These provisions are at odds with the organizational cultures of some
associations. Others might fear that this is too difficult a step to take
117
for constituencies that are not politicized in the same way as students
in UQAM or the most radical CEGEPs.
The student body also has the right to participate in university
governance. Since the 1960s and 1970s most universities in Canada
have adopted a bicameral governance structure involving a board in
charge of administrative affairs and a senate in charge of academic
policy (Bégin-Caouette and Jones, 2014). In Quebec, all universities
include students in both the board and the senate to varying degrees,
but the structure and composition of boards differ greatly. For
example, in the Université Laval, there are 3 students in a board
of 25 members, and 8 students (4 from the first cycle, 4 from the
second and third cycle) in a senate of 67 members (12 per cent of the
total). In UQAM, 2 students participate in a board of 16 members,
and 7 students designated by the certified associations integrate a
senate of 23 members (30 per cent of the senate’s seats). In most
cases, students hold elections to select these representatives, but
in some cases, associations can directly appoint them, for example
in boards (IGOPP, 2007b). A similar structure of governance with
participation of students in collegiate bodies is replicated at the
faculty and departmental levels. Similarly, in the English-speaking
universities, students participate in the process of selecting the
university president, as they integrate the search committees (Bégin-
Caouette and Jones, 2014).
University governance has recently become a controversial issue,
partly because of reform plans from the provincial government. There
have been proposals to update these structures to bring them closer
to those of Anglo-Saxon universities in North America, including
further autonomy to establish tuition fee levels, and more powers for
boards (IGOPP, 2007a). The provincial government presented Bill 38
in 2009. This bill introduced the requirement that 60 per cent of board
members must come from outside of the university (only Concordia
and the Université de Montréal exhibited that ratio). In addition,
the government would appoint three members to the boards of the
University of Quebec system and one member to the other institutions
of the province. For most French-speaking universities, this would
mean less government representation, but in McGill and Concordia this
would have implied for the first time that the government would hold
a seat on their board. The bill also reduced the influence of students
and non-academic staff on the boards. CREPUQ, the conference
of university rectors, accused the bill of unnecessarily increasing
procedural control, and compromising the autonomy of universities
with higher government interference. The bill would be eventually
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Student Politics
abandoned in 2011 amidst criticisms from students, professors, unions

and university authorities alike.
An important feature of student politics in Quebec is that activism
has been intense and well developed among francophone students,
and weak among anglophone students. This is the outcome of the rise
of the Quebec sovereignty movement since the 1960s. A number of
francophone CEGEPs have been hotbeds of political activism. Thus,
francophone universities recruit students who in many cases have
significant experience of activism or who have been sensitized towards
social and political action during their college experience. This makes
the field of student politics in Quebec more politicized than in any
other area of Anglo-Saxon North America. Yet politico-ideological
groups or the youth sections of political parties do not act openly in
student campaigns, despite some connections with parties such as the
PQ and the left-wing Quebec Solidaire.
One of the members of the executive committee of CSU explains
the differences between French and Anglo-Saxon youth culture thus:
‘there’s one association at McGill that went on strike during

2012, and it was the French Students Association, because
it was all Quebecers. There’s this historical, cultural identity
in Quebec that is rooted in historical oppression that I think
paved the way to a certain degree to more activism … to
more belief in the power of social movements. I think
that exists in the Quebecois/francophone identity more
than it does in the anglophone. I think the anglophone is
actually reactionary to that, and you can see that also with
students coming in. A lot of the students coming in [to
anglophone universities] didn’t go to CEGEP, didn’t go to
high school [in Quebec], didn’t see, never participated in a
general assembly, never participated in a student association.
So, they’re coming into university and this is the first time
they’re hearing about this. Whereas, by the time you’ve got
to UQAM, they’ve already had two years in a francophone
CEGEP, where they probably went on strike already, you
know? So, it’s a different level of education, with regards to
organizing, that doesn’t exist in the Anglo schools.’ (QUE 2)
The existence of four national student associations, representing

