B.

Reorganization of Administrative Agencies
1. Definition of Reorganization
2. President’s power to reorganize; basis
3. Power of other agencies to reorganize; limitations

Reorganization – is the process of restructuring the bureaucracy’s

organizational and functional set up, to make it more viable in terms of
economy, efficiency, effectiveness and to make it more responsive to the
needs of its public clientele as authorized by law.

s well-settled as the rule that the abolition (office itself is remove) of an

office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent, is the
principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good
faith. Where the abolition is made in bad faith, for political or personal
reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure
of civil service employees, it is null and void

Is a means used by the legislature to reorganize or abolish offices which

t may do so directly or indirectly by authorizing an executive department or
agency to reorganize its office.

The President can also abolish a long standing bureau in the DILG
provided it is done in good faith because the president has been granted the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of his office
and the executive departments to effect economy and promote efficiency and
the power includes the abolition of government offices.

It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the

power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in
line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over
executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power
to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,12 the Court pointed out that

Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the
President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the
Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said
Code, is explicit:
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office.
– The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other Departments or agencies.
Interpreting the foregoing provision, we held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB,
thus:

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We
must not lose sight of the very source of the power – that which constitutes
an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No.
292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he
may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of
the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that
reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It
takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department
of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
President’s continuing authority to reorganize

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary

FACTS:
Petitioner assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.
364 and 379, or TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM

Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo

Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of Executive
Order (E.O.) Nos. 364 and 379, both issued in 2004, via the present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.

EO. 364, as amended by EO. 379, among other things, orders that
the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP)placed under the
supervision and control of the Department of Land Reform, and
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
shall be an attached agency of the Department of Land Reform.

Why is this important?
For AMIN: It alleges that by issuing Eos 364 and 379, the Executive has
impaired the powers of Congress. AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP
and NCIP were created by statutes,they can only be transformed, merged
or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders.
For MDOI: It alleges that it is concerned with the negative impact of
NCIPbecoming an attached agency of the DAR on the processing of ancestral
domain claims

Petitioner represented by Rep. Muji S. Hataman, Respondent is Hon.

Eduardo Ermita, and the Secretary of Agrarian Reform Hon. Rene Villa.
Petitioner (AMIN) assail the constitutionality of EO 364 and 379 both
issued in 2004, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition EO 364
issued by GMA on Sept. 27, 2004 which transforming the DAR into Dept. of
Land Reform (DLR).
EO 379 amending EO 364 which states that National Commission on
Indigenous People (NCIP) shall be attached agency of the DLR

Contention:
Petitioner contends that 2 Presidential issuances are unconstitutional for
violating:
1. Principle of Separation of Powers.
2. Constitutional scheme and policies for Agrarian Reform.
3. Constitutionality right of the people in reasonable participation in
decision making including through adequate consultation.

ISSUE:
Whether the reorganization valid

HELD: SEPARATION OF POWERS

YES. The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of
control over executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President
alone. And it lays down a limitation on the legislative power.

The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control in the
President justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization measures
under a broad authority of law.

 Administrative Code of 1987 Sec. 31: “The President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President”
The consolidation of functions in E.O. 364 aims to attain the objectives
of simplicity, economy and efficiency as gathered from the provision granting
PCUP and NCIP access to the range of services provided by the DARs technical
offices and support systems.

In the present case, AMIN glaringly failed to show how the
reorganization by executive fiat would hamper the exercise of citizens’ rights
and privileges.
A law is presumed constitutional unless proved otherwise

On the issue of Sec 16 Art. 13 of the Constitution (The right of the

people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged.
The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation
mechanisms)being violated: the state merely facilitates this participation, and
not necessarily create these mechanisms. The State provides the support, but
eventually it is the people, properly organized in their associations, who can
assert the right and pursue the objective.
Pursuant to AC of 1987 Sec. 39, states that: The President shall have
continuing authority to re-organize the administrative structure of the Office
of the Pres. And he may take the ff actions:
“Transfer agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other departments or agencies.”

Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration

FACTS:
President ERAP issued on Sept. 1998 EO 29 entitled “Mandating the
Streamlining of the National Tobacco Administration (NTA) a government
agency under the Department of Agriculture (DA).
Order was followed by EO 36 amending EO 29 by increasing from 400
to not exceeding 75 the positions affected thereby.
In compliance therewith, NTA prepared and adopted a new
Organization Structure and Staffing Patter (OSSP) which was submitted to
the Office of the Pres.
 On Nov. 11, 1998, the rank and file employees of NTA, Batac
(Petitioners) filed a letter appeal with CSC and sought the assistance in
recalling OSSP.
On Dec. 4, 1998, OSSP was approved by DBM subject to certain
revisions.
On June 10, 1999, petitioners, all occupying different position of NTA
Office in Batac, Ilocos Norte, received individual notices of termination of their
employment effective 30 days from receipt thereof.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
before RTC of Batac Ilocos Norte. The RTC ordered the NTA to appoint
petitioners in the new OSSP positions similar to their respective former
assignments.
Motion for Reconsideration (MR) filed by NTA was denied by RTC, then
NTA filed on appeal with CA, and CA reversed and set aside the assailed orders
of the TC.
Petitioners, elevated the matter to SC; SC denied for failure to
sufficiently show any reversible error of CA, MR denied. Petitioners submitted
a “Motion to admit Petition for en banc resolution.”

ISSUE:
Whether NTA may be re-organized by an executive fiat, not by
legislative action

RULING:
According to the supreme court, the president has the power to
reorganized an office to achieve simplicity ,economy and efficiency as
provided under executive order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which
provides that activities of executive agencies may be scaled down if it is no
longer essential for the delivery of public service
Petitioners contention, re-organization through the issuance of EO
cannot be done without the benefit of due deliberation, debate and
discussion of members of both chambers of the Congress of the Philippines.
A public office is either created by the constitution, by statute, or by
authority of law. Where the office was created by Congress, it may be
abolished by them. The EXCEPTION, is as far as bureaus, agencies, or offices in
the executive department, the Pres. Power of control may justify him to
inactivate the function of a particular office and grant him the broad authority
to carry out re-organization measures.

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

 National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. Civil
Service Commission

FACTS:
Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy
Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is thus clear that she
cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The additional qualification
was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion
imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
In 1977, Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Law graduate and a first grade
civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under
permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy of Deeds III
pursuant to PD 1529 which she appointed under permanent status up to Sept.
1984
She was for 2 years designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan by virtue of EO 649 which authorized the restricting of
the Land Registration Commission to NLTDRA.
Petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of
Deeds II on Oct. 1, 1984 under Temporary status for not being a member of
the Bar.
She appealed to Sec. of Justice but her request was denied; MR was
denied as well.
Petitioner was administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the
best interest of the Service. While said case was pending decision, her
temporary appointment was renewed in 1985.
In Memorandum dated Oct. 30, 1986, minister and now Secretary of
Justice notified petitioner of the termination of her services as Deputy
Register of Deeds II on the ground she was “receiving bribe money”.
Appeal to Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred to
appeal to the Merit System Protection Board which denied on the ground that
termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary
appointment. MR DENIED.
However, in Resolution dated June 30, 1988, the CSC directed Garcia be
restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds II because the new
requirement of BAR membership would not apply to her but only to filling up
of vacant lawyer position on after Feb. 9, 1981. Since she had been holding
the position from 1977-1984, she would not be affected by EO 649.
NALTDRA filed present petition to assail the validity of the Resolution
of the CSC.
Contention:
Sec. 8 and 10 of EO 649 abolished all existing positions in LRC and
transferred to NALTDRA and Garcia is not a member of the Bar and she cannot
be reinstated.
ISSUE:
W/N Membership of the Bar is the qualification requirement for
appointment of Deputy Register of Deeds under EO 649?

RULING:
EO 649 authorized the re-organization of LRC into NALTDRA. It
abolished all the positions and required new appointments to be issued to all
employees of the NALTDRA.
Law mandates from the moment an implementing order is issued, all
positions in LRC are deemed “NON-EXISTENT.” After Abolition, there is No
Occupant, No Tenure to Speak.
Its requirement of BAR membership for Deputy Register of Deeds is
valid reorganization measure. A reorganization carried in good faith for the
purpose to make bureaucracy more efficient.

Sinon v. Civil Service Commission

FACTS:
Prior to re-organization of then Ministry of Agriculture and Food,
Private Respondent Banan was the incumbent Municipal Agricultural Officer
of Region II, Cagayan.
Petitioner Eliseo Sinon occupied position of Fisheries Extension
Specialist II in BFAR in the same region. However, the re-organization of the
MAF into Department of Agriculture with the issuance of EO 116 called for
the evaluation of 29 positions of Municipal Agriculture Officer (MAO) in
Region II, Cagayan. Petitioner is included but Banan is excluded.
Thus, Respondent Banan filed an appeal with the DARAB for re-
evaluation of qualifications. And was re-evaluated. And Sinon was displaced
by Banan and the resolution was approved by Sec. of Agriculture, Carlos G.
Dominguez.
However, on Aug. 30, 1988, Sinon received an appointment as MAO for
Region II Cagayan as approved by the Regional Director Gumersindo Lasam on
the basis of 1st evaluation.
Thus, Sinon filed an appeal to CSC, then DARAB Resolution Set Aside.
Banan filed an MR which she pitted her qualifications against Sinon. And
granted Banan’s MR.
Sinon filed MR, but CSC denied it. Hence, Petition before SC to assailed
the resolution of CSC.

ISSUE:
W CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the
rating or qualification of petitioner.

RULING
No. CSC departed from its power which is limited only to “REVIEW” and
hence encroached upon the appointing power exclusively lodged in the
appointing authority.
Under RA 6656 Sec. 6, In order that the best qualified and most
deserving persons shall be appointed in any re-organization, there shall be
created a placement committee in each department or agency to assist the
appointing authority in placement of personnel.
Placement committee was charged with the duty of exercising the
discretionary functions as the appointing authority.
Purposes of Re-organization – is the process of restructuring the
bureaucracy’s organizational and functional set-up to make it more viable in
terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and make it more responsive to
the needs of its public clientele as authorized by law.
Petition DENIED.

Domingo v. DBP

FACTS:
Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior Training and Career
Development Officer on permanent status from Feb. 1979 to Dec. 1986.
On Dec. 3, 1986 EO 81, the Revised Charter of IBP was passed
authorizing the re-organization of DBP. Pursuant to the Executive Order,
DBP issued Board Resolution allowing the issuance of Temporary
Appointments to DBP Personnel in order to fully implement the re-
organization. Such Temporary Appointments issued had max. period of 12
months.
Petitioner was issued a Temporary Appointment on Jan. 2, 1987 for a
period of 1 year which was renewed for another period up to Nov. 30, 1988.
A Memorandum issued by the Final Review Committee, Petitioner got a
performance rating of “Below Average” by reason of which his appointment
was made lapse.
Petitioner, together with certain Evangeline Javier filed with CSC a joint
verified complaint against DBP for illegal dismissal. Complainants alleged that
dismissal constitute violation of Civil Service Law against issuance of
Temporary Appointments to permanent employees, as well as of their right to
Security of Tenure and due process.
On Nov. 27, 1989, CSC issued a resolution directing the re-appointment
of Mr. Domingor and Ms. Javier as Senior Training and Career Development
Officer and Research Officer or any such equivalent rank under staffing
pattern of DBP.
DBP filed a MR, then CSC issued resolution setting aside its previous
resolution and affirming the separation of Petitioner. Hence, Petition before
SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the validity of the re-organization implemented by DBP violates
petitioners right to Security of Tenure?

RULING:
The dismissal of herein petitioner is a removal for cause which,
therefore, does not violate his security of tenure.
Re-organization is recognized a valid ground for separation of Civil
Service Employees, subject “ONLY” to the condition it be done in good faith.
Constitution and Sec. 33 and 34 of EO 81 and Sec. 9 of RA 6656 states
that “all those not appointed in the implementation of said re-organization
shall be deemed separated from service.”
Appointment in the Civil Service shall be made only according to the
Merit and Fitness requiring Public Officers and Employees to serve with the
highest degree.
f the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss
of security of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,29 we even observed that there was no such thing as an
absolute right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right to an office or salary.30
Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission
FACTS:
The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career
Executive Service Board is challenged.
Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research
Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO
rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President
for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which
abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A.
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the
Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its organization as
the need arises. Said resolution states:
“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be
known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service
Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and
equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the
Office for Career Executive Service.”
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive
Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished,
petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether the CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB

RULING:
  NO. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on
September 1, 1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was
created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an
unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is
primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing
the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations
Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation
of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3,
Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of
its power to abolish the CESB. But as well pointed out by petitioner and the
Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said
Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent
Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as
enumerated in Section 16..

