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Book Review of Tragedy of Great Power Politics (John J. Mearsheimer)

Book Review Tragedy of Great power politics (John J. Mearsheimer)

“Tragedy of Great Power Politics” is a seminal work in academic discourse on international
relations and more specifically in realist tradition. The book appeared fifty years after “Politics
among Nations” authored by Morgenthau. “Politics among Nations” introduced realism as an
approach towards studying and understanding the behavior of states in international system. Now
referred as the classical realist, Morgenthau blamed human nature for the security competition in
the system. States, explained Morgenthau, are administered by humans and the acts of state are
actually the acts of these people who negotiate treaties, wage wars and impose taxes in the name
of state. Thus, it is the desire and lust for power of these humans that leads states to wage wars.
Thirty years after, in 1979, Kenneth Waltz rejected this claim of Morgenthau and proposed a new
theory. “Theory of International relations” posited that states exist in a condition where no
government or higher authority exists which can check states’ aggression. Therefore, states have
to rely on self-help for their survival. Waltz exonerated human nature and declared the structure
of international system the main culprit. It is anarchy that forces states to engage in security
competition. As in an anarchic structure every state has to rely on its own capabilities for
survival. These ‘neo-realists’ identified themselves as structure realists. “Tragedy of Great Power
Politics” belongs to this school of thought. However, it disagrees with Waltz on one particular
point; the question of how much power is enough? Waltz answers that power which ensures a
state’s security is enough where the state’s defense is so formidable that it has little worry about
being invaded or undermined. Mearsheimer, contrastingly, thinks that the very condition of
anarchy behooves states be insecure as long as they are not the Hegemon. Simply put for Waltz
states are security maximizers whereas for Mearsheimer states are power maximizers. The
contention is Waltz argues that states when satisfied wouldn’t strive to change the balance of
power whereas Mearsheimer argues that the condition of anarchy dooms states to always look
after their backs and the only status quo power is the one that dominates the system.
Mearsheimer named his realisms as ‘offensive realism’ which came after the end of Cold War
and reinforced the besieged walls of realism. That was being constantly hammered for its failure
to explain the peaceful conclusion of Cold War. Mearsheimer answers that despite this
shortcoming of realism it still remains relevant and credible. As the driving forces of behavior of
states in international system had not changed that is anarchy and self-help.

Offensive realism:

Offensive realism argues that great powers are always on the lookout to exploit opportunities that
could increase their power over their rivals with the ultimate goal of hegemony. As states that
dominate the system is truly secure in a system where anarchy prevails. Mearsheimer explains
“great powers” as any state which has enough military capabilities that could compete with the
most powerful state in the system. To qualify as a great power the state doesn’t have to defeat the
powerful state instead it should possess enough capability that in a war it could considerably
weaken the great power.

A theory is often associated with answering the “why question”. For example Morgenthau gave a
theory when he located the reason for power seeking state behavior in human nature whereas
E.H Carr only made a case for realism in his book “twenty years crisis”. Later, Kenneth Waltz
proposed his theory of “structural realism” where he identified the cause in structure of
international system rather than in human nature. Similarly, Mearsheimer begins by answering
the question why states pursue power. To answer this, a set of five assumptions that lay down the
foundation of offensive realism is introduced. The first assumption is that international system is
anarchic. The second assumption is that great powers possess some military capability which
says that great powers possess capability to hurt or destroy the rival state. Third assumption
underpins the uncertainty that states face about the intentions of other states. The fourth
assumption lays down survival as the primary goal of great powers. As once a great power is
conquered it loses the ability to pursue other aims or goals. Fifth assumption assumes that great
powers are rational therefore policies and decisions of great powers are driven by rationality
rather than otherwise. These assumptions work together to answer why states pursue power.
The utmost goal of state is survival which leads state to develop offensive capabilities. There can
be variances in the level of fear or suspicion which great powers may have of other great powers
but the condition remains the same that great powers are dangerous actors. The next question that
arises is of how much power would be enough for a great power to feel secure. In light of
assumption stated above John Mearsheimer answers that only hegemony can make a state feel
secure. As in a system where an increase in one state’s security automatically leads to other state
feeling insecure binds states in a vicious cycle which goes on for eternity. Another argument
would be that a system where one or more than one great powers exists the state would always
be in fear of that great power’s conquest. As great powers are inherently revisionists. In contrast
to defensive realism Mearsheimer deems power as an end and not a means. Great powers are
concerned with relative gains rather than absolute gains. Great powers would let go of benefits
which would cause an increase in power of rival great powers. These concerns along with long
term calculations make it impossible to assess how much power would be enough. Therefore,
great powers strive to maximize their power at the same time undermining the power of rival
great powers.