different strategies and cultures of participation with a long-standing
tradition in Quebec society, has created a situation of competition for
the representation of the student body. Unlike England and Italy, this
119
situation has not led however to the fragmentation of the student body.
One factor preventing fragmentation is that affiliation to the national
associations depends on decisions made by local associations at the
school and university level. The existence of strong, representative
student governments can facilitate agreements and large coalitions,
provided there is willingness to act in coordination –as it happened
during the 2012 strike. In turn, politico-ideological or affinity groups
respect their local associations of reference, attempting to lead them
and acting within them to –among other purposes –make use of the
resources they have at their disposal. Furthermore, the leadership of
these organizations gives students access to the authorities at different
levels, thus reinforcing the legitimacy of these organizations and the
unity of the field.
Low institutionalization, fragmented field: Italy

In Italy, student politics have traditionally exhibited a low level of
institutionalization and a high level of political fragmentation. This
was the case of the student mobilizations of the ‘long 1968’ (the 1960s
and 1970s) and of those of the 1990s. SUs and formalized groups have
never played any political role during such protests. Rather, informal
networks and groups of students (‘collettivi’), affiliated either to extra-
parliamentary leftist political parties or to broader social movements,
adopting more militant tactics of action, have been the central actors
of this field. These networks of activists have been key in setting in
motion and organizing mobilizations in all three cycles of student
protests (in 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s), which brought about institutional
and organizational change within Italian HE and universities.
If the 1968 movement was part of a long protest cycle where the
labour movement was by far the central actor, the generation of
activists of the student movement of 1990 (the so-called ‘Pantera’
[panther]) flowed into the movement against the Gulf war and
into that of the social centres. Likewise, the student activists of the
movement of 2008/10 (the so-called Onda Anomala [anomalous wave])
inherited, to a certain extent, the protest forms and claims from the
activists of the global justice movement (Andretta et al., 2006) and,
more especially, their demands for a more radical process of social
redistribution. In short, all the past generations of student activists
were immersed in and influenced by larger cycles of struggle, strongly
shaping their cultural repertoire of actions and discourses. Yet, the
level of political and ideological factionalism that these groups usually
showed prevented the student movement from being organizationally
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Student Politics
unified and thus developing a widely accepted institutional structure

of student representation.
Unlike England or Quebec, but similarly to France, Italy has in
fact shown a radical tradition of student activism both in terms of
ideology (that is, revolutionary Marxism) and repertoire of actions
(disruptive tactics). More specifically, Italian students started to
play an important role in the ‘political affairs’ of Italian universities
from the second half of the 1960s onwards, when the global wave
of student protest arose. As in many other parts of the world, they
contested the authoritarian and hierarchical way in which universities
were organized and governed. The figure of the professor and their
arbitrary authority, represented as the quintessential features of
baronial power, were radically challenged in the assemblies, sit-ins
and university occupations at which students began to overtly adopt
the buzzword of ‘student power’: that is, ‘the power of students to
determine structure and content of their education’ (Cockburn and
Blackburn, 1969, p 14).
In this sense, the Italian students involved in those mobilizations
constituted the first university actor, after the end of the Second World
War and the establishment of the Italian democratic republic, able to rise
up and overtly question the authority of the class of tenured professors.
For a while, they succeeded in reversing or at least counterbalancing
the power relations constitutive of the university field at that time. The
rise of ‘student power’ in the Italian universities was, therefore, strictly
related to the capacity of protesters to carry out large mobilizations
through acts of ‘contentious politics’ (McAdam et al., 2001). Despite
the variety of movement organizations and political orientations, the
key demands underpinning student contestation in Italy were three:
(a) the cessation of academic authoritarianism and the democratization
of university governance, (b) the reorganization of curricula towards the
needs and desires of students, and (c) the democratization of university
access (Ortoleva, 1988).
The impact of these protests was relatively significant, at least in the
years immediately after the contestation. The then Italian government
was forced to adopt some legislative measures reflecting specific points
of student demands, especially the ones concerning the liberalization
of access, the reorganization of curricula, and the inclusion of student
representatives in governing bodies (see Cini, 2019b). Yet, in the
long run, all these attempts were doomed to fail. The Italian student
movement lacked a structured national organization and a clear political
strategy corresponding to its ‘firepower’.
121
Table 4.2: Student organizations involved in the protest campaigns of