III. Powers of Administrative Agencies: Nature

A. General Principles
Legislative, Judiciary, Executive – are the separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances among them.
While one branch is not to invade the domain of the other, no one
branch can act without any participation or check from the other branches
which the Constitution recognizes and permits.
Administrative falls to Executive Department

2 Most Important Powers

Quasi-legislatve or rule-making power – promulgate IRR
The authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to
adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of a law and
implement legislative policy.
Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power – interpret and apply such regulations
Power to a wit of execution for the enforcement of decision
The power of the administrative authorities to make determination of facts in
the performance of their official duties and to apply the law as they construe
it to the fact so found.
Ministerial duty – is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for
the exercise of discretion in its performance.
Discretionary duty – is that which by its nature requires the exercise of
judgment.
Quasi-legislative
 – power of the body to promulgate rules intended to carry out the provisions
of particular laws
Quasi-judicial 
power of the administrative body to resolve, in a manner essentially judicial,
factual and sometime seven legal questions incidental to its primary power of
enforcement of the law.
•In case of conflict between the statute and
administrative order, the statute shall prevail

Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations:

Legislative Rule – designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the
details thereof; it is in the nature of subordinate legislation.
Supplementary Regulation – intended to fill in the details of the law and “to
make explicit what is only general” (IRR of Labor Code)
Contingent Regulation – issued to enforce or suspend the operation of a law,
after the ascertainment by the administrative agency of existence of a particular
contingency.
Interpretative Rule – those which purport to do no more than interpret the statute
being administered for proper observance by the people (BIR Circulars)

Requisites for validity of administrative rules and regulations

Must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law
Conform to the standards that the law prescribes
Must be reasonable
Must be related solely to carrying into effects the general provision o the law

Solid Homes, Inc. v Payawal

FACTS:
Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who is suing Solid Homes
for failure to deliver the certificate of title. The complaint was filed with the
RTC. Solid Homes contended that jurisdiction is with the National Housing
Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD 957, as amended by PD 1344 granting
exclusive jurisdiction to NHA.

 a general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and

does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class,
while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of
a class

ISSUE:
W/N NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to award
damages

HELD:
SC held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction. In case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of
the dates of their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this case is
BP 129 and PD 1344 the special law.
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is
part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD 1344 to hear and decide
“claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman.”
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in
the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields
assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more
expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts
of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi- legislative and
quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth
department of the government.
Statues conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be
liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in
accordance with the legislative purpose.

FACTS:
On August 31, 1982 Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid
Homes Inc., before the Regional Trial Court alleging that they contracted to
sell her subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975. Subsequently Solid Homes
Inc. executed a deed of sale but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate
title despite of repeated demands by Payawal because defendant had
mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. Thereafter, Solid
Homes Inc moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had
no jurisdiction this being rested in the National Housing Authority under PD
no. 597. The motion was denied, hence, the petition to reverse said decision
of the Court of Appeals in sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
was submitted by Solid Homes Inc. to the Supreme Court.
 Matienzo v Abellera
FACTS:
The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators
in Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admittedly operate "colorum" or
"kabit" taxicab units. Private respondents filed their petitions with the
respondent Board of Transportation for the legalization of their
unauthorized "excess" taxicab units citing Presidential Decree No. 101,
promulgated on January 17, 1973, "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful
trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become
legitimate and responsible operators." Within a matter of days, the
respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the applications for hearing
and granting applicants provisional authority to operate their "excess taxicab
units" for which legalization was sought. The petitioners allege that the BOT
acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization
and awarding special permits to the private respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether the BOT has the power to legalize, at this time, clandestine and
unlawful taxicab operations.

RULING:
YES. Presidential Decree No. 101 vested in the Board of Transportation
the power, among others "To grant special permits of limited term for the
operation of public utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the
Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators into
legitimate and responsible operators." It is argued that under PD 101, it is the
fixed policy of the State "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of
clandestine operators by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and
responsible ones". In view thereof, it is maintained that respondent Board
may continue to grant to "colorum" operators the benefits of legalization
under PD 101, despite the lapse of its power, after six (6) months, to do so,
without taking punitive measures against the said operator
It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or
commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally
construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which
is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent
should be upheld as germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is
required, the appropriate means are deemed given.
 Senator Robert S. Jaworski v. PAGCOR

FACTS:
  PAGCOR is a GOCC existing under PD 1869 (legislative frenchise)  issued
on 1983 by then Pres. Marcos.
1998, PAGCOR’s  BOD  (Board of Directors) approved and granted
authority to  Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) to
operate and maintain Sports Betting station including Internet betting in
PAGCOR’s casino locations
SAGE commenced its operations by conducting gambling on the
Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of
winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner Senator Robert Jaworski, Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Games, Amusement and Sports, filed the petition, praying that the grant of
authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be NULLIFIED. 
He said PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, its just 'ultra vires') when it authorized SAGE to
operate gambling on the INTERNET. He contends that PAGCOR is not
authorized under its legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, to operate gambling
on the internet for  said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet
gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was
yet inexistent 

ISSUE:
WON  PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to another entity
such as SAGE.

RULING:
NO. A LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISE is a special privilege with attached
public concern granted by the state to corporations to address public interest.
The privilege  cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but reserved for
public control and administration, directly by government or public agents,
under such CONDITIONS AND REGULATIONS as the government may impose
on them in the interest of the public. Congress that prescribes the conditions
on which the grant of the franchise may be made
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s
and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to
relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to
another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view of the
legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is
nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. 

A. Express and Implied

 Sarcos v Castillo

RULING:
Under the former law (Sec. 2188, Rev. Adm. Code) then in force which
stands repeated by virtue of the Decentralization Act (Sec. 25), the provincial
governor, if the charge against a municipal official was one affecting his official
integrity, could order his preventive suspension (Cf. Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil.
175 and Ochate v. Deling, 105 Phil. 384). A reading of the provision of Section
5 of Republic Act No. 5185 makes manifest that it is the provincial board to
which such a power has been granted under conditions therein specified. The
statutory provision is worded differently. The principle, that the deliberate
selection of language other than that used in an earlier act is indicative that a
change in the law was intended, calls for application (Brewster v. Gage, 280
U.S. 327). Any other view would be to betray lack of fidelity to the purpose to
manifest in the controlling legal provision. The construction here reached, as
to the absence of power on the part of provincial governors to suspend
preventively a municipal mayor is buttressed by the avoidance of undesirable
consequences flowing from a different doctrine Sarcos vs. Castillo, 26 SCRA
853, No. L-29755 January 31, 1969
 Villegas v Subido

FACTS:
Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of 91
women street sweepers in the City of Manila. But the appointing would still
have to be approved by the Office of Civil Service Commission under
Commissioner Abelardo Subido. Subido refused to extend approval to such
appointments on the ground that appointing women to manual labor
is against Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of 1964. Subido pointed out
that putting women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the
sun and placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and
ridicule and constitutes a violation of the traditional dignity and respect
accorded Filipino womanhood. Villegas however pointed out that the said
Memo has already been set aside by the Office of the President hence the
same is no longer in effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed
by the Civil Service Commissioner.

RULING:
Yes,the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of Subido was not
on any
Law or rule but simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this
instance in accordance with his own personal predilection. Here he appeared
to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside
their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. A
public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule
justifying the exercise of a challenged authority.
Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises
power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which
the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are
likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions.
As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must
be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of
a valid grant, they are devoid of power. It must be conceded that
departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by
statute. Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the
motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a
myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.
 This trend towards greater recognition of equal rights for both sexes
under the shelter of the equal protectionclause argues most strongly against
this kind of discrimination.

Radio Communications v Santiago

FACTS:
On July 12, 1966, a telegram was filed with respondent-company (now
petitioner) and the amount of P1.50 was paid for the transmission of said
telegram to Zamboanga City. The telegram, however, was never
transmitted until now. The respondent not only did not give any valid
explanation, but did not present any evidence to explain why the said
telegram was not forwarded to the addressee until now.
In another complaint, complainant Constancio Jaugan filed a telegram
at the branch office of respondent in Dumaguete City, ... addressed to
Commissioner Enrique Medina, PSC, Manila. The telegram was received by an
employee of the respondent, Mrs. Jesusa A. Orge, as shown by the receipt ...
dated August
1, 1967, and the sum of P2.64 was collected in payment of said telegram. The
telegram, ... in effect, advised Commissioner Medina that the Land
Registration Case where he was cited by subpoena to testify before the
CFI of Oriental Negros on August 14 and 15, 1967, was transferred and,
therefore, there was no necessity for the said Commissioner to proceed to
Negros Oriental on those dates. It appears that the said telegram
received by Jesusa Orge at Dumaguete City on August 1, 1967, was
transmitted to Manila, on the same date,but was never delivered to the
addressee, and on August 14 and 15, when Commissioner Medina appeared
before the Dumaguete Court.
It was the manifest failure in both cases to render the service expected
of a responsible operator that led to the imposition of the penalty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Public Service Commission has jurisdiction to act on
complaints by dissatisfied customers of petitioner Radio Communications of
the Phil., Inc. and thereafter to penalize it with a fine?

RULING:
No. There can be no justification then for the Public Service
Commission imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any
clearer. The only power it possessed over radio companies, as noted was the
fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any negligence or
misfeasance. It was bereft of such competence. It was not vested with such
authority. What it did then in these two petitions lacked the impress
of validity.
The Public Service Act expressly exempting radio companies from the
jurisdiction, supervision and control of such body "except with respect to the
fixing of rates."7 In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that
the Public Service Commission lacked the required power to proceed against
petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which impowers it to impose
a fine that calls for a different conclusion
The Public Service Commission having been abolished by virtue of a
Presidential Decree, as set forth at the outset, and a new Board of
Communications having been created to take its place, nothing said in this
decision has reference to whatever powers are now lodged in the latter body.
It is to be understood, likewise, that insofar as the complainants are
concerned, this decision goes no further than to rule adversely on the
exercise of authority by the Public Service Commission when it took
disciplinary action against petitioner

Azarcon v Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving
business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP.
Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla
whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.
 
 
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by
BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels
or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of
accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was
issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to
transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his
possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as
custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating
that while he had made representations to retain possession of the property
of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said
property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his
reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the
provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17
yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new
trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not Azarcon is a public officer.
 
RULING:
No. SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for
lack of jurisdiction. Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when the
Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the
complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or
accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime
within its jurisdiction.
 
The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense
under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven
a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime
charged.
 
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that
the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by
the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions,
he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was
he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR
had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the
National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a
public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act as a
depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a
public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.

Implied Powers” are those which are necessarily included in, and are
therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other
matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto.—It is axiomatic
in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited government, that
its branches and administrative agencies exercise only that power delegated
to them as “defined either in the Constitution or in legislation or in both.”
Thus, although the “appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the
President, x x x” the quantum of powers possessed by an administrative
agency forming part of the executive branch will still be limited to that
“conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication” in its enabling act.
Hence, “(a)n administrative officer, it has been held, has only such powers as
are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof.” Corollarily, implied powers “are those which are necessarily included
in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot
extend to other matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental
thereto.” For to so extend the statutory grant of power “would be an
encroachment on powers expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution.” It
is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes
the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring “any person” to preserve
a distrained property, thus: The constructive distraint of personal property
shall be effected by requiring the taxpayer or any person having possession or
control of such property to sign a receipt covering the property distrained and
obligate himself to preserve the same intact and unaltered and not to dispose
of the same in any manner whatever without the express authority of the
Commissioner.

Taule v Santos

FACTS:
On June 18, 1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC)
of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members convened in Virac,
Catanduanes with sixmembers, including Taule, in attendance for the purpose
of holding the election of its officers. Thegroup decided to hold the election
despite the absence of five (5) of its members. The Governor of Catanduanes
sent a letter to respondent the Secretary of Local Government, protesting the
electionof the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification due to flagrant
irregularities in the manner itwas conducted. The Secretary nullifed the
election of the officers of the FABC and ordered a newone to be conducted to
be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of
LocalGovernment. Taule, contested the decision contending that neither the
constitution nor the lawgrants jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary
over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC and that
the Constitution provides that it is the COMELEC which has jurisdictionover all
contests involving elective barangay officials.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest
involving theelection of the officers of the Federation of Association of
Barangay Councils;

RULING:
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective
barangay officials is limitedto appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial
courts. Under the law, the sworn petition contestingthe election of a barangay
officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courtby
any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted
for the sameoffice within 10 days after the proclamation of the results.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the
organizational set-up of thekatipunan ng mga barangay composed of
popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by lawwhose officers are
voted upon by their respective members. The authority of the COMELEC over
thekatipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election
of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a
particular level conducted by their own respectiveorganization.

