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Topic 6 Debt Policyv2
Topic 6 Debt Policyv2
DEBT POLICY
& CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Prof. Marta Degl’Innocenti
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Identify the types of debts.
• Explain the composition of firms’ capital structure.
• Briefly explain MM’s irrelevance propositions and
apply the proposition in explaining firms’ value
before/after restructuring.
• Explain how firms’ value can be affected in
financial distress.
• List the costs of bankruptcy.
• Discuss the main argument of trade-off and
pecking order theory.
DEBTS COME IN MANY FORMS
• Interest rate
• Coupon bond / zero coupon bond.
• Fix / Floating-rate loan.
• Income bond: Interest payments on such bonds
may be skipped or deferred if the firm’s income is
insufficient to make the payment.
• Seniority
• Senior debt / subordinated debt.
1
DOES BORROWING AFFECT
FIRM VALUE?
• The company’s choice of capital structure does NOT
increase the underlying value of the firm.
$75,000
The changes of
expected operating $125,000 $125,000
income:
$175,000
5
MM’S IRRELEVANCE PROPOSITION
• Before restructuring:
6
MM’S IRRELEVANCE PROPOSITION
Investors in levered equity will require a
higher expected return to compensate for
• After restructuring: the increased risk.
7
MM’S IRRELEVANCE PROPOSITION
• Borrowing increases earning per share.
8
Financing a Firm with Debt and Equity)
WACC
9
CAN RESTRUCTURING
INCREASE FIRM VALUE?
• Assuming the firm conducted restructuring, but the investor
does NOT like that, how individual investors can undo firm’s
leverage by lending their money to the firm?
• The investor can buy 1 share for $10 from the restructured firm
and invest $10 in firm’s debt. (Investing $20 in total)
10
IMPLICATION OF MM’S PROPOSITION I
• Leverage increase the equity risk and equity required
return.
12
MM’S PROPOSITION I
• MM’s proposition I (MM debt-irrelevance proposition)
• The value of the firm must be unaffected by its
capital structure.
• Key assumptions:
• Same borrowing rate.
• No transaction cost.
• No Tax
• Restructuring and risk & return
• Firm’s borrowing does NOT changes its operating
income.
• However, debt finance adds financial risk. With
only half the equity to absorb the same amount of
operating risk, risk per share must double.
11
Modigliani−Miller I: Leverage, Arbitrage,
and Firm Value
• Leverage will not affect the total value of the firm.
– Instead, it merely changes the allocation of cash flows
between debt and equity, without altering the total cash
flows of the firm.
E + D = U = A.
– The total market value of the firm’s securities is equal
to the market value of its assets, whether the firm is
unlevered or levered.
E D
RE + RD = RU
E+D E+D
15
The Interest Tax Shield and Firm Value
1 1
PV (Interest Tax Shield) = $20 million 1 −
0.05 1.0510
= $154 million
E D D
rWacc = rE + rD − rD c
E+D E+D E+D
Pretax WACC Reduction Due
to Interest Tax Shield
• MM II is therefore,
D
requity = rcapital + (1 − Tc ) ( rcapital − rdebt )
E 16
The Interest Tax Shield with a Target
Debt-Equity Ratio (1 of 2)
• When a firm adjusts its leverage to maintain a target debt-
equity ratio, we can compute its value with leverage, VL, by
discounting its free cash flow using the weighted average
cost of capital.
4.25
Vu = = $91 million
8.67% − 4%
To compute western Lumber’s levered value, we calculate its WACC:
1 0.5
= 10% + 6%(1 − 0.21) = 8.25%
1.05 1 + 0.5
17
FINANCING CHOICES
• Trade-off Theory: Debt levels are chosen to balance
interest tax shields against the costs of financial
distress.
18
FINANCING CHOICES
• Pecking Order Theory
• Information asymmetry–managers know more than
outside investors about the profitability and prospects
of the firm.
• New issued stocks might be overpriced; Manager
would not issue new stocks if they are underpriced. So
whenever the firm issues new stocks, market should
respond negatively on their prices.
• Certain pecking order in terms of financing:
• Firms prefer internal finance (Retained earnings).
• Firms prefer to issue debt rather than equity if
internal finance is insufficient.
19
READING
• Corporate Finance (11th ed.), Chapter 16-18.
• Principles of Corporate Finance (12th ed.),
Chapter 17-18.
• Myers, S. C. and N. S., Majluf (1984) Corporate
financing and investment decisions when firms
have information that investors do not have,
Journal of Financial Economics, 13:187-221.