2008 and 2010
Protest campaign against Law 133 Protest campaign against Law 240
(2008) (2010)
UDU UDU
Uniriot Uniriot
Atenei in Rivolta Atenei in Rivolta
- Link
- Red-Net
This tradition has heavily impacted on the Italian field of student

politics of recent years. The field of student politics of 2008 and
2010 was indeed characterized by a low organizational formalization
and a relatively high level of political fragmentation. It consisted of
several locally based groups with the ambition to be representative
of the entire student body, even though they usually had different
names in every city.8 During the protest campaign of 2008, three
student organizations (or networks of organizations) competed for
the leadership of this field, while in the campaign of 2010 there were
five (see Table 4.2).
Founded in 1994, UDU (Unione degli Studenti, Union of Students)
is one of the few student groups that publicly claims to be a union
that defends and promotes student rights, ‘because the student is a
social person and should be independent from their family’ (Genicot,
2012, p 69). About 10,000 students each year enrol in UDU, which
is politically linked to CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del
Lavoro, General Italian Confederation of Labour). UDU is formed
by a central executive committee and 26 local branches, that is, units
rooted in the university campuses of 26 cities (Pavia, Brescia, Verona,
Padua, Trento, Venice, Parma, Modena, Forlì, Ferrara, Florence, Pisa,
Ancona, Macerata, Perugia, Rome, Teramo, L’Aquila, Naples, Caserta,
Salerno, Catanzaro, Cagliari, Messina, Palermo and Catania). UDU is
the largest student group in terms of membership, and it is organized by
an internal statute and formalized decision-making procedures. Yet, it
was marginal in the organization of the protests, as other student groups,
both in 2008 and 2010, accused UDU of professing an excessively
moderate political orientation.
In 2008, two other ‘quasi-national’ organizations were involved
in the protest: Uniriot and Atenei in Rivolta. While Uniriot was
politically close to the social centres of the Italian ‘Autonomia’, a
network of political activists adopting a workerist ideology which
122
Student Politics
emerged in the movements of the 1970s (Raparelli, 2009), Atenei in

Rivolta was politically linked to the national Trotskyist party Sinistra
Critica (Critical Left). Both Uniriot and Atenei in Rivolta were central
to the organization of protests in many universities, competing with
each other with the ambition of becoming the politically hegemonic
organization of the Italian student movement. More notably, Uniriot
was present at the universities of Rome, Padua, Bologna, Milan,
Naples, Turin, and Venice, whereas Atenei in Rivolta was present at
the universities of Bari, Bologna, Florence, Milan, Reggio Calabria,
Rome and Trento. Although both student networks aimed at radically
transforming HE by opposing the neoliberal agenda of the government,
they used different tactics of action and political strategy (see also
Chapter 2 for a more detailed account of the different political strategies
of the various student movement organizations).
This difference constituted one of the main causes of the split and
the consequent failure of the national assembly of the Italian student
movement held at the University of La Sapienza in Rome in November
2008. While Atenei in Rivolta intended to construct a national political
organization of the movement with a formalized decision-making
structure, Uniriot preferred to maintain a movement-like type of
organization, with a loose network of relations and informal decision-
making procedures. In the words of one of the leaders of Uniriot:
‘[Atenei in Rivolta’s] way of conceiving the organization

of the protest did not reflect the political potential of the
movement. We believe that organization should not be an
obstacle but a way to multiply the power of the movement.
In our view, this cannot occur if we build a formalized
coordination of student representatives according to the
French model [of the 2007 student protests that Atenei
in Rivolta aimed to adopt in the Italian situation].’ (IT 2)
A further consequence of the failure of the national student assembly

in November 2008 was the establishment of two other sub-national
networks of groups, Link and Red-Net, founded in early 2009. Both
groups were in fact critical towards the organizations that had led the
protest in 2008. More specifically, they accused Uniriot and Atenei
in Rivolta of being responsible for the failure of the movement to
make an impact at the national level. In their views, both Uniriot
and Atenei in Rivolta missed an opportunity to create a nationwide
unitary organization voicing the concerns of students. As one of the
future leaders of Link mentioned:
123
‘In 2008, the movement did not have any organizational