GSIS v CSC

FACTS:

The GSIS dismissed six government employees on account of

irregularities in the canvassing of supplies. The employees appealed to
the Merit Board. Said board found for the employees and declared the
dismissal as illegal because no hearing took place. The GSIS took the
issue to the Civil Service which then ruled that the dismissal was indeed
illegal. The CSC thereafter ordered the reinstatement of the employees
and demanded the payment of backwages. The replacements of the
dismissed employees should then be released from service.
Heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion for execution of the Civil
Service resolution so that backwages can be paid. GSIS however denied
the motion saying that the SC modified that part of the ruling.
CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to the GSIS and granted the motion.
GSIS was made to pay. Backed against the wall, GSIS filed certiorari with
the SC asking that the CSC order be nullified. The GSIS contends that the
CSC has no power to execute its judgments.

ISSUE
Whether the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments

HELD

YES. The Civil Service Commission is a consitutional commission invested

by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to
administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the
authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted
directly with it or brought to it on appeal. It has the power, too, sitting
en banc, to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice
before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not however
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it
would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power
or authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders. It
would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile
unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided
is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory
power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and
logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or
execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise
provides.
Therefore, the GSIS must yield to the order of the CSC.

Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform

Beneficiaries Cooperative

FACTS:
Certain members of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Cooperative filed several complaints alleging mismanagement and/or
misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the then incumbent officers and
members of the board of directors of the cooperative, some of whom are
herein private respondents. Acting on the complaint, the CDA issued an order
freezing the funds of DARBCI and creating a management committee to
manage the affairs of the said cooperative. Private respondents questioned
the jurisdiction of CDA before the RTC of South Cotabato. RTC then issued a
TRO against CDA. Court of Appeals then declared that the order of the CDA
was NULL AND VOID and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CDA it is vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate
cooperative disputes in view of its powers, functions and responsibilities
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6939?

RULING:
None. Concededly, Section 3(o) of R.A. No. 6939 and Article 35(4) of
R.A. 6938, may not be relied upon by the CDA as authority to resolve internal
conflicts of cooperatives, they being general provisions. Nevertheless, this
does not preclude the CDA from resolving the instant case. The assumption of
jurisdiction by the CDA on matters which partake of cooperative disputes is a
logical, necessary and direct consequence of its authority to register
cooperatives.
It can be gleaned from the above-quoted provision of R.A. No. 6939
that the authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrative functions
which consist of policy-making, registration, fiscal and technical assistance to
cooperatives and implementation of cooperative laws. Nowhere in the said
law can it be found any express grant to the CDA of authority to adjudicate
cooperative disputes. At most, Section 8 of the same law provides that “upon
request of either or
both parties, the Authority shall mediate and conciliate disputes with a
cooperative or between cooperatives” however, with a restriction “that if no
mediation or conciliation succeeds within three (3) months from request
thereof, a certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the commission prior
to the filing of appropriate action before the proper courts”. Being an
administrative agency, the CDA has only such powers as are expressly granted
to it by law and those which are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.

Carino v Capulong

FACTS:
AMA sent a LOI to operate as an educational institution to DECS 9in which it
responded that under PB 232, the application shall be at least
on year before the opening. While the application is on process, AMA proceed
ed to announce it’s opening through news and print media, and there upon,
started to enroll students in elementary, secondary and tertiary levels. Taking
remedial action, the DECS Regional Director directed AMA to stop enrollment
and to desist from operating without prior authorization.
Regional Director requested military assistance to affect the closure of  AMA.
Sometime on June 1990, AMA’s application was denied. Sometime of July
1990, AMA filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, a petition for
prohibition, certiorari and mandamus to annul and set aside the closure order
and to enjoin the respondents from closing or padlocking AMACC,Davao City.
The respondent Judge (RTC BR134) issued an order directing the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction

ISSUE:
Is the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational
institution a ministerial duty or discretionary duty?

RULING:
DISCRETIONARY. Petition granted . As a rule, mandamus will lie only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary
function. A ministerial duty is one, which is so clear and specific as to leave no
room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a
discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment.

As explained in the case of Symaco vs. Aquino, —

A purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
In the case at bar, the issuance of the permit is not a ministerial duty of
the DECS. DECS is authorized either to impose the total closure of a school
and/or to disqualify the school from conferring title or degree in the non-
recognized program or course of studies.

It is a discretionary duty or function because it had to be exercised in

accordance with — and not in violation of — the law and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.BP 232 governs the establishment or recognition of
private schools through government grant of permits is governed by law. The
authority to grant permit is vested upon the judgment of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the rules and regulations
governing the recognition on private schools (Section 27, BP 232).

AMA had been operating a school without a permit in blatant violation

of law. Since DECS has no ministerial duty to issue the contested permit,
Capulong was in GAD when he issued the injuction.

Mateo v CA

FACTS:
The petitioners failed to file their appeal within the period allowed by law.
Claiming that their non-filing of their appeal was due to excusable negligence,
they filed their notice of appeal before the RTC that rendered the decision
which denied the same. The petitioners elevated their case before the
Supreme Court on a Petition for Mandamus on their contention that the duty
of the RTC judge to grant a notice to appeal is purely a ministerial act. On that
premise, the judge’s denial of the petitioner’s appeal is not justified. 

ISSUE:
Whether the grant of a notice of appeal by a judge is purely ministerial and if
he refuses, he may be compelled through mandamus.

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and said: “As regards the denial of the
Petition for Relief from Judgment, there is no question that the same involved
the exercise of discretion by the trial court and therefore, the granting thereof
can not be compelled by mandamus.” (G.R. 83354, April 25, 1991) Since the
act of granting or denying a notice of appeal involves the exercise of
discretion, it is not ministerial and the judge cannot be compelled to grant it.
“Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for
the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a
discretionary duty is that which by its nature requires the exercise of
judgment. A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. But if the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
of official discretion nor judgment. . . .”

Symaco v Aquino
We agree with the lower curt that the moment petitioner complied with the
requirements under said ordinance for the issuance of a building permit" the
petitioner became entitled to it and the respondents duty became ministerial
and it was" thereupon" incumbent upon him to issue the same. There is
nothing in the ordinance which grants respondent the discretion to refuse the
issuance of a building permit to an applicant owner" tenant"manager" or
contractor. All that the ordinance requires is that said applicant must state the
data mentioned therein.
The pending forcible entry case is a private matter. As the lower court stated"
if the petitioner is allowed to build" no damages in case of adverse decision
will be the petitioner himself who has to remote the decision will be the
petitioner himself who has to remote the building should the court find that
the land upon which it stands does not belong to him.

Roble Arrastre v. Villaflor

FACTS:
Petitioner Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo handling service operator, authorized
by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to provide and render arrastre and
stevedoring services at the Municipal Port of Hilongos, Leyte, and on all
vessels berthed thereat, from September 1992 to September 1993.
In December 1993, pending final consideration of petitioner’s
application for renewal with the PPA Office, Manila, the PPA through its Port
Manager Salvador L. Reyna of the Tacloban Port Management Office issued a
90-day holdover authority to petitioner. Stated therein was the proviso that
notwithstanding the 90day period aforementioned, the authority shall
be deemed ipso facto revoked if an earlier permit/contract for cargo handling
services is granted or sooner withdrawn or cancelled for cause pursuant to
PPA Administrative Order No. 1081. Meanwhile, petitioner filed with
respondent mayor an application for the renewal of its business permits,
which, in turn, was denied. Petitioner thus filed for a petition for mandamus
with preliminary injunction, and enjoined respondent mayor to issue the
business license sought.
On the other hand, the respondent mayor averred that the remedy of
mandamus does not lie as the issuance of the permit sought is not
a ministerial function, but one that requires sound judgment and discretion. In
denying petitioners application, respondent mayor invoked Municipal
Resolution No. 9327, passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, Leyte
which prohibits any party which likewise operates shipping lines plying the
route of Cebu to Hilongos and vice versa, from engaging in arrastre and
stevedoring services at the port of Hilongos.

ISSUE: Is respondent mayor’s issuance of the permit a discretionary duty?

RULING:
Yes. It can be deduced from Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local
Government Code that the limits in the exercise of the power of a municipal
mayor to Issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the same can be
contained in a law or ordinance The said section is pursuant to Section 16 of
the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, which encapsulates the
delegated police power to local government units. Thus, under the LGC, the
municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or
revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses
or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
The pursuit of its duty under the police power necessarily entails
exercise of official discretion in order for any local officials to ascertain which
will better serve their constituents who elected them into office. Full
discretion must necessarily be granted them to perform their functions and it
will not be sound logic to simply make them perform purely ministerial
functions. And when the discharge of an official duty requires the exercise of
official discretion or judgment, it is never a ministerial one. Furthermore,
where the only power given to a municipal corporation or official is to issue
license, as in Section 444 of the Local Government Code, it is clearly regulatory
in nature rather than a revenue raising one. Conclusively, regulation being the
object of the power to issue license and permits the exercise of discretion by
the issuing authority becomes an inescapable prerogative. This could be the
very same reason why business permits and licenses are renewed almost
annually in order that the licensing officials in carrying out their functions
could examine and evaluate availing circumstances and conditions and with
the exercise of discretion determine whether to grant or deny the application
or, to revoke a license or permit already issued. It should also be understood
that a municipal license is not a property such that it is revocable when public
interest so requires.
However, the fact that there only was the Resolution No. 93-27, and no
ordinance nor law, petitioner’s cause still cannot prosper because the proper
action is certiorari to determine whether grave of abuse of discretion had
been committed, and not mandamus.

MERALCO Securities Corp. v Savellano

FACTS:
The late Juan G. Maniago (substituted in these proceedings by his wife
and children) submitted to petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue
confidential denunciation against the Meralco Securities Corporation for tax
evasion for having paid income tax only on 25 % of the dividends it received
from the Manila Electric Co, thereby allegedly shortchanging the government
of income tax due from 75% of the said dividends.
 Commissioner caused the investigation of the denunciation after which
he found and held that no deficiency corporate income tax was due from the
Meralco Securities Corporation since under the law then prevailing (in the
case of dividends received by a domestic or foreign resident corporation liable
to corporate income tax only 25% shall be returnable for the purposes of the
tax. The Commissioner rejected Maniago's contention that the Meralco from
whom the dividends were received is not a domestic corporation liable to tax.
In a letter, the Commissioner denied Maniago's claim for informer's
reward on a non-existent deficiency. This action of the Commissioner was
sustained by the Secretary of Finance. Maniago filed a petition for mandamus
to compel the Commissioner to impose the alleged deficiency tax assessment
on the Meralco Securities Corporation and to award to him the corresponding
informer's reward under the provisions of R.A. 2338.
The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that since in
matters of issuance and non-issuance of assessments, he is clothed under the
National Internal Revenue Code and existing rules and regulations with
discretionary power in evaluating the facts of a case and since mandamus win
not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary power, he cannot be
compelled to impose the alleged tax deficiency assessment. 
On the other hand, the Meralco Securities Corporation averred that
since no taxes have actually been recovered and/or collected, Maniago has no
right to recover the reward prayed for
The respondent judge rendered a decision granting the writ prayed for
and ordering the Commissioner to assess and collect from the Meralco
Securities Corporation the sum of P51,840,612.00 as deficiency corporate
income tax plus interests and surcharges due thereon and to pay 25% to
Maniago as informer's reward.

ISSUE: 
Whether mandamus is proper in this case

RULING:
No. It is a well-recognized rule that mandamus only lies to enforce the
performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of
a discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may
not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the
power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under
certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and
conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.
Mandamus may not be resorted to so as to interfere with the manner in
which the discretion shall be exercised or to influence or coerce a particular
determination.
Moreover, since the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is
charged with the administration of revenue laws, which is the primary
responsibility of the executive branch of the government, mandamus may not
he against the Commissioner to compel him to impose a tax assessment not
found by him to be due or proper for that would be tantamount to a
usurpation of executive functions.
Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with
the task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the collection of
taxes had after a mature and thorough study rendered his decision or ruling
that no tax is due or collectible, and his decision is sustained by the Secretary,
now Minister of Finance (whose act is that of the President unless
reprobated), such decision or ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the
performance of official duty and cannot be controlled much less reversed by
mandamus. A contrary view, whereby any stranger or informer would be
allowed to usurp and control the official functions of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue would create disorder and confusion, if not chaos and total
disruption of the operations of the government.