What is power?

Realists deem power as the currency of international relations. Power is defined by Mearsheimer
in material terms or capabilities rather than in outcome. The reason Mearsheimer argues is not
because material terms give absolute certainty to who is going to win in a war rather it is the
shaky foundation of power based on outcome that led him to defining power in terms of material
capabilities. Power in military capabilities includes the number of armored battalions and tanks
and aircrafts whereas power defined in terms of outcome is more similar to the definition of
given by Thomas Hobbes. That power is what compels an actor to do something which that actor
otherwise will choose not to. The problem with this definition, argues Mearsheimer, prediction
can only be made after the outcome has occurred. Simply that to say who is more powerful can
only be assessed after the conflict has ended. Similarly, he signifies misconception related with
material basis of power. Defining power in material terms logically leads to the prediction that
state with more material capabilities is going to prevail. This prediction refuted by historical
evidence also excludes the non-material factors like strategy, intelligence, will, weather and
disease. Mearsheimer further illustrates that choosing material capabilities as basis of power,
however, is the only reliable indicator. As it is for increasing these material capabilities that great
powers go to war and on conquests. After clarifying the basis of power definition of offensive
realism Mearsheimer than goes on to define its types. There are two forms of power; latent
power and military power. Latent power is defined as the socio economic resources that a state
has. These resources are identified by Mearsheimer as population and economy. Mearsheimer
considers land force as the primary force and all other types of military power in an auxiliary
role. Simply due to the ability of land force to wage expeditions and expand territory and
establish control. So population size is required for creating a large army and wealth for building
sophisticated military equipment. Economic resources include the resources that are available to
expend on military capabilities. Along with ‘Mobilizable wealth’ technological development of
the country is also included in the economic resources. As an agrarian economy can have wealth
but for weapons it would have to depend on other resources. Same is not the case with an
industrial economy. Military power includes the size and strength of army and the size and
strength of auxiliary military forces like the air force and navy.

Strategies of great powers

Strategies of great powers can be divided into two broad categories; Strategies for gaining power
and strategies for checking aggression. Strategies, however, are subordinate to ends or goals for
which the strategies are contrived. Goals of great powers involve regional hegemon, wealth
maximization, prominence of land power and nuclear superiority. The goal of regional hegemony
is closely related with the concern of great power with its security. The second goal is largely due
to the link between latent power and military power. Wealth is required for building a powerful
military therefore great powers strive to maximize their wealth. This leads to a dilemma where
great powers consider wealthy states as threatening despite the question of whether these states
possess formidable military power or not. Third goal is due to prominence of land force. Land
force is the most important when it comes to increasing the share of world power. The last goal is
also related with the offensive military capability of great power which would ensure victory in
conquest.

Strategies are made to realize these goals. These strategies, however, are related with increasing
the power of great power rather than checking aggression of rival great power. The first strategy
is war. Mearsheimer consider this strategy as controversial due to claims over its utilization. First
opposition is from the defensive realists who argue that aggression would rally the weaker or
victim states to band together against the aggressor. Here, the historical evidence is utilized of
conquests in Europe in which aggressor had won 60% of the time. The second and third
perspectives make arguments regarding the costs and benefits of war. The costs argument states
that wars are won at such cost that the victory is a pyrrhic victory. Benefits argument postulates
that after victory control and exploitation of modern economies is very hard. Mearsheimer
answer by citing the examples of United States in 1860 and Prussia in 1870 where aggression
was very beneficial for both states. Other strategies involve Bait and Bleeding, Bloodletting and
Blackmail. The first two tries to engage a rival state in protracted conflict where its resources are
depleted and the last involve the use of coercion and intimidation. All these strategies have been
substantiated in the book by relevant historical examples.