structure, neither locally nor at the national level. We did
not manage to organize a politically credible actor capable
of negotiating with the ministry and the government. At
the national assembly in Rome, we argued with other
student groups precisely over this issue; some of us wanted
to create a national political structure of the protests. We
failed. Because of this failure, the movement was unable to
entertain any kind of political or institutional relation[ship]
with official authorities for the remainder of the 2008
campaign.’ (IT 3)
Although sharing this view on the causes of the decline of the 2008
protests, Link and Red-Net had a very different take on how to lead
the student movement and on how to reform Italian HE. Link emerged
as a split from UDU (which had been accused of being too moderate)
and put forward a trade unionist line whose goal was to make Italian
universities more democratic and participatory. This stance emerges
very clearly in the narration of a student activist at La Sapienza of
Rome and a member of Link’s national executive:
‘We as LINK believe that there are three tools which,

jointly, successfully affect higher education policy. They
are: adaptive claims [‘vertenza’], representation, and conflict.
They cannot stand separately. Representation only works
if we have concrete demands to put forward, which
means that we have to seriously study university policies
and regulations and come up with alternative proposals.
Representation and counter-proposals, in turn, do not work
without conflict, because if outside there are no students
creating pressure, this thing does not work. These three
things [adaptive claims, representation, and conflict] are the
pillars on which we have built Link. What we don’t like
about UDU is that they think that one can raise demands
only through representation. What we don’t like about
the [antagonist] student collectives is that they think it’s
possible to win things only through conflict and without
representation; and actually very often even without a
specific demand: conflict for conflict’s sake. For us, these
three things must be linked together for student politics to
be effective.’ (IT 4)
124
Student Politics
Link was present in the university campuses of Bari, Bologna, Foggia,

Lecce, Milan, Naples, Padua, Rome, Pisa, Salerno, Siena, Taranto,
Turin, Trieste and Urbino. In contrast, Red-Net was active in the
universities of Milan, Padua, Naples, Rome, Florence, and Palermo.
It gathered together all the student groups with a Marxist-Leninist
orientation, whose main political goal was to transform HE into a field
of (class) struggle. For them, student politics should not be understood
as institutional mediation but as conflict and antagonism. In this sense,
a student movement should ‘develop antagonistic and incompatible
attitudes towards the system’. Student movements are political only
to the extent that they are able to express incompatibility vis-à-vis the
status quo. They have to pursue “an intrinsic politicization, exhibiting
dissatisfaction for what exists. This politicization is the expression of
dissatisfaction and incompatibility with the extant. The contestation of
the system in which we live.” (IT 13) The main aim of a revolutionary
student organization is to politicize and socialize as many students as
possible to the new language of social conflict.
In sum, the organizational field of Italian student protest appeared
highly fragmented in political terms in both 2008 and 2010. This
thwarted the emergence or the construction of a national actor
capable of fully representing students and negotiating their demands
with the government. Most of the protagonists of the 2008 and 2010
events we interviewed confirmed this picture. As argued by a former
MIUR consultant in the late 1990s and one of the central figures of
the university reforms of the 2000s, who considered the politically and
organizationally fragmented character of the student mobilizations of
2008 and 2010 as one of the main causes of their failure:
‘The cause of the current weakness of the movement is that

the organizational field of the student left is too fragmented.
UDU, Link and too many other organizations populate
this universe. Small groups competing against each other
without a national political centre, and even capable of
losing student elections to CL [a conservative organization
of Catholic students]. A terrible fragmentation. Without
a nationwide scope of action, which is a deleterious lack.
A strong presence of organized students would improve
the system.’ (EN 12)
A similar interpretation seems to be endorsed also by the leaders of

the various student organizations. As one of them put it:
125
‘The lack of a nationwide movement organization has