Binamira v Garrucho

FACTS:
Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority. He was designated as general Manager by the
Chairman of the PTA Board.
In 1990, Pres. Aquino sent Garrucho, Secretary of Tourism, a
memorandum stating that his designation is invalid because it was not her,
the President, who appointed him as what is required by PD No. 564. As such,
he will remain in the position until the President appoints a person to serve in
a permanent capacity.

In pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the Minister

of Tourism, the petitioner assumed office on on April 7, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President
Aquino of the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which
included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General Manager,
approved by the President on the same date.
Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties
of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors.
On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent
Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism.
On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a
memorandum designating him concurrently as General Manager,
effective immediately, until the President can appoint a person to serve
in the said office in a permanent capacity.
Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in
accordance with this memorandum, the petitioner filed this action
against him to question his title. Subsequently, while his original petition
was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on
April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines appointed Jose A.
Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
Capistrano was impleaded as additional respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether Binamira was appointed as General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority or merely designated

RULING:
                Petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but
only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction
between appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to
consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment
results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent
official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or
where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are
designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or
the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially
executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it
likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office.
That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is
merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the
office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an
acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on
the person named.
                Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of
the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The
reason is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President
of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise
of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally
speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of
that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or
designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act
that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in
this case to be a member of the Cabinet.

Republic v Capulong

FACTS:

As a rule, mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a

ministerial duty and not a discretionary act. In Meralco Securities
Corporation v. Savellano (L-36748, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 804,
812), We ruled that “(d)iscretion when applied to public functionaries,
means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially,
under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or
conscience of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to
a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.” As a
general rule, a writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the
exercise of discretion of a public officer since it is his judgment that is to
be exercised and not that of the court (see Magtibay vs. Garcia, G.R. No.
L-28971, January 28, 1983, 120 SCRA 370). Thus, the courts will

not interfere to modify, control or inquire into the exercise of this

discretion unless it be alleged and proven that there has been an abuse
or an excess of authority on the part of the officer concerned (see Calvo
v. de Gutierrez, et al., 4 Phil. 2033). Republic vs. Capulong, 199 SCRA
134, G.R. No. 93359 July 12, 1991

BREHN V. REPUBLIC
FACTS:

Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen who is serving U.S Navy with the
temporary Assignment at Subic Bay. He Married Ester Mira on October
9, 1958, who had a daughter Elizabeth Mira, by another man. After the
marriage, the couple established residence at Intramuros, Manila, and
the minor Elizabeth had been their care and support of Brehm.
            On January 28, 1959, the spouses filed a joint petition with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the minor
Elizabeth.
            An opposition to the petition was registered. It appears that
Brehm residence in the Philippines was merely temporary thus
disqualifying him from making an adoption because under the (Art. 335
[4]. New Civil Code ; Sec. 2 Rule 100, Rules of Court) and that being a
non-resident alien , the court has no  jurisdiction over him.
            He argued that Article 335 of the New Civil code which prohibits
to a non-resident alien to adopt was not applicable because it includes
adoption only for the purposes of establishing a relationship of paternity
and filiation, where non existed, but not where the adopting parents are
not total strangers to the child. Brehm further argued that pursuant to
Art 338 of the New Civil Code, expressly authorizes the adoption of a
step-child by a step-father.

ISSUE:
            Does Brehm have the rights to adopt his Step-child?
HELD:
            No, because Brehm was a non-resident alien in the Philippines
and cannot adopt anybody even his step-child.
            Art. 335 No.4 of the Civil Code is mandatory because it contains
words of positive prohibition and is couched in negative terms importing
that the act required shall not be than otherwise than designated. On
the other hand, Art.338, no.3 of the same code is merely directory, and
can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the
mandatory provisions of said article.
SERINA VS VFI OF BUKIDNON
PROV. TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL VS. ASCONA
FACTS:
A civil case questioning the legality of an assessment of properties for
taxation purpose was on going within the Court of First Instances, when
on June 17, 1954, 18 months before the decision in said case was
rendered CFI, RA 1125, was enacted granting to the CTA exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions of the Collector
of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, and Provincial or City
Boards of Assessment Appeals in all cases involving disputed
assessments of internal revenue taxes, customs duties, and real property
taxes, and providing that all said cases that were then pending
determination in the courts of first instance shall be certified and
remanded by the respective clerks of court to the Court of Tax Appeals
for final disposition. However, in spite of the fact that when said Act was
approved the present assessment case was still pending decision by the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, the latter court, in open
disregard of the mandatory provisions of said Act, decided the same on
the merits, instead of remanding it to the Court of Tax Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First instance’s decision is valid.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 22 of said Act
which postulate that “All cases involving disputed assessment of Internal
Revenue taxes or customs duties pending determination before the
Court of First Instance shall be certified and remanded by the respective
clerks of court to the Court of Tax Appeals for final disposition thereof”,
are mandatory. The open disregard of the CFI renders its decision null
and void.
It is true that said Section 22 seemingly limits its scope as regards the
cases to be remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals to those involving
assessment of internal revenue taxes and customs duties, while the
present case admittedly refers to an assessment of land tax, but this is of
no moment for in interpreting the context of said Section 22 we should
not ignore Section 7 of the same Act which defines the extent and scope
of the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.

REPUBLIC VS. PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.

FACTS:
Plaintiff -appellant Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint against
defendant-appellee Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. on January 17, 1963
alleging that the latter, as the registered owner of motor vehicles, paid
to the Motor Vehicles Office in Baguio the amount of P78,636.17, for the
second installment of registration fees for 1959, not in cash but in the
form of negotiable backpay certificates of indebtedness Thus, it sought
the payment of such amount with surcharges plus the legal rate of
interest from the filing thereof and a declaration of the nullity of the use
of such negotiable certificate of indebtedness to satisfy its obligation.
The defendant-appellee, countered that what it did was in accordance
with the Backpay Law, both the Treasurer of the Philippines and the
General Auditing Office having signified their conformity to such a mode
of payment. It then sought the dismissal of the complaint.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of defendant-appellee

upheld the validity and efficacy of such payment made and dismissed
the complaint holding that the National Treasurer upon whom devolves
the function of administering the Back Pay Law (Republic Act 304 as
amended by Republic Act Nos. 800 and 897), in his letter to the Chief of
the Motor Vehicles Office, had approved the acceptance of negotiable
certificates of indebtedness in payment of registration fees of motor
vehicles with the view that such certificates 'should be accorded with
the same confidence by other governmental instrumentalities as other
evidences of public debt, such as bonds and treasury certificates'.
Significantly, the Auditor General concurred in the said view of the
National Treasurer. The Republic of the Philippines appealed. While
originally the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals, it was
certified to the Supreme Court, the decisive issue being one of law.

ISSUE:
1. Is the registration fee a tax, and as such, its payment by
backpay certificates valid?

2. Whether or not estoppel lies against the government for the

mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the
auditorgeneral.
RULING:
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. A tax refers to a financial
obligation imposed by a state on persons, whether natural or juridical,
within its jurisdiction, for property owned, income earned, business or
profession engaged in, or any such activity analogous in character for
raising the necessary revenues to take care of the responsibilities of
government.

As distinguished from other pecuniary burdens, the differentiating

factor is that the purpose to be subserved is the raising of revenue. A tax
then is neither a penalty that must be satisfied nor a liability arising from
contract. Much less can it be confused or identified with a license or a
fee as a manifestation of an exercise of the police power. It has been
settled law in this jurisdiction as far back as Cu Unjieng v. Potstone,
decided in 1962, that this broad and all-encompassing governmental
competence to restrict rights
of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a
regulatory fee. Unlike a tax, it has not for its object the raising of
revenue but looks rather to the enactment of specific measures that
govern the relations not only as between individuals but also as between
private parties and the political society. To quote from Cooley anew:
"Legislation for these purposes it would seem proper to look upon as
being made in the exercise of that authority ... spoken of as the police
power." The registration fee which defendant-appellee had to pay was
imposed by Section 8 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. Its heading
speaks of "registration fees." The term is repeated four times in the body
thereof. Equally so, mention is made of the "fee for registration." A
subsection starts with a categorical statement "No fees shall be
charged." The conclusion is difficult to resist therefore that the Motor
Vehicle Act requires the payment not of a tax but of a registration fee
under the police power. Hence the inapplicability of the section relied
upon by defendant-appellee under the Back Pay Law. It is not held liable
for a tax but for a registration fee. It therefore cannot make use of a
backpay certificate to meet such an obligation.

2. Insofar as the taxing power is concerned, Pineda v. Court of First

Instance, a 1929 decision, speaks categorically: "The Government is
never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents. It follows
that, in so far as this record shows, the petitioners have not made it
appear that the
additional tax claimed by the Collector is not in fact due and collectible.
Theassessment of the tax by the Collector creates, it must be
remembered, a charge that is at least prima facie valid." That principle
has since been subsequently followed. While the question here is one of
the collection of a regulatory fee under the police power, reliance on the
above course of decisions is not inappropriate. There is nothing to stand
in the way, therefore, of the collection of the registration fees from
defendant-appellee. WHEREFORE, the decision of November 24, 1965 is
reversed and defendant-

Government is never estopped by mistake or error of its agents.—The

Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its
agents. Hence, the mistake of the Collector in giving allowance to the
payment of a tax in a form not sanctioned by law, is at least prima, facie
valid only. Republic vs. Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211, No. L-
26862 March 30, 1970

DIR. OF BUREAU OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS VS. ALIGAEN

FACTS:
Jose Belo owned a congressional franchise, pursuant to the said
franchise he had put up in Roxas, an automatic telephone system which
had been operating and rendering good service with 410 telephones and
sufficient reserves for additional lines. Bureau of Telecommunications,
was starting to establish maintain and operate the same within the
geographical area of Roxas City another local telephone system. This
prompted Belo to file with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, a verified
petition for “Injunction with Preliminary Injunction”. Belo posted a bond
in the amount of P 5,000.00, accordingly a writ of injunction was issued.
On the same date, respondent offers a counter bond in the amount of P
20,000.00 for the dissolution of injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not filing of counter bond dissolves the effect of injunction

RULING:
No, The mere filing of a counterbond does not necessarily warrant the
dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction. Under Section 6 of Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, the court is called upon to exercise its
discretion in determining or weighing the relative damages that may be
suffered by the parties. If the damages that may be suffered by the
defendant by the continuance of the injunction outweigh the damages
that may be suffered by the plaintiff by the dissolution of the injunction,
then the injunction should be dissolved.
LEVERIZA VS. IAC
FACTS:

This case involves three contracts of lease:

1) Contract A: executed between Civil Aeronautics Administration

(lessor) and Rosario Leveriza (lessee)
2) Contract B: executed between Leveriza (lessor) and Mobil Oil
(lessee)
3) Contract C: executed between CAA (lessor) and Mobil Oil
(lessee)

When Leveriza subleased the property to Mobil Oil (Contract B)

without permission from the lessor, CAA cancelled Contract A and
executed Contract C with Mobil Oil. Leveriza contended that
Contract C was invalid not only because it was entered into by
CAA without approval by the Department Secretary but also
because it was not executed by the President of the Philippines or
officer duly designated. According to Leveriza, the officer duly
designated to cancel the contract is not the Airport General
Manager but the Secretary of Public Works and Communication or
the Director of the CAA.

ISSUE:
Whether the administrator of CAA had the statutory authority,
without the approval of the then secretary of the PWC, to enter into
or cancel a lease contract over a real property owned by the RP.

HELD:

YES. SC held that the Airport General Manager had authority to

enter into contracts of lease. In executing Contract C, the Airport
General Manager signed for the Director of the CAA, who
subsequently ratified the same.