The second type of strategies is employed by states to check aggression by other states. These
include balancing, buck passing, bandwagoning and appeasement. Mearsheimer prescribes
balancing and buck passing and critiques bandwagoning and appeasement. Balancing is the
strategy when Great power directly shoulders the responsibility of maintaining the balance of
power. Buck passing is when great power tries to get another great power to share the burden.
Bandwagoning and appeasement are not useful strategies when it comes to dealing with
aggressors as it requires conceding power to a rival state.

Great power politics in twenty first century:

The peaceful conclusion of cold war led many to point towards the end of dominance of realist
discourse. The book argues otherwise and provides substantive evidence to support the claim.
After the cold war, Mearsheimer argues, states still exist in an anarchic structure where anarchy
is still present and shaping states behavior. The five assumption discussed above are still
adequately and insightfully explaining and depicting state behavior. The next is the argument of
weakening of state sovereignty. State is still the principal actor and role associated with
international institutions is greatly exaggerated. Institutions are instruments for great powers for
maintaining their share of world power. For example, UN’s decisions are heavily influenced by
Security Council and when United States decided to remove general secretary Boutros
BoutrosGhali. There is no Alternative to State in sight. Nationalism is still the most powerful
ideology in the world. Globalization had little impact upon importance of state. Democratic
peace theory assaulted the realist assumption that there could be no certainty in state’s intentions
by proposing that democratic states don’t go to war. There doesn’t exist, a mechanism which
could ensure that furthermore state can transform from democratic state to authoritarian state. To
counter such scenarios democracies have to be prepared for any case. The constructivist
argument that emphasizes the need for a discourse of cooperation and trust falls short of
defeating realism. As realist discourse has dominated international politics for seven centuries
and there are no strong prospects of its replacement. Another factor is state’s concern with
survival. Globalists argue that states are now more concerned with getting prosperous than with
survival. Europe was more economically interdependent and interconnected but despite these
facts World War 1 broke out.

The intensification of security competition in North East Asia and emerging security competition
between Russia and NATO also points towards the realist practices rather than cooperation. In
short, the world after Cold War is the same world. The only change was power structure leaving
the system intact. Anarchy still exists and states concerns with survival. These factors points
towards the realist character of post cold war world.

Conclusion

“Tragedy of Great Power Politics” is a seminal addition in international relations literature. For
realist tradition it reinvigorated the old sage and armed with new arguments which could
adequately face the storm of new phenomena in international arena. Offensive realism provides
new insights and explains the behavior of great powers. As the balance of power is largely
depends on their behavior. The assumptions of the theory endow it with immense explanatory
power. Especially the discussion on how much power would be enough is the defining feature of
the theory. Predictions made by theory in 2001 have been proven right by the events of 2020.
The breakdown of Brexist, resurging Russia, security competition between China and United
States and the survival of state attest to the claims made in the book. Today, the world is again
embroiled in a security competition and the battlegrounds were identified by Mearsheimer in
2001. The intense confrontation between United States and China in South China Sea and over
the state of Taiwan are unfolding along the lines described by Mearsheimer. Recent pandemic
has made even the most optimists among us to sound the fall of liberal economic order. The rise
of Trump in United States has weakened the credibility and trust in democracies. Despite these
real world examples, the overwhelming power of arguments put forward is hard to ignore.
Mearsheimer brilliantly puts forward the case of offensive realism with little mistakes. Especially
the discussion over the definition of power and account of strategies great powers adopt is
impeccable. Power defined in terms of material capabilities is easy to measure, however it is not
the reason for author to adopt this definition, as well as it effectively enables the analyst to make
sound assessments and predictions. The book contains words of wisdom and is thought
provoking.