jeopardized the emergence of a national agenda and political
alternative. We were not politically mature [enough] to
pose concrete demands. Uniriot rejected completely this
approach. For them, the movement had to convey only a
rebellious generational identity to avoid having a reformist
approach. This was wrong. We had to pose a list of demands
to challenge the government.’ (IT 3)
Yet, this fragmentation was not only conditioned by the students’

inability to organize themselves at the national level, but also by the
specificity of the Italian system of student representation, which was, in
their views, institutionally designed so as to fragment and disempower
the students’ voice. Again, in his words:
‘The CNSU [National Council of University Students] is

not representative of the actual student forces. It was built to
fragment the movement. There is an election on a national
basis in which entire sections of the student movement do
not take part. Those who participate are generally local
clientelist networks, which then take part in the CNSU
election. Students do not care about the CNSU, which is
a useless ministerial advisory body.’ (IT 3)
The presence of an organizationally fragmented field prevented the

students from elaborating and agreeing upon a shared political agenda
to reform HE. In both 2008 and 2010, the Italian student movement
failed to formulate and put forward an alternative vision for Italian HE
(on this, see also Caruso et al., 2010).
What is more, the absence of a concrete political proposal on HE
was related to the highly ideological protest culture of Italian students,
historically embedded in larger cycles of struggle and therefore more
focused on broader societal rather than educational issues (Tarrow,
1989). In short, each generation of student activists is influenced by
larger protest cycles, strongly shaping their cultural repertoire of actions
and discourses. If the ‘1968’ movement was part of a long protest cycle,
where the labour movement was by far the central actor, the generation
of activists of the student movement of 1990 flowed into the movement
against the Gulf war and into that of the social centres (Mudu, 2004).
Likewise, the student activists of the movement of 2008/10 inherited,
to a certain extent, the protest forms and claims from the activists of
126
Student Politics
the ‘global justice movement’ and, more especially, their demands for
a more radical process of social redistribution.
In sum, this section illustrated the extent to which the organizational
field of Italian student protest appeared highly politically fragmented
in both 2008 and 2010: it consisted of several quasi-national networks
of student organizations able to neither individually hegemonize the
protests nor to cooperate with each other. These features jeopardized
the emergence of a national actor representing the full student body and
capable of creating both a national system of alliance and negotiating
student demands with the government.
Conclusions
The ways in which student organizations interact with state institutions
and the party system have a significant influence in shaping the patterns
of student activism. As suggested by the political process approach to
contentious politics, the institutional setting is crucial for the making
of social movements, as it ‘enhance(s) or inhibit(s) prospects for
mobilization’ (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004, p 1457). In particular, we
have focused here on formal aspects of the HE sector, such as access and
recognition, that have significant long-term effects on the patterns of
student activism. However, we have also claimed that political cultures
are extremely influential in student politics, especially when students
take inspiration from them to mobilize identities and establish their
demands and goals. These cultures can survive the demise of some
organizations and reappear in new ones, as well as endure through
various generations of activists. Indeed, they can be so influential as to
offset the limitations of adverse institutional settings, as we have learnt
from the study of the Chilean case.
In this chapter, we have observed that regular channels of access
to decision-making bodies at the national or university level offer
opportunities for influence that do not necessarily depend on the
protest capacity of these organizations. However, some associations
might accommodate themselves to this institutional environment in
manners that, over the long term, exclude them from the disruptive,
militant commitments that were their foundational resources. In Chile
and Italy, students have limited access to policy making at the national
level, and restricted channels of influence at the university level. This
characteristic makes student associations more confrontational and
militant and, especially in Italy, it makes these associations weaker in
terms of organizational resources. By contrast, in England and Quebec
127
student associations have legal status and protection, which confer