Under sec. 567 of the RAC, a contract of lease may be executed

by: (1) President; (2) officer duly designated by him; and (3) officer
expressly vested by law. Under sec. 32 (24) of RA 776, the
Director of the CAA is one such officer vested by law.
It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the
authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the government under
the third category. As provided in Section 32 of Republic Act 776,
the Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its creation
and existence, administers properties belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines and it is on these properties that the Administrator
must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter into,
make and execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or
public or private corporation or entity and to acquire, hold,
purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways and
easements which may be proper or necessary. The basic principle
of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must
give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally
be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special
provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a
general statute and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefore
specially should prevail.
SHAUF VS CA
FACTS:  
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin, filed for damages and equal
employment opportunity complaint against Don Detwiler and Anthony
Persi, both officers of the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. The
former was allegedly rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in
the said institution because of her sex, color, and origin. The
respondents defended that they are immune from suit for acts done
made by them inperformance of their official governmental functions. 

ISSUE:  
Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit being officers
of the US ArmedForces

DECISION:  No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of

diplomatic immunity for all its acts orthe acts of its agents in the
Philippines. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent is expressly declared in the Constitution. It also applies to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed
by them in the discharge of its duties. However, it is a different matter
where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. In other
words, the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. Here, the respondents were found guilty
of discriminating against Shauf on account of her sex, origin and color.
Hence, the respondents may be sued in their private and personal
capacity. 
SANDERS
Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers (deceased) were
both employed as game room attendants in the special services
department of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA). They were advised that
their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protect the conversion and
to institute grievance proceedings. The hearing officer recommended
the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status
plus back wages.
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Commanding Officer of Subic
Naval Base, petitioner Sanders, Special Services Director of NAVSTA,
disagreed with the recommendation and asked for its rejection.
Moreau, even before the start of the grievance hearings, sent a letter to
the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private
respondent‘s status and requested concurrence therewith.
Private respondents filed suit for damages claiming that the letters
contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and
had caused them mental anguish, and prejudgment of the grievance
proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
They make it clear that petitioners were being sued in their personal
capacity. A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was
filed by the petitioner and was denied.
ISSUE:
Were the petitioners performing their official duties when they did the
acts for which they are being sued for damages?
HELD:
YES. It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners
are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties. Sanders as director of the special services
department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel
including the private respondents and had a hand in their employment,
work, assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The
act of Moreau is deadly official in nature, performed by him as the
immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval
Personnel in matters involving the special department of NAVSTA.
   Petitioner Sanders was then the special services director of the U.S.
Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said
station. Private respondents were American citizens with permanent
address in the Phil and were both game room attendants of the NAVSTA.
Herein respondents were then advised that there employment was
changed from permanent full time to permanent part-time. They filed a
case of the US Dept. of Defense then was gave a recommendation for
their reinstatement. The controversy of the case was when Sanders sent a
letter to Moreau that he disagrees with the recommendation. Because of
the letters private respondents filed a case with CFI of Zambales, the
plaintiffs claim that the letters contains libelous content and has caused
them the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings.
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The lower court ruled that the defendants acted maliciously and in bad
faith. Motion to lift the default order and motion for reconsideration of the
denial on the motion to dismiss which was subsequently denied by the
respondent court.
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction
Issue:

1. Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
2. Wether or not petitioners were acting officially or only in their private
capacities when they did the acts where they are sued for damages.

 
Ratio:

1. Since the facts lead to that the petitioners are acting in the discharge
of their official duties, the petitioners are being sued as gov’t. Officials
of USA. If the trial will proceed damages will not be on the petitioner’s
personal capacity but of the petitioner’s principal. The USA
government. thus making the action a suit against that government
without its consent. The government of the United States has not
given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners,
who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them
2. It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the
petitioners are sued by are acts in the discharge of their official
duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of
NAVSTA had supervision of its personnel and matters relating to
their work and employment. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to
have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence
with the conversion of the private respondent’s type of employment
even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced.
EXECUTIVE POWER

Art VII, Sec 1.

The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only

to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers
enumerated. Residual unstated powers of the President are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in
that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.

FACTS:

Only about three years after Pres. Aquino replaced Marcos, the
latter, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. But Pres. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences of his return to the nation at a time when the
stability of government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward,
has stood firmly on the decision to bar his and his family’s
return. The Marcoses now seek to enjoin the implementation
of the Pres. Aquino’s decision, invoking their constitutionally
guaranteed liberty of abode and right to travel.

ISSUE:

Is the President granted power in the Constitution to prohibit

the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

RULING:

Yes. It would not be accurate to state that “executive power” is

the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of
state as well as head of government and whatever powers
inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Although the Constitution
imposes limitations of the exercise of specific powers* of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of “executive power.” Corollarily, the powers
of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the
President’s powers as protector of the peace. The President is
also tasked with xxx ensuring domestic tranquility xxx. The
demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines xxx must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of
the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare. There exists factual basis for the
President’s decision. The Court cannot xxx pretend the country
is not besieged from within xxx. xxx the catalytic effect of the
return of the Marcoses xxx may prove to be the proverbial
final straw that would break the camel’s back. With these
before her, the President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously xxx in determining that the return
of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest
and welfare and in prohibiting their return. The Court voted 8-
7.

* The Court enumerated the specific powers of the President:

the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing
power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the
power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the
power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to
enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to
submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address
Congress [Art VII, Secs 14-23] (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA
689)


The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.



Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the
President shall exercise general supervision over local
government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope
of their prescribed powers and functions.



The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over
provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent component
cities; through the province with respect to component cities
and municipalities; and through the city and municipality with
respect to barangays.

C ontrol generally means the power of an officer to alter,

modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate has done in the

performance of his duties and to substitute his judgment to that of
the former. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Loving Fetalvero, Jr., G.R.
No. 211450, July 23, 2018.)

The law says:

Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

“Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.”

Jurisprudence says:

In the case of Mark Anthony Zabal, et. al. v. Rodrigo Duterte (G.R.
No. 238467, February 12, 2019), the Supreme Court has defined
control in the following manner:

“The power of control refers to the authority to direct the

performance of a duty, restrain the commission of acts, review,
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units, and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and
programs.”

What is the difference between the power of control and the

power of supervision?

Jurisprudence says:

“The power of supervision involves oversight of a subordinate to

ensure that the rules are followed. On the other hand, the power of
control is broader as it involves laying down the actual rules to be
followed. If the rules are not followed, the power of control allows
the controlling officer to order that the act be done or undone, or
even to supplant the subordinate’s act with his or her own
act.” (Office of the Ombudsman v. Loving Fetalvero, Jr., G.R. No.
211450, July 23, 2018.)

“Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or

accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may,
in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their
subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand,
supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials
merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do
not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify
or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may
not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have
no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed.” (Judge Mercedes Dadole, et. al. v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002)
 

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single

executive, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and

evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence
presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts
proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198,
citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is
also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the
determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it
to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law,
1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect
the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or
entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require
disclosure of information by means or accounts, records, reports,
testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De
Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and
analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative
agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had
occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole
power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its
power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect
thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely
investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and
authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties
before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances
presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment.

Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due

process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and
procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice
and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial
and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-
106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice
and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in
administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will
invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim
the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the
position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996
ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory
proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the
respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting
documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover,
the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion

FACTS
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of
Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S.
The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges
include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with

the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they
found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested
for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for
him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied
request on the following grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of
the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of
evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant
law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition
Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government.
Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the
information in the documents.
3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in
connection with an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to
Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC
presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to
issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar

RULING:
An investigatory body does not exercise judicial functions and its power is
limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto; Its
only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements
of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition.—In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported),
the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with
the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its
power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect
thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory
functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if
the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before
it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is
not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then
there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. The above
description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to
evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in
regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the
prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers
comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore,
sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely
initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the
extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body’s power
is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be
filed in court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The evaluation process is akin to an administrative

agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which
are essentially criminal; In essence the evaluation process partakes of the
nature of a criminal investigation.—Logically, although the Extradition Law is
silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is
forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be
continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5],
Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request
is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his
possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the
prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court
(Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Clearly, there is an impending threat
to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It
is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Because
of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is
akin to an administrative agency conducting

an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially

criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure
for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As
described by petitioner himself, this is a “tool” for criminal law enforcement
(p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the
nature of a criminal investigation. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA
160, G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
Evangelista v Jarencio
FACTS
The President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms
and Government Operations (PARGO).

The President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating

committee including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena (Subpoena
is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the
hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by
competent authority, or for the taking of his deposition .)
dues tecum, administer oaths, testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation.

Petitioner Evangelista as Undersecretary of the Agency issued to respondent

Manalastas the Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad
testificandum commanding him to appear as witness a th office of PARGO to
declare and testify on a pending investigations.

Instead of obeying the subpoena respondent filed with CFI of Manila a

petition for prohibition, certiorari on the case and assailed
its legality

ISSUE:
Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue
subpoena in its conduct of fact-finding investigations?

RULING:
Yes.The life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact. the
gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are
useful for all administrative function, not only for rule-making, adjudication,
and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for
determining general policy, for recommending legislation, and for the purpose
no more specific than illuminating obscure ares to find out what if anything
should be done.
An adminstrative agency may be authorized to
make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature,
but alos in proceeding whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon
which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and
may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely
investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling
for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make
recommendations for actions.
administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of
investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not
probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a
complaint. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to
prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered
evidence so justifies.

Subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is a.) within
the authority of the agency ,b.) the demand is not too definite , c.) the
information is reasonably relevant.

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the

Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain officials of the City
Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's
sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from
respondent Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in
possession is reasonably relevant to the investigations.

Same; Administrative agencies may issue administrative subpoenas in the

course of investigations whether or not adjudication is involved and whether
or not probable cause is shown.—Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce
subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication
is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the
issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a
specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be
made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully
authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not
to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered
evidence so justifies. Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of
testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully
authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have
information that might shed some helpful light.

Same; Administrative agency has power of inquisition; it can investigate

merely suspicion that law is being violated or because it wants assurance that
it is not.—The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not
dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.

Same; Requisites for validity of administrative subpoena.—In sum, it may be

stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry
is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite;
and (3) the information is reasonably relevant
Larin v Executive Secretary
FACTS:
BIR Assistant Commissioner Aquilino T. Larin was dismissed from his post due
to an administrative case of grave conduct in lieu of the criminal cases filed
against him in the Sandiganbayan in violation of Section 268(4) of the NIRC
and Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which found him guilty of such.However, the Anti-
Graft court’s decision was reversed by the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of Larin as the Assistant Commissioner of BIR is valid

RULING:

On the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner

was given every chance to present his side. The rule is well settled that
the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence he may have in support of his defense.7 The records clearly
show that on October 1, 1993 petitioner submitted his letter-response
dated September 30, 1993 to the administrative charge filed against
him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted various documents
attached as annexes to his letter, all of which are evidences supporting
his defense. Prior to this, he received a letter dated September 17, 1993
from the Investigation Committee requiring him to explain his side
concerning the charge. It can not therefore be argued that petitioner
was denied of due process.
NO. The dismissal of Larin from the BIR not valid. The well-settled principle
that the “power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” conferred to
the President by Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution is not absolute. It must be
pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence
of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose
tenure is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose the employment was made. As a career
service officer, petitionerenjoys the right to security of tenure. The fact that
petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give
the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure
for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under
the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be
removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.

LARIN
Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and he also appears to be a co- accused in two criminal
cases for violating Section 268(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and
Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently petitioner was convicted and this was
reported to the President, the then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary by the
authority of the president issued Memo order 164 creating an executive
committee to investigate the administrative charges.
The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with regard to
the charges against him, the petitioner complied, and however his statement
was that he cannot comment on the merits of the case for fear of being cited
in contempt by the court. Petitioner also alleged that the committee doesn’t
have any jurisdiction over his person, that the case cannot be validly filed
without violating res judicata, his rights against double jeopardy and lastly to
proceed with the investigation would be redundant and oppressive against
him. While all this is pending, the president issued an order for the
streamlining of BIR, in which case the office of the petitioner was abolished by
the order. His office being abolished, the petitioner was not reinstated as an
assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another Administrative order was
issued in which it stated that he is being dismissed for being guilty of grave
misconduct in connection to the criminal cases filed against him.

Public Officers; Civil Service; A presidential appointee who belongs to the

career service of the Civil Service comes under the direct disciplining authority
of the President.—At the outset, it is worthy to note that the position of
Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career Executive Service.
Under the law, Career Executive Service officers, namely, Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional
Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service
Board, are all appointed by the President. Concededly, petitioner was
appointed as Assistant Commissioner in January, 1987 by then President
Aquino. Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career
service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the
direct disciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled
principle that the “power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint”
conferred to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it
is ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. 164, which created a
committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner, was
issued pursuant to the power of removal of the President.

Same; Same; Security of Tenure; The fact that an officer is a presidential

appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at
will or at his pleasure.—This power of removal, however, is not an absolute
one which accepts no reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a
career service officer. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is
characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished
from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified
by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the
employment was made. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right
to security of tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right
of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. Specifically, Section
36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy
security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in
said law. In other words, the fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee
does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at
his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer
who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be
removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.

Pefianco v Moral

FACTS:  
Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative complaint against respondent
for dishonesty.  She was dismissed.  Respondent filed a petition for mandamus
to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation
Committee Report.  It was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether Moral should have been furnished with a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report.

HELD: 
 A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the
findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to
inquire into charges filed against him.  He is entitled only to the administrative
decision and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence
presented during the hearings of the investigation committee.  Respondent
had been accorded these rights.
Administrative Law; Due Process; A respondent in an administrative case is
not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him—he
is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence
made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the
evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation
committee.—There is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner
to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary,
we unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an administrative
case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of
any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him.
He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial
evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges
and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the
investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these
rights.

Same; Same; It is the administrative resolution, not the investigation report,

which should be the basis of any further remedies that a respondent in an
administrative case might wish to pursue.—The DECS resolution is complete in
itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it
contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which
respondent’s removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the
investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies respondent
might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by
denying her access to the investigation report. Pefianco vs. Moral, 322 SCRA
439, G.R. No. 132248 January 19, 2000

FACTS
On 26 July 1994, former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a
complaintagainst respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian,
Catalog Division,of the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged
respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents, which
were under her control and supervision as Division Chief, and keeping in her
possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty-one (41)
items of historical documents.The Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS)Investigating Committee found the respondent guilty of
administrative offenses of dishonesty,grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage
of historical documents, to the prejudice of the national library in particular,
and the country in general. She was dismissed from service.
Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco
who was thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria. Subsequently,
Moral filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report,supposedly to guide her on whatever action would be most
appropriate to take under the circumstances. The petition was denied.
Respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September 1996
dismissing her from the service.Instead, she instituted an action for
mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria
praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of
dismissal until she received a copy of the said report.Petitioner contends that
there is no law requiring the DECS to furnish respondent with a copy of the
Report of the DECS Investigation Committee.

ISSUE:
Whether Moral should have been furnished with a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report.

HELD:
No. There is no law or rule that imposes a legal duty on petitioner to
furnishrespondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary,
the Courtunequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an
administrative case isnot entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of anyinvestigating committee created to inquire into
charges filed against him.She isentitled only to the administrative decision
based on substantialevidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity
to meet thecharges and the evidence presented against her during the
hearings ofthe investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been
accordedthese rights.The Report remains an internal and confidential matter
to be used aspart, although not controlling, of the basis for the decision.

Carino v CHR
FACTS:
FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions”to act

upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable
assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order
to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the
return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School
were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant
to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating

Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott
the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from
service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of
violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case
was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers
submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain
that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly
learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the
cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-
to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the
“striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have
been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there
had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is
empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may be conceded to the Commission
in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights.—The most that may be conceded to the
Commission. in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusion in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions
to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution clearly and categorically
grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations invoking civil and political rights.—As should at once be observed,
only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance
to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically
grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its
own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power
pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations
of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the
course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of
its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its
findings. Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483, G.R. No.
96681 December 2, 1991

Concerned Officials of MWSS v Vasquez

FACTS:
In order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million
people in the metropolitan area,Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) launched the Angat Water Supply Optimization.
Private respondent, Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers'
Association(PLDPPMA), filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
protesting the public bidding conducted by the MWSS for said project,
detailing charges of an "apparent plan" on the part of the MWSS to favor
suppliers of fiberglass pipes, and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation thereon and to hold in abeyance the award of the contracts.
After investigation, the Ombudsman ordered the MWSS to:
1) Set aside the recommendation of the MWSS to award the project to a
contractor offering fiberglass pipes;
2) Award the subject contract to a complying and responsive bidder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the complaint at bar

HELD:
No, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the complaint at
bar.

Although the Ombudsman is granted investigatory power and public

assistance duties, in issuing the challenged orders, it has not only directly
assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise pre-empted the exercise of discretion
by, the MWSS.

It is the agency that should be in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of
the projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with its
development plans.The issue here involved, on basically technical matters,
deserve to be disentangled from undue interference from courts and so from
the Ombudsman as well.

Same; Ombudsman; Jurisdiction; The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear

that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses ‘all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by
any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of
office.—Indeed, in Deloso v. Domingo, this Court had occasion to explain not
only the rationale for the creation of an office of the Ombudsman but also the
grant to it of broad investigative authority, thus: “The reason for the creation
of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad
investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of
officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others
involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the
exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss
investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public
officers. lt was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to
investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether
or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the
performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly
clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses ‘all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by
any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of
office.’ ”

Same; Same; Same; Powers, Functions and Duties of the Ombudsman.—To

begin with, the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman have
generally been categorized into the following headings: Investigatory Power;
Prosecutory Power; Public Assistance Functions; Authority to Inquire and
Obtain Information; and Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement
Preventive Measures.

Same; Same; Same; Investigatory Power and Public Assistance Duties.—

Although the Solicitor-General has practically enumerated all the
constitutional and statutory provisions describing the ample authority and
responsibilities of the Ombudsman, the particular aspect of his functions that,
however, really finds relevance to the present case relates to his investigatory
power and public assistance duties which can be found in the first and second
paragraphs, respectively, of Section 13, Article XI, of the Constitution, along
with the corresponding provisions of the Ombudsman Act. This much can be
gleaned from the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman leading to its
questioned orders.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Metropolitan Waterworks and

Sewerage System; The Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged
orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise preempted
the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS.—While the
broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which “x
x x appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient” may be yielded, it is difficult
to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act
have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an
exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that
judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. It would seem to us that the Office of
the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has not only directly
assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise preempted the exercise of discretion by,
the Board of Trustees of MWSS. Indeed, the recommendation of the PBAC-
CSTE to award Contract APM-01 appears to be yet pending consideration and
action by the MWSS Board of Trustees. Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) vs. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502, G.R.
No. 109113 January 25, 1995

FACTS:
Private respondent Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturer’s
Association (PLDPPMA) filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
on the public bidding conducted by MWSS for projects APM-01 and APM-02 of
its Angat Water Supply Optimization Project (AWSOP), which aims to provide
1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million residents in the
metropolitan area.  The  letter of complaint accused the MWSS of an apparent
plan even before the bidding to favour suppliers of fiberglass pipes and urged
the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation to hold in abeyance the award of
contracts.
The Fact finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
issued an injunction directed to the Board of Trustees of the MWSS  (1) to set
aside the recommendation of its Pre-qualification, Bids, and Awards
Committee for Construction Services and Technical Equipment (PBAC-CSTE)
that contract no. APM-01 be given to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes 
and (2) to instead award the contract to a complying and responsive bidder.
Petitioner MWSS assailed the order of the Ombudsman for lack of jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman over  PLDPPMA’s complaint and for issuing the challenged
order contrary to PD 1818 prohibiting the issuance of restraining
orders/injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects.

ISSUE:    
Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over PLDPPMA’s complaint
and has the power to issue orders directing the Board of Trustees of the
MWSS to set aside the recommendation of PBAC-CSTE and to instead award
the contract to a complying and responsive bidder.

RULING
No.  While recognizing the investigatory and public assistance duties of the
Ombudsman, the assailed orders were an undue interference in the
adjudicatory responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a mere
directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the law. 
The Fact finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
reveals a predisposition against the use of fiberglass pipes, a technical, rather
than a legal matter.
As a GOCC, MWSS is charged with the construction, maintenance, and
operation of waterwork system to insure uninterrupted and adequate supply
and distribution of potable water. Therefore, it is the agency that should be in
the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the projections of the bidders
and to decide which bid is compatible with its development plans.     The
exercise of this discretion to reject a bid and to award contracts, which is a
purely technical matter, is vested in the MWSS entrusted with such function
that even courts or the Ombudsman cannot unduly interfere from. 
DELOSO VS. DOMINGO

Constitutional Law; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; The office of the Ombudsman

has the power, function and duty to act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials and to investigate any act or omission
of any public official when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.—As protector of the people, the office of the
Ombudsman has the power, function and duty “to act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials” (Sec. 12) and to
“investigate x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.” (Sec. 13[1].)
The Ombudsman is also empowered to “direct the officer concerned,” in this
case the Special Prosecutor, “to take appropriate action against a public
official x x x and to recommend his prosecution.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The law does not require that the act or omission
be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official
duty.—The clause “any [illegal] act or omission of any public official” is broad
enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not
qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or
employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the
act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the
performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should
we.

Same; Same; Same; The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee during his tenure of office.—The reason for the creation of the
Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad
investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of
officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others
involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion
of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into
malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed
necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal
complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or
omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the
duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses “all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Crime allegedly committed by the petitioner as

provincial governor of Zambales lies within the pale of the Ombudsman’s
investigative authority.—The murder of three persons, is, without any doubt,
an illegal act. Since it was allegedly committed by the petitioner as provincial
governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale of the Ombudsman’s
investigative authority.

Same; Same; Same; Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed

by public officials when the penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher
than prision correccional (The duration of the penalties of prision correccional,
suspensión and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six
years, except when suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which
case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.).—The Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4,
subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against the petitioner carries the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it. Deloso vs. Domingo,
191 SCRA 545, G.R. No. 90591 November 21, 1990

Under the Revised Penal Code, malfeasance is doing an act prohibited

by law or doing an act ought not to be done while misfeasance is the
improper or irregular performance of an act and nonfeasance is the non
performance, failure or refusal to do an act which one is required to do.

Quasi-Legislative Power

Quasi-legislative power

Legislative power – the power to make, alter and repeal laws

Doctrine of separation of power – compartmentalization of the functions of
the government. The branches of the government are left alone in the
discharge of their duties as they see fit.

Non-delegation of powers – power delegated cannot be further delegated.

Potestas delegata non delegari potest.

XPN to non-delegation of powers:

1. Delegation to the President

Art. VI, Sec. 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by a resolution
of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Art. VI, Sec. 28(2). The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within a specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.

2. Delegation to the local Government

LGC, Sec. 48. Local legislative power – Local legislative power shall be
exercised by the sangguniang panlalawigan in the province, the sangguniang
panglungsod in the city, the sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the
sangguniang barangay for the barangay.

3. Delegation to the Supreme Court

Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts , the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged.
 4. Delegation to the People
R.A. 6735, Sec. 3(a). “Initiative” is the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through
election called for the purpose.

R.A. 6735, sec. 3(c). “Referendum” is the power of the electorate to approve
or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose.

US v. Barrias
FACTS:

DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.—The fixing of penalties for

criminal offenses is the exercise of a legislative power which can not be
delegated to a subordinate authority. UNITED STATES VS. BARRIAS., 11
Phil. 327, No. 4349 September 24, 1908
People v. Vera
FACTS:
Mario Cu-Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case. He applied for PROBATION
under the provisions of ACT # 4221. He insists that he is innocent of the crime
for which he has convicted, and that he has no prior criminal record and the
he would observe good conduct in the future. The matter was referred to the
Insular Probation Office, but the Office DENIED THE PROBATION.
Nevertheless, Judge Vera heard the petition. The City Fiscal obviously opposed
the grant of probation. Among the arguments raised was that Act 4221 (which
granted probation) was violative of the Constitution as an undue delegation of
legislative powers to the provincial boards of several provinces. This is
because Act 4221 ENDOWS THE PROVINCIAL BOARDS WITH THE ABSOLUTE
POWER TO MAKE SAID LAW EFFECTIVE OR RESPECTIVE NOT IN PROVINCES,
THEIR AND SUBJECT TO THE DIRECTION OF THE PROBATION OFFICE. Act 4221
gives discretion to provincial boards whether the Probation Law can be made
applicable in their area, and subject to whether they FUNDS have
APPROPRIATED FOR THE SALARY OF PROBATION OFFICER.

ISSUE:
Whether there was valid delegation of legislative powers to provincial boards,
in the matter of implementation of the Probation Law?