on them ample financial and organizational resources. A significant
segment of the student associations in these regions displays moderate
patterns of activism.
A second dimension that affects the patterns of student activism
refers to the ways in which student organizations engage in politics and
organize the student body. Two modalities are identified: fragmented
versus unified modes of student politics. The main difference between
them is the existence (or not) of a more or less formalized arena of
political exchange, where different groups of students regularly meet,
debate and strategize with each other. As seen in the Chilean and
Quebecoise cases, student governments act as such arenas, facilitating
processes of coordination and large-scale collective action. When
these arenas are in place, competition for the leadership of the student
body can be temporarily suspended or tamed, thus favouring coalition
building among the various groups that inhabit the campuses (Van
Dyke and McCammon, 2010; Heaney and Rojas, 2014). Therefore,
and given certain conditions, these arenas of exchange can play a role in
transforming competition into cooperation, fostering alliances among
groups that otherwise would ignore, or compete against, each other.
An important precondition of the large protests of 2011 and 2012 in
Chile and Quebec, respectively, was the presence of this common arena
of political exchange. This allowed students to act in coordination and
deliver a coherent message to the public, politicians and the state. By
contrast, such an arena was weak in England and practically inexistent
in Italy, jeopardizing the capacity of students to act in coordination. As
is explained in other chapters of this book, fragmentation of student
politics makes it easier for governments and politicians to ignore
student associations and their demands. Furthermore, historical patterns
of student activism have been more resilient in Chile and Quebec,
shaping successive generations of activists and the student associations
themselves. One crucial aspect in which the legacy of previous struggles
is especially relevant for current generations of activists, is their trust in
nationwide associations and their role vis-à-vis the state and the party
system. This aspect has helped to mould unified fields of student politics
in these regions. Particularly in Chile, this factor offsets a significant
lack of resources in several federations and the lack of a legal framework
regulating their existence and representative role.
128
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Chapter · June 2020

Lorenzo Cini Cesar Guzman-Concha

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Chapter Title: Student Politics

Book Title: Contesting Higher Education

When activists plan a mobilization campaign, decide the timing of

between student organizations and authorities constitutes an important

or university campuses, which can sometimes be accompanied by the

this chapter we offer a detailed account of these features and of the

Low institutionalization, coordinated field: Chile

institutions. However, no binding agreements exist between federations

those who participate in the politico-​ideological groups (Autonomists,

universities’), and 19 from private (created after 1980) universities. In

of 2006. This was a series of protests staged by secondary students,

These changes in the balance of power at the level of CONFECH

‘a body that represents all university students in Chile

High institutionalization, fragmented field: England

which have regular access to all HE governing bodies and authorities,

This situation came to an end at the NUS National Conference in

‘when [NUS] tries to be a commentator on global affairs,

Attempts to neutralize the political potential of SUs have been taking

institutions for a grant to support their activities. More specifically, SUs

‘The university pays me £27,000 per year: it’s another

To avoid full financial (and decisional) dependence on their institutions,

with local unions as service providers, members as consumers, and

The second (and only apparently divergent) tendency accompanying

maintenance. This position on grants was informed by an intent on

adapted policy positions, political rhetoric, and tactics to the

In the same token, Woodcock (2014) depicts NUS as a politically

Table 4.1: The main organizations/​political factions within the English

concern to minimize the influence of the ‘left’. In the first group,

High institutionalization, coordinated field: Quebec

movement of the time, introducing practices of horizontality and

ANNEQ attempted to follow the historical and foundational precepts

consultation. These organizations were not only more moderate in

abandoned in 2011 amidst criticisms from students, professors, unions

‘there’s one association at McGill that went on strike during

The existence of four national student associations, representing

Low institutionalization, fragmented field: Italy

unified and thus developing a widely accepted institutional structure

Table 4.2: Student organizations involved in the protest campaigns of

This tradition has heavily impacted on the Italian field of student

emerged in the movements of the 1970s (Raparelli, 2009), Atenei in

‘[Atenei in Rivolta’s] way of conceiving the organization

A further consequence of the failure of the national student assembly

‘In 2008, the movement did not have any organizational

‘We as LINK believe that there are three tools which,

Link was present in the university campuses of Bari, Bologna, Foggia,

‘The cause of the current weakness of the movement is that

A similar interpretation seems to be endorsed also by the leaders of

‘The lack of a nationwide movement organization has

Yet, this fragmentation was not only conditioned by the students’

‘The CNSU [National Council of University Students] is

The presence of an organizationally fragmented field prevented the

student associations have legal status and protection, which confer

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those who participate in the politico-ideological groups (Autonomists,

Table 4.1: The main organizations/political factions within the English