RULING:
SC: LAW INVALID. UNDUE DELEGATION. The Probation Law does not fix nor
impose upon the provincial boards, any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power. What is granted is a ROVING COMMISSION which
enables them to exercise arbitrary discretion. In reality, the Legislature has left
the entire matter to provincial boards to determine. The legislature has not
made the operation of the Law contingent upon any specified facts or
conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. A provincial board need
not investigate conditions or find any fact or await the happening of any
specified contingency. It is BOUND BY NO RULE, LIMITED BY NO PRINCIPLE OF
EXPEDIENCY. If a province does not want to enforce said law, all it has to do is
to simply decline appropriations needed for the salary of a probation officer. It
need not give any reason for refusing or failing to appropriate funds for the
salary of the probation officer. This is a matter which rests entirely at its
pleasure. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
boards.

ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TEST OF UNDUE DELEGATION ; DETAILS OF EXECUTION.—

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so -that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature. In United States vs. Ang Tang
Ho {[1922], 43 Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to the foregoing rule.
The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain
extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations
to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative
boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it.

26. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION ACT MAKES VIRTUAL SURRENDER OF

LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PROVINCIAL BOARDS.—The Probation Act does
not, by the 'force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted is a "roving commission" which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section
11 of the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend
the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the
entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. If a
provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all
that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the
salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative
power to the provincial boards.

27.ID.; ID.; ID.; TRUE DlSTINCTION BETWEEN POWER TO MAKE LAW AND
DlSCRETION AS. TO ITS EXECUTION; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection People vs. Vera., 65 Phil. 56, No. 45685 November 16, 1937

 "Probation" is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction

and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and
to the supervision of a probation officer.

What is parole?
It is the conditional release of a prisoner from correctional institution
after serving the minimum period of prison sentence.

Who cannot be granted parole?

Generally, those sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one (1) year or
less, or to a straight penalty, or to a prison sentence without a minimum
term of imprisonment.

Who may grant parole to a prisoner?

The Board of Pardons and Parole, an agency under the Office of the
Secretary of Justice.
The President may grant amnesty with the concurrence of the majority
of all the members of Congress. This distinguishes amnesty from pardon
because the latter does not need congressional approval. The other
distinctions between amnesty and pardon are:

(1) Amnesty covers political offenses, while pardon refers to any

infraction of peace and order in the State;
(2) Amnesty is generally addressed to a group or a community, while
pardon is granted to an individual or a limited number of individuals;
(3) Amnesty is a public act of which the court may take judicial notice,
while pardon is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the
person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof;
(4) Amnesty is granted either before or after conviction while pardon is
given only after conviction;
(5) Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted. It abolishes
or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and
in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code).
(6) On the other hand, amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself so much so that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense (Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642).
(7) In no case does pardon exempt the culprit from the payment of civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal
Code). Amnesty, likewise, does not extinguish the civil liability (Article
113, Revised Penal Code).

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA

FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in

Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the
Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular
No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial
expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines
questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the
POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-
delegation of powers

HELD:

SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern
Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to
promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under
the principle, is not subject to delegation.

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the

law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature
to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a

valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when
it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative

authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and

the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the
problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may
not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious,
not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected
from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular
fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in

general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry
out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of
subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad

policies laid down in statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress
may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

Issue Ruling
1. W/N the POEA has jurisdiction over the case, even Yes
though Vitaliano Saco was not an overseas worker as contended
by Eastern Shipping Lines
2. W/N Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself is violative of the principles No
of non-delegation of legislative powers

Rationale/Legal Basis
1. Yes, Vitaliano Saco was an overseas employee of the Eastern Shipping
Lines at the time the accident happened since he died while under a
contract of employment with the petitioner and the petitioner’s vessel in
a foreign country. Under the 1985 Rules of Regulation on Overseas
employment it is defined that an “Overseas Employment is an
employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment
in board vessels plying international water, covered by a
valid contract”.
2. No, there was no principles violated. The POEA has an authority to the
regulation as stated in Section 4 (a) of Executive Order No. 797, “The
governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory function of the administration (POEA)”. The
legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. The things that can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not the law shall be. In the
discretion of how the law shall be is a prerogative of the legislature. The
prerogative cannot be abdicated by the legislature to the delegate.
There are two accepted tests to know whether the delegation of
legislative power is valid or not:
a. Completeness test – The law is complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature so that the delegate will only enforce it.
b. Sufficient Standard test – there is an adequate guideline in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running a riot.
The reason for the delegation of legislative power is the increasing
complexity of the task of government and the inability of the legislature
to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The
growth of the society created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot reasonable comprehend. Thus, a solution is
having a delegate who is supposed to be an expert in the particular field.
The reasons for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant to peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the
general provision of the statute which is called the “power of
subordinate legislation”. With this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by filling
in the details which the congress may not provide. In the case,
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one of the administrative
regulation

Rabor v. CSC
Civil Service Commission; Administrative Law; Test of a Valid
Subordinate Legislation; Statutory Construction; In subordinate,
delegated rule-making by administrative agencies, all that may be
reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation
consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general
purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute.—Clearly,
therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail
in the statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It
seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed
and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion)
for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the
inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed
situations
in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes
subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so
important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably demanded is a
showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative
regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the
governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately
applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of
1990, and to this test we now turn. Rabor vs. Civil Service Commission,
244 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995

Delegation of legislative power to Administrative Agencies

  

a.     Quasi-legislative or rule-making powers of administrative agencies

b.     Kinds of rule-making power

1.    Rule-making by reason of particular delegation of authority
(subordinate legislation)
2.    Rule-making by the constructuion and interpretation of a statute
being administered (interpretative legislation)
3 kinds:

§  Interpretation as incident of the execution of a law

§  Interpretation handed down by the Secretary of Justice upon the
request of a government agency or official
§  Intyerpretation in adversary proceedings
3.    Determination of facts under a delegated power as to which a statue
shall go into effect (contingent legislation)

c.     Reasons for delegation of legislative power

Delegation of legislative pwer has become more and more frequent, if

not necessary. This has led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.

The reasons for the delegation of legislative power are the increasing
complexity of the tast of government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention.  The growth of society has ramified its activites and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend.  Specialization even in legislation
has become necessary.  
d.     What can and cannot be delegated
What can be delegated – Legislature may properly delegate to
administrative agency any legislative power other than the making,
altering or repealing of a law, the determination of legislative policies
and objectives to be achieved, and the formulation and promulgation of
a defined and binding rule of conduct.  It can delegate the discretion as
to how the law shall be enforced, to issue rules to fill in details, to
ascertain facts on which the law will operate, to exercise police power,
and to fix rates.  To be valid, however, the delegation has to pass the
competence and sufficiency of standard tests.
What cannot be delegated – Doctrine of separation of pwers prohibits
the delegation of that which is purely legislative in nature.  This consists
of the power to make the law, or to determine what the law shall be,
and to alter or repeal it. 
e.     Test to determine validity of delegation
1.      Completeness test – The law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
2.      Sufficient standard test - There must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 

ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima
RA 9335 or the Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to
encourage their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing
a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation (Board).

The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC were tasked to promulgate and issue the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9335, to be approved by the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.
Petitioners invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335m a tax reform legislation.

They contend that:

By establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “ transforms the officials
and employees into mercenaries and bounty hunters’’ as they will do their best only
for such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and
undermines the constitutionally mandated duly of these officials and employees to
servethe people with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
They also claim (Petitioners) that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of the congressional oversight committee
on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and compelled upon the enactment and
approval of the laws, the creation of it permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law
ISSUE
Whether there was undue delegation?

Held:
The completeness and sufficient standard test determine if the delegation of
legislative power is valid. A law is complete when it sets forth the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented. It lays down a sufficient standard when
it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law regarding the acts of
the delegate.
To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.
The policy of RA 9335 is to optimize the revenue generation capability and
collection of the BIR and BOC.
On the other hand, Section 4 of the law delegating to the president to fix
revenue targets provide that the revenue targets are based on the original
estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and BOC for a given fiscal
year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. Thus,
revenue targets are determined not only by the president. It undergoes a
scrutiny by the DBCC.
On the other hand, section7 of the law provides that… “remove from service
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at
least 7.5% with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collecting subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance
with substantive and procedural due process… the application of the criteria
for the separation of an official or employee from service shall be without
prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of public
officers…”
Clearly, RA9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC.
The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be
dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and
only after due process is accorded the employee.
Under RA9335, the yardstick for removal is when the revenue collection falls
short of the target by at least 7.5% with due consideration of all relevant
factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is similar to inefficiency
and incompetence in the performance of official duties which is a ground for
disciplinary action under civil service laws. Besides, the removal here is
subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process.

Other issues:
1) Actual case and ripeness – petitioners fail to assert any specific and
concrete legal claim to demonstrate the law’s adverse effect on them. What
they have is a general claim that there is a judicial controversy by reason of
the enactment of the law.
2) Accountability of public officers – the fear that the BIR and BOC officials will
become bounty hunters doing their best only because of the reward is
speculative. Public officials enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties. A system of incentives for exceeding the set
expectations of public office is not contrary to the concept of public
accountability but in fact reinforces one’s dedication to his duty and loyalty to
the
public service.
3) Equal protection – When things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated by law differently. Here, since the subject
of the law is revenue generation capability and collection of the BIR and BOC,
necessarily, the incentives must also pertain to them. Besides, the law
concerns itself only with the BIR and BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
4) Separation of powers – RA9335 created a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee for the purpose of approving the IRR proposed by certain admin
agencies for the implementation of the law. Actually, the Committee has
already ceased to exist after it approved the IRR. A congressional oversight
committee does not per se encroach upon the executive power to implement
laws. However, to prevents a congressional encroachment beyond the
legislative sphere, the Constitution imposes some restraints on congress: 1) it
may not vest itself or
any of its committees or members with executive or judicial power and 2)
when it exercises legislative power, it must follow the single, finely wrought
and exhaustively
considered procedures specified under the Constitution. Hence, any post-
enactment congressional measure (such as the action of the joint
congressional oversight committee in this case which approved the IRR) must
beconfined to scrutiny and investigation only. Any legislative veto undermines
the separation of powers of the state. Thus, section12 of RA9335 which grants
to the oversight committee the power to approve the IRR (more than just
scrutinize and investigate it — thus, they have the power to veto some of the
proposed rules) is unconstitutional.

Delegation of Powers; Test; A law is complete when it sets forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and lays
down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot.—Two tests determine the validity of
delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented. Abakada Guro Party List vs.
Purisima, 562 SCRA 251, G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

Gutierrez v. DBM
FACTS
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the
compensation of government employees.Its Section 12 directed the
consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being
enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates.But
itexempted certain additional compensations that the employees may
be receiving from such consolidation

ISSUE
WON the COLA should be deemed integrated into the standardized
salary rates of the concerned government employees

IRR cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to
amend or repeal a statute belongs to the legislature. Administrative
agencies implement the broad policies laid down in a law by “filling in”
only its details

Delegated rule-making is a practical necessity in modern governance

because of the increasing complexity and variety of public functions.
Congress has endowed administrative agencies like respondent DBM
with the power to make rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies. Such power is, however,
necessarily limited to what the law provides. Implementing rules and
regulations cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power
to amend or repeal a statute belongs to the legislature. Administrative
agencies implement the broad policies laid down in a law by “filling in”
only its details. The regulations must be germane to the objectives and
purposes of the law and must conform to the standards prescribed by
law. Gutierrez vs. Department of Budget and Management, 616 SCRA 1,
G.R. No. 153266 March 18, 2010

BPI Leasing v. Court of Appeals

FACTS
CTS: BLC is a corporation engaged in the business of leasing properties.
For the calendar year 1986, BLC paid the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) a total of P1,139,041.49 representing 4% contractors
percentage tax then imposed by Section 205 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), based on its gross rentals from equipment leasing
for the said year amounting to P27,783,725.42.

On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued Revenue Regulation 19-86.

Section 6.2 thereof provided that finance and leasing companies
registered under Republic Act 5980 shall be subject to gross receipt tax
of 5%-3%-1% on actual income earned. This means that companies
registered under Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable for
contractors percentage tax under Section 205 but are, instead, subject
to gross receipts tax under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC.
Since BLC had earlier paid the aforementioned contractors percentage
tax, it re-computed its tax liabilities under the gross receipts tax and
arrived at the amount of P361,924.44.

On April 11, 1988, BLC filed a claim for a refund with the CIR for the
amount of P777,117.05, representing the difference between the
P1,139,041.49 it had paid as contractors percentage tax and
P361,924.44 it should have paid for gross receipts tax. Four days later, to
stop the running of the prescriptive period for refunds, petitioner filed a
petition for review with the CTA. CTA dismissed the petition and denied
BLCs claim of refund. The CTA held that Revenue Regulation 19-86, as
amended, may only be applied prospectively such that it only covers all
leases written on or after January 1, 1987. The CTA ruled that, since BLCs
rental income was all received prior to 1986, it follows that this was
derived from lease transactions prior to January 1, 1987, and hence, not
covered by the revenue regulation.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Revenue Regulation 19-86 is legislative rather than
interpretative in character
RULING: The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to be
legislative in nature. LEGISLATIVE
2) Whether or not its application should be prospective or retroactive.
PROSPECTIVE

RULING:

1) Section 1 of Revenue Regulation 19-86 plainly states that it was

promulgated pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC. Section 277 (now
Section 244) is an express grant of authority to the Secretary of Finance
to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. The Court recognized that
the application of Section 277 calls for none other than the exercise of
quasi-legislative or rule-making authority. Verily, it cannot be disputed
that Revenue Regulation 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rule-making
power of the Secretary of Finance, thus making it legislative, and not
interpretative as alleged by BLC.

2) The principle is well entrenched that statutes, including administrative

rules and regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative
intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary
implication. In the present case, there is no indication that the revenue
regulation may operate retroactively. Furthermore, there is an express
provision stating that it shall take effect on January 1, 1987, and that it
shall be applicable to all leases written on or after the said date. Being
clear on its prospective application, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without further interpretation. Thus, BLC is not in a position
to invoke the provisions of Revenue Regulation 19-86 for lease rentals it
received prior to January 1, 1987.
Administrative Law; Taxation; Administrative issuances may be distinguished
according to their nature and substance—legislative and interpretative;
Revenue Regulation 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of
the Secretary of Finance, thus making it legislative, and not interpretative.—
Administrative issuances may be distinguished according to their nature and
substance: legislative and interpretative. A legislative rule is in the matter of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other hand, is
designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is
in charge of enforcing. The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to
be legislative in nature. Section 1 of Revenue Regulation 19-86 plainly states
that it was promulgated pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC. Section 277
(now Section 244) is an express grant of authority to the Secretary of Finance
to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement
of the provisions of the NIRC. In Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court recognized that the application of
Section 277 calls for none other than the exercise of quasi-legislative or rule-
making authority. Verily, it cannot be disputed that Revenue Regulation 19-86
was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of Finance,
thus making it legislative, and not interpretative as alleged by BLC. BPI Leasing
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 416 SCRA 4, G.R. No. 127624 November 18,
2003

The prospectivity and retroactivity of laws are important concepts in

the operation of law.

First, let us define the terms.

A thing is prospective if it is expected to happen in the future.

Meanwhile, a thing is retroactive if it takes effect from a date in the
past.

Now, let us look at what the law says about prospectivity and
retroactivity.

“Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless

the contrary is provided.”Art. 4, Civil Code.

Thus, a law is prospective at all times. Laws always take effect after
they have been enacted and published.  A law may only be
retroactive if such retroactive effect is expressly provided for in the
law.
Example:

Law A provides that it shall take effect after 15 days following its
publication on Aug. 5, 2010. The law takes effect on Aug. 20, 2010
and will continue to take effect thereafter until it is repealed or struck
down. Law A is prospective.

Law B provides that it shall take effect after 20 days following its
publication on Dec. 3, 2012, and that it shall have retroactive effect.
The law takes effect on Dec. 23, 2012 and will continue to take effect
thereafter, but the law shall also be applied to things and events that
have happened in the past—prior to Dec. 23, 2012. Law B is both
prospective and retroactive, but its retroactivity only comes into
operation upon the effectivity of the law itself, which is Dec. 23, 2012.

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There are other exceptions to the rule that laws shall have no
retroactive effect. The following laws have retroactive effect even if
retroactivity is not expressly provided for in the law.

1. When the law is a penal statute and that it favors the accused
who is not a habitual criminal, even though at the time of the law’s
enactment, final sentence has already been rendered. (See Art.
22, Revised Penal Code.)
2. When the law is procedural and that it does not affect or change
vested rights.
3. When the law creates new substantive rights.
4. When the law’s purpose is to cure defects in judicial or
administrative proceedings.
5. When the law’s purpose is to interpret other laws.
The reason for the rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect is
the tendency of retroactive laws to be unjust and oppressive. They
may infringe upon vested rights or disrupt the legal effect of
transactions prior to the enactment of the law.

Board of Trustees v. Velasco

FACTS: Petitioners charged respondents administratively with

grave misconduct for their alleged participation in the
demonstration held by some GSIS employees, and placed them
under preventive suspension for 90 days.
Respondents asked that they be allowed to avail of certain
employee privileges but were denied because of their pending
administrative case.

Petitioner promulgated Resolutions 372 and 197 disqualifying

employees with pending administartive case from step increment
and other benefits and privileges. Respondents claimed that the
denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their
pending administrative cases violates their right to be presumed
innocent and that they are being punished without hearing.

In its 24 September 2004 Decision, the trial court granted

respondents’ petition for prohibition, restraining petitioners from
implementing the above resolutions.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the trial court, and not the Civil Service
Commission, has jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the resolutions need to be filed with the UP
Law Center to be valid.
3. Whether or not a regulation, which disqualifies government
employees who have pending administrative cases from the
grant of step increment and Christmas raffle benefits is
unconstitutional.

HELD:

Petition is partially meritorious.

REMEDIAL LAW: Jurisdiction for prohibition

First Issue:

Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer

for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents
prayed that the trial court declare all acts emanating from
Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 void and to prohibit petitioners
from further enforcing the said resolutions. Therefore, the trial
court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for
prohibition.

Also, the petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special

civil action which may be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case
may be. Thus, it may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. Therefore, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of
respondents’ petition for prohibition because it had jurisdiction
over the action and the venue was properly laid before it.

Second Issue:

CIVIL LAW: Validity of regulations

Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency

are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of
permanent character are to be filed. Interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the Administrative agency and not the public, need
not be filed with the UP Law Center. The assailed resolutions
pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of
the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these
resolutions with the UP Law Center.

Third Issue:

LABOR LAW: Preventive suspension

If an employee who was suspended as a penalty will be treated like

an employee on approved vacation leave without pay, then it is
only fair and reasonable to apply the same rules to an employee
who was preventively suspended, more so considering that
preventive suspension is not a penalty. An employee who was
preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment after
serving the time of his preventive suspension even if the pending
administrative case against him has not yet been resolved or
dismissed.

Also, the trial court was correct in declaring that respondents had
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Therefore, after serving the period of their preventive suspension
and without the administrative case being finally resolved,
respondents should have been reinstated and, after serving the
same number of days of their suspension, entitled to the grant of
step increment. DENIED.

Requisites of Validity of Administrative Rules and Regulations

Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature

It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure
It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature
It must be reasonable

Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission
FACTS:
Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; The rule is that what has been delegated
cannot be delegated or as expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegate
non delegare potest; Rule admits of recognized exceptions such as the grant
of rule-making power to administrative agencies.—The rule is that what has
been delegated cannot be delegated, or as expressed in the Latin maxim:
potestas delegate non delegare potest. This rule is based upon the ethical
principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to
be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment
acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the
intervening mind of another. This rule however admits of recognized
exceptions such as the grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies.
They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to
regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-
making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the
increasing complexity and variety of public functions.

Same; Same; Same; In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a

showing that the delegation itself is valid; Requisites for Validity.—In every
case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected.

Same; Same; Same; There is no delegation of power to speak of between

Philracom, as the delegator and Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine
Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) as delegates; Compliance with the Philracom’s
directive is part of the mandate of Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) and
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) under Section 1 of R.A. No. 7953 and Sections
1 and 2 of 8407.—There is no delegation of power to speak of between
Philracom, as the delegator and MJCI and PRCI as delegates. The Philracom
directive is merely instructive in character. Philracom had instructed PRCI and
MJCI to “immediately come up with Club’s House Rule to address the problem
and rid their facilities of horses infected with EIA.” PRCI and MJCI followed-up
when they ordered the racehorse owners to submit blood samples and
subject their race horses to blood testing. Compliance with the Philracom’s
directive is part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI under Section 1 of R.A. No.
7953 and Sections 1 and 2 of 8407.
Same; Same; Same; As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the
exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not
require notice and hearing.—As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in
the exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not
require notice and hearing. In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, 442 SCRA
507 (2004), this Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of
quasi-legislative powers since there is no determination of past events or facts
that have to be established or ascertained. Dagan vs. Philippine Racing
Commission, 578 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 175220 February 12, 2009


Smart Communications Inc., v. NTC
FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission issued a Memorandum Circulars on
the billing of telecommunications services and on measures in
minimizing, if not eliminating, the incidence of stealing of cellular phone
unit.  Isla Communications Co., Inc. (IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone
Corporation (PilTel) filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the
memorandum circulars, alleging that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate
the sale of consumer goods as stated in the subject memorandum
circulars.  Such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Acts
of the Philippines.  Soon thereafter, Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart
Communications, Inc. filed a joint motion for leave to intervene and to
admit complaint-in-intervention.  This was granted by the trial court.

The trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC from implementing the MCs.
NTC filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that petitioners failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.  The defendant's MD is denied for lack
of merit.  NTC filed a MR but was later on denied by the trial court.  The
CA, upon NTC's filing of a special action for certiorari and prohibition,
reversed the decision of the lower court.  Hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the private respondents failed
to exhaust administrative remedies?

RULING: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making

powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-
legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers.

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate,

which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new
and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute
in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations
may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect
to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or
which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of
a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative
order, the former must prevail.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an

administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their
quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for
their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the

administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has
been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts
will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute
administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to
guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some
question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding
before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the
courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such
case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to
the administrative body for its view.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a

rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within
the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Administrative Law; National Telecommunications Commission; Powers;
Quasi-Legislative Power; Administrative agencies possess quasilegislative or
rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
—Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-
making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The rules and regulations that administrative
agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power
to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency.—The rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated
legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by
the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation
be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling
statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be
promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields
are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute,
particularly the statute it is administering or Smart Communications, Inc.
(SMART) vs. National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), 408 SCRA 678,
G.R. No. 151908, G.R. No. 152063 August 12, 2003
which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the
former must prevail.

Same; Same; Same, Quasi-Judicial Power; The administrative body exercises

its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative nature.—Not to be confused with
the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and
to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises
its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in
such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their
quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

Same; Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exception; In

questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court.—In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule
or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only
where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained
to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; The doctrine of primary

jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory function.—In like manner, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes,
the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will
not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact, and a uni-formity of ruling is essential to comply
with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question
arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is
originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement
of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view. Smart Communications, Inc.
(SMART) vs. National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), 408 SCRA 678,
G.R. No. 151908, G.R. No. 152063 August 12, 2003
Conte v. Commission on Audit
FACTS:
Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former
employees of the Social Security System (SSS) who retired from
government service on May 9, 1990 and September 13, 1992,
respectively.  They availed of compulsory retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 660. In addition to retirement benefits provided under
R.A. 660, petitioners also claimed SSS “financial assistance” benefits
granted under SSS Resolution No. 56, series of 1971.
SSS Resolution No. 56, approved on January 21, 1971, provides financial
incentive and inducement to SSS employees qualified to retire to avail of
retirement benefits under RA 660 as amended, rather than the
retirement benefits under RA 1616 as amended, by giving them
“financial assistance” equivalent in amount to the difference between
what a retiree would have received under RA 1616, less what he was
entitled to under RA 660.
Long after the promulgation of SSS Resolution No. 56, respondent
Commission on Audit (COA) issued a ruling, captioned as “3rd
Indorsement” dated July 10, 1989, disallowing in audit “all such claims
for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56.”
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits under
Resolution No. 56

Held:

Petitioners Contention
Res 56 is not a retirement plan prohibited under RA 4968, and that it
provides benefits different from and “aside from”
The rationale for the financial assistance plan
Petitioners’ contention are not supported by law. We hold that Res. 56
constitutes a supplementary retirement plan.
It is clear from its preambular clauses that it is a retirement plan.
But it is simply beyond dispute that the SSS had no authority to maintain
and implement such retirement plan, particularly in the face of the
statutory prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the guise of rule-making,
legislate or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory