P-M European Economy

GEHS 5 G l oba l E c onom ic H i s tory Se r i e s
The book deals with the characters and evolution of the European
Pre-Modern
Pre-Modern European Economy

Paol o M a l a n i m a
economy from the high Middle ages until the start of modern growth
in the 19th century. Europe is always set in a global context and the
European specific features are analysed on the background of the world
economy.
European Economy
This work focuses initially on population (Chapter I), moving on
in Chapter II to look at the techniques and energy exploited in pre- On e Thou sa n d Ye a r s
modern European economy. In Chapters III-VI the products of the
(10 t h -19 t h Ce n t u r i e s )
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors are examined, together with
the organisation of these and the overall product. The demand is then
analysed in Chapter VII. Chapter VIII recalls the main features of the Paol o M a l a n i m a
pre-modern economic system and its workings in a more formal way.
The book is the only available work dealing with the formation of the
European economy and its features over the long term, that is from the
10th until the 19th century.
Paolo Malanima graduated from the University of Pisa and

Scuola Nornale Superiore. He has been Professor of Economic History
at the University of Pisa, and of Economic History and Economics at
the University Magna Graecia in Catanzaro. He published on Italian
and European economic History. He is now Director of the Institute of
Studies in Mediterranean Societies (ISSM-CNR).
G l o b a l E c o n o m ic H i s t o ry Se r i e s, 5
Se r i e s e d i t o r s :
Maarten Prak & Jan Luiten van Zanden
ISSN : 1872-5155
9 789004 178229
brill.nl/gehs
Pre-Modern European Economy
MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd i 5/26/2009 12:34:29 PM
PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompressor
Global Economic History Series
Series Editors
Maarten Prak, Utrecht University
Jan Luiten van Zanden, Utrecht University
Editorial Board
Gareth Austin, London School of Economics and Political Science
Şevket Pamuk, London School of Economics and Political Science
Kenneth L. Pomeranz, University of California, Irvine
Tirthankar Roy, London School of Economics and Political Science
Peer H. H. Vries, University of Vienna
VOLUME 5
MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd ii 5/26/2009 12:34:31 PM
Pre-Modern European
Economy
One Thousand Years
(10th–19th Centuries)
By
Paolo Malanima
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2009
MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd iii 5/26/2009 12:34:31 PM
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
ISSN 1872-5155
ISBN 978 90 04 17822 9
Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing,
IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission
from the publisher.
Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by

Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to
The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910,
Danvers, MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.
printed in the netherlands
MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd iv 5/26/2009 12:34:31 PM
CONTENTS
List of Figures and Tables ................................................................ vii

Introduction ........................................................................................ xvii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................ xxi
Chapter I. Population ....................................................................... 1

1. World population .................................................................... 1
2. The European population ....................................................... 6
3. The demographic model ......................................................... 17
4. The death rate ........................................................................... 21
5. The birth rate ............................................................................ 31
6. The demographic transition ................................................... 36
7. Conclusion ................................................................................ 46
Chapter II. Energy ............................................................................ 49

1. Energy systems ......................................................................... 49
2. Fuel ............................................................................................. 56
3. Animals ...................................................................................... 65
4. Water and wind ........................................................................ 70
5. Climate and biomass ............................................................... 78
6. The energy transition .............................................................. 84
7. Conclusion ................................................................................ 92
Chapter III. Agriculture ................................................................... 95

1. Men and lands .......................................................................... 95
2. Three agricultural ecosystems ................................................ 100
3. Peasant economies ................................................................... 107
4. The village and the manor ...................................................... 116
5. Land productivity and labour productivity ......................... 129
6. Conclusion ................................................................................ 156
Chapter IV. Trade ............................................................................. 159

1. Seas ............................................................................................. 159
2. Rivers, roads, fairs, markets ................................................... 176
3. Innovations in exchange ......................................................... 193
4. Conclusion ................................................................................ 200
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vi contents
Chapter V. Industry ......................................................................... 201

1. Types of industry ..................................................................... 201
2. From South to North .............................................................. 208
3. Industrial technology and organisation ............................... 225
4. Urbanisation ............................................................................. 239
5. Conclusion ................................................................................ 253
Chapter VI. Output .......................................................................... 255

1. Prices and incomes in agriculture ......................................... 255
2. Wages and productivity in industry ..................................... 267
3. GDP ............................................................................................ 273
4. Conclusion ................................................................................ 291
Chapter VII. Demand ...................................................................... 293

1. Consumption ............................................................................ 293
2. Investment ................................................................................. 320
3. Public expense .......................................................................... 333
4. Conclusion ................................................................................ 346
Chapter VIII. Pre-modern economies .......................................... 349

1. Past and present economies ................................................... 349
2. A model of an agrarian economy ......................................... 353
3. Distribution ............................................................................... 367
4. A dualistic economy ................................................................ 370
5. The mature agrarian economy ............................................... 378
Bibliography ........................................................................................ 383
Index .................................................................................................... 417
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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figures
Chapter I
Fig. 1. World Population (from 1 million years ago
until 2000) (millions) (log horizontal axis) . ............................. 2
Fig. 2. European Population 1–2000 (without Russia)
(log scale) ........................................................................................ 7
Fig. 3. Population of China, Europe, India 800–2000
(log scale) ........................................................................................ 11
Fig. 4. Yearly rates of growth 1500–1870 and densities
in 1500 ............................................................................................. 13
Fig. 5. Population density in 1500 Europe (inhabitants
per km2) .......................................................................................... 15
Fig. 6. The spread of Black Death in Europe from 1347 on ..... 28
Fig. 7. Death- and birth-rates in Europe (1750–2000) ............... 37
Fig. 8. Death Rates in Sweden and Finland (1750–1900) . ......... 40
Fig. 9. Death Rates in Italy and England (1650–1870) .............. 41
Fig. 10. Mortality Crises in England (1550–1850) ...................... 43
Chapter II
Fig. 1. Cycles of demographic growth in the last 1 million
years (years prior to the present on the horizontal axis) ....... 51
Fig. 2. Estimate of the extent of forests in Europe (% of the
wooded area) (1000–1800) .......................................................... 58
Fig. 3. Prices of charcoal in England and firewood in North
Italy (1550–1840) (1550–60 = 1; decadal data) ........................ 60
Fig. 4. Coal consumption in England & Wales 1560–1900
(in Petajoules; log scale) . .............................................................. 62
Fig. 5. The reaming of a cannon through a waterwheel in
a 17th century print ...................................................................... 64
Fig. 6. Three kinds of harnesses for horses .................................. 67
Fig. 7. The spread of fulling mills in Europe ............................... 73
Fig. 8. The ancient Persian Mills .................................................... 76
Fig. 9. Northern Hemisphere Temperatures (200–2000)
(Winter Temperatures 1961–90 = 0) ......................................... 80
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viii list of figures and tables
Fig. 10. Temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere from

1000 until 2000 .............................................................................. 81
Fig. 11. Temperatures in northern Hemisphere 1400–1900
(deviations with respect to the 1900–60 mean) (trend:
mobile 15 years average) .............................................................. 83
Fig. 12. Estimate of per c. energy consumption in England
and The Netherlands 1550–1800 (Gj/year) ............................... 89
Fig. 13. Per capita energy Consumption in Europe
1800–1900 (Gj) .............................................................................. 91
Fig. 14. Energy consumption (England-Wales and Italy)
1700–2000(Gj per c.) . ................................................................... 92
Chapter III
Fig. 1. The advancement of agriculture from the Near
East towards northern Europe (dates BC) ................................ 98
Fig. 2. Agricultural lands in the World today ............................. 99
Fig. 3. Agricultural lands in the World in 1500 .......................... 99
Fig. 4. Three-field rotation in the village of Limbach, East
of the Rhine Valley (19th century) . ........................................... 105
Fig. 5. Wheat Prices in Tuscany 1250–1860 (% deviations
from the trend) .............................................................................. 114
Fig. 6. Wheat Prices in England 1250–1860 (% deviations
from the trend) .............................................................................. 115
Fig. 7. Open fields in Spoy, Côte d’Or, canton Is-sur-Tille
(end of the 18th century) . ............................................................ 119
Fig. 8. Open fields in the village of Weisbach (Franconia,
18th century) . ................................................................................. 119
Fig. 9. Utility and cost on the peasant farm ................................ 142
Fig. 10. Simple symmetrical and asymmetrical plough ............. 146
Fig. 11. Wheelplough ....................................................................... 147
Fig. 12. Output per ha and output per Worker
(Italy CN 1300–1870) (1420–40 = 1) ......................................... 150
Fig. 13. Land productivity and agricultural labour productivity
in Holland (1510–1810) (1510–14 = 100) ................................ 150
Fig. 14. Labour Productivity in Italy, United Kingdom,
France 1300–1910 (U.K. 1910 = 100) ........................................ 152
Chapter IV
Fig. 1. Europe and China: seas and lands .................................... 160
Fig. 2. Ships through the Sound (1497–1657) (per decade) ...... 164
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list of figures and tables ix
Fig. 3. Commodities from western and eastern Europe in

the 16th and 17th centuries ......................................................... 165
Fig. 4. World trade relationships in 1500 (according
to Braudel) ...................................................................................... 166
Fig. 5. World trade relationships in 1775 (according
to Braudel) ...................................................................................... 167
Fig. 6. Centres of silver production in 16th century southern
America ........................................................................................... 168
Fig. 7. Import of gold and silver in Europe (1500–1600)
(kgs. per decade in log) ................................................................ 169
Fig. 8. The World flow of precious metals in the 16th and
17th centuries ................................................................................. 171
Fig. 9. Prices and the volume of exchange by two diverse
economies ....................................................................................... 178
Fig. 10. The ways through Asia ...................................................... 184
Fig. 11. The fairs in 18th century France ...................................... 186
Fig. 12. Wheat prices in Pisa and Udine 1500–1821
(harvest prices, Florentine lire and Venetian lire per kg) ...... 191
Fig. 13. Wheat prices (coefficient of variation) in Europe
1750–1914 ....................................................................................... 193
Fig. 14. Late medieval ships (11th–13th c.) .................................. 194
Chapter V
Fig. 1. The organisation of the putting out system in the
wool industry ................................................................................. 206
Fig. 2. Textile industries in the Muslim Mediterranean
(10th–11th centuries) .................................................................... 209
Fig. 3. North-European centres of wool production in the
12th century ................................................................................... 212
Fig. 4. The centres of the woollen industry in the
13th century ................................................................................... 213
Fig. 5. The metallurgy in 16th–17th centuries Europe ............... 217
Fig. 6. Developed and peripheral areas of Europe in the early
Modern age .................................................................................... 220
Fig. 7. Exports of woollen cloths from England 1450–1650 ..... 224
Fig. 8. Combination of costs and product in pre-modern
and modern industry .................................................................... 226
Fig. 9. The horizontal loom ............................................................. 230
Fig. 10. Water mill for silk throwing (18th century) .................. 231
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x list of figures and tables
Fig. 11. Hydraulic pumps in 16th century German mines ....... 233
Fig. 12. A water mill for the production of paper in 16th
century Italy ................................................................................... 236
Fig. 13. Urbanisation rates in Europe in 1800 (centres with
over 10,000 inhabitants) ............................................................... 243
Fig. 14. European urbanisation 1300–1870 (centres with
over 10,000 inhabitants) ............................................................... 248
Chapter VI
Fig. 1. Wheat Prices in Tuscany and England from 1250 to
1860 (Tuscany—soldi per staio—; England—shillings per
qtr of Winchester—) ..................................................................... 256
Fig. 2. Price Indices in Italy and England (1285–1860)
(1420–40 = 1) (decadal data) ...................................................... 260
Fig. 3. Price indices in Central and Northern Italy, Paris,
Antwerp, Krakow in 1270–1900 (1440 = 1) ............................. 261
Fig. 4. Price Index in Europe 1500–1850 (1500–50 = 1) . .......... 262
Fig. 5. Real agricultural wages in Italy 1320–1913
(1420–40 = 1) (yearly data; log scale) ........................................ 264
Fig. 6. Real agricultural wages in England 1300–1870
(1420–40 = 1) ................................................................................. 264
Fig. 7. Land rent in England (1450–1825) ................................... 265
Fig. 8. Building real wages in England 1300–1860
(1420–40 = 1) ................................................................................. 269
Fig. 9. Building real wages in central and northern Italy
1300–1913 (1420–40 = 100) (log scale) ..................................... 269
Fig. 10. Real wages in the building sector in the Netherlands
1470–1860 (1530–40 = 100) (decadal data) .............................. 270
Fig. 11. Real wages in the building industry in Istanbul
1480–1900 (1530–40 = 100) ........................................................ 270
Fig. 12. Building Real Wages Indices for Italy and England
1300–1913 ....................................................................................... 272
Fig. 13. Trend of the European real wage-rates 1500–1850
(1500–50 = 100) ............................................................................. 274
Fig. 14. Building real wages and population in Europe
1500–1850 ....................................................................................... 275
Fig. 15. Per capita GDP in western Europe 1820–2000
(int. 1990 dollars) .......................................................................... 275
Fig. 16. Per c. GDP in Europe 1000–1900 (int. 1990 $ PPP) ...... 287
Fig. 17. GDP in Europe 1000–1900 (int. 1990 $ PPP) ............... 287
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list of figures and tables xi
Fig. 18. Per capita GDP in Italy CN 1300–1913 (1911 prices) ... 290
Chapter VII
Fig. 1. Expenses of a mason’s family in Antwerp 1596–1600 ..... 294
Fig. 2. Expenses of a mason’s family in Berlin 1800 ..................... 295
Fig. 3. Slaughtering in a town in medieval Germany .................... 298
Fig. 4. Yearly meat consumption per head in some European
regions (15th–19th centuries) (kgs) ............................................... 299
Fig. 5. Herring fishing and main fishing areas in Europe
(17th and 18th centuries) ................................................................ 303
Fig. 6. The European cereals in an 18th century print ................. 304
Fig. 7. Daily cereal (C) or bread (B) per capita consumption
in grams per day in some European cities and countries
(14th–20th centuries) ....................................................................... 306
Fig. 8. Indices of agricultural and industrial prices in England
from 1660 until 1820 (9 years mobile averages) ......................... 315
Fig. 9. Being rich in medieval Germany .......................................... 316
Fig. 10. The relationship inequality-per capita product
according to Kuznets ........................................................................ 325
Fig. 11. A Renaissance investment. A Tuscan villa
(by Giusto Utens) .............................................................................. 331
Chapter VIII
Fig. 1. Production function ................................................................. 357
Fig. 2. The intensive production function ....................................... 359
Fig. 3. The production function: the general framework ............. 361
Fig. 4. The production function: the late Middle Ages ................. 364
Fig. 5. The production function: the 18th and early
19th centuries ..................................................................................... 366
Fig. 6. Production function and distribution .................................. 368
Fig. 7. A two-sectors economy: growth ............................................ 373
Fig. 8. A two-sector economy . ........................................................... 376
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xii list of figures and tables
Tables
Chapter I
Table 1. World population from 1 million years ago until
2000 AD (millions) ........................................................................... 2
Table 2. Two different estimates of world population at the
birth of Christ (thousands and percentage per continent of the
world population) .............................................................................. 4
Table 3. Distribution of world population per continent
(millions and percentage per continent of the world
population) ......................................................................................... 4
Table 4. European population (with all Russia) as to the world
population (millions) ........................................................................ 5
Table 5. European population (without Russia) 1–2000
(millions) ............................................................................................. 7
Table 6. The European population 1300–1870 (000) .................... 9
Table 7. Population in China and India from 800 to 1900
(millions) ............................................................................................. 10
Table 8. The population of Mediterranean countries, central
and northern Europe in the 6th and 11th centuries
(in millions) and variations (%) ..................................................... 12
Table 9. The European population from 1500 to 1800
(absolute values and percentages 1500=100) ............................... 13
Table 10. Demographic density in Europe (inhabitants per
km2) in 1300–1870 and yearly rates of growth (%) between
1500 and 1800 .................................................................................... 16
Table 11. Arable land, population with respect to arable land
and arables with respect to population in Japan, China,
India and Europe in 1600 ................................................................ 17
Table 12. Global population changes 1700–1950 ........................... 38
Table 13. Infant death rate in some European countries from
1700 to 1820 (deaths within the first year of life out of 1000
born alive) ........................................................................................... 39
Chapter II
Table 1. Fuel prices in some European cities during the 18th
century (1700 = 100) ........................................................................ 59
Table 2. Production, consumption and exportation of coal in
the United Kingdom from 1500 to 1869 (production,
consumption and exportation in millions of tons per year,
per capita consumption in tons per year) .................................... 62
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list of figures and tables xiii
Table 3. Estimate, of the availability of power per capita from

hydraulic energy, between 1200 and 1800 in Europe
(in Horse Power) ............................................................................... 74
Table 4. Estimates of the carrying capacity of the European
merchant fleets from 1470 to 1780 (thousands of tons and
indices) compared with demographic movement (indices) ..... 78
Table 5. Energy consumption per capita in Europe 1750 c.
(in kcal. per day and Gj per year) .................................................. 86
Table 6. Composition of energy consumption in 1850 Sweden,
the Netherlands, Italy* and Spain (%) .......................................... 87
Table 7. Per capita energy consumption in six European
countries in 1800 (Gj per year and kcal per day) ....................... 88
Chapter III
Table 1. Yield per hectare of rice, maize and wheat in
16th century agriculture (kgs. per hectare) ................................ 103
Table 2. Average yields for wheat, rye and barley in
16th century Europe (ratio between product and seed) ......... 138
Table 3. Average yield ratios of wheat, rye, barley and oats
1500–1750 in Europe (ratio between product and seed) ....... 139
Table 4. Average yield ratios of wheat, rye, barley and oats
1500–1750 (ratio between product and seed) ........................... 139
Table 5. Average yields of wheat, rye and barley in 1800
Europe (ratio between product and seed) .................................. 140
Table 6. Percentage growth or decline of agricultural labour
productivity between 1500 and 1800 ........................................... 149
Table 7. Indices of gross agricultural product, per capita
product and population (Russian population included)
between 1300 and 1800 (1500 = 1) .............................................. 153
Table 8. Agricultural product per capita in England, Germany,
Spain, Italy, France, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Austria from 1300 until 1800 (1500 = 1) ................................... 155
Chapter IV
Table 1. Carrying capacity of World shipping (in tons) and
index (1470 = 1) 1470–1850 .......................................................... 176
Table 2. Transport costs in pre-modern economies and at the
start of modernisation (in kgs of grain per ton-kilometre
transported) ........................................................................................ 181
Table 3. Correlation of wheat and rye prices between some
European cities in 1500–1700 (indices of correlation for
50 years) .............................................................................................. 192
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xiv list of figures and tables
Table 4. Weight of the Florentine lira, English pound,

Dutch guilder and Turkish akçe from 1300 to 1800
(in grams of silver and index 1450–60 = 100) .......................... 198
Chapter V
Table 1. Hours required for the manufacturing of woollen
cloth in the XIII and XVII centuries ............................................. 229
Table 2. Iron production in Europe 1000–1970
(tons per year) .................................................................................... 234
Table 3. Urbanisation rate in 1800 (cities with 10,000
inhabitants and over) ........................................................................ 242
Table 4. Urbanisation in Europe from 1300 to 1850.
(cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants and cities with
more than 10,000 inhabitants) ....................................................... 244
Table 5. Number of cities, urban inhabitants and urbanisation
rates in European centres with more than 10,000 inhabitants
between 1300 and 1870 .................................................................... 245
Table 6. European increase in urbanisation rates between 1500
and1800 by size category (% increase from 1500
until 1800) ........................................................................................... 247
Table 7. Urban population per region from 1300 until 1870
(% of the European urban population) ........................................ 251
Chapter VI
Table 1. Prices of non-agricultural products in
central-northern (CN) Italy and textiles in the Netherlands
from 1450 to 1810 (1450–70 = 1) .............................................. 258
Table 2. Prices of cereals, luxury textiles and ordinary textiles
in Poland from 1500 to 1800 (1500–20 = 1) ............................ 259
Table 3. The European price trend 1500–1850 (index) ............. 262
Table 4. The rent-wage ratio of 1500–1800 in some European
regions ............................................................................................. 265
Table 5. Real wage rates in the building sector in some
European cities 1500–1900 (1500–50 = 100) ........................... 271
Table 6. The European trend of real wage rates 1500–1850
(1500–50 = 100) ............................................................................. 274
Table 7. Three series of western European per capita
GDP 1500–1820 by: 1. A. Maddison; 2. J.L. Van Zanden;
3. C. Alvarez Nogal-L. Prados De La Escosura (1990 PPP
international dollars; and index 1500 = 100) ........................... 277
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list of figures and tables xv
Table 8. Per capita agricultural output in England, the

Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Germany from 1300 until
1800 and the European average (PPP 1990 Intern. $) ........... 279
Table 9. Variation between 1500 and 1800 of the European
per capita GDP according to different assumptions on the
weight of agricultural output in gross GDP ............................. 281
Table 10. Estimates of per capita and aggregate GDP in
Europe 1500–1870 (international 1990 PPP dollars and
indices) ............................................................................................ 283
Table 11. Per capita output in England, The Netherlands,
Spain, Italy, France, and Germany from 1500 until 1870
(PPP 1990 Intern. $) and index numbers 1500 = 1 ................ 289
Table 12. Rates of increase or decrease of GDP per capita
between 1500 and 1800 in Maddison, Van Zanden Alvarez
Nogal-Prados de la Escosura and the present reconstruction
(%) .................................................................................................... 290
Chapter VII
Table 1. Height of soldiers in several European countries
from 1740 to 1840 (in centimetres) ........................................... 310
Table 2. The employment of the gross product in early
Modern Europe and the EU in 2000 (percentages) ................ 347
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MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xvi 5/26/2009 12:34:33 PM
INTRODUCTION
The most striking feature for the historian analysing the European
economy of the millennium preceding modern growth is the simultane-
ous effect of contradictory forces: the forces of decline and the forces of
growth. The forces of decline are to be found particularly in the rural
world, where resources and techniques change slowly in relation to the
increasing population, whereas the forces of growth, and their dynamic
effects, prevail in the cities, in the shops and on the seas. While the
agricultural product in most European regions remained stable for long
periods and, in per capita terms, decreased, the product of urban shops,
trades and industrial activities underwent periods of rapid increase.
However, lack of progress in agriculture proved to be an obstacle to
the forces of growth in the secondary and tertiary sectors.
The interaction between the forces of decline and the forces of growth
was well known to classical economists. In their opinion, the wealth
of a country depended on the stock of natural resources, on capital,
labour and technology. Since the potential of increasing resources and
capital was limited and the development of technical knowledge slow
and unpredictable, the most dynamic independent variable of the
economic system was population. The increase of population against
a relatively stationary background could only result in a diminished
productive capacity. The immediate consequence was the decline in
wealth and income. The classical economists’ pessimistic view coexisted
with a more optimistic belief in the forces of growth. These forces of
growth were able to moderate the effects of decline. The spreading
of knowledge, the exchange of human experiences and the division
of labour among several cooperating workers were all factors which
disclosed new potentialities. Adam Smith referred to these forces when
commenting on man’s predisposition for bartering and exchange and
the division of labour. John Stuart Mill expressed this same idea very
clearly when he wrote about “the continual growth of the principle
and practice of cooperation”. It is true, however, that in the pessimistic
vision of the classical economists the forces of decline were to prevail
over the forces of growth.
A reconstruction of the economic system that preceded the recent
growth of western economies must inevitably consider both the con-
tradictory forces that distinguished the European societies and the
MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xvii 5/26/2009 12:34:33 PM
xviii introduction
specificity of these forces on the continent in comparison with those

of other areas of the world. The particular features of the European
economy can only be perceived when examining the global scenario
of differences and similarities.
Historians often focus on the dynamic side of the early modern
European economy. This attitude has been critically summarized by
Wrigley: “General considerations seem to point so strongly in this direc-
tion. This was an age in which triumphs of European navigation and
discovery opened up the whole world to commerce and when colonies
of conquest and settlement were established; an age, too, when capital-
ist forms of enterprise became established more and more widely and
modern forms of state organization evolved, both developments held to
favour urban growth. There was invention and innovation in industry
and transport, initially modest in nature but becoming increasingly
impressive in scale and scope during the course of the 18th century”
(Wrigley (1991), p. 274). The doubts expressed by Wrigley on this
approach to the European pre-modern history coincide with our own.
The European pre-modern economy was a dualistic economy where,
until about 1800, decreasing returns in agriculture were stronger than
the increasing returns in industry and trade. Increasing returns began
to profoundly influence the course of the economy from the first
decades of the 19th century. The European economy did not describe
an unilinear trend towards prosperity from the Middle Ages until the
modern growth, but merely cycles around an overall stability. The
constraints of the old system, often too simply defined as Malthusian,
were not overcome by the rooting of bourgeois virtues in the leading
social strata and their inheritance generation by generation. Useful
knowledge and its spread was a slow cultural formation within the
urban European civilization.
The order of the present reconstruction can easily be represented
as the development of two well-known equations. The first establishes
the identity of the product (Y) with population (P) multiplied by per
capita product in agriculture (A), the secondary (S) and the tertiary (T)
sectors of the economic system:
A + S +T
Y =P⋅
P
Looking at the demand side, the product of these sectors can only be
employed for consumptions (C), investments (I) and public expenses
(G), plus the algebraic result of exports (X) minus imports (M):
MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xviii 5/26/2009 12:34:33 PM
introduction xix
Y = C + I + G + (X – M)
Although it is often difficult to quantify the parameters in these equa-
tions for past economic systems, an identification of these can contribute
to a compact reconstruction of the elements that came into play. It is
always important, however, to underline the specific features of the
pre-modern world and how it evolved. The application to the past of
modern economic concepts must not cancel out the specificity of the
pre-modern world and its differences from the present day.
This work focuses initially on the denominator of the first equa-
tion; population (Chapter I), moving on in Chapter II to look at the
techniques and energy exploited in pre-modern European economy.
In Chapters III–VI the products of the primary, secondary and terti-
ary sectors are examined, together with the organisation of these and
the overall product. The second identity between product and demand
will then be analyzed in Chapter VII. Chapter VIII will recall the main
features of the pre-modern economic system and its workings in a
more formal way.
MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xix 5/26/2009 12:34:33 PM
MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xx 5/26/2009 12:34:33 PM
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The suggestions by Jan Luiten Van Zanden, Leandro Prados de la

Escosura, and an anonymous referee, on some specific points and
on the overall structure were particularly helpful to me during the
preparation of the final version of the book. Maarten Prak did great
work in improving the text and suggesting changes. I thank Giovanni
Federico for allowing me to use some not yet published material on
market integration and Salvatore Capasso for our discussions on the
adaptation of growth models to pre-modern economies. My thanks
go to Janet Boumphrey, Nicky Checketts and Gina Richardson for the
editing of the language and their efficiency in revising all the text and
Sarah Carmichael for the last revision. Gianfranco Canitano, Davide De
Rosa and Aniello Barone helped me in the preparation of some maps.
My thanks go to them as well.
MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xxi 5/26/2009 12:34:33 PM
MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xxii 5/26/2009 12:34:33 PM
CHAPTER I
POPULATION
In the one thousand years preceding modern economic growth, i.e. from
the 10th century to the 19th, both world and European populations grew
between four and five-fold. From the beginning of the 10th until the
middle of the 14th centuries population rose conspicuously. The three
following centuries witnessed a dwindling or stabilization. Subsequently,
during the second half of the 17th century, the population growth rate
began to increase rapidly due to a decline in mortality. Over a period
of two centuries (1650–1850), world population doubled, determining
unprecedented pressure on the agriculture in Europe and throughout
the world. Since the rate of population growth from the late Middle
Ages onwards was higher in northern than in southern Europe, the
demographic balance was shifting from South to North.
1. World population
1.1. Successful reproduction

Over the last 5 million years, between 100 and 120 billion people have
inhabited the Earth.1 The human species has grown at an ever increasing
rate. In the year 2000, with a population of 6 billion, 5 to 6 percent of
the entire world population of all time, were living on Earth. Twenty
percent of the human species since its origin lived during the 19th and
20th centuries.
Man has been unique in his capability to reproduce. One hundred
thousand years ago the world population numbered merely 1 million
humans; 10,000 years ago human beings numbered between 5 and 10
million. The population had grown to around 250 million by the time
of the birth of Christ, swelling to 1 billion in the year 1820 (Table 1 and
Figure 1). Its increase accelerated sharply during the last two centuries
and began to slow down only recently. In 2050, however, the human
1
See the calculations by Bourgeois-Pichat (1988). A little higher are the calculations
by Haub (1995).
MALANIMA_F2_1-48.indd 1 5/26/2009 1:00:38 PM
2 chapter i – population
Table 1. World population from 1 million years ago until

2000 AD (millions).
1,000,000 years ago 0.125
100,000 BC 1
10,000 BC 5
1 AD 250
1000 250
1340 440
1650 600
1750 770
1850 1,240
1950 2,500
2000 6,236
Source: Cohen (1995), App. 2 (until 1950).
6000
5000
4000
(000,000)
3000
2000
1000
0
1 mil. 100000 10000 1000 100 10 1
Source: data in Cohen (1995), App. 2.

Note: the dates represent the years before 2000.
Fig. 1. World Population (from 1 million years ago until 2000) (millions)
(log horizontal axis).
world population 3
population will be 10 billion. At the beginning of the 21st century it

is already five times that of any other similar sized mammal with an
analogous position in the food chain.2
Demographic figures concerning the human species reveal that the
population remained relatively modest during the 4–5 million years
in which economic activity was confined firstly to gathering and sub-
sequently to hunting. The population increased when men dedicated
themselves to agriculture due to increased capability in the exploitation
of energy.3 Such developments in agriculture enabled colonization of
the world and the multiplication of the human species. The rate of
growth rose during the period of industrialization of the 19th and 20th
centuries and only recently has begun to diminish.
1.2. World population

Available data on population per continent are somewhat precise
only for the more recent ages. As for the remoter eras we know about
the diffusion of the human species from Africa, where it originated
between 5 and 4 million years ago, towards other regions of the world.
Colonization of Europe began at least 2.5 million years ago. The era
between the 5th century BC and the 5th century AD witnesses the set-
tlement of new foreign peoples and ethnic groups on the continent.4
The attempts to calculate the earth’s population at the beginning
of our era, based on the settlements in the various continents and the
level of technological knowledge, show that the population was mostly
concentrated in Asia. An estimated 15 percent of the total lived in
Europe (Table 2).
Only since 1500 are more reliable figures available on the geographic
distribution of population worldwide (Table 3).
Despite all the uncertainties regarding figures which relate to such
distant epochs, one thing is certain. In the 17th century, the majority
of the world’s population was concentrated in an area that stretched
across the whole of southern Asia, the Middle East and Europe; that is
to say the large agricultural areas of Eurasia, where a continuous supply
of the most important source of energy, i.e. food, was easily found and
temperatures were higher.
2
Kapitza (1996).
3
See especially Cipolla (1962).
4
Poussou (1996), p. 5.
Table 2. Two different estimates of world population at the birth of Christ

(thousands and percentage per continent of the world population).
A % B %
Africa 30,000 13 16,500 7
Asia 150,000 66 176,100 76
America 10,000 5 6,320 3
Europe 35,000 15 31,450 14
Oceania 1,500 1 0,450 0
226,500 100 230,820 100
Sources: A. Valentej (1974), pp. 238 ff.; B. Maddison (2001), pp. 229–41.
Table 3. Distribution of world population per continent

(millions and percentage per continent of the world population).
1500 % 1700 % 1800 % 1850 %
Africa 87 18.9 107 15.7 102 10.7 102 8.2
Asia (without Russia) 245 53.0 433 63.7 631 66.2 790 63.7
North America 3 0.7 2 0.3 5 0.5 25 2.0
Latin America 39 8.5 10 1.5 19 2.0 34 2.7
Europe (with Russia) 84 18.2 125 18.4 195 20.4 288 23.2
Oceania 3 0.7 3 0.4 2 0.2 2 0.2
461 100 680 100 954 100 1,241 100
Source: Vallin (1986), Tab. 5.
Note: the European population includes the Russian population on the whole and not
only the European part.
In the 17th century, China numbered approximately 150 million

inhabitants; India 120–150 million; the Ottoman Empire, which then
included most of the Middle East, 20–30 million, and Europe 100 mil-
lion.5 These temperate, agricultural regions thus totalled 4 out of 5 or
6 hundred million, that is a good 70–80 percent of the world popula-
tion. The inhabitants of the vast areas which lay directly to the north
and south of the agricultural band, were for the most part herdsmen
and nomads. These groups were much less numerous, but were a con-
tinuous threat to the agricultural settlers in the borderlands, troubled
by the frequent raids and invasions of nomadic peoples such as the
Barbarians who attacked the Roman world, and then the Hungarians,
5
Braudel (1979), I, Chapter 1 (data refer to 1650) and Biraben (1969), p. 16.
world population 5
Table 4. European population (with all Russia) as to the world

population (millions).
Europe World Europe/
(with Russia) World (%)
1 43 250 17.2
500 41 200 20.5
1000 43 260 16.5
1340 87 440 19.8
1500 84 460 18.3
1700 125 680 18.4
1800 195 954 20.4
1900 422 1,650 25.6
2000 818 6,175 13.2
Source: Le Bras (1993).
the Mongolians and the Turks who all fought against the agricultural
civilisations of Asia and Europe.
1.3. Europe and the rest of the world

Over the long period of time ranging from the birth of Christ up until
the 19th century, the European population was between one fifth and
one sixth of the world population,6 that is, approximately equal to the
population of China. It was only during the course of the 19th century
that the population of Europe rose significantly with respect to world
population, reaching 25 percent in 1900, thereby increasing from
one fifth to one quarter (Table 4).7 Subsequently, in relative terms, it
diminished once more.
All this is true when referring to the population of Europe living on
the continent. The European population as a whole rose much more.
Up until the 19th century the flux of migration out of Europe was
sporadic and modest in quantitative terms. It was during the period
of demographic growth in the 19th century that a significant number
of Europeans emigrated towards other continents, and above all to
6
If Russia is included in the European population. In this chapter Russian population
is sometimes excluded from series on European population. The exclusion is justified
by the extent of the country—about half the whole continent—and the low density of
population. Including Russia causes density in Europe to drop radically. Comparisons
with the rest of the world are heavily influenced by this drop.
7
Similar proportions of the European population on World population are also
provided by Bairoch (1976), p. 18.
north and south America; later also to Australia and New Zealand.
Between 1850 and 1913 more than 40 million people left Europe for
the United States.8 Likewise colonialism in the 19th century favoured
the spread of Europeans towards Asia and Africa. Between 1750 and
1930, the Europeans, both in Europe and in the rest of the world,
increased 14 fold, whilst the world population only rose 2.5 times, the
Caucasian populations by 5, the Asians by 2.3 and the Africans and
Afro-Americans by less than 2 fold. In 1750 populations of European
origins made up 25 percent of the worldwide population. This figure
increased to 40 percent by 1900.9 Alongside the people, the European
culture, as well as social, economic and political institutions, was
spreading and conquering the world. Europeans were creating a world
to their own image.
2. The European population
2.1. The long-term trend

Just as the species that have the greatest ability to exploit energy are
rewarded by natural selection, likewise, within every species, the more
lucky or capable groups and individuals have a higher probability of
reproduction and development. In this respect, over the last 1000 years,
the populations of Europe have proved themselves to be efficient in
settling in different areas of the world.
As regards demographic development, until the end of the early
modern age, the available figures are able to suggest only the magnitude
of different populations.10 It has been estimated that the population of
the continent increased until the 2nd century AD, reaching 40–50 mil-
lion (Figure 2). There followed an era of population decline subsequent
to an epidemic, today believed to be smallpox, “the Antonine Plague”,
which spread over the entire Roman Empire from 160 to 180 AD.11 In
the 7th–8th century the population reached its historic low, after which
there was a slight upward trend, but only from the 10th century did an
appreciable increase take place (Table 5).
8
Poussou (1996), p. 6.
9
Crosby (1993).
10
In the central centuries of the Middle Ages, the margin of error for the available
figures on population is approximately 50 percent: Livi Bacci (1998), p. 264.
11
Duncan-Jones (1996).
the european population 7
1000
100
(millions)
10
1
1
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Source: data in Table 4.
Fig. 2. European Population 1–2000 (without Russia) (log scale).
Table 5. European population (without Russia) 1–2000 (millions).

1 31 1300 79
100 37 1350 54
200 44 1400 57
300 40 1450 60
400 36 1500 70
500 30 1550 73
600 22 1600 91
700 22 1650 90
800 25 1700 102
900 28 1750 121
1000 30 1800 154
1050 32 1850 218
1100 35 1900 295
1150 42 1950 395
1200 49 2000 510
1250 57
Source: Biraben (1969). Data from 1300 to 1800 has been replaced with
those of the following Table 6.
2.2. Three long phases

From the 10th century up until the present, we can distinguish three
phases in European demographic history, each 300–400 years long:
1. from the 10th to the beginning of the 14th century: increase between
2 and 3 per thousand each year, with a rise in population from 30
to approximately 80 million (without Russia);
2. from the 14th century up to the second half of the 17th century: decline,
recovery and stability. After a long-lasting absence (at least from the
9th century), the return of the plague caused a sharp decrease in the
middle of the 14th century followed by an upswing from the middle
of the 15th century until the beginning of the 17th. Many parts of
Europe underwent a decline or stagnation in population in the 17th
century, for some decades. Overall the population of the continent
increased, between 1300 and 1700, by 0.6 per thousand yearly. It
was 79 million in 1300 and a little more than 100 million in 1700;
3. from the second half of the 17th century to the end of the 20th: yearly
increase of 5.3 per thousand; twice that of the late medieval period.
Population doubled between 1700 and 1850. Growth was initially
slow, but rose steeply in the 19th century and the first half of the
20th: from approximately 100 million in 1700 to more than 500
million in the year 2000.
The average yearly growth was around 2 per thousand between 900 and
1800, growing to 4 per thousand during the 18th century and to 6.3 in
the 19th century. Between 1850 and 1960 growth was almost 10 per
thousand. The population of Europe, including Russia, rose more than
threefold in the seven centuries between 1000 and 1700 and doubled
in the 5 centuries between 1200 and 1700.
In short, after the drop at the beginning of the Middle Ages, the
population followed an upward trend from the 10th until the end of
the 20th century.
2.3. Similarities and differences

Data for some regions are still uncertain even for late medieval and
early modern Europe. Only from the 19th century onwards are they
more accurate, although differences among the estimates still exist.12
12
As we can see if we compare the figures in Table 5 with those provided by Bairoch
(1976), p. 24.
We know, however, that the same evolution, with varying intensity,

was shared by almost all European regions (Table 6). In any area the
upward trend from the 9th century on was interrupted by two eras of
decline:
1. the second half of the 14th century and the first half of the following;
2. the 17th century; especially during the central part of the century.
In 1700, however, the level of the European population was higher
than in 1600.
Table 6. The European population 1300–1870 (000).

1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1750 1800 1870
1 Scandinavia 2,500 1,400 1,500 2,400 2,900 3,600 5,250 9,550
2 England (Wales) 4,500 2,700 3,500 4,450 5,450 6,300 9,250 23,000
3 Scotland 1,000 700 800 1,000 1,200 1,260 1,630 3,420
4 Ireland 1,400 700 800 1,000 1,900 3,120 5,200 5,800
5 Netherlands 800 600 950 1,500 1,950 1,950 2,100 3,650
6 Belgium 1,400 1,200 1,300 1,300 1,900 2,300 2,900 4,900
7 France 16,000 12,000 15,000 18,500 21,500 24,600 29,000 38,000
8 Italy 12,500 8,000 9,000 13,300 13,500 15,500 18,100 28,000
9 Spain 5,500 4,500 5,000 6,800 7,400 9,300 10,500 16,200
10 Portugal 1,300 1,050 1,200 1,300 2,000 2,600 2,900 4,300
11 Switzerland 800 500 800 1,000 1,200 1,300 1,700 2,700
12 Austria (Hungary) 10,000 9,000 11,500 12,800 15,500 18,300 24,300 35,700
13 Germany 13,000 8,000 11,000 16,200 14,100 17,500 24,500 41,000
14 Poland 2,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 2,800 3,700 4,300 7,400
15 Balkans 6,000 5,000 5,500 7,000 8,550 9,900 12,000 23,700
16 Russia (European) 15,000 11,000 15,000 16,000 13,000 22,000 35,000 63,000
EUROPE 93,700 67,850 84,850 107,050 114,850 143,230 188,630 310,320

EUROPE 78,700 56,850 69,850 91,050 101,850 121,230 153,630 247,320
(without Russia)
Sources: among the following works, only Urlanis provides data on a country basis for all our period
and for any country: Meyers Konversations-Lexikon (Germany 1870); Reinhard, Armengaud, Dupâquier
(1968) (all countries); Urlanis (1941), p. 414 (all of Europe); Mols (1974) (early Modern; several countries);
Armengaud (1973) (several countries; 18th–19th century); Wilson, Parker (eds.) (1977) (some countries;
early Modern); Blayo (1975a) (France 1740–1860); Dupâquier (1968) (France); De Vries (1984), pp. 36–7
(Western Europe); Russell (1958); Wrigley, Schofield (1981) (England from 1541); Myrdal (forthcoming)
(Scandinavia 1300 and 1400); Beloch (1937–61), Lo Cascio-Malanima (2005) (Italy 1300–1800); Bardet,
Dupâquier (eds.) (1997) (several countries); Maddison (2001), (2003) (Western countries); Klep (1991)
(Belgium); De Vries, Woude (1997) (the Netherlands); Valerio (2001) (Portugal); Mc Evedy, Jones (1978)
(several countries); Glass, Grebenik (1965) (several countries); Dupâquier (1987) (several countries 18th–
19th centuries); Woods (1989) (early Modern United Kingdom); Campbell (2000) and (2008) (England
1300); Palairet (1997) (19th century Balkans).
Note: data in the table refer to the European population within the 1870 borders. Poland is in 15th
century borders. On the extent of any geographic area or country see the following Table 8. Scandinavia
includes: Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Austria includes: Hungary, Bohemia, Croatia, Slavonia,
Transylvania. Balkans include: Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rumania, Bulgaria, Crete,
the European part of Turkey. Iceland, Malta and some minor islands are excluded.
Table 7. Population in China and India from 800 to 1900 (millions).

China India
800 56 43
900 48 38
1000 59 40
1100 83 48
1200 115 69
1300 96 100
1400 72 74
1500 103 95
1600 160 145
1700 150 175
1800 330 180
1900 415 290
Sources: China: Biraben (1969); Maddison (2007), Table 1–2; Caboara (1998); India
(together with Pakistan and Bangladesh): Biraben (1969); Mc Evedy, Jones (1978).
It is interesting to note that, on the other side of Eurasia, a similar

demographic trend was shared by China, and, between China and
Europe, by India. In both China and India the same rising trend was
interrupted in the 14th and 15th centuries and, in China, again in the
17th century (Table 7 and Figure 3).
The similarities in European, Chinese and Indian demographic
history suggest the presence, on the Eurasian continent as a whole,
of some common factor which influenced population figures. While
the spread of the same epidemics both in the east and the west is well
known, the influence of climatic changes has still to be examined in
depth. It seems plausible to suppose that climate history carries more
weight than is ordinarily assumed. Braudel already put forward a cli-
matic explanation for these similarities on both sides of the Eurasian
continent.13 In particular, the rise of world population from 1650–1700
onwards is likely to have been a result of the rising temperatures in the
same period throughout the northern hemisphere, allowing the spread
of cultivation to marginal soils and, as a consequence, an increase in
the carrying capacity of agriculture.14
13
Braudel (1979), I, Chapter I. I will discuss the evolution of climate in the following
Chapter. See Galloway (1986), on the topic climate-population.
14
I come back to the climatic changes in Chapter II.
10000
1000
millions
100 China
India
Europe
10
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
Note: European population is without Russia, while Indian population includes Pakistan
and Bangladesh.
Fig. 3. Population of China, Europe, India 800–2000 (log scale).
2.4. Mediterranean Europe and continental Europe

In the history of population and, as will become apparent, in that of
the economy, the balance shifted from south to north. During the
Middle Ages and the early modern epoch, Europe was becoming more
continental than Mediterranean.
In ancient times populations were densest in the regions around the
Mediterranean: they were like frogs around a pond, as Plato wrote.15
The north-south balance changed during the early Middle Ages. A
comparison between the Euro-Mediterranean populations in the years
500 and 1000 reveals the decline in Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt and
Northern Africa.16 The European population, as has been noted, rose in
the centuries between the birth of Christ and 1500. If, however, Europe
is considered together with southern Mediterranean regions and the
Middle East, we could speak rather of a south-north redistribution than
15
Plato, Phaeton, LVIII.
16
As we see in the following Table, however uncertain the demographic estimates
for the period may be.
Table 8. The population of Mediterranean countries, central and northern

Europe in the 6th and 11th centuries (in millions) and variations (%).
500 1000 %
Northern and Central Europe 9.0 12.0 +33
Southern Europe 13.0 17.0 +31
Eastern Europe 5.5 9.5 +73
Asia Minor, Siria, Egypt, Northern Africa 22.5 12.5 –45
50 51
Source: Russell (1973).
a true rise during this long period. In fact the populations of south-
western Asia and northern Africa diminished respectively from 47 to
23 million and from 14 to 9 million in 1500 years.17 According to a
different estimate these two areas totalled 35–60 million people at the
beginning of our era and 26–42 in 1500.18 In any case, these uncertain
estimates of the population allow nothing more than an approximate
evaluation of its size and redistribution (Table 8).
The demographic balance was already shifting northwards in the
first half of the Middle Ages. In these centuries “for the first time in
history the axis of western civilisation moved towards the north”.19 As
we will see, this movement did not concern only population, but the
economy as a whole.
Within Europe itself, the relative weight of various regions changed
in the course of time. The north-south relationship was slowly modified
as the population of central-northern Europe rose. In relative terms the
Mediterranean area lost ground. This shift is revealed by the trends in
the European population in the different areas during the early modern
era (Table 9).20
As we can see, the growth rates differ within the same continent.
During the 300 years between 1500 and 1800 the population of north-
ern and western Europe increases and new regions are colonized.21
17
Biraben (1969).
18
Durand (1977), p. 259.
19
Pirenne (1937).
20
See also Kriedte (1980), p. 3, where a similar table is presented, although the
demographic data are different from ours.
21
The process of colonization from Germany towards the less populated eastern
regions of Europe, started in the late Middle Ages and continued later, is analyzed in
Abel (1953) and Aubin (1966).
Table 9. The European population from 1500 to 1800 (absolute values and
percentages 1500=100).
1500 1800 %
(000) (000)
North 1,500 5,250 350
North-West 7,350 21,080 287
West 15,000 29,000 193
South 15,200 31,500 207
Centre 25,300 54,800 217
South-East 5,500 12,000 218
East Europe 15,000 35,000 233
84,850 188,630 222
Note: this Table is based on data in Table 6.
North: Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden (1 line in the first column of Table 5);
North-West: England, Scotland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium (2, 3, 4, 5, 6);
West: France (7);
South: Portugal, Spain, Italy (8, 9, 10);
Centre: Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Poland, Bohemia, Slovakia, Hungary (11,
12, 13, 14);
South-East: Balkans (15);
East: European Russia (16).
0.7
0.6
0.5
Rates of growth
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Densities

Fig. 4. Yearly rates of growth 1500–1870 and densities in 1500.
The rate of increase appears stronger in the regions with a lower initial
demographic density (Figure 4).
As indicated by the scatter graph for the rates of demographic growth
between 1500 and 1870 as regards the densities in 1500, a weak ten-
dency towards convergence exists. A significant south-north shift had
already taken place. It has been stated that throughout most of history,
the growth rate of population was proportional to its level.22 This is
probably true on a global scale and over several millennia but not, as
the European case suggests, on a more limited scale.
2.5. Population densities

Europe in the late medieval and early modern centuries has frequently
been represented as a densely populated continent. However, on closer
observation, this perspective must be reconsidered. Europe is more
densely populated than the nomadic and shepherd civilisations at the
margins of the Eurasian agricultural civilisations, but, when compared
to other agricultural regions, it is in fact the least densely populated.
Today the population densities of Europe exceed 200 inhabitants per
km2 in some areas, although the figures are usually lower. In 2000 the
average value was, in fact, 70 inhabitants per km2 if Russia is included
and 106 excluding this country.
In late medieval and early modern Western Europe the highest
population density is to be found along the axis which crosses the
continent from Tuscany up to England cutting through Lombardy,
central-northern France and the Low Countries.23 Moving away from
this axis both eastwards, and westwards towards the Iberian Peninsula
the density drops. As we will see, this is also the most dynamic area of
the continent; its economic core (Figure 5).
At the beginning of the 14th century, the most densely populated
areas in Europe were Belgium, Italy, with more than 40 inhabitants
per km2, and England and France, with 30.24 The densest areas, as we
can see, were those around a line running from Florence to London
(Table 10).
22
Kremer (1993).
23
In this region, the urbanization rate was also higher. Cities and urbanization will
be analyzed in Chapter V.
24
Russell (1958).
1.3
10.1
9.5 2.8
23.2 28.8
24.3 8.3
43.3
27.6
19.5 18.4
13 9.9 29.9 10.7
Source: Table 10.

Fig. 5. Population density in 1500 Europe (inhabitants per km2).
Average density around 1700 was 11 inhabitants per km2. In some areas
this level was exceeded almost tenfold. Towards the middle of the 18th
century an average of about 50 was reached in central-western areas.
Further westwards, in Spain, the average value fell to fewer than 20,25
and moving eastwards the density dropped even more. In 16th century
Hungary there were 10 inhabitants per km2,26 in Poland and in Prussia
around 14 and in Russia about 3. To the north, in Sweden and Finland,
the density was a mere 1–2 inhabitants per km2.
The population densities of Europe seem somewhat modest when
compared to those of the other rural civilisations of the ancien régime.
The difference is indisputable despite the scarcity and imprecision of
the demographic data concerning Asia. While the density of inhabitants
25
Bennassar (1967) p. 166.
26
Makkai-Zimanyi (1978), for Hungary. Figures on density are from Braudel (1966),
I, Part I, Chapter 1.
Table 10. Demographic density in Europe (inhabitants per km2) in 1300–1870 and
yearly rates of growth (%) between 1500 and 1800.
km2 inhabitants per km2 yearly
rates (%)
(000) 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1870 1500–1800
1 Scandinavia 1,198 2.1 1.2 1.3 2.0 2.4 4.4 8.0 0.42
2 England (Wales) 151 29.8 17.9 23.2 29.5 36.1 61.3 152.3 0.32
3 Scotland 79 12.7 8.9 10.1 12.7 15.2 20.6 43.3 0.24
4 Ireland 84 16.7 8.3 9.5 11.9 22.6 61.9 69.0 0.62
5 Netherlands 33 24.2 18.2 28.8 45.5 59.1 63.6 110.6 0.26
6 Belgium 30 46.7 40.0 43.3 43.3 63.3 96.7 163.3 0.27
7 France 544 29.4 22.1 27.6 34.0 39.5 53.3 69.9 0.22
8 Italy 301 41.5 26.6 29.9 44.2 44.9 60.1 93.0 0.23
9 Spain 505 10.9 8.9 9.9 13.5 14.7 20.8 32.1 0.25
10 Portugal 92 14.1 11.4 13.0 14.1 21.7 31.5 46.7 0.29
11 Switzerland 41 19.5 12.2 19.5 24.4 29.3 41.5 65.9 0.25
12 Austria (Hungary) 626 16.0 14.4 18.4 20.4 24.8 38.8 57.0 0.25
13 Germany 543 23.9 14.7 20.3 29.8 26.0 45.1 75.5 0.27
14 Poland 240 8.3 6.3 8.3 10.4 11.7 17.9 30.8 0.26
15 Balkans 516 11.6 9.7 10.7 13.6 16.6 23.3 45.9 0.26
16 Russia (European) 5,400 2.8 2.0 2.8 3.0 2.4 6.5 11.7 0.28
EUROPE 10,383 9.0 6.5 8.2 10.3 11.1 18.2 29.9 0.27
EUROPE (without Russia) 4,983 15.8 11.4 14.0 18.3 20.4 30.8 49.6 0.26
Sources: see the previous Table 6.
Note: we see that the rate of growth of Ireland is much higher than that of other European countries. Data
for Ireland are from Bardet, Dupâquier (eds.) (1997) (the Chapter on British Islands is by R. A. Houston,
C. O’ Grada, R. Schofield, A. Wrigley).
in 16th and 17th century Europe rarely exceeded 50 per km2, in China
and India it was at least three times as high. On average, the density
in 17th century Europe was 10 inhabitants per km2, whereas in China
the figure reached some 30–40 inhabitants.27
It is interesting to relate population data to arable land, which in
Europe was relatively abundant while scarce in Asia (Table 11). Such a
diverse relationship between men and the land constitutes an important
difference when considering Europe in the light of comparative history.
In regions of irrigated agriculture, such as southern China and
northern India very high population densities existed. Referring to
these very areas at the end of the 17th century, the Chinese author P’u
Sung-ling noted that “such closely massed dwellings resemble fish scales
27
Debeir-Deléage-Hémery (1986), p. 85.
the demographic model 17
Table 11. Arable land, population with respect to arable land and arables with
respect to population in Japan, China, India and Europe in 1600.
% arables Population/arables Per capita arables
(km2) (ha)
Japan 11.0 856 0.12
China 8.6 477 0.21
India 24.2 269 0.37
Europe 28.4 60 1.66
Source: Grigg (1992), p. 93.
and the people are as numerous as ants”.28 In regions such as southern

Vietnam, China, Korea and parts of Japan the number of agricultural
workers per km2 of exploitable farmland was rarely lower than 300 and
often as high as 1,000.29
3. The demographic model
3.1. The biotic potential

The expression of biotic potential is used to indicate the capacity of
growth of a given animal population. When, as in newly colonized
lands, energy resources are abundant with respect to the number of the
species, the growth rate is initially low, but then tends to increase before
slowing down again and then stabilizing. This trend is the result of the
environmental resistance (deriving from crowding and the diminishing
availability of food), a phenomenon ultimately consequential of every
process of growth and different both in nature and intensity for each
species. A balance exists between the energy resources of the environ-
ment and the size of a particular animal species.
The case of human beings is, at least in part, different. Both human
and animal populations are influenced in their growth by the avail-
ability of consumption goods on the one hand and by its density, on
the other. While there is a direct relationship between population and
consumption goods, density, by contrast, is inversely related to the
potentiality of demographic growth. The higher the density, the higher
28
Cit. in Ho Ping-Ti (1959).
29
Gourou (1940).
the possibility of transmission of diseases and the lower the consump-

tion potential.
The relationship between the rate of population growth, on the one
hand, and the quantity of consumption goods, together with the density
of population in agricultural societies, on the other, can be represented
by the following function:
⎛Q⎞
rp = F ⎜ ⎟ (1)
⎝P⎠
where rp is the rate of population growth, Q the product in a specific

region and P, the population living in the same region. Since Q is the
product of the economy (Y), the equation (1.1) could be rewritten:
⎛Y ⎞
rp = F ⎜ ⎟ (2)
⎝P⎠
However, product Y is composed of consumption (cY) and investment

(1–c)Y, but only consumption is directly correlated to the demographic
rate of growth. Equation (1.2) then becomes:
⎛ cY ⎞
rp = F ⎜ ⎟ (3)
⎝ P ⎠
which means that population growth depends on per capita consumption.30

This view, often simply labeled Malthusian, was largely shared by
classical economists of the 18th and 19th centuries. They also agreed
on the fact that social customs make the relationship of population-
environment much more flexible than in the case of other animals.31
In the case of human beings technical ability enhances the capacity
of exploiting the environment, much more than in the case of other
animal species. More recent economists and historians reacted to this
classical approach and stressed how demographic growth spurs tech-
30
I come more widely on the topic in Chapter VIII.
31
I refer especially to the last edition of Malthus (1826), where the relationship
population-environment is much more complex than often represented in anti-
Malthusian literature (based rather on secondary literature than on the direct evidence
of the original texts).
the demographic model 19
nical progress.32 More human beings mean more possibilities for the
exchange of useful knowledge and the formation of what it is often called
human capital.33 This is true; but only in part. Our perspective of the
human possibilities of technological advance cannot be so optimistic,
especially when we look not at mankind’s evolution since its origin, but
at a shorter, although still lengthy epoch. Some progress is possible in
the adaptation to the environment within the prevailing structure of
technical knowledge. Examples of such progress are the adjustment of
land cultivation to different soils and the introduction of more effective
tools . . . The colonization of the world by the agrarian populations was
based precisely on this adaptation. The passage to a new and different
technical model, as happened with the introduction of a new energy
system from the 18th century onward, is a different matter. This implies
the transition to new technology and a new technical paradigm, and
this change is not immediately a consequence of population pressure.34
Much, in the progress of technology, is due to chance: a deterministic
view is always partial.
The dependence of the rate of population growth on the quantity of
agricultural product and the density of population holds true for pre-
modern agrarian societies. In these societies the possibilities of farm
cultivation depend on the number of children, since human beings
and animals are the only machines—biological machines- employed in
agriculture. In order to produce, the available number of these engines
constitutes an important factor. It has been noted, by contrast, that
the introduction of machinery into the productive activities, from the
19th century on, implies the enhancement of the “quality” of children.
The number of children per family diminishes, while the formation
of human capital becomes more and more important. Female fertility
drops, while families invest to a much greater extent in the instruc-
tion of their children in order to prepare them for the management
and workings of a much more complex economy, where industry and
services play an increasingly important role.35
32
This opinion was primarily put forward by Boserup (1965), and (1981). See also
a similar perspective in Lee (1988).
33
See, as examples, Kremer (1993) and Galor (2005).
34
The topic is examined in the following Chapter II. A different opinion is presented
by Boserup (1981).
35
Galor, Weil (2000).
The European population merely doubled in the centuries between

1300 and 1800, increasing from fewer than 100 million inhabitants to
not many more than 200, whereas between the years 1000 and 1800
it increased four to five fold. This demographic rate of growth after
the colonisation of the late Middle Ages was lower than it could have
been. Population across the continent had to adapt to the limits of the
existing agricultural technology.
3.2. Environmental resistance

What is it, therefore, that refrain demographic potential? Here I will
focus on the purely demographic aspects of the problem. We could
refer to them as immediate causes. The economic reasons—that is the
remote causes- will be presented later.
From a purely demographic viewpoint, the population (P) in a spe-
cific year t is the result of the population in a previous year 0, plus the
difference between those born (B) and those who died (D), within the
time interval we are considering, plus the difference between those who
immigrated (I) and those who emigrated (E):
Pt = P0 + B – D + I – E
We have now to look at the several variables involved and their influ-
ence on the demographic movement.
Any particular effect of migration on the demography of Europe in
medieval and early modern times can be excluded; even though certain
areas are known to have undergone migrations for reasons of employ-
ment, military activity or, as was often the case, for religious reasons.36
The migratory flow between Europe and other areas of the world was
not remarkable with respect to the population of the continent. In the
era of the ancien régime even the movement towards the Americas
was comparatively modest, although notably stronger than the flows
towards the rest of the world. By the end of the 18th century, 8.5 mil-
lion Europeans were living in the Americas: half in the north and the
36
See, as remarkable examples, the expulsion of the Jews and the moriscos from
Spain in early modern times, the emigration of the Protestants from the Spanish Low
Countries at the end of the 16th century, the departure of thousands of Huguenots
from France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.
the death rate 21
other half in Latin America.37 The European population was then a

little less than 200 million.
Excluding migration, both mortality and birth rates remain as the
main variables influencing demographic growth. Fertility, as will be
shown, played an important role, but mortality remained the main
impediment to population increase. Hence we have to focus first on
mortality.
Three deciding factors which affected the death rate were wars,
famines and epidemics.
Catastrophes such as earthquakes, floods and droughts, which fre-
quently hit the populations of other continents, in particular Asia, were
less influential in Europe. The number of earthquake victims between
1400 and 1800 has been calculated as approximately 1,230,000 people
in China, 300,000 in India, 110,000 in Europe and 77,000 in the Near
East.38 Might this be a consequence of the high demographic density
in those areas of Asia most exposed to natural calamity?
4. The death rate
4.1. Wars
Deaths in war concerned above all those engaged in fighting. Between
the late Middle Ages and the French Revolution weapons underwent
radical changes; blades were replaced by more destructive firearms
and the art of war was no longer based so much on personal valour
as upon military efficiency. Inevitably the number of war victims rose
and the fact that the number of armed men continually increased also
contributed to the ever-rising death rate.
The civilian population was also affected by the detrimental effects
of military action. Diseases were spread by the armies, especially the
plague. Resources were destroyed, crops trampled or burned and
livestock was plundered or killed, either to cause economic damage to
the enemy or to refurbish military supplies. The populations suffered
the damaging effects of these tragedies for long periods; as in the case
of northern Italy during the lengthy wars at the beginning of the 16th
century and the French religious wars towards the end of the same
37
Livi Bacci (1998), pp. 165–66.
38
Jones (1981).
century. Severe losses were suffered during the war of Spain against
the Netherlands (1568–1648).
The Thirty Years War in the first half of the 17th century was dev-
astating for the populations of Central Europe. The population fell by
about 40 percent in Pomerania, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg in the
first half of the century, and in Saxony and Bavaria by almost half,
whereas Palatinate, Württemberg and Hessen lost some two thirds of
their inhabitants.39 Throughout the whole of Germany urban popula-
tion diminished by about one third and the population of the coun-
tryside by some 40 percent. Another area severely afflicted by war in
the 17th century was Poland.40 In Poland and Masovia the population
fell sharply, subsequent to the Cossack wars (in 1648) and the Swedish
invasion (1655–60). The rise during the last decades of the17th century
was counteracted by the negative effects of the Great War of the North
from 1700 to 1720.
It is impossible to draw quantitative conclusions for Europe as a
whole from such fragmented and unreliable figures, but a distant com-
parison can be made with World War I which registered 8.5 million
victims among the military, i.e. 2 percent of the population, and an
overall loss of some 12 million lives, in total around 3.5 percent of the
pre-war population.41 The conflicts of the early modern era seriously
affected particular areas, but the overall influence on the demographic
movement was marginal.
4.2. Famines
The negative effects of famines were much more serious. Pre-modern
agrarian economies were often struck by exogenous events whose
impact on the economic system was not compensated by the mobil-
ity of production among different regions. The technically precarious
agrarian basis of pre-modern economies reveals, in this case, its weak-
nesses and limits. The demographic crisis is nothing but the result of
this weakness. The correlation between famine and mortality has often
been stressed. Bad harvests resulted in an abrupt increase of prices,42
malnutrition and mortality. Yet the mechanism of transmission from
39
Kriedte (1980), pp. 61–2, and Kamen (1971), Chapter I.
40
De Vries (1976), p. 56.
41
Aldcroft (1978), Chapter 1.
42
I will reconsider the topic in Chapter III.
the death rate 23
the fall of the agricultural product to the rise of deaths is often not as
clear as we might imagine.
It has been repeatedly stated that, apart from direct mortality, fam-
ine also caused indirect mortality. It is assumed that the reduction
of available nutrition rendered populations vulnerable to disease and
infection. This was the opinion of the chronicler Giovanni Villani when
he wrote, with reference to the famine in Tuscany in 1347, “as is the
usual consequence to famine, in Florence and its surroundings sickness
and death followed, especially among women, children and the poor”.43
The existence of this correlation between an increase in death rate and
famine is, however, far from clear. It does exist in the case of serious and
prolonged calorie deficiency and then only in relation to certain illnesses
such as influenza, cholera and leprosy . . . In less extreme circumstances
things are different and “the ability to adapt in situations of nutritional
stress is surprising and such to allow for considerable reduction in the
energy balance without seriously jeopardizing survival”.44 In the case of
some illnesses such as tuberculosis, influenza, dysentery and breathing
disorders like typhus, poor nutrition and hence a reduced resistance of
the organism does seem to directly influence the possibility of contract-
ing these infections. During a famine certainly a part of the population
succumbed to “nutritionally sensitive diseases brought on by impaired
immunity, or to poisoning from inferior foods that would have been
discarded in normal times”.45
In many other cases, like, for example, smallpox, malaria, diphtheria,
encephalitis and plague, there is no relationship between the nutritional
state and the possibility of contracting the illness.46 In some cases poor
nutrition can in fact increase, not reduce, the individual’s resistance.
Whatever the case, immunity deficiency is only the result of very serious
43
Villani (1537), XII, 84.
44
According to Livi Bacci (1987), p. 83. A different point of view is suggested by
Mc Keown (1976), who connects the population increase with an improved diet. The
subject of the relationship between nutrition and demographic movement is discussed
from different angles in Rotberg, Rabb (1985).
45
Mokyr, O’ Grada (2002), p. 340.
46
For an ample discussion on this subject I strongly suggest Livi Bacci (1987 and
1989). The relationship between nutrition and illness is complicated by the fact that
in many cases it was not the actual state of nutrition that influenced mortality, but
the deficiency suffered in early childhood which affected the chronic illness that was
later suffered.
malnutrition.47 Nowadays we find something similar in the poor coun-

tries during periods of famine.
Although a high density of population can, in many cases, prepare
the background on which a fall in agricultural production hits people
severely, in other cases a link between density of population and disease
does not exist. A higher density of population results, however, in less
hygienic conditions, especially in the cities, and, as a consequence, in
a higher probability of disease. In the case of plague, for instance, we
know that there is no direct link between illness, food shortage and
population pressure. Yet an indirect link does exist. Demographic
pressure involves lower standards of hygiene and thus can favour the
multiplication of rats and fleas, which were the vehicles of disease.
4.3. Epidemics
During the centuries of the early modern age, between two thirds and
three quarters of deaths were caused by infectious diseases. Only in
recent times has an epidemic transition taken place. In 18th and19th cen-
tury Europe there was in fact a change from illnesses transmittable from
one person to another to degenerative non-infectious illnesses.48
Humans’ contact with other animals seems to be the cause of the
worst infectious diseases that have affected the human species in recent
millennia. Various strains of influenza, smallpox, malaria, plague,
measles, and cholera are illnesses provoked by infections which in the
first place affected animals.49 They were then transmitted from animals
to humans and from humans to other animals.
Great epidemics mark the agricultural world of the past, from
Neolithic times onwards. The formation of much denser societies
compared to those of hunters and gatherers, and the daily contact with
domestic animals are the origin of serious epidemic infections which
have accompanied humans for 10,000 years. Among these are infections
of the digestive system—typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, dysentery,
diarrhoea, cholera; infections of the breathing apparatus, transmitted
through the air -smallpox, diphtheria, measles, influenza-: infections
of the reproductive system -syphilis and venereal diseases in general-;
47
Carmichael (1985); Fogel (1992).
48
Omran (1971).
49
Diamond (1997), Chapter 11.
the death rate 25
diseases introduced into tissue and into the blood stream deriving from
insect bites -plague, typhoid, yellow fever and malaria.50
4.4. The plague

For many centuries the plague was the most serious epidemic illness in
Europe.51 Also in this case, the disease was primarily a disease of animals,
specifically “of small mammals. It survives indefinitely in populations
of wild rodents; prairie dogs, ground squirrels, marmots, and the like.
These wild populations are its natural reservoirs. But it can infect
rodents, such as grey rats, that live in or close to human habitations.
Humans, on the other hand, are always its secondary, almost accidental
victims. Its principal vector, the rat flea, prefers to avoid human beings.
The flea will leave the infected rat only when the rodent dies and grows
cold, and will seek out a human host only when a live, warm rat is not
accessible”.52 The flea on which the bacterium lives is a parasite of the
black rat which spread in Europe since the 6th century AD.53
The plague had spread in ancient times, but later, from the end of
the 8th century AD, disappeared. It spread again in Europe between
1347–52 and out of 80 million inhabitants (excluding Russia) took
20–30 million lives in the two years that it raged. From then onwards
it was present on the continent for 300 years, subsequently disappear-
ing in a manner typical of infective illnesses, changing from epidemic
to endemic before finally vanishing.
The bacterium of the plague (Pasteurella pestis or Yersinia pestis) was
only discovered in 1894 by A. Yersin, a Swiss doctor in Hong Kong,
and at the same time by the Japanese doctor S. Kitasato. The real causes
of the epidemics, which frequently broke out, were unknown in the
late medieval and early modern era and the reasons for the destructive
consequences were sought in the motion of the stars, infected air, and
the Devil. “We still have much to learn of the etiology and epidemiology
of medieval pestis”.54 Doubts have also been expressed about the real
kind of epidemics that struck Europe from 1347 onwards and remained
on the continent for about 350 years. Although some differences exist
50
Livi Bacci (1998), pp. 90–1.
51
It is not yet disappeared. Between 1979 and 1993 there have been 16,312 cases of
plague: Audoin-Rouzeau (2003), p. 18.
52
Herlihy (1997), p. 21.
53
Audoin-Rouzeau (2003).
54
Herlihy (1997), p. 30.
between the medieval disease and the one directly observed by modern
epidemiologists, the prevailing opinion is still that the Black Death was
actually the plague.55
The disease can be transmitted by an infected flea, through the insect’s
bite, or by contact with faeces on an abrasion of the skin, furthermore
by penetration of the membrane of the lungs. The infection then spreads
between individuals by direct contact or is passed indirectly by infected
objects. The plague which man contracts, can be of three types: bubonic,
pulmonary and less commonly, septicaemic. The first is transmitted by
bites or through abrasions, the symptoms being boils and a high tem-
perature, with the duration of the course of the illness being at most
about ten days, after which 20–40 percent of cases recover. The second
is a respiratory disease with symptoms of a cough and catarrh: it causes
death two or three days after the first appearance. The development of
the septicaemic plague is similar to that of the pulmonary disease with
the added effect of damaging nerve centres.
4.5. The arrival of the plague

The plague was well known in Europe since the 6th century AD.56 A
famous outbreak occurred during the epoch of Justinian from 541–44,
followed by other outbreaks across Europe and the Middle East in the
years 628–32, 639–40, 654, 669–73, 684–88. These outbreaks continued
until 763–67 (although we must be cautious about the identification of
these diseases as the plague, given the scarcity of information). Then,
for more than 600 years, the plague disappeared from the continent.
Consequently, the medieval demographic expansion was, at least in part,
55
Despite the opinion expressed by Cohn (2002b), (2002a): “the Black Death in
Europe, 1347–52, and its successive waves to the eighteenth century was any disease
other than the rat-based bubonic plague” (p. 1). See, however, the remarks by the
biologists Raoult, Aboudharam, Crubézy, Larrouy, Ludes (2000): (“This result [the
presence of Yersinia Pestis in the dental pulp of people dead in the mid-14th century]
indicates that the plague had authentically been recognized as a unique morbid entity
as early as the Middle Ages, and suggests that medieval descriptions of Black Death can
be regarded as true descriptions of plague epidemics”), and Drancourt Aboudharam,
Signoli, Crubézy, Larrouy, Ludes, Dutour, Raoult, Drancourt (forthcoming), who
found traces of Yersinia Pestis in 14th century graves in Montepellier and Drancourt,
Aboudharam, Signoli, Dutour, Raoult (1998) referring to the existence of Yersinia
Pestis in 16th century. See also Achtman, Morelli, Zhu, Wirth, Diehl, Kusecek, Vogler,
Wagner, Allender, Easterday, Chenal-Francisque, Worsham, Thomson, Parkhill, Lindler,
Carniel, Keim, Meselson (2004).
56
Biraben (1975), I, pp. 26 ff.
the death rate 27
a result of the absence of this illness. The reappearance of the disease

in Europe was one of the effects of the so-called medieval “commercial
revolution”, that is to say of the resumption of European trade and new
connections between Europe and the Middle East. In fact the bacterium
of the plague was imported into Europe by Genoese ships. We do not
know precisely where the bacterium came from, but the most plausible
hypothesis is that it was introduced into Europe from the foothills of
the Himalayas, from a region of India, that is, where a species of rat
existed, the parasite of which was the flea, carrier of the bacteria.57 The
infection may have passed from these rodents to the nomadic popula-
tions who lived on the northern plains of Eurasia, and these horsemen
then spread the disease rapidly not only to the west, as far as the gates
of the Byzantine Empire, but also to the east.
The epidemic began in 1347 in Europe, whereas in China the plague,
appearing for the first time in 1331, raged from 1353 onwards. The
great Mongolian Empire, which created a peaceful era (pax mongolica)
by reuniting internal Asia between 1279 and 1350 and promoting
connections between internal Asia and Europe, was responsible for
the diffusion of the plague on an intercontinental scale. With regard
to the appearance of the illness in Europe, it is known that when the
Tartars laid siege to Genoa’s colony, Caffa (modern Theodosia), in
the Crimea on the Black Sea, they catapulted plagued corpses beyond
the walls. It was an early example of bacteriological war. Some infected
sailors returning to Italy aboard the galleys, carried the illness to
Constantinople where they docked first, then to Messina in September
1347. Following this, the infection multiplied and spread and, before
the end of the year, reached Reggio Calabria, Sardinia, Corsica, Elba,
Genoa and Marseilles (Figure 6).
In January 1348 the plague arrived at Pisa and from there entered
Tuscany, and half way through 1348 had invaded the whole continent.
However the epidemic only reached the North Sea ports and Norway in
1349, the Baltic ports in 1350, and Russia in 1352. Poland was spared
by this first outbreak of plague; only the north was affected by a new
epidemic in 1360.58 During this first wave the number of deaths was
at least 25 million, equal to one third of the continental population,
and the aggression of the epidemic did not diminish; bouts continued
57
Mc Neill (1976), Chapter 3.
58
Fryde (1958).
JUNE 1350 DECEMBER 1350
DECEMBER 1349
JUNE 1349
DECEMBER 1348
JUNE 1348
DECEMBER 1347
Source: based on Carpenter (1962) (in black some regions spared by the plague).
Fig. 6. The spread of Black Death in Europe from 1347 on.
throughout the second half of the 14th century, although the propaga-
tion of the epidemics was not simultaneous in all regions. From the
middle of the 15th century the epidemics finally diminished, only then
allowing the population of the continent to increase once again.
It is possible that, after the first great European irruption, the plague
disappeared, only to be periodically re-imported via those sea ports
with connections in Asia.59 What is certain is that, from the middle of
the 14th century, the plague became endemic in Europe, and claimed
victims in recurring waves, the effects of which were reduced only
with the passage of time. Thus, during the 17th and part of the 18th
centuries, there were several epidemics in France: 1603, 1606, 1629,
1636, 1652, 1668 and 1721, but on the whole, deaths by plague in the
59
As supposed by Biraben (1975), I, p. 42.
the death rate 29
kingdom were only between 5 and 7.7 percent of the total mortality
throughout this long period.60
The last great outbreaks of the plague occurred in the 17th century,
the last bout in England being in 1665–66,61 when the death toll in
London amounted to 69,000. In Italy the last serious outbreak of plague
was in 1656–58 in the south,62 whereas in France it appeared again in
1720–21. The bacterium of the plague remained active in the eastern
Mediterranean and Russia for the whole of the 18th century and part
of the 19th.
4.6. The disappearance of the plague

There is no consensus on the disappearance of the plague and various
hypotheses have been suggested referring to elements which could have
had some influence, amongst which the manner of prevention (health
checks and quarantine); the replacement of wooden houses with those
in brick and stone, which offered less shelter to rats; a new species of
domestic rat which superseded its predecessor, more intrusive and liv-
ing closer to humans; changes in the method of infection connected to
the evolution of the bacterium Yersinia pestis. It has been suggested by
bacteriologists that the spread among the rats of the bacterium Yersinia
pseudotuberculosis, born from a mutation of Yersina pestis, was the
cause of the immunity to the disease acquired by the rats and then the
disappearance of the epidemic.63
Although often serious, the effects on population of other illnesses
could not be compared to those of the plague. Among the main diseases
are leprosy (in regression in the early modern age); syphilis (which
spreads from the 16th century onwards), typhus (which struck various
regions of Europe around 1650), and smallpox (which during the 18th
century was the intermittent cause of a high death rate).
The death rate in the cities was always higher than in the countryside
and it usually exceeded the birth rate. The reasons for this are consid-
ered to be the hazardous hygienic conditions and the more frequent
contact among the inhabitants in densely populated centres. It was only
60
Biraben (1975), I, p. 309.
61
About which a fine read is De Foe (1722).
62
On epidemics in Italy see: Livi Bacci (1978); Del Panta (1980). Still of importance
is Beloch (1937–61). In particular on the plague in 1656–58 Southern Italy see Fusco
(2008).
63
Audoin-Rouzeau (2003), p. 418.
immigration from the countryside that enabled cities to grow. However

it seems that the death rate in the cities was probably higher within
the social groups of temporary residents and the poorer population.
The death rate being so much higher in these groups than among the
residents, combined with the lower birth rate, resulted in a higher death
rate and lower birth rate than in the countryside. Paradoxically, the
population of the cities would have increased without the immigrants,
who caused the excess of births over deaths.64
4.7. Infant mortality

The causes of death struck diverse age groups differently. In the medi-
eval and early modern age the younger age groups were the hardest hit.
This is the case with the plague, whose lethal effects diminished with
the increase of age. It is plain that a smaller number of children would
result in fewer weddings and fewer births in the future; the smaller
number of births implied a diminished number of weddings and births
in a more distant future. The open wounds healed slowly. The same
was also true for other illnesses which affected children because of their
lower immunity. Hence the high mortality of children neutralized the
very high number of births during the ancien régime. In some regions
of France, half of those born did not reach the age of 20, and France
was not an exception.65 Famine and hygienic conditions also contrib-
uted to the number of infant deaths. It has been calculated that in the
salubrious rural regions of France 20 to 25 percent of the new-born
died in the 17th century; in the villages and rural towns the percent-
age was from 25 to 30; in the less salubrious rural and manufacturing
regions from 30 to 40 percent. In the large cities infant mortality was
extremely high.66 In the case of Venice, from 25 to 37 percent of infants
died between 1620 and 1629, whereas, between 1631 and 1636, from
24 to 29 percent, and in 1630, when the plague struck Venice, from 42
to 61 percent.67 Among the aristocratic families infant mortality was
lower, but only slightly.
In some regions of the world, for example in China, where infanticide
was admissible, it was probably a relief to families to eliminate the extra
64
Sharlin (1978).
65
Goubert (1960), p. 41.
66
Mols (1974).
67
Beltrami (1954), pp. 162–3.
the birth rate 31
mouths or the taxable heads by this means. It was reported, in the 18th
century, that in China, particularly in the large cities, children were
drowned in streams, at night, like puppies, as Adam Smith remem-
bered.68 More recently female infanticide has been seen as an important
check on population; a kind of preventive control.69 Morals, religion
and the law impeded similar behaviour in Europe, but by contrast the
practice existed of abandoning children near churches and hospitals.
Considering the high mortality of the ‘foundlings’ one can wonder if
this were not a disguised form of infanticide.
5. The birth rate
5.1. The birth rate yesterday and today

Nowadays, in Europe the birth rate is around 10 per thousand, about
the same level as the rate of mortality; the population grows slowly and
in some countries is diminishing. Progress in the medical field and the
disappearance of epidemics has curbed mortality and the use of contra-
ceptive methods has reduced the level of births. In the past the death
rate was around 35 per thousand, rising conspicuously in periods of
epidemics and famine. Similarly the birth rate was much higher than
today, being 1 or 2 units per thousand above the average mortality rate.
Thus the numerous births filled the gaps created by the also numerous
deaths, thereby allowing for a slight increase. High birth and death
rates were the fundamental characteristics of the demographic model
of pre-modern Europe. Today it is only poor countries that have such
high rates. Mortality was the principal mechanism for maintaining the
population in balance with the resources, but the birth rate also con-
tributed, as, notwithstanding its high levels, it was nevertheless lower
than what it could have been. It was an important preventive check.
The hypothetical biological upper limit of fertility is “around 15 to 17
births per woman”.70 An often quoted example of high fertility is that of
the French immigrants in Canada in the 17th and 18th century, with a
birth rate of 52–55 per thousand. In Europe it was much lower.71 Which
68
Smith (1776), I, 8. See also Godwin (1820), p. 47.
69
Lee, Wang (1999).
70
Lee (2003), p. 170.
71
Charbonneau (1987).
mechanisms made possible this restraint in eras when knowledge of

contraception was almost nonexistent?
An important element which conditions the biotic potential of an
animal population is the age at which sexual activity begins; when this
is early, a population tends to grow. The opposite occurs when this age
is higher. In this case one could say that the reproductive capacities of
the female population are only exploited over a shorter period of time
(between the first union and menopause). Consequently the number
of children will remain lower than could have been possible. For that
reason, when there is an increase in the density of a particular species,
with an increase in environmental resistance, the consequences will be
an increase in mortality on the one hand, and the tendency to delay the
first union on the other. In this way the equilibrium between environ-
ment and population can be rebuilt.
The human species is more complex in this regard due to cultural
and social factors. There are also similarities however. The marriage-
able age represents an important variable in demographic development.
It must be taken into consideration that in Europe, during the early
modern age, women probably became menopausal at about forty,
that is earlier than today.72 It is obvious that marriage at fifteen could
have very different demographic effects than marriage at the age of
twenty-five. In the first case the female reproductive period was about
twenty-five years whereas in the second it decreased to fifteen. Such a
decrease meant that between three and five fewer children were born.
In many areas of Europe two to three years elapsed between the birth
of each child and it has been calculated that, during the 18th century,
an average increase of three years in the age of marriage, could have
halved demographic growth all over Europe.73
It is therefore obvious that the influence the age of marriage had on
the population is based on two premises:
1. there are no methods of birth control;
2. the number of children conceived outside wedlock is of little relevance.
As regarding birth control, the study of intergenesic intervals (i.e. the
period of time that elapses between two births) has shown that such
72
Flinn (1981), Chapter 3.
73
E. L. Jones (1981), Chapter 1.
the birth rate 33
intervals have been longer in some periods of time. The length of these
intervals, otherwise inexplicable, leads us to believe that some form of
birth control existed. Up to the end of the 18th century, this was usu-
ally limited to the upper classes, to religious minorities and to urban
rather than rural inhabitants. In the 18th century birth control was
practiced in both France74 and Hungary.75 The discovery that some
kind of birth control was common, even among rural populations, is
apparent in a document concerning a trial which took place in a small
village in the Alps in 1678. Knowledge and diffusion of the interrupted
coition is clearly stated in this document.76 That Alpine village people
knew how to limit births seems to suggest that forms of birth control
had to be far more widely known than is assumed by most historians.
However, on examining the European population as a whole, it seems
that birth control did not have much influence until the late 18th and
19th centuries.
The practice of breast-feeding was more commonly used as a primi-
tive form of contraception, sometimes for up to three years, thus causing
temporary sterility (amenorrhea) in breast-feeding mothers.77 This was
the most widely used method of contraception whether intentional or
unintentional. In China it has been considered as an important form of
demographic control.78 Amenorrhea was also caused by malnutrition.
Famines not only resulted in an increase in the death rate, but they
reduced the birth rate as well. This was also depressed by the practice
of sexual abstinence sometimes observed during Lent.
The illegitimate birth rate of Europe remained moderate during the
ancien régime. Up until 1700 it was 2–3 percent of the total birth rate
and only during the 18th century did it rise, but very rarely exceeded
5 percent.79 We know, however, that in France it was 1.3 percent in
1740–50 and grew to 6.6 in 1820–29.80
74
Henry (1965).
75
Livi Bacci (1975).
76
See the document of the legal proceeding in Merzario (1992), pp. 79 ff.
77
Knodel (1974).
78
Lee, Wang (1999).
79
Anderson (1980), pp. 21–2. On the same topic, see Laslett (1977), p. 115, fig. 3.2,
and (1988a, b).
80
Blayo (1975b), p. 67.
5.2. Birth rate limitations

In pre-modern societies it was through marriage age and not by the
use of contraception after marriage, that the birth rate was restrained.
In comparison with Asian cultures, where virtually everyone married,
Europe had a high number of people who did not marry. In fact, out-
side Europe, “fertility and mortality were higher in the pre-transitional
period”.81 Two to three percent of the population did not marry for
religious reasons (monks, nuns and priests) and others in order not
to divide or weaken the family heritage. Widows and widowers hardly
ever remarried. Amongst women, the percentage of those who did not
marry could be as high as 15–20 percent and often the only alterna-
tive to marriage was to take the vows. In Zurich in 1467, a town that
was neither common nor unique, slightly more than 50 percent of the
taxpayers were married, whilst 44 percent had never married and 6
percent were widows or widowers.82
Population growth was also hindered by the tendency to marry late.
Together with the plague, this was the most influential constraint on
population growth.83 In recent times, demographers have rediscovered
a peculiarity of the European population which Richard Cantillon had
already noticed at the beginning of the 18th century. He wrote that
many of the inhabitants of Europe “live in uncertainty whether they
will find by their labour or their undertakings the means of support-
ing their household on the footing they have in view. Therefore they
do not all marry, or marry so late that of six women, or at least four,
who should produce a child every year there is actually only one in
six who becomes a mother”. In contrast, in China, where people were
content with little and lived “only on rice and drink only rice water”,
and worked “almost naked”, the inhabitants “by the principles of their
religion are obliged to marry, and bring up as many children as their
means of subsistence will afford”. As a consequence, “their number is
incredible”.84 Recent demographers are, however, much more cautious
about the existence of universal marriage in China.85
81
Lee (2003), p. 169.
82
Helleiner (1967), par. 6.
83
Hajnal (1965).
84
Cantillon (1755), Chaps. XIII and XV.
85
Lee, Wang (1999).
the birth rate 35
Numerous studies on Europe in the early modern age have supplied

documentary evidence about the existence of a marriage pattern which
was different to that in other parts of the world and to that of previous
epochs. This pattern was representative of Western Europe, that is, of
the area west of an imaginary line joining Trieste and St Petersburg.
Elsewhere women married in puberty and celibacy was almost non-
existent, and although some characteristics of this pattern have been
lost, it still has not vanished completely. In the 1950s, in India and
Ireland, two diverging patterns of marriage behaviour were found. In
India marriage was celebrated at a very early age and only one percent
of 45 year old women were not married. In Ireland the percentage was
26 percent and women were relatively mature at their marriage.86 If
one compares France and Sweden, in 1900–30, to India-Pakistan and
Korea, it transpires that in France 42 percent of women between 20
and 24 were married, in Sweden 20 percent, whilst in India-Pakistan 95
percent, rising to 98 percent in Korea. In Sweden, 19 percent of women
between the ages of 5–49 had never been married, in France 12 percent,
in India-Pakistan only one percent and in Korea none.
5.3. The marriageable age in Europe and elsewhere

From 1500 to 1700 the marriageable age varied, depending on the region
and period. It did however tend to be approximately 25, slightly less
for women and slightly more for men. Before 1750, women in France
married at 24.6 years of age, in Belgium and England at 25, in Germany
at 26.4 and in Scandinavian countries at 26.7.87
It is not easy to say when this marital system became popular in
Europe. Some have traced its origin back as far as the second millennium
BC. More often, however, it is thought that the system was adopted in
more recent eras. Rare evidence from ancient times leads us to believe
that the marital age was very young then.88 This was also true during
the Carolingian age, when brides were no more than 14 to 15 years
old.89 It has been suggested that this derived from the existence of large
86
W. A. Lewis (1955), Chapter 6.
87
Dupâquier (1987), p. 14. Differences exist between the different social classes. See
the examples in Henri (1956); Hollingsworth (1957).
88
Hajnal (1965), p. 134. On the ancient world see Scheidel (2001).
89
Toubert (1986).
areas of land; for those who got married there was an abundance of
agricultural land. Why therefore postpone marriage?
In Europe however, marriage patterns were also far from uniform.90
In the late Middle Ages in some areas, such as England, the age of mar-
riage began to increase,91 whilst in others, such as Tuscany, it remained
low: in 1427 it was approximately 16 for women both in town and
country.92 It is reasonable to say that probably towards the end of the
16th century, in various parts of Europe the age of marriage began to
rise. Initially this rise occurred in the upper classes and then spread
to the rest of the population. However, it was not experienced by all
regions, nor in the same way. In the 17th and 18th century there was
a small decrease of some years, although it never again went below the
threshold probably established in the 16th century.
One could assume that, when there is a rise in population, a point is
reached when the newly formed families meet with ever stronger envi-
ronmental resistance: above all, the land to be cultivated in the custom-
ary fashion becomes scarcer. Unless production can be boosted, each
family will have to accept a deterioration in living conditions if their
members decide to take the newlyweds into their family nucleus. If this
deterioration is to be avoided, the young couple must await the death
of the older generation in order to be able to take over their house and
land. In Asia, where extended families are commonly found, the older
generation takes care of the newlyweds even though this may mean a
decrease in the standard of living. In Europe, families are, for the most
part, made up of limited numbers of members and young couples must
be independent and set up house alone. Therefore they have to wait
longer to marry. This custom favours homeostatic change, the popula-
tion thus producing little impact on the environment. It is destined to
preserve the standard of living despite social economic change.
6. The demographic transition
6.1. Transition into modern times

There is consensus among scholars about the movement of the European
population since approximately 1650. The growth that came about is
90
De Moor, Van Zanden (forthcoming).
91
Macfarlane (1978), pp. 158–9.
92
Herlihy-Klapisch (1978), IV, Chapter 14.
the demographic transition 37
50
40 birthrates
(per thousand)
30
deathrates
20
10
0
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
Source: based on Westoff (1974).

Fig. 7. Death- and birth-rates in Europe (1750–2000).
considered an example of demographic transition.93 Before the demo-

graphic transition life was short, births were many and the population
was young. In contrast, after this transition, life is long, births are few,
and population is old. The change took a couple of centuries and in
some parts of the world it is not yet concluded.
Basically, in Europe during the century spanning 1650–1750, the
death rate began to diminish. Since the birth rate remained relatively
high, the difference between the two values increased. The natural
growth in population, i.e. the margin between the death and birth rates,
rose, especially in the 19th century. Subsequently, with the fall of the
birth rate, the margin of demographic increase narrowed once more
(Figure 7).94 Finally, a new balance was established.
In brief we have:
1. pre-industrial stability: the values of the birth rates and mortality

rates were similar and their difference only permitted limited growth.
93
Chesnais (1986).
94
Westoff (1974).
The relatively frequent demographic crises, caused by famine and

epidemics, led to a sudden increase in mortality rates which conse-
quently provoked sharp depletion in the population;
2. transitional imbalance; death rates declined from approximately
35–30 per thousand, in the century 1650–1750, to 25–27 in the early
19th century, to 20 per thousand around 1900 and about 10 at the
end of the 20th century. Birth rates, in contrast, remained similar
to those of the pre-modern era for the whole of the first half of the
1800s. In some regions they rose. Only in the decade between 1830
and 1840 did they fall below 30 per thousand;95
3. modern stability: in the final years of the 20th century, a drop in the
rates of birth to approximately 10 per thousand ended the transitional
period and restored stability.
This transition started in Europe and later spread across the rest of
the world. If we look at the main changes in a global perspective
between 1700 and 1950, we may appreciate the slowness of this change
(Table 12).
Table 12. Global population changes 1700–1950.

Life Births per Growth
expectancy Woman Rate (% year)
1700 27 6.0 0.50
1800 27 6.0 0.51
1900 30 5.2 0.56
1950 47 5.0 1.80
Source: Lee (2003), p. 268.
6.2. The fall in mortality

It is thought that population growth, starting in the 18th century, was
caused mainly by the decrease of mortality.96 It seems that only in few
cases has an increase in fertility contributed to the expansion. Instead
of diminishing, the age of marriage rose between 1700 and 1800.
95
Ryder (1965).
96
Flinn (1981).
Table 13. Infant death rate in some European countries from 1700 to 1820
(deaths within the first year of life out of 1000 born alive).
England France Germany Spain Switzerland
pre-1750 187 252 154 281 283
1740–1790 161 213 388 273 237
1780–1820 122 195 236 220 255
Source: based on data in Flinn (1981), App., Table 10. The figure relative to Germany
before 1750 is underestimated due to the scarcity and deficiency of sources.
For Finland and Sweden we have series on the mortality rate since
1749 (Figure 8). They show a slightly declining trend despite a recovery
between the end of the 18th and the beginning of the new century.
Available figures for England, Italy and France prove the existence of the
same trend.97 In these countries “the bulk of the acceleration between
1750 and 1850 is attributable to declining mortality rates, without which
there would have been no consistent and significant change in growth
rate”.98 It appears that the decline in the rate of mortality particularly
concerned the younger generations and above all the new-born. As
mentioned, the pre-industrial mortality rate was high due to the large
number of deaths in infancy (Table 13).
A reduction of infant mortality came about during the second half
of the 18th century. It was the beginning of a process accentuated
throughout the following two centuries. Before 1750, mortality was
below 200 deaths per thousand infants in England: “the combined
contribution of the fall in late foetal and early postnatal mortality on
the overall acceleration in the intrinsic growth rate which took place
between c. 1680 and c. 1820 was substantial”.99 In France infant mortal-
ity descended below this level at the beginning of the 19th century. The
decline continued uniformly and, in developed countries, at the end of
the 20th century, infant mortality was at around 5–10 per thousand.
It has been suggested that this downward curve is connected to that
revaluation of the infant’s world, which spread in European society from
1700 onwards. As opposed to the pre-industrial family, “the modern
97
See for France Blayo (1975a), pp. 108 ff.
98
Wrigley-Schofield (1981), p. 247.
99
Wrigley (2004d), p. 348.
70
60
50
(per thousand)
40
Finland
30
20
10 Sweden
0
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
Source: B. R. Mitchell (1975), pp. 16–17.
Fig. 8. Death Rates in Sweden and Finland (1750–1900).
family organizes itself in function of the child and its future”.100 Children
become the centre of family life and care of them increases. It is a slow
process, which is outlined during the 18th century and interests all the
social groups by the mid 19th century.
6.3. England and Italy

Apart from certain restricted areas, only in the case of England did the
demographic increase originate from the reduction of the age of mar-
riage; consequently a more important role was played by the increase
in fertility as opposed to the decrease in mortality. The average age of
marriage for males in England fell from 27.3 years at the beginning of
the 18th century to 25.9 at the end, whereas for females it declined from
25.8 to 24.1.101 It is probably a demographic consequence of the greater
economic dynamism. In England, “although mortality improved almost
without interruption, its influence on the growth rates was swamped
100
Ariès (1971), pp. 327–333.
101
60
50
Italy
40
(per thousand)
30
20
England
10
0
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1710
1720
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
Source: for Italy see Malanima (2002), p. 69 and Galloway (1994); fo England the graph
is based on Wrigley-Schofield (1981).
Fig. 9. Death Rates in Italy and England (1650–1870).
by sweeping changes in fertility”.102 Increase in the demand for work

probably contributed to the fall in the marriage age and consequently
to the increase in fertility.103 In some proto-industrial areas the same
phenomenon has been identified; in those regions, that is, where during
the 18th century, rural industry, and in particular the textile sector,
was progressing.104
Although a sharp drop in the rate of mortality is discernible through-
out Europe, not everywhere was its importance the same. Furthermore
on observation of lengthy series of data regarding the mortality rate, a
gradual diminishing in the frequency of the peaks is noticeable. With
respect to the average values of the series, the deviations from the
trend become less frequent and less important. A comparison between
England and central-northern Italy shows this clearly: in the second
half of the 18th century the drop in the mortality crises is evident in
England, whereas it only occurs a century later in Italy (Figure 9).
102
103
Wrigley (1969).
104
The topic of proto-industry will be examined in Chapter V.
Throughout Europe the rate of population increase was above 50

percent in the 18th century. The rise was strong in Central European
countries, particularly Hungary and Rumania, and in Northern coun-
tries, such as Sweden and England, whereas it was more modest in
those of western Europe (Germany and France), and in the south
(Spain and Italy).
6.4. Famine and epidemics

Agreement also prevails on the reasons that influenced the decrease in
mortality. The number of inhabitants of Europe began to grow more
rapidly from the end of the 17th century, as the catastrophic crises,
which had frequently struck the population, became less frequent, even
though they did not disappear.
Grain prices series, available for various regions of Europe, show the
declining frequency of famines.105 In fact, even though it is generally
impossible to make use of long-term series of agricultural production,
a bad year is reflected in the high rise of prices. If we consider the per-
centage deviations of annual values with respect to the trend, we can
follow the gradual reduction of the high peaks.106 Prices generally tended
to level out during this century.107 The variability decreased, and at the
same time a growing convergence is discernible between the different
regions.108 In reality, the peaks of high prices are rarer from the end
of the 17th century and consequently famine becomes less frequent:
after the 1750s approximately, famine, although still present, was less
devastating than before.
The epidemics were also scarcer than before, and the plague which
broke out in Marseilles (1720), Ukraine (1737), Messina (1743) and
Moscow (1789), did not take as many victims as in the preceding
centuries.109 The demographic incidence of other epidemics, such as
typhus, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, influenza, whooping cough, measles,
scarlet-fever and smallpox diminished. A subsequent, stronger reduc-
tion took place during the following century.
105
The topic is examined in the following Chapter III.
106
Braudel-Spooner (1967). See, however, Chapter IV, where I recall the different
opinion of more recent historians on price volatility during the 18th century.
107
See the Figures 5 and 6 in the following Chapter III.
108
The topic is examined by Persson (1999).
109
These considerations are based above all on Biraben (1975).
160
120
80
40
0
1550
1575
1600
1625
1650
1675
1700
1725
1750
1775
1800
1825
1850
Source: Wrigley-Schofield (1981), p. 333. The graph refers to the crises that determine a
mortality rate of at least 10 percent or more above average.
Fig. 10. Mortality Crises in England (1550–1850).
When, as in the case of England, series of data are available referring

to the great mortality crises, their decrease is clear to see (Figure 10).
Also in Italy “the ‘great crises’ which had characterized the first two
thirds of the 17th century diminished sharply after the disappearance
of the plague (starting from 1660)”.110
Medicine cannot have influenced these events. Only in the case of
smallpox, which was endemic throughout Europe, was there a limited,
positive influence thanks to inoculation, already in use in England
at the beginning of the 18th century and vaccination, discovered by
E. Jenner, at the end of the century. It is only from 1900 on that medi-
cine began to exert any influence over the other illnesses.
Nor was there, during the 18th century, any form of progress regard-
ing hygiene that could have been responsible for a decrease in mortality.
On the contrary, with the growth of urbanisation, hygienic conditions
deteriorated rather than improved. In most cases the water supply and
110
Del Panta (1980), p. 202.
the drainage system remained as they were, whilst the urban inhabit-
ants multiplied.
6.5. Economy and population

Demographers, therefore, agree on the facts, though points of view vary
on the explanations for the decline of mortality, especially regarding
the relationship between economy and demography.
A common opinion is that the reduction of the death rate during
the 18th century due to both famine and epidemics was the result
of improved nutrition made possible by progress in agriculture.111
Improvements in productivity are believed to have put an end to fam-
ine, and a better diet is considered to have rendered the population
more resilient to illness. Especially for England it has been maintained
that the increase in the agricultural product per capita during the 18th
century was the immediate cause of the demographic spurt. The death
rate decreased in the 18th and 19th centuries as a result of better nutri-
tion.112 Besides the improved quality of food, during the second half
of the 19th century, hygiene would have become an object of atten-
tion and, from the beginning of the 20th, sanitation would also have
contributed to better living conditions. They would have consolidated
growth and drastically reduced the death rate. It has been argued that
“recently developed biomedical techniques, when integrated with eco-
nomic techniques, make it possible to probe deeply into the extent of
chronic malnutrition from the beginning of the 18th century in Europe
and north America” and demonstrate the positive impact during the
century of improved diet on the sanitary conditions, on productivity
and on economic growth.113
In this type of explanation, the economic variables—agricultural
increase in productivity due to improved techniques, investment and
progress at an institutional level—would influence the movement of
population both because of fewer agricultural crises, i.e. famines, and
because of fewer epidemics. It is a straightforward line of thinking which
has been widely accepted, especially in overall analyses of economic
movement and population. Seeing as the influential variables are part
111
We will see in Chapter III that this assumption is questionable.
112
Mc Keown (1985).
113
Fogel (1994), p. 371.
of the economic model we can consider this interpretation of the facts

as an endogenous model.
While the assumption of progress in agricultural techniques and
labour productivity during the 18th century is dubious,114 it seems more
plausible to think that agricultural product rose merely due to improve-
ment in the temperature which permitted the extension of cultivation to
marginal soils and diminished the occurrence of famines.115 We could
define it as a process of extensive growth. The introduction of maize in
the South and potato in the North of the continent also contributed to
the increase of the product. Consumption possibilities were rising and
it was becoming possible to support a larger population than before
both in Europe and in other regions such as India and China.
As we have seen there is no evident explanation for the disappear-
ance of the plague, however it is certain that improved nutrition was
not among the reasons. No relationship exists between nutrition and
infection in this case. Had the European population been inflicted with
plague during the 18th century to the same extent as during the previ-
ous century there would have been some 20 million fewer people. The
growth, in total 50 million between the years 1700 and 1800, would have
been almost halved as a result. Let us allow for a moment that other
causes which reduced the death rate can all be ascribed to improved
nutrition and therefore to progress in agriculture. The sole fact that the
plague disappeared for exogenous reasons with respect to the economic
variables leads us to believe that the endogenous model holds good for
half of the phenomena under consideration.
However any explanation of the demographic recovery from 1670–80
on must consider exogenous variables, that is external elements influ-
encing the trend of population. A more convincing theory suggests
how, with reference to the reduction of epidemics in the 18th century,
a gradual adaptation took place between the bacteria, the viruses and
organisms they inhabited, and this adaptation was the result of “a
mutual tolerance between invader and invaded”,116 that is between the
parasite and the host. The mutations which took place in competing
organisms had an influential role. Considering the question in this light,
the decreasing importance from 1700 onwards, of epidemic diseases
114
The topic will be discussed in Chapter III.
115
As we will see in Chapter II.
116
Zinsser (1935), p. 61.
would be for the greater part the result of ecological adaptation of which
humanity was completely unaware and on which the influence of the
economy was only marginal.117
During the 17th century, the population underwent a slight decrease
although generally remaining stationary; then the available resources
per inhabitant increased and even wages rose noticeably.118 Until about
1750 the ratio between agricultural product and population appears
to have improved considerably. However, the rise in population was
faster than that of agricultural production after the mid 18th century.
Agricultural prices once again increased; purchasing power diminished
and wages fell. In the second half of the century and until about 1820
various areas of Europe were once more struck by severe famines. As
we will see, the movement of agricultural production could lead one to
expect a decrease, rather than an increase in population.119 As regards
the 19th century, the connection between agricultural development
and demographic growth seems more convincing than for the earlier
period.
7. Conclusion
On reconsidering the equation presented in the introduction, we see

now that both in Europe and worldwide the population increased four
to five fold during the period between 900 and 1800. If product per
capita in agriculture, industry and services had increased at the same
rate, the gross product of Europe and the world could have risen four
to five times as well. Thus population increase could provide an initial
insight into the aggregate development in the pre-modern era.
The question to answer is then: was the capacity to produce in Europe
rising more than population, or not? In the first case all European
inhabitants would have enjoyed rising living conditions, while in the
second case demographic growth would have taken place along with
diminishing incomes per capita and worsening standards of living.
We know that the increase of population in the 19th and 20th cen-
turies coincided with economic growth, which meant a simultaneous
rise of population and of per capita GDP; the rise in production being
117
Mc Neill (1976).
118
As we will see in Chapter VI.
119
In Chapter III.
conclusion 47
stronger than population growth. Labour, endowed with better tools,

machines and techniques, became much more productive and produc-
tivity and wages rose simultaneously. Was this the continuation of a
previous tendency towards increase?
We will see that within the existing, vegetable-based agricultural
technology, the possibility of improving living conditions was limited.
Consequently, for a long period, demographic growth did not mean the
rise of a richer and more prosperous population. Modern growth has
been characterized both by the increase of population and the increase
of product per capita. In pre-modern agrarian societies the former
feature was common; very seldom do we find the latter.
CHAPTER II
ENERGY
The energy sources exploited in the agrarian societies of the past were
food for men and working animals, and wood, along with water and
wind employed to drive mills and sails. These sources originate from
the radiation of the sun which enables the land to produce vegetable
matter consumed by men and animals and which constitutes the force
behind the movements of water and air masses. During the Middle Ages
some remarkable changes took place in the European energy system,
although their contribution to the energy balance was, in quantitative
terms, relatively small. Of much greater importance, ultimately, was
the transition to fossil mineral sources of energy which took place in
some northern regions, particularly in England, from the 16th century
onwards. These new sources prepared the basis for a more dynamic
increase. Real growth in the exploitation of fossil energy carriers,
however, began in the first half of the 19th century and only from
then onwards did other western European regions become involved
in the new energy system. On the whole, from the late Middle Ages
until 1800–20 energy consumption per capita is more likely to have
decreased rather than increased.
1. Energy systems
1.1. Limited energy availability

We have seen in the previous chapter that until today 100–120 billion
human beings have lived on Earth. On a time scale, the last 200 years
represent 0.004 percent in the history of mankind since its beginning.
An approximate calculation shows that over the last two centuries, 20
percent of all mankind consumed 3 to 5 times the total energy con-
sumed by our ancestors—who numbered between 80 to 100 billion and
lived for 99.996 percent of the total time.1 The enormous increase in
1
The calculation is based on the average number of years lived in the past by any
human being, by the energy consumption per capita per year (par. 1.2) and the number
of human beings that lived from 5 million years ago until today.
50 chapter ii – energy
our capacity for doing work and modifying materials and the environ-
ment in which we live, has been the effect of this amazing increase in
energy intake.
Today, on a daily basis, each inhabitant of any industrialised country
consumes a considerable amount of energy: from the moment a light
or the oven is turned on, to when the car is started, or he takes a train,
eats food or listens to the radio. Previous to industrialisation, worldwide
energy consumption was limited.2 Goods were generally transported by
men with little assistance from animals, and the most frequently used
tools were axes in the woodlands and spades and hoes in agriculture.
Throughout this period, man, although assisted by working animals,
still represented the main machine or the main biological converter
transforming the energy assimilated from food into work.
1.2. Four epochs

Humans, more than any other animal, have had the ability to utilise
different forms of energy as subsidies to integrate the modest strength of
their body and overcome environmental resistance.3 From the viewpoint
of energy we can distinguish four epochs in the history of mankind:
1. during the first era, that is for a long period of some four million
years, food was the only source of energy for humans;
2. the beginning of the second era, between one million and half a mil-
lion years ago, was marked by the discovery of fire, which enabled
humans to greatly improve their technical capacities;4
3. the third era saw the use of animals for work and transport thereby
constituting an additional energy carrier during the 4th millennium
BC. Later inanimate energy sources such as wind and water were
harnessed and, together with working animals, became the basis of
the energy system of the agrarian civilisations;
4. in recent times, from the beginning of the 19th century onwards, man
has partly substituted previous energy sources and partly integrated
2
See the important works of Cipolla (1961) and (1962), regarding energy in the
pre-industrial world. A more recent overall reconstruction is that of Caracciolo-Morelli
(1996). Smil (1994) is rich in information and quantitative data. Wrigley (1988) is
important on the topic energy-economy in pre-modern societies.
3
See, in this perspective, the “law of the maximum of energy in biological systems”,
which establishes a relationship between energy and population growth: Lotka (1921),
(1922a), (1922b) and Vernadsky (1926).
4
Two important books on the subject are: Perlès (1977) and Goudsblom (1992).
Both also useful when studying recent epochs.
energy systems 51
them with fossil fuels: coal, oil and natural gas. This marks the start
of the fourth era.
For little less than 90 percent of his history, humans exploited food
as the only source of energy; for 9 percent fire; for 1 percent working
animals; for 0.1 percent water and wind engines; for 0.01 percent fos-
sil fuels. The following data summarise the diverse levels of per capita
energy consumption in these four epochs in calories5 per day:6
Kcal per c. per day

I Before fire 2–4,000
II With fire 4–6,000
III Agricultural 6–15,000
IV Industrial More than 70,000
These different epochs corresponded to remarkable changes in the level

of world population (Figure 1).
1010
4th era
3rd era
Population
107
2nd era
104
1,000,000 100,000 10,000 1,000 100 10
Years prior to the present
Source: based on Deevey (1960).

Note: vertical and horizontal axes in logs.
Fig. 1. Cycles of demographic growth in the last 1 million years
(years prior to the present on the horizontal axis).
5
Here and in the following pages when speaking of calories, I always refer to
kilocalories.
6
Compare with Cook (1976), p. 135.
1.3. Reproducible and non-reproducible energy sources

We often distinguish past reproducible energy sources from modern
non-reproducible fossil carriers. Reproducible sources originate from
sunlight through the process of photosynthesis. The movement of air
and water is also caused by the sun: the unequal warming of the earth’s
crust and of the seas is the cause of the movement of air masses and
water through evaporation. All these forms of energy are reproduc-
ible and will in all likelihood remain so for some 5 billion years, that
is for as long as the sun’s rays will continue to reach the earth. They
may therefore effectively be considered as inexhaustible sources. In
the long run their availability is without limits. Yet in the short run it
is hard to increase their exploitation. Sunlight can be employed more
advantageously by increasing the number of cultivated areas, manag-
ing woodland with greater efficiency and harnessing more effectively
the power of the wind and water. These are, however, slow processes
which only increase humans’ strength in the long term. It is easy, by
contrast, to extract ever larger quantities of crude oil or coal. Although
growth existed before modern times, the increase of production in those
pre-modern epochs met with difficulties in energy availability that were
virtually impossible to overcome on a short-term basis.7
Remote geological eras, particularly the Carboniferous Era (360–280
million years ago), witnessed the formation of natural deposits of irre-
producible sources of energy. Such carriers originated from the process
of absorption of sunlight by terrestrial plant-life and are therefore
organic sources, that is carbon compounds such as food and firewood.
A German jurist, Johann Philipp Bunting, in a book published in
1683, described these underground deposits of plant fossil as a Sylva
Subterranea.8 Only in the last two centuries has this underground forest
been exploited to the full. This form of fossil energy is limited and will
be exhausted within a relatively brief period of time, probably during the
21st century. In the meantime, however, fossil energy forms the basis
of fast developing economic activity and it is one of the core elements
7
History before modern growth was not motionless, as Le Roy Ladurie (1974)
inferred on the basis of French economic history.
8
Sieferle (1982), p. 181.
energy systems 53
of modern growth. In 1865 the economist Stanley Jevons singled out

coal as “the mainspring of modern material civilisation”.9
In brief: whilst the energy system of the past was based on energy
derived daily from the Sun and permitted only limited economic
development, that of the Modern Era, based on energy given off by the
Sun and accumulated in the subsoil, is the basis of modern economic
growth.
1.4. Biological systems and mechanical systems

Another important difference exists between the energy systems of the
pre-industrial past and those of today. Modern machinery is almost
completely based on the transformation of heat into work. Before
the 18th and 19th centuries, that is before the machine age, heat and
movement were separate. Mechanical work, which is the basis for
every productive task, was engendered through the chemical conver-
sion of food that man and animals consume, or through the ability to
intercept the movement of air or water masses using machines. Fire
was utilised for heating houses, cooking, melting metals or producing
ceramic, glass, etc. There was no way of transforming the disorderly
movement of atoms and molecules from heat into an orderly move-
ment for productive purposes.
If we consider the difference between the dominating converters of
the past and the present, we could define past societies as biological
systems, and our modern economies as mechanical systems. Today we
are surrounded by a variety of machines, which are made operational
by heat. Mechanical converters make use of heat to carry out differ-
ent jobs and replace man and beasts in any manual labour. Factory
machinery either transforms combustible fossil fuel into heat, thereby
generating work, or makes use of electricity that, in turn, is produced
by turbines run on various fuels. Cars, ships, and planes all burn fuel
that produces movement. In the past it was not so. No machinery was
capable of converting heat into movement and the only converters were
biological, apart from water-mills, wind-mills and sails, which however,
were not thermal machines. The technical problem to be resolved was
not simple. In nature, movement creates heat spontaneously—a rolling
9
Jevons (1865), p. 1.
stone, a contracting muscle., whilst heat, despite being the movement

of atoms and molecules, does not spontaneously give origin to the
controlled movement necessary for manufacturing processes. It was
only in the 18th century, with the invention of the steam engine by
Thomas Newcomen and James Watt, that the Age of the Machines
really began. Only then was the fundamental technological obstacle
overcome, that for millennia limited the capacity to perform work of
economic systems.
In 1824, the French physicist Sadi Carnot clearly pointed out the
great novelty represented by what he called the “machines à feu”, the
thermal machines. In his opinion they would replace both the force of
animals and that of water and wind. This is precisely what has happened
over the last two centuries.10
Previous to fossil fuels, there were four sources of energy with eco-
nomic value:11 food for man, food for working animals (in some periods
slaves would have to be included in this category), fuel, and inanimate
sources (water and wind).
When we deal with energy, we are interested both in energy input
into the economic system and in the share of total energy actually
available as mechanical work and heat. We know that energy cannot
be created or destroyed, but only transformed (according to the first
law of thermodynamics). On the other hand, we also know that in any
transformation there is a loss of useful energy: a large part of the energy
we use remains unavailable (according to the second law of thermody-
manics). How great it is in relation to the energy input depends on the
technical efficiency of the converter. Efficiency is, therefore, the result
of the ratio of useful energy to total energy input:
Eu
η=
Et
where η is the efficiency of conversion, Eu is useful energy and Et is
total energy input. To calculate the amount of useful energy in tradi-
tional societies, we have to calculate the total input of energy together
10
Carnot (1824).
11
Only sources that implicate a cost for man, have been taken into consideration:
not, for example sunlight and the heat from the Sun which are free of cost. The ways to
quantify pre-modern energy consumption are explained in Malanima (1996), (2006b),
Kander (2002), Warde (2007).
energy systems 55
with the efficiency of the converters used (human and animal bodies,
fireplaces, wind, water engines, and ships).
1.5. The technology of the traditional agrarian systems

Although several elements of the technical system of traditional agrar-
ian societies slowly developed during the previous four millennia, the
formative phase of the agrarian civilisations took place between 4000
and 3000 BC. G. Childe defined this long period as the most fertile
epoch for useful inventions and discoveries in human history.12 The
basic support of this momentous change was innovation in the field of
energy, with the taming of animals: the ox, donkey, horse and camel.
Until then, men’s energy supports were represented by food and fire,
of which availability is estimated to correspond to about 4–6,000
kilocalories per capita per day. With the taming of animals humans
increased their daily availability of energy by 50 to 100 percent, to
approximately 6–15,000 calories (although with differences according
to diverse climates and environments).13 A series of decisive technical
innovations took place in the wake of the new energy system, from the
wheel, to metallurgy, ceramics, the plough, several agricultural tools,
and the sailing boat, which added to the energy system a non-organic
energy carrier i.e. wind.
Labour productivity rose during this millennium between 4000
and 3000 BC. This is clearly shown by two important demographic
changes:
– population growth, estimated by some demographers to have been
about tenfold, from 15 million in 4000 BC to 150 million in 3000;14
– the Neolithic urban revolution, that is the formation of the first cities in
Mesopotamia, Egypt, India and China. If part of the population, such
as the urban population, is not employed in agriculture, this means
that peasants must produce more than the goods necessary for the
subsistence of the agricultural population. Therefore labour productivity
must increase.
12
Childe (1942), Chapter IV.
13
I will come back to animal energy later on. In any case, a magnitude of the energy
utilized by men following the taming of working animals can be attained by dividing
the energy input of animals by the number of men who use their muscular energy. So,
if a peasant family of 4 people utilises an ox in order to work land and the ox consumes
20,000 kcal per day, any member of the family is endowed with 5,000 kcal. We will
see later what this means in terms of useful energy.
14
Vallin (1986).
Despite subsequent technical progress, and the diffusion of increased

knowledge, productivity in the newly colonized parts of the world and
the energy basis of the original agricultural civilisations did not exceed
the level of 6–15,000 kcal per capita per day until the 19th century.
2. Fuel
2.1. Wood civilisation

The epoch that precedes the Industrial Revolution is sometimes called
the “Wood Civilisation” thereby contrasting the civilisation of yesterday
with the contemporary world, which is based on iron, coal and artificial
materials. Organic substances were the foundation of this era, principally
wood, used for fuel and to manufacture common objects and tools.
Houses were often built in wood, as were furniture and utensils; most
farming implements, carts and boats were also made of wood.
Most wood was exploited as fuel within homes, where it was used
for cooking and, above all, heating. Food is the primary necessity for
man’s survival, but food alone is not enough. As we saw, during the
Middle Ages, European population increased more in the north, that is
in relatively cold regions, than in the south. During the early modern
age all major agricultural civilisations, with high demographic density,
were situated in warm or temperate areas of the World, such as the belt
stretching from Peru to Mexico, north-east Africa, India and China. In
these areas man needed less firewood for his survival than in Europe.15
In southern Europe the quantity of wood used per capita, per day, was
also low. On the plains of Italy, 1 kilogramme of wood per capita per
day, with a calorie content of 3–3,500 kcal, was sufficient for survival.
In France the consumption was higher and even more so in Belgium,
the Netherlands and East Germany, whereas up to 7–8 kilogrammes
per person were necessary in Sweden and Finland. Across the whole
continent, the daily average per capita was about 2–4 kilogrammes,
corresponding to 7–14,000 calories per day. The wood which grew in
one year on more than one hectare of forestland was necessary to sup-
ply the needs of one person.
15
I have dealt with the subject of fuel consumption in Malanima (1996), pp. 47 ff.
fuel 57
2.2. The forests

During the later centuries of Roman civilisation, forests had been cut
down in many densely inhabited areas of the Mediterranean. Dense
woods still existed in numerous uninhabited or scarcely populated
zones of northern and eastern Europe. Following the fall of the Roman
Empire in the west, population declined in the Mediterranean regions
and consequently forests grew up again. There were less than 30 million
people living in Europe in the 8th century, with demographic density
at below 3 inhabitants per km2. Men of this era lived immersed in a
landscape of majestic forests where wood for burning was abundant.
Cultivated land and inhabited sites were superficial scars in a never-
ending green forest.16
Before the year 1000, demographic growth began to intensify in
Europe thus forcing forests to be cut back (Figure 2). As the demand for
food gradually increased, farming families, monasteries, and landowners
cleared gaps in the thick forests in order to gain land for agriculture.
Cultivated lands extended north, south and to the east, where German
settlers searched for land to cultivate.
The attack on the forests concerned not only Europe but also China,
where in the high Middle Ages there was a sharp rise in population.
Many forests were cut down for heating requirements, building and
industrial use, especially for the casting of metals. A consequence was
increase of coal in metal working during the high Middle Ages.17
In Europe, from the 13th century onwards, the increasingly wide-
spread destruction of woodlands by the population began to be seen
as dangerous, and, by the end of the century, the first laws appeared,
attempting to limit the felling of forests. According to the Domesday
Book of 1086, 15 percent of the land surface of England was woodland.
Over the next two centuries between one third and a half of this area
had been cleared.18
Wood was not only necessary for building and heating, but also for
use in many industries. Wood and charcoal were used in breweries,
potteries, salt refineries, dye-works, bakeries and distilleries. Fuel for the
kilns represented 60 percent of the total cost of production of bricks,
16
Higounet (1966).
17
Elvin (1973), p. 85; and above all Hartwell (1967).
18
Wrigley (2006), p. 439, n. 18 (on the basis of O. Rackam).
80
70
60
50
%
40
30
20
10
0
1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800
Source: Malanima (1996), p. 57.

Note: the graph shows the movement over a long period and represents the percentage
of forest over the extent of the whole continent. See also Williams (1990).
Fig. 2. Estimate of the extent of forests in Europe (% of the wooded area)
(1000–1800).
tiles and lime.19 Medieval kilns were very simple, often being holes
in the ground or simple clay bowls filled with minerals and charcoal.
Their production was limited. The ratio between charcoal used and iron
obtained was 16 to 1. According to another calculation it was necessary
to process 200 kgs of minerals and burn 25 square metres of wood to
obtain 50 kgs of iron.20
The efficiency of exploitation of firewood, both for domestic and
industrial use was very modest. Open fireplaces in houses are credited
with an efficiency of 5–10 percent.21 Only a very modest part of the
calorie content was utilised by people in order to heat houses or cook.
The spread of stoves in early modern northern Europe resulted in an
increase of the energy yield to 15 percent. In Sweden energy intensity,
that is the ratio energy to gross product, declined during the 19th
century thanks to more efficient stoves which contributed to diminish
19
Goldthwaite (1980).
20
Tylecote (1962), pp. 190–1; Tylecote (1980), p. 183; Schneider (1956), p. 125.
21
Cook (1976), p. 155.
fuel 59
heat dispersion.22 On the contrary, in southern Europe, open fireplaces

continued to prevail until the late 19th century.
Building, demographic growth, and the increase in the number of
industries were factors, which could in the long run, affect the overall
availability of wood and eventually restrict the productivity of ship-
yards, arms stores, kilns and ultimately demographic growth itself.
This problem was felt to a greater extent particularly in the northern
regions from the 16th century onwards. The scarcity of wood trans-
lated into its increase in price. In England coal and wood prices went
up considerably from the end of the 16th century and the early 17th
century.23 This price rise characterises the period between the 17th and
19th centuries.24 Prices increased throughout the whole of Europe above
all during the 18th century (Table 1 and Figure 3).
Table 1. Fuel prices in some European cities during the

18th century (1700 = 100).
1750 1800
Paris 109 —
Strasbourg 160 331
Florence 99 182
Naples 114 163
Valencia 132 —
Madrid 134 188
Leipzig 88 —
Vienna 120 127
Danzig 168 273
Warsaw 162 —
Lwow 149 —
Antwerp 91 93
Amsterdam 131 238
London 123 155
Source: Allen (2003), p. 479.
22
Kander (2002), pp. 258 ff.
23
The strong rise in charcoal prices in England was certainly influenced by the
increase of demand due to the strong demographic growth of 16th–17th century
London.
24
We will see—Chapter VI—that the 18th century increase of prices concerns not
only fuels, but also all agricultural energy sources. If we deflate the prices of the fuels
by means of a price index, always heavily influenced by the price of agricultural goods
(and then energy sources), the rise of Table 1 is lower or totally inexistent. This is a
consequence, however, of the fact that all energy sources were increasing in price.
500
400
300 England
200
Italy
100
0
1550–60
1570–80
1590–00
1610–20
1630–40
1650–60
1670–80
1690–00
1710–20
1730–40
1750–60
1770–80
1790–00
1810–20
1830–40
Source: Beveridge (1939) (from the data regarding Eton and Winchester). Wood prices
in Italy are taken from Parenti (1939); Sella (1968); De Maddalena (1974b).
Fig. 3. Prices of charcoal in England and firewood in North Italy
(1550–1840) (1550–60 = 1; decadal data).
2.3. Coal and peat

From the end of the 16th century two alternative fuels, coal and peat,
began to be used to overcome the lack of wood; with ultimately deci-
sive consequences to the economy.25 Coal was almost unknown in the
ancient world. Already widely utilised in medieval China, it only started
to be used in Europe to a limited degree at the end of the 12th century.
We know that it was extracted in 1200 in England, Scotland and in the
Netherlands, around Aachen, in Franche-Comté, near Lyon, in Forez
and in Anjou.26 Limited quantities were transported by sea and therefore
consumed in places quite far from the mine. In the 13th century coal
from Northumberland was transported not only to London, but also to
the Netherlands.27 Peat, another fossil fuel, formed over the centuries in
areas of marshland, was already employed as a fuel when the Romans
25
On this subject, see the important essay by Wrigley (1962).
26
Nef (1952).
27
Postan (1952).
fuel 61
reached the Dutch plains. In the 11th–12th century its use spread with
the population. In the 15th century coal and peat were widely used
around Lièges and near Newcastle. In urbanised, therefore deforested,
areas such as Flanders, such quantities of peat were used as to exhaust
the peat fields. Further supplies were sought elsewhere, to the north of
Antwerp and near Utrecht.28
Overall, the use of coal in Europe during the 17th and the greater
part of the 18th centuries remained modest and was of no particular
importance to the economy as a whole. This, however, was not the case
in England or in the northern areas of the Netherlands, where much
of the economy’s success from the 17th century onwards was a result
of these new-found energy resources.29 Without coal could a city such
as London have grown from 50,000 inhabitants in the 16th century,
to almost 600,000 in the 18th and 1 million in the 19th? It would have
been impossible considering the restrictions that the availability of
wood imposed on every human settlement. Such growth was possible,
nonetheless, thanks to the coalfields in the north-east of the country.30
In the whole of England the production of coal increased 7–8 times
between 1530 and 1630, thanks to the greater depth of the shafts and
better drainage of the mines.31 Between these two dates the quantities
of coal extracted increased from 200,000 tons per year to 1,500,000 and
then to 3 million tons in 1700 and 11 million in 1800. It was only the
beginning of a phase of great expansion (Table 2).
Coal in England had become more important than wood as a pro-
vider of thermal energy by the 1620s. The proportion of coal in total
energy consumed was 12 percent in 1560, 20 in 1600, and 50 in 1700.32
Its consumption from 1560 until 1900 reveals an almost stable rate of
growth as a graph in log scale shows (Figure 4).
Industrial activities that turned to new sources of energy became
more numerous: from weapon and gunpowder production to that of
alum, bricks, tiles and glass, and from salt, beer and soap production,
to sugar refineries.33 Until the end of the 18th century the use of coal in
the steel industry was limited.34 Coal contains a high quantity of sulphur
28
De Zeeuw (1978).
29
Hayami, De Vries, Van der Woude (1990), p. 12.
30
On these developments see Nef (1932).
31
Nef (1964), p. 128.
32
Warde (2007).
33
Nef (1936), pp. 169–70. See also Mathias (2003) on the topic.
34
Tylecote (1962), pp. 190–1; Sprandel (1981), p. 419.
Table 2. Production, consumption and exportation of coal in the United

Kingdom from 1500 to 1869 (production, consumption and exportation in
millions of tons per year, per capita consumption in tons per year).
Production Consumption Export Per c.
consumption
1550–60 0,21 0,21 — —
1700 3 3 0 0.3
1800 15 15 0.2 0.9
1840 34 32 2 1.2
1869 110 97 13 3.1
Source: Eden, Posner, Bending, Crouch, Stanislaw (1981), p. 99. Data for 1800 are
replaced by Flinn (1984), 2, pp. 303–04. One ton of coal corresponds to approximately
7 million Calories or 0.7 Toe.
10000
1000
100
y = 5.9606e0.0183x
R2 = 0.9816
10
1
1560
1600
1640
1680
1720
1760
1800
1840
1880
Source: Warde (2007).
Fig. 4. Coal consumption in England & Wales 1560–1900

(in Petajoules; log scale).
fuel 63
that, combined with minerals during melting, produces a poor-quality

product. No problem exists for the use of coal in the forge when the
metal utilised is solid and compact and does not absorb sulphur.
A crucial change in the use of coal came about in England in the
first half of the 18th century. Thanks to the steam engine, the pos-
sibility of fuel combustion to produce movement was exploited and
thermal machinery was born.35 Newcomen’s steam-engine was, in the
first half of the 18th century, no more efficient than 1 percent, while
Watt’s engine, at the end of the century, was no more efficient than
5 percent.36 Technological progress rapidly increased the energy yield
of steam engines. If we set 1 equal to the efficiency of the Newcomen
steam engine in 1720s, Watt’s engine in 1776 is 6.2, and, in 1830, 12.4.37
Technological progress was fast in the field of thermal machines, even
though the immediate importance of steam “for industrial transforma-
tion should not be overestimated . . . By 1800 certainly, and even by 1850
there had been relatively little adoption of power-driven machinery
in the majority of industries”.38 In domestic heating coal burning also
became more and more efficient. “The rate of growth in the consump-
tion of coal for domestic heating and cooking was linked to far-reaching
developments in domestic architecture”, especially in “the adaptation
of hearths and chimneys for coal”.39
Dutch civilisation in the 17th century also owes much of its splendour
to its fuel resources, above all peat. Due to the rise in population, the
forests had totally disappeared and the country’s salvation was peat,
the presence of which had been known since the 15th century if not
earlier. Before 1600, however, it had been used very little.40
35
The most important novelty of Newcomen’s machine was that of the use of the
cylinder and piston running on steam. The discovery was made by Denis Papin and
Newcomen might well have learnt of this. Newcomen’s engine has a boiler, powered
by coal that gives off vapour. By means of the valve, which is opened and closed manu-
ally, the vapour is directed into the cylinder and exerts pressure on the piston, which
in turn is pushed upwards.
36
Cook (1976), pp. 30 ff.
37
Mathias (2003).
38
Goodman, Honeyman (1988), p. 191.
39
Hatcher (1993), p. 409.
40
See the stimulating article by De Zeeuw (1978).
Source: Quatrefages (2003), p. 779.
Fig. 5. The reaming of a cannon through a waterwheel in a 17th century print.
2.4. Gunpowder
Technology and mechanisation had progressed considerably during the
Middle Ages, especially in the field of armament. Gunpowder was a
compound of potassium nitrate, sulphur and charcoal in the proportion
of 4–1–1 when used for cannons and 6–1–1 for harquebuses. It was
supposedly to be found in China as early as the 9th century, but was
not used for weapons. The first Chinese cannon was in fact recorded
in 1356.41 In Europe, gunpowder made its first appearance in the early
14th century and may well have had no connection with the Chinese
invention.42 After its first appearance, in 1314 or 1319 in Flanders and in
1326 in Florence, it soon reached every corner of Europe. By the middle
of the 14th century, it was already well known everywhere (Figure 5).
On closer consideration, gunpowder was perhaps the fastest growing
source of energy in the early modern age. This explosive mixture of
substances along with the construction of ever more perfect machines,
i.e. weapons, played an important role in the expansion of Europe into
the rest of the world.
Saltpetre was the main component of gunpowder. It was obtainable
in an artificial manner from the 16th century and probably as early as
41
Needham (1956–2004), V, 34.
42
As Braudel also suspects (1979) I, Chap. VI.
animals 65
the 15th.43 As firing a cannonball required 10 kilos of gunpowder, of

which more than 6.5 kilos were made up of saltpetre, this component
was often in short supply. The European chemical industry took primary
steps in supplying armies and obtained saltpetre by mixing nitrogenous
organic residues (for the most part sheep excrement), with earth, before
adding urine and lime, then filtering the mixture with water, and finally
repeatedly distilling the liquid.
It is often claimed that the first transformation of heat into orderly
movement occurred with the steam engine, but would it not be more
correct to say that this came about with gunpowder? “The cannon is
the first known example of controlled conversion of thermal energy to
kinetic energy: it is a one-cylinder internal combustion machine”.44
3. Animals
3.1. Working animals

The taming and use of animals began during the epoch of the Neolithic
agricultural revolution. It would seem that the use of the ox and the
donkey, in agriculture, goes back to 4000–3000 BC, although these had
been tamed before, whereas that of the horse to 2000 BC, if not later.
The invention of the wheel around 3000 BC was possibly connected in
some way with the taming of the ox, donkey and horse, thereby creat-
ing a coherent technical system.
The use of animal strength became characteristic, first of the Medi-
terranean area and subsequently of the whole of Europe. However,
this was not so in all agricultural regions of the world; in some areas
where animals such as the ox, horse, donkey and mule were unknown.
In the case of the American continent these animals were introduced
after Columbus’ arrival. Although originally native of America, the
horse and camel spread towards Asia, Africa and Europe, ultimately
disappearing from America between 40–10,000 years ago.45 Man and
his daily labour remained the most common element in Chinese
agriculture; in some areas it was the only one. In a 17th-century trea-
tise on agricultural technology, Sung Ying-Hsing mentioned the use of
43
Panciera (1988).
44
Mokyr (1990), p. 85, n. 2.
45
Crosby (1972), Chap. I.
man-power to draw the plough whenever the “water buffalo and the yel-
low ox”,46 working animals used extensively in Chinese agriculture, were
not available. Furthermore, when transport by water was impossible,
man’s shoulders were the most frequent substitute. Likewise in the
Arab world, the use of energy sources, alternative to human ones, was
limited both in agriculture and in industry. Camels were a fundamen-
tal auxiliary to transport in many areas.47 In India, on the contrary,
livestock was so essential to agriculture that religious taboo prevented
their killing.48
3.2. The discovery of the horse

On the European continent animal power began to be employed to
a much greater extent from the 8th century onwards. It has been
calculated that, as a result of this progress, 70 percent of the available
mechanical energy in 11th-century England was provided by work-
ing animals (still mostly oxen in this period) and only the remaining
30 percent by human muscle power or by water mills.49 Although we
assume a more modest increase in the use of horses outside England,
we can, nonetheless, suppose a rise in the availability of energy per
capita in the high medieval centuries.
In the early Middle Ages horse power was little used and, as in
ancient times, the horse was still considered a war machine. Horses
were not exploited in agriculture and were expensive, owned only by
rich people. In Anglo-Saxon documents of 7th century England, for
example, the horse is never mentioned as a working animal.50 In early
9th-century France only the ox appears as a working animal in the
fields, whereas the horse is employed exclusively for the transportation
of people and goods.51
Wider use of horse power resulted from a series of innovations,
none of which seems to have originated in Europe. One of the first,
46
Sung Ying-Hsing (1966), p. 8.
47
Carlstein (1982).
48
Harris (1977), Chap. XII.
49
Langdon (1986), p. 20. In this estimate only mechanical energy is included.
See also Langdon (2003). See also Vigneron (1968), Lefebvre De Noëttes (1931), I,
Haudricourt-Delamarre (1955).
50
Langdon (1986), p. 26.
51
Parain (1966).
animals 67
Source: Needham (1969).

Note: a. harness used in antiquity in the West; b. Chinese harness; c. harness with collar
used in China since the early Middle Ages.
Fig. 6. Three kinds of harnesses for horses.
of Chinese,52 Indian,53 or central Asian54 origin, was the stirrup, which

appeared in the west in the 8th century. The stirrup notably reinforced
the impact of the horseman, who could now hold the lance in one
hand and the shield in the other. This contributed to the success of
the knight in military action.
All other innovations improved the use of the horse in agriculture
and transport. The first appearance in Europe of a new type of harness
dates back to the 6th century. This harness transferred leverage onto the
horse’s chest instead of the neck.55 In the 8th–10th centuries another
type of harnessing with a collar piece appeared which was destined to
be widely used56 (Figure 6). This is said to have originated in the Far
East, in particular in China, where horses were used mainly for military
purposes.57 However, it is possible that this method of harnessing had
been discovered by the nomadic peoples of central Asia, who had a
much deeper knowledge of horses than the Chinese.58
The use of horses in agriculture became more efficient with this type
of harness. It has been said to increase the animal’s power 4–5 fold.59
The one remaining problem was, however, the fragile hooves. This was
solved by shoeing the horse. Such protection for the hooves already
existed in Roman times, but strangely enough it only re-appeared in
52
White (1962), part I. See also Needham (1956–2004), IV, 27, and Temple (1986),
p. 20.
53
White (1960), p. 516.
54
Gille (1978).
55
Langdon (1986), pp. 9 ff.
56
Parain (1966), anticipates it at the 5th–7th centuries.
57
Needham (1956–2004), I.
58
Gille (1962), p. 583; Gille (1978); Parain (1966).
59
Braudel (1979), I, Chap. V.
the 9th century, after a long period of disuse. Archaeological remains

attest that Siberian horsemen of this period shod their own horses.60
The invention of in-line harnessing concluded, in the 10th and 11th
centuries, the rediscovery of the horse as a working animal.61
The exploitation of horse power was most intense in northern Europe.
With the exception of England and the Netherlands, however, the
importance of horses in agriculture must not be overrated. As will be
shown,62 outside these regions of northern Europe, the trend of labour
productivity was stable or declining rather than growing. If in 17th- and
18th-century England animals were the main cause of the upward trend,
then we have to deduce that in the rest of Europe, on the whole, rural
workers were increasing at a faster rate than the animals assisting them
in work and transport; at least after the favourable medieval phase of
innovation in the use of animal force. If we translate all draught animals
(oxen, cows, mules, donkeys) into horse equivalents,63 on the basis of
their relative power, we discover that any agricultural worker could
avail in 19th-century Europe in most cases of 0.3–0.5 horses.64
Furthermore the ox, as a working animal, continued to be of prime
importance in Mediterranean agriculture until the relatively recent
period of mechanisation. In Italy in 1845, agricultural workers were far
more numerous than in England, whereas the number of horses and
mules was approximately slightly more than one third of all equines
in England.65 In northern France horses were used to plough the
farmland whereas in the south oxen were predominant. This contrast
between north and south also applied to Germany. In other areas of
Europe, above all eastern countries such as Hungary, oxen rather than
horses were still harnessed to the plough.66 The utilisation of horses
in agriculture was more suited to regions where rainfall is relatively
abundant, and the growing season long with moderate summer heat.
60
Gimpel (1975), p. 37.
61
On the progress of the horse in agriculture during the high Middle Ages see:
Langdon (1986), pp. 29 and 40 ff.; Duby (1962), II, 2; Slicher Van Bath (1962), D, II
b; Campbell (2003), p. 187; Langdon (1986). See also the comment on Langdon’s book
by Campbell (1988). On the exploitation of the mule, see Leighton (1967). On the
relationship horse-productivity: Wrigley (1991), p. 327 and (2006), p. 456.
62
In the next Chapter.
63
“One ox equals two thirds of a horse, one donkey is one-half of an ox, and one
cow is one-third of an ox”: Kander, Warde (forthcoming).
64
Kander, Warde (forthcoming).
65
Cipolla (1974), p. 126.
66
Makkai-Zimanyi (1978), p. 112.
animals 69
These conditions, favourable to the growth of grass, are more usual in

northern than in southern Europe.
In any case, even with these innovations, the efficiency of the biologi-
cal converters of energy did not exceed 13 percent, both in the case of
animals and men.67 In this case as well as in that of thermal machines,
the coefficient representing the machine yield (η) is the result of:
Hi − Ho
η=
Hi
where Hi heat input and Ho heat output. This formula will be used later
to estimate the yield of energy converters.
3.3. Machines and slaves

In ancient times, slaves were an important innovation in the field of
energy, allowing an increase of power, directed and controlled by free
men. The use of a slave is a great advantage whenever labour productiv-
ity is relatively high and the yield of a worker is higher than the price
of his bare subsistence. The slave can be supported simply at the cost
of food and shelter (plus the purchasing cost divided by the time of his
activity), and the owner can take advantage of this difference between
productivity and subsistence. If labour productivity diminishes and
reaches this cost, a slave is no longer an advantage.
According to a cautious calculations, during the 5th century BC in
Athens, and in ancient Italy at the end of the republican age, the num-
ber of slaves was equal to 30–35 per cent of the population.68 Later on,
throughout the 17th century, until almost the end of the 19th century,
slavery once again became a cheap supply of energy in American society
and to all appearances in very different conditions.
Slavery may therefore be considered as a source of energy. For the
master, Aristotle wrote, the slave is “a living object of property”, a
tool better than many other tools. There is no doubt, he added, that
if “shuttles spun by themselves, and plectrums touched the lyre, head
craftsmen would have no need for subordinates, nor masters for
slaves”.69 It would merely be possible to use these automatic machines
without resorting to animate tools, such as slaves.70
67
Smil (1994), p. 86; Haldane (1949), on man’s efficiency in work.
68
Finley (1980).
69
Aristotle, I A, 4. On this subject also useful Koyré (1961a, b).
70
See also Gille (1978).
In late ancient times, the army of slaves had begun to fall in number,
following the epoch when a continual supply had been provided by the
great wars. To some degree the simultaneous spread of Christianity
also made its contribution; if not directly by prohibition, then at least
indirectly with the recognition of the value of man as one of its lead-
ing principles. Late medieval documents reveal that slavery still existed
in several areas of Europe. It drastically declined, however, around
the 8th–10th centuries.71 In exactly the same period Europeans began
to devise many new technical methods for controlling and exploit-
ing energy. According to Marc Bloch there really was a connection
between the two; in fact emphasising that medieval invention implied
“a more efficient use of natural inanimate forces”, he concluded that
this endeavour to “spare human work” derived from the fact that “the
master had fewer slaves”.72
4. Water and wind
4.1. Watermills
Man, slave and animal are all biological converters and derive their
driving force from the production of food in agriculture. Mills and
ships are, on the contrary, mechanical converters and do not require
agricultural products in order to function.73
It took early men very little time to learn how to use the river cur-
rent to shift rudimentary rafts or to transport heavy loads, such as tree
trunks. In ancient times wind was exploited in order to power craft,
the sail made its first appearance in approximately 3500 BC, although
river vessels existed much earlier.
Until recent decades the opinion prevailed that, although the water-
mill was an ancient invention, it was nevertheless a medieval innovation,
in Schumpeter’s sense of the word.74 Recently, the increase of knowledge
about the use and spread of mechanical water devices in ancient times
has forced us to partly change our perspective. We know today that
all the grain-grinding devices used in Europe in late medieval to early
71
See on Italy Toubert (1976b), p. 114. More generally Boutruche (1959–70), I.
72
Bloch (1935b).
73
On the theme see Popitz (1995). See also Betti (1977–82).
74
Dealing with the actual utilisation of a discovery—innovation—rather than with
the discovery itself—invention.
water and wind 71
modern times, were already well-known in the late Roman Republican

world. In the 3rd century BC animal mills, usually turned by donkeys,
or slaves, and even watermills were already in use.75 The first three
explicit documents mentioning watermills in the west date back to the
1st century BC.76 The hydraulic wheel appears in China in 31 BC, where
it was used to operate bellows. Official Chinese history of that time
recorded how Tu Shih, Prefect of Nanyang, invented a water-powered
reciprocator for the casting of iron implements for agriculture: “thus
the people gained great benefit with little labour”.77
In the 1st century AD, Pliny the Elder wrote that numerous hydrau-
lic wheels and mills existed in Italy, alongside manual pestles.78 In the
2nd, 3rd and 4th centuries these became common north of the Alps,
in France, England and Germany.79 In 2005, archaeological remains
of 69 watermills, dating from the 1st century BC to the 5th AD, were
discovered.80 It is important to note that these remains demonstrate
an advanced knowledge in the use of hydraulic power. The horizontal
watermill differed very little from the animal-driven mills. However
both archaeological and literary remains prove the existence of a vertical
mill, the mechanics of which were more complex due to the indirect
transmission of motion to the upper stone. A lantern gear was used for
the purpose of transmitting the motion from one shaft to another.81
The increase in the number of watermills from the 9th century has
been considered a true “technical revolution”.82 The number of water-
mills grew simultaneously with population, the cultivation of new
lands and the reorganisation of rural society in the village structure
and demesne. The success of the watermill was one of the dynamic
features which characterised Europe at the beginning of the feudal era.
75
M. J. T. Lewis (1997); Wilson (2002). Needham (1956–2004), IV–2, p. 361 cited
some texts that ambiguously suggested that water-wheels were used in 4th century
BC India.
76
Two wide reconstructions are Moritz (1958), and Reynolds (1983).
77
Temple (1986), p. 55. See also Needham (1956–2004), IV–2, pp. 370 and 392.
78
Pliny the Elder, XVIII, 97.
79
Forbes (1956a), pp. 589–90.
80
Brun (2006).
81
On the medieval progress of watermills, see; Ludwig (1994); Wilson (2002), p. 31;
Gille (1956), II; Munro (2003), pp. 226–27; Aebischer (1932); Chiappa Mauri (1984);
Gille (1956a, b), p. 67; Gille (1962), p. 463; Forbes (1956a); Shaw (1984); Curwen (1944).
See the general reconstruction in Lo Cascio-Malanima (2008).
82
Gille (1954). The opinion of a medieval technical revolution was clearly stated
by Lilley (1973).
It was the feudal system itself which sustained such dynamism. Only
when the previously scattered population began to increase and group
into villages under the protection of lords and monasteries, interested
in investing resources in production, did the mill become a regular
feature of the rural world.83
4.2. Water power

The mill is a non-specific engine: by introducing some modifications, it
can be put to other uses other than milling of cereals. These new uses
also became more numerous towards the high Middle Ages.84
The first alternative use for which the mill wheel was adapted was
most probably the fulling of cloth: a procedure carried out on wool
during which this was immersed in water, soap, clay and sometimes
even urine in order to provoke the tightening of the cloth.85 For this
purpose the fulling mill, or walking mill, began to be used, a first ref-
erence to which (though certainly not the date of its invention) goes
back to the 10th century or more precisely to 962 in Abruzzo, in the
centre of Italy.86 From there the use of this new “machine” spread
throughout the rest of Europe over the following centuries. This suc-
cess has even been referred to as constituting a medieval “industrial
revolution” (Figure 7).
Many other forms of production benefited from water power: the
beating of hemp, the milling of paper, the pressing of olives, the spin-
ning of silk, the beating of oak bark for the production of tannin, the
boring of gun and canon shafts, the crushing of cereals, the prepara-
tion of tobacco, the working of clay, the production of cement and
gunpowder, the grinding of glass and the milling of linen. In the 16th
century hydraulic energy was used for at least fourty different industrial
processes.
From our late medieval-early modern documentary sources, we know
that the power of an ordinary watermill seldom exceeded 3 HP (power
83
On these themes see in particular Bloch (1935a); Toubert (1976a), pp. 488 ff.;
Toubert (1977), pp. 460–1 (n. 63); Toubert (1976b), p. 106. Quantitative information
on the presence of watermills in some European regions is provided in: Bautier (1960);
Chiappa Mauri (1984), for Lombardy. For Sicily see particularly Idrisi (1983). Braudel
(1986), part I, II, 1. Darby (1977), p. 270; Hogden (1939); Holt (1988). See also the
comments of Langdon (1991), p. 441.
84
On the different uses of energy see Cortese (1997), pp. 47 ff.
85
Malanima (1986), and Malanima (1988). See also Ludwig (1994).
86
Alexander Monachus (2001), p. 131.
water and wind 73
Source: Malanima (1988).

Fig. 7. The spread of fulling mills in Europe.
being the work able to be carried out in unit time). Often it was lower:
around 2 HP or less. As a comparison, we can consider Watt’s steam
engines, that in 1800 were 10 times more powerful.
Some calculations can be made using a 2 HP engine. If a watermill
with a power of 2 HP worked 12 hours a day, its everyday energy
consumption, in order to grind grain, generated by the falling water
of a stream, would be 24 HPh (HPh being a measure of the consumed
energy, while HP is a measure of power). Since 1 HPh is equal to 745
Watt-hours, 24 HPh correspond to 17,896 Watt-hours or 15,475 kcal.
A more powerful mill -3 HP-, endowed with a vertical overshot wheel,
could, as Vannoccio Biringuccio maintained in the 16th century, replace
about 100 men.87
87
Biringuccio (1540). From the work by Biringuccio, Reynolds (1983), derived the
title of his book. See the calculations in Reynolds (1983), p. 22.
The mechanical contribution of the watermill to the available energy

in traditional societies is, however, relatively modest when compared
to the total pre-modern energy consumption. For the 19th century,
estimates of energy consumption in some European countries are now
available.88 Water represented less than 1 percent of the overall con-
sumption.89 Its contribution was similar, in terms of quantity, to that
of wind power by sails and windmills (with the exception of Holland,
where wind consumption was traditionally much higher). The quantity
of energy from water increases if the ratio is calculated with mechanical
energy alone (subtracting that is, the energy produced from firewood).
It does not exceed, in any case, 2 percent. This medieval technical
revolution was not, after all, so revolutionary.
Progress in this innovative sector seems to be even more limited
during the early modern age.90 Between 1200 and 1800 the number
of hydraulic wheels rose considerably and by 1800 there were 750,000
water-wheels throughout Europe, representing an increase of 150 per-
cent compared to 1200. In 1800 the number of wheels used to grind
cereals had grown to at least 250,000 (one third of all operational
wheels). However, between 1200 and 1800, the population rose by
approximately 150 percent and therefore the number of wheels per
person remained stable, that is one wheel for every 250 inhabitants.
Nevertheless, in the course of the six centuries taken into consideration,
there was an increase in the power of each wheel. Therefore it can be
concluded that in 1800 each individual had at his or her disposal a
larger quantity of hydraulic power than in 1200: 1 horsepower to every
83 people rather than every 125 (Table 3).
Table 3. Estimate, of the availability of power per capita from hydraulic energy,
between 1200 and 1800 in Europe (in Horse Power).
Average Power (HP) Inhabitants per wheel Per c. HP
1200 2 250 0,008
1800 3 250 0,012
Source: Makkai (1981).
88
See the following par. 6.
89
Gales, Kander, Malanima, Rubio (2007).
90
There is agreement between the figures proposed independently by Makkai (1981),
p. 178 and Braudel (1979), I, 5.
water and wind 75
4.3. Windmills
As already mentioned, watermills also existed mainly in the northern
regions of Europe. However, in these areas more energy could be
obtained from wind, an alternative source, which, during the Middle
Ages, began to be used more intensively for productive purposes.
Together with water it took on an important role in several regions.
Aeolian energy proved to be a particularly plentiful resource, not only
on the north European coasts, pounded by the Atlantic winds, but also
as far inland as Vistola or even the Urals.
This never-ending reservoir of energy, which previously had been
used exclusively for sailing, was successfully exploited by the inven-
tion of the windmill, although it became well known much later than
the watermill.
The windmill supposedly originates from Asia. The first evidence we
possess refers to the 7th century AD. It is reported that the Arabian
caliph, Omar I, founder of the National Arabic Empire and conqueror
of Persia in 636–42, ordered a Persian, who claimed he was capable
of such, to “build a mill which was made to revolve by the wind”.91
Whatever the origins really were, windmills were long known in Europe
as Persian mills (Figure 8). Thus were they mentioned in one of the
first, if not the first, account of windmills in Europe: the Book of King
Ruggero, written in 1154 by the Arabian geographer al-Idrisi. In Sicily,
al-Idrisi wrote, in Calatubo, near Erice, on the extreme southwest point
of the island, “exists a quarry where they cut stone for the use of mills
driven by water and for those called ‘Persian’ ”.92
The regions in which wind power played a more important role
were the great plains of northern and western Europe, where the winds
are constant and there are no mountains; from northern France, to
Holland, Denmark and then inland as far as Poland and Russia. On
the Atlantic Coast, windmills were still rare in the 14th century, only
multiplying in the 15th.93 In Holland the number rose continually,
reaching 3–4,000 in the 17th century and 9,000 in the second half of
91
Forbes (1956a).
92
Idrisi (1983), p. 118. For the origins of the windmill see Kealey (1987), p. 69 and
Langdon (1991), p. 433 (n. 21) who criticises Kealey for his dates.
93
Forbes (1956a). For the diffusion of the windmill towards Eastern Europe: Davids
(1990).
Source: Kealey (1987).

Fig. 8. The ancient Persian Mills.
the 19th century. Towards the year 1900, 30,000 existed in the area
surrounding the North Sea.
The windmill, like the watermill, had many uses apart from that of
grinding cereals. In Holland, in the 16th century, windmills were used
to spin cotton, full cloth, beat leather, manufacture gunpowder and
tannin, saw wood, produce oil, paper and tobacco and to drain water.
Fulling windmills became relatively common in the 16th century in
Dutch towns such as Leiden, Rotterdam and Groningen, whereas they
were well known in Flanders at an earlier date.94
At the end of the 18th century, the power created by a windmill was
2–3 times higher than that of a watermill, varying on average between
5 and 10 horsepower. In 17th-century Holland, a windmill supplied 60
kilowatt-hour per day, equal to that of 100 men. On a European scale
the number of these installations was, however, much lower than that
of the watermill and it has been calculated that the overall power was
equal to one-third or one-quarter of that of hydraulic wheels: the first
varied from 1.5 million horsepower to 3 million and the second from
a minimum of 300,000 to a maximum of 1 million. Their number was
94
Van Uytven (1971), pp. 11–2.
water and wind 77
therefore between approximately 30,000 and 100,000 whilst that of

hydraulic wheels (for mills and other devices) could well have reached
1 million. In the first half of the 19th century the windmills in France,
England, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Finland numbered
between 50 and 60,000.95
4.4. Sails
Whilst the use of wind power for milling was an innovation of con-
siderable economic influence, the modifications in the use of the wind
for navigation were less important and only marginally concerned the
use of energy.96
The wide use of the triangular-shaped sail, known as the Latin sail,
was an innovation of the medieval era, although the origin and diffu-
sion are extremely difficult to trace.97 In Roman times it would appear
that it was only used on small coasters and fishing boats.
From the 8th century the Byzantines, in the east Mediterranean,
made widespread use of the Latin sail, and moreover, ships of larger
dimensions began to utilise it. Later it was also resorted to on western
Mediterranean ships. It cannot be said that this type of sail was more
efficient in the exploitation of wind power and neither can it be said
that there was any saving in manpower employed in the manoeuvring
of ships. On the contrary, it would seem that greater galley crews were
required for ships using the Latin sail.98 However the manoeuvrability
of the ship was improved, and this, perhaps, was the only advantage. In
the late Middle Ages it is uncertain if there was an increase in the use
of the sail, or a reduction of labour; oars and sails continued to coexist
as they had previously and as they would in the future.
Although the harnessing of wind power in navigation was not a
real innovation, uninterrupted progress was made regarding quantity:
increase in the number of sails on the seas implied a growth in the
magnitude of energy exploited.99
Between the end of the 15th and the end of the 18th centuries, whilst
the population only doubled, tonnage of European ships rose 10–15 fold
95
Davids (2003).
96
See especially Unger (1980), pp. 29 ff.
97
Adam (1962).
98
Lane (1974), p. 213; Lane (1969), pp. 240–1.
99
Unger (1980) is an important work on the topic.
Table 4. Estimates of the carrying capacity of the European merchant fleets

from 1470 to 1780 (thousands of tons and indices) compared with demographic
movement (indices).
A B Population
1470–1500 350 100 200–250 100 100
1570–1600 800 229 600–700 289 127
1670 1,350 386 1,000–1,100 467 139
1780 3,856 1,102 3,372 1,498 210
Sources: A. Maddison (2001), p. 77; B. Van Zanden (2001), p. 82.
generating the most substantial increase that took place in the exploita-
tion of energy sources (Table 4). In 1780, the power of the European
merchant ships is estimated to have been 150–250,000 horsepower. If
the navy and the numerous small vessels and boats were to be added,
these figures would increase considerably.
Both water and wind machines were more efficient than the biologi-
cal converters and modern thermal machines. Their yield was 60 to 85
percent.100
5. Climate and biomass
5.1. Sunlight
Whilst examining the subject of energy throughout history a decisive
aspect of the problem is always forgotten. Attention is concentrated on
the techniques man has devised to improve the exploitation of solar
energy; it is said that, up to today, this is the base of every source of
energy used, but it is often forgotten that solar radiation is not always
the same. In reality it changes over time and leads to the creation of
long climatic phases which influence the extent of biomass generally
produced on Earth.101 In the short run it is well known how meteoro-
logical phenomena have a strong influence on the quantity of biomass
that forms, and therefore on the availability of energy. In other words:
year after year solar fuel produced on Earth differs.
Today the climatic and meteorological variations do not have such
a strong influence on the quantity of energy man consumes, as the
100
Smil (1994), pp. 107 ff.
101
See the remarks by Galloway (1986).
climate and biomass 79
most part comes from under the ground. However, in past centuries
the biomass that formed on fields and in forests was the energy base,
and differed greatly from one year to another. In the long run, solar
radiation varied in consequence to both changes in solar activity and
alterations in the inclination of the terrestrial axis, with respect to the
sun. The fuel that man had at his disposal also varied. From year to year
the great difference in the production of cereal or wood in the forests
was noticeable, but the slow changes in solar radiation that reached the
earth were overlooked because they were imperceptible to men. Yet
the energy available depended more on these small variations, than on
anything man was able to accomplish with his techniques. While in the
past climate heavily influenced energy availability, today it is the reverse
and the energy humans consume is heavily influencing climate.
5.2. Climatic Evolution

14,000 years ago, after a period of more than 60,000 years, the great
Würmian Ice Age came to an end. The increase in temperature modi-
fied the environment, facilitating the ripening of food plants in certain
areas of the world, though hindering hunting in other regions. The birth
of agriculture, or the beginning of the so-called Neolithic agricultural
revolution, has often been associated with these climatic changes.
During the following period, long phases of temperature variations
were detected, though within a relatively warm post-glacial era.102 There
were warm millennia from 8500 to 1500 BC, after which a long cold
period ensued. We know, however, that temperatures slowly increased
in the 3rd century BC, reaching a peak towards the beginning of our
era, then declined in the 3rd century AD.103
The recently obtained series of annual temperatures, from the
3rd century AD onward, clearly shows a declining trend (Figure 9).
Temperatures remained low until the beginning of the so-called
Medieval Climatic Optimum, which lasted from the 9th century until
1250–1300.104 The increase in available energy was a result, not only
of technological innovation, but also of a rise in average temperatures.
102
Two introductions to the topic of climate over very long periods are those of Le
Roy Ladurie (1967) and Pinna (1984).
103
An overview is proposed by Pinna (1996), pp. 118 ff. For a recent long-term
reconstruction, see Berglund (2003).
104
A general approach to climate in the past millennium is provided by Bradley,
Briffa, Cole, Hughes, Osborn (2003), and by Pfister (2003).
-0,1
-0,2
-0,3
-0,4
-0,5
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Source: Mann, Jones (2003) (data over 2000 years are available from the World Data Center
for Paleoclimatology. Data Contribution Series #2003–051. NOAA/NGDC Paleoclimatology
Program, Boulder CO, USA).
Fig. 9. Northern Hemisphere Temperatures (200–2000)
(Winter Temperatures 1961–90 = 0).
It became possible to cultivate land located in cold regions, therefore

feed an increasingly larger population.105 Moreover, the higher tem-
perature resulted in the formation of greater biomass for both men
and working animals. The growth in population during the medieval
period, and indeed of production in general, depended not only on the
conscious efforts of man to harness new energy sources by means of
new converters, but also on the variation in the availability of energy
due to climatic phenomena.
From the end of the high Middle Ages, in the 13th century,106 tem-
peratures gradually dropped (Figure 10). It was the start of the so-called
Little Ice Age, which lasted until the first half of the 19th century. The
Figure reveals another rise in temperature during the one hundred
years from 1450 until 1550, resulting in a new period of agricultural
expansion.
The worst period of the Little Ice Age107 started after 1550; in par-
ticular after the freezing winter of 1564–65. It coincided with a period
105
Mann (2002).
106
On the 14th century, see especially Pfister, Schwarz-Zanetti, Wegmann (1996).
107
A narrative recostruction is by Fagan (2000).
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2 A
0,1
0
-0,1
-0,2
B
-0,3
-0,4
-0,5
1000
1050
1100
1150
1200
1250
1300
1350
1400
1450
1500
1550
1600
1650
1700
1750
1800
1850
1900
1950
2000
Source: A. Crowley (2000); B. Mann, Bradley, Hughes (1999).
Fig. 10. Temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere from 1000 until 2000.
when the agricultural product diminished. The growing season had

extended by 5–7 weeks during the warmer years of the medieval era;
conversely however, from the middle of the 16th century, it became
shorter.108 In that particular period, the average temperature was one
degree below that of the first half of the 20th century and was char-
acterised by fresh, damp summers. Grapes were harvested later than
before.109 Glaciers increased in size, especially between 1600 and 1850.
Their dimension being affected by the temperature, thus constituting
proof of the colder climate, particularly between the months of May
and September. Summers of exceptionally low temperatures resulted in
years of general famine as was the case in 1590–91, in 1594–1597, in the
two decades from 1640 to 1660 and in 1693–94. From 1645 until 1715,
the so-called Maunder’s Minimum,110 there was a drastic reduction in
sunspots; an indicator of reduced solar activity.111 In the 18th century,
temperatures rose slightly, followed by another fall during the second
half of the century and the first two decades of the following one. The
negative effects on agriculture of this sudden temperature change have
108
Lamb (1984), p. 230.
109
For central Europe see Landsteiner (1999).
110
Eddy, Gilman, Trotter (1976).
111
Eddy (1977b).
been noted.112 In England these periodic climate changes appear clearly

in long-term reconstructions.113
Little information exists on rainfall, which has a decisive function
in agriculture. It is known, however, that reduced evaporation, due to
lower temperatures, resulted in damper land during the Little Ice Age.
It is important to note how the long period of demographic expansion
which initiated towards the 10th century, was accompanied during its
first phase by rising temperatures. Subsequently and conversely, there
was a divergence between population growth and temperature. In the
17th century while the latter tended to drop, the population remained
stationary, to increase once again in the 18th century. During the years
between 1750 and 1820 in particular, when the European population
underwent a substantial increase, there was a fall in the temperature.114
Energy reaching the Earth diminished. In this period, Europe on the
one hand and China on the other faced “serious ecological problems.
By the late 18th century both in Europe to the West and Asia to the
East, there was little space left for further extensive growth to take
place”.115 The lack of wood which we have noted coincided partly with
the reduction of the biomass caused by the climatic phenomena. In
some cases, particularly in the years 1815–18, volcanic dust dispersed
in the atmosphere was an obstacle to the diffusion of sunrays causing
what were at the time referred to as “summerless” years.116
5.3. The epoch 1400–1900

Thanks to recent research, we are able to establish some correlation
between demographic evolution and the changes in temperature for the
period 1400–1900. More accurate analysis of these relationships would
require, however, demographic series and series of temperature and
precipitation for specific areas. Some main trends both in population
and temperature are clear (Figure 11):
1. recovery from 1450 until 1560 (corresponding to a century of popula-

tion rise);
112
Michaelowa (2001).
113
From Lamb (1984).
114
Malanima (2006b).
115
Pomeranz (2000), p. 212.
116
Fagan (2000), pp. 167 ff.
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0,0
-0,1
-0,2
-0,3
-0,4
-0,5
1400
1450
1500
1550
1600
1650
1700
1750
1800
1850
1900
Source: based on Rutherford, Mann, Osborn, Bradley, Briffa, Hughes, Jones (2005).
Fig. 11. Temperatures in northern Hemisphere 1400–1900 (deviations with respect

to the 1900–60 mean) (trend: mobile 15 years average).
2. decline from 1560 until 1660 (corresponding to stagnation or decline

in population);
3. recovery from 1660 interrupted by a fall in the last decade of the
18th century and until about 1820 (a period when population rises
again).
These phases correspond to changes in the Sun’s activity117 and heav-

ily influence both the energy made available through agriculture and,
consequently, the possibilities of consumption, together with population
and economic rise. The existence of a “synchrony” in the long-term
movements of temperature, agricultural yield, and population series
across space”118 is likely, although we must still be cautious about the
relationship, which is yet to be irrefutably demonstrated.
117
Eddy (1977a).
118
Galloway (1986), pp. 20–1.
6. The energy transition
6.1. Europe and other regions

While the technological innovations that emerged out of the West
over the two last centuries were later to be adopted elsewhere, a dif-
ferent chain of events came about in the Middle Ages. There is clear
evidence that the East contributed substantially to the growth of the
western world and not only from an economic point of view. Europe
was indebted to the Orient for numerous techniques for harnessing
environmental energy. Following the crisis of the ancient world many
novelties made their way to Europe from various parts of the globe:
from the barbarians in the North, from the Near East, from India and
from China.119 The Arab expansion of the 7th and 8th centuries in
particular considerably increased this opening of Europe towards the
Orient, creating a bridge between Asia and Europe.120
In the energy sector in particular, nearly all innovations came from
the East. The origin of the water mill is not known (even though an
eastern origin has often been proposed), but the windmill certainly
comes from the East, as do the various methods of harnessing horses
and carts, mills for the production of paper, mills for the throwing of
silk (perhaps not the hydraulic one, as that was of European origin),
gun powder etc.121
As to the levels of energy consumption in Europe and other regions
of the world in the pre-modern age a comparison is far from easy to
make. Indirect evidence suggests that:122
– as a consequence of higher temperatures in coeval agrarian civi-

lisations, consumption of fuel must have been lower than that of
Europe, due to the fact that they were generally further south, and
were sometimes in tropical zones;
– cereals or tubers, cultivated in much non-European agriculture,
had a considerably higher yield per unit of area than that of wheat,
predominant in Europe. As a consequence, the area necessary for
119
Gille (1978).
120
White (1940), pp. 144 ff.
121
Singer (1956).
122
Malanima (2006c).
the energy transition 85
man’s energy requirements was, on average, significantly lower (as

we will see in the following chapter);
– working animals were generally used less than in European agricul-
ture.
Available information for China allows a more precise comparison with

Europe than other regions.123 In most parts of China the consumption
of fuel—wood, coal and cultivation remnants—was considerably lower
than in Europe. The average 10,000 calories per capita per day was
only exceeded in the colder northern areas.124 The use of animals in
agriculture was, however, far lower than in Europe. There is evidence
to demonstrate that, around 1800, the consumption of this source of
energy was about 2,000 kcal per capita per day, whilst in Europe it
exceeded 4,000.125 The number of oxen was more or less equal to that
of Europe, but the population was more than double and horses were
never used in agriculture and rarely for transport. In relation to the
population, the use of hydraulic energy was higher in Europe than in
China, due to the fact that wheat is milled, whilst rice is not. With
regard to wind-power, sails were probably more numerous in Europe
than in any other part of the world, including China, at least in rela-
tion to the population.
We can summarise the different levels of consumption in the
European agrarian society and in other 18th-century societies by say-
ing that, while in European society these were around 15,000 kcal per
capita per day, in non-European societies they were between 5 and
10,000 kcal.
The European agrarian civilisation, characterized by short growing
seasons with one, mainly low yield harvest of cereal, such as wheat,
per year, needed a higher average consumption per capita, with its
numerous working animals and the long months of low temperatures.
It was therefore more vulnerable than other agrarian civilisations to
the increase of demographic pressure, with the growing demand of
energy that this entailed.
123
Elements for a comparison between China and Europe can be found in Debeir,
Deléage, Hémery (1986), pp. 57 ff. See also Smil (1979), (1988) and (2004).
124
Pomeranz (2000), p. 231 and pp. 307 ff.
125
See the following Table 5.
Table 5. Energy consumption per capita in Europe 1750 c. (in kcal. per day
and Gj per year).
Sources of energy Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
kcal kcal Gj Gj
Fuel 3,500 30,000 4.5 45.8
Fodder for animals 4,000 6,500 4.3 5.8
Food for human beings 2,000 4,000 3.0 6.1
Water and wind 100 700 0.2 1.1
Total 9,600 41,200 12.0 58.8
6.2. Quantities
Sources of energy have already been considered but now their quantita-
tive importance remains to be investigated. The following are obviously
provisional calculations. Europe, with its 150 million inhabitants, will
be analysed in the era that preceded the Industrial Revolution, around
the year 1750.
All pre-industrial energy consumption analyses must refer back to
the four fundamental sources, which have already been examined.126
In some cases, particularly for fuel, wide differences exist between the
regions of Europe. Firstly it is preferable to identify the range between
minimum and maximum values, between which the consumption of
the different European regions probably lay. An order of magnitude
for the whole continent can then be put forward (Table 5).
Foremost is the consumption of fuel, generally wood and charcoal.
As we have seen, great differences existed between regions of southern
and northern Europe. In the 19th century, the average in south Italy
was about 1 kg. per capita per day.127 In Scandinavia it was almost 10
kg.128 Thus, in terms of daily calories, the quantity could vary from 3,500
to around 30,000. In countries such as Great Britain, the Netherlands
and West Germany it was about 4 kg. per day (14,000 calories). When
fossil fuel was used, such as coal or peat, the same consumption of
12–14,000 calories per day was provided from the combustion of
respectively 2 or 4 kg.
126
Excluding gunpowder. Even today, energy used for military purposes is not
included in the energy consumption balance.
127
Bardini (1998) and Malanima (2006b).
128
For Sweden, Kander (2002).
Given that working animals were smaller than those of the present
day, 20,000 calories was the approximate daily consumption of oxen
or horses. It has been estimated that, in 1750 in Europe, the total num-
ber of oxen and horses was 24 and 14 million respectively, that is, 38
million working animals, thereby representing a ratio of 1 animal to
every 4 persons.129 Thus, on a per capita basis, the animals represented
a consumption of 4–6,500 calories per day.
Variations in the consumption of food amongst the inhabitants
of different parts of the continent were less significant. As regarding
calories, the consumption was, and still is, 2–4,000. The next chapter,
dealing with agriculture, and chapter VII, covering demand, will discuss
this subject in more depth.
When considering the availability of water and wind energy per
person, before the Industrial Revolution, several general estimates can
be made. With the exception of the Netherlands, these carriers did not
exceed 1–2 percent of overall consumption.
Naturally, in 18th-century Europe, many differences existed between
regions and such diversity was greater than today. Northern regions
witnessed greater innovation, ranging from the introduction of horses
on arable land, to the windmill and fossil fuel, whereas the south ben-
efited from greater availability of hydraulic energy thanks to physical
and climatic factors.
For 1850 we have reliable estimates of energy consumption in four
European countries, two northern, Sweden and the Netherlands and
two southern, Italy and Spain (Table 6).
Table 6. Composition of energy consumption in 1850 Sweden,

the Netherlands, Italy* and Spain (%).
Sweden Netherlands Italy* Spain
Food (men, animals) 25 38 41 50
Firewood 73 11 51 46
Wind, Water <1 10 1 2
Fossil fuels 2 41 7 2
* 1861.
Source: Gales, Kander, Malanima, Rubio (2007).
129
Again from Braudel (1979), I, Chap. 5. The same average ratio of a working
animal per family is confirmed by Langdon (2003), p. 216.
Table 7. Per capita energy consumption in six European countries in 1800

(Gj per year and kcal per day).
Gj per year Kcal per day
Sweden 47.3 30,850
England 60.0 39,140
Netherlands 25.8 16,830
France 19.5 12,720
Italy 17.4 11,350
Spain 14.8 9,650
Note: 1 Toe = 10,000,000 kcal = 42 Gigajoules.
Sources: data in the table are based on the research in progress on energy consumption
in Europe by the Energy, Growth, Pollution group. In particular, figures for Sweden
were worked out by A. Kander, for England by P. Warde, for the Netherlands and
France by B. Gales, for Italy by P. Malanima, for Spain by M. Rubio. Data on Portugal
(S. Enriques) start in 1856, when per capita energy consumption was 18.8 Gj. The
criteria followed in the preparation of these series are widely explained by Malanima
(1996) and (2006b), Kander (2002) and Warde (2007).
It may be noted that during this period, fossil fuel was of importance
in the Netherlands, but of small consequence in Sweden, Italy and
Spain.130 In France modern sources accounted for 27 percent,131 which
was already a relatively high level of consumption. Only in England
were fossil sources predominant: 83 percent of total consumption.132
Direct data confirm that, on average, in 1800 Europe, daily consump-
tion per capita was around 15,000 kcal with coal and 13,000 without133
(Table 7).
And previous to this? What was the level of energy consumption per
capita before 1750–1800? Scanty information, together with indirect
evidence summarised above, suggests that European consumption per
head varied, until the 16th century, between 14 and 20 Gigajoules. The
limits of this range were exceeded by the Netherlands and England in
the 17th century (Figure 12).
In this period the capacity to perform work in the different European
regions started to diverge. Whilst consumption of energy per capita
continued to rise in England during the 18th century, that of the
130
Estimates regarding the change to fossil fuels are provided by Bairoch (1985a),
p. 178.
131
This information is based on the series of energy consumption in France—still
provisional—provided by Ben Gales.
132
Warde (2007).
133
In the range between the maximum and minimum defined in Table 5. Coal was
meaningful in England and negligible elsewhere.
70
60
50 England
40
30 Netherlands
20
10
0
1550
1570
1590
1610
1630
1650
1670
1690
1710
1730
1750
1770
1790
Sources: English data are taken from Warde (2007) and are based on direct information;
data concerning Holland are based on assumptions on peat and wind exploitation and on
their increasing diffusion in the 17th century.
Note: The graph illustrates the range (between the straight lines) into which average European
consumption was presumably comprised together with Dutch and English energy consump-
tion.
Fig. 12. Estimate of per c. energy consumption in England and The Netherlands
1550–1800 (Gj/year).
Netherlands remained stationary, or declined. The rise in energy con-

sumption initially experienced by the Netherlands and England was
experienced by most European regions during the 19th century. When
taking into consideration mechanical energy, “shipping apart, the per
capita supply of kinetic energy is likely to have fallen rather than risen
since the resumption of growth in the 16th century.”134 We have in
fact noticed that the extent of forests diminished. It is dubious, as we
will see in the following chapter that the number of working animals
increased in ratio to the population. Water power remained more or
less stationary in per capita terms. A rise in the average temperature
is more likely to have caused an increase in the population than the
availability of consumable goods.
134
Campbell (2003), p. 192.
It must be added that, of this European average of 15,000 calories

per capita per day, only a very small part constituted useful energy.
That is to say, the ratio, as we have seen, between energy that can be
used as heat or for work, and all the energy put into a converter was
modest: less than 20 percent.
The conversion efficiency in different energy systems evolved through
the following four stages:135
%
1. Subsistence Agriculture 5
2. Advanced Agriculture 15
3. Emerging Industrial 25
4. Advanced Industrial 35
Late medieval and early modern Europe was in the second stage.
England progressed to the third stage at the very end of this period.
6.3. Modern growth and energy

While per capita daily energy consumption in Europe at the beginning
of the 19th century was some 15,000 calories a day, in 2000 in Western
Europe it amounted to 142,000 calories.136 With an overall population
of around 150 million inhabitants in about 1750 (European Russia
included) the yearly consumption can be estimated as some 80–85
million Toe.137 At the end of the 20th century yearly European energy
consumption has been calculated at 2 billion Toe.
In order to evaluate the actual increase in available useful energy in
these last two centuries, the energy consumed must be multiplied by
the efficiency in energy consumption. A decomposition of per capita
GDP can be useful. Per capita GDP (Y/P) is, in fact, the result of energy
consumption per capita (E/P) by the productivity of energy (Y/E):
Y E Y
= ⋅
P P E
If we assume:138
y as the annual rate of growth of Y/P;
e as the annual rate of growth of E/P; and
π as the annual rate of growth of Y/E;
135
Cook (1976), p. 135, on which the present figures are based.
136
A percentage of traditional energy is included in this amount.
137
A Toe (ton oil equivalent) corresponds to 10 million kcal.
138
are the derivatives as to time.
70
60
50
40
Gj
30
20
10
0
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
Sources: data in the table are based on the research in progress on energy consumption
in Europe by the Energy, Growth, Pollution group. In particular, figures for Sweden
were worked out by A. Kander, for England by P. Warde, for the Netherlands and
France by B. Gales, for Italy by P. Malanima, for Spain by M. Rubio.
Fig. 13. Per capita energy Consumption in Europe 1800–1900 (Gj).
we can specify the relative importance of e and π in the growth of y,

during the period we are interested in; that is the years from 1820 until
2000. In fact:
y=e+π
In our case, we have:
1.54 = 1.10 + 0.44
The conclusion is that, from 1820 until 2000, the annual rate of growth
of per capita GDP was 1.54 percent, and that E/P and Y/E grew respec-
tively at the rates of 1.10 and 0.44 per year. As a consequence, the input
of energy contributed more than the productivity of energy in the
growth of per capita product. It was 2.5 times more important (1.10/0.44
= 2.5). If we define energy in economic terms as the capacity to perform
useful work, this capacity increased enormously in the last two centuries.
With regard to the movement of energy consumption, the recent
literature affords a clearer picture of the 19th-century trend. On the
basis of direct information on Sweden, England, the Netherlands,
France, Italy and Spain we can now illustrate the long-term trend in
per capita terms (Figure 13).
250
200
150
Gj
100 England
50
Italy
0
1700
1720
1740
1760
1780
1800
1820
1840
1860
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
Sources: data for Italy before 1861 are based on my work in progress and after 1861
on Malanima (2006); data for England are from Warde (2007).
Note: the falls in the English series around 1920 were caused by two years of miners’
strike.
Fig. 14. Energy consumption (England-Wales and Italy) 1700–2000(Gj per c.).
At the beginning of the 19th century, per capita energy consumption

in Europe was some 24 Gigajoules per year. Our curve demonstrates
stability until around 1840 when a clear upward trend is visible, until
the end of the century, with per capita energy consumption more than
doubling in 50 years.
It is important, however, to note the difference in consumption
of the various regions. While energy transition took place rapidly in
northern Europe, this was not the case in the south. England and Italy
represent two different trends in the evolution towards modernity in
energy consumption (Figure 14). While southern European countries
are more similar to Italy, northern Europe resembles England.
We can see that even in 1700 England did not differ much from
Italy, especially when taking into account the lower temperatures in the
north and the necessity for higher fuel consumption and more power
in agriculture. In England at that time, the combustion of coal served
more for heating than for productive purposes. The true divergence
took place later in the 18th century, and particularly during the 19th
century. At the end of the 19th century, energy consumption in England
conclusion 93
was 7–8 times higher than in Italy. As a consequence, the capacity to

perform work was also higher in England than in Italy. As can be seen,
a convergence took place during the last half century.
7. Conclusion
Since the energy of pre-modern economies was constituted by cul-

tivated vegetable products, a clearer quantification of the per capita
energy consumption will be possible subsequent to an analysis of the
agricultural product (in the following chapter). However, technical
changes in the exploitation of energy examined in the previous pages
allow some preliminary conclusions to be drawn.
These changes did not derive from the progress of science,139 as is
the case today, when many innovations are the effect of investment
in research and can be considered as endogenous to the economic
system. Were they random events? It is possible to consider them as
“mutations”, determined by specific and localised needs of those who
developed them.140 Whenever these mutations turn out to be useful in
the evolution of the economy, they become the driving force of growth.
An evolutionary approach to technological evolution seems better
suited than other theories to account for the changes in techniques in
traditional agricultural civilisations.
According to L. White Jr. “modern technology was born of the
Western Middle Ages”. Its labour-saving character was “largely rooted
in religious attitudes” and especially in the replacement of animism by a
“naturalistic view of the world” and the impulse “to make faith concrete
in works”.141 In the period with which we are dealing, no true techno-
logical revolution took place in the mature agricultural civilisation of
Europe. After all, in its basic features, the energy system was still that
which had evolved some millennia before, at the origin of agricultural
civilisations. However, in the central centuries of the Middle Ages,
some considerable innovations were introduced. From a quantitative
viewpoint the main medieval novelty was the exploitation of horses
139
See, however, the interesting approach by Mendelssohn (1976), where the main
push to the economic progress is in any case the progress of science.
140
I follow here the approach developed by Mokyr (1990), chap. 11, where the
evolutionary interpretation of technological change is discussed in depth.
141
White Jr. (1963), pp. 273, 283, 290.
in agriculture. In some northern regions the average level of energy

consumption may have risen. Horses in agriculture, however, allowed
agriculture to expand on those lands where this had previously been
impossible: an innovation which resulted in extensive growth (more
cultivated lands and more men) rather than intensive growth (higher
per capita income). Later, the diffusion of water and wind power in
many different industrial processes, especially in grinding cereals, con-
stituted a significant change. Given the low level of available mechanical
energy even a seemingly negligible addition was not unimportant from
a quantitative viewpoint. The higher temperatures during the Medieval
Climatic Optimum contributed to the increase in the availability of
energy and hence to feeding more people. It is plausible to think that
for some centuries aggregate energy consumption increased, and more
land began to be cultivated by more men. Only temporarily did some
increase in per capita energy consumption actually take place.
Water power rose slightly. A meaningful rise took place in the use
of wind (both because of the diffusion of the windmill and of ships)
and gunpowder which were two main weapons of the European expan-
sion. However, the relative importance of water, wind and gunpowder
was marginal, since together these sources did not account, on aver-
age, for more than 2 percent of the total. Coal and peat only played a
significant role in England and the Netherlands, but on the European
scale both these sources were of minor importance. With regard to the
problem of change in the efficiency of exploitation, it is possible that
the introduction of different tools, the improvement of mills, and the
diffusion of stoves in northern countries slowly increased the energy
yield. However, nothing can be said on the matter with any certainty!
It is plausible to imagine small changes in efficiency, but no important
transformations. In any case, the rise in energy yield during the Middle
Ages and the early Modern Age may probably have been in the range
of few percentage points, that is, between 15 and 20 percent of the total
energy input, but no more!
On the whole, if we compare per capita energy availability in Europe
in 1800 with that of the late Middle Ages, a decline in per capita terms
occurred, despite some important innovations. Population more than
doubled between 1400 and 1800. Energy availability, however, did not.
Since energy sources originated for the greater part in the fields and for-
ests, the examination of agriculture will allow a clearer view of its trend.
CHAPTER III
AGRICULTURE
Agriculture is the key sector in the pre-modern economy, represent-

ing the largest part of the aggregate product and providing occupation
for the majority of the workforce. Until the end of the 19th century,
innovations in agriculture were scarcer than in the secondary or tertiary
sectors. During periods of population growth several different methods
were employed in order to meet the increase of daily needs: woodlands
were cut down, swamps reclaimed, and arable land extended, result-
ing in increased land productivity. However, the increase was lower
than that of the number of workers. The consequence was that labour
productivity diminished. In pre-modern times, energy resources pro-
vided by the agricultural sector—wood and food for man and working
animals—represented more than 90 percent of the energy consumed,
but they increased at a slower rate than the population and therefore
per capita available energy diminished. This downward trend was inter-
rupted by falls in population due to epidemics; however it continued
throughout the 18th century, until at least 1820.
1. Men and lands
1.1. The role of agriculture

During the last few decades less than 5 per cent of the working popula-
tion in western Europe has been employed in agriculture.1 In the 19th
century, the industrial sector developed remarkably and, in relation to
this, the importance of agriculture diminished. This trend continued in
recent times. Food and raw materials were produced more efficiently
thanks primarily to the use of sources of fossil energy, modern machin-
ery, and new fertilizers. A significantly lower number of workers were
capable of providing food for many more people than in the past.
1
Grigg (1982).
MALANIMA_F4-95-158.indd 95 5/25/2009 2:44:03 PM
96 chapter iii – agriculture
Before the 19th century the situation was fundamentally different.

Technical progress was slow in agriculture, and, as a consequence, a
large majority of the workforce was forced to toil in the fields in order
to provide food and raw materials for themselves and the relatively
modest number of city dwellers, which comprised artisans, rulers,
nobles, professional men, soldiers, priests, and so on.
Reliable data on the number of agricultural workers before the 19th
century are nonexistent, mainly because each person was frequently
employed in more than one job. This was the case for peasant families,
who apart from being farmers, spun, wove, and sometimes traded. The
quota of the population between 15 and 65 years old (the labour force)
was then 60–65 percent of the total.2 Between 40 and 70 percent of this
workforce was occupied in agriculture; the equivalent of 30 to 50 per-
cent of the entire population.3 During the first half of the 19th century,
in Great Britain alone a quarter of the labour force were agricultural
workers,4 whereas in western Europe these accounted for between 40
and 50 percent.5 Agricultural product before 1800 was around 40–60
percent of the aggregate product, at times reaching 70 percent.6
1.2. Soil and agriculture

The evolution of the soil moves through a cycle. During growth, a plant
absorbs elements from the environment such as carbon, oxygen, nitro-
gen, potassium, phosphorus and others. These elements pass from the
abiotic (or inanimate) part to the biotic part of the ecosystem (that is
a community together with its habitat). Plants produce carbohydrates,
fats and proteins through the absorption and transformation of these
substances from the soil. The energy that is supplied to man is the result
of chemical links, created during the cycle of growth. In many cases,
these substances are returned to the soil when the fruit falls or the plant
dies. Humans and animals feed on and use vegetable products for their
2
See the figures for France and Great Britain, in 1801–1911, proposed by O’Brien-
Keyder (1978), p. 72, between 65 and 70 percent, but including population 10–65
years old.
3
Bairoch (1992a) estimates, for Western Europe, indicating that the working popu-
lation employed in agriculture in 1800 was 73 percent, decreasing to 59 in 1860 and
48 in 1900. However, these figures are higher than those based on direct data for the
first half of the 19th century. See also Bairoch (1976), p. 15.
4
Crafts (1984), pp. 57–8.
5
Table in Toninelli (1997), p. 600.
6
Some data are provided by Toninelli (1997), p. 601.
men and lands 97
needs, transferring these substances to the external environment as

waste and as heat. The result is that the elements forming vegetation
again become part of the abiotic component of the ecosystem. This
transfer is carried out through the excretory process of consumers and
by the work of parasites, which cause the decomposition of refuse. Thus
the whole procedure ranges from the formation of complex organic
molecules (cellulose, sugars, starches, oils, fats, proteins, and their by-
products) to the breaking down into original elements (carbon dioxide,
water and minerals). In this transformation all the solar energy stored
by the plants is released again as energy, or, in other terms, as the
capacity to perform work.
The plant growth cycle can continue without hindrance when man
collects fruit and vegetables in an occasional manner over vast territo-
ries. It is interrupted when a numerous community repeatedly removes
vegetable products for consumption from a certain area. This began to
take place in geographically stable communities, such as those which
started to form and grow in the Neolithic, from 8000 BC.7 As far as
is known, agriculture advanced towards Europe from the Near East,
where the agricultural revolution primarily developed, at the speed of
1 kilometre per year.8 Agriculture reached northern Europe as long ago
as 5500 years BC (Figure 1).
As the practice of agriculture developed, occasional gathering was
replaced by systematic appropriation of the elements from which plants
are grown. Places of consumption were some distance from the area
where food grew. With time this methodical gathering could compro-
mise and subsequently interrupt the plant cycle. Soil fertility, on the
other hand, could be restored artificially by re-establishing conditions
for new vegetation growth and thereby recovering the cycle. Agriculture
can therefore be defined as the set of techniques with which natural
products are systematically gathered and the means to re-establish the
conditions for their new growth.9 Methodical gathering (harvesting) and
methodical recreation of growth conditions (cultivation) are the two
aspects of every agricultural system.
7
On the problems of agricultural economies, discussed in this Chapter, see a general
overview in Cerman, Steffelbauer, Tost (eds.) (2008).
8
Bodmer-Cavalli Sforza (1976), III.
9
George (1963); Kostrowicki (1980); Wolf (1966), pp. 20 ff.
Source: based on Bodmer-Cavalli Sforza (1976), III.
Fig. 1. The advancement of agriculture from the Near East towards

northern Europe (dates BC).
1.3. Lands and agricultures

Across the globe today little more than a quarter of the 13.5 billion
hectares above sea level form agricultural space i.e. only 3.6 billion
hectares (Figure 2). Before the Industrial Revolution, the area which
underwent continuous cultivation was less vast. The agricultural regions
of the world included southern and eastern Asia, from Japan to Korea,
most of China, Indochina, almost all of India, part of the Middle East
and North Africa, and zones of North and South America. A large
majority of the world population lived in these areas. The density of
populations of mountain dwellers, nomads, shepherds and fishermen,
who lived on the margins of these areas was much lower (Figure 3).
These were a continuous threat to the agricultural civilizations; as,
for example the Barbarians were to the ancient Roman Empire or the
Mongols to medieval China.
Three agricultural ecosystems can be discerned in the infinite diversi-
ties of past agricultures, and all types of cultivation fall within one of
these categories. They can be defined as:
men and lands 99
Fig. 2. Agricultural lands in the World today.
Fig. 3. Agricultural lands in the World in 1500.
1. shifting cultivation or swidden system;

2. wet farming or intensive system based on irrigation;
3. dry farming or fallow system.
These systems of cultivation are distinguished by the method with

which the fertility cycle is restored, that is, with the interruption of
cultivation for some years, through irrigation and lastly through a
period of fallow.10
2. Three agricultural ecosystems
2.1. Shifting cultivation

Although not widespread, the swidden system has not disappeared, even
today. It can be found in the tropical regions of Africa, the southern and
south-eastern mountains of Asia, Indochina, Indonesia and in areas of
Korea. It is typical of sparsely populated regions where the economy is
not labour-intensive. In this agricultural eco-system, cultivation takes
place on the same land for a period of between 3–5 years or more
and, because of such intensive exploitation, after a few years the land
fertility decreases. Since the population is not dense and other land is
available in the vicinity, possibly wood or scrubland, the cultivated area
is abandoned. The nearby ground is cleared mostly by burning before
going on to intensive cultivation for a few years. Elimination of plants
through burning is an elementary form of fertilization, as minerals
contained in ash penetrate the soil; this procedure takes the name of
swidden, also known as slash-and-burn. Only after land, which has been
intensively cultivated and then abandoned, has lain fallow for 20–30
years can it be cultivated again. In the intervening period, the soil has
the chance to recover.
Ten thousand years ago, at the beginning of the Neolithic revolu-
tion, the first agriculture was based on this temporary or swidden
system. This farming method existed in Europe in the early Middle
Ages, when there was abundance of available land. In time, as the
population increased, their increased needs stimulated more intensive
soil exploitation and the swidden system, was substituted for by more
efficient forms of cultivation.11
10
Kostrowicki (1980), pp. 187 ff.
11
Slicher Van Bath (1977).
three agricultural ecosystems 101
2.2. Hydraulic agriculture

Moving on to agriculture based on irrigation means changing from the
most rudimentary method of cultivation to that which has been both
the most developed and the most popular for millennia. Indeed, this
system of agriculture existed in Egypt and ancient Mesopotamia, and, in
the early Modern Age, in India, Persia and most of extreme East Asia,
in Korea and China, Indochina and in the pre-Spanish Andean zone
in Central America and New Mexico. Mainly due to this agricultural
system has 60–70 percent of the world population lived for thousands
of years.
By means of a complicated, widespread network of canals, continu-
ous irrigation permits the re-establishment of ground fertility in wet or
hydro-agriculture. The presence of rivers is fundamental for this type
of cultivation, since river-water, compared to rain-water, provides the
crops with a more constant supply of mineral salts and nutritive sub-
stances. For this reason, uninterrupted crop cultivation may produce
more than one harvest each year, thus resulting in high production per
hectare and providing nourishment for dense populations.
The scarce use of basic agricultural tools and working animals are
factors common to all areas of irrigated agriculture, despite the marked
differences between regions: all work is done by humans by way of his
or her muscle power, with minimal technical support. In China, for
example, the plough, although sometimes pulled by buffaloes, was gen-
erally drawn by man and the few available buffaloes (Indian buffaloes)
were generally for hire and commonly owned by several families.12 The
economic system in this region was very labour-intensive.
In this kind of agriculture grain is the most important crop and
is the basic and frequently the only source of sustenance, whereas
tubers are less widespread. The cultivation of pulse foods, fruit, and
industrial plants is of secondary importance, whilst forage is almost
totally absent. There are very few fields and meadows, nor are they
necessary, being livestock a rarity. Apart from the mountains and the
hills, on which agriculture is not practiced, the remaining tillable land
is all cultivated.
During the early modern centuries, rice was the most important
crop in wet agriculture. It is a considerably more productive cereal
12
Needham (1964); Gernet (1959).
than wheat and today’s yield is five times that of wheat. Probably it
was even higher in the past.13
In wet agriculture, available land per worker is scarce (low land-
intensity), whereas the number of workers is high (high labour-inten-
sity). Capital invested in the peasant smallholdings is minimal, whereas
much capital is involved in the enormous artificial water network. Many
generations of extenuating toil have resulted in the control of rivers
and in the digging of canals and drains.
Small family farms are inextricably linked by collective enterprise in
the carrying out of work on the irrigation network. Due to continuous
irrigation and the presence of a high-yield cereal such as rice, extremely
high productivity of the soil is achieved, thus favouring demographic
growth. The consequence is that malnutrition and high soil productivity
exist side by side. For this reason, agricultures such as those of China
or India have been often considered as examples of the so-called “Asian
paradox”.14 Higher productivity leads to an increase in birth rate rather
than better standards of living. Incomes are low and living conditions
modest. While in Europe, techniques and machinery were used to
spare man from hard labour, in Asia this did not occur because of the
dense population and consequent consistent supply of labour. Malthus
wrote of China that “the country is rather over-peopled in proportion
to what its stock can employ, and labour is, therefore, so abundant,
that no pains are taken to abridge it”.15
At the beginning of the 16th century, wet farming also existed in
America. It is found in the economy of the Aztecs in Mexico, in that of
the Maya in Central America and in that of the Incas in South America.
In these economies, maize and potatoes permitted high productivity
from the land with a much higher yield per hectare, in terms of calo-
ries, than in Europe. In some cases the yield was as much as five times
higher, as is shown from a comparison of different regions in the 16th
century (Table 1).
13
Bray (1986), p. 45.
14
Lattimore (1962).
15
Malthus (1798), Chap. XVI.
Table 1. Yield per hectare of rice, maize and wheat in 16th century
agriculture (kgs. per hectare).
Cultivation Place Kilograms

per ha
Rice, irrigated fields Southern China, Taiwan 2,500
Rice, dry cultivation Northeast Thailand, Part of India 2,500
Rice, floating cultivation Deltas of Mekong, Chaqhraya, 1,500
Ganges
Rice, slash and burn Areas of Southeast Asia 1,500
Maize, irrigated fields Mexico 1,000
Maize, dry cultivation Central America 1,000–1,300
Wheat and rye, dry Europe 400–500
cultivation
Sources: on Asian agricultures: Tsubouchi (1990); on Mexico: W. Bray, (1968), pp.
119 ff.; on Central America: Wilhelmy (1981), Chap. 4; on Europe: De Maddalena
(1974a).
Note: in reality, one should allow for husking, which reduces the weight of rice by
about 20–25 percent and that of wheat by only 10 percent.
2.3. Dry agriculture

Examples of irrigation are not uncommon in early modern Europe,
especially in Lombardy and the Low Countries.16 From the late Middle
Ages onwards, the presence of abundant water had permitted high
yields in these regions of the continent. In all other parts of Europe
agriculture was organised very differently, the dominating system being
dry-agriculture based on fallow. In the rest of the world this form of
cultivation was insignificant. During the early modern age it only con-
cerned approximately one fifth of the world population. Therefore the
European type of agriculture was an exception.
Since the Neolithic age, 10,000 years ago, the European continent
has been less favoured from the point of view of energy availability,
than others, especially after the development of agricultural societies.
Previously, well-developed societies of hunters and gatherers existed
in Europe. When agriculture became the most important economic
activity, the cold temperatures of the northern regions, the absence of
flowing water that permitted large scale irrigation, the relatively brief
growth periods for the produce of the land—which made harvesting
16
For the modest irrigated acreage in European agriculture in comparison with
Asia see Federico (2005), p. 45.
more than one crop a year impossible—all prevented the establish-

ment of sizeable settlements. The rise of population in Europe became
possible only with the adaptation of agricultural techniques specific to
the environment, a rather different situation from that existing in the
Middle East and North Africa where agriculture first developed.
In Europe neither the hydrographical system permitted abundant
and continuous irrigation (as in the irrigation system), nor was culti-
vable land so abundant that it could be abandoned for long periods of
time (as in the swidden system). The possibility of restoring fertility to
exploited land was therefore entrusted to: rainfall, temporary interrup-
tion of cultivation, and manuring.
Vegetable products harvested in Europe absorbed virtually all the
water necessary for their ripening from rain. Rainwater, however, is
poor in minerals required by the plant during the vegetative cycle. The
land was therefore subject to sharp drops in fertility due to brief cycles
of continuous cultivation. This entailed that it was of fundamental
importance to leave the land uncultivated for periods of time, which
were usually one year in every two or three.
The periodic interruption of cultivation is called fallow and the system
by which it alternates with other crops is known as rotation. The farmer
divides his land into two parts, and each year cultivates one part whilst
the other lies fallow. This system, known as two-field system, gives the
soil an opportunity to regenerate.
Rotation can become more complex when, instead of cultivating half
the land each year, two-thirds (three-field rotation) or three quarters
(four-field rotation) or more are cultivated (Figure 4).
In this way, fallow land is less extensive than in the two-field system.
The land is divided into three, four, or more fields, each of which rests
for one year in every three or four years. Generally, with this system, it
proves necessary to rotate the crop on each field every year. Considering
that each plant absorbs different quantities of elements from the ground,
this substitution is a means of exploiting the land less. The wheat sown
on the first field will be replaced the following year by oats. In the case
of three-field rotation, the third year the field will be left fallow. In
this way, every field will be subject to two different cereal crops, then
subsequently left fallow.
The Chinese were amazed when they heard of this strange and
complicated system of cultivation used by the barbarians in the far
West. They could not believe that—according to a 17th century Italian
writer—“after bearing fruit once, our fields are totally depleted: further-
Legend: 1. Fallow land; 2. Winter cultivations; 3. Spring cultivations;

4. Meadows; 5. Buildings and gardens; 6. Lawns; 7. Forests.
Source: Kostrowicki (1980), p. 241.
Fig. 4. Three-field rotation in the village of Limbach, East of the Rhine
Valley (19th century).
more, it is worth our while to leave them to rest for a year, in order
to allow them to regain fertility, thereby recovering what was lost: in
addition to the extenuating servitude that we dedicate to the land”. In
China it was totally different, “thanks above all to the fertile, life-giv-
ing water which by weaselling its way underground keeps the land soft
and fertile; there is such an abundance of water that flows and then
spills over”.17
However, in order to restore fertility to the land, rotation alone is not
sufficient. Fertilising becomes of utmost importance, restoring the earth
with nitrogen, an element that only partly penetrates into the ground
thanks to rain and micro-organisms. In European dry-agriculture ani-
mals are not only necessary for the energy that they provide, but also
for the manure that they produce. The most important characteristic
of the European system of cultivation was the combination of both
17
Bartoli (17th c.), p. 43.
106 chapter iii—agriculture
agriculture and livestock farming on the same land. It is in this combi-

nation that it differs from that of Asia, where agriculture and livestock
breeding were separated.18
In Europe, wheat is undoubtedly the most important crop, whereas
in wet agricultures rice, maize and potatoes are often the main prod-
ucts. The diffusion of rice and maize in Europe, starting from the late
16th century, and of the potato from the end of the 17th were only
important in some regions and not before well into the 18th century.
Despite the use of these new products, the cereal yield of the European
dry-culture was much lower than that of wet-agriculture. It has been
calculated that in Europe, on reasonably fertile flat land, a peasant fam-
ily of five members would require between 5–10 hectares to survive.19
In comparison, in China only 0.50–1 hectare was sufficient to meet
the requirements of rice for a family of five people. This relationship
between humans and the land implied that, without animal power, a
European family would not have been able to cultivate an area of 5–10
hectares or more, whilst it would have been possible for a Chinese
family, with 0.50–1 hectare.
When comparing wet farming and the European dry agriculture, it
clearly emerges that the latter is land- and capital-intensive, but not
labour-intensive. In Europe, the cost of labour was probably no higher
than in China or in other areas of wet agriculture and the few available
figures on wages in China20 reveal little difference to those of Europe,
both being close to the subsistence level. “In the advanced parts of India
and China, grain wages were comparable to those in north-western
Europe”.21 However, this level was reached in the irrigated farming of
the past on much less land. In Europe therefore, the cost of labour was
higher in terms of land; that is, each worker had greater need of natural
resources in order to be capable of working. To understand European
agriculture and its evolution better, it is initially necessary to focus on
the main institutions of the rural world, that is the peasant household
and the manor.
18
As noted by Weber (1898), Chap. I.
19
De Vries (1976), p. 35; Abel (1966), Chap. VI; Lis-Soly (1979).
20
For example in Chao (1986), pp. 217 ff.
21
Broadberry, Gupta (2006), p. 2.
peasant economies 107
3. Peasant economies
3.1. The peasant economy

The dominant enterprise in the European countryside before modern
economic growth was the peasant household with the land it cultivated.
Family and enterprise, which today represent two separate subjects
of economic life, were at that time one and the same.22 The produce
of the land of the peasant household was above all the means of the
family’s subsistence. The contact with the market, although of funda-
mental importance at times, was not sufficient to influence the nature
of farm production. The main concern was to provide for the needs
of the family nucleus following the traditional pattern.23 One of the
distinguishing features of this small peasant household was, in fact, the
limited employment of external, paid manual labour.24
Despite this, the agricultural household was in contact with the out-
side world. It was under the influence of the political power of the State
and taxes had to be paid. The market town, however distant this may
have been, constituted the central place for the sale, although limited,
of produce and the purchase of few available manufactured goods.
Traditional peasant families, it has been noted, are always “with one
foot in the market and the other in subsistence”.25
3.2. Peasant household

The rural family was patriarchal in structure in the sense that the role
within the household depended on age, sex and order of birth. Until
the 19th century and even later this family structure was dominant in
some areas of Europe. Only in recent times has the family (the rural
family included) transformed its hierarchy and authoritative struc-
ture into an association of individuals with more or less equal rights.
However, the recent literature has stressed the many different kinds
of peasant households, which depend on “the diversity of possible
modes of adaptation to a specific physical environment”.26 A distinctive
22
Mitterauer-Sieder (1982), pp. 71 ff. See also Anderson (1980).
23
Warde (2006).
24
The work by Chayanov (1925) is still important in order to understand the features
of the peasant economy.
25
Ellis (1988), p. 3.
26
Mitterauer (1995), p. 28.
feature of European peasant society is “the great variety of different rural

family forms and the great variety of alterations caused by economic
changes in rural society”.27 Peasant households have been considered as
special “ecotypes”, whose demographic features are influenced by the
natural resources, the way in which they are used, and the intensity of
the work load over the year.28 Rural societies controlled their size and
their adaptation to the environment by regulating both nuptials and
fertility. This interdependence of social norms and economic needs
gave origin to several different family structures.
The patriarchal structure of the rural family derived primarily from
the fact that the main means of production was the land.29 “Access to
resources and land was strictly regulated by social norms in rural pre-
industrial societies”,30 especially through the control of nuptials and
fertility. The norms of the peasant household represented a kind of “pre-
ventive check”, in order to avoid the “positive check” of mortality.
Landowners, that is the older men, guided the family, and the pre-
vailing sentiment of other family members towards them was respect,
rather than affection. There was reserve as far as feelings were concerned
and formalism marked both the marital relationship and that between
parents and children. Sentiment is pushed into the background and
suppressed in this peasant family. Marriage was usually the result of
an agreement between households, with decisions made by the elderly.
There was no room for so-called romantic love in this world.
How many members does this peasant family comprise? In Europe,
before 1000, the simple conjugal family was the most common, as has
been highlighted by studies on France, Germany and Italy.31 Four to
five family members generally made up a household. It was a dynamic
family structure, which had adapted to an economy where available land
was abundant. The marriage age was low and it was relatively easy to
leave the paternal hearth in order to form new family cells and farms.
In late medieval times and during the early modern age, the peasant
family included one or two grandparents, the married couple, children,
often an aunt or an uncle, and, in many cases, one or two servants.32
27
Mitterauer (1995), p. 29.
28
Rudolph (1995), p. 9.
29
Medick (1977) and (1976).
30
Fauve-Chamoux (1995), p. 86.
31
Toubert (1986), pp. 344 ff. See also Leverotti (2005), p. 44.
32
Hilton (1974), p. 209.
It was therefore an extended or complex family, made up of two to

three generations.33 It was larger than the usual nuclear family of our
epoch, made up of 3–4 people; even though size alone is not enough
to identify the family structure. In fact, in an age when mortality was
high, the presence of three generations in the same family was often
hidden because of the death of many members.
It can be supposed that the trend of forming more complex families,
in late medieval times and in the early modern age, developed parallel
to the increase in population and the consequent scarcity of available
land. Since the opportunities of obtaining the means of basic produc-
tion, i.e. land, were limited, economic independence was reached later,
weddings were postponed, the marriage age increased, and the young
remained longer in their paternal home. The possibility of migrating
to the towns and becoming servants in smaller and relatively richer
households was a feature of the internal adaptation of family structure
to the economic environment.34
Europe is, however, made up of several different regions, and the
combination of forces at stake could give many different results, some-
times in contrast with what would appear to be the basic outline of the
family. For example, in England even before the Industrial Revolution,
the number of members per family was low; with an average of 4.75.35
The nuclear family was predominant not only in the city, but also in the
countryside. Moving from central-northern Europe towards the South
and East, household structure becomes more complex. In the 15th and
16th centuries, in certain areas of central and southern France and
northern Italy, the number of complex families sometimes approached
75 percent,36 as in Eastern Europe. Here the high number of extended
families stemmed from the fact that land belonged to the family and
not to the individual.37 There was no reason to create an independent
economic base at the time of marriage, as all the members had a right
to hereditary landed estate. Households of up to 30 people existed in the
Balkans (Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bulgaria).38
33
Laslett (1988) (for the terms used for different kinds of family).
34
See the examples in De Moor, Van Zanden (forthcoming).
35
Laslett (1972). See, for the Netherlands, Van der Woude (1972), pp. 309–13.
36
However, see the differences even in different Italian environments in Leverotti
(2005).
37
Macfarlane (1978), pp. 16 ff.
38
About the characteristics of the European family with respect to the rest of the
world see also Laslett (1977).
3.3. Peasant income

We have already seen that the quantity of land necessary to provide for
an average peasant family of northern Europe was usually between 5
and 10 hectares. However, the property of peasant families was nearly
always smaller, although ownership of land by peasants was widespread.
In 16th-century France 80–90 percent of land which was owned by
peasants, was less than 5 hectares.39 In late 14th-century Flanders, in
the sandy regions at considerable distance from the sea, some 1,000
peasants out of 1,250 owned fewer than 5 hectares.40
With the demographic decline during the second half of the 14th
and the whole of the 15th century, small property ownership recovered.
There was more land for the survivors. From the late 15th century,
when the population began to increase, properties were once more
fragmented. At the end of the 15th century, the majority of small
landowners produced enough grain to sell some at the markets, but
by the beginning of the 17th century the situation had deteriorated
for many. The small landowners were therefore obliged to buy grain as
their own land produced insufficient amounts.41 This was already the
case in England in the 16th century. At the end of the century, half
the privately owned land was still the property of peasants. This figure
drops to 30 percent by the end of the 17th century. At the beginning
of the 19th century it was only around 10–15 percent.42 The number of
peasants with very modest land plots increased simultaneously.
The differences between one area and another were huge; however
almost everywhere in the early Modern age the peasant properties were
insufficient to provide for the food requirements of the household.
Expropriation of peasants land was, on the whole, more visible in
England than in France and Germany.43 The differences which emerged
in the early modern centuries between England on the one hand, and
France on the other, were still visible at the end of the 19th and the
beginning of the 20th century. At that time only 20 percent of cultivated
land was farmed and managed by the owner in England, whereas in
France this figure was still 52 percent.44
39
Lis-Soly (1979).
40
Mendels (1981), p. 79.
41
Le Roy Ladurie (1966), I, pp. 150 ff. and 239–59.
42
Macfarlane (1978), pp. 11–12; Coleman (1977), pp. 43–46.
43
See the decline of small landownership in France in Jacquart (1974), pp. 101 ff.
44
Bloch (1960).
Even though the situation somewhat differs from one area to another,
there is a marked tendency towards a weakening of the basis of the
peasants’ subsistence; through an expropriation of the family’s fun-
damental means of production, the land. Although the causes of this
were various, a significant one was demographic growth. In a society
where agricultural techniques developed very slowly, the multiplication
of men, given the system of inheritance, meant the division of land
among an ever greater number of heirs. It consequently became dif-
ficult for them to afford economic independence. The fragmentation of
property also concerned that part of Europe—southern France, Great
Britain, Scandinavia—where primogeniture dominated and land was
inherited by the eldest male.45 This situation was a precondition to the
sale of land to more powerful neighbours and consequently to peasant
expropriation. Therefore the number of people who resorted to renting
land and who were completely landless increased. The latter became
wage earning farmers or labourers. The disintegration of the old rural
system caused a reorganisation in the structure of economic relations
in rural society: rent fees, wages and market purchase became custom-
ary and people could rely less on self-sufficiency. There was increasing
dependence on the buying and selling of goods; that is on money.
Since land ownership by peasants was diminishing, the family was
obliged to resort to renting. The peasant economy was characterised
by the coexistence of small farms together with medium and large
landownership.46 The small farm was ordinarily composed of privately
owned lands together with land rented from more than one source:
from a nobleman, the church, a monastery, a citizen, or a wealthy
farmer. The peasant family, whose house was in the village, often
had to cultivate pieces of land scattered at some distance across the
surrounding countryside and almost always interlinked with those of
other landowners.
Nearly all peasant families in the regions of central-western Europe
we are examining here, on the whole managed subsistence by renting
half or more of the land they cultivated. Rents were paid in money as
from the beginning of the 11th century and, in order to procure this
money, it was necessary to sell a part of the farm produce at markets.
45
See the map on the inheritance systems in Europe in Abel (1951).
46
Bois (1976), p. 352.
The expropriation of the peasants and the extension of the monetary

economy were two sides of the same coin.
Self-sufficiency was diminishing in this central-western area of
Europe, due to the increasing use of monetary exchange. Only a limited
part of the foodstuffs necessary to feed the family was produced on its
own land; this often constituted less than half the required amount. In
England, where expropriation of peasants was quite advanced by the
late Middle Ages and where much property was rented and paid for
with money, the monetary economy advanced rapidly. In English vil-
lages the sale of goods on the market, the presence of wage earners, the
payment of fees in money were all already present in the late Middle
Ages.47 There were, however, areas even in western Europe where the
market influenced the economy to a lesser extent. Such was the case in
scarcely populated mountain areas, where communication was more
difficult and everyone attained self-sufficiency from woodland and
farm produce. In mid-17th century Ireland, a large majority of the 1.1
million inhabitants ate food that was not bought from others.48 In the
same period, on the other hand, the autoconsumption of home-grown
products was almost nonexistent in the northern Netherlands.49
All the energy of the farming families and animals was employed on
their lands, whether owned or rented. The cultivation was principally
carried out by the men; even though children and women collaborated
when necessary, above all during the summer months, that is, during
periods of more intense labour. Given the variations of agricultural
activity throughout the year, peasant labour was far from fully utilised.
Although the women usually cared for the domestic sphere of the
household and men were responsible for outdoor tasks, a complete
division of the roles between the sexes in the peasant family could not
be accomplished. Often women and children cooperated with men in
the fields.
Many other occupations appear alongside agricultural work. Multiple
activities were a distinctive feature of the peasant household. The most
frequent jobs ranged from textile production, where women were com-
mitted to covering family needs, to local trading, to work assisted by
animals when and finally to cottage industry of which the home-produce
47
Hilton (1975), pp. 38 ff.
48
Petty (1691).
49
On the basis of a conversation with Ad Van der Woude.
was sold in nearby villages, or to merchants dealing in distant towns.50

In short, the family nucleus was a remarkably flexible organism within
the peasant world.
The peasant family income was a composite income. In modern
terms, part of this income could be considered as a kind of wage;
although this wage was often represented by the part of the agricultural
product that the family kept to cover needs for subsistence after the
payment of rent. If the peasant was the owner of all or part of the land
he cultivated, another fraction of the income could be considered as
rent (although this rent was represented by another part of the product
the family obtained on the land it cultivated). Whenever the peasant
was the owner of livestock, he was an investor of capital, thus part of
his income could be considered as interest. Finally, since any farm was
a kind of enterprise, we could even discern a component of profit in
the total peasant income. The historian of the agricultural world has
to disentangle these several different items in the composite peasant
income in order to represent this in modern terms.
3.4. Famine
Farming economy was, at least partly, protected by the wide range of
sources of income. When one of these was reduced or exhausted, it was
sufficient to change the equilibrium and further exploit other sources:
from cereal cultivation to the production of livestock, craftwork, or
local trading. Nevertheless, the farming family remained fundamentally
vulnerable, subject as it was to variations of the physical environment,
to natural hazard and uncertainties. The outcome of uncertain events
can make, in the case of the peasants, the difference between survival
and starvation.51 This was inevitable as the cultivation of cereals was
the basis of both diet and income, and all the other sources were of
secondary importance. The whole farming economy plummeted when
grain production collapsed. In this case the farming family suffered a
series of disastrously linked consequences. Initially, the most painful
effect of the crisis was a dramatic reduction of the food that reached
the tables from the fields. Subsequently, taking agricultural products
to market became impossible, thus cancelling the sale of any surplus
50
Medick (1977). The subject of industrial work of the farming family will be
examined in Chap. V.
51
Ellis (1988), pp. 82 ff.
products, which was often an important element of farming income.

In a short time, any modest savings accumulated over the years to
provide the dowry for a daughter or for hard times, dried up. With
them minor cereals were purchased, such as barley and rye instead of
the more expensive wheat, with the effect of worsening the diet both
in quantity and quality.
The effects of the agricultural crisis also extended to the industrial
sector and any attempt on behalf of the farmer or more often his wife,
to increase the output of textiles, woven for the local market, proved
impractical. The agricultural underproduction caused an under-con-
sumption of manufactured products and, therefore, a sharp fall not
only in textile production, but also in the production of other second-
ary articles.52 Why? All farming incomes, whether from exchange, or
from sales, reduce during an agricultural crisis. Therefore, how should
manufactured goods like a new spade, a few plates for the house, shirts,
or a winter cloak be bought? Every purchase was forgone and wear-
ing old clothes became a necessity. Demand for manufactured articles
200
150
100
50
-50
-100
1250–51 1300–01 1350–51 1400–01 1450–51 1500–01 1550–51 1600–01 1650–51 1700–01 1750–51 1800–01 1850–51
Source: Malanima (2002), App. III. The series is available in the website of the International Institute
of Social History (www.iisg.nl).
Fig. 5. Wheat Prices in Tuscany 1250–1860 (% deviations from the trend).
52
The work by Labrousse (1933), II, pp. 320 ff. is still important on the topic.
200
150
100
50
-50
-100
1250–51 1300–01 1350–51 1400–01 1450–51 1500–01 1550–51 1600–01 1650–51 1700–01 1750–51 1800–01 1850–51
Sources: 1250–1325—Farmer (1969); 1326–1450—Thorold Rogers (1866–1902), (and the comments

and changes by Usher (1931); 1450–1649—Finberg (ed.) (1967), IV, pp. 814 ff.; Harrison (1971);
1650–1749—Thirsk (ed.) (1967), pp. 826 ff.; 1750–1860—Mingay (ed.) (1986), VI, pp. 972 ff.
Fig. 6. Wheat Prices in England 1250–1860 (% deviations from the trend).
dropped, production was reduced, and craftsmen joined the farmers

begging at the main door of the church.
What if disaster repeated itself and famine recurred for two, three,
or four years in succession? By then, acorns would have been ground
into flour to make bread and even grass by the roadside and in the
fields would have disappeared, transformed into food by famished
populations. Years of consecutive disaster were not frequent, but seri-
ous famines did occur, such as that of 1590–92, which struck many
Mediterranean regions, those of 1645–54 and 1764–67 affecting most
of Europe, and devastating many areas of the continent, and later on
that of 1815–17.
Product instability, particularly agricultural product instability, was
an important feature of pre-modern economies. Yet the quantity of
evidence on the matter is scanty, because annual information on agrar-
ian production is usually lacking, except for small, specific areas. In any
case, prices, and especially those of wheat, the main agricultural product,
suggest the magnitude of this instability. Looking at wheat prices in
England and Italy, we perceive, thanks to the deviations from the trend
of the annual prices, how wide the fluctuations of the agrarian economy
were and what vast consequences they could have for the everyday life
of past populations (Figures 5 and 6). These wide fluctuations are well
documented for any European region.53 The growth of agricultural pro-

ductivity and the great improvement in transportation has drastically
reduced this annual instability over the last two centuries.54
4. The village and the manor
4.1. The village

A village is more than merely a settlement of farmhouses grouped
together. It is a rural community; that is to say a group of people,
mostly farmers, linked by complex relationships and sharing eco-
nomic interests, family ties, and sometimes even political orientation.
Anthropologists define a village as a local organisation based on face
to face relationships.
It has been calculated that some 200–250,000 villages existed through-
out the whole of Europe in the early Modern Age.55 Large and small
villages, but they usually had less than 1,000 inhabitants. Most were
even smaller, made up of a few dozen families; a few hundred people
or less. These are the basic communities of the rural world. A descrip-
tion of a 16th–17th century French village reads: “about one hundred
households, 4–500 inhabitants, 60–70 active heads of the house. Among
them two thirds are peasants . . . There are ordinarily one-two millers.
The last third of the active population includes some craftsmen . . . Some
administrative officials and a lot of widows are always present”.56
The village inhabitants were mostly farmers with land in the neigh-
bourhood. These farmers lived alongside a minority of craftsmen such
as the cobbler, the blacksmith, the tailor and the weaver, who supplied
the most urgent and often recurrent needs of the farming families.
Professionals were even less numerous, such as the schoolteacher, the
parson, the doctor (who appears from the 17th century onwards) and
sometimes the notary.57
Cooperation and protection, supported by a web of interpersonal
relationships, were recurring features of the village. Periodically the
53
See the Austrian example in Cerman (2006), p. 3 ff.
54
See, in any case, the analysis by Persson (1999).
55
Huppert (1986), (even though Huppert presents only an estimation of 160,000
villages for Western Europe).
56
Jacquart (1974), I, pp. 136–7.
57
Jacquart (1974), I, pp. 138–9.
the village and the manor 117
heads of the families assembled to discuss economic problems between

inhabitants, arguments with nearby villages, and relations with local
lords and the central government.58 Relations within the social structure
of the community were often less than amicable, with rifts and divisions
into contrasting clans, or stratification into social groups with differ-
ing interests. The numerous documents surviving from the villages of
the Ancien Régime in Europe mostly concern arguments and disputes
between families over a plot of land, disagreements between neighbours
over stream water or a well, clashes over the exploitation of communal
land etc; these disputes sometimes continued for decades.
4.2. Common lands

The village covered an important economic function for its people. It
possessed assets, usually land, belonging to all the inhabitants, hence
the name common lands. Some were vast, as in mountainous zones,
others were of a limited size, but all had an important economic value
for the population of the village, whether they were woods interlaced
with streams and fishponds, or cultivated fields and pastures. Within
limits, the inhabitants were allowed to chop wood, produce charcoal, fish
and hunt, cultivate some plots, and above all graze their work animals
and sheep: all beasts that would have been difficult to feed without the
use of common lands. The most important function of common land
was that of grazing and to a lesser degree grain cultivation. Sometimes
the village rented out parts, or all, of the land to its own inhabitants. In
this case, the community budget generated an income; thus enabling
the payment of expenses, such as a schoolteacher’s or a doctor’s salary,
or even local taxes.
By making use of these communal assets, many farming families
integrated the family income originating from their own or rented land
and from casual work carried out by members of the family in different
periods of the year. Furthermore, for those farming families without
land, who lived from hand to mouth every day and for the most part
worked for wages, during the periods when agricultural work was more
intense common lands were the main source of income, and in some
cases the only one.59
58
See, for Germany, Robisheaux (1989), pp. 33–4.
59
On common lands in Italy, see the fine article by Corona (2004).
These families, like those of the English cottagers, who may have
built their own hut on common land, also grazed a cow, a pig or a
couple of sheep when fortunate enough to own these.60 Hunting was
another benefit that not only integrated income, but also provided a
source of protein in a diet primarily based on carbohydrates. Humble
dishes were also enriched with products from a kitchen-garden planted
near the house. In those villages where the common land was more
extensive, the animals belonging to each family were gathered into one
large flock and entrusted, often in turn, to one or more shepherds from
among the inhabitants.
4.3. Open fields

In some periods common exploitation of land was carried out on what
are known as open fields, which should be distinguished from common
fields.61 These open fields were private property. We have seen that lands
belonging to the same owner were divided into fields, sometimes some
distance one from the other and intermingling with other proprietors’
land. These could also be situated in different villages as not all the
land within the boundaries of a village belonged to the residents of
the same village. Fields in the ownership of city dwellers were found in
certain communities, and landed estates of nobility were often situated
in distant areas. Moreover, the lands owned by a family together with
rented fields rarely made up a compact area of land. The cultivation of
a variety of crops and the distance between the owner’s fields created
a form of insurance against the risks of poor harvest: a bad year was
unlikely to strike dissimilar crops in different areas.62
In certain parts of southern France and Germany, the fields appeared
as long thin strips (Figures 7 and 8). Neither fence nor hedge separated
the strips of cultivated land despite the fact that the property most prob-
ably belonged to different owners.63 For this reason, the whole village
was forced to follow the same rotation scheme and cultivate the same
crops. No other system could have existed; independent or individual
initiative would have resulted in total chaos. Without a hedge or fence
to divide the property, how could stock-rearing possibly have been
60
Everitt (1967), p. 418 ff.
61
Garavaglia (1985).
62
Mc Closkey (1976).
63
Bloch (1930) and (1952).
Source: Bloch (1952).
Fig. 7. Open fields in Spoy, Côte d’Or, canton Is-sur-Tille

(end of the 18th century).
Source: Kostrowicki (1980).
Fig. 8. Open fields in the village of Weisbach (Franconia, 18th century).
tolerated in one field whilst, in the next, wheat was germinating? It was
therefore necessary for private property to be subject to common law
in the form of compulsory rotation. Wheat was sown, for example, on
a large part of the cultivable village land in November and harvested
in July or August. The following year, on the same area, oats were
sown in spring and the year after the land lay fallow. Although they
were individual properties and were farmed by different owners, the
fields were cultivated following the same rotation pattern and were all
left to rest during the same period i.e. between one season’s harvest
and the sowing in the following season and during the year when the
land lay fallow. During this particular period the privately owned fields
became common domain and were then occupied collectively by the
villagers who gleaned the remaining grains of cereals left in the fields
after harvesting and allowed animals to graze (known in France as
vaine pâture).
It is therefore apparent that, within this system, land was private
property during the period that stretches between sowing and harvest-
ing, whilst during the rest of the year it was collectively exploited and
the right of property was suspended.64 However, this system was not
common to all regions. In some central-northern European regions,
landowners also made use of their own property after harvesting, grazing
only their own animals. Here, the fields were not long strips without
physical boundaries, but compact polygons surrounded by small walls
and hedges. In the larger part of Flanders and Normandy, the agricul-
tural landscape displayed these characteristics.
4.4. The rationality of the system

It is not easy to comprehend the rationality of this system of agricul-
ture and the origin of its three main features: the common lands, the
division and merging of the fields, the collective use of private land.
Only hypotheses can be put forward regarding the formation of this
complex system. It is probable that the oldest component was rep-
resented by common ownership of village land.65 This possibly dates
back to Germanic tribes, in times when land was abundant due to
low population density. Therefore the need to claim possession of a
resource so extensively available was absent. The increase in population
64
Dahlman (1980) is both useful and stimulating on these themes.
65
Thirsk (1964).
resulted in scarcer availability of land, thereby accounting for the gradual

appearance of private property. Land that was isolated or difficult to
cultivate remained communal, whereas arable land cultivated with
cereals became private property. Each owner could therefore enjoy the
fruits of his own efforts.
The system of land inheritance in an ever-increasing population led
to the second feature typical of this type of agriculture: the inextricable
tangle of ownership. A single property was initially split between sons
and then between the son’s sons only to reassemble through marriage
and the transfer of inheritance; thereby giving rise to a new composite
structure very different from the original one.
The third element of the system, that is the collective use of fields
after harvesting, derived from the necessity to feed the livestock. One
consequence of the demographic increase was the development of arable
land that came about at the expense of pasturage, precisely when the
cultivation of cereal required a higher number of animals and greater
quantities of manure. It was therefore necessary to make the most of
every opportunity, however slight, to nourish the livestock, even if this
meant capitalising on fallow land and on the poor pasturage of stubble
left after harvesting.
The restriction of private right in order to make space for collective
pasturage was a rational solution to the problem of finding an efficient
combination of land and livestock. For the same reason, the land that
was communally owned, and used in large part for grazing, represented
rational use of a scarce resource such as pasture.66
4.5. Agrarian individualism and enclosures

Economic stability in rural communities was only apparent. Variations
in the balance of different factors such as land availability, livestock and
population could affect the economic life of the village on the whole
and cause gradual transformation. The slow increase in communication
between villages and the rise of specialisation, that is the spread of trade
relations, were all reasons for the breakdown of the communal balance.
Mercantile exchanges were gradually leading the village community
towards both technical and productive innovation. This innovation, on
the other hand, had more need of private property. Thus, community
66
Dahlman (1980).
rules were becoming an impediment and making the village economy

less efficient and more impractical. Freedom of individual choice regard-
ing productivity became the best solution. At this point, it could be
convenient to recompose the scattered strips of land into single com-
pact properties separated by clearly defined boundaries such as fences
or hedges. Whosoever desired to embark on a new kind of cultivation
was free to do so and would have advantages from the success of his
initiative or suffer the consequences of his failure. Naturally on these
properties community rights had to cease, thereby opening the way to
so-called agrarian individualism which meant that the individual, free
to choose the use of his own land, became the leading factor instead
of the community. There is no doubt that this change contributed to
the efficient growth of many agricultural areas of Europe where market
institutions were widening and new relationships developing.
The reorganisation of landownership into organic complexes, and the
abolition of common rights developed through the enclosures.67 The
enclosure was “the consolidation of scattered strips, and the abolition
of communal rights and decisionmaking”.68 Many European countries
were affected, in varying degrees, by this change. It was, however, merely
one event in a long process, which, above all in the 18th century, led
to the elimination of many rules and institutions that were a hindrance
to the development of agriculture. In some cases, the enclosures rep-
resented a widespread process resulting in fundamental modification
of the methods of cultivation and agricultural organisation. In others,
and above all in southern Europe, the enclosure process was a more
superficial phenomenon and only marginally affected the conditions
of the landed estate and of the agricultural system in rural communi-
ties. Here community rules had much less influence. The enclosure of
land did not necessarily represent a basic change towards agricultural
modernisation.
During the 18th century the process of enclosure developed in two
directions:
1. common lands were divided between the landowners of the com-

munity or sold by the village community;
67
Garavaglia (1986).
68
Dahlman (1980), p 147.
2. the use of communal grazing on open fields was abolished, whilst

privately owned lands were reorganised in order to form compact
units. This is the typical example of the system of enclosure found
in England. As always, however, this process of enclosure presented
infinite variations in different areas.
In conclusion, therefore, a landowner who possessed 5 percent of the

land and had his fields scattered about the village territory, was given
land which was more or less united and which had virtually the same
value and size as the previous property. The owner also received a quota
of communal property equal to the quota of the land that he owned
in the community. He was now private owner of five percent of the
common land and had the right to fence in his land in order to keep
sheep, goats, cows, and livestock in general from straying and grazing,
but also in order to keep his fields safe from neighbouring danger. He
had already been owner of his land, but now the land was his property
more than ever before. “Enclosure, per se, did not raise yields”, but
“farmers in enclosed villages could pursue more productive methods;
in particular they could practise capital-intensive agriculture”.69
4.6. The manor

The manor is another of the secondary powers in the society of the
ancien régime and, as an institution, was much more important and
powerful than the village. In north-western Europe, between the 9th
and the 13th centuries this institution was one of the pillars of rural
life, being the most powerful in terms of political strength and thus
influencing life in peasant society for a long period.
Originally, in its classic form during the 9th and 10th centuries,
the manor or seigneury was a combination of economic elements and
power relations.70 The manor was the result of a relationship between
the inhabitants of a certain zone, particularly peasants, who received
military protection from a rich landowner and in turn committed
themselves to providing auxilium et consilium, that is to say help and
assistance in peace and, above all, in war.71 It was a relationship, which
69
Allen (1992), p. 137.
70
Brunner (1939), II, 1.
71
Brunner (1978), Chap. IV.
entailed reciprocal obligations and set rules for the contracting parties.72
In virtue of this agreement the lord of the manor ensured sources of
authority and income, such as the revenues from justice, the monopoly
of economic structures, for example the mill, and rents or taxes which
the peasants were obliged to pay.
To those who did not own land, the lord conceded a farmstead (in
Latin mansus) composed of enough land to maintain a family. Another
part of his land, the reserve or demesne, that is, the manorial estate, was
made up of undivided territory that was never distributed amongst the
farmers. It was on this land that the lord generally resided. The demesne
was cultivated by means of corvées that is compulsory unpaid labour
by those peasants who received a farmstead from the lord and became
his serfs. Both slaves and labourers contributed to the cultivation of
the demesne, but on a minor scale. Curtis is the Latin term used to
indicate the combination of the demesne and the farmsteads and the
expression manorial or seigneurial economy refers to the agricultural
organisation on which the manors were based.
The manorial system (seigneurie in France) took root in northern
France, (except in Brittany and Maine), in the regions of the Rhine and
the Moselle, in modern day Belgium, in western and southern Germany
and in northern Italy. The manorial network was more loosely knit in
southern Bourgogne, in Alvernia, in the south of France, in Catalonia, in
central Italy and above all in northern and western Germany. In England
and Denmark, the manor developed only later, in the 11th century,
whereas further north in Norway, Sweden, this institution was totally
unknown. In the Netherlands its importance was only marginal.73
The manorial economy began to disintegrate during the 11th and
12th centuries,74 and the economic bond between demesne and farm-
steads weakened. The lord transformed the compulsory labour duties
of the serfs on his manorial estate into the payment of rent in money
or in kind. During the 16th century, the corvées had been eliminated in
western Europe, thereby modifying the economic relationship between
landowners and farmers, resulting in the disappearance of the manorial
economy. On the other hand, the relationship of power between the
72
Brunner (1939), IV, 1c.
73
De Vries, Woude (1995), pp. 159–60.
74
Boutruche (1959–70), I.
lord and the inhabitants of the land subject to him survived long after
the disappearance of the manor.
The power which the landlord wielded in the countryside (and not
only because he was a landowner) made him beneficiary of other sources
of income, even though these were much less consistent than that from
his land, at least in the early modern age. This further revenue, received
as lord of the manor, consisted of dues for the use of the mill, the
fulling mill, the oil press, from hunting and fishing rights, from taxes
which to some degree were still due (on bridges and roads) and from
the justice which he administered (i.e. fines).75
Subsequent to the Middle Ages the lord’s power was further weak-
ened. The dues were paid to him in exchange for protection from
enemies and for internal administration of justice. However, when the
State, with its bureaucracy, its judges and army, took these tasks upon
itself in order to create a single centre of power both in peace and war,
the power of the lord of the manor was gradually absorbed by that
of the State. The remaining rights of the lord of the manor appeared
to the country dwellers as mere privileges which were unjustified and
incomprehensible abuses of power.
4.7. The manorial economy in eastern Europe

The history of the manor in eastern Europe was very different. The
strength of this institution during the early modern centuries was one
of the major differences between central-western and eastern regions.
While this institution was weakening in early modern western Europe,
it was, on the contrary, becoming stronger in the East.
Eastern Europe comprises the regions between the River Elba to the
West, the Balkans to the South and the Volga to the East. The major
political formations in this vast area in the 16th and 17th centuries were
the kingdom of Bohemia, the kingdom of Hungary, the kingdom of
Poland and the Princedom of Moscow. The physical characteristics of
these regions were quite dissimilar, ranging from the forested areas
of the northern band to the southern steppes in Hungary, the Carpathian
and Sudete mountains, and to the valley of the Danube right at the foot
of the Balkans. A common characteristic of much of the area was the
presence of extensive plains, though these were employed for different
75
Goubert (1969), p. 94.
types of agriculture and so produced diverse kinds of agricultural

goods. Products ranged from cereal, wood and skins in the Baltic area
to fur in Russia, metals from the Carpathian—Sudete Mountains—,
livestock from the plains around the Black Sea, and grain and metals
from the Balkans.
These oriental regions were closely connected with the rest of
Europe.76 Before the 11th century, the intense economic and cultural
contacts with the South, with Muslim Asia and with the Byzantine
Empire had made eastern Europe a sort of hinterland of these south-
ern civilizations.77 From the 11th century onwards, when the western
European economy was on the upturn, relations between East and West
intensified:78 in trade, with metals, grain and livestock which reached the
West from the East overland and across the Baltic Sea; in the circulation
of population, with the flow of people, peasants and feudal lords beyond
the Elba, as the population in the West increased; in culture, with the
adoption of the Renaissance models by a part of Hungary, Poland and
Bohemia. Integration on the continent was taking place.79
However, diversity between East and West was noticeable. To the
differences from a geographical point of view we can add those in
demography, in urbanisation and in the levels of economic develop-
ment. In the 14th century, when in the West demographic density per
km2 numbered some 20 inhabitants, Poland and Bohemia figured about
10, Hungary 8 and Russia and Lithuania 2.80 As for the towns, these
were more scattered and smaller in the East than in the West. In late
medieval times the only towns east of Elba to exceed 30,000 inhabitants
were Prague and Gdansk. At the end of the 15th century the centres
considered as towns were calculated to be around 600 in number.
Many of these (some 60 percent) were towns privately owned by feu-
dal lords. Only five or six approached or exceeded 10,000 inhabitants.
In Hungary only the city of Buda counted 8,000 inhabitants whereas
another 7 towns numbered between 4,000 and 7,000 and 11 towns
totalled only 3,000 people.81 The limited urban development and the
low demographic density were at the same time proof and consequence
76
Many elements can be found on this theme in Malowist (1972).
77
A. Lewis (1978b), pp. 309 ff.
78
A. Lewis (1978c) and (1951), p. 216.
79
See Maçzak, Samsonowicz, Burke (eds.) (1985).
80
Samsonowicz, Maczak (1985), p. 8; Petrusewicz (1977), p. 9.
81
Fügedi (1985).
of relative underdevelopment of the East compared to the West: the

former having larger quantities of land and fewer people and the lat-
ter many people with relatively scarce land, but with larger cities and
greater capital endowment.
Regarding agricultural conditions, eastern Europe of the late medieval
period presented several analogies with the West. However, along with
demographic growth, a change occurred in the relations of production
and the institutions of the countryside: rent dues began to be paid in
money and in kind; wage work became more common and village
communities were formed, even if their power and influence was much
weaker than those in the West.
A diverging trend between East and West became discernible from
the mid-15th century, which is when the population began to grow.82
In the West the weakening of the manorial economy and the diffusion
of paid rent and wage work continued and spread. In the East, the situ-
ation developed quite differently. Despite the differences between one
region and another, the overall tendency was towards a strengthening
of the reserve economy and an increase in serfdom. Systems of agri-
cultural organisation developed similarly to those characteristic of the
manorial economy in western Europe several centuries earlier. At the
end of the medieval era therefore, this system of agricultural organisa-
tion spread East of the Elba, where it had never become established
during the high Middle Ages. At the end of the 15th century corveés
were disappearing in the west of Germany whereas in the East they
were becoming widespread.83
The increase in labour services and in their intensity illustrates the
progress of this reserve economy. Every peasant family had to provide
labour services on the landowner’s demesne in exchange for the farm
which received and often together with the payment of other dues in
money or in kind.84 In Poland, prior to the 16th century, the obligation
of the corveés was only a few days per family, per year. This rose to
three days per week for a member of every family towards 1550 and
six days towards 1600. In the meantime wage labour on the demesne
was diminishing. In Hungary the demesne economy developed from
1530–40.85 Labour services were one day per week for a member of a
82
This is the approach of, among others, Pach (1964).
83
Robisheaux (1989), p. 35.
84
Braudel (1979), II, Chap. III; Kriedte (1980), pp. 28 ff.
85
Zytkowicz (1985), p. 78.
family towards 1514; later they became two and then three. Shortly
after, the required services rose to one week out of two, resulting in
“intolerabilis servitus”,86 as some contemporary wrote; a heavier serf-
dom than that experienced by the peasants of western Europe around
the year 1000. Similarly in Bohemia and Prussia, the reserve economy
progressed, though on the whole it was less onerous than in Poland
and in Hungary. It seems, in fact, that Hungary and Poland were the
regions in which servitude was most widespread and exacting.
Towards the 17th century this “feudal economy” was dominant
to a greater or lesser degree in nearly all areas of Europe beyond the
Elba: Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Lusatia, and parts of
Saxony, Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, Russia, whilst in Austria only
a few eastern areas adopted this system.87 Along the lower course of
the Danube servitude was established later than anywhere else; only
being adopted, to the South in the Balkan areas, under the Ottoman
sovereignty around the mid 16th century. Here centrally managed rural
estates (chiftliks) spread. The landholding regime transformed “from
a social and economic structure founded upon a system of moderate
land rent and few labour services to one of excessive land rent and
exaggerated services”.88
How can such a divergence in the institutions of the rural world
between the East and the West be explained? The initial factor dur-
ing the 16th and 17th centuries in eastern Europe, was, as had been
the case in western Europe, an increase in internal demand from the
growing population, from the developing towns and from the armies.
Foreign demand also increased. However, this increase did not come
about, as in the West, in densely populated regions with diminishing
availability of land and a peasant population dwelling in villages which
had been long accustomed to negotiating contracts with landowners,
in areas where there were many towns, with central power strengthen-
ing at the expense of the nobility. In the East, the influential variables
were somewhat different. Above all, the relationship between land and
labour was different. In the 17th century, when the overall population of
Europe was some 100 million inhabitants, 25 million lived in the East
and the other 75 million in the West. In the East there was abundance
86
Pach (1964), p. 27.
87
Knittler (1993).
88
Stoianovich (1953).
land productivity and labour productivity 129
of land suitable for cereal crops. This being the case, the cultivation of
land would have been excessively expensive had landowners turned to
wage labour and marginal labour productivity was high because the
ratio of capital and land to labour was high. It has been calculated that
in Poland, in the last decades of the 16th century, had the nobles made
use of wage labour instead of serfs to work the land their rent would
have been one third less.89 The alternative solution of renting property
did exist in the East before the end of the 15th century, but with such
huge amounts of land available the dues would have been very low.
On the one hand, therefore, there was an increasing demand for
agricultural products both internally and, though somewhat less, exter-
nally and, on the other hand, a combination of production factors that
made contractual arrangements between landowners and peasants not
advantageous for the former. Hence the most convenient solution, at
least from the landowners’ point of view, was to rely on the compulsory
labour of serfs.
5. Land productivity and labour productivity
5.1. Agricultural progress

In a biological energy system, such as the one existing in pre-modern
agrarian economies, the number of human beings simultaneously rep-
resents both an advantage and a danger. It is an advantage in as much
as more humans provide more hands, but a danger when the greater
necessity for nourishment is considered. In the first chapter we have
seen that population described two rising trends, the first from the
9th until the 14th century and the second from the late 17th century
onwards. These two rising trends were separated by a long period of
decline and stability: from the 14th until the end of the 17th century.
We have now to see how the agrarian economy responded to these
demographic changes. In order to present a clear picture of the man-
environment relationships it is opportune to start with the following
production function:
Y = AF (L, K, R)
89
Kriedte (1980), p. 28.
where the agricultural product Y is expressed as a function of labour (L),

capital (K) and natural resources (R), while the parameter A represents
the state of technology. We can also simplify the previous function by
considering natural resources as a kind of capital. K is, then, a com-
posite variable which includes the stock of animals employed in output
production, the amount of usable land, the tools, the rural buildings
and all other physical factors and natural resources that contribute to
production. We can rewrite the previous equation as:
Y = AF (L, K)
Dividing by L we have the so-called intensive form of production
function:
= AF ⎛⎜ ⎞⎟
Y K
L ⎝L⎠
where output per worker (Y/L, that is the average productivity of
labour) is a direct function of the ratio between capital (K) and labour
(L) together with the level of technology (A). Whenever the ratio K/L
diminishes, since a rise in the number of workers (the denominator)
is higher than that of capital (the numerator), the product per worker
also diminishes, unless technology does not increase thereby mak-
ing labour or capital plus resources more productive. If the ratio K/L
diminishes and technology does not counterbalance this decline, the
consequences are diminishing product per capita (from agriculture)
and worsening living conditions. The population will react to this
decline by working harder, thereby improving land productivity (here
in K). On the contrary, whenever capital per worker increases, the ratio
capital-labour rises and output per worker rises simultaneously, thus
creating the basis for improvement in living standards. This improve-
ment is stronger wherever capital incorporates new and more efficient
techniques or new types of knowledge (which is also a form of capital,
or human capital).
We will see how, not only in Europe, innovations and investments
which came about in medieval times and which increased labour pro-
ductivity, became scarcer over the following centuries. The situation was
only reversed during the 19th century when substantial improvements
in the living conditions of the European population occurred due to
an increase in labour productivity.
We already know the trend of population and discussed, at the start
of this chapter the magnitude of the workforce employed in agricul-
ture. This workforce, however, changed over time both because of the
increase in the number of people employed in agriculture and the
working hours. Now we will follow the changes in K, then in L, and
finally the changes in A.
5.2. The cultivated areas

The colonisation of new lands on the continent is well known: despite
geographical differences over a short period, the evolution of these
reveals basic similarities in the different areas and corresponds to dif-
ferent epochs of population movement.
The following three phases can be distinguished:
1. colonisation: 10th–14th centuries. Medieval colonisation came about

in the span of time from the 10th to the 14th century, during which
the population approximately tripled. Consequently, the boundar-
ies of farming shifted and woodland regions were cultivated for the
first time. From the 10th century settlements multiplied, along with
the conquest of new agricultural lands. Furthermore, through the
initiative of the lords, castles were built and scattered inhabitants
of the region concentrated around these built up areas protected by
fortifications.90 This is another aspect of demographic expansion and
human conquest of space. Among the settlement processes, which
took place on the continent, one of considerable importance was that
which occurred from the 12th century onwards, beyond the river
Elba.91 A veritable migration took place. Thousands and thousands
of German settlers flooded into eastern Europe. The European bor-
der was pushed further East and thousands of farming villages were
created. In East Prussia alone there were as many as 1,400, with a
population of about 150,000 people;
2. de-colonisation and colonisation: 1350–1650/1700. A process of de-
colonisation followed the Black Death in the mid 14th century.92 With
the European population diminishing by about one third, what need
was there for new land? The tilled land was too plentiful. A rise in the
ratio capital-labour (K/L) took place, in this case not because of the
90
See above all Toubert (1977).
91
Aubin (1966).
92
Kershaw (1973).
increase in the numerator of our previous function, but through the

decrease in the denominator. With respect to preceding centuries, at
that time there was an inverted process and widespread abandon of
land. This process is particularly evident in central-eastern Europe.
Many villages founded one or two centuries earlier became com-
pletely depopulated. German historians have called them Wüstungen
and French historians villages desertés, that is abandoned towns and
villages.93 At the same time grain cultivation left space for orchards
and pastures and in some cases, as in Hungary and Denmark, cattle-
rearing progressed. In other areas sheep farming was established, as
in Spain, where the number of Merino sheep, a race originating from
West Africa, reached 2.5 million toward 1450 and almost 3 million
around 1500. The Mesta, created in 1273, was the organisation that
gathered the most important breeders of transhumant flocks.94 The
respite in European colonisation reversed during the second half
of the 15th century, when increase in population resumed. As the
demographic growth of the late 14th and 15th centuries was, to a
great extent, a recovery following the decline caused by the plague
in late medieval times, so also the process of colonisation consisted
mostly in the reclaiming of land abandoned after 1350. The basic
tendency was that of an increasing “cerealization” of agriculture,
through the conquest of new space, and conversion of pastureland
or tree culture to grain. Among the main events of conquest, two
deserve more attention for the major commitment of men and capi-
tal. The first consists of colonisation towards the East. The European
agricultural border was moved eastwards. The second saw widespread
extension of agricultural land with the recovery of land from the sea,
in several regions of northern Europe;95
3. new colonisation: after 1650–1700. During the 17th century, the
increase in cultivated areas was interrupted until demographic revival
93
I follow Abel (1953).
94
An 18th century Spanish author described the Mesta as daughter of the plague
(“hija de pestilencia”), as much of a devastator as locusts and syphilis (“comparable a
la langosta y a la sifilis”) that had been created by the hated Berber infidels, and like
them had come from Africa and been introduced into Spain after the plague “para su
mayor devastacion”. Cit. in Klein (1920), p. 22.
95
This phenomenon was of great importance in the Netherlands as here, thanks to
the creation of dykes and other structures using hydraulic engineering and all requiring
a substantial investment of capital, vast areas of land were taken from the sea.
came about from the end of the century and during the following
one.96 It was estimated that, between 1750 and 1850, 140–190,000
km2 were cleared in Europe (not including Russia).97 Throughout the
19th century, not only did this process of conquering new space for
agriculture continue, but it also spread out of Europe, opening up
new lands on other continents, especially the Americas. These vast
areas of natural resources were for the most part entirely unexploited.
Thus, during the period 1840–1915, 35 million people emigrated
from Western Europe to the Americas; the equivalent of around
half a million per year.98 This corresponded to a quarter or a third of
the whole European demographic growth. Whilst in Europe labour
was abundant with respect to the scarcity of land, in the Americas
the ratio between these two factors was extremely different, there
being many virgin resources and so few workers. Therefore the
workforce there required huge capital and, above all, machinery to
exploit these resources.
5.3. Rotation
During the early Middle Ages when the density of population was low,
two-field rotation—grain on half the land with the other half lying
fallow—widely prevailed in Europe.99 The use of three-field rotation
spread with the growth of the population, which took off from the
10th century. It is certain that this form of rotation did not originate in
the high Middle Ages. Because of the abundant rainfall in the regions
of Europe on the Atlantic coast, it was customary even in the early
Middle Ages to follow the strategy of subdividing ground into three
parts which were subsequently seeded in autumn and spring before
being left fallow.100 Wheat or rye were sown in autumn and in March
barley or oats. This type of cultivation could have several advantages.
96
There are plenty of examples on this new phase of expansion, from Brandenburg
and Prussia to Schleswig-Holstein (where the cultivated area increased by more than
20 percent), to Breisgau (74 percent), followed by Catalonia, Holland and France (10
percent): Kriedte (1980), p. 105. In 1600, tilled land in France amounted to 36 percent
of the total, increasing to 50 percent in 1789. In the course of the 18th century, the
expansion of cultivated areas in Italy was 10 percent: Caracciolo (1973), p. 544.
97
Williams (1990), p. 180.
98
Livi Bacci (1998), pp. 188–89.
99
On the process of intensification as a consequence of demographic growth see
Boserup (1965) and also (1981).
100
Duby (1973).
First of all, instead of half the land, only one third was unutilised each
year. The spring oats provided more plentiful foodstuff for the horses,
and the working capacity of man and animal was better employed, as
work on the fields was more evenly distributed throughout the year. It
is to be considered though, that the crop yield (the ratio between the
cereal harvested and sown) of land cultivated for two consecutive years
was lower than that of ground sown one year and left to lie fallow the
next. Nonetheless, the product of the whole cultivated area (tilled and
fallow) increased.
It is known that on the lands of the great monasteries of North Gaul
the three-year rotation was already carried out in the 9th century101
and in the following centuries progress was made in this area. In 12th
century England it was common practice. Although it was introduced
into Poland by German settlers in the 13th century, it remained an
exception for a long time, but it appeared in Russia at the end of the
15th or beginning of the 16th century.102 According to some scholars,
three-field rotation continued to be unknown in southern Europe dur-
ing the high Middle Ages because spring sowing and cultivation of oats
would have been difficult for climatic reasons. Actually, in northern
Mediterranean regions, during the Middle Ages, three-field rotation
was anything but unfamiliar, having been developed in the Roman
era. In the early Middle Ages it may have been abandoned when the
population was scarce with respect to land availability. However, it
progressed again at a later date. This system of agriculture is found on
the plains of Italy, southern France, and Spain.
5.4. Mixed farming

From the second half of the 17th century onwards, cattle breeding
became more important in some regions of the continent. This increase
is surprising because during such a period of demographic growth, a
decrease rather than an increase in cattle farming would have been
expected; more demand exerting pressure on resources, and thus leading
to exploitation of the land principally for the growth of food. If some
areas witnessed expansion in cattle farming, it was due to modification
in the rotation system and the success of new animal food products.
Despite pressure from the population to convert pasture into arable
101
Parain (1966).
102
Gille (1962), p. 477.
land, it was impossible to totally eliminate working animals, which were

therefore diversely integrated into agriculture, especially in Lombardy,
the Netherlands and England.
Throughout the European continent agriculture had always seen the
presence, on the same land, of both cereal cultivation and livestock.
European agriculture was in reality already a form of mixed farming.
When mentioning mixed farming with regards to England, historians
refer to even closer integration between livestock farming and cereal
cultivation. English landowners adopted a system of cultivation which
had been well known in Flanders and in specific areas of Lombardy
since the high Middle Ages. However on careful inspection it may be
noted that the knowledge necessary for this system of cultivation was
not new and had already been recorded by Latin agronomists.103
This new system was based on the cultivation of forage on land des-
tined to lie fallow. Forage impoverished the land less than cereals, whilst
at the same time it could be used for the raising of farm animals. A
system of continuous rotation thereby replaced the traditional three-field
rotation system with no field ever remaining fallow. This took place in
Norfolk and other areas of England, especially to the South and East,
when the turnip was taken from the vegetable garden and cultivated
in the fields as a fodder crop, and when alfalfa, clover, sainfoin and
darnel began to be cultivated on a large scale. In the 18th century the
so-called “Norfolk system” introduced a four-field system cultivating
grain, turnip, barley and clover in close succession. The extension of
the system of irrigation was generally connected with the diffusion of
these crops thus taking a step towards agricultural intensification.
There were several positive consequences for agriculture. Above all
the land was more intensively exploited, due to continuous crop rota-
tion and consequently each field produced a crop every year. Formerly
livestock had survived on meagre grazing, while now a higher number of
animals had an abundant diet in stables and thus each head of livestock
produced a higher quantity of manure. This quantity could vary from
less than 5,000 to approximately 10,000 kilos each year.104 As a result,
the pastures no longer in use could be turned into arable land or could
produce forage. Greater quantities of fertilizer rendered the land much
103
Ambrosoli (1992).
104
more fertile and therefore the yields higher. The quantity of kilocalories
per hectare was in 1800 England twice that in 1600.105
It has been said that mixed farming in England caused a veritable
agricultural revolution, which in turn paved the way for the Industrial
Revolution.106 This innovation came about above all in areas of England
where fencing and agricultural independence had rapidly progressed.
5.5. New products

During the 17th century the diffusion of new agricultural products
contributed to the intensification of land exploitation, that is, the total
amount of calories obtainable from any hectare of land. To achieve this,
new products were widely cultivated, most of which originated from
the Americas. During this period a biotic transfer occurred from the
western world to the East and from the East to the West, thus creat-
ing worldwide homogenisation of the landscape107 and permitting the
diffusion of animals and products which were not originally native to
these areas. The diffusion of these products came about, above all, in
the European countryside when population pressure rose again and
especially in periods of crisis.108
The most important agricultural products that reached Europe in
the Modern Era were:
1. maize: although present in some areas during the 16th century it was
not until the end of 17th that it spread to a part of Europe extend-
ing from the North of Spain and Provence, through the whole of
the North of Italy (especially the Po Plain) to Slovenia and Hungary
and subsequently to the Balkans. For the farmers in this vast region
maize represented a considerable contribution to the availability of
foodstuffs, being from 50 to 100 percent more productive per hectare
than other cereals;109
2. potato: another plant which originated in America. One hectare
cultivated with potatoes could supply a caloric value two to three-
105
Overton, Campbell (1999), p. 200.
106
Overton (1996a).
107
Crosby (1972).
108
As happened in France: Morineau (1971), p. 70.
109
Levi (1991), pp. 156 e 164. See also Gasparini (2002). The diffusion of rice was
more limited, only interesting the North of Italy and some areas of Spain. Rice was of
Asian origin and was already well-known in Italy in the high Middle Ages.
fold that of a hectare cultivated with grain; sometimes even higher.110

In 18th-century France it was calculated that the yield of grain per
hectare was equal to 600–900 kilos whereas that of potatoes was 5,000
per hectare.111 Already well-known in Europe at the end of the 16th
century, potatoes spread into the countryside’s of Germany, Austria
and then Switzerland, northern France, Flanders and Ireland in the
second half of the 17th century. However, they continued to be used
almost exclusively for animal food and at the very most might have
been seen on the table of the poor, as for example in Ireland at the
end of the 17th century.112 Major progress was made during the first
decades of the 18th century although in England it was slow and
hard-won, whereas in Flanders, Ireland and northern Germany it was
considerably faster and potato cultivation almost totally replaced that
of grain. Diffusion was greatly boosted due to a general shortage of
cereals. However the potato was not particularly popular in France
and Spain until the end of the 18th century. In northern Europe
(Sweden and Norway), southern Europe (Italy) and western Europe
(Poland, Russia) it was introduced later on and was cultivated only
little until the beginning of the 19th century.113
Amongst other new products which appeared or spread from the sec-
ond half of the 17th century onwards were: the mulberry tree, already
important in northern Italy, and of increasing importance in southern
France and Hungary; tobacco and hemp, cultivated in large quantities
in the northern Netherlands from about 1675 onwards, and finally,
cabbage, turnips, tomatoes, hops and woad in southern Europe.114
5.6. The yields

Some information referring to the trend of land productivity can usu-
ally be gained from evidence relative to the yield of grain, with an
estimate of the ratio between the quantity of a type of grain produced
and the amount that was sown, or of the ratio between the quantity
produced and the tilled land. This kind of information is, however,
110
Grigg (1982), p. 84.
111
Toutain (1961), p. 94.
112
Braudel (1986) II; Mendels (1981), pp. 130–1. Il tema della diffusione della patata
verrà ripreso nel cap. V.
113
Masefield (1967), p. 346.
114
Slicher Van Bath (1965), p. 141.
incomplete, as it was possible that the cereal yield remained stationary

or even declined in the presence of an increase of land productivity.
This is possible when, for example, other types of cultivation, such as
fruit trees, were grown alongside grain, or after an increase in livestock
production, hence an increase in the value of agricultural product to
be divided by the land surface.
Thanks to numerous detailed studies, it is possible to trace the trend
of yield ratios in Europe as a whole. Due to increased exploitation of
the land there was a rise in such ratios during the high Middle Ages.
Population was rising and people tried to obtain more calories from
the land. Each peasant family tried to boost the production of cere-
als, not only thanks to methods which have already been taken into
consideration, such as tillage, deforestation and land reclamation, but
also by more frequent crops, deeper ploughing, and repeated fertilising.
In the high Middle Ages product to seed ratios rose from the modest
levels of 2–3 to 4–5–6.
In the centuries that followed, cereal yields barely exceeded the levels
of the high Middle Ages and during the 16th century the average figures
were between a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 7.5 (Table 2).115
When comparing the crop yields of the 16th century with those of two
centuries later, a decrease is noticeable in all European regions. Between
the periods of 1500–50 and 1700–50 the diminishing yield of grain was
22 percent in both England and the Netherlands; 17 percent in France;
Table 2. Average yields for wheat, rye and barley in 16th century Europe
(ratio between product and seed).
1500–50 1550–1600
England, Netherlands 7,4 7,3
France, Spain, Italy 6,7 —
Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia 4,0 4,4
Russia, Poland, Bohemia, Slovakia, Hungary 3,9 4,3
Source: Slicher Van Bath (1977).
115
Although new data have been more recently elaborated on yield ratios in
Europe—e.g. Le Roy Ladurie, Goy (1982) and Bavel, Thoen (eds.) (1999)—on a half
century basis they do not modify previously published data such as those presented
in the following tables.
Table 3. Average yield ratios of wheat, rye, barley and oats 1500–1750 in
Europe (ratio between product and seed).
1500–50 1700–50 Decline (%)
Wheat 4,0 3,2 –27

Rye 4,6 4,3 –8
Barley 5,0 3,7 –32
Oats 5,1 4,0 –27
Source: Slicher Van Bath (1965), p. 138.
8 percent in central Europe and Scandinavia (32 percent for rye) and
30 percent in eastern Europe (Table 3).
The reason for the decline may have been the slowing down of demo-
graphic growth during the 17th century. When population pressure
diminishes there is no reason to intensify cultivation in order to attain
a higher product per hectare. The decline in the level of temperature
during the central phase of the Little Ice Age contributed, on the other
hand, to declining output per hectare.116 In this period “yield ratios
either ceased to increase or even began to fall”.117
It is also interesting to single out the difference in the level of yields
among different crops (Table 4).
Table 4. Average yield ratios of wheat, rye, barley and oats 1500–1750
North East North-West South
1500–50 1700–50 1500–50 1700–50 1500–50 1700–50 1500–50 1700–50
Wheat 4.0 3.2 4.7 3.6 8.7 7.0 5.4 4.3
Rye 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.6 8.1 7.2 4.5 7.1
Barley 5.0 3.7 5.2 3.9 6.4 5.3 5.1 7.0
Oats 5.1 4.0 4.1 2.4 4.4 2.9 5.5 7.1
Source: based on data in De Maddalena (1974a).

Note: North: Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia;
East: Poland, Hungary, Russia;
North-Western: The Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain, northern France;
South: Italy, southern France.
116
As noticed by Galloway (1986).
117
Van Zanden (1999a), p. 357.
Table 5. Average yields of wheat, rye and barley in 1800 Europe

Wheat Rye Barley Oats
England 11.3 — 12.7 9.0
Netherlands 11.2 7.5 14.2 11.1
Belgium 11.5 12.22 14.1 13.2
France 6.4 5.5 6.8 8.2
Italy 4.1 4.4 5.0 5.2
Spain 4.5 2.5 7.0 —
Germany 7.1 5.6 6.7 8.0
Austria 4.0 4.0 4.6 5.2
Sweden 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.0
Russia 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.6
Source: Van Zanden (1999a), p. 359.
The decline in yields is to be noticed over the two centuries along with
the relatively high level in north-western Europe compared with the rest
of the continent. However, between 1500 and 1750, the decline did not
mean a downward trend in land productivity. Cereals were only part
of the agricultural product and their decline was partially compensated
by the introduction of new products and the increase in agricultural
working time. In the second half of the 18th century yields recovered
in England, Belgium and the Netherlands. In the rest of Europe they
remained stable or diminished118 and in France remained low until
1840.119 In 1800 a big difference existed between the yield ratios in
northern and southern Europe (Table 5).
Certainly “the elasticity of supply in southern European agriculture
was much lower than that in the countries around the North Sea”.120
In Belgium the rise in land productivity during the 18th century is
frequently referred to as an “agricultural revolution”. This, however, is
not strictly correct even if one considers the introduction of the potato
and the rise in cereal yields. “Although land productivity responded
positively to the rapid population growth and rising prices after 1750, it
realised a less marked increase. The increase in yield since 1750 cannot,
118
Slicher van Bath (1977).
119
Morineau (1971).
120
Van Zanden (1999a), p. 371.
therefore, be attributed to an agricultural revolution”.121 In per capita

terms a fall of product occurred.
5.7. Working time

Past agricultural societies were characterised by a structural labour sur-
plus. On Russian peasant families at the beginning of the 20th century,
A. V. Chayanov wrote, that if we add to the agricultural work “all this
work in crafts and trades, we still have to recognise that peasant labour
is far from fully used and gives us a use rate not exceeding 50 percent.
The main reason for this undoubtedly lies in the particular features
of labour organisation in agriculture: in contrast to the processing
industry, in which labour processes are not connected with any time
of the day or year, a great part of the agricultural process is exclusively
seasonal in nature, and some demand particularly favorable conditions,
which are not always present”.122 The presence of redundant labour as
a resource of past agrarian economies cannot be forgotten. This esti-
mate, based on Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, represents
a reality prevailing to a certain extent in Europe in late medieval and
early modern times, although, as will be seen, work intensity increased
century by century.
In past agrarian societies, demographic growth was initially faced with
more intensive land use in order to increase output.123 Intensification of
land is, however, connected with intensification of labour. Cultivation
was carried out with greater care and more time was devoted by the
peasants to any given plot of land. The process is represented in Figure 9.
Marginal utility (Um in the Figure), for the peasant farm, dimin-
ishes as soon as the product (Q) increases. At the same time, however,
the cost of producing one extra unity is rising (Cm). In E we find the
traditional equilibrium of the peasant farm. If the number of family
members rises, the curve of the marginal utility displaces itself to the
right (Um1 and Um2). The cost, in terms of working hours, rises in
order to face the need of feeding more mouths (from E to E1 and E2).
The volume of product (as we see on the horizontal axis) rises from
Q, to Q1 and Q2, thanks, however, to a higher cost in terms of hours
devoted to cultivation.
121
Dejongh (1999), p. 28.
122
Chayanov (1925), p. 74.
123
Boserup (1965) is an important book on this theme.
U Um2
C
Um1
Um
Cm
E2
E1
0 Q Q1 Q2 Q
Fig. 9. Utility and cost on the peasant farm.
For the process of pre-industrial economic growth in Europe, increase

in the intensity of labour was of primary importance. In the long run,
the number of working hours per person did undoubtedly increase.
Researchers are inclined to overlook this tendency, which is often
underestimated or even neglected by historians. It is perhaps true that
“the main tendency towards economic development in the 18th and
19th centuries consisted of an increasing intensity of labour and a
greater diligence in work. The economic growth of the first period of
industrialisation only marginally derives from greater endowments of
capital goods. It was the greater employment of labour which deter-
mined the results.”124
Two factors brought about the increase in labour intensity:
1. the reduction of holidays and the increase of working hours of

agricultural labourers’ families (more hands, more hours);
2. the spread of industrial and commercial activities alongside and
often in combination with agriculture.
124
Sandgruber (1982), p. 377.
In Chapter V we will see how the industrial activities of the rural

family rose. As far as holidays are concerned, these were numerous in
the late Middle Ages. They were mostly religious festivals and besides
Sundays there were at least another 50 holidays. The number of working
days did not exceed 250. The number of holidays was later reduced. A
low number of working days was once again reached in Europe towards
1960.125 It seems that the number of holidays started to be reduced
from the 16th century. This was partly an effect of the Reformation.
In Holland, for example, as ideas of the reformation were diffused, the
number of holidays dropped from 47 days to 6 during the 16th century
and around 1650 there were 307 working days. The same happened in
England where, at the end of the 15th century, masons had 40 days
holiday. An Act of Parliament, in 1552, reduced the number of holidays
to 27. During the second half of the 17th century religious holidays
were limited to few more than Christmas, Easter and Pentecost. Even
in Catholic countries a reduction in the number of religious holidays,
although less significant, was also introduced during the same period.
In France, in 1600, the number of working days counted no more
than 275–85. On the whole it can be said that, during the 16th to 18th
centuries the overall number of working days in Europe increased by
some 15 per cent.
It is, naturally, legitimate to ask: did the effective number of working
days increase accordingly? To what degree did these directives actually
influence rural labour, where labour patterns most probably adhered to
the requirements of the seasons, to crop harvesting and livestock more
than to the decisions of public authorities on the worship of saints?126
We do know that over the course of time labour rendered by the peas-
ant family increased. The widespread cultivation of potatoes and maize
required intensification of labour in certain periods of the year and the
diffusion of livestock rearing in the regions of mixed agriculture and
continuous rotation had a similar effect.
It should be remembered, however, that this change in number of
holidays, the increase in effective labour and the combination of agri-
cultural work with industrial-commercial efforts can only effectively be
considered an increase in labour intensity when accompanied by an
actual cultural change. By this we mean a real desire to increase the
125
De Vries (1993), p. 110.
126
De Vries (1993), p. 111 and particularly (1994).
availability of goods by reducing inactivity and to change the evaluation

of the marginal utility of working hours.127
Chapter VI will take into consideration the declining trend of wages
from the late Middle Ages onwards. Declining labour incomes were
the main reason for increasing labour intensity. Today, in advanced
countries, a direct relationship exists between wages and labour supply
whereas in backward regions and in past agricultural economies the
relationship is and was the opposite, especially for women and chil-
dren.128 Whenever the subsistence of family members was at risk, more
time was devoted to labour. Due to the decline in labour productivity
throughout Europe after the late Middle Ages, people (and not only
peasants) were forced to work many more hours than before. Labour
intensification played an important role in the pre-modern European
economy.
5.8. Labour productivity

Among all innovations, those regarding the supply of energy had the
greatest effect on work productivity. We have seen to what degree the
employment of energy changed. If, however, we consider to what extent
this concerned cultivation of the land, it becomes apparent that agri-
culture was less affected than other sectors. Water mills, for example,
facilitated the task of milling, but not agriculture. The same applies to
windmills, wood and coal. On closer observation, we can see that only
horse power and the labour of the ox helped to alleviate the peasants’
toil throughout Europe; in the North in particular. Progress was made
during the centuries around the year 1000. However, we have seen
how contemporary demographic growth cancelled out the advantages
deriving from greater use of power in agricultural labour. We have
also seen how, in 17th-century England, horse power was increasingly
used in farm labour.
Technical and organisational innovations, even when not developed
to harness a new source of energy, could, however, allow more pro-
ductive use of the energy and materials already employed. Innovations
of this type were not uncommon in western European agriculture. It
is difficult to say, exactly how far these innovations increased man’s
127
De Vries (1994) and the recent (2008).
128
See the interesting paper by Dasgupta, Goslar (2005), dealing with modern rural
India.
capacity to exploit the environment to his advantage. The most impor-

tant new tool for agriculture in medieval Europe was the heavy, asym-
metric plough, which became a well-known piece of equipment in the
central-northern areas of the continent.129 The simple plough had been
widely used in the Mediterranean world since the Neolithic agricultural
revolution (Figure 10). This was small in size and built of wood. It was
composed of the handle, the part held by the farmer; the helm, to which
the ox was harnessed, connected the handle to the share beam or plough
stock; at the end of this was a point called the ploughshare which cut
into the soil. This was the only component generally, but not always,
forged in metal. Even as late as the end of the 19th century, ploughs of
this type, or very similar, remained in use in Mediterranean agriculture,
above all in some areas where the soil was crumbly and loose, due to
low amounts of rainfall, and therefore did not require deep ploughing.
With few exceptions (e.g. the Po Valley), the traditional plough was
the most efficient piece of equipment for this terrain.
When agriculture was introduced into central-northern Europe,
country people had to deal with quite different conditions. Here, where
the soil was heavy because of frequent rainfall and frost, the light
Mediterranean plough was completely ineffective for ploughing deep
and breaking up the soil. North of the Alps and, possibly, south of the
Danube it appears that a plough with wheels, larger and heavier than
the traditional one, already existed in the 1st century AD.130 This type
of plough also appeared south of the Alps, in certain areas of the Po
Valley during this period, or shortly afterwards. However, it did not
spread further South despite becoming of increasingly common use to
the north. In the 6th century it was well-known in central Europe.131
Linguistic evidence proffers some precious information on the
diffusion of this wheel plough. In Germanic and Slavic languages a
stem exists from which analogous terms for this plough originate:
plough (English), Pflug (German), plog (Norwegian and Swedish),
ploeg (Flemish and Dutch), plug (Russian), pluh (Czech). In Italy, in
certain areas of the Po Valley the terms of piò and plovo refer to the
heavy plough.132 In France, the heavy plough was called charrue, from
129
On the topic, see particularly Haudricourt-Delamarre (1955).
130
Apart from Haudricourt-Delamarre (1955), see also Parain (1966).
131
Gille (1962), p. 481.
132
Haudricourt-Delamarre (1955), pp. 46–7.
Source: Haudricourt-Delamarre (1955).

Fig. 10. Simple symmetrical and asymmetrical plough.
the Latin carruca, while the light one, only in use in the South of the
Kingdom, kept its old name also of Latin derivation, araire.
As with many ancient technical innovations the precise stages of the
evolution of this tool are unknown. Its main characteristics became
definitive in the asymmetrical plough where three components, each
carrying out a different procedure, were combined (Figure 11):133
1. the coulter, a metal blade which cuts into the earth vertically and
prepares the furrow, which is then dug deeper by the ploughshare;
2. the asymmetrical ploughshare, which digs into the earth more deeply
on one side than on the other;
3. the moldboard, a metal wing which lifts the earth cut by the plough-
share and discards it to one side.
The metal components of this plough were more numerous than in

the light version. However, it is most probable that not all ploughs of
133
Haudricourt-Delamarre (1955), p. 348.
Source: Haudricourt-Delamarre (1955).
Fig. 11. Wheelplough.
the high medieval period had these characteristics. Between the two
versions, the asymmetrical one with wheels and the symmetrical one
without, there were various stages of development which resembled
more closely one version or the other. One plough was probably
different from the next. The heavy plough came into general use in
central-northern Europe after the 6th century and underwent its most
significant evolution between the 9th and 12th centuries. Over this
period the asymmetric plough with wheels contributed substantially
to the extension of cultivation, alleviating work with the plough. In
northern Europe the diffusion of the use of the plough was connected
to the increasingly frequent employment of horsepower. A heavy plough
required more vigorous traction and the power of horses was superior
to that of oxen. As from the end of the 13th century, there do not seem
to be any further important developments in the plough and ploughing
until the 20th century.
5.9. Trends in labour productivity

The institutional setting of European agriculture has been outlined and
the changes taking place within this setting are important when dealing
with the problem of labour productivity. Simultaneous to the technical

evolution and the progress of cultivation, the relations of production
changed throughout the whole of Europe. The seigneurial economy
gradually disappeared, which in most cases occurred during the 13th
and 14th centuries.134 The fact that men were under less pressure from
their landlords may have been an incentive to work more productively;135
even if the increase in production was due to longer working hours
rather than an increase in output per working hour.
Moreover, the replacement of serfdom with more competitive con-
tractual relationships in the rural world contributed to the adaptation
of agriculture to the market and the rise in land productivity. It has
been suggested that this institutional change was responsible for the
upward trend in labour productivity in England.136
During the centuries of medieval progress, from around the 9th to
the 14th century, very little is known about the effect of the aforesaid
changes on labour productivity. However, since growth in labour
productivity means that the output of agricultural workers is sufficient
to support themselves plus a percentage of people not employed in
agricultural production, the trend in urbanisation can provide some
information on labour productivity in the primary sector.137 If the rate
of urbanisation rises, more people are sustained by the hard toil of the
agricultural workforce. Unfortunately, before 1300, information on
the urbanisation rate is scanty; however, it is generally assumed that
urban populations increased not only in absolute terms but also as a
ratio to the population as a whole. This opinion is more fully supported
by indirect evidence than by direct information. In any case, the rise
could not have been more than a few percentage points. Consequently,
there was also a modest rise in labour productivity. At the end of the
Middle Ages, the fall of population from 1347 to about 1450 was the
main factor determining an increase of capital per worker, followed by
higher productivity. In this case, however, the rise of output per worker
was not determined by more investments and more capital, but by the
fall of population. In our K/L ratio, the numerator did not rise, but the
denominator diminished. As a result, the 15th century was a period of
high labour productivity.
134
As we have previously seen in this Chap.
135
Duby (1973).
136
See especially Campbell (2000).
137
The topic of urbanization is examined in the following Chap. V.
Table 6. Percentage growth or decline of agricultural labour productivity

between 1500 and 1800.
1500–1800
%
England +43
Germany –10
Spain –21
Italy –22
France 0
Belgium –20
Netherlands +35
Austria –11
Source: for England, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Austria, Allen (2000); for Italy, France,
the Netherlands, Federico-Malanima (2004).
We know much more about the trend of productivity in agriculture

during the following centuries. If we take the late Middle Ages as our
starting point, with the exception of England, labour productivity stag-
nated or decreased. Since productivity was already low, there could not
be a marked decrease. The recently assembled (and constructed) data
from the Middle Ages up to 1800 show a stable and, in some cases,
downward trend.138 There were, however, differences from region to
region (Table 6). There was a sharp fall in Spain, Italy and Belgium.
In Flanders, the progress of agriculture “rested rather upon the high
input of labour per unit of land”,139 while labour productivity declined.
In France, productivity was stationary, whilst in Germany and Austria
there was a modest decline.
It is interesting to note the similarity and difference of productiv-
ity trends in two relatively advanced European regions; central and
northern Italy and the Netherlands. In Italy only during two periods of
demographic decline, such as the 14th and the 17th centuries, did the
downward trend of productivity level off. Overall in Italy a clear inverse
relationship existed between population and labour productivity. Labour
productivity diminished by about 40 percent between 1400 and 1800.
Land productivity, on the contrary, rose substantially: 50 percent dur-
ing the same four centuries (Figure 12). It was the consequence of the
138
Allen (2000).
139
Dejongh, Thoen (1999), p. 58.
2,5
2
per ha
1,5
0,5 per worker
0
1300–10
1340–50
1380–90
1420–30
1460–70
1500–10
1540–50
1580–90
1620–30
1660–70
1700–10
1740–50
1780–90
1820–30
1860–70
Source: Federico-Malanima (2004).
Fig. 12. Output per ha and output per Worker (Italy CN 1300–1870)
(1420–40 = 1).
300
250
land productivity
200
150
100
labour productivity
50
0
1510
1530
1550
1570
1590
1610
1630
1650
1670
1690
1710
1730
1750
1770
1790
Source: Van Zanden (2002a).
Fig. 13. Land productivity and agricultural labour productivity in Holland (1510–1810)
(1510–14 = 100).
attempt by peasant families to exploit land more intensively, in order

to support an ever larger family. In 1911 land productivity was higher
in Italy than in the United Kingdom or France, while labour produc-
tivity was among the lowest on the continent.140 In the Netherlands
labour productivity peaked in the 1730s, later to diminish, while land
productivity was rising (Figure 13).
In this case England also stands out as an important exception.
Even though opinions diverge on the rate of growth, there is, on the
contrary, agreement on the upward movement subsequent to the late
Middle Ages. According to various views, the rise between 1300–1800
could have been between 80 percent and more than 400 percent.141 The
range is wide, but the high estimate of a 3-fold increase seems best sup-
ported by direct evidence. Greater use of mechanical power of animals
in agriculture may have been the cause of this increase.142 Energy thus
stands out as a major source of progress. It has also been suggested
that in England, although within an upward trend, the second half of
the 18th century was not as prosperous as has often been assumed
in the past.143 England is, however, the only European example of a
long-term sharp decline in the labour force employed in the primary
sector. While in 1300 almost 80 percent of the labour force worked in
agriculture, at the end of the 18th century it was 45–40 percent, and
in 1840, 25 percent.144
Throughout Europe during the second half of the 18th century,
there was a slight decline in labour productivity.145 However, the cases
of United Kingdom, France, and Italy show three different courses of
labour productivity in agriculture during the early Modern Age: an
upward trend, relative stability, and a decline (Figure 14). Only in the
19th century did the trend sharply ascend, and if we take 100 to equal
140
O’Brien, Prados De La Escosura (1992).
141
The lowest figure has been proposed by Allen (2000), while the highest –4.4 times
more from 1300 and 1800– by Clark (1991). Wrigley (2006) estimated a 3 fold rise
between 1300 and 1800. In the previous Table, for the period 1500–1800, the estimate
by Allen is presented.
142
As supposed by Wrigley (1991).
143
In Allen (2000), labour productivity also declines in England between 1750–
1800.
144
Data for 1300 are from Campbell (2003), p. 193 and Wrigley (2006), p. 454; for
about 1800 from Wrigley (2006), p. 453; for 1840 from Crafts (1984), pp. 57–8.
145
I will reconsider labour productivity in agriculture in Chap. VI, when rural wages
will be examined.
100
90
80
70
60
United
Kingdom
50
40
France
30
20 Italy
10
0
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1910
Source: Federico-Malanima (2004).

Fig. 14. Labour Productivity in Italy, United Kingdom, France 1300–1910
(U.K. 1910 = 100).
the agricultural labour productivity of the main European agricultures

in 1800, it jumps to values between 2,800 and 7,000 in the year 2000.
Thus, we can distinguish three different periods in the long-run trend
of agricultural labour productivity:
1. from approximately the 10th to the 15th century; slow progress was
reinforced, in the 15th century, by the fall in population followed
by the rise of capital per worker;
2. from about 1450–1500 to 1800; stagnation or decline, with the excep-
tion of the Netherlands (until 1700–30) and England;
3. from 1800 up to the present day: very strong productivity growth.
5.10. The output

The demographic expansion of the late Middle Ages was therefore
accompanied not only by the extension of cultivated areas, but also by
innovations in agricultural work, and new methods of organisation.
By contrast, in the subsequent until the beginning of the 17th century,
only extensive progress and a “cerealization” of agricultural life took
place. Cultivation techniques and rotation systems did not change.146
146
Gille (1978).
Projects, experiments and inventions which developed in agriculture

had, in practice, limited use.147
The agricultural product per capita (Ya/P) of a country is the result
of the output per agricultural worker (Y/La), that is the average produc-
tivity of labour, multiplied by the proportion of employed agricultural
workers on total workforce (La/W) and by the proportion of workforce
with regards to the total population (P):148
Ya Ya Ya W
= ⋅ ⋅
P La W P
It would certainly be better to estimate L with a calculation of the
number of hours (h) per year devoted to agricultural work, whereas it
is only possible to say that (L•h) rose, i.e. the number of workers per
year multiplied by working time in hours.
If labour productivity falls whilst occupation remains stable (in rela-
tive terms), demographic increase causes a fall in agricultural produce
per capita even though land productivity rises. In the long run, increase
in occupation can hinder, but not block decline (Table 7).
Table 7. Indices of gross agricultural product, per capita product and

population (Russian population included) between 1300 and 1800 (1500 = 1).
Gross Per capita Population

Product Product
1300 0.99 0.90 1.11
1400 0.82 1.02 0.80
1500 1.00 1.00 1.00
1600 0.94 0.74 1.26
1700 1.06 0.78 1.35
1750 1.37 0.81 1.68
1800 1.72 0.76 2.26
Sources: the table is based on the estimations proposed by Allen (2000). For Italy,
Allen’s data has been substituted with those of Federico-Malanima (2004). Data on
European population, per country, to calculate gross agricultural product, are those
already presented in Chap. I.
Note: countries on which the estimation of agricultural production is based: England,
central-northern Italy, Germany, Spain, France, Poland, Belgium, The Netherlands,
and Austria (including Hungary and Czechoslovakia). Data only refer to England and
Italy for the 14th century. From the 15th century, the series concern all the countries,
except the Netherlands in 1400.
147
148
It is the adaptation to the primary sector of the already presented identity in 5.1.
As can be seen, the gross agricultural product rose by almost 80 percent

between 1500 and 1800, principally owing to the spread of agriculture to
new lands. Whereas the population increased by 132 percent, product
per capita diminished by 24 per cent.149 These data suggest the magni-
tude of a long-term change which is confirmed, as has been seen, by
the available information on specific countries. The decline in 1800 is
about 15 percent in comparison to 1300.
However, if the intensification of labour throughout the centuries is
taken into account, the decline in labour productivity must have been
sharper. It might be supposed that between the late Middle Ages and
1800 the ratio between population and workforce remained stable, at
around 55 percent of the total population. Let us suppose that labour
intensification was only 10 percent (meaning that the same percentage
of the population, i.e. the agricultural workers, worked 10 percent more
hours per year). To verify the decline in labour productivity we have
only to insert these values into the previous formula, thereby arriving
at the following result for the year 1800 as regards to 1500 (where 0.76
is Ya /P, as in Table 7; 1.10 is the assumed 10 percent increase in La /W;
and 1 represents the stability in W/P between 1500 and 1800):
0.76 = x · 1.10 · 1
The unknown factor (represented by x in the formula) is labour pro-
ductivity, and in this case is 0.69, meaning a decline of about 30 percent
from 1500 until 1800. If working time is assumed to be 20 percent
more in 1800 than in 1500, the fall in labour productivity becomes
more than 35 percent.
In the following Table 8, data are reported on agricultural product per
capita, from 1300 to 1800, in several European countries, representative
of the North, Centre, and South.
As far as is known, what happened in Europe was by no means an
exception. In China, where the population quadrupled between 1400
and 1800, the increase in agricultural products depended for 58 percent
on the expansion of areas under cultivation, and for 42 percent on the
increase of grain yields. During the four centuries which have been
considered, the yield of cereals increased by more than 80 percent and
149
If we multiply 2.32 by 0.76, the result is, in fact, 1.77 (the rise in aggregate agri-
cultural product).
Table 8. Agricultural product per capita in England, Germany, Spain, Italy, France,
Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria from 1300 until 1800 (1500 = 1).
England Germany Spain Italy France Poland Belgium Netherlands Austria
1300 0.83 0.93

1400 0.92 1.15 1.00 1.06 0.87 1.14 1.25 1.12
1500 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1600 0.70 0.76 0.81 1.00 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.84 0.60
1700 0.85 0.67 0.94 0.96 0.76 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.71
1750 0.92 0.67 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.82 0.82 1.02 0.82
1800 0.68 0.76 0.75 0.66 0.78 0.90 0.90 0.96 0.68
Source: as in Table 7.
it even tripled in some regions.150 This was the huge success of Chinese
agricultural societies.151 However, despite some optimism regarding the
18th and 19th centuries, agricultural labour productivity in China,152 the
former opinion of a declining trend seems more convincing. During
the 18th century, England and the Yangzi Delta “were at virtually
opposite poles in a continuum from development to involution across
Europe and China. In one, agriculture was much less intensive in terms
of labour input per unit area, with average farm size one hundred
times that of the other and cultivated acreage per capita 45 times and
substantially higher productivity per unit of labour”.153
In Europe the demographic increase was lower than in China and
the population increased less than three times between 1400–1800.154 In
a system of dry-agriculture, such as that of Europe, it was impossible
to increase yields in the same way as in China because intensification
of use of farmland was much more difficult than that of land used for
wet-farming. The yield of cereals in Europe reveals that “extremely
limited progress was achieved in many regions from the 16th century
until the end of the 18th-beginning of the 19th”,155 resulting in an
150
Perkins (1969), pp. 33 and 19; Goldstone (2002).
151
The subject of Europe, with respect of that of other civilizations, here hardly
mentioned, is amply discussed, with special reference to China, in Vries (2003) and
Pomeranz (2000).
152
Bozhong (1998a, b).
153
Huang (2002), p. 534.
154
As we saw in Chap. I, 2.
155
Slicher Van Bath (1962), III, D II.
average European increase of few percentage points. The introduction

of potatoes and maize helped increase both production and yield in
terms of calories, however in terms of value, this increase was much
more limited due to the low price of both products. In the Chinese
countryside, the spread of both foodstuffs added to the considerable
rise in the yield per hectar in terms of kilocalories.
As an essential resource in temperate regions such as Europe, wood-
lands were widely destroyed in order to face up to the overall increase
in general consumption. This pressure on the woodlands gave origin to
what became known as an “ecological crisis”,156 an aspect of the energetic
crisis which has been considered in previous chapters.157
6. Conclusion
We have seen, in the first and second chapter, three great waves,
characterise the economy of the last millennium (probably not only
in Europe). We find the same three long phases when we look at the
agrarian economy; although chronologically, in agriculture, on the one
hand, and population, on the other, they do not always coincide. We
can single out:
1. a first epoch, lasting from the 9th–10th century until 1300. It is an

age of slow progress, as far as we can perceive from the scanty direct
information, both in population and economy. In this period no true
revolution took place, but there was modest, short-lived progress
both in energy supply and agrarian technology. Climatic conditions
were more favourable than they had been previously and would be
later on;
2. a second age began from the 14th century and lasted until the begin-
ning of the 19th century. Chronologically, agricultural development
does not correspond to population movement. The population
recovered from 1450 onwards, slowing down in the 17th century
and starting to increase rapidly from the end of that century or
the beginning of the following. From an agrarian viewpoint, it was
characterised by a stationary or declining trend in Europe in general
despite the success of both English and Dutch agriculture, especially
156
Pomeranz (2000), pp. 211 ff.
157
Chap. II.
conclusion 157
during the 17th century. So, while in demography a new period starts
from 1660–90 onwards, in agriculture the downward trend persists
until 1820;
3. so-called modern growth started only from 1820 onwards. It was the
third age.
The analysis of the non-agricultural world can more effectively specify

this general trend.
CHAPTER IV
TRADE
In this chapter on trade we turn our attention from the forces of decline
to the forces of growth, from the decreasing returns to the increasing
returns. During the high Middle Ages and the early Modern Age, com-
merce and industry experienced more innovations than agriculture did
in terms of both organisation and techniques. However, industry and
trade had to develop within the limitations imposed by the agricultural
sector. Before the era of modern growth, the European economy can be
defined as dualistic, a more static agricultural sector existing alongside
the dynamic sectors which were centred mainly in the cities. As clas-
sical economists knew very well, long-term growth in production and
exchange is impossible if the primary sector does not expand. In pre-
modern Europe, the stability or decline of the energy carriers produced
in agriculture, on a per capita basis, set a limit to the possibility of
economic growth as a whole. The tension between the developing urban
sectors and the stagnation of agricultural activity and the availability
of energy, constituted an important feature of pre-modern European
economy and a stimulus towards change and development.
1. Seas
1.1. The geography

From the late Middle Ages, the expansion of maritime trade was one
of the major originators of European economic dynamism. Numerous
elements contributed to bringing this about; among them, the geogra-
phy of the European continent played an important role.1 “Among the
many distinctions which may be noted whilst comparing the East and
the West on the background of world history, one simple, elementary
difference appears evident: the contrast between land and sea. Russia,
China and India make up the area which is today known as the East.
1
As stated by Habakkuk (1955), p. 151.
160 chapter iv – trade
It is a compact mass of land that forms the most gigantic island on

Earth; the “central land” of the globe. That which today is called the
West is a hemisphere covered by the worldwide Atlantic and Pacific
oceans”:2 we are therefore confronted with a continental world to the
East and a marine world to the West (Figure 1).3
Europe occupies a central position in this marine world, penetrated
by seas that interrupt the continuity of the land. Not even in the Arab
Source: based on Diamond (1997).
Fig. 1. Europe and China: seas and lands.
2
Schmitt (1955), and also (1954).
3
In the map 1 cm = 1000 km.
seas 161
territory which, before 1000, stretched from India to Spain, and was
surrounded by water, did the sea have such an important role;4 in China
and India, further to the East, the sea does not infiltrate the coastline
as it does in Europe.5
In European geography the seas are of such importance because they
afford a means of contact between areas endowed with diverse produc-
tion factors (land, labour, capital), which are thereby able to produce a
wide range of diverse goods. The complementarity between the regions
partly originates from the physical characteristics of the continent: the
alternation between mountains and plains and differences of latitude
and climate between the lands furthermost north and those as distant
as the southern boundaries of the Mediterranean, on the coast of Africa.
Historical differences, such as urban density, agricultural systems, and
industrial products are superimposed upon specific geographical char-
acteristics. The northern seas permit communication between different
economies such as urbanised Flanders and Holland with Scandinavia,
Poland and even Russia. The same applies for the Mediterranean, which
is bordered by Spain with its wool, North Africa with its gold and the
Levant with exotic oriental goods. Furthermore, the Mediterranean
offered the possibility of contacts and circulation of goods among the
countries washed by the northern seas, via the Atlantic Ocean to the
West. Moreover, these European seas are connected to the Orient, and
then to India and China, through the deep fracture in the continental
mass, from Gibraltar as far as Indonesia.6 Further opportunities of
exchange are thus provided to Euro-Mediterranean commerce.
European maritime exchanges progressed significantly after the 10th
century. Initially internal commerce existed both on the Northern
seas and on the Mediterranean without any contact between the two
commercial areas; then, from the end of the 12th century onwards,
North-South connections developed, widening the world of exchanges.
Seaborne trade acquired continental dimensions. In the 16th century,
trade extended worldwide as, on the one hand, the Atlantic was crossed,
whilst on the other, the furthest regions of Asia were now also reached
by sea. We will see that remarkable growth occurred in maritime
commerce over this period whereas, by contrast, progress in internal
exchange was much more modest.
4
Lopez (1952).
5
Tawney (1932), p. 18. See also Ho (1959).
6
Le Lannou (1970), p. 21.
1.2. The southern seas

The Mediterranean has provided numerous advantages to navigation
since ancient times: moderate winds, infrequent storms, often cloudless
skies allowing navigation by the stars at night. However, impediments
were not lacking. Geographical conditions, climatic changes, and the
flow of currents divide the expanse of water into many seas and com-
municating gulfs, which widen onto regions with very different physical
and economic characteristics. Within the Mediterranean, a first divi-
sion is determined by the straits between Tunisia and Sicily into two
separate seas: the eastern and the western, which in turn are made up
of many smaller seas.
On the Mediterranean Sea the goods which circulated most frequently
were almost always heavy products which probably represented, in
volume, around 90 percent of all traffic.7 In the thousand years from
the 9th century to the 18th, the ship holds were almost always loaded
with grain, oil, wine, fish, salt, timber, metals, wool and skins. These
products represented the basis of “mass” commerce, which involved
the greater part of navigation, and above all short-range trade.8
However, the circulation of other more precious commodities
should not be underestimated. During the Middle and early Modern
ages spices such as pepper, cinnamon, cloves, nutmeg, incense, dyes
and medicinal products were amongst the most valuable products in
commerce. Originating from China, India and Indonesia, these goods
arrived in the ports of the Near East during the Middle Ages after
which they were transported by sea, and subsequently overland to the
European markets. It was calculated that, at the beginning of the 15th
century, approximately 6–7,000 quintals of these spices were trans-
ported every year throughout the Mediterranean, which weight-wise
was a paltry quantity in comparison to wheat. Their value, however,
was very high.9
Textiles were, in terms of total market value, probably of even greater
importance. During the 14th century, merchant ships transported a
variety of these, ranging from Italian fustians, woollen cloths (from
Brussels, Ypres, Poperinghe, Malines, Courtrai, Beauvais…), Italian
cloths (from Florence, Milan, Como, Piacenza, Bergamo…), linen from
7
A. Lewis (1978a), p. 1.
8
Luzzatto (1948), p. 230.
9
R. H. Bautier (1970), pp. 298–9.
seas 163
Germany and above all from Reims.10 In terms of weight, textile traffic
was much greater than that of spices. The value of these cargo was also
higher as textiles were very precious goods during the late medieval
period. A bail of Flemish cloths had a greater market value than a bail
of pepper.11 Therefore, value-wise, over a long period of time, textiles
were probably the most important single product, followed by pepper
and wheat.
1.3. The northern seas

In both northern and southern Europe, one vast body of water infiltrat-
ing among the lands led to the formation of smaller seas, thus permit-
ting communication between different areas. The North Sea extends
from England, France and the Netherlands northwards to Scandinavia
and Denmark, then reaching the great White Sea and finally the Sea
of Barents and Russia; eastward the waters make their way between
Denmark and Scandinavia to finally merge with the Baltic which in
turn branches out into a large number of gulfs, the waters of which
bathe Poland, Russia, Finland and Sweden.
As in the case of the Mediterranean, the economic importance of the
waterways stemmed from the fact that they permitted contacts between
geographical areas with diverse productive vocations. The major dif-
ference was the separation of the urbanised industrial West from the
East. In the 13th century, this urbanised region included Flanders
and Northern France whereas later, from the 16th century onwards,
it spread as far as southern England, the Netherlands and Germany
bordering the Rhine. Throughout this area of dense population with
numerous cities, the inhabitants had relatively scarce amounts of land
at their disposal. Industrial activities were widespread and capital was
plentiful, but despite improvements in agriculture over the centuries,
the product of the land proved insufficient to support the entire popula-
tion. However, by sea it was possible to reach many scarcely populated
regions which had raw materials and abundant land at their disposal.
Eastward there were fewer cities and plenty of arable land and to the
North, in Scandinavia, population density was even lower, while the
territory was rich in timber and metals. The Sound, between the North
Sea and the Baltic Sea, was crossed every year, in the 16th and 17th
10
Balard (1978), II, pp. 834 ff.
11
R. H. Bautier (1970), p. 300.
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1540–49
1550–59
1560–69
1570–79
1580–89
1590–99
1600–09
1610–19
1620–29
1630–39
1640–49
1650–59
Source: Jeannin (1964).
Fig. 2. Ships through the Sound (1497–1657) (per decade).
centuries, by 3,700 ships in order to meet this East-West trade demand.

A peak was reached between 1580 and 1620 with 4,500–5,000 ships
per year (Figure 2).
Thanks to these geo-demographic conditions a more or less con-
tinuous flow in commerce was witnessed from the late Middle Ages
onwards. Manufactured articles came from the West, whilst from the
East and North foodstuffs and raw materials were exported (Figure 3).12
Woollen fabrics from Flanders spread East, and up until the 16th
century were also transported to England. Wine from Poitou, Gascoigne,
Bourgogne and the Rhine reached cities further North, whilst, in the
late Middle Ages, timber for construction and ship building came above
all from Scandinavia and, at a later date, from the coniferous forests of
eastern Europe (Russia, Poland, and Livonia). Also during this period,
wool for the textile industry arrived from both England and France.
Due to the development of the English textile industry, from the 16th
century onwards, it proved necessary to find raw materials further afield,
with Spain becoming a primary supplier. Metals were also transported
by sea (for example Swedish iron) and luxury goods such as furs, which
came from Russia.13
12
Postan (1952).
13
Topolski (1985).
seas 165
Fig. 3. Commodities from western and eastern Europe in the 16th

and 17th centuries.
Cereals were amongst the most valuable goods in circulation in the

North Seas and, from the middle of the 15th century, trading increased
considerably, when the population in Western cities started to rise again
and land soon proved insufficient to meet with food demand. Western
cities had to rely ever more frequently on grain supplied from the vast
eastern plains, especially from Poland.
1.4. The Oceans

During the Early Modern Era, the most significant change in the geog-
raphy of commercial relations was the success of oceanic trade. Within
what has been called “the first great worldwide revolution”, it was a
decisive change which was bound to result in “a surprising conquest
of land without precedents”.14 The conquest of the oceans was also an
14
Schmitt (1954), Chaps. XI and XIII.
Source: Braudel (1979), III.
Fig. 4. World trade relationships in 1500 (according to Braudel).
important event in the shifting of the equilibrium of European maritime

commerce, from the Mediterranean to the North of the continent. In the
late Middle Ages, the Mediterranean had been a crucial area for world
trade. From the 16th century onwards, as a consequence of oceanic
trade, the North European regions established themselves as dominant
maritime regions on the world scale (Figures 4 and 5).
The widening of contacts and circulation of goods was made possible
by two discoveries; that of the American continent in 1492, and of the
Cape of Good Hope route in 1487, which enabled ships to reach East
Asia by circumnavigating the southern point of Africa. The oceans
opened up the Americas and the furthest regions of Asia to Europeans.
Already in the first decades of the 16th century, the effects of these dis-
coveries were felt in Europe, and intensified with the passing of time.
Over a period spanning from the beginning of the 16th to the end of
the 18th century, three epochs can be distinguished in world trade. The
first period covers the 16th century, the second from 1600 up to about
1660, and a third up until the last decades of the 18th century.
seas 167
Source: Braudel (1979), III.

Fig. 5. World trade relationships in 1775 (according to Braudel).
1.5. Oceanic trade: the 16th century

This was the epoch of Spanish and Portuguese supremacy. Both America
and Asia were almost exclusively exporters; precious metals from
America and spices from the Far East being the most important goods
to reach Europe. Already from the end of the 15th century, American
gold had begun to reach Europe. The conquistadors sent gold hoarded
by American civilizations back to Spain. The flow of precious metals
remained scanty until 1540, the year in which silver mines were dis-
covered at Potosì, in Peru (Figure 6). From then on, the quantity of
silver, which reached Spain, grew continuously (Figure 7).15
Following an increasing flow of gold and silver, if the quantity of
goods available on the market remains stable, or grows less than the
currency reserves, prices have to increase. We know that, during the
15
Vilar (1969), Chap. XII; Boyer-Xambeu, Deleplace, Gillard (1986), p. 137 (for an
estimate on the quantity of silver that was imported).
Source: Vilar (1969).

Fig. 6. Centres of silver production in 16th century southern America.
16th century, the European population rose, whilst the production

of goods, especially agricultural produce, barely met the increase in
demand. Prices were already rising from the end of the 15th century
and after 1540 the silver that poured into the European markets had
the effect of accelerating this trend.16 During the 16th century, cereal
prices grew almost four fold.
The 16th century inflation is often explained using the Fisher equa-
tion, or the quantity theory of money:
MV = PQ
16
See the graphs in Chap. VI, par. 1.
seas 169
10000000
silver
1000000
100000
10000
log
gold
1000
100
10
1
1500–09
1510–19
1520–29
1530–39
1540–49
1550–59
1560–69
1570–79
1580–89
1590–99
Source: Vilar (1969).
Fig. 7. Import of gold and silver in Europe (1500–1600)

(kgs. per decade in log).
where M represents the currency reserves, V the velocity with which

money circulates (or how many transactions are accomplished by means
of the same unit of money), P the average price level and Q the number
of transactions based on the quantity of commodities produced. The
level of prices is then:
MV
P=
Q
The equation means that, in absence of change in one or more of the

other terms of the equation, the level of prices P remains unaltered.17
Thus demographic increase cannot bring about inflation unless some
other change occurs in M, V or Q. However, the rise of population can
be accompanied, and often is, by a debasement of money or an increase
in the velocity of circulation. This increase may occur even by simply
adopting other products as measures of value. In these cases, population
growth is an indirect rather than a direct cause of inflation.
17
Friedman (1992).
The long period of inflation, from approximately 1500 to 1650, has

often been referred to by the historians as a Price Revolution, in order
to underline the influence that these changes in money and prices had
on the economy and society of the time. However, this Price Revolution
was not particularly revolutionary, especially when one considers
that during the 16th century the annual rate of inflation was only 2
percent.18 The modern day economy has accustomed us to far higher
rates of inflation.19
Whilst precious metals flowed into Seville, in Lisbon the number of
ships destined for Asia was on the increase, despite profound differ-
ences in trades towards the East and the West.20 The number of ships
docking in the port of Lisbon, rose from approximately 20 at the start
of the 16th century, to 114 per year, in the last decade. Between 1506
and 1510, 45 ships left Seville each year for America, whereas, between
1591 and 1600, their number rose to 186, only experiencing a decline
after 1608.21
Goods transported in this international trade were less, at least in
terms of weight, than the quantity of grain traded in the Baltic alone.
Their value was, however, far higher. In Seville, at the end of the 16th
century, Asian spices were one and a half times more valuable and
American precious metals more than threefold.22
Commercial flows to both America and Asia were not entirely inde-
pendent, despite their diverse trends of development: international
commerce was born with worldwide connections. European trade with
eastern Asia had always been in deficit. It was therefore necessary to
either pay for goods by cash, rather than by the exchange of products,
or through the lending of commercial services in those seas from which
products were imported. In the 16th century, American treasures began
finding their way into Asia, in exchange for spices, which were imported
into Europe. In 1621 it was said that there existed a “fountain which
welled up in the West Indies”, and which flowed into Spain, expanding
throughout Europe and finally reaching eastern Asia (Figure 8).23
18
Cipolla (1955).
19
Contrary to previous beliefs, it is now known that the influx of silver into Europe
did not diminish during the 17th century: Morineau (1985).
20
Steensgaard (1974).
21
It is the trend reconstructed by Chaunu (1959 ff.).
22
Kriedte (1980), p. 41.
23
Cit. in Chaudhury (1982), p. 398.
seas 171
Source: Chaudury (1982), p. 15.
Fig. 8. The World flow of precious metals in the 16th and 17th centuries.
The Price Revolution was not only a European phenomenon. It was

also found in both India24 and China. A world circuit was established,
sustained by ocean trade which spread from the extreme West to the
extreme East.25 The statement that “there was a single global economy
with a worldwide division of labour and multilateral trade from 1500
onward”26 is, however, misleading. Until about 1820, with the begin-
ning of modern growth, world trade was limited to few non-competing
goods, that is, to valuable commodities which were only produced in a
few regions of the world and impossible to produce elsewhere. Freight
costs on these goods remained significant and monopolies by a few
European companies27 contributed to keep prices high.
1.6. Oceanic trade: 1600–1660

During this second era, from 1600 to 1660, whilst European merchant
trading decreased, commercial connections with both North and South
24
Moosvi (1994).
25
Antwerp represented the centre of international trade, occupying the position
which had previously been held by Venice and Genoa: Van der Wee (1963).
26
Frank (1998), p. 52.
27
See the following par. 3.3 in this chapter.
America and Asia were consolidated.28 The most significant change

in ocean trading was the gradual substitution of the Spanish and
Portuguese by the English, the French and above all the Dutch. On
the international scene, Amsterdam occupied the position previously
held by Antwerp and the Italian centres. A guidebook of 1701, when
describing the Dutch port, said that the ships were so numerous that
their masts “form a sort of forest, so thick that the sun seems to have
difficulty in penetrating”.29
As in the previous era, whilst European importation was extensive,
exportation towards America and Asia was extremely modest. The
spice trade with Asia was more significant when compared with that
of the 16th century, despite the fact it was diminishing in relative
terms.30 Towards 1650 pepper and spices made up 50 percent and 18
percent respectively, of the trade of the Dutch East Indies Company.31
At the end of the century, together they made up a mere 11 percent
of all products bought in Asia, whereas silk and cotton accounted for
50 percent, and dyes, tea, copper and coffee between 4 percent and 8
percent each. Amongst the products introduced into Europe, Indian
cotton assumed an ever more important role.32 In the 17th century,
Europe also imported spices, sugar, gold, and silver, while Asia imported
linens, woollen cloths and silver.
The European balance of commerce was also in deficit with America.
The imports of silver increased, from 7,500 tonnes in the 16th century
to 26,158 in the 17th century; gold remained virtually unchanged.33
In the 17th century the flow of sugar may be added to that of silver,
the former becoming even more significant as the cultivation of sugar
cane spread across the Caribbean. The European debt towards America
was partly compensated by the creation of triangular trading between
Europe, Africa and America. The trade thus developed was the slave
trade from Africa. Between 1492 and 1807, 9.5 million men and women
were transported from Africa as slaves.34
28
Romano (1992), pp. 115 ff.
29
Cit. in Braudel (1979), III, Chap. 3.
30
Reinhard (1983), Chap. 5.
31
De Vries (1976), pp. 120 ff.
32
Chaudhuri (1982), pp. 400 ff.
33
Morineau (1985).
34
Maddison (2001), p. 37. See also the data supplied by Curtin (1975), pp. 119–216.
As mentioned by Romano (1992), p. 75, these data are probably much lower than the
real figures.
seas 173
1.7. Oceanic trade: 1660–1800

In the last decades of the 17th century, there were fewer Dutch ships
in Atlantic trade. The trade wars against England in which Holland
was involved (1652–54, 1665–67, 1672–74), and the navigation acts
(1651, 1660, 1662, 1669, 1673, 1696) resulted in a decline in sea-force,
limiting maritime trade. England subsequently assumed supremacy in
oceanic trade. The Dutch Navy, however, did not disappear from the
oceans, but took on a subordinate role. France contemporaneously
extended her maritime trading activities and, between 1716–20 and
1784–88, her foreign trade increased threefold. Hamburg experienced
growth in trade, and over the same period of time English foreign trade
increased 2.4 times.35
The overall volume of trade, with both Asia and America, devel-
oped despite undergoing modifications. With regard to the East, the
importation of spices, textiles, tea and coffee increased and until the
end of the 17th century the rise of trade in textiles was, in relative
terms, higher than that of other goods. In 1621, importation on behalf
of the East Indies Company was made up of 74 percent spices and 16
percent textiles. In 1698–1700 spices diminished to 23 percent, whilst
textiles rose to 55 percent. Later, in the 18th century, the relative value
of textiles decreased, whilst that of tea and coffee increased. Also to be
considered is an important modification in trade with Asia: it became
more common to exchange goods in order to pay for merchandise.
Trade with the American continent also developed during the 18th
century and overseas territories became markets for European products,
whilst also being producers of raw materials and silver. This develop-
ment was linked to population growth in America and to the increase
of production. At the beginning of the 18th century, the population
of the English colonies in America numbered 300,000; it was therefore
evident that demand for manufactured goods was limited. In 1776, the
population had increased to 3 million,36 thus requiring numerous prod-
ucts such as metal goods (including huge quantities of nails, necessary
for construction in wood), tools, buttons, buckles, and wool and cot-
ton textiles. Large quantities of linen were sent across the ocean from
central Europe, often via Hamburg and Flanders. The already existing
35
Kriedte (1980), p. 127.
36
R. Davis (1967), pp. 18–9.
triangular trade between America, Africa and Europe was thus strength-
ened and America became more important than Asia on the European
market. The geographic division of labour expanded and became more
complex. In 1691 Dudley North wrote, that, when considering trade,
it was as if the whole world were one nation and the nations as single
individuals.37 How could the reality of worldwide economy have been
better expressed? Despite the rise in world trade during the 18th century,
exchange on a world scale was still dominated by luxury commodities.
There is “no sign that freight rates were declining on the large-scale
textile trade routes between India and Europe during the 18th century”,
and “there is no evidence of commodity price convergence for these
non-competing goods prior to the 19th century”.38 Although sugar and
cotton imports in Europe were sizeable and tobacco, coffee and tea
were also important (especially for England), they “would only grow
in significance after 1830”.39
1.8. England and the Oceans

Between 1720 and 1820 the growth rate of exports from England, was
2 percent per year and only during the 19th century did it increase
noticeably, reaching 4.9 percent between 1820 and 1870. From 1870 to
1990 this was slightly higher than during the 18th century; 2.3 percent
per year, whereas the European average was 4 percent during the whole
of the 19th and 20th centuries.40
The strong impetus displayed by English trade after 1750 was linked
to the increasing demand for manufactured goods from the American
markets.41 In England the sectors dealing with exportation grew much
faster than the sectors working for the domestic market; between 1700
and 1750 growth registered 67 and 7 percent respectively, and between
1750 and 1770 it was 80 and 7 percent. Industrial growth in England,
during the second quarter of the 18th century, “was to a great extent
the response to the colonial demand for nails, axes, firearms, buckets,
carriages, clocks, saddles, handkerchiefs, buttons, rope and thousands
37
Cit. in Glamann (1977), par. III.
38
O’Rourke, Williamson (2002), pp. 31 and 33.
39
Pomeranz (2000), p. 283 (see, in any case, the remarks by Wrigley (2006), p. 471
on the calculation by Pomeranz about the importance of sugar for England).
40
Maddison (1991), p. 75.
41
R. Davis (1962). See especially the fine article by Berrill (1960) stressing the role
of the international trade in Britain’s growth.
seas 175
of other things”. Towards 1770, England exported about one quarter

of her industrial production. There is no doubt, however, that quan-
tity-wise the domestic market played an increasingly important role
in comparison to the foreign market due to a higher volume of trade.
Growth in foreign trade was, however, more dynamic and stimulated
transformation in the industrial sector. “Internal demand increased, but
foreign demand multiplied. If only a spark was needed, it was from the
foreign market that it sprang”.42
1.9. Growth in maritime trade 1500–1820

Oceanic trade played a relatively marginal role in the European economy
as a whole. Towards 1780–90, an approximate average of only 4 percent
of every European country’s national product was exported and only
1 percent of the national product was sold in Africa, Latin America,
the Caribbean and North America.43 In the best of hypotheses, it has
been calculated that the contribution of commercial profit from oceanic
trade might correspond to 1 percent of the national product of each
European country.
However, it is true that this estimate of the average incidence of trade
in European economy as a whole is by no means satisfactory. In reality,
the effects of oceanic trade were not evenly distributed. The Atlantic
ports and their hinterlands greatly benefited from this trade, whilst the
textile industries of Flanders, Brittany and northern Germany were
stimulated, thanks to American demand for linen to clothe the slaves.
Metal products and arms were also in demand from the Americas,
favouring the development of production in metallurgic centres such
as Birmingham in England. Sugar importation favoured the birth of
the refining industry and cotton importation was fundamental in the
development of the textile industry in England. A kind of Commercial
Revolution was underway.44
There is no doubt about the real growth in trade in the early modern
age. A rough indication can be drawn from the increase in the car-
rying capacity of World shipping between 1470 and 1820; although
any quantitative measure can only provide an approximate evaluation
(Table 1). Carrying capacity rose by a factor of 18. The world distribution
42
Hobsbawm (1968), Chap. 2.
43
O’Brien (1982).
44
R. Davis (1967) and (1954).
Table 1. Carrying capacity of World shipping (in tons) and index

(1470=1) 1470–1850.
Carrying Index
Capacity (1470=1)
(tons)
1470 320 1
1570 730 2.3
1670 1,450 4.5
1780 3,950 12.3
1820 5,880 18.4
1850 14,600 45.6
Source: Maddison (2001), p. 95.
of this growth was extremely unequal, and in 1820 a little less than half
the tonnage was British.45 World population grew, over the same period
of 350 years, by 2.2 times. In per capita terms, world trade increased
about 8 times.
In 1820 global exports in the world have been estimated to be 7 per-
cent of the gross product46 whilst in 1500 they could not have exceeded
1–2 percent. However, only from 1820 onwards did globalisation really
begin. From then on, with the increase in steamships and the fast pace
of technological change in transportation, freight rates sharply dimin-
ished.47 Only “a technological revolution” made “the movement of bulk
commodities between continents” possible and this basic condition was
“not satisfied prior to the early 19th century”.48 Given the difficulties and
costs of transportation, before the times of the railway and steamships,
trade by land between distant regions was limited. Even in the United
Kingdom around 1820 exports did not reach 5 percent.49
2. Rivers, roads, fairs, markets
2.1. Market institutions

A free market economy is merely an abstract model. In the course of
history this theoretical model has virtually never functioned to the full.
45
Maddison (2001), p. 95.
46
Maddison (1995), p. 17.
47
Harley (1988), fig. 1.
48
O’Rourke, Williamson (2002).
49
Maddison (1995), p. 37.
rivers, roads, fairs, markets 177
It has always existed alongside regulating norms, forms of non-market

circulation of goods, and monopolies which have conditioned the
formation of prices. Interference with market mechanisms has existed
in every epoch.
During the millennium preceding the Industrial Revolution trade
developed alongside other forms of movement of goods, and restrictions
of every sort. Towards the 10th century, with the recovery in population
and productive activities, the role of trade expanded. However, the sub-
sistence economy of the peasant family continued to be the basis of the
rural world. The village represented a largely autonomous unit whereas
in the cities the corporative regulations and the bylaws regulating sales
limited the mobility of production factors and of goods.
Production for subsistence can be considered an elementary form of
circulation particularly widespread in the countryside prior to the 19th
century. Here the transfer of goods took place within the family amongst
the same individuals who had taken part in production, particularly in
agricultural production and, to a lesser degree, in industrial production.
In this case money is totally absent. Each individual receives a certain
quantity of goods, not in relation to the money he possesses and is able
to spend, but in relation to his necessities and social position occupied
within the family hierarchy.
The presence of subsistence derives from the high costs of overland
transportation of heavy goods, especially cereals, firewood and veg-
etables, necessary for the survival of a large part of the population.
Not only peasant families depended on their own production to cover
their daily needs, but so did some of the middle classes and nobles
who received a large part of their food from their peasants. Since food
consumption represented about 60–70 percent of the total expense of
an economy, and since secondary goods were partly produced in order
to be consumed by the same producers, it is not an exaggeration to
estimate subsistence at about 50 percent of the gross product of pre-
modern European economies. Exchange by sea was therefore increasing;
however, progress in internal exchanges is far more uncertain.
2.2. What is the market?

A clear definition of markets is supplied by Eric Kerridge: “Markets
are the sum of the voluntary, spontaneous, recurrent, and mutually
profitable exchanges of property at agreed prices between imperfect and
infinitely diverse men seeking to supply one another’s actual and antici-
pated demands. Markets grow and develop as their participants try to
PA PB
I E
A
PA
t
M
P*
PB B
0 Q1 Q* Q
Fig. 9. Prices and the volume of exchange by two diverse economies.
increase their supplies by concentrating on what they have the greatest

comparative advantage in producing and supplying, so widening and
deepening the technical, geographical and social division of labour”.50
The existence of a market relationship between different regions or
within a single region or city is discernible from the presence of “one
price” (hence the “law of one price”, formulated by William Stanley
Jevons). The concept can be presented graphically (Figure 9).
The figure clarifies the relationship between prices and the volume
of the produced commodities in two different places (or, alternatively,
of goods produced by two different firms in the same place).
Country A imports and country B exports a specific product. Factors
required for the production of the commodity are, in fact, available in
B, but not in A. Imports (I) by country A increase as soon as the price
of the imported commodity (PA) diminishes. Exports (E) from country
B rise as soon as the price (PB) of the exported commodity grows. In
the unlikely case that transport and transaction costs should be zero,
the quantity exported by B and imported by A is Q* and the price is
P*. The value of the total product is given by the price multiplied by
the quantity and is then represented by the P*MQ*0 rectangle. Since,
by contrast, costs of commercialisation must be sustained whatever
50
Kerridge (1986), p. 121.
the case, country B will produce up to the point Q1. The sale price will
be PB. To this price several transport and transaction costs have to
be added, represented in the graph by the t segment and the import
price of the product into country A will be then equal to PA, that is its
price in A plus transport and transaction costs. The quantity imported
by A and exported by B is Q1 and is, therefore, lower than it might
otherwise have been (Q1<Q*). The producer country benefits from a
lower price than would have been possible (PB<P*) in the absence of
commercialisation costs, whereas this results in higher prices for the
importing country (PA>P*).
The value of the quantity produced for export is represented by the
rectangle PBBQ10. Transportation and transaction costs, equal to the
area PAABPB, are to be added to this rectangle. The overall price of
the product imported into country A is equal to the sum of the two
previous rectangles and corresponds to the PAAQ10 rectangle. Transport
and transaction costs result in production being lower than in the case
of their absence: PBBQ10<P*MQ*0. The more the t segment, and conse-
quently the area of the AMB triangle, diminish, the more the produced
quantity can rise, to the advantage of both purchasers and sellers.
2.3. Transport costs and transaction costs

A same single price for a commodity in different places is never attained
because of the two different costs of commercialisation, i.e. transaction
costs and transportation costs.
Transaction costs are simply the inevitable costs to be sustained
whenever a transaction is made. “In order to carry out a market transac-
tion” R. H. Coase wrote “it is necessary to discover who it is that one
wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw
up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that
the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on”.51 Transaction
costs “can be separated into the costs of externalities, of informa-
tion, and of risk”.52 The cost of externalities is the cost or benefit in a
transaction accrued to parties other than those directly participating.
A typical example is the inability of an entrepreneur or merchant to
capture the gains from an innovation without the legal protection of
51
Coase (1937).
52
North, Thomas (1970), pp. 5–6.
personal property. Information and risk costs are costs associated with
the knowledge of demand conditions and trading opportunities in a
market and with losses deriving from trade. In addition to the resources
employed in order to produce goods, there are also the resources spent
on exchange.53
Institutions heavily influence the weight of transaction costs. A
change in institutions, such as in the structure of law, in police control,
or in property rights, can result in greater efficiency of the market. The
decline in transaction costs during the Early Modern centuries was,
according to institutionalist economic historians, an important incen-
tive towards the widening of markets and trades, although it is difficult
to specify the extent of the decline in these costs.54 On the other hand,
scholars have paid much less attention to transport costs, at least in
recent times, though these are much easier to quantify, determined
as they are by the state of the roads, the means of transportation and
locomotive energy. These did not really improve in the agricultural
societies prior to the steam engine and coal. It has been calculated
that the average transport cost over land equalled 4–5 kg of cereals
per ton of a commodity transported per kilometre; by river 0.9 and by
sea 0.3–0.4 (Table 2).55
Transport costs of internal overland traffic, which related to the vast
majority of all exchanges, were no different in the 18th century from
what they had been two millennia earlier.56 This is the reason why
many scholars, distracted by the improvements in trading conditions
in international commerce and declining transaction costs, forget that
this commerce was, after all, a thin veneer over a deeper and much
wider reality of difficult exchanges on the local level. The agricultural
sector was the core of the pre-modern economy, and was little affected
by progress in long-distance transactions because self-sufficiency was
dominat, due to high transport costs. However, we have seen, that,
between continents, “only goods with very high value to bulk ratios
were shipped, like silk, exotic spices and precious metals”. Only within
Europe were relatively cheap commodities (in relation to their weight)
53
I follow here North, Thomas (1973).
54
See especially North, Thomas (1973).
55
See the interesting Table XLVII in Clark, Haswell (1967), pp. 184 ff. and Bairoch
(1990), p. 141.
56
See the recent modernising views on ancient Roman economy presented in Lo
Cascio (ed.) (2000).
Table 2. Transport costs in pre-modern economies and at the start of

modernisation (in kgs of grain per ton-kilometre transported).
Kgs of grain per
Ton/km
Porterage 8.6
Pack animals 4.1
Wagon 3.4
Boat 1.0
Steam boat 0.5
Railways 0.45
Source: Clark-Haswell (1967), p. 189 (median figures).
transported. In the exchanges between Europe and Asia, “Europe

imported spices, silk, sugar and gold, which were hardly found there
at all; Asia imported silver, linens and woollens, which were hardly
found there at all”.57 “Globalisation did not begin 5,000 years ago, or
even 500 years ago. It began in the early 19th century”.58
2.4. A Smithian perspective

When market exchange does not exist or is limited, actual growth will
remain lower than the potential. Free trade allows regions to gain from
specialisation in those goods where they enjoy comparative advantages.
With specialisation, the economies of the world progress towards the
frontier of efficiency.59
We may consider economic progress as a gradual reduction of
exchange costs, increase in the volume of the exchanged goods, and
progress in the division of labour and, subsequently, productivity. In
this way the area of the triangle of inefficiency in the previous graph
would diminish. Economic progress would be equivalent to the sum of
the rise in welfare as a consequence of the elimination of inefficiencies
in market mechanisms and increasing incentives to innovation. This
Smithian approach to economic history had, and continues to have,
considerable explanatory strength. A widely accepted view is that some
progress did take place during Ancient times, the Middle Ages and the
57
O’Rourke, Williamson (2002), pp. 26–7.
58
O’Rourke, Williamson (2002), p. 47.
59
A special approach to market integration, specialisation and growth is presented
by Goodfriend, Mc Dermott (1995).
182 chapter iv—trade
early Modern Age. Despite interruptions, as occurred during the early

Middle Ages, progress in market relations would have come about, not
only because of the process of extension resulting from demographic
growth, but also because of a consolidation of market relations. The
history of traditional, agrarian civilizations would appear to be char-
acterised by gradual progress.
It is, however, difficult to agree with this perspective of development
in pre-modern agrarian economies as a consequence of market widen-
ing. “Specialisation of functions through the division of labour,” Wrigley
states, “promised substantial, but often finite gains”.60 The technical and
especially the energy systems limited the possibilities of growth through
market expansion. Changes in market extension and depth would not
“have sufficed on their own to engender an industrial revolution . . . No
matter how assiduously Icarus may strive, human flight is not possible
if the energy employed in the attempt is derived from human muscle”.61
An examination of the concrete ways trade developed from the high
Middle Ages until the 19th century can contribute to a clarification of
both change and stability in European internal exchanges.
2.5. The rivers

Communication between seas, plains and cities and relations among
different internal areas were possible through the network of European
rivers. Transportation was much cheaper on waterways than over
land.62 Above all there are numerous rivers with a North-South direc-
tion, which flow to the heart of the continent: the Vistula, Elba, Rhine,
Seine, Rhone, Adige. The network they form is completed by rivers
which flow from west to east, or in the opposite direction, such as the
Danube, the Po and the Loire.
In contrast the Muslim world, had few big rivers and this represented
an obstacle to the circulation of goods during the late Middle Ages. The
Guadalquivir, the Nile, the Euphrates, the Tigris and rivers in north-
ern Africa maintained a substantial traffic of heavy goods. Trade took
place, however, mainly over land using camels and mules.63 In eastern
Asia the river system supported a far more important trade, perhaps
60
Wrigley (2004b), p. 83.
61
Wrigley (2004c), p. 64.
62
See the previous Table 2.
63
Lopez (1952).
even more so than in Europe. This may be the case in India and it is
certainly the case in China. There river transportation was preferred
to that over land which was limited by the insufficiency of the road
network and the scarce use of animals for transport, and to that by sea,
which does not penetrate the territory. From the 8th century onwards,
there was a notable increase in exchanges between the regions serviced
by the Yang-tze river. A network of traffic developed exploiting rivers,
canals and lakes, forming a sort of single commercial area.64 At the
end of the 16th century, the Florentine Carletti wrote that in China
“continuously more than 12,145 boats from Scianton to Peking trans-
port all the food the King needs and receives as a tribute . . . Besides
there is an endless number of boats of passengers and merchants who
transport to Peking all food needed for the maintenance of the city”.65
In the 17th century Daniello Bartoli confirmed what Carletti had pre-
viously written by noticing that “the rivers are full of every manner of
boats both for passengers and traders”. This was made possible by the
numerous rivers which ramify everywhere and make traffic by water
universal and easy”.66 In the 18th century, river circulation in China
had become proverbial. The Jesuit Du Halde wrote about “the ease of
goods transportation thanks to the rivers and channels”.67
2.6. The roads

Transport overland was hindered worldwide by the physical character-
istics of different territories. However, in comparison with Asia, Europe
was much less fragmented by mountains.68 We have already seen that,
among the innovations in transport, from the 11th century onwards
the utilisation of horses and mules constituted a remarkable change
in the distribution of goods within the continent.69 No innovation
whatsoever was made to the road network. In this pre-modern world,
roads were for the most part precarious tracks, approximately one
and a half metres wide, and cart tracks which rarely reached a width
of more than two and a half metres. Wide roads, covered with gravel
or paved in stone, had existed during Roman times, but this network
64
Ho (1959).
65
Carletti (1701), p. 145.
66
Bartoli (17th c.), p. 52.
67
Cit. in Ho (1959), p. 278.
68
Needham (1956–2004), I, p. 66.
69
We have already seen this innovation in Chap. II.
Source: Singer (1956), II.
Fig. 10. The ways through Asia.
had been abandoned during the early Middle Ages, gradually becoming
impracticable, whereas waterways had gradually become more regularly
used for transport.
It was only from the 12th–13th centuries, with new developments
in trade and with the increasing power of urban communes and rural
communities, that the rebuilding of roads safe for travellers, instead of
unsafe tracks, began.70
Despite the dangers and difficulties on the roads, travel over land
was safer than sea travel which was prone to piracy and shipwrecks.
At times, even when the advantage of sea transport seemed apparent,
merchandise was sent overland to distant places, a prime example of
this being the trade routes which united the Near East with China.71
Above all, between the middle of the 13th century to the middle of
the 14th century, these routes provided civilizations such as those of
Europe and Asia, with the possibility of communication despite the
70
Leighton (1972), pp. 58 ff.; Day (1973), p. 97.
71
Balard (1978), map 72, II, p. 861.
distances separating them (Figure 10). A substantial trade in raw silk

was established. The formation of a huge Mongolian Empire in Central
Asia encouraged contact overland between Europe and the Far East,
during the so-called epoch of the Pax Mongolica, which lasted for
several decades after 1250.
2.7. The fairs

In all of the economies in which trade is an exception rather than a
general practice, the fair held an important position. In such econo-
mies purchases of durables, made outside the cities, were limited and
not sufficient to allow the supply of goods on a daily basis. In these
cases the fair is the most opportune institution. This was usually, but
not always, the annual meeting between producers and consumers,
or between merchants in order to conduct negotiations, especially
regarding goods which were not for everyday use, such as capital goods
(livestock and agricultural tools), or durables such as textiles. The fair
was generally held in conjunction with a religious holiday especially
that of the patron saint. Political authorities were able to concede cer-
tain privileges to those who attended the fairs, such as the exemption
from duties on transported goods, and normally granted protection for
the traders and their customers. Since privileges and exemptions were
granted to those who took part in the fair, it may also be said that “the
fair is independent from the territory on which it is held” and it is this
that distinguishes it from the market.72
The fair is a universal institution and early Modern Age India was,
above all others, the country of fairs. On the occasion of religious fes-
tivals immense crowds gathered in order to attend these events which
were held in places of pilgrimage, some of which were famous. At the
beginning of the 19th century, W. H. Sleeman, an observer of the time,
wrote: “the Hindus have fairs on the banks of all their sacred rivers in
places consecrated either by poetry or tradition”.73 In both China and
Islamic countries fairs seem to be of less importance.74 In Europe fairs
(nundinae) also existed in the early Middle Ages and we have informa-
tion about fairs in Merovingian Gaul and Visigoth Spain.75 In the 9th
72
Boyer-Xambeu, Deleplace, Gillard (1986), p. 59.
73
Conetti (1988), p. 201.
74
Braudel (1979), II, Chap. I.
75
Verlinden (1963).
Source: Braudel (1986).
Fig. 11. The fairs in 18th century France.
century, in northern Europe there were fairs in York, London, Cologne,

Quentovic, Dorestad (in the lower Rhine area), Ribe and Hedeby (in
Jutland), Birka (near Stockholm) and Staraja Ladoga (to the South of
Lake Ladoga).76 After the 11th century, during the period of commercial
recovery and demographic growth, they increased everywhere in both
number and importance. In the 12th century, series of regional and
inter-regional fairs formed a sort of continuous market in England,
France and Flanders. From the 13th century onwards the increase was
minor and probably tended to follow population growth.77
A map of the fairs of Europe during the Early Modern Era is only
possible for limited areas and one has the impression that the number of
fairs is higher in those areas where cities with their markets and shops
are scarcer (Figure 11). This is probably the reason why in Italy, in the
76
Sawyer (1986), p. 59.
77
For Information on different fairs in several European regions see: Everitt (1967),
pp. 533 ff.; Glamann (1977); Braudel (1986), II.
late Middle Ages, there were few fairs: they were concentrated in cities
which had few contacts abroad (Ferrara, Mantua, Verona, Bergamo).78
There were fewer regional fairs than elsewhere and they were found in
the more backward areas of the Marche, Abruzzo and Puglia. There
were none whatsoever around Genoa, Venice, Milan or Florence.
In a sense the fair is a symptom of the limits of mercantile exchange.79
Turgot explained this very clearly in the Foire (Fair) item of the
Encyclopédie. In his opinion, far from being proof of progress, the
presence of so many fairs was the demonstration of limited economic
vitality: “these can only exist in states where commerce is subject to too
many limitations and excessive taxes, and thus remains mediocre”.
2.8. The markets

Whilst a fair was a trading place for goods which were not of daily
use, the market was the place of ordinary purchases. The former took
place once a year, or at least intermittently; the latter were held once
or twice a week, or even more frequently. Thus market and fair were
complementary institutions. Given that articles for daily consumption
were sold in the market, it follows that this was the place where most
trade took place. Consequently markets could not exist in villages of a
few hundred inhabitants as the customers were too few to give rise to
regular transactions. Inhabitants of these areas had to turn to markets
some distance away. Generally the market was an urban institution,
although it also existed in densely populated rural areas.
Both the fair and the market are universal phenomena, and markets
proliferated in India in the early modern age. There were many in cities
(the bazaars) and even in a large number of densely populated villages.
In 13th-century China, large permanent markets developed along the
course of the Yang-tze River and, at least during the Middle Ages, the
volume of transactions would have been much higher than in European
markets.80 In Europe the market was held once or twice a week and
78
From the late Middle Ages, some fairs only carried out financial functions. The first
of these international fairs are the Fairs of Champagne. They were held not far from
Paris in the centres of Troyes, Provins, Lagny and Bar-sur-Aube. During the second
half of the 14th and the whole of the 15th century, the position of the Champagne
Fairs was assumed first by the Fairs of Geneva, in the 15th century, and then by Lyons
during the 16th century.
79
On the vitality of 18th century fairs in England, see, I. Mitchell (2007).
80
Gernet (1959).
only occasionally more often. It usually took place in a marketplace

built especially for bargaining, or in the main square. Situated around
the square were stores, craftsmen’s workshops, abattoirs, and offices for
the public authority that carried out checks on the bargaining.
During the late Middle Ages numerous markets sprang up not only
in towns but also in smaller centres.81 In fact, from the 11th to the 13th
century, “everywhere small villages became, for the ten or twenty sur-
rounding villages, the centre of commercial activity which affected even
the most humble families and which developed continually. Country
people found iron for tools and cloth for weddings, and they took grain
which city traders or monks’ communities bought regularly for their
consumption”.82 However, it was in towns that the market became an
institution of central importance. Agricultural products were brought
from rural areas to be sold in towns, whereas goods manufactured in
towns were sold to the inhabitants of the local districts and the coun-
tryside further afield. It is possible that the economic importance of the
market increased during the Early Modern Age. The decrease of small
farmers, the obligation of cash payments such as rents and taxes, the
increase in number of wage earners; all contributed to the growth of
sales and purchases of products and thus also of the market.
An increase in free trade does not necessarily follow the development
of those market contacts. The freedom mentioned in the Middle Ages
and the Early Modern Age with reference to trade, today would be
defined as privilege: “the law contained in some document or licence
with which a person or an institute is emancipated from an obliga-
tion; or with which a certain person or institute is granted the right
to certain qualifications or economic advantages with the exclusion of
someone else”.83
The market place was usually an area where rules, limits, and precise
regulations applied. The presence of some authority, which supervised
the control of money, weights, and measures, was required in every
market square. This necessity ensued from the unreliability of weights
and the authenticity of coins, in a world in which variety was the
norm in nearby territories and often even within the same region. For
this reason the retail of agricultural products could only take place in
81
Verlinden (1963).
82
Duby (1962), I.
83
Bridbury (1986), p. 81.
market squares regulated by law.84 Only under public management,

could demand meet supply.
2.9. The shops

In the late medieval period, the shop or workshop was the organisation
which guaranteed continuity between demand and supply. It was in
the shop that goods were actually made and apprentices learnt their
skills. In a bakery, bread was made, the apprentice learnt the art and
the product was sold. However, in late medieval times artisans were
often prohibited by law from selling goods in their workshops, and on
particular days had to transfer these to the market place, where they
were subject to the laws of sale. The reason for prohibiting sale in shops
was that only in the market place was it possible to check weights,
measures, money, the quality of the goods for sale and the negotiation.
Where trading did not take place in public, the supplier and often even
the purchaser could deal dishonestly without impediment. In 1499, in
the city of Hull in England, artisans were prohibited by the corporation
of merchants from selling their goods “in their howses, shoppes, and
wyndowes”.85 Artisans often had their own stalls which they put up in
the market squares to sell the product of their labour.
Alongside these workshops, shops for retail alone also existed in
medieval times. They belonged to salesmen and not to artisans and were
in large part shops which sold edibles, such as delicatessens, grocers
and butchers. During the 18th century, it was exactly this type of shop
which spread, although in some areas, such as England for example,
it had already existed as early as the late 16th century. Thus the com-
mercial function began to differentiate from the productive. Without
doubt, the division of the two functions remained only partial. During
the late medieval period, it may be noted that whilst almost every artisan
also sold his product, in the 18th century there were numerous artisans
who no longer did so.86
The most frequently stocked goods in the smaller shops were cheeses,
butter, soap, candles, tea and sugar. The increased sales of tea and sugar
in the 18th century were largely due to the increased number of shops.
In the 17th and 18th centuries consumption of coffee, chocolate, beer
84
On market regulations in France see: Meuvret (1977); Goubert (1960).
85
Unwin (1904), p. 76. Other examples in D. Davis (1966), p. 5.
86
See especially: Mui (1989), pp. 47 ff.; D. Davis (1966), pp. 55 ff.; Willan (1970).
and liqueurs also increased, due to the proliferation of taverns, beer

houses and cafés. These became ever more popular meeting places for
the rich and the poorer members of society. It was the birth of the
leisure industry. In the eyes of some, the multitude of these meeting
places was symptomatic of new idleness and sin, representing a threat
to the social structure. It seems that England became the vanguard in
this sector. Here, at the end of the 18th century, some 20–25 percent
of the population was in a position to spend 30 pounds a year on
manufactured goods and commercial services for the house.87 As a
natural consequence more efficient methods of exchange were devel-
oped which, in their turn, stimulated the growth of industrial output.
In 1794, Matthew Boulton, owner of a toy factory, wrote in a letter:
“I do believe it to be much more advantageous to produce for the
common people and not only for the nobility”; to whomsoever spoke
disparagingly of travelling salesmen and small shops he retorted: “we
must remember that they do more to sustain a large industry, than all
the gentlemen of the nation”.88
2.10. Market integration

The question whether from the late Middle Ages until 1800 market
integration progressed in Europe or not is difficult to answer. As has
already been seen, when markets are poorly integrated, prices for the
same commodity are different even in relatively close places and their
volatility is remarkable since harvest shocks are local and independent.
Limited mobility hinders the compensation of drops in production in a
specific region with the abundant harvests of other regions. However,
evidence on pre-modern Europe is poor: data on prices often do not
refer to the same commodity and the same quality. Even when prices
refer to the same kind of goods (as in the case of cereals), the reliability
of the available series differs. The improvement in market relations could
merely be the effect of improvement in the quality of the existing series
of data which are ordinarily better when relating to the 18th century
than to the 15th century.
Some attempts at a quantitative analysis of market integration have
been tried for wheat and rye in the period from the 16th century up to
the end of the 18th century. Yet even where we find a high correlation
87
As computed by Eversley (1967), p. 257.
88
Cit. in Mui (1989), p. 18.
10.00
1.00
0.10 Pisa
Udine
0.01
1500–01
1520–21
1540–41
1560–61
1580–81
1600–01
1620–21
1640–41
1660–61
1680–81
1700–01
1720–21
1740–41
1760–61
1780–81
1800–01
1820–21
Sources: M. Breschi, A. Fornasin (forthcoming) for Udine; Malanima (1976) for Pisa.
Fig. 12. Wheat prices in Pisa and Udine 1500–1821 (harvest prices,
Florentine lire and Venetian lire per kg).
between prices in different markets, we must be cautious about market

integration. It is not surprising to find that within a relatively small
state such as Tuscany, for which we have good prices series (at least
for Pisa, Siena, Prato and Florence), wheat prices were almost identical.
However, if we compare two series of market prices, elaborated with a
similar methodology and among the best available from a qualitative
viewpoint, such as those for Pisa and Udine89 for a long period of 300
years, we could conclude that market integration was also very high,
almost like the one existing within Tuscany (Figure 12).
In fact, the correlation is 0.913, when in the case of identical move-
ments the result would be 1. Furthermore no considerable improvement
in the result is to be found if we compare the 16th to the 18th century.
On the other hand, we know that the exchange of wheat between the
Republic of Venice (Udine) and the Granduchy of Tuscany (Pisa)
was nonexistent. As far as we know, during these three centuries the
influence of Mediterranean wheat commercialisation did not have a
notable or constant influence on the price movement in these two
89
The series of wheat prices in Udine has been elaborated by Marco Breschi and
Alessio Fornasin. I thank them for allowing me to use it.
Table 3. Correlation of wheat and rye prices between some European cities
in 1500–1700 (indices of correlation for 50 years).
Paris- Augsburg- Danzig- Danzig- Danzig-

Grenoble Würzburg Warsaw Utrecht Amsterdam
1501–1550 0.396 0.790
1551–1600 0.262 0.589 0.787
1601–1650 0.432 0.756 0.515 0.950 0.881
1651–1700 0.550 0.839 0.242 0.917
Source: Achilles (1959), pp. 54–5.
cities. More convincing is the hypothesis that a similar climatic evolution

and demographic trend was shared by both cities. Even the correla-
tion between wheat prices in Tuscany and England is relatively high,
0.712, during the long period from 1300 to 1860,90 although it is not
plausible to assume that there was a strong influence of the European
cereal trade on the price trends of both countries.
There is no certainty that correlation among prices in Spain, France,
and Germany increased during the 17th century.91 By contrast, it is cer-
tain that prices were more correlated wherever wheat could be marketed
by sea (such as in the case of Poland and the Netherlands) (Table 3).
In the decades between 1760 and 1780, reforms in several European
states aimed at the liberalisation of internal trade and the reduction of
tariffs on interstate circulation thus allowing market integration.92 On
the whole, however, a “very dramatic transformation”, only occurred
during “a comparatively short period in the nineteenth century, when
there were serious changes in transport and information technolo-
gies”.93 “There is little evidence of the development of an integrated
Europeanwheat market in the second half of the 18th century”.94
A measure of the dispersion of wheat prices—the coefficient of varia-
tion—contributes to clarify the trend towards a more intense circulation
of goods in Europe from 1820–30 and confirms the opinion of weak
market integration before the 19th century (Figure 13).
90
See the series in Figure 1 in the following Chap. VI.
91
Achilles maintained (1959), p. 51, that correlation among prices in Spain, France
and Germany increased during the 17th century.
92
Persson (1999), p. 137.
93
Persson (1999), p. 91.
94
Federico (2008).
innovations in exchange 193
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
1750 1775 1800 1825 1850 1875 1900
Source: Federico (forthcoming).

Fig. 13. Wheat prices (coefficient of variation) in Europe 1750–1914.
3. Innovations in exchange
3.1. Techniques of transport

The term innovation indicates a different combination of production
factors, a new product, a new method of trade, or a change in the
institutions of commerce.95 As from the late medieval period, many
innovations took place in the commercialisation of goods and services.
All of them concerned long distance trade and finance, and not local
exchanges. These innovations increasingly contributed to lower transac-
tion costs rather than transport costs. Transport costs were little affected
and only in the case of distant or international commerce.
Innovations in shipping were significant, both in vessels and in navi-
gational equipment (Figure 14). Around the year 1000, there were two
basic types of vessel on the European seas, both dating back to ancient
times. The galley, powered by approximately one hundred rowers and
guided by about 10 sailors, was around 40 metres long and some 5–6
metres wide, with a limited cargo capacity. It was particularly suitable
for war, whereas the round ship, which was 23–27 metres long and
some 10 metres wide, was equipped with lateen sails exploiting aeolian
95
I follow the use of the term innovation in Schumpeter (1912).
C
A a. Viking ship (12th c.);
B b. Viking ship with castle (12th c.);
c. Viking ship (11th c.);
d. Viking ship with castle (12th–13 c.);
E e. Viking ship (1250 ca.);
D f. Viking ship with castle (13th c.);
G
g. small Viking ship (1228);
h. primitive Viking ship;
H i. ship of Viking kind (1270);
j. first example of kogge ship (1200);
k. kogge (1250 ca.);
F l. kogge (1242 ca.);
I m. kogge (13th c.);
K n. kogge (1242 ca.);
o. ship with side rudder (1180).
J
O
M
L N
Source: based on Gille (1978).
Fig. 14. Late medieval ships (11th–13th c.).
energy and was mostly used for commercial purposes. This vessel and
the galley both had two laterally positioned rudders. In the north of
Europe, between 750 and 1000, significant changes were to be seen in
the Viking ships.96
Following these innovations, important changes regarding naviga-
tion spread especially between 1250 and 1350 and between 1450 and
1600:97
1. 1250–1350: in the late medieval period the most significant devel-

opments were: the substitution of the two lateral rudders with one
single one at the stern (used in the North earlier than in the South);
96
Unger (1980), pp. 34 ff., pp. 80 ff.
97
See Lane’s essays (1974). See also Lefebvre des Noëttes (1935).
the spread in the use of the compass; the wider utilisation of nautical
maps and then of the unified pilot’s book for the Mediterranean, the
first nautical map charting the sea from Gibraltar to Constantinople;
the introduction in the Mediterranean of the cog, an imitation of the
kogge used in the northern seas (a ship with a tall mast and square
sail; in the Mediterranean it had a smaller mast at the prow with a
lateen sail);98
2. 1450–1600: a second period of development in navigation began
towards 1450, consisting, above all, in the conquest of the high seas,
that is, the possibility of moving further away from dry land. This
was an important novelty, which created “asymmetry on a world
scale”99 between Europe and the other continents. The traditional
difference between a long boat with oars (galley), used above all for
war, and the round boat with sails used for commercial purposes,
was overcome.100 In the 16th century, wind-powered ships called
galleons began to be built with cannons on board and were thus
functional both as war ships and transport vessels. It/was an expedi-
ent for economising on energy/and achieving higher efficiency.101 At
the same time, ocean-going sailing ships, caravels, united the best
of the northern maritime tradition with that of the Mediterranean.
The sails functioned on three masts and combined a square north-
ern type sail with a triangular lateen sail.102 During this second era,
important structural changes were also made in ships in northern
Europe. The fluyt appeared first in Holland and then elsewhere. The
characteristics of this vessel were its low building cost—50 percent
lower than that of other ships- and its large cargo capacity (500–
600 tons).103
As from the end of the 16th century, these innovations in navigation

were accompanied and favoured by the decline in piracy. Protection
against pirates had previously weighed considerably on the seafaring
economy.104 Every ship had to be armed, a number of the crew was
recruited for defence purposes and insurance premiums were high. The
98
See especially Unger (1980), pp. 56 ff. and 104 ff.
99
Braudel (1979), I, Chap. 6.
100
Cipolla (1965).
101
Cipolla (1974), p. 201 and (1965).
102
Rosenberg-Birdzell (1986), Chap. III.
103
Reinhard (1983), Chap. 6.
104
Lane (1974), pp. 203–4.
decline in piracy enabled defence costs to be reduced by eliminating

weaponry on board and diminishing the size of the crew, thus increas-
ing cargo capacity.105 Merchants definitely benefited from this change,
which represented a true decline in transaction costs and fostered com-
mercialisation of goods by sea.106
It was due to these innovations that, between 1600 and 1750, the
productivity of oceanic transport grew at a rate of 1–1.5 percent per
year.107 Between 1600 and 1850 the cost of oceanic transport halved.108
It has been calculated that over a long term, the crew-cargo ratio passed
from one sailor for every 5–6 tons around 1400, to one sailor for every
7–8 tons by the mid 16th century and to one for every 10 tons in the
second half of the 17th century.109 The general consequence was pro-
gressive development in maritime commerce.
In Holland, the tonnage doubled between 1560 and 1660, but during
the 18th century it remained more or less constant.110 In England it
tripled between 1680–90 and 1780–90;111 lesser increases were noticeable
in other European countries. In the 18th century it was not unusual
to find ports where traffic increased by 2–4 per cent a year, as was the
case in Bordeaux and Marseille in France.112
3.2. Money
Less evident than the innovations in transport, but no less important
for productivity in the commercial sector, was the development in
business techniques. “Business techniques” refer to all the institutions
and practices which influenced the movement of goods and money and
facilitated exchange of commodities and transactions. They included
the use of money, the legal institutions which supervised commercial
traffic, the systems of accounting, and company formation.
Regarding the circulation of money, it has been said that the
pre-industrial European economies continued to be “hard money
economies”.113 In some periods the available monetary reserves were
105
Shepherd-Walton (1972).
106
As noticed by Lane (1974), pp. 203–4.
107
North-Thomas (1973) and (1970).
108
North (1968).
109
Cipolla (1974), p. 208.
110
van Zanden (1993).
111
Coleman (1977), p. 147.
112
Carrière (1973), I, pp. 67 and 59.
113
Day (1978), p. 2.
“dramatically scarce”.114 The different phases of economic expansion,

depending on demographic growth and increase in exchange, were
accompanied by an increase in the monetary base and velocity of
monetary circulation. Such was the case in the late medieval period,
at the time of the prosperous trade of precious metals from the mines
of Saxony, the Tyrol and sub-Saharan Africa. In the 16th century, the
influx of silver from Peruvian mines was responsible for the increase
in the European monetary mass; while in the 18th century silver from
Mexico increased monetary reserves.115
Despite this inflow, monetary circulation was nearly always inad-
equate. Metal coins constituted the physical money and the availabil-
ity of the necessary metals—gold, silver and copper—was limited.116
Between 1500 and 1650 the availability has been estimated to have
grown by 5 percent for gold coins and by 50 per cent for silver, thanks
to the importation of precious metals from America. As was always the
case, however, a large part of this treasure from America flowed out
of Europe to eastern Asia. It is a constant feature of pre-19th century
economic history and the consequence of this unfavourable balance
of trade with the East was a serious depletion of the metal reserves of
the continent. This draining of metals was substantial during the 16th
and 17th centuries, when the various Dutch and English companies
increased their purchase of Asian goods.117
Devaluation was one of the reactions to the monetary shortage. It
became a characteristic phenomenon of pre-modern European his-
tory.118 Here devaluation meant a progressive reduction of the precious
metal content of coins. Between the mid 13th century and the end of
the 15th century, the Milanese lira was subjected to a debasement of
90 percent, the Genoese lira 80 percent and the Venetian lira 70 per
cent.119 This devaluation happened in nearly all European currencies. It
was particularly strong in the case of Turkish money (Table 4).
114
Parker (1974).
115
Vilar (1969).
116
The suggested estimations of the availability of gold and silver vary notably. See
Day (1978), Braudel-Spooner (1967), and Boyer-Xambeu, Deleplace, Gillard (1986),
p. 137.
117
Parker (1974).
118
Cipolla (1963).
119
Cipolla (1958), p. 58.
Table 4. Weight of the Florentine lira, English pound, Dutch guilder and Turkish akçe
from 1300 to 1800 (in grams of silver and index 1450–60 = 100).
Florentine lira English pound Dutch guilder Turkish akçe

silver (gr.) Index silver (gr.) Index silver (gr.) Index silver (gr.) Index
1300–25 16,2 173 319 148 –
1450–60 7,7 100 216 100 22,0 100 0.85 100
1490–1500 6,6 86 173 80 22,0 100 0.68 80
1600 4,5 58 111 51 11,0 50 0.29 34
1700 4,5 58 105 49 9,6 44 0.13 15
1800 3,8 50 104 48 9,6 44 0.048 6
Sources: for Florentine lira see Malanima (2002), App. III. The data for the pound sterling are from
Felloni (1997), p. 70 and Munro (1991), pp. 154 ff. The weight of the Dutch guilder is from Posthumus
(1943, 1964), Tab. IVe VIII. The weight of the Turkish akçe is from Pamuk (2000), p. 455.
Devaluation depended on various causes. However, its effect was an

increase in the quantity of coins in circulation, even if each coin had a
lower value. As a reaction to the inelastic supply of circulating currency,
when an increase in exchange necessitated greater quantities of money,
debasement had the effect of preventing “the pressure of deflation which
would have strangled the process of economic development”.120
With an unchanged monetary mass and without devaluation, another
way of dealing with the requirements of commercial exchange consisted
of faster money circulation, brought about by introducing means of
credit. In this way, the number of commercial exchanges could rise
through the increased use of cheques, credit transfers, or other expe-
dients. It has been noted that these instruments of credit functioned as
nothing more than palliatives in the overall structure of the European
economy,121 though in the sector of exchanges with more distant areas
they were not of secondary importance. These innovations prepared the
way for the modern systems of credit. In the late medieval period they
developed first of all in northern Italy and especially in Tuscany where
credit became separate from commerce before anywhere else.122
120
Cipolla (1958), p. 31.
121
Day (1978), p. 3.
122
Melis (1955); Cassandro (1988).
3.3. Companies
From the 12th century, there was a rapid evolution of commercial com-
panies and their organisation, the most important innovations of the
high Middle Ages in this sector being the establishment of the limited
liability (commenda) alongside the unlimited liability (company).123
In the Mediterranean trade commenda became common in the 12th
century. As the commenda limited the investor’s responsibility to the
capital invested, fund-raising was facilitated. Even nobles or modest
savers, who would never have invested without some protection of their
private capital, could participate in business financing.
Later, in the early modern age, a change in the commercial institu-
tions came about with the introduction of privileged companies, which
already existed in England in the 16th century: one for Moscovia was
founded in 1555, for the Levant in 1581, and for Africa in 1588.124 The
privileged companies were the means by which European commerce
extended worldwide: the Dutch East India Company, founded in 1602,
was among these. This institution integrated the functions of a sover-
eign power with that of a business association, differing from previous
merchant companies and having the right to a monopoly in Dutch
commerce with Asia, thus, to a certain extent, enjoying the sovereignty
of a State.125 In this company, the management of commercial affairs
and the financing were separate. The savings of both the rich and the
comfortably well-off contributed to capital formation, above all when
the practice of sales of shares on the Stock Exchange was consolidated,
as happened in Amsterdam in the 17th century.
Instruments of circulation and different company structures devel-
oped at the same time as the establishment of improved methods of
accountancy, until the appearance of the double entry in Tuscany during
the 13th century.126 With this, every operation is registered in opposite
sections, debit and credit, and thus the total of written values in debit
equals that of the values in credit. According to some scholars, this type
of accounting corresponded to a method of control over company busi-
ness, which was an important factor in the success of the rationality of
123
This topic will be considered further in Chap. VII concerning capital.
124
Coornaert (1967).
125
Steensgaard (1982).
126
Melis (1950).
capitalism.127 This accounting system spread throughout Europe from

the North of Italy, often through the Italian traders, to cities such as
London, Bruges and Antwerp.
4. Conclusion
From the late Middle Ages on, trade could thus benefit from the progress
of wind energy exploitation, which, as has been seen, was one of the few
progressing carriers of energy. In the Early Modern Age this enabled the
astonishing widening of world trade contacts. However, if we look at the
internal market of goods, the stability of biological energy converters
did not allow the extension of contacts and the progress of marketing.
Travel and transport costs remained high and, as a consequence, the
many difficulties in the commodity circulation were not overcome. If
we consider the dimension of market connections in Roman antiquity
in comparison with the late Middle Ages or early Modern times, there
is no doubt that the market advanced thanks to the rising maritime
circulation of goods. With regard to the internal circulation there is
reason to be more sceptical. Internal circulation did not overcome
the limits of agricultural economies, rooted in vegetable-based energy
systems. Growth took place in the small fraction of the total product
exchanged by sea, whereas stability or modest increase in per capita
terms occurred in the larger fraction of the total product that could
not be exchanged by sea.
127
This is a central topic in Weber (1921).
CHAPTER V
INDUSTRY
Agricultural produce is hardly ever consumed without first undergoing

some sort of slight or radical transformation and it is industry that is
responsible for the modification of raw materials, products of the earth
or minerals, and the transformation of these to meet the requirements
of men.
Three main types of industrial organisation are found in the past. In
the late Middle Ages and early Modern era these are well documented
throughout Europe and elsewhere. They also existed prior and subse-
quent to this long period, thus forming a recurrent pattern in which
the various forms did not follow one another, but appeared side by
side throughout the different ages. It is only their relative importance
that changed. The three main types are: domestic industry, crafts, and
centralised industry.
1. Types of industry
1.1. Industry and agriculture

Although, as we will see, industry was not exclusive to the city and
several industrial activities developed in the countryside, in traditional
agrarian societies the majority of industrial firms were located in urban
centres. Among the several differences existing between agriculture and
industry, two seem of special interest in our reconstruction:
1. whilst in the countryside community relations within the family

and among the village members dominated the life and work of
the individual, in the cities the situation was different. Here for
work purposes family members were involved in much broader
relationships than those in families or villages. What is referred to
by modern economists as “human capital” is a feature of urban life.
The possibilities of human capital accumulation increase wherever
cities are more numerous;
MALANIMA_f6_201-254.indd 201 5/26/2009 12:04:05 PM
202 chapter v – industry
2. a consequence of the network of contacts in the cities and industries

is an increase in returns which characterises industrial activity over
the long period under discussion. In agriculture decreasing returns
follow the rise in population, whilst in pre-modern European cities
progress in techniques and forms of organisation is continuous and,
alongside development in different regions, this progress continually
changed the European geography of industry.
We will begin by outlining all the forms of industrial organisation, from

the simplest to the more complex; then we will examine the changes in
geography together with the changes in technology and organisation.1
Since both industry and trade developed primarily in the cities, or were
controlled by merchants and entrepreneurs based in the cities (although
they spread outside the urban centres as well), we will examine finally
the importance and evolution of urbanisation.
1.2. Domestic industry

Domestic industry is the activity carried out by the members of a
family to satisfy their need of non-agricultural products. The aim is
self-sufficiency or consumption. This form of organisation is found
primarily in the rural household, even though it was not unknown in
towns. Until relatively recently it was probably the most important and
widespread form of industry.
The characterising feature of domestic industry is that the producer
and the consumer are one and the same; that is the family which
produces is also the family which consumes the goods. Not only are
producer and consumer the same, but the producer carries out vari-
ous functions which would be separate in more advanced industrial
production. In domestic industry, the producer of the final product
is often the producer of raw materials such as textile yarns, wood or
leather, and the provider of the capital employed for production in the
form of tools. In most cases, he is also owner of the site where product
transformation takes place. He is an artisan and, in this role, he both
organises and carries out production. This is made possible because
the nature of the work requires simple skills and modest capital invest-
ments which are accessible to almost all families.2 In peasant households
1
On the organisation of the industrial sector in Europe, see Massa (2002), pp. 23 ff.
2
Some examples in Malanima (1990).
types of industry 203
engaged in this form of industrial organisation, the family income is

composite. Since family members work, a quota of their income could
be defined in modern terms as a wage. Since they are the owners of
the tools, another part of the income could be defined as interest on
the invested capital. if they own the building where industrial activity
develops, then part of their income would represent rent. Finally, as
they organise the production and combine production factors, they
also generate a profit. Income types that divide up with the division of
labour, are here intertwined and hard to distinguish.
In medieval and modern times, textile production was the most
important of the activities organised in the form of domestic industry.
Other goods, however, were also produced. Before modern growth
food production was, in quantitative terms, of foremost importance
in domestic industry. Since the invention of the water mill and sub-
sequently of the oil press, some important household tasks, such as
the production of flour and oil, became the prerogative of specialised
artisans who possessed considerable fixed capital. Until quite recently
bread production remained, for the most part, a domestic job, as did
the production of wine, beer, butter and cheese.
After the early Middle Ages there was a decline in other types of
production such as that of agricultural and building tools.3 The increas-
ing use of metals and more frequent employment of stone and brick
forced rural families to turn to specialised craftsmen.
1.3. Crafts
Artisan industry is the production in workshops of handmade arti-
cles, destined for the market, realized by specialised craftsmen, who
generally worked single-handedly or with a few assistants. While in
cottage industry the producer was also the consumer, in craftsmanship
these functions are separate. However small the craftsman’s clientele,
it would still number from tens to hundreds of people, distributed
within a radius of a few miles from the workshop, as was the case
for millers, tailors, carpenters and builders. For textile producers, the
market was often considerably larger and consumers were far from the
place of production. Cloth produced by craftsmen in northern Europe,
Flanders, Germany, and England was, for centuries, transported to the
3
Duby (1962), I, 2, Chap. IV.
Mediterranean. Italian silk was exported towards the cities of northern

Europe from the 12th to the 18th centuries, along with glass, luxury
furniture, works of art and crafted gold.
The diversity and variety of crafts resulted in more complex systems
of production than those of domestic industry. The craftsman carried
out his industrial activity with the help of his family and often some
additional labourer, amongst whom the duties were divided accordingly.
The skill of the craftsman acquired by engaging his capacities on one
job is superior to that of an occasional, unspecialised worker, such as a
farmer, who produces tools and weaves in his own home. Each product
made by the craftsman is the result of physical and intellectual capacities,
handed down in time and acquired through long experience of body
and mind. The textile industry, food production, the building industry,
wood, metal and leather work were all organised as crafts.
The capital employed by the craftsman was greater than that used
in cottage industry, because he used more expensive materials, and
more fixed capital in the form of equipment and tools. Even if the tools
employed by the craftsman were only the loom or the spinning wheel,
the cost of these was usually high compared to those used in cottage
industry. Fixed capital investments such as a mill, or a furnace were
well beyond the possibilities of the domestic producer.
Frequently the artisan worked at home. However, it was often nec-
essary to rent or purchase a workshop, which was the typical site for
this type of production, thus separating the combination of work and
home life which prevailed in cottage industry. The workshop became
the core of the business, instead of the family. The worker was intro-
duced into a wider social circle than the family, that is, into a system
where it was necessary to buy, sell, and employ work-hands. The circle
of economic contacts increased and, as a consequence, so did the circle
of social contacts.
Although craftsmanship existed also in villages, it was found mostly
in the towns. There are many reasons for this, the most obvious of
which is that the market for handmade goods was larger in towns.
The greater and more varied demand meant that there was a market
for specialised crafts which in the countryside would not have found
sufficient clientele. The development of contacts and commercial traf-
fic in the towns facilitated both the supply of raw materials and the
sale of finished goods, and owing to the more numerous population,
recruitment of the necessary skilled labourers was easier.
No membership of guilds was required in order to be a craftsman.4

Numerous craftsmen in the countryside had no rapport whatsoever
with the guilds, were not subject to any regulation and paid no taxes.
Nonetheless, over the long period from the 13th to the end of the
18th century guilds played an important role in the industrial sector
throughout Europe, most craftsmen being subject to these institutions.5
With their statutes and directives, the guilds influenced the structure
and the course of production.6
The basic principles of the guilds, i.e. the guarantee of equal economic
opportunities for members and that of the monopoly of production
against outsiders, were for centuries the two fundamental mainstays
of the corporative system. The guild represented a sort of collective
monopoly, that is, a group holder of exclusive rights in a particular sec-
tor of industrial activity. It also exercised a wide social control, which
“encompassed both members and non-members and mainly touched
on their economic lives but was also extended to such social issues as
marriage and burials and the gendered division of labour, and to such
cultural aspects like common meals, and rituals, and a shared religion
among the membership, as well as exclusion of other religions, notably
the Jewish”.7
In many instances the system of craftsmanship was subject to a more
complex organisation. The same person did not always act as crafts-
man, entrepreneur and salesman, and in time the salesperson became
an independent figure from the entrepreneur. As was the case for most
trades, the small manufacturer no longer worked exclusively for a local
clientele which commissioned specific products. The production, usu-
ally textiles, was purchased in bulk by one or more merchants who
organised its sale in other, sometimes distant, places.
A further step towards internal change in craftsmanship came about
with the putting-out system, or, to use a German term, Verlagssystem,
which is a particular form of organisation within the system of crafts-
manship. With the putting-out system, production takes place in small
family workshops and not in large establishments; the craftsman usually
4
A short reconstruction of the corporation system is to found in Thrupp (1965). The
subject of the guilds has recently been the object of new research in Italy: Frangioni
(1998) (a useful bibliography); Guenzi, Massa, Moioli (eds.) (1999). On the function and
purposes of the guilds, see especially Lucassen, De Moor, Van Zanden (eds) (2008).
5
See the fine article by Belfanti (2004).
6
See the article by Epstein (1998).
7
Prak (2004), p. 176.
Central Workshop
Merchant-entrepreneur
Purchase of Sale of
Production
raw materials commodities
Preparation of
Spinning Weaving Finishing Dying
wool
Note: the structure represented in the Figure follows the organisation of the wool
industry in late medieval Florence as described by Doren (1901).
Fig. 1. The organisation of the putting out system in the wool industry.
owns the equipment with which his activity operates. Nevertheless, in

comparison to simple craftsmanship, there is a clearer separation of
roles and division of labour in the putting-out system. In particular,
the entrepreneurial role is separated from production in as much as
the merchant coordinates the work of the artisans. He purchases the
raw materials and organises their manufacture by the craftsmen either
in their own homes or in a workshop, their work being coordinated by
intermediaries under his supervision. Subsequently, he proceeds with the
sale of the finished product. Putting-out industry is a sort of network of
numerous independent small workshops. The merchant-entrepreneur
is the director of this kind of scattered manufacturing process.
The period from the 17th to the 19th centuries witnessed a wide dif-
fusion of rural industry, or proto-industry. During this era, the textile
activity became a source of additional income for many peasant families.
It was usual for the merchant-employer’s workshop to be situated in
the city, thus forming the commercial base of the entire cottage system,
which was widely scattered over the countryside.8
1.4. Centralised industry

Centralised industry is the activity carried out by paid workers, concen-
trated in one place, using tools often belonging to others and under the
direction of a supervisor. In different periods, centralisation emerged
8
The subject of this form of organisation or proto-industry will be resumed later
on in par. 3.9.
for different reasons: because of the uniqueness of the product, for

example a ship, a palace or a church; or because there was a single
source of materials to be employed (a mine); or because of the neces-
sity of constant surveillance of the workforce whilst utilising valuable
raw materials which could be stolen. Furthermore, the supervision of
complex procedures in certain sectors, such as carpets and porcelain,
and of expensive technical equipment that only few could afford and
which had to be used collectively, for instance industrial machinery,
were also motives for centralisation.
There are numerous cases of centralised industry in the early Middle
Ages. Industrial activity was often carried out by serfs in factory work-
shops which landowners and religious bodies maintained on their
estates. The serfs owed the owners of the land they cultivated both
service in the form of agricultural labour and industrial work. In these
workshops metal products, pots, bricks, and tiles were manufactured,
but above all, textiles.
Numerous examples of industrial activity in the form of central-
ised factories exist in the late Middle Ages and the early Modern
era. However in the period preceding the Industrial Revolution, this
represents a less important form of organisation compared to that of
craftsmanship and domestic industry. Centralised organisation was
found in the mines, the building trade, in shipyards and paper mills,
in textile dyeing enterprises, hydraulic mills for silk twisting and in
the textile factories.
During the Industrial Revolution, industrial centralisation advanced,
even if scattered industry was neither immediately nor completely
replaced by centralised work. In the middle of the 19th century, the
workforce employed in factories was only 5 percent of the total in
England. Elsewhere the percentage was lower: 4 percent in Belgium, 3
percent in France, and less than 2 percent in Switzerland and Prussia.9
The factory is a kind of centralised industry in which the separation
of roles is more noticeable. Within the system of craftsmanship, the
functions of entrepreneur and worker are still mainly concentrated in
the hands of the artisans themselves, only separating when consider-
able investments are required for high production technology beyond
the financial capacity of most craftsmen. The separation that follows
9
Lis-Soly (1979).
the development from domestic industry and putting-out, to factories

is linked to the growth in volume of products and to the progressive
widening of markets confronting every industrial sector. When the
volume of goods produced rises to meet the needs of a greater number
of consumers, there is also an increase in the volume of work to be
carried out at every stage. Such being the case, this work can constitute
the base of an independent occupation. One man performing many
different functions on his own is replaced by several specialists.
2. From South to North
2.1. Southern industries

The first Muslim geographer whose work has been handed down was Ibn
Khurdàdhbeh, a Persian who lived around the middle of the 9th century.
With regard to commerce between the Muslim world and Europe, he
mentions that “products coming from the western sea are made up
of Slav, Greek, Frank and Longobard slaves, Greek and Andalusian
slave girls, beaver skins and other furs, perfumes, styrax, medicinal
substances and resin”.10 In short, from some European regions came
commodities such as raw materials, men and women, that nowadays
are characteristic exports of underdeveloped areas. In the 10th century,
these European goods reached the Muslim and Byzantine regions by
land, along a route which began in the Baltic, then followed the course
of the Volga, skirted the Caspian Sea and finally reached Iraq and
Persia.11 In exchange for these goods, the Arabs and Byzantines sent
products such as spices, quality textiles, especially silk and precious
coins from the far East.12
The “poles of development” of that time were the Arab and Byzantine
regions (Figure 2). Towards the 10th century, all of the most important
centres of industrial production, mainly textiles, were located outside
Europe. They formed a long belt which ran from Persia to the Levant,
to North Africa as far as southern Spain, thus encircling the whole of
southern Europe. Silk manufacturers existed in Byzantium, but also
10
Cit. in B. Lewis (1982), Chap. V.
11
Bolin (1953), pp. 118 ff.
12
Sabbe (1935).
from south to north 209
Fig. 2. Textile industries in the Muslim Mediterranean (10th–11th centuries).

Source: based on Lombard (1978), Map I.
to a lesser degree, in smaller centres of the Empire, such as Tyre and

Beirut.13
As that time, the Muslim world was, from an industrial point of view,
more advanced than Europe and the volume of textile production was
considerable.14 The demand of the court, the urban market, the military
and naval markets (for sails and ropes), and the religious market had
stimulated the production of a rich variety of industrial goods. In the
10th century the geographer Ibn Hawqal wrote that the products of the
textile workshops of many Arab cities were exported “to every point
of the universe”.15 Zones of silk textiles manufacturing were found in
Arabia, Upper Mesopotamia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tabaristan, North-
West and South-West Iran and Hurasan.16 Linen was mainly produced
in Syria, Cyprus, North Africa, and Mesopotamia, Iran and on the Nile
delta (Alessandria, Damietta, and Tinis forming an important industrial
area). Syria was the foremost producer of cotton, cotton textiles, and
silk.17 The manufacturing of silk textiles also emerged in a few centres of
Spain and Sicily which, during the 10th century, were the two European
areas integrated into the Muslim world.
In 10th-century Europe, industries capable of producing articles for
distant markets were almost nonexistent, the exceptions being Spain,
Sicily and Naples, famous for the “inimitable”18 beauty of its linen
textiles. From the Tiber in the South and the Ebro in the East, to the
North Sea and the Baltic in the North, a vast area of the continent was
made up of uninhabited forests, and sparsely-populated territories, with
a few small towns. The industries that existed in those regions operated
almost entirely for local customers. The building industry was mod-
est. Mining diminished considerably from the 3rd century and ceased
almost completely after the 5th until around the 10th century.19 The
Rhenish smiths distinguished themselves in the iron working indus-
try in the Rhine area and to a lesser degree, in Saona, Berry, Biscay,
Catalonia and Norico. The production of valuable swords gained them
fame outside Europe.20
13
Runciman (1952); Lopez (1945).
14
It is the opinion of Lombard (1978), p. 15.
15
Hawqal (1964) I, p. 293.
16
I follow the detailed map I in Lombard (1978).
17
For silk, see the map relative to the 10th century in Guillou (1978), p. 83.
18
Hawqal (1964) I, p. 197.
19
Nef (1952); Sprandel (1971), (1965), pp. 298 ff.
20
Lombard (1974), pp. 174 ff.; Salin (1957), III.
Skins were widely used for the manufacturing of garments and

domestic production met with most of the demand for textiles. Two
exceptions were monasteries and convents, on one hand, which pro-
vided for their own needs and demesne’s workshops, on the other, where
serfs were employed alongside a modest number of workers. The only
luxury textiles produced in Europe were the so-called pallia or saga
fresonica, the origins of which are unknown. It is thought, however,
that these may have been the high quality cloths produced in Flanders21
and called pallia fresonica because they were traded by merchants from
Friesland, not because the cloths had been manufactured there.22
With the exception of Frankish swords and cloths from the Flanders-
Friesland area, there are no traces of industrial production of qual-
ity commercial goods in 10th-century Europe. The North to South
relationship was the opposite compared with today. Even then the
Mediterranean was the dividing line between more advanced and less
developed civilizations. The difference was that the advanced, export-
ing industries were not located in the North, but situated in the long
southern belt, which runs from the Caspian Sea, passing through Persia,
Syria, Greece, embracing northern Egypt, and the coastal region of
North Africa and finally terminating in Spain.
2.2. The first European industrialisation

In the 13th century, European industrial geography was consider-
ably different from that of three centuries before. By 1200 there were
numerous thriving centres in every sector of commercial production;
firstly in the textile sector, then in the metallurgic-mining activity and
lastly in many luxury productions. European growth was connected
to the rise in population and agriculture and to the new geography of
the exchanges we have hitherto examined. Urbanisation and change
in institutions had favoured this European industrial expansion.23 The
circulation of craftsmen and traders on the European continent strongly
contributed to the development of human capital based on the exchange
of knowledge and practice.24
21
Pirenne (1909).
22
Amongst others see the synthesis of Pounds (1974), pp. 76–7.
23
Changes in urbanisation will be discussed in the following Chap.
24
For the mining industry, see Brianta (2007).
Source: based on Ammann (1954).
Fig. 3. North-European centres of wool production in the 12th century.
Source: based on Lopez (1976).
Fig. 4. The centres of the woollen industry in the 13th century.
The most important poles of the wool industry were in the Flemish
region, above all in Lille, Saint Omer, Ghent, Bruges and, more sparsely,
to the South as far as Beauvais and Rouen (Figure 3).25 We will see that
this area was among the most urbanised in Europe. There are different
reasons why this region was particularly successful in industry.26 In the
first place, a wool spinning tradition already existed, possibly dating back
to even earlier than Roman times. During the early Middle Ages, when
this activity declined all over Europe, here it survived and human capital,
made up of skill and technical knowledge consolidated over the centu-
ries, persisted. The availability of the raw material, constituted another
important factor, and the clay necessary for the fulling of textiles, was
to be found throughout Flanders. Thus from the 10th century onwards,
a thriving trade both on the northern seas and overland, resulted in a
considerable increase in the supply of goods.
Other important centres of wool production sprang up in various
parts of the continent (Figure 4). In the 13th century, central-northern
Italy established itself as the second most significant wool produc-
ing area in Europe. In the first half of the century, the wool industry
increased considerably in the commercial centres of the Po Valley and
particularly in the areas surrounding Como, Milan and Verona. Less
important were the centres of Bergamo, Brescia, Cremona, Bologna,
Mantova, and Piacenza. The second half of the century witnessed the
rise of textile production in Tuscan towns, primarily in Florence, which,
from the beginning of the 14th century, established itself as one of the
biggest, and, in some periods, the most important wool producing
centre in Europe.27 We will see that this area was also one of the most
urbanised. During the high Middle Ages, the English wool industry
was, on the other hand, of minor importance.28
Thus, by the end of the 13th century, an industrial region had
emerged, having as its boundaries the Seine to the south, the Rhine to
the east and the English Channel to the west. Another wool trading
region had developed to the south, extending across northern Italy as
far as Tuscany, including Florence which was the southernmost wool
25
The essay of Ammann (1954) is of utmost importance; and the maps are also
very useful.
26
Carus-Wilson (1952).
27
See Hoshino (1980) for the first achievements of the Florentine wool industry
and the Italian wool industry in general.
28
On the matter see: Power (1941); Lloyd (1977); Miller (1965), and Carus-Wilson
(1950), p. 42 and passim.
centre of prestige on the continent. Eastwards, the density of commercial

and industrial activities diminished together with the level of urbanisa-
tion and this localisation of the medieval wool industry persisted even
after the 14th century.
In this first period of medieval industrialisation, wool held a cardi-
nal position in industry, but cotton, despite being generally associated
with the industrial revolution, should not be underestimated. As early
as the beginning of the 12th century, Italian cotton textiles were well
established in the urban markets of the continent, and it was above all
in the cities of northern Italy that this kind of industry developed.29
Until the end of the 13th century, cotton manufacturing outside Italy
was almost totally unknown,30 existing only in Marseilles, Barcelona, a
few Flemish towns and in the North of France. However, from the 14th
century onwards, this industry started to spread from Italy to southern
Germany and the centre of the continent.
The development of the silk industry has some similarity to that
of the cotton industry. Both came about during the 12th century in
central-northern Italy and both used raw materials which came from
distant places. Silk had already arrived in Sicily in the 10th century, due
to the Arab influence and, together with several Spanish towns, Sicily
had become part of the Arab civilization and represented a stage in the
silk trail. This began in China, gradually spreading to Persia and the
Byzantine Empire and finally reaching Europe after a thousand years. It
was in Lucca, probably during the 12th century, that silk manufacturing
first made its appearance in Europe,31 giving rise to the birth of the silk
industry on the continent. From Lucca the silk industry spread to many
other northern cities such as Florence, Venice, Modena, Reggio Emilia,
Mantua, and Como. Only in the 16th century, with the diffusion of the
mulberry tree in the Italian countryside, could the growing demand for
raw material be met32 and it was in this century that the manufacturing
of silk spread abroad; the Italian manufacturers experiencing tough
competition from France, especially from Lyons.
In the field of metal extraction and forging, even during the early
Middle Ages, Europe was no less important than the regions of the
Near East. The scarcity of metals in the Byzantine and Arab areas had
29
Borlandi (1953).
30
Mazzaoui (1981) and the previous work (1972).
31
Edler De Roover (1950).
32
Battistini (2003).
permitted a certain flow of metals to continue, from North to South.33

In Europe, around the 10th century, an increase in mining was partly
the result of simultaneous growth in other sectors. The increase in
population and consequentially the need for tools, ploughs, buildings,
horse-shoes . . ., all demanded iron. Evidence of the resulting develop-
ment of the mining industry can be found across the Alps, on the
Isle of Elba opposite Tuscany and throughout Germany, Scandinavia,
England and Spain.34 Three large regions are evident in the geography
of the 15th century European mining industry, in particular that of
iron (Figure 5):35
1. the Atlantic or western region: this included two dynamic poles, the
Basque region in the South and Sweden in the North;
2. the Mediterranean area: especially the Brescia–Bergamo area, but
also Friuli and Carniola to the North and the Isle of Elba to the
South;36
3. the central European area: extended from the Alps to the Carpathian
Mountains including Piedmont, Delfinate, France-Comté, Lorraine,
Luxembourg, the area of Liges, Limburg, the upper Palatine area, the
Rhine area and Westphalia, Bohemia, Slovakia, northern Hungary
and Lesser Poland.
It is evident that western Europe was also at an advantage in the min-

ing sector. The areas involved were more widely dispersed compared to
those of the textile industry; a difference which appears more noticeable
when considering iron together with other minerals, whose importance
was remarkable in eastern Europe.37 Gold was mined in Silesia, Tyrol,
Carinthia, and Transylvania and there were rich deposits of silver, cop-
per, tin and lead in Saxony, Bohemia, the Tyrol, Carinthia, Slovakia,
Bosnia, Sweden, Scandinavia, Spain and Russia, and of mercury in the
Palatine region, Bohemia, Carniola, and Estremadura.
33
Lombard (1974).
34
Schneider (1956), pp. 112 ff.
35
Bautier (1960, 1963), pp. 15–6. In the 14th century, England retained a compara-
tively weak position in the mining industry, totally lacking in international contacts.
Despite the production of iron from the mines of Dean, it relied on Spain and Sweden
to meet its internal demand.
36
See Vergani (2003b) for organization and techniques in alpine areas.
37
Kellenbenz (1972), pp. 75 ff.
Source: based on Kellenbenz (1977).
Fig. 5. The metallurgy in 16th–17th centuries Europe.
2.3. Decline in the Levant

In the late Middle Ages, the most important centres of the textile
industry were mainly concentrated across the central belt of Europe.
Whilst these centres became more competitive, those in the East,
including the entire Muslim world, which once had flourishing com-
mercial centres, declined, and North-South trade relations changed
considerably.38 In the 14th century it was the European dealers who
had control of trade with the Middle East and who exported industrial
products from central-northern Europe to Greece, Syria, Egypt and
Persia. From the middle of the 12th century, French textiles, originat-
ing from the North of France and Flanders, started to appear in the
Mediterranean.39 Cloth was transported to Genoa overland from Arras,
Lille, Tournai, Cambray, Valenciennes and many other centres and, on
Genoese ships, reached the southern coast of Italy and the southern and
eastern Mediterranean.40 In the 13th century, Italian products were also
exported and, together with Flemish products, they were transported
overland as far as Persia.41
At this time, however, the textile industry in the East was still pros-
perous. On his journey towards China, beginning in 1271, Marco Polo
observed that the Middle East was a rich, lively area with many cities
which “made a living from commerce and art”, and where craftsmen
“make quantities of cloth decorated with animals and birds”, or which
produced “all the silk and golden cloth called muslin”.42 It has been
suggested, however, that the Arab and Byzantine civilizations were
already experiencing a decline in industrial activities; a decline which
may have started as early as the 11th century.43
By the 15th century, European cloth undisputedly dominated the
Arab and Byzantine world. On the Oriental market one could find, not
only an abundance of cloths from Flanders, Italy, England, Germany
and Spain, but also European armaments and luxury products. Large
quantities of these arrived on the eastern market via Venice from the
Po Valley and overland from Florence.
38
Ashtor (1976).
39
Ammann (1957); Doehaerd (1941) (who edited the majority of the documents
which refer to the connections between Genoa and Flanders); and Laurent (1935).
40
Krueger (1937).
41
Ashtor (1978). See the interesting Testamento di Pietro Viglioni (1883).
42
Polo (1928), Chaps. 20, 23, 24.
43
Cahen (1977).
2.4. The peripheral areas of Europe

Economic growth is never uniform. In late Medieval to Early Modern
Europe (Figure 6), alongside the more developed centres, numerous
backward areas existed inland. These areas were not totally lacking in
industrial production. The products were, however, mainly used for
personal consumption or to meet local demand, and the supply of
superior quality or luxury products at this time depended entirely on
the craftsmen of the Flemish, French and Italian cities, and, later, also
on English industries.
The underdeveloped areas extended West and East from the stretch
of territory running from Flanders to northern Italy. They included
southern Italy, Spain, Portugal, England, East Germany and most eastern
areas as far as Russia and, southwards, as far as the Black Sea, although
in some of these areas more developed “islands” existed. As from the
12th and 14th centuries, all these regions were, to a greater or lesser
extent, importers of Flemish or Italian cloth. This was the case in Sicily
and the whole of southern Italy, which had profited from its prestigious
position as an outpost of the Arab and Byzantine civilizations. The
situation had, however, already changed by the 12th century.44 Large
quantities of Flemish cloth were imported into the Iberian Peninsular,
first into Spain, from the beginning of the 13th century, and then,
due to the geographical proximity, into Portugal by the middle of the
century.45 In late medieval times England was also a market for the
industries of towns across the Channel.46
In time, the eastern regions of Europe became increasingly depend-
ent on foreign industry. In the 13th and 14th centuries, only Flemish
cloth (from Ghent, Tournai, Ypres, Bruges, Louvain, Malines, Lierre,
Tirlemont and Brussels) was found in Hungary, Bohemia and Poland.
Subsequently, Italian and English cloths made their appearance.47
Goods exported from these areas were mainly agricultural products.
In the 13th and 14th centuries, Hungary, for example, exported wine,
fish, meat, hides, grain, wheat, oxen and metals (copper and silver)
from the mines in Slovakia.48 Dependence on foreign industry, already
44
Abulafia (1977).
45
Verlinden (1936), (1937).
46
Carus-Wilson, Coleman (eds.) (1963).
47
Székely (1966).
48
Halaga (1978).
Source: based on Pounds (1974).
Fig. 6. Developed and peripheral areas of Europe in the early Modern age.
extensive in late medieval eastern Europe increased considerably in the

16th and 17th centuries.49
2.5. Decline in the South

During the early modern age, the balance of the European industrial
system shifted from North to South, and this more rapidly in the 17th
century. Italian industry generally weakened, whilst that of England
and the Netherlands strengthened, as, to a lesser extent, did that of
northern France and some regions of Germany and Sweden. On closer
scrutiny, this proves to be the continuation of an extensive process
which began already in the 10th century. From the end of the medieval
era the whole of the Mediterranean decreased in importance compared
to the areas of the North.
Fourteenth-century Italy witnessed a decline in the cotton industry,
with production ceasing to increase and, from the 15th century, dimin-
ishing. Cotton from the East, imported into Venice, was sent beyond
the Alps and absorbed by the industrial areas of southern Germany and
above all by Swabia, where processing techniques had been learnt from
Italian immigrants. The cotton mills extended from southern Germany
to the area of the Rhineland, Bavaria, Austria, Bohemia, Silesia, Hungary
and Poland. In the 15th century, this industry became well-established
in France (Marseilles, Nimes, Troyes, Chambery, and Rouen) and also
developed in England (Lancashire) at the end of the century.50
Italy also witnessed the decline of its iron industry. As from the
15th century, development of the mines and increase in the extraction
and commercialisation of minerals was apparent in central–northern
Europe, whereas Italy was simultaneously undergoing a decline in
production and becoming a region which imported iron, despite hav-
ing once been an exporter.51 Italy also saw a decline in iron working
during the 16th century, whereas in the northern countries, such as
England, the Low Countries and Sweden, this industry developed.52
When swords and armours were commonly used, a city such as Milan
was renowned throughout Europe, whereas in the period of cannons
and artillery, Italy was replaced by Sussex in England, by Maastricht,
49
Malowist (1931) and (1972).
50
Mazzaoui (1981), pp. 129 ff.
51
Sprandel (1968), pp. 217 ff.
52
Cipolla (1965), pp. 34 ff.
Utrecht, Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands and, in the

17th century, by Sweden and Germany.
Often described by historians as an era of general crisis, the 17th
century marks the period when the industrial balance in Europe
changed fundamentally. At different moments, economic activity stag-
nated throughout the continent.53 This phenomenon was particularly
noticeable in industry, but whereas it constituted a mere interruption
in a general upward trend in some countries, in others the situation
was quite different. As is always the case, the crisis selected the most
resilient organisms.54 In 17th-century Spain, where the industrial sec-
tor had never been particularly well-established, the textile industry in
Segovia, Cordova, Toledo and Cuenca declined. In Castile the period
of maximum production was reached between 1575 and 1585.55 From
the early 17th century, production declined and Catalonia faced a long
period of reduced productivity in its textile industry.56 During this
period, quality goods were imported from France, England and Italy.
Despite having been an extremely successful area in the past, the
southern Low Countries lost their central position in the economy of
the continent. From the last decades of the 16th century, Brabant expe-
rienced a decline in both urban population and industrial production.57
In Ghent and Bruges the textile industry resisted, by specialising in
quality articles, whilst linen production increased in rural areas. Decline
was, in this case, due to the war with Spain (1568–1648), rather than
to economic events. In Belgium, a remarkable industrial revival began
in the first decades of the 18th century.58
In France, production in the wool sector also fell heavily; two
examples being the industries of Beauvais59 and Amiens.60 From 1630
onwards both areas experienced a period of decline and new expansion
only became visible towards the end of the century.
Even northern Italy became an importer at the end of this century,
despite its having been the most developed area in the wool industry
53
The article by Romano is still relevant (1962).
54
C. Wilson (1960).
55
Ruiz Martin (1968).
56
Thomson (1992), p. 41.
57
Klep (1988), (1992).
58
See a concise reconstruction in Wee (1990).
59
Goubert (1960), pp. 579 ff.
60
Deyon (1967), pp. 165 ff.
from the 13th to the end of the 16th century.61 The years 1570 to 1620
saw the collapse of all the great production centres, including Milan,
Como, Cremona, Venice, Florence, and many other towns. It was a
heavy blow for the urban economies of central-northern Italy. In the
17th century, central northern Italy also lost the leading position in
the silk market, which it had held since the 12th century. However,
in this case, it was only a fall in comparative terms, due to the growth
of production centres outside Italy. Italy maintained an undisputed
position of superiority in Europe in the production of silk as raw
material, expanding continuously throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th
centuries.62
The North of Europe, above all Holland and England, took advantage
of the industrial decline of their southern rivals. The Netherlands in
particular, took a leading position in maritime commerce and industry.63
The first success was at the time of the separation from Spain; the long
war which ensued resulted in the industrial decline of the southern
Low Countries, which were still part of the Spanish Empire. Just after
1570, some industrial progress was made possible by the emigration
of labourers, businessmen, and capital from South to North. The suc-
cess of the city of Leiden is an example of Dutch industrial growth.64
Even though the country was totally lacking in raw material, the silk
industry was established in Amsterdam, Haarlem, and Utrecht and
expanded until 1730.65 The linen industry profited from the abundance
of local raw material and developed in numerous centres, both large
and small. Satellite activities ranging from minor crafts to shipbuild-
ing and construction, sprung up alongside these principal sectors.
This economic burst was taking place in the Netherlands in the period
frequently referred to by historians as a general crisis; at least for the
rest of Europe.66 Only after 1670 did a significant drop affect the more
dynamic sectors of the Dutch textile industry, although it could not be
considered a genuine crisis.67
61
Malanima (1998).
62
Battistini (2003).
63
De Vries, Van Der Woude (1997).
64
Sjoerd Jansma (1976) and Coornaert (1946) (both contributions are summarizing
presentations of the fundamental work, in Dutch, by Posthumus (1908–39).
65
C. Wilson (1939), pp. 32 ff.
66
Schöffer (1978).
67
De Vries, Van Der Woude (1997).
There is some similarity between England and the Netherlands.68 At

the beginning of the 16th century, England was also a marginal region,
and industry progressed in the second half of the century. Moreover,
England benefited from the decline of the south of the Low Countries
and the emigration of Belgian workers. The “crisis of the 17th century”
was also favourable for the English industries, the main difference
between the two situations being that, whilst industry in Holland ceased
to progress from the end of the 17th century, in England growth con-
tinued and strengthened.
In the European economic picture, England was, for a long period,
looked upon as “the island of wool” (Figure 6). During the course of
the 16th century England passed from the export of raw material to that
of textiles. Woollen textile exports rose in the 16th century, stagnated
in the 17th and progressed again in the 18th century. However, the
wool industry was not the only industry to develop, and the range of
expanding activities was wide. The progress in mining is to be noted
(especially of coal), as is glass production, salt, lime, alum, gunpowder,
ships, paper, ceramics, books, tobacco, and beer. The ground was being
prepared for the surge of the Industrial Revolution.69
140 140
120 120
100 100
80 80
60 60
40 40
20 20
1450 1470 1490 1510 1530 1550 1580 1600 1620 1640
Source: Coleman (1977), pp. 50 and 63.

Fig. 7. Exports of woollen cloths from England 1450–1650.
68
Coleman (1977), pp. 50 ff.
69
Contrary to the opinion of Nef (1954), this period can not be referred to as one
of Industrial Revolution.
industrial technology and organisation 225
3. Industrial technology and organisation
3.1. Technique, capital and product

An important feature of pre-modern industries is the limited employ-
ment of capital, especially fixed capital, and the wide employment
of labour. In the past the production process in industry was labour
intensive. Today, by contrast, production process in industry is capital
intensive. From the 19th century onwards, the evolution of production
techniques, incorporated in tools, implements and machinery resulted
in the relative growth of capital. During the recent phase of modern
growth in Western European countries, the rate of increase of gross
non-residential capital stock per worker rose from 1–2 percent per
year in the 19th century, to 4–7 percent in 1950–73, and 3–6 percent
after 1973.70 In pre-modern European economies, industry mainly used
circulating capital, the raw material accounting for something between
30 and 50 percent, even in the most elaborate processes of the textile
industry.71 Fixed capital depreciation was negligible, because more than
half the production cost consisted of wages.
The main change from the 19th century onwards can be represented
by the following graph (Figure 8). The lines X1 and X2 (or isocosts)
represent the several combinations of capital (K) and labour (L) in a
firm, according to the costs of these two production factors. The curve
Y represents the level of product (or isoquant) which can be attained
according to the specific techniques of a production activity (e.g. tex-
tile industry). Where the curve Y is tangent to the line X is the more
rational combination of production factors according to the costs of
such factors and the techniques utilized. In pre-modern times, the
best combination required little capital (K1) and a lot of labour (L1).
Technical evolution and capital accumulation implied the possibility
of reaching the same value of product Y with lower costs (the line X2
of the isocosts is nearer the intersection of the vertical with horizon-
tal axis) and a different combination of production factors: relatively
much more capital (K2) and less labour (L2). The direction of the arrow
indicates the trend of capital-labour ratio in industry with the passage
of time from the pre-modern to the modern epoch.
70
Maddison (1991), p. 142.
71
See, for instance, the case of the wool industry, in Malanima (1982), p. 215.
K2
X1
K1
Y
X2 Y
L2 L1 L
Fig. 8. Combination of costs and product in pre-modern and modern industry.
Although, new technology had been adopted by European industry as

of the Middle Ages, this main feature of the capital-labour relation-
ship continued to characterise the European industry until the rapid
introduction of machinery in the 19th century.
3.2. Industrial techniques from Asia

During the millennium from the 9th century until the Industrial
Revolution, the history of industrial techniques witnessed Europe’s
gradual shift from a backward position, compared to Asian civiliza-
tion (around 1000), to its surpassing Asian technology towards the
16th century.
Ancient technology was not the only source from which Europe reaped
technical knowledge, as Asia as a source was equally, if not more important.72
Over a long period, European technology was influenced by that of Asia,
especially China, of India and the Near East and even of the nomadic
72
Singer (1956).
populations of the steppes. Francesco Carletti, from Florence, who had

travelled all over the world at the end of the 16th century, believed
that all the most important European technology had been invented
by the Chinese. He wrote: “it is to be believed without any doubt that
everything has come from them [the Chinese]; and I would concur in
saying that not only these, [printing and gun powder], but every other
invention, good or bad, beautiful or ugly, has come from that country.
Nevertheless, it can be stated that [the Chinese] have the knowledge of
every same thing neither from us, nor the Greeks, or other nations that
have taught us, but from native authors in that great and so ancient
country”.73
During the high Middle Ages, Arab intermediation was of consider-
able importance. Technical and scientific knowledge reached Europe
through the Arab civilization, which spread across Asia as far as Spain,
allowing contact between two different worlds.74 With regard to agri-
culture, it is known that new products such as cotton, cane sugar, rice
and bitter oranges, were introduced into Europe by the Arabs, with the
relevant technology. In the industrial field, on the basis of incomplete
data available to us, the windmill, the horizontal loom, the throwing
mill for silk, scissors, the spinning wheel, textiles such as scarlet and
fustian, and paper can be mentioned. It is possible that these improve-
ments originated mostly from China and India, rather than from the
Arab world, which, was much less inventive in technology than in
other sectors. Silk arrived from China through the Byzantine Empire;
however, the processing technology was transformed and renewed in
Europe. Cotton also originated in China, together with the appropriate
methods of production. At that time, the European debt to Asia proved
to be significant, if we take into account that important inventions like
gunpowder75 and printing arrived in Europe from China, after the 13th
century, and that skills in the use of horses and the technology of iron
came from the nomadic people of central Asia.
It is difficult to say when the relationship between Asia and Europe
was reversed and Europe moved into a superior position. It is often
repeated that change came about in the 17th century, in the age of
73
Carletti (1701), pp. 145–6.
74
Wiet (1962); Al-Hassan-Hill (1986).
75
In this case however the facts are uncertain.
Galileo and Newton, but it is probable that it took place one, or even
two centuries before. Europe overcame the Near and Middle East in
techniques long before surpassing China. Already during the early 15th
century, the Greek humanist cardinal Giovanni Bessarione spoke with
astonishment about the success of European technology compared
to that of the Byzantine Empire.76 It was necessary to send the young
to Europe to learn the arts, he said. Notwithstanding the feeling of
superiority held by the Arab rulers towards the European infidels,
they were ever more often forced to import technical novelties, such
as watches, which they were unable to imitate. Arms were the greatest
cause of concern as in the 16th century nothing could be done against
European cannons, and harquebus.77
The admiration Carletti expressed for Chinese technology in the
last years of the 16th century was in contrast with the representation
of Chinese science and technology put forward, only a few years later,
by the Jesuit Matteo Ricci, who claimed that not only were the Chinese
unable to imitate mechanisms such as European watches, but by that
time nobody was capable of explaining the principles of European
mathematics and astronomy.78 These two regions of the world appeared
as two different models; while on the one hand, efforts were made in
Europe to economise on energy with machines and mechanisms of
every type, on the other hand, in China, it was man who remained the
primary source of energy and the most important machine.
3.3. Materials
The materials most often used by men of the late Middle Ages, during
their daily lives, were not very different from those used in ancient times,
the manufactured articles being of wood, stone, brick and plant fibre,
with little use of metal. The basis of the economy only began to shift
to minerals, coal, and metals in the era of the Industrial Revolution79
and yet around the year 1000 several innovations emerged. These were
above all concentrated in two operational fields: in the first place that
of textiles, with the transition to a wider use of animal fibre such as
wool and silk, together with cotton and hemp, which were unknown
76
Keller (1955), pp. 343–8.
77
B. Lewis (2002).
78
B. Lewis (1982); and especially Cipolla (1965).
79
Wrigley (1988).
or little used in the ancient world; secondly metal processing, with an

ever-increasing use of iron.
3.3.1. Wool
The first changes came about between the 10th and 11th centuries, the
most important in this sector being the introduction of the horizontal
loom, in the place of the old vertical loom used in ancient times (Figure
9). This machine arrived in Europe via the Arabs, but probably originated
in China, where it was used for silk manufacturing.80 Short pile wool was
prepared for spinning—wool carding—with a fine toothed iron brush,
called card or teasel. The spinning wheel, probably originating in India
as early as the 5th century, arrived in Italy via Venice around 1250.81
Fulling, with the hydraulic fulling-mill, is first documented in Abruzzo
in 962.82 From the 15th to the 18th century, the changes in technology in
the wool sector were less important than those previously experienced.83
Labour productivity rose in the wool sector between the 13th and 17th
centuries: in the 17th century, the number of hours necessary for the
production of a length of the same quality cloth, was equal to 40 percent
of that which had been necessary four centuries earlier (Table 1).
Table 1. Hours required for the manufacturing of woollen cloth in the XIII
and XVII centuries.
13th c. 17th c.
Preparation for spinning 1700 1000
Spinning 1700 400
Preparation for weaving 300 200
Weaving 500 150
Finishing process 1800 750
(fulling) (1000) (50)
Total 6000 2500
Sources: Endrei (1976), p. 632, and (1968).
80
Carus-Wilson (1969). For wool technology in Flanders, see above all De Poerck
(1951).
81
Fano (1936), p. 152.
82
Malanima (1986) and (1988). This piece of machinery has been examined in Chap. II.
83
These changes regarded the nature of the product rather than the methods of
production. The most important of these developments was probably the gradual shift
to light textiles of unfulled combed wool, known as new drapery in contrast with the
more traditional textiles, old drapery. The new drapery was of such success that in 1640
these new textiles constituted little less than 40 percent of all English exportation. See
Coleman (1969) and Bowden (1971), pp. 43 ff.
Source: Geraint Jenkins (ed.) (1972), p. 126.
Fig. 9. The horizontal loom.
3.3.2. Cotton
When taking into consideration progress in the production of both
cotton and wool, it is apparent that the technological debt of Europe
to Asia was considerably higher with regards to the former. Cotton,
which originated in India, was well-known in China in 200 BC, although
scarcely used for many centuries. Towards the year 1000, it became the
principal textile produced,84 whereas in 11th century Europe, cotton
production was still totally unknown, and it was not until the 12th
century that it started to be imported and produced. Techniques and
specialized machinery, ranging from methods of ginning, to beating
with a bow, in order to open and separate the fibres, to the spinning
wheel and the horizontal loom, also originated in Asia.85 The cotton
industry was established in southern Germany during the 14th century
and its strong development enabled the German cities of Ulm and
Augsburg to take the place of the Italian manufacturing cities from
the 15th century onwards.
84
Chao (1986), pp. 4 ff.
85
Mazzaoui (1981), pp. 73 ff.; and also Id. (1972).
Source: Encyclopédie, Soierie, Planche VIII.
Fig. 10. Water mill for silk throwing (18th century).
3.3.3. Silk
The silk sector displays a more continuous expansion compared to
that of both wool and cotton. Like cotton, the silk manufacturing
process was a total innovation during the late Middle Ages, with the
raw material, the necessary equipment and processing techniques all
originating in Asia.
Despite some developments arriving from the Near East and some
from Central Asia, all had their origins in China and had gradually
spread closer to Europe in the course of the centuries. The white mul-
berry tree, which fed the silkworms, reached Europe through Byzantium
and in the 10th century was introduced by the Byzantines into Calabria,
together with the technology of the sector.86 Particularly interesting is
the development of silk throwing which is indicative of the innovative
capacities of Europe, but reveals just how much Europe was indebted
86
Guillou (1978).
to the Orient87 (Figure 10). Silk throwing, in fact, came from China, but
the use of water power for its working developed in Europe.88
3.3.4. Metals
In Europe, progress in the mineral sector was limited until the late
Middle Ages. Mines were merely superficial digs into the sides of
mountains, at the point where the mineral vein came to the surface.89
Tunnels were rare,90 and it was not until the 13th and 14th centuries
that changes in mining activities came about with the excavation of
deeper tunnels91 and with the application of techniques such as the
water wheel and drainage channels (Figure 11).92
From the end of the 16th century gunpowder started to be used to
create openings in the ground and rock,93 but only from the first half
of the 17th century did this system come into regular use. In the 15th
century the first carts were used to transport minerals. These were
subsequently utilized on an ever widening scale. However, only with
the employment of steam was there any real advancement in min-
ing technology and, thanks to Thomas Savery in 1698, and Thomas
Newcomen in 1708, the problem of pumping water from the mine
shafts was solved. Progress in the techniques of metallurgy was also
significant.94 As a result, from 1460 to 1540, the production of silver
in central Europe increased five-fold, whereas in America the method
of amalgamation with mercury was applied.
The iron industry progressed considerably more than other sectors
of metallurgy. China and India were notably more advanced than
medieval Europe in this sector; China’s iron industry in particular,
87
Chao (1986), pp. 58 ff. See the translations of the Arab text with the first men-
tioning of the silk throwing machine in Amedroz, Margoliouth (eds.) (1920–21), II,
p. 230, V, p. 244, and Lombard (1978), pp. 227–8. On the subject see also Serjeant
(1942–51), p. 198.
88
On the development of this machine see Poni (1976); and also Maiocchi
(1980).
89
For a brief reconstruction of these events see the works of Gille (1966); Forbes
(1956b).
90
Pleiner (1980).
91
Kellenbenz (1981), p. 367 ff.
92
Braunstein (1983); Ludwig (1991).
93
Vergani (2003a) mentions the first evidence on the use of gunpowder, in mines
near Schio (Veneto) in 1574.
94
Silver production switched from the exploitation of lead minerals containing
silver, to that in which silver was mixed with copper. The procedure was initially used
in Saxony in the middle of the 15th century: Kellenbenz (1974), p. 86.
Source: Agricola (1550).
Fig. 11. Hydraulic pumps in 16th century German mines.
Table 2. Iron production in Europe 1000–1970 (tons per year).
1000 5,000 (?)

1400 25–30,000
1525 100,000
1540 150,000
1700 180,000
1750 250,000
1790 600,000
1810 1,100,000
1840 2,800,000
1970 720,000,000
Sources: Sprandel (1968); Braudel (1979), I, Chap. 5.
evolving considerably from the 9th century up until the 13th century.95
The iron industry underwent fundamental change with the smelting of
ore.96 The first examples of this technique are traceable to the alpine
mines of Italy, in the 13th century; more specifically to the metallurgy
and mining areas of Brescia and Bergamo.97
Although we have only incomplete data regarding the products of
the industrial sector, more information is available on iron production.
Around the year 1000 the figures are low considering that, during the
time of the Roman Emperor Augustus, some 100,000–150,000 tons
of iron were produced per year.98 The data suggest a six-fold increase
in production between the beginning of the 15th century and the end
of the 17th century (Table 2). During the same period the population
doubled, so in per-capita terms the availability tripled.
3.4. Other sectors

Every era has its leading or primary sectors of development. The
Industrial Revolution was based on steel, steam and cotton. Later,
modern growth was dominated by the railways and then by the internal
combustion engine, electricity, chemistry and subsequently by elec-
95
Hartwell (1966); Needham (1958).
96
Sprandel (1968). It has been said that these methods were already in common use
in China in the 4th century BC; 1700 years before Europe. It has also been suggested
that the indirect procedure originated in China; however, apparently this is not the
exact case. The invention was in fact unrelated. Needham (1958) and (1980) (discussed
by Lombard (1954), pp. 52 ff.).
97
Sprandel (1981), p. 418.
98
Wertime, Muhly (eds.) (1980), p. XVIII.
tronics, genetics and new industrial materials. It is from these primary

sectors that originate the demand towards the depending sectors, often
defined as supplementary or derived sectors, that is the industries that
produce raw materials and goods for the local market.
Before the Industrial Revolution, textiles and metallurgy were the
primary sectors for many centuries. In other derived sectors, such as
construction, no technical innovation of any significance came about
in medieval and early modern eras; one exception being the use of
bricks instead of wood in some northern European regions where
the use of wood had been extensive in the building sector. The case
of other activities was different and each one would require a careful
analysis. Some activities were, in fact, new. The most important was
the printing press. From the period of Gutenberg’s printing of the
Bible in 1452–56, printing presses became more numerous throughout
Europe. In the 1470s they were only present in a few cities (Paris, Lyons,
Poitiers, Venice, Naples, Louvain and Krakow): in 1480 they existed in
110 cities and by 1500 in 236. Before the year 1500, 20 million books
had already been printed and in the meantime productivity markedly
increased; early printers could run off some 300 pages per day whereas
at the beginning of the 18th century two printers produced 250 pages
per hour. The increased activity of printing presses brought about an
increase in the production of paper (Figure 12).99 Thanks to the birth
of the modern book, the spread of useful knowledge increased more
rapidly. Moreover, at the end of the 18th century, the real price of a
book was half that of two centuries earlier.100
Glass and crystal production were also amongst the developing
industries. Towards 1600 new procedures were developed by Italian
immigrants in the Netherlands, enabling vast quantities of glass to be
obtained at a low cost. These new methods spread swiftly. It became
possible for many Europeans to possess glasses and glass bottles in their
houses and panes in their windows. Likewise in the 16th century, the
production of ceramics spread from Italy towards France, Germany and
the Netherlands. The 18th century witnessed the successful production
of china and the imitation of goods imported from China. Furniture
production increased and improved, with a greater variety being used
in the houses of both the wealthy and the poor. In some cities such as
99
See data on this industry collected in Cavaciocchi (ed.) (1992).
100
Van Zanden (2004), Fig. 5.
Source: Zonca (1656).
Fig. 12. A water mill for the production of paper in 16th century Italy.
Nuremberg, Augsburg, Hamburg, and Danzig, specialized manufactur-

ing in large-scale production of particular pieces of furniture increased.
The production of carriages and art objects also rose, as did that of car-
pets, soft furnishings and uniforms for the army, bricks and porcelain,
cannons, rifles and pistols, and of wire and pins. Important progress
was made in clock production at the end of the 15th century, with the
invention of the spiral spring and, again, in the 17th century, with the
pendulum. A myriad of new and ancient skills developed, creating a
varied spectrum of innovation in products, procedures, markets and
methods and organisation of labour. “The movement of skilled workers
from one manufacturing centre to another activated networks of com-
munication through which information and goods flowed in a relatively
lawful manner despite limitations and prohibitions. The existence or
creation of such networks could play a determining role in the transfer
of technical knowledge”.101
3.5. Organisation
Innovations also emerged in the organisation of industrial production,
the most important of which, during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries,
was the spread of textile production in the countryside. Only the final
production phases and commercial co-ordination were carried out in
the towns.
In most cases, this innovation was motivated by the attempt of the
entrepreneurs to contain costs, in a period when textile production was
expanding. Work could be distributed among the labourers’ houses;
in the countryside this cottage industry was advantageous since wages
were, in some areas, as much as 25–30 percent lower than those in
the towns.102 Peasant households worked mainly in agriculture, and a
wage merely supplemented their income. Furthermore, the guilds did
not control the level of wages in the countryside to the same extent as
they did in the towns and in addition, both food and house rent were
cheaper. Often there was an interest in establishing rural industry in
areas where agriculture was poor; such was the case in mountainous
regions. Following the fragmentation of property, the rural population
possessed very little or no land and was therefore driven to seeking ways
of supplementing their income or forced to turn to industry. Another
101
Belfanti (2004), p. 583.
102
Deyon (1972), p. 23.
influential factor was high demographic density, which increased the

availability of labour and held wages low.
The spread of rural industry was part of the process of labour inten-
sification already encountered in agricultural activity. With reference
to this self-exploitation by the peasant families, which reached its most
intensive phase after 1750, Jan de Vries coined the expression of “indus-
trious revolution”.103 It was characterised by greater participation of the
labour force (more workers) and longer working time (more hours per
year). In his opinion, this revolution was driven for the most part by
“commercial incentives (changes in relative prices and reduced transac-
tion costs) . . . originating to a substantial degree from the aspirations
of the family”. They “preceded and prepared the way for the Industrial
Revolution”. As previously mentioned, evidence supports the existence
of labour intensification. However, it seems much simpler to consider
it to be driven by the necessity of meeting with declining labour pro-
ductivity and wages on behalf of peasant households, rather than with
the “reallocation of labour from goods and services for direct consump-
tion, to marketed goods”. Adam Smith was well aware of this when he
wrote, about workmen: “a plentiful subsistence relaxes, and a scanty one
quickens their industry”.104 When peasants are poor they have to work
more. The negative side of the industrious revolution was much more
influential than the positive decision of the working man to increase
“both the supply of marketed commodities and labour and the demand
for goods offered in the marketplace”. Peasants became industrious
because they had no other choice.105 Declining labour productivity and
per capita agricultural income was the main reason for the search for
alternative activities by the peasant families.106 In Flanders, for instance,
“the highest levels of rural industrialisation were found in areas with
the highest population density and land fragmentation”.107
These forms of rural industry were more widespread in some areas
than in others. Regions that can be referred to as regions of rural
industry are England (above all the West Country, East Anglia, and
Yorkshire), Scotland, Ireland, Flanders (French Flanders, North of
Brabant and around Verviers and Eupen), the Netherlands (Twente,
103
De Vries (1994) and (2008). The following quotations are from the article.
104
Smith (1776), I, Chap. VIII.
105
A similar opinion has been expressed by Van Zanden (1999a).
106
As has been seen in Chap. III.
107
Mendels (1972) and also (1981a).
urbanisation 239
Dutch Brabant), areas of Germany (Rhineland, Westphalia, Saxony,

Silesia), zones of northern France, most of Bohemia, Austria108 and,
further to the East, Poland and Russia. The same strong concentration
existed in northern England, France and Germany. It seems that rural
industry in southern Europe developed later and slower than in the
North.109
It has been said that this 17th–18th century phase of rural industry
was in many ways a sort of preparation for 19th century industrialisa-
tion, and therefore a kind of proto-industrialisation.110 It has been noted
that entrepreneurs would most probably have been prepared for the
following take-off phase of modern industry; the workforce would have
been trained, and capital prepared in order to be invested in expanding
industries. It has often been stressed that this would also have caused
an increase in population. In the countryside, higher incomes and
more opportunities of employment would have favoured the forming
of new families, and brought about a decline in the age of marriage.
For this reason, population and supply of labour would have grown
simultaneously.
These developments appeared sporadically. We know now that few
rural entrepreneurs financed industrialisation; country hands rarely
went to work in factories; the proto-industry age of marriage was no
different to that of the traditional agricultural world and there was no
close connection between proto-industry and demographic increase. In
many regions it was not uncommon for farming families to grow more
rapidly than those where the proto-industry took place.
4. Urbanisation
4.1. The cities and the agrarian economy

Urbanisation can be an indicator of the composition or structure of the
economy and the trends of non-agricultural sectors, since a city can be
defined as a stable settlement of population devoted mainly to secondary
108
Cerman (1994).
109
See, on Southern France, Mendels (1981b).
110
On the topic of proto-industrialization see especially Mendels (1972). Two impor-
tant volumes on the subject of proto-industries are: Kriedte, Medick, Schlumbohm
(1977) and Cerman, Ogilvie (eds.) (1994).
activities and services.111 Ordinarily, in a genuine city, more than half

of the inhabitants are employed in industry and services. There was
no lack, however, of craftsmen in the countryside and peasant families
sometimes lived within the city walls. We have just examined the spread
of industry in the countryside in the age of proto-industrialisation.
Agricultural activity is necessarily widespread. Secondary and tertiary
sectors tend, on the other hand, to be concentrated due to the external
economies provided by vicinity and transactions. The level of urbanisa-
tion can therefore provide good indirect information on the importance
of industry and services in the economy. Since incomes of some groups
of urban inhabitants, such as craftsmen, merchants, men employed in
the professions and military services, bureaucrats, landowners, priests
and governors are always higher than those of peasants, a higher
urbanisation rate normally indicates a higher per capita product. More
urbanisation is also often associated with a higher degree of agricultural
productivity, cities being in need of, but not themselves producing,
food, firewood, and raw materials. Agricultural workers must be able
to meet not only their own needs, but also those of people employed in
industry and services. If urban sectors are not supported by the rise of
the primary sector, economic growth comes up against an obstacle that
is difficult to overcome, whenever importation of food from elsewhere
does not compensate (as almost always in past agricultural economies)
the lack of agricultural goods produced in the region where the city is
located. This is precisely the reality of pre-modern economies, based
on vegetable energy sources and biological converters. An economy
depending on these energy carriers and on the afore mentioned tech-
nological capacity of performing mechanical labour is generally unable
to exceed urbanisation of about 10 percent, and is on average around a
level of 5 percent.112 This means that the technological capacity allows
100 peasants to support themselves and only a tiny fraction of no more
than 5–10 percent of non-agricultural workers. This was the case from
the beginning of the major agrarian civilizations in the Middle East and
Egypt between 4000 and 3000 BC and was still so during most of the
millennium reviewed here. As Bairoch pointed out: “it is this lack of
progress in agricultural productivity that explains near stagnation in
the level of urbanisation”113 in pre-modern societies.
111
Which is the definition proposed by Weber (1921) II part, IX, VII.
112
Centres with more than 10,000 inhabitants to be considered as cities.
113
Bairoch (1985b), p. 202.
urbanisation 241
Slow progress in urbanisation, however, can take place also when

labour productivity in the primary sector is diminishing. It has been
noted, that information on wage rates indicates a declining trend of
productivity in both agriculture and industry.114 We would, therefore,
also expect a decline, rather than a rise, in urbanisation from the late
15th century onwards.115 By contrast, a slow increase in urbanisation
is generally noticeable during the same period. The explanation of this
apparent contradiction can be found in a higher decline in agricultural
productivity than in industry and services. That part of rural population
left without employment because of declining agricultural productiv-
ity was attracted by the possibilities of occupation in non-agricultural
urban sectors or by the urban institutions of assistance to those living
in poverty. We have already seen that another opportunity of employ-
ment was provided to low productive rural workers by the spread of
proto-industrial employment; especially from the 17th century onwards.
Thus, on the one hand, some slight increase in the rate of urbanisation
was not necessarily the consequence of economic progress, and, on
the other, decline in the rate of urbanisation was not necessarily the
consequence of regression and deindustrialisation.
4.2. World urbanisation in 1800

In 1800, worldwide population was approximately 900 million and there
were about 1,500–1,700 cities with 10,000 inhabitants and over, with
a total urban population of 50 million and a rate of urbanisation of
about 5 percent (Table 3). Approximately 600 of these cities—therefore
more or less one third of the cities of the World—were European. The
Western part of Europe, where in 1800, urban inhabitants counted for
more than 15 percent, was urbanised to a greater degree than Japan or
the Middle East, which however, also had high rates of urbanisation
(Figure 13).116
114
The trend of wages both in agriculture and industry will be examined in the fol-
lowing Chapter. We have already seen that diminishing labour productivity character-
ized the primary sector in the early Modern age (Chap. III), when, that is, urbanisation
was slowly progressing. A more formal analysis of the urban-rural productivity and an
economic explanation of the slow urban progress will be presented in Chap. VIII.
115
As explained in the previous Chap. IV, §1.
116
In Table 3, the differences in the level of urbanisation depend on the bordes of the
areas covered. The high level of Middle East urbanisation is the result of the existence
of 7 big cities (with a total of 1 million inhabitants) (De Vries (1984), p. 350).
Table 3. Urbanisation rate in 1800 (cities with 10,000 inhabitants and over).
%
1 China 3–4
2 Japan 12
3 Russia 3
4 Europe 8–9
5 Eastern Europe 3–5
6 Middle East 12
7 India 6
8 Rest of Eastern hemisphere 1.5
9 North America 3
10 South America 7
11 Central America-Caribbean 3.5
World 5
Source: De Vries (1984), p. 349 (urbanisation rates for Europe and Eastern Europe has
been replaced with those of the following Table 9). Data on China are from Maddison
(2007), p. 39.
4.3. European urbanisation: the data

In the history of European urbanisation since the Middle Ages we dis-
cover the same three long epochs already found in population history
and agricultural production:
1. slow medieval progress;

2. early modern stability;
3. strong, rapid growth from the 19th century onwards.
The first era began in the 9th century, when population was recovering
from a long period of decline. Even though figures are scanty for this
epoch, continuous progress is indicated by indirect information on the
building of new centres, on the expansion of existing ones, and on the
vitality of social and political life in European towns. When considering
centres with more than 5,000 inhabitants, Bairoch suggested something
less than a two-fold increase in the urbanisation rate, ranging from 6–8
percent in the 9th century, to about 10 percent in 1300.117 In 1300, the
most urbanised regions were Tuscany-Umbria with a rate of about
25 percent, the Po Valley from Milan to Venice with 20–25 percent,
Flanders and Spain with about 15 percent, whilst Northern and Eastern
117
Bairoch (1985b), p. 118.
urbanisation 243
Source: the following Table 5.
Fig. 13. Urbanisation rates in Europe in 1800 (centres with over 10,000 inhabitants).
Table 4. Urbanisation in Europe from 1300 to 1850. (cities with more than
5,000 inhabitants and cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants).
Bairoch Bairoch De Vries De Vries

>5,000 >10,000 >5,000 >10,000
1300 9.5 6.3
1400 12.5
1500 10.3 6.4 9.6 5.6
1600 11.7 7.6 10.8 7.6
1700 11.4 7.8 11.9 9.2
1800 11.9 8.1 13.0 10.0
1850 16.7
Sources: Bairoch, Batou, Chèvre (1988) and De Vries (1984).
Europe hardly reached 5 percent. The heart of European urbanisation

was located in the Northern Mediterranean countries and was only
rivalled by Flanders.118
More precise figures are available for the following age, although
agreement on the trend of urbanisation is only partial, as can be
demonstrated by the series elaborated by Bairoch and De Vries and
published in the 1980s (Table 4).
These series differ in some respects, reflecting different hypotheses
and criteria and covering different time periods, whilst contemporane-
ously presenting diverse definitions of Europe. Bairoch examines the
entire continent with the exception of European Turkey (and then
Constantinople), whereas De Vries includes the Mediterranean, Western
Europe, Austria-Bohemia and Poland, but not the rest of Eastern
Europe and the Balkans. In brief, the trend resulting from Bairoch’s
series appears more stable, whilst De Vries’ results indicate a more
lively development. In both cases, the 16th century is a period of rising
urbanisation. Whilst this rise is shown to continue in the figures of De
Vries, in those of Bairoch a period of stagnation follows from 1600 to
1800. In Bairoch’s series European urbanisation reached its peak in 1400.
By combining and revising urbanisation rates on the basis of differ-
ent data on the overall population and new data on late medieval-early
modern cities, it is possible to re-examine the European trend from
1300 until 1870 (Table 5).
118
These data are from Russell (1972) and are different from the following ones in
Table 9, because of the difference in the extent of the regions defined by Russell and
the threshold used in order to define a city.
urbanisation 245
Table 5. Number of cities, urban inhabitants and urbanisation rates in European

centres with more than 10,000 inhabitants between 1300 and 1870.
Number
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1750 1800 1870
1 Scandinavia 0 0 2 2 3 3 7 21
2 England (Wales) 9 4 5 7 11 22 57 147
3 Scotland 0 0 1 1 3 7 14 23
4 Ireland 1 1 1 1 3 3 8 15
5 Netherlands 0 0 13 20 20 18 19 29
6 Belgium 11 9 10 9 13 14 20 45
7 France 32 24 31 42 62 63 88 161
8a Italy CN 53 21 31 37 34 40 51 66
8b Italy SI 26 5 20 38 32 49 75 136
9 Spain 19 12 28 43 25 30 60 107
10 Portugal 2 2 3 5 2 4 3 14
11 Switzerland 2 1 2 2 3 4 4 11
12 Austria (Hungary) 3 2 5 10 10 18 31 98
13 Germany 26 18 28 38 34 38 64 222
14 Poland 1 2 5 5 4 5 5 18
15 Balkans 13 8 13 17 20 24 43 65
16 Russia (European) 12 9 11 13 8 19 36 121
EUROPE 210 118 209 290 287 361 585 1299

Urban inhabitants (000)
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1750 1800 1870

1 Scandinavia 0 0 17 50 125 167 251 727
2 England (Wales) 179 67 80 266 718 1,031 2,065 9,891
3 Scotland 0 0 18 15 64 145 390 1,242
4 Ireland 11 15 8 10 96 159 382 822
5 Netherlands 0 0 169 442 634 577 600 1,061
6 Belgium 263 209 282 242 404 363 482 1,225
7 France 831 566 756 1,173 1,877 2,136 2,592 6,881
8a Italy CN 1,394 583 871 1,130 1,043 1,264 1,447 2,131
8b Italy SI 446 109 468 1,018 873 1,203 1,658 2,893
9 Spain 665 457 572 985 714 846 1,542 2,649
10 Portugal 47 43 57 148 190 196 225 470
11 Switzerland 24 10 22 27 39 60 63 222
12 Austria (Hungary) 60 43 91 210 263 473 770 2,753
13 Germany 436 324 451 717 767 992 1,489 6,965
14 Poland 20 20 108 165 106 124 176 580
15 Balkans 314 231 422 929 1,195 1,214 1,536 2,519
16 Russia (European) 322 257 303 378 267 542 1,268 4,228
EUROPE 5,012 2,934 4,710 7,905 9,375 11,492 16,936 47,259
Table 5 (cont.)
Urbanisation rates (%)
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1750 1800 1870

1 Scandinavia 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.1 4.3 4.6 4.8 7.6
2 England (Wales) 4.0 2.5 2.3 6.0 13.2 16.4 22.3 43.0
3 Scotland 0.0 0.0 2.3 1.5 5.3 11.5 23.9 36.3
4 Ireland 0.8 2.1 1.0 1.0 5.1 5.1 7.3 14.2
5 Netherlands 0.0 0.0 17.8 29.5 32.5 29.6 28.6 29.1
6 Belgium 18.8 17.4 21.7 18.6 21.3 15.8 16.6 25.0
7 France 5.2 4.7 5.0 6.3 8.7 8.7 8.9 18.1
8a Italy CN 18.0 12.4 16.4 14.4 13.0 13.6 14.2 13.4
8b Italy SI 9.4 3.3 12.7 18.6 16.1 19.4 21.0 26.4
9 Spain 12.1 10.2 11.4 14.5 9.6 9.1 14.7 16.4
10 Portugal 3.6 4.1 4.8 11.4 9.5 7.5 7.8 10.9
11 Switzerland 3.0 2.0 2.8 2.7 3.3 4.6 3.7 8.2
12 Austria (Hungary) 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.6 1.7 2.6 3.2 7.7
13 Germany 3.4 4.1 4.1 4.4 5.4 5.7 6.1 17.0
14 Poland 1.0 1.3 5.4 6.6 3.8 3.4 4.1 7.8
15 Balkans 5.2 4.6 7.7 13.3 14.0 12.3 12.8 10.6
16 Russia (European) 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.1 2.5 3.6 6.7
EUROPE 5.3 4.3 5.6 7.4 8.2 8.0 9.0 15.2

EUROPE (without 5.4 4.4 5.7 7.4 7.9 7.6 8.3 13.0
England)
Urbanisation 7.6 6.7 8.8 11.2 11.4 11.7 12.4 19.7
(centres >5,000 inhab.)
Sources: the basic sources of this table are De Vries (1984) and Bairoch, Batou, Chèvre (1988) (and
Russell (1972) for 1300). Data for 1800 and 1870 are from coeval geographic dictionaries. Data have
been revised on the basis of more recent demographic literature (quoted in Chap. I, Table 5). Data
on Istanbul’s population (only the European side of the city) have been kindly provided by Sevket
Pamuk (I thank him for this help). Population estimates are the same as those presented in Chap.
I, Table 5. Data for Italy are from Malanima (2005). I distinguish central-northern Italy—8a—from
southern Italy plus the Islands—8b—given the particular nature of the cities in the southern part
of Italy and the large percentage of resident peasant families. Data for 1700–1870 are from a
forthcoming essay on European urbanisation 1700–1870. Urbanisation in centres with more than
5,000 inhabitants (in the last line of the Table) in 1300–1600 has merely been computed from the
ratio of the population in centres with more than 5,000 inhabitants to that in centres with more
than 10,000 inhabitants in Bairoch, Batou, Chèvre (1988), pp. 259 and 271. The method used to
compute urbanisation in centres with over 5,000 inhabitants between 1700 and 1870 is explained
in Malanima (forthcoming).
urbanisation 247
Table 6. European increase in urbanisation rates between1500 and1800 by size

category (% increase from 1500 until 1800).
Size category %
>5,000 35
>10,000 78
>40,000 200
>100,000 788
Source: elaboration on data from De Vries (1984), pp. 71–6.
Caution is advisable when drawing conclusions from these series.

Figures for the starting period could be higher than they are in the
previous series. Since data for the late medieval period are uncertain,
it may therefore be concluded that the rise from 1500 until 1800,
although limited, was more apparent than real. We should also remind
ourselves that the threshold of 10,000 inhabitants to define a city is
merely a convenient choice, since it is usually more difficult to collect
evidence on smaller centres especially when dealing with Europe as a
whole. The threshold of 2,000 inhabitants could be more suitable, at
least in central and northern Europe.119 In any case, the choice of a
fixed threshold can be deceitful as we notice by looking at the trend
of urbanisation from 1500 until 1800, adopting four different possible
thresholds (Table 6).
If we were to examine European urbanisation by only taking into
consideration the larger cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants,
it would be easy to get the impression that the European continent
underwent a massive period of urbanisation in the early modern age.
When considering the centres with more than 40,000 inhabitants,
our impression is still one of a dramatic increase, urbanisation rising
by 200 percent. Taking the threshold of 10,000 residents, growth is
more modest. It is even lower when we consider 5,000 inhabitants.
Undoubtedly it would become negligible referring to a threshhold of
2,000. The explanation is that when population more than doubles,
such as in the period from 1500–1800, any centre grows and enters
the database with a fixed threshold and the higher the threshold, the
greater the increase appears.120
119
Bosl (1973), considering as cities centres of 100–1,000 inhabitants as well, records
the existence of 3,000 cities in 1400 Germany.
120
Also noticed by De Vries (1990), p. 45.
30
25
N.
20
S.
15
10 Europe
C.
5 E.
0
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1870
Source: Table 5.
Note: see the following Table 11 for the countries included in N. (North), S. (South),
C. (Centre) and E. (East).
Fig. 14. European urbanisation 1300–1870 (centres with over 10,000 inhabitants).
Let us assume, however, that the threshold of 10,000 inhabitants

reflects reasonably well the actual changes in European urbanisation
from 1300–1870.
When considering the period between 1300 and 1800, three points
are worth stressing in Table 5; the first concerning the trend, the second
the urban development of three leading economies, and the third the
North-South geography of European urbanisation (Figure 14).
4.3. The trend

Data concerning the cities with 10,000 inhabitants and above seem
to show an upward surge during the 15th and 16th centuries, follow-
ing a decline in the second half of 14th century,121 due to the plague
epidemics which afflicted above all the urban populations. A period of
relative stability followed. From 1400 until 1600 the rise was about 60
percent, while in the two subsequent centuries it touched 20 percent.
121
On the contrary the series built by Bairoch, Batou, Chèvre (1988) reveals a rise
urbanisation 249
For the period between 1600 and 1800, “there is no firm evidence
that there was any increase in urbanisation on the continent”.122 If we
exclude England, the long period from 1600 until 1800 was a period
of stagnation,123 which was certainly due, at least in part, to the spread
of proto-industrial activities in the countryside. Members of peasant
families were no longer forced to emigrate to the towns in search of
non-agricultural employment. Urbanisation always provides a partial
picture of the structure of the economy.
Even though urbanisation rates did not rise in the 17th and 18th
centuries, it is important to notice the increasing role the cities played
within the boundaries of the continent. In the European space the
number of cities rose fast even whereas the number of urban inhabit-
ants with regard to the total population fell or remained stable.
The early modern rise in urban population was particularly concen-
trated in some European regions such as the Balkans, where Istanbul
underwent rapid expansion from 1500 until 1600, the Netherlands
during the 16th and 17th centuries and England during the 16th and
18th centuries. Excluding England, the surge in urbanisation in the 17th
and 18th centuries is, on the European scale, from 7.4 percent in 1600
to 8.3 in 1800; the growth of some large capital cities being the major
cause of this increase. London alone rose from 80,000 inhabitants at
the end of the 16th century, to 900,000 inhabitants in 1800, thereby
representing 10–15 percent of the total increase. Furthermore, dur-
ing the 17th century, the population of the nine capital cities Dublin,
Bucharest, Stockholm, London, Madrid, Vienna, Berlin, Paris and
Amsterdam, rose from 720,000 inhabitants at the beginning of the
century to 1,730,000 inhabitants at the end.124 The difference between
the two figures represents 60 percent of the increase of the entire urban
population of the continent.
The situation changed rapidly after 1800, during the third era of
European urbanisation. From 1800 until 1870, the urbanisation rate
grew by about 65 per cent. The 19th and 20th centuries witnessed
a rapid increase in urbanisation125 and the urban population, so far
always a tiny minority of the European population as a whole, rose
122
Wrigley (1991), p. 276.
123
Bairoch (1985b), p. 214.
124
Bairoch, Batou, Chèvre (1988), p. 265.
125
De Vries (1984), p. 47.
rapidly from less than 10 percent in 1800 to 25–30 percent in 1900126

and 60–80 percent in 2000. The developing countries outside Europe
promptly made headway at the end of the 19th century and reached
similar rates in the second half of the 20th century. On the world scale,
urbanisation was about 5 percent in 1800, 15–20 percent in 1900 and
40 percent in 2000.127
4.4. Leading economies

Urbanisation quite adequately reflects the changes in economic leader-
ship. Medieval urbanisation rates approached 20 percent in Italy and
Belgium. Whilst in Belgium rates remained more or less stable around
the late medieval level until 1800,128 central-northern Italy revealed a
slow, but continuous, decline until the end of the 19th century.129 The
marked increase in Eastern urbanisation in the 16th century is partly
determined by the rise of Constantinople from 150,000 inhabitants in
1500 to 460,000 inhabitants in 1600 when it was the main European
city: more than twice the size of both Paris (220,000) and London
(200,000) and far more populous than the second largest city in Europe,
Naples, with its 280,000 inhabitants. In Europe, Constantinople-Istanbul
would be surpassed by London only around 1750. In the Balkan cities
on the whole, after a long period of stability in the 15th century, due
to the Ottoman conquest, the 16th century witnessed a fast recovery
during the golden age of Ottoman civilization. In the 16th century,
urban primacy was assumed by the Netherlands, rising to 33 percent in
1700 and thus reaching the highest pre-modern rate of urbanisation.130
England was relatively backward, whereas Italy and the Netherlands
were leading economies. In 1700 Italy and England shared the same
level of urbanisation, but as this began to diminish in Italy, England’s
position strengthened considerably, overtaking Holland in the first half
of the 19th century. The rise in labour productivity in agriculture was
correlated with a remarkable structural change in urbanisation.
126
De Vries (1984), pp. 45–8.
127
Bairoch (1988), p. 405. See also, more synthetically, Bairoch (1992b).
128
The article by Stabel (2007) is very useful for the late medieval period and espe-
cially for the year 1450, for which a table presents the inhabitants in centres with the
low threshold of 120 inhabitants.
129
The rise in Southern Italian urbanisation is only due to the growth of peasant
population within the cities. Large agro-towns characterize the South of Italy especially
from the 16th century onwards.
130
See especially Todorov (1972).
urbanisation 251
Table 7. Urban population per region from 1300 until 1870 (% of the
European urban population).
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1870
North 9.0 9.9 12.4 13.1 21.8 24.6 31.7
Centre 25.8 30.7 26.2 24.2 28.6 24.5 29.8
South 50.9 40.6 41.8 41.5 30.1 28.8 17.2
East 14.3 18.8 19.6 21.3 19.5 22.1 21.3
Note: North: Scandinavia, England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland, The Netherlands,
Belgium.
Centre: Germany, France, Switzerland.
South: Italy, Spain, Portugal.
East: Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Poland, Balkans.
4.5. North and South

The most significant change in the urban geography of Europe is
represented by the transformation of the North-South equilibrium
(Table 7). In 1300 9 percent of the continent’s urban population lived
in North-West Europe, whereas this figure had risen to 31.7 percent
by 1870. After the Black Death, a relative decline was already begin-
ning in southern Europe.131 While the percentage of the total European
population in Central and Eastern Europe is quite stable, in the South it
decreased from 51.3 percent in 1300 to 17.2 percent in 1870.132 Above
all, Italy lost its prominent position in urbanisation.133 As shown by
the percentage of urban inhabitants in towns exceeding 10,000 inhab-
itants, the 17th century represents the era of decisive change.134 This
modification of the North–South equilibrium is part of a more radical
change which concerned demography and economy as a whole. The
Euro-Mediterranean civilization was becoming less Mediterranean and
ever more European.
4.6. Human capital and the cities

We have seen that, during the millennium before 1800, the urbanisa-
tion rate did not undergo significant changes. However, with regard
to the cities, an important feature must not be overlooked and that is
131
Pamuk (2007) notices the same North-South divergence in the wage level since
the late Middle Ages.
132
Bairoch, Batou, Chèvre (1988), p. 255.
133
See also De Vries (1976), p. 155.
134
De Vries (1984), p. 32.
the impact that urban culture and above all urban “useful economic
knowledge” had on the economy as a whole. After all, it was precisely
this accumulation of useful knowledge, or human capital, which was
the mainspring of economic modernisation which took place from 1800
onwards.135 R. E. Lucas wrote that “human capital is simply an unob-
servable magnitude or force”, although “we have learned to “see” it in a
wide variety of phenomena”. It is based on “group interactions that are
central to individual productivity and that involve groups larger than
the immediate family and smaller than the human race as a whole”.136
These group interactions are precisely those external economies that
occur in the cities. They play an important role in the formation of the
European culture.137
On the whole, between 1300 and 1800, the rise in urban population as
regards total population was not remarkable; however, we can wonder
if the rate of urbanisation represents the only correct means to meas-
ure the urban impact on social and economic life? In 1800, within the
borders of present-day Europe, urban population had increased 3-fold
compared to 1300 and 9 times by 1870. The number of centres with
over 5,000 inhabitants is 86 percent higher in 1800 than it was in 1700
and this figure had increased 4 fold by 1870. In 1800 the centres with
more than 10,000 inhabitants were twice as many as they had been in
1700. Therefore if we look at the ratio between urban population and
space the figures were on the increase. Urban culture was much closer
to any European inhabitant in 1800 than in 1700 and much more so in
1870. The contacts of rural inhabitants with the nearest urban centres
had certainly intensified century by century. The transportation of agri-
cultural goods to the market and the purchase of industrial goods was
an exceptional event for 11th century peasants, whereas it had become
a custom seven centuries later since the large cities were much closer
to the fields they cultivated.
135
On the topic, see especially Mokyr (2002).
136
These quotations are from Lucas (1988).
137
Little convincing seems to me the mechanism of inheritance put forward by Clark
(2007) in the explanation of the European economic success and overcoming of the
so-called Malthusian constraints.
conclusion 253
5. Conclusion
We have, until now, followed the forces of decline and the forces of
growth separately. An optimistic view has frequently been proposed
by historians on the scale of growth and on the dynamism of urban
economies in early modern Europe. When considering a longer period,
from the 14th until the 19th century, progress in technology, knowledge
and product seems undeniable in the secondary and tertiary sectors.
It might also be cautiously suggested that this rise was higher than
that of the population. Decline in the primary product per capita and
increase in industry and trade is an important feature of the tension
existing in Europe between decreasing and increasing returns. A further
step (Chapter VI) is the combination of the elements, which until this
moment had been gathered separately, regarding the primary sector on
the one hand, and non-agricultural production on the other. On this
basis we will be able to examine, in chapter VII, the demand, that is
to say the ways in which the product was employed.
CHAPTER VI
OUTPUT
Since the beginning of modern growth, the gross domestic product

(GDP) in the economies of western European countries has increased
more than 40 times. On a per capita basis this increase has been in
the order of 15–20 times. Although it is relatively simple to estimate
the magnitude of GDP in past economies, not much above the level
of subsistence, identifying trends and variations among the European
economies is a more arduous task. In the 17th century, attempts were
already being made at quantifying the wealth and product of some
European regions. However, it was only during the second half of the
20th century that GDP quantification developed considerably. Whereas
an evaluation of GDP is now available for all European economies
during the 19th and 20th centuries, this has been only approximately
calculated for the centuries preceding 1800. In order to specify the
level of GDP in pre-modern Europe, I will begin with data on prices
and wages.
1. Prices and incomes in agriculture
1.1. Agricultural prices and GDP

A comparison between the trend of prices in agriculture and non-
agricultural activities confirms what we have already seen for the
movement of economic sectors in pre-modern dualistic economies.
The trend in wheat prices relative to England and Tuscany provides an
initial indication regarding the long-term change in agricultural prices
(Figure 1). Three developments can be considered to have caused this
rising trend:
1. increase in money supply and the subsequent decrease in value of

precious metals compared to commodities;
2. reduction in the value of money as a consequence of debasement
by all European states;
3. increase in general demand for goods due to population increase.
MALANIMA_f7a_255-292.indd 255 5/21/2009 10:30:12 AM
256
MALANIMA_f7a_255-292.indd 256
1000
100
Tuscany
10
England
chapter vi – output
1250–51
1300–01
1350–51
1400–01
1450–51
1500–01
1550–51
1600–01
1650–51
1700–01
1750–51
1800–01
1850–51
Sources: the same as Figures 5–6 in Chap. III.
Fig. 1. Wheat Prices in Tuscany and England from 1250 to 1860 (Tuscany—soldi per staio—; England—shillings per qtr
of Winchester—).
5/21/2009 10:30:14 AM
prices and incomes in agriculture 257
The latter was the most important reason. The two series of wheat prices
closely follow population development.1 We notice:
1. the rise in prices up to the Black Death; during a period, when

population progressed rapidly;
2. the downturn during the second half of the 14th century and until
about 1470: the effect of substantial demographic decline (fewer
people resulting in lower demand). Wheat was in abundance after
the Black Death;
3. the rise from 1470 until 1600, due to population recovery. Between
the beginning and the end of the 16th century, the price of wheat
increased 2–6 times in the main European states;2
4. the new phase of stability and fall from 1600 until 1730–40;
5. renewed increase later on until 1817 and the subsequent decline
until, at least, the end of the period represented in the graphs.
The cereal prices-population relationship is direct until the 19th century,

when it becomes inverse. For the first time the increase in population
was followed by a fall in wheat prices, while previously a rise in prices
had accompanied the rise in population. From 1818 onwards, the
growth in agricultural productivity allowed a larger population to be
supported without any rise in prices. Agricultural product rose more
than population, while previously the opposite had occurred.
In pre-modern economies, when the population increased, the price
of wheat rose accordingly. The reason for this being that demand grew
whilst, over long periods, the supply of cereals only adapted slowly.
Even without any increase in the amount of precious metal, the grow-
ing population had a greater money supply at its disposal both through
debasement3 and due to the greater velocity of money circulation.4
Changes in the money stock, during the 16th century, the century of
1
See Friedman (1992), according to whom the opposite applies and the only reason
for price rise is the increase of the money stock or the velocity of money circulation.
2
Kriedte (1980), p. 48.
3
As shown in Chap. IV, 3.
4
The exchange of goods can give rise to more rapid circulation even when there is
scarcity of money, whenever goods are valued at market price, and some commodi-
ties develop the function of money in everyday comparisons between goods on the
market. See Clerici (2005).
258 chapter vi – output
Table 1. Prices of non-agricultural products in central-northern (CN) Italy

and textiles in the Netherlands from 1450 to 1810 (1450–70 = 1).
Italy CN The Netherlands
Non-agricultural goods Textiles
1450–60 1.00 1.00
1500–10 1.06 1.25
1550–60 1.51 1.69
1600–10 1.66 3.22
1650–60 1.61 4.14
1700–10 1.63 4.29
1750–60 1.83 4.16
1800–10 2.36 4.60
Sources: For Italy, Malanima (2002), App. III. For the Netherlands Van Zanden, The
Prices of the Most Important Consumer Goods.
the Price Revolution, and during the 18th century, contributed to the
rise in prices; however, prices decreased in the 17th century, although
silver imported from the New World did not diminish.5 While the
direct correlation with population is clear, the correlation with changes
in the volume of money is doubtful.6 Debasement also contributed
to the rise in prices; but in this case, the relationship seems equally
doubtful. Debasement was remarkable during the 15th century, but
prices decreased nonetheless. During the 18th century debasement was
modest, but prices rose at the same rate as they had during the 16th
century, when, by contrast, debasement was significant.
1.2. Industrial prices

The overall trend of industrial prices was similar to that of agricultural
prices, since variations in population, money stock, velocity of circu-
lation and debasements affected both trends. Nevertheless, industrial
prices displayed a lower rate of growth than those of agricultural prod-
ucts. As David Ricardo, at the beginning of the 19th century, already
convincingly indicated, this different behaviour can be explained as the
consequence of the influx of innovations in industry and trade. “The
natural price of all commodities . . .”, Ricardo wrote, “has a tendency
5
As shown by Morineau (1985).
6
Although, in the past, the monetary explanation dominated. See, as an example,
the approach by Hamilton (1960). See also the fine reconstruction of the monetary
interpretation of the economic history in Kula (1972), Chap. 12.
world population 259
Table 2. Prices of cereals, luxury textiles and ordinary textiles in Poland from
1500 to 1800 (1500–20 = 1).
Cereals Luxury clothes Ordinary clothes
1500–20 1.00 1.00 1.00
1600–20 4.59 1.24 1.68
1700–20 24.45 3.73 4.86
1780–1800 37.54 3.30 7.85
Sources: Kula (1962), pp. 178–9.
to fall, in the progress of wealth and population”, thanks to “improve-

ments in machinery”, “better division and distribution of labour”, and
“increasing skill both in science and art of the producers”. On the
other hand, the diminishing returns in agriculture tend to enhance “the
natural price of the raw material of which they are made”.7 Pre-modern
economies display a tension between the progress in non-agricultural
and agricultural activities and this tension is clearly reflected by the
relative prices.
In Italy, for example, the cost of living rose 6.46 times between 1450
and 1810, whereas the price of manufactured goods only increased 2.36
times. Over the same period the price index in the Netherlands rose
13.85 times, but textile products increased 4.60 times (Table 1).
The prices of many textile products diminished in England,8 as was
the case for woollen cloths (heavy broadcloths, kerseys, serge, baizes,
flannels), and linen. Between the end of the 17th century and the end of
the 18th century the price of textile products dropped by half. This fall
in prices also occurred in France and involved the price of paper, beer,
wax and sugar.9 A similar difference can be seen in eastern Europe. In
Poland, between 1500 and 1800, the price of grain increased drastically,
whereas that of fabrics rose much less (Table 2).
Whilst the downward trend in prices of industrial goods compared
to those in agriculture was favourable to higher income groups, whose
expenditure for secondary commodities was relatively high, it did not
favour the low-income groups, since their purchase of industrial prod-
ucts was relatively marginal.10
7
Ricardo (1821), Chap. 5.
8
Shammas (1990). See also Figure 6 in the following chapter.
9
Hoffman, Jacks, Levin, Lindert (2002), p. 331.
10
I will come back to this topic in the following chapter.
16
14
12
10
8
England
6
2 Italy
0
1540–50
1580–90
1620–30
1660–70
1700–10
1740–50
1780–90
1340–50
1380–90
1420–30
1460–70
1500–10
1285–95
1820–30
Source: for Italy Malanima (2002); for England Clark (2007a).
Fig. 2. Price Indices in Italy and England (1285–1860) (1420–40 = 1)

(decadal data).
1.3. Price indices

Considering that agricultural goods represented an important propor-
tion of pre-industrial demand, the cost of living was greatly influenced
by the fluctuation of agricultural prices. This is clear in the general price
indices for England and central-northern Italy (Figure 2).
Despite considerable differences amongst the various regions, price
trends also reveal significant similarities. Except for England and Italy,
it is impossible to retrace these trends from the second half of the 13th
century in most European regions; however the South, North and East
of the continent show similar long-term trends (Figure 3).
The following epochs can be distinguished in these trends:
1. until 1360–70: rise;

2. 1370–1470: decline;
3. 1470–1600: rise;
4. 1600–1730–40: decline;
5. 1730–40–1817: rise;
6. 1818–1900: decline and then further increase.
5/21/2009 10:30:15 AM MALANIMA_f7a_255-292.indd 261
10
10
0.1
0.1
1
1
1270 1270
1300 1300
1330 1330
1360 1360
1390 1390
1420 1420
1450 1450
1480 1480
1510 1510
1540 1540
1570 1570
1600 1600
1630 1630
1660 1660
1690 1690
Italy CN (1270–1900)
Antwerp (1399–1900)
1720 1720
1750 1750
1780 1780
1810 1810
1840 1840
1870 1870
1900 1900
10
10
0.1
0.1
1
1
1270 1270
1300 1300
1330 1330
1360 1360
1390 1390
1420 1420
1450 1450
1480 1480
1510 1510
1540 1540
1570 1570
Sources: Italy: Malanima (2007); the other series are from Allen (2001) (in www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/allen).
1600 1600
1630 1630
1660 1660
Paris (1431–1900)
1690 1690
Krakow (1409–1900)
1720 1720
1750 1750
1780 1780
Fig. 3. Price indices in Central and Northern Italy, Paris, Antwerp, Krakow in 1270–1900 (1440 = 1).
1810 1810
1840 1840
1870 1870
1900 1900
261 prices and incomes in agriculture
Table 3. The European price trend 1500–1850 (index).

1500–50 1
1550–1600 1.82
1600–50 2.54
1650–1700 2.29
1700–50 2.04
1750–1800 2.39
1800–50 3.28
Source: Allen (2001).
3,5
2,5
1,5
0,5
0
1500–50 1550–1600 1600–50 1650–1700 1700–50 1750–1800 1800–50
Source: Allen (2001).
Fig. 4. Price Index in Europe 1500–1850 (1500–50 = 1).
An average of the diverse trends can help show these similarities (Table 3
and Figure 4).
The two waves of growth, separated by a period of stagnation, are
clear. The European prices more than doubled in the 16th century, stag-
nated during the 17th, and rose by 60 percent in the 18th century.
1.4. Agricultural wages and living conditions

Fluctuations in agricultural wages offer an insight both into the move-
ment of agricultural production and into living conditions in the
countryside from the late Middle Ages onwards. These figures can help
specify the previously examined trends in labour productivity and total

productivity in agriculture.11
Since at least the second half of the 14th century, wages were dimin-
ishing.12 The Black Death caused high mortality throughout Europe
modifying the relation between the costs of the productive factors:
resources and capital on the one hand and labour on the other. Land
continued to be abundant in relation to the low supply of labour force
and it was not until the middle of the 15th century that the population
began to increase once more. Equipment per worker, in the form of
animals and tools, was plentiful. The consequence was a rise in the price
of labour, the scarce factor, which was much more productive than pre-
viously. The 15th century is therefore considered to have been a golden
era for the lower classes of the population.13 Wages were high,14 there
was greater abundance of food, and families had more assets, above all
in the form of land.15 After the plague, fewer people shared the same
quantity of land. The position of the great landowners was weakened,
in particular that of the nobles, who found themselves owners of lands
which continued to decrease in value.16 The rent paid by the tenants
was low, while the landowners were forced to pay high wages.
From the mid-15th century, population began to rise again until
about 1600. Total agricultural productivity increased at too slow a
rate whilst the population was rapidly rising, resulting in the reduc-
tion of agricultural produce per capita. This above all affected the most
numerous social groups, the most important of which was labour. As
will be seen, workers’ conditions deteriorated both in the countryside
and in the towns.17
In the course of a century and a half, real wages decreased by 50 per-
cent or more (Figures 5 and 6). Simultaneously, land distribution also
underwent changes which proved to be to the peasants’ disadvantage.
11
In Chap. III.
12
Among the few data available for the 13th century, see Herlihy (1967), about
Tuscany and the notes by Campbell (2000), pp. 4–5.
13
This expression was used more than a century ago by Rogers (1884), I, p. 326.
14
In Chap. III we have seen that the agricultural income of peasant families was
often composite and only part of this income could be defined “wage”. Furthermore,
this labour income often corresponded to the quota of the product remaining to the
family after the payment of the rent to the landowner. Our economic concepts must
be adapted to the different economic conditions of the past agrarian economies.
15
The article by Postan (1973) is still useful.
16
See the example examined by Dyer (1969).
17
In the following par.
10
0.1
1300
1330
1360
1390
1420
1450
1480
1510
1540
1570
1600
1630
1660
1690
1720
1750
1780
1810
1840
1870
1900
Fig. 5. Real agricultural wages in Italy 1320–1913 (1420–40 = 1)

(yearly data; log scale).
1,4
1,2
1,0
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
0,0
1300
1330
1360
1390
1420
1450
1480
1510
1540
1570
1600
1630
1660
1690
1720
1750
1780
1810
1840
1870
Source: Allen, www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/allen.
Fig. 6. Real agricultural wages in England 1300–1870 (1420–40 = 1).
Throughout almost all the 16th century the amount of land owned by
the peasants declined. This phenomenon was particularly evident in
England,18 whilst in France small owners were still numerous. However,
18
Everitt (1967), pp. 399 and 417 ff.
25
20
15
10
0
1450
1500
1550
1600
1650
1700
1750
1800
Source: Allen (1992), p. 286.
Fig. 7. Land rent in England (1450–1825).
Table 4. The rent-wage ratio of 1500–1800 in some European regions.

Paris England Holland Zeeland Near
Basin Antwerp
1500–10 10.6 9.0 12.0
1600–10 22.8 31.5 21.3 28.7 21.8
1700–10 28.9 25.4 23.8 40.2
1785–1800 37.3 30.4 31.0 73.7
Source: Hoffman, Jacks, Levin, Lindert (2000), app. C.
Note: the number of days of labour needed to pay the annual rent of a hectare of
farmland.
since their number was increasing continuously, the land per capita
decreased.19
It was above all the great landowners who benefited from these eco-
nomic conditions, having at their disposal the scarce factor of produc-
tion, land. There was a reversal of the situation compared to the 15th
century. Social polarization increased, together with the rise in rent
across the whole continent for a long period of time.20 In England, land
rent increased more than four times between 1510 and 1650 (Figure 7).
19
The English case is examined by Bowden (1967), pp. 593 ff.
20
See also Kerridge (1953–54), p. 28.
In the Netherlands rent increased fourfold during the 16th century.21

In Spain22 and southern Italy23 the increase was also considerable. In
eastern Europe, the rise in rent came about not in the contractual form,
but in that of increase in compulsory services, corvées, by the serfs.24
The decline in the real wage and rise in rent are even clearer when
we divide rent by the ordinary wage of a worker (Table 4). The number
of working days needed to pay the rent of a hectare of farmland rose
3–4 fold in the course of three centuries. It doubled in the 16th cen-
tury, stabilized or declined during the 17th century, (near Antwerp, it
rose to 50 days in 1650 and fell to 40 in 1700), and grew rapidly again
1.5. The increase of pauperism

In such a context the early Modern Age was, unsurprisingly, witness
to a spread of pauperism. The rise in the number of workers as a
consequence of demographic increase, the loss of land by numerous
peasant families, and therefore the proletarianization of rural inhab-
itants resulted in the expulsion from the rural world of significant
groups of the population. The advance of pauperism in Europe has
often been stressed by social historians. The number of poor people in
many European regions increased from the first decades of the 16th
century, especially after the serious famines of the 1520s.25 The pauper
was often a peasant who had lost the basis of subsistence for himself
and the members of his family. While labour productivity was declin-
ing in the countryside and labour and land were undergoing a process
of intensification, a part of the rural population could no longer eke
out a living and was forced to resort to forms of redistribution, such
as charity from the wealthiest, usually the nobility or religious institu-
tions, and to a lesser degree, the state.
The importance of pauperism is hard to quantify although figures
have been suggested indicating that between 10 and 20 percent of the
population was destitute.26 At the same time, the attitude towards the
21
De Vries (1974), p. 188.
22
Nader (1977).
23
Galasso (1967), pp. 222 ff.
24
As we have seen in Chap. III.
25
Geremek (1980), Chap. 5. This topic has been developed especially by Lis, Soly
(1979).
26
Geremek (1980), Chap. 5 and Gutton (1974), Chap. 2.
wages and productivity in industry 267
poor was changing and they were seen as a growing danger for the urban
classes.27
Expelled from the land, these people were forced into the towns in
search of assistance resorting, for example, to begging outside churches.
In the 17th and 18th centuries, at least one tenth of the population of
every city was made up of the poor, many of whom originated from rural
areas. The peasant riots and rebellions which occurred from the end of
the 16th and during most of the 17th centuries were in some way to be
connected with the worsening of living standards in the country.
In the 17th century the downward trend in wages eased off and came
to a halt, whilst demographic expansion was moderate and, towards
the end of the century, some sporadic progress in agriculture could
be observed.
Owing to the rise in productivity in some European regions, agricul-
tural wages increased during the 18th century. This was true in England
at least, until approximately 1760, but not in France or Germany,
Austria, Denmark or Italy.28 In any case, as real wages show, the period
between 1760 and 1820 was a period of worsening living conditions
for the majority of the population. Only after 1820 was a constant rise
in productivity and in per capita output to be registered in European
agriculture. From this date onwards, even wages began to rise. The
trend of urban wages can help identify this long-run trend.
2. Wages and productivity in industry
2.1. Trends
The long-term trend of industrial productivity resembles that of agri-
culture. If productivity declines in the primary sector, because the rise
in labour force is higher than that in capital and land availability, and
if techniques are stationary, low productive or unproductive workers
abandon the countryside to find better paid jobs in industry.29 This flow
lowers the productivity level in industry as well. We must expect, as a
consequence, a wage movement in industry similar to that in agriculture,
27
Chevalier (1958).
28
Söderberg (1987).
29
The problem is presented in a more formal way in Chap. VIII.
at least in a long-term perspective, while in the short term possibilities

of divergence exist, given the imperfections of past labour markets.
When looking at payment of labour both in agriculture and industry,
it is above all important to note that we should speak of wage rates rather
than wages. Historians often forget to specify this difference. The data
we have refers to the wage per day (as in the construction sector) or
per unit of product (as in the textile industry). Wage is actually equal
to wage per day or per piece produced multiplied by the number of
working days or goods produced. We only have direct information on
the number of working days in the industrial sector, from the second
half of the 19th century. It can, however, be assumed that workers try
to compensate the drop in wage rate by working longer hours. The
decline in wage rates is likely to be stronger than the decline in wages.
In any case, labour intensification in order to keep wages stable could
hardly be considered genuine stability in the standard of living. If we
have to work longer hours to secure our subsistence, our standard of
living is actually worsening.
As regards urban wages, especially those of the building industry,
for which more precise figures are available, there were also similar
long-term trends during the period in question. In the two long series
referring to England and central and northern Italy, both starting from
the late Middle Ages, the following trends are discernible (Figures 8
and 9):
– a high level in the era from the middle of the 14th century to the
middle of the following century;
– a decline, beginning between 1450–1500. A relatively low level is
reached at the end of the 16th century: 40 percent less than about
1450;
– a modest recovery in the 17th century;
– a new decline after the first decades of the 18th century, until the
low at the end of the 18th century and during the first two decades
of the 19th century;
– a clear recovery in England from the beginning of the 19th century
and a weak trend reversal in Italy.
Despite the different history of the Netherlands, a lengthy series of data

referring to this country depicts virtually the same trends over a long
period (Figure 10). The 16th century decline is weaker; the 17th century
shows a recovery and the 18th century is again an age of decline, until
1820, when wage rates invert their course. A similar trend is recorded in
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
1300
1330
1360
1390
1420
1450
1480
1510
1540
1570
1600
1630
1660
1690
1720
1750
1780
1810
1840
Source: Allen (2001) ) (www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/allen).
Fig. 8. Building real wages in England 1300–1860 (1420–40 = 1).
10
0.1
1300
1330
1360
1390
1420
1450
1480
1510
1540
1570
1600
1630
1660
1690
1720
1750
1780
1810
1840
1870
1900

Fig. 9. Building real wages in central and northern Italy 1300–1913
(1420–40 = 100) (log scale).
the series concerning Istanbul, even though the 19th-century rise seems
to take place earlier here than in other European regions (Figure 11).
Available data for various European cities reveal the same trend.30
If the first half of the 16th century is taken as a reference point, all the
30
For example, for Flanders see the series of wages in the building sector in Munro
(2002), spanning the period from 1350 to 1500.
140
120
100
80
60
40
1470–80
1500–10
1530–40
1560–70
1590–00
1620–30
1650–60
1680–90
1710–20
1740–50
1770–80
1800–10
1830–40
Sources: Dutch wages are taken from De Vries-Van der Woude (1995), pp. 610–11
(East Holland)(since the series of wages only goes up to 1815, it is continued up to
1850 by inserting data for the missing decades on the basis of the wage trend in Smits,
Horlings, Van Zanden (2000), pp. 51 ff.). The data are deflated with the series in Van
Zanden, The Prices of the Most Important Consumer Goods.
Fig. 10. Real wages in the building sector in the Netherlands 1470–1860
(1530–40 = 100) (decadal data).
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1480–90
1510–20
1540–50
1570–80
1600–10
1630–40
1660–70
1690–00
1720–30
1750–60
1780–90
1810–20
1840–50
1870–80
Source: Pamuk (2000), (2002).
Fig. 11. Real wages in the building industry in Istanbul 1480–1900

(1530–40 = 100).
Table 5. Real wage rates in the building sector in some European cities
1500–1900 (1500–50 = 100).
1500– 1550– 1600– 1650– 1700– 1750– 1800– 1850–
50 1600 50 1700 50 1800 50 1900
Antwerp 100 94 94 88 93 88 83 94
Amsterdam 100 80 96 99 100 91 74 82
London 100 85 83 95 101 101 105 153
Paris 100 103 97 99 91 85 122 152
Strassbourg 100 68 54 64 49 52 64 57
Augsburg 100 66 52 85 77 61 52 –
Munich 100 67 56 58 45 41 – –
Vienna 100 70 60 72 72 61 46 –
Valencia 100 66 59 63 65 50 – –
Florence 100 96 105 122 106 78 59 56
Danzig 100 105 109 124 123 82 66 –
Krakow 100 99 60 71 65 60 68 100
Lwow 100 95 84 52 50 42 – –
Istanbul 100 83 77 83 80 69 77 110
Source: revision on the basis of Allen (2001). For Florence the wages are those in
Malanima (2002), App IV; for Istanbul data are from Pamuk (2000).
series have a tendency to decrease and an uneven recovery only comes

about during the 19th century. In many areas of Europe, real daily wage
rates were lower on the eve of World War I than in the late Middle
Ages. However, this does not mean that every working family’s income
was lower at that time. Every worker was employed for more hours
per year in the 19th century than at the end of the Middle Ages, and
more members of any family had to work. However, the fact remains
that from the Middle Ages to the 19th century there was a diminishing
trend of real wages per day’s labour.
2.2. Urban wages

Data referring to different European cities reveals a 16th century slump
which continued into the first half of the 17th century; losses even
reached 50 per cent. Stability followed for about a century, but subse-
quently, during the second half of the 18th century, a uniform decline,
although of different intensity, brought real wages to a level of between
20–60 per cent lower than that of the beginning of the 16th century
(Table 5).
10.0
1.0
England
Italy
0.1
1300
1330
1360
1390
1420
1450
1480
1510
1540
1570
1600
1630
1660
1690
1720
1750
1780
1810
1840
1870
1900
Sources: London: Allen, www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/allen; Florence: Malanima (2007).
Fig. 12. Building Real Wages Indices for Italy and England 1300–1913.
Expressed in wheat, “the wage in western Europe fell from about 12

to 15 litres of grain in 1500–20, to 6 to 10 litres in 1780–1800”.31 This
trend is not very different to that of agricultural real wages that has
already been considered.32
Although various scholars have already noticed divergence in wages
between several European regions from the 16th century, comparison
between real wages in the building industry in Italy (Florence) and
England (London) reveals that a genuine difference only occurred from
1700 on. We have already seen that urbanisation rates suggest the same
trend of the North-South divergence. If we assume that in 1905 Italian
building wages were 35 percent that of the English ones33 and that the
series for England and Italy reliably describe the long-run trend, we
get the result as shown in Figure 12.34
31
Van Zanden (1999b), p. 188.
32
In Chap. III, par. 6.
33
Zamagni (1989), p. 119. The estimate of the Italian wage rate (purchasing parity
power) by Zamagni refers to the United Kingdom and is 38–41 percent of that relat-
ing to the UK. If we refer to England the level of the Italian industrial wage must be
lower. I choose 35 percent.
34
The series have been deflated through two different baskets. On the other hand,
it is not possible to find data on the same products for both countries or, better, for
In the late Middle Ages, the level of wages in the building industry was
higher in northern Italy than in England (although more volatile). This
difference continued until the 17th century, when both regions shared
virtually the same level of wages. Only from the 18th century on did
Italian wages diminish rapidly in comparison with the English ones.
The recovery of Italy started from 1880 on, when modernisation also
started to affect her economy.
2.3. Wages and population

An average European trend can summarise more clearly the phases of
decline and growth in urban real wages (Table 6 and Figure 13).
In the first half of the 17th century European wage rates were
23 percent lower in comparison with the level of 1500–50. They recov-
ered between 1650 and 1750, subsequently fell again between 1700–50
and 1800, reaching their lowest level since the late Middle Ages. From
the perspective of the wage trend, the decades around 1800 can be
considered a period of crisis. In the trend of wages we do not however,
find the so-called 17th century crisis. We find, instead, an 18th century
crisis, culminating in the years between 1760 and 1817–18.
The inverse relationship between population and real wages is appar-
ent. Capital grew less than population and innovation was unable to
counterbalance the declining trend, hence labour productivity and
wages fell (Figure 14). As can be seen in the second part of the graph,
only after 1820, with the start of modern growth, was the inverse wage-
population trend replaced by a direct relationship.
3. GDP
3.1. Modern growth

Owing mainly to the works of Angus Maddison, it is now known that,
while population increased 3-fold in western Europe between 1820
and 2000, Gross Domestic Product rose about 45 times, and per capita
products with the same utility. Despite all this, the Italian series by Allen in www.nuff.
ox.ac.uk/users/allen is not so different from mine in Malanima (2007). On the contrary,
London building wages are always higher than the Italian ones in Allen (2001), since
1300. Higher Italian wages, as in Figure 12, better fit the dynamics of North-South
economic levels in the long run. See also the comparison in Clark (2007b), p. 47.
Table 6. The European trend of real wage rates 1500–1850

(1500–50 = 100).
1500–50 100
1550–1600 83
1600–50 77
1650–1700 83
1700–50 80
1750–1800 69
1800–50 77
Source: average of the series in Table 5.
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
1500–50 1550–00 1600–50 1650–00 1700–50 1750–00 1800–50
Source: Table 6.
Fig. 13. Trend of the European real wage-rates 1500–1850 (1500–50 = 100).
GDP consequently rose some 15-fold (Figure 15). On the world scale,
the growth of population was relatively higher than in Europe over the
last two centuries, rising by about 6 times in the same period. World
GDP rose 50–60 times between 1800 and 2000, while per capita GDP
increased a little less than 10-fold.35
At the end of the second Millennium the per capita output in west-
ern European countries, was about 20,000 1990 international dollars,
35
See a general reconstruction in Di Vittorio (ed.) (2002), pp. 201 ff.
gdp 275
110 250000
100
200000
Population (000)
90 wage
80 150000
Wage
70 100000
60 population
50000
50
40 0
1500–50 1550–00 1600–50 1650–00 1700–50 1750–00 1800–50
Source: the wage curve is based on the previous table, while data on population are those
presented in Chap. I.
Fig. 14. Building real wages and population in Europe 1500–1850.
20000
18000
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1820
1840
1860
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
Source: Maddison (2001).
Fig. 15. Per capita GDP in western Europe 1820–2000 (int. 1990 dollars).
purchasing parity power (PPP).36 In the year 1900 this was 3,000 and in
1870 2,100, with only the United Kingdom exceeding 3,000 dollars. In
the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland, per capita output
was between 2,000 and 3,000 dollars, while in France, Austria, Germany,
Sweden, Italy and Norway it exceeded 1,400 dollars. Europe began to
outdistance the other regions of the World, which in most cases were
below 1,000 dollars. At the beginning of the 19th century, that is, at the
outset of modern growth, only England37 and the Netherlands exceeded
2,000 dollars, while all other countries were well below this level.
3.2. Before modern growth

And before modern growth? Is it possible to identify the trend of the
European output before 1800? The lack of reliable direct data is the
main obstacle in the pre-statistic age. Nowadays, any possible result
on the issue can only be speculative. In any case, we cannot but agree
with the opinion of Angus Maddison, when he writes that “quantifica-
tion clarifies issues which qualitative analysis leaves fuzzy. It is more
readily contestable and thus likely to be contested. It sharpens scholarly
discussion, sparks off rival hypotheses, and contributes to the dynamics
of the research process”.38
For the period before 1820, estimates of GDP, with different degrees
of reliability, have been elaborated for the economies of western Europe.
Three reconstructions by Angus Maddison, Jan Luiten Van Zanden
and Carlos Alvarez Nogal-Leandro Prados De La Escosura exist, each
covering several European countries.39 The profile they present of the
early modern European economy is quite different (Table 7).
According to Maddison, between 1500 and 1820, European per capita
GDP increased by more than 50 percent. This growth is the continu-
36
In 1990 international Purchasing Parity Power (PPP) dollars are expressed the
series proposed by Angus Maddison in his works (Maddison (2001) and (2003). This
money is often utilized in international comparisons during the 19th and 20th century.
The exchange between the currencies for calculations of the product is not based on
official rates of exchange (which have the effect of crushing poorer countries), but on
exchange calculated on baskets of similar assets (with the same utility) for the differ-
ent countries. In these pages I will use this same money to allow easier comparisons
with Maddison’s results.
37
But not the United Kingdom. The per capita GDP in UK was 80 percent than
that of England and Wales.
38
Maddison (2001), p. 18.
39
See also the comparisons among Maddison’s and Van Zanden’s estimates in
Federico (2002) and the comments on the view of long-terms trends by Maddison.
gdp 277
Table 7. Three series of western European per capita GDP 1500–1820 by: 1. A.
Maddison; 2. J.L. Van Zanden; 3. C. Alvarez Nogal-L. Prados De La Escosura
(1990 PPP international dollars; and index 1500 = 100).
1 Index 2 Index 3 Index
1500 798 100 1,105 100 1,223 100
1600 908 114 1,103 100 1,204 98
1700 1,033 129 1,177 107 1,242 102
1800–20 1,245 156 1,175 106 1323 107
Sources:
1. Maddison (2003), p. 59 (data refer to 12 western European countries; the last figure
of the series refers to 1820);
2. Van Zanden (2005), p. 27 (the last figure refers to 1800; the conversion into 1990
PPP int. dollars has been made on the basis of the figure for 1820 England in
Maddison);
3. Alvarez Nogal, Prados de la Escosura (2007a) (2007b) (the last figure refers to
1800).
ation of a previous rising trend. In the 11th century, according to his

estimate, per capita GDP was about 400 dollars. It doubled from 1000
to 1500. The Western European economy was thus a progressing one
and its per capita GDP tripled in the eight centuries from 1000 until
1800.
The view proposed by Van Zanden is more pessimistic. The European
economy hardly increased from 1500 until 1800 and the profile was
flat. In his reconstruction, per capita GDP rose from 1000 until 1300,
whereas it stagnated from 1300 until 1800. This pessimistic view is con-
firmed by C. Alvarez Nogal and L. Prados De La Escosura, whose index
increases barely by 7 percent between 1500 and 1800; but the level for
each period is higher compared to that proposed by Van Zanden.
The common opinion of scholars of pre-modern economies seems to
be closer to Maddison’s view than that proposed by Van Zanden and
Alvarez Nogal-Prados De La Escosura. In most authoritative recon-
structions of medieval and early modern European economic history
there exists a long tradition of revolutions, growth, and progress. It was
recently written that from 1500 onwards a true surge in momentum
characterized the European economy: “in fact, between 1500 and 1800,
western Europe experienced a historically unprecedented period of
sustained growth, perhaps the <<First Great Divergence>>”.40 A rising
path was followed by the European economy.
40
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2002), pp. 1 and 7.
Probably most economic historians would agree on the following

periodization:
10th century–1300: expansion (population rise, commercial revolu-

tion; growth of industry and agriculture; progress
in urbanisation);
1300–1450: late medieval crisis (population fall; decline in
industrial production and stability in trade);
1450–1600: growth (demographic rise; European expansion
outside the continent);
1600–1700: crisis (population decline or stagnation; fall
of industrial production and stability of com-
merce);
1700–1820: new expansion (in population, agriculture, indus-
try and trade).
Many studies indicate this periodization, which could be summarised

by saying that pre-modern European economy was, in the millennium
before modern growth, preparing the path for the upward trend which
was later to be followed by the rest of the world. The analysis seems
to be inspired by the aggregate figures of population, trade, industries
and agriculture, rather than by a per capita perspective. On observing
per capita output the situation will appear quite different.41
3.3. Agricultural output

Both Maddison and Van Zanden, based their estimates primarily on
data elaborated with different methods in the first half of the 1990s and
referring to some European countries.42 These data, however, have been
integrated by Van Zanden with series on wages and non-agricultural
employment in order to elaborate his more advanced estimates.43
To check the reliability of these diverse views, a different method
will be followed; starting with the series of the agricultural output in
some European countries, already presented in Chapter III. To make
the comparisons easier, the same series have been translated into 1990
41
The topic has been developed with regard to the long epoch from the Roman
antiquity until 1820 in Lo Cascio, Malanima (forthcoming).
42
In both cases the starting point is Maddison, Van der Wee (eds.) (1994). These
data have been revised and discussed by Van Zanden (2001).
43
Van Zanden (2005).
gdp 279
Table 8. Per capita agricultural output in England, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France,
Germany from 1300 until 1800 and the European average (PPP 1990 Intern. $).
England Netherlands Spain Italy France Germany Per c. Index
GDP Europe
(Europe) (1500 = 1)
1300 854 709 755 0.90
1400 947 824 723 741 854 860 1.02
1500 1,029 854 824 682 854 741 842 1.00
1600 721 721 669 580 669 566 623 0.74
1700 875 721 772 628 649 494 660 0.78
1750 947 875 669 662 669 494 684 0.81
1800 700 824 618 566 669 566 641 0.76
Source: Allen (2000); Federico-Malanima (2004) for Italy. The European average is weighted on
the basis of data on European population presented in Chap. I.
international PPP dollars for six countries representative of North,

South and Central Europe (Table 8).
We have already seen44 that from the late Middle Ages onwards the
European per capita agricultural product witnesses a declining trend
and that this trend confirms other information, on population, prices,
wages and technical change. Agricultural output per capita diminished
especially during the 16th and 18th centuries, when the population
rose.
These series regarding agricultural output suggest a preliminary
consideration, when compared to those elaborated by Maddison of per
capita GDP for the period from 1820 to 1870. In the first series it can
be seen that the agricultural part of the average output is never lower
than about 500 dollars. Comparison with the level of prices and food
consumption before the 19th century shows that this level was extremely
low and hardly covered the essential needs of the individual. If we add
consumption of some secondary goods and the rent of a modest house
to this figure, we easily reach 600 dollars. Considering some degree
of inequality in income distribution, this figure should be higher. The
conclusion is that, in pre-modern Europe, per capita GDP could not
have been lower than 700 dollars. Considering that the conventional
poverty line adopted today when expressed in the same nominal money,
stands at about 2 dollars per day per person, it almost coincides with
this estimate (in reality it is even higher).45 It may have been lower in
44
In Chap. III.
45
See L. Prados De La Escosura (2007), p. 21.
warmer climates in pre-modern Europe, where less clothing, shelter and

fuel were required. However, this does not mean that the standard of
living was also lower in these extra-European regions, but simply that
in Europe survival was more expensive than elsewhere, because of the
difference in physical conditions.
It may be noted that, according to Maddison, per capita GDP in
western Europe was 1,245 dollars in 1820 and that in about 1850,
when modern growth had already begun in some regions, the level
of 1,500 dollars was seldom exceeded. A maximum of a little more
than twice the minimum of 700 dollars, that is of 1,500–1,600, can be
assumed to be a plausible upper limit for most pre-modern economies.
A level between 700 and 1,500–1,600 dollars appears compatible with
the economic conditions of past European agrarian societies. Within
this range lie the estimates already proposed by some historians for
specific countries, during the period 1500–1800, and summed up by
Van Zanden.46
3.4. The output of industry and services

A subsequent step towards identifying per capita GDP in pre-modern
Europe would be to add the output of secondary and tertiary activities to
the agricultural GDP. Since we have data on urbanisation, on the pres-
ence of industry outside the cities and also estimates of the proportion
of the agricultural product in relation to the total GDP, this following
step may appear straightforward. We could, for instance, establish the
statistical relation between urbanisation and non-agricultural product
during the 19th century and project this result back in time to recon-
struct per capita output from the secondary and tertiary sectors. We
have already seen, however, that urbanisation is not a perfect index of
secondary and tertiary activities. It can only suggest the magnitude of
what we are looking for, and needs to be completed by further infor-
mation on the importance of these sectors in the pre-modern world.
However, until the end of the 19th century, no precise evidence exists
on the percentage of agricultural output in total GDP, and the estimates
sometimes proposed are far from reliable. In this case it is far better to
look at other possibilities than to use unreliable data. Here I will begin
46
Van Zanden (2001).
gdp 281
Table 9. Variation between 1500 and 1800 of the European per capita GDP
according to different assumptions on the weight of agricultural output
in gross GDP.
1500 62 59 59 50 62 67
1800 48 45 48 50 43 48
% 0 –1 –6 –24 10 7
Note: the percentages of agricultural GDP on the total in 1500 and 1800 are presented
in the first two lines. In the last line we find the increase in total GDP per capita on
the basis of the relative weight of the first two lines.
by reviewing different plausible proportions of the non-agricultural per

capita output on the total per capita output.
Today, in the European Community, agricultural output accounts
for 2.2 percent, industry for 28.4 and services for 69.4 of total GDP.47
Information on the late 19th-century economic structure suggests that
in relatively backward European economies agriculture accounted for
about 50 percent of total output. In Italy, for instance, around 1860–70,
agriculture represented 50 percent of GDP.48 Data on other European
countries suggest that it was seldom less than 50 percent and that only
in the United Kingdom was it already about 30 percent in 1820.49 If we
were to assume a stable percentage of 50 as the quota of agriculture
in gross output, in order to convert the agricultural output into total
output, we would only have to multiply the agrarian per capita output
by 2 to reach the estimate of per capita GDP. In this case the trend
of GDP per capita would decline in the same way as the agricultural
sector that is by about 25 percent from 1500 to 1800. We have seen,
however, that everything from urbanisation to the presence of proto-
industrial activities in the countryside, to the expansion of trade and to
technical progress, suggests growth, albeit slow, of the secondary and
tertiary sectors. For this reason several coefficients have been utilized
in order to convert per capita agricultural output into per capita GDP,
assuming values for the proportion of the agricultural output on the
total between 67 to 43 percent. I have also assumed that the weight of
the secondary and tertiary sectors on GDP was growing between 1500
and 1800 (Table 9).
47
Data refer to the year 2000.
48
Fenoaltea (2005a) and (2005b).
49
See the data collected by Mitchell (1975).
If we were to assume the quota of agriculture as being 62 percent in

1500 and 43 percent in 1800, per capita GDP would have grown by 10
percent in these 300 years. A modest rise of 7 percent may be reached
assuming for agriculture a percentage of 67 percent in 1500 and 48
percent in 1800. Then only a deep structural change from 1500 and
1800 would result in a relatively modest rise of GDP. A more plausible
assumption could be an agricultural output of 62 percent in 1500 and
48 percent in 1800. In this case, the result obtained is the complete
stability of per capita GDP during these three centuries. In this case,
the structural change intervening from 1500 until 1800 would have
had the capacity to counterbalance agricultural decline. The increase
we reach on the non-agricultural output tallies with the relationship
between urbanisation and industrial production from 1800 to 1870 on
the basis of the data elaborated by Bairoch.50
Again these results are only speculative. It is impossible to exclude
a rise in per capita GDP, however small. A rising trend could only be
justified by assuming that agricultural per capita output did not dimin-
ish in the centuries of the early modern age, or that if it did diminish,
urbanisation, proto-industrial growth, and trade expansion experienced
a deep structural change. In any case, if labour productivity diminished
as the real wage trends indicate, a remarkable rise in per capita output
would imply excessive (and unlikely)51 labour intensification (more
workers and longer working hours). The early modern European trend
can be described better as an epoch of stability or decline, rather than
growth. In any case, it seems that both decline and rise within this long
early modern age occurred within a narrow range of values.
Both Braudel and Chaunu supposed there to have been a strong
growth of aggregate industrial output, and Fernand Braudel suggested
that between 1600 and 1800 industrial production increased five-fold.52
The growth in per capita terms would have been substantial considering
that, in the meantime, the population increased less than two-fold. Pierre
Chaunu estimated that the product of industry increased three-fold
between the end of the 17th century and 1800.53 These two estimates
50
Bairoch (1997), I, p. 404 (where a series is presented on the level of industrialisation
in several European countries). I used the relationship of past urbanisation-industriali-
sation to estimate the structural change intervening between 1500 and 1800.
51
As we will see in the next par.
52
Braudel (1979), II, Chap. 2.
53
Chaunu (1966), pp. 328–9, 342.
gdp 283
Table 10. Estimates of per capita and aggregate GDP in Europe 1500–1870
(international 1990 PPP dollars and indices).
GDP per c. Index GDP (000,000) Index
1500 1,347 1.00 111,680 1.00
1600 1,246 0.93 133,760 1.20
1700 1,387 1.03 159,440 1.43
1750 1,436 1.08 205,530 1.84
1800 1,346 1.00 253,900 2.27
1870 1,974 1.46 619,970 5.55
Note: the table is based on the assumption of a per capita agricultural output of 62
percent in 1500 and 48 percent in 1800. In 1600 it is 50 percent. Data on 1870 are
from Maddison (2003) (data on population to calculate gross output are those pre-
sented in Chap. I).
would not be too far from the one presented here; only assuming that
the decline in prices of manufactured goods resulted in a far higher
production of these commodities than our estimate of the real growth,
in money terms, would suggest, that is a mere doubling between 1600
and 1800.
Stability of the European economy—on a per capita basis—seems
to be a more convincing interpretation than the optimistic version
(Table 10).
These results are very close to those proposed by Van Zanden and
especially (both in the trend and the level) to those developed by Alvarez
Nogal and Prados de la Escosura.
3.5. Output and productivity

How can the rise in per capita output be compatible with the decline
in labour productivity, which, according to the movement of real wage
rates, affected not only the primary sector, but also the non-agricultural
ones? If productivity diminishes while output per capita is stable, the
only possibility is a rise in the total time devoted to labour. A simple
equation can clarify what happened in the European economy between
1500 and 1800. The components can be broken down thus: the gross
product (Y) is the result of labour productivity (p) per hour worked
by the population able to work (L), or working force, by the number
of hours worked (h) in a year. While labour productivity is a function
of the technical level and capital per worker, the multiplication of L by
the hours worked h records the simple intensity of labour by a specific
society or the total labour done. We have then:
Y = p⋅ L ⋅h
Using the results reached for 1500 and 1800 it can be assumed that:
1. L is equal to 60 percent of the population, which is approximately

the proportion of people aged 15–65 in pre-modern societies;
2. h is equal to 2,000 hours per year in 1500. The assumption of a
different figure as working time would not change our results since
we are interested in the change in time and not in the actual level
(which cannot be established);
3. the level of output per hour worked is the one we reach for 1500
calculated in 1990 PPP international dollars. A different level would
not change our results.
Therefore to determine the magnitude of the rise in labour time in 1800

compared to 1500 the following figures emerge:
1500
111,684,000 = 1.122 • 49,770 • 2,000
(the figures referring to Y and L have to be multiplied by 1,000).
1800
253,900,000 = 0.90 • 113,178 • h
(0.90 represents labour productivity per hour worked in 1800 assum-
ing a decline of 20 percent since 1500—a little less than the decline in
real wage rates).
In order to determine the increased effort on behalf of society while
labour productivity is declining, we have to solve the following equa-
tion for the year 1800:
Y
h=
p⋅L
The result is that working time had to rise by about 25 percent during
these three centuries in order to reach the same per capita GDP as in
1500. Working time may be lower, if we consider some change in the
proportion of the labour force as regards the total population: e.g. 50
percent in 1500 and 65 percent in 1800. In any case, to keep the level
of per capita product constant in 1800, society had to devote more
hours to work: the labourers worked longer hours, and more people
worked than before (working hours were generally rising). If the same
gdp 285
level of income is attained through strong labour intensification we

can hardly speak of stability in personal welfare. In agriculture dif-
ferent types of cultivation were introduced in order to increase land
productivity (fruit trees alongside cereals, maize, potatoes etc.) and
new kinds of activities spread, especially proto-industrial jobs, which
exploited unemployed labour time. We have already discussed these
forms of labour intensification. It is quite clear that an increase of 50
percent in per capita income between 1500 and 1800 would require
much higher labour intensification: in our calculations with respect
to 1500 the result of the rise in 1800 would be 88 percent. Such an
increase in personal income could only be compatible with a much
lower decline in labour productivity (the first term of our equation);
much lower than suggested by the trend of wages. What we have seen
up to this point does not warrant optimistic views regarding European
growth. The stability proposed through the calculations presented may
well imply considerable labour intensification.
3.6. Some implications

Accepting the plausibility of this reconstruction and the range of levels
of pre-modern per capita product, three implications follow:
1. the period before the Black Death, from the 10th to the 14th cen-
tury, was a period of slow progress.54 On a per capita basis, output
from agriculture was probably not so low, given the low density of
population around the 10th century, whereas the proportion of the
non-agricultural sector was very low. A value of about 1,000 of our
nominal money synthesizes in only one figure the average level of
output per head in Europe at the time. During these 300 years, whilst
the output of the agricultural sector probably declined (at least from
the late 13th century), the output of of industry and services rose.
All in all a level of approximately 1,200 1990 international dollars
in 1300 seems reasonable and is the level calculated by means of the
previous elaboration (even though quantitative data on wages and
urbanisation only refer to Tuscany and England in 1300);
2. the result for 1800 is relatively higher than figures for the same period
proposed by both Maddison and Van Zanden, but close to the fig-
54
See the several estimates proposed for England and discussed by Campbell (2000),
pp. 406–10.
ures worked out by Alvarez Nogal and Prados De La Escosura. The

assumption of some increase in the quota of industry and services,
in the previous elaboration, to compensate for agricultural decline
during the early modern period, results in a higher figure of per
capita GDP. The consequence is that European growth between
1800–20 and 1870 was slower (the figure for 1800 being higher):
0.6 percent per year, whereas, according to Maddison, it was around
1 percent;
3. European growth between 1000 and 1800 no longer appears to
describe an upward trend in preparation for sudden modern growth.
The trend of per capita GDP during the last millennium describes
three long phases: three to four centuries of moderate progress from
the 10th to the 14th century; a period of stagnation for about five
centuries; and finally recent modern growth after 1820. The above
Table 9 also suggests a change in the previously mentioned late
medieval-early modern periodisation. On an aggregate basis the
late Middle Ages is a period of crisis, the 16th century an epoch
of growth, the 17th century another period of crisis and the 18th
century a new age of growth. On a per capita basis, things are quite
different. Looking at the previous table and remembering the trend
of real wages, we have to speak of a 16th century crisis and of an 18th
century crisis. The late Middle Ages and the 17th century no longer
appear as periods of crisis; even though in both cases the recovery
was supported by the decline or stability of population in the ratio
between GDP and population (that is per capita GDP). In particular
it is to be noticed how the second half of the 18th century appears
as a period of decline. The recovery of the 17th century lasted until
about 1750, to be followed by a downward trend until about 1820,
when modern growth really began.
Figures 16 and 17 present a simplified long-term view of per capita

and aggregate output based on the previous considerations (simplifying
drastically the per capita trend).
As we have already seen, productivity diminished both in rural areas
and cities, and the stability of output per capita meant that more peo-
ple worked longer hours than previously. It was a winning strategy to
keep family income stable, while output per worker was diminishing.
The struggle for stability of the pre-modern European families was a
difficult one; but in the end they were relatively successful in a world
gdp 287
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900
Fig. 16. Per c. GDP in Europe 1000–1900 (int. 1990 $ PPP).
1200000
1000000
800000
(000)
600000
400000
200000
0
1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900
Fig. 17. GDP in Europe 1000–1900 (int. 1990 $ PPP).
where the capacity to perform work by any worker was declining, due
to the decline in available energy per capita.
Comparing the late Middle Ages to 1800, as regards the composition
of output in particular, we may observe:
1. a decline in agricultural output per capita;

2. a rise of about 40 percent in output per head from industry and
services (in value, but since prices of non agricultural goods were
diminishing, the volume of the available commodities per head rose
further).
Until now we have referred to the continent as a whole; however Europe

is made up of several regions each following a different pattern. We
shall now, therefore, turn our attention to these particular patterns and
examine the similarities and differences in a composite picture.
3.7. Output by country

We have already seen that different European regions followed different
paths during the early modern centuries. Is it therefore possible to dis-
aggregate gross and per capita product in order to specify the different
performances? Ordinarily the aggregate is calculated from disaggregate
estimates. Contrarily, we will disaggregate from the previous European
series on the basis of the importance of secondary and tertiary sectors,
based on the relative weight of urbanisation and proto-industrial occu-
pations in some European countries and subsequent redistribution of
total output according to the size of the non-agricultural population. As
previously discussed, data on urban inhabitants have been elaborated for
several European countries55 and approximate data on non-agricultural
population are available (Table 11).56
In England output per capita grew by 80 percent from 1300, when
it was 1,120 dollars, until 1800,57 while in Van Zanden the increase
is 128 percent during the same period and in Maddison 178 percent
between 1500 and 1820. In the Netherlands the level was already high
55
I have used the series on urbanisation presented in this chapter. Data have been,
however, calculated for the cities with 5,000 inhabitants and more by means of the
ratio between urban inhabitants in cities with more than 10,000 and more than 5,000
in Bairoch, Batou, Chèvre (1988).
56
Data on non-agricultural population are from Allen (2000).
57
Campbell (2000), pp. 402–05.
gdp 289
Table 11. Per capita output in England, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France,
and Germany from 1500 until 1870 (PPP 1990 Intern. $) and index numbers
1500 = 1.
England Netherlands Spain Italy France Germany
1500 1,421 1,604 1,459 1,600 1,334 1,224
1600 1,352 1,858 1,442 1,480 1,303 1,153
1700 1,889 2,154 1,428 1,440 1,439 1,210
1750 2,147 2,260 1,312 1,570 1,495 1,251
1800 2,013 2,046 1,285 1,340 1,413 1,255
1870 3,487 2,757 1,369 1,507 1,876 1,839
1500 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

1600 0.95 1.16 0.99 0.93 0.98 0.94
1700 1.33 1.34 0.98 0.90 1.08 0.99
1750 1.51 1.41 0.90 0.98 1.12 1.02
1800 1.42 1.28 0.88 0.84 1.06 1.03
1870 2.45 1.72 0.94 0.94 1.41 1.50
Note: until 1800 the series are based on the procedure presented in the text. Only for
Italy data are from Malanima (2003). Data for 1870 are from Maddison (2003), and
(2001), p. 297 (for England), excepting Italy, from Malanima (2006a) and for Spain
from Prados de La Escosura (2003), p. 177 (where we find the ratio between per capita
GDP in Spain and US in 1870; on this basis and the US output in Maddison (2003),
I calculated the Spanish output).
in 1500, as shown recently by Van Zanden.58 It rose during the 17th

century and the first half of the 18th century, to decline thereafter. Italy
and Spain shared a similar trend: from the high 1500 position to rela-
tive backwardness.59 The Italian case shows the particular example of
a declining economy. In 1860–70, per capita GDP was 25 percent less
than in the 15th century (Figure 18).
France and Germany reveal stability, or even a slow increase. Recent
estimates for countries not included in the previous sample confirm
the resulting pessimistic interpretation.60 In Poland agricultural output
per capita diminished by 33 percent between 1500 and 1800, according
58
Zanden (2002b).
59
For Italy see Malanima (2003) (2006a); for Spain Alvarez Nogal, Prados de la
Escosura (2006). The results by Alvarez Nogal, Prados de la Escosura differ from those
proposed by Carreras (2003), according to whom per capita GDP rose in Spain by 50
percent from 1500 until 1800.
60
Topolski, Wyczanski (1982).
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1310
1350
1390
1430
1470
1510
1550
1590
1630
1670
1710
1750
1790
1830
1870
1910
Sources: Malanima (2003) and Federico-Malanima (2004). The methods for the reconstruction of
the series are explained in these two articles, with the only difference that only decadal estimates
had been presented in the two quoted papers.
Fig. 18. Per capita GDP in Italy CN 1300–1913 (1911 prices).
Table 12. Rates of increase or decrease of GDP per capita between 1500 and
1800 in Maddison, Van Zanden Alvarez Nogal-Prados de la Escosura and the
present reconstruction (%).
1500–1800 Maddison Van Zanden Alvarez Nogal Malanima
Prados de La E.
England +178 +97 +61* +42
Netherlands +141 +26 +10 +28
Spain +52 –17 –7 –12
Italy 0 –15 –6 –16
France +56 +6 +12 +6
Germany +56 –2 –6 +3
EUROPE +56 +6 +7 0
* The series by Alvarez Nogal-Prados De La Escosura (2007a) refers to the UK.
to Topolski and Wyczanski. In Sweden per capita output remained

stable.61
The results obtained for this previous sample of European regions
do not greatly differ from those proposed by Van Zanden and Alvarez
Nogal-Prados de la Escosura as the percentage of growth or decline in
per capita GDP between 1500 and 1800 shows (Table 12).
61
Krantz (2004).
conclusion 291
According to the reconstruction presented above, three European

areas can be distinguished:
1. expanding northern Europe (England and the Netherlands);

2. the declining Mediterranean (Spain and Italy);
3. the relatively stable central regions (Germany and slowly developing
France).
4. Conclusion
Data on aggregate and per capita output in pre-modern times can

only be based on the internal plausibility of the overall view of a long
economic process. The data presented here are no exception. They are
the result of direct data on population, agricultural changes, prices
both in agriculture and industry, wage rates, urbanisation rates and
inferences on land and labour productivity, energy availability and
technical change. Ultimately, the logic of these facts indicates a more
negative view of early modern European economy than the brighter
one often proposed in historical reconstructions. Historians, dazzled by
the rising aggregate figures, generally speak of growth. Since European
population was less than 50 million inhabitants around 1000 and had
grown to little less than 200 million during these 800 years, progress
had occurred in aggregate terms. Agricultural product, industrial goods,
and trade, had all increased. A per capita perspective, such as the one
followed in the present reconstruction, casts these developments in a
different light. From 1800 onwards both gross and per capita output
increased, although inevitably at diverse speeds. In pre-modern agri-
cultural economies this is not so. Aggregate progress is often the result
of a lowering of per capita incomes. Population progressed more than
the capacity to produce, in a world where the capacity to work, that is
energy per head, was diminishing.
However, we could widen the geographical horizons. We have
focused on Europe, which 2000 years ago was divided into two
areas, the advanced, southern Mediterranean part and the backward,
northern continental part, covered with forests. What result would be
attained if, instead of only reviewing Europe, we looked at the Euro-
Mediterranean civilization and included in our perspective northern
Africa and the Middle East? We could hypothesize that, according to
this new perspective, even in aggregate terms things would appear
less progressive than we are accustomed to thinking, since European

progress would merely consist in a shift from South to North within a
relatively stable Euro-Mediterranean civilization. Economic history of
the Euro-Mediterranean civilization would appear as a series of cycles
taking place around a basic stability.
CHAPTER VII
DEMAND
Having analysed supply in previous chapters, we will now look at the

economy from the demand side, ordinarily represented as:
Y = C + I + G + (X − M)
where Y is product, C private consumption, I investment, G pub-
lic expense and X and M respectively exportation and importation.
Assuming the equilibrium of the balance of payment, the previous
equation becomes:
Y =C + I +G
In this chapter we will follow the components of this second equation
in order to examine the differences between pre-modern and modern
economies from the point of view of demand.
Today, in developed economies, private consumption represents
60 percent of output, and investments and public expense about
20 percent each. Since the average income was so low in the pre-mod-
ern economies, it was utilised almost entirely to satisfy primary needs
and above all food requirements. Surplus, or the quota of the aggregate
income exceeding basic needs, the privilege of the wealthier classes, was
consumed in luxury expenditure or utilised in little productive invest-
ments such as buildings (palaces, country houses) and churches. Slow
change in technology limited opportunity for investment especially in
tools and equipment. Public spending was low, as was revenue from
taxation, most of the population being poor. For social and political
reasons taxation was also moderate for the wealthy.
1. Consumption
1.1. The structure of consumer expenditure

Level of consumption depends primarily on level of income. This rela-
tionship is ordinarily represented by the following equation:
C = Co + c (Y − T )
294 chapter vii – demand
dry legumes
7%
clothes
10%
lighting and heating

6%
bread
house rent 49%
5%
food of animal
origin
23%
Source: Abel (1966), Chap. IV.
Fig. 1. Expenses of a mason’s family in Antwerp 1596–1600.
where total consumption (C) is equal to a minimum consistent with

survival (Co), and a quota (c) of available personal income (that is prod-
uct Y minus taxation T). Here public consumption (that is expense for
instruction, defence, police and public administration) is excluded. This
will be included in G (government expense) in a following section.
1.2. Food
It is no surprise that in pre-modern society the importance of food
expenditure, in relative terms, must have been higher than today (at
least in developed countries), and above all it must have been extremely
high for the poor (Figures 1 and 2). Presently, in western countries,
food expenditure corresponds to 20–33 percent of total consumption,
varying according to state and national income.
Some calculations for England and France during the ancien régime
suggest that for the greater part of the population 80 percent of income
was absorbed by food expenses, another 10 percent by clothes and fabric
consumption 295
vegetables
12%
drinks
2%
clothes
6%
lighting and heating

7% bread
44%
house rent
14%
food of animal
origin
15%
Source: Abel (1966), Chap. IX.

Fig. 2. Expenses of a mason’s family in Berlin 1800.
(household linen, sheets), and the remaining 10 percent was used on

rent, heating, and furniture.1 Savings were non-existent in the budget
of low-income families.
An estimate of 80 percent of income allocated to food is high when
considering not only the lower classes, but the population as a whole.
In many areas of Europe until around 1850, it is thought that food
absorbed about 70 percent of income, and this was still so in Italy
between 1870 and 1890.2 In countries which were becoming industr-
ialised, between the end of the 19th century and 1914, the percentage
dropped to around 50 percent and in the following years stabilised at
around 30 percent.
1
Phelps Brown-Hopkins (1956), (1957), (1959).
2
Somogyi (1973).
Moving up the social scale the burden of food expenses lessened,

whilst there was a relative increase for that of clothes, durable goods,
and services. Taking a notary’s family as an example, the food outlay
could be equivalent to 50 percent of total expenditure. The remaining
half was spent on clothes and linen, on servants’ wages, on medical
treatment and entertainment, taxes and charity.3 Distribution of eve-
ryday expenses was not very different in the case of small traders, civil
servants, doctors, lawyers, and so on.
Food did not usually exceed 20–40 percent of the nobility’s expenses
(servants’ food included). In the case of the wealthy, it is deemed that
the percentage of food consumption would have been even lower as a
percentage of total family income. Consumption and income coincided
for the poor in that every family spent its entire income; in the case of
the rich, food consumption only represented a part of its expenditure
whilst a certain percentage was saved and invested. The annual expenses
of an English ducal family at the beginning of the 17th century were
distributed between food (30 percent),4 allowances for family members
(20), clothes (10), the stable (10), wages (10), maintenance (8), presents
and charity (2) and sundries (10).5
1.3. Proteins
The daily consumption of calories today should average 2,500, with a
minimum of circa 2,000 and a maximum of 3,500. In the past body-
weight and height were lower, so caloric requirements were lower than
those of today. In relative terms, yesterday’s society was populated by
many more children and children naturally consume less than adults.
However, the fact that the working activity usually required greater
muscular exertion than today had the opposite effect. Considering
all these factors, it can be estimated that an average intake of around
2,000–2,200 calories per capita was the norm.6
Throughout history, numerous variations have taken place in the use
of proteins and fats in the diet. The scanty evidence spanning the very
3
Tagliaferri (1968).
4
Food for servants included.
5
Stone (1965), Chap. X.
6
Livi Bacci (1987), p. 43 (the whole volume is extremely useful for approaching the
subject of pre-industrial diet). The subject of food deficiency is discussed in several
papers included in Rotberg, Rabb (eds.) (1985).
consumption 297
long period from the 10th up to the 19th century, reveals a modifica-
tion in food intake: from a diet rich in protein and fat content, to one
widely based on carbohydrates. To summarise a long evolution in few
words, from meat to grain, from a rich diet to a poor diet. Meat has
only recently returned to European tables in notable quantities.
For millennia and millennia before the birth of agriculture, our
forefathers had an abundance of meat at their disposal.7 Some scholars
describe this long period as a golden age.8 With the birth of agriculture,
the quantity of proteins and fats consumed decreased and the use of
cereals increased. The average height of both men and women dropped
by more than 10 centimetres.
Towards the 9th century, when demographic density was particularly
low and man was surrounded by dense forests and uncultivated lands,
the economy in Europe was based on forestry and pasturage rather than
on agriculture. The peasant farmer was engaged not only in work in the
fields but also as livestock breeder, huntsman and fisherman.9 His diet
was consequently rich in meat and fish. Pork was ordinarily present at
his table, as favourable pasturage beneath oak trees and in the woods
facilitated pig rearing. Mutton was frequently consumed and hunting
brought in substantial quantities of venison and wild boar. Proteins were
abundant both in the diets of the rich and the poor and the stature of
population higher than in the following centuries.10
During the period of demographic expansion in late Middle Ages, the
consumption of meat diminished. Many woodland areas were cleared
resulting in reduced possibilities for free animal rearing. This trend was
reversed after the mid-14th century and the Black Death, which had
decimated the population across the continent and, as a consequence,
reduced arable (Figure 3).
Further change came about from the end of the 15th century with
the general demographic recovery. The increase in population caused
a reduction in woodlands, grasslands, and animals. The diet, in some
areas earlier and in others later, became increasingly vegetarian. The
ration of proteins and fats continued to decrease for the majority of the
7
Harris (1977).
8
See, for example, Chavaillon (1996).
9
Montanari (1980).
10
Nada Patrone (1990).
Source: Toman (ed.) (1990), p. 80.
Fig. 3. Slaughtering in a town in medieval Germany.
population. The production of calories of vegetable origin for a growing

population requires much less land than for those of animal origin.
In the agricultural civilization of early Modern Age Europe, the diet
was based on cereals and consumption of meat was extremely low,
compared to the present. If Europe is compared to coeval agrarian
civilizations in Asia and America, the consumption of meat was,
however, higher; this was a consequence of the different agricultural
structures. In European fallow agriculture, livestock is an essential
component and therefore products of livestock rearing appeared more
frequently in the general diet.
Available information concerning the period between the 14th and
19th centuries documents an average level of meat consumption of
consumption 299
kgs
CH Switzerland
140 GB
D Germany
120 E Spain
F France
100 D S
GB Great Britain
GB
I Italy
80 CH
GB GB NL Netherlands
60 P Poland
F I
NL S Sweden
40 F I
E F
F E GB I NL
F F
20 I I P I F
D I
D
E I I F
0
XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX centuries
Source: Livi Bacci (1987), p. 128.
Fig. 4. Yearly meat consumption per head in some European regions (15th–19th
centuries) (kgs).
15–40 kg per person per year (Figure 4).11 This means that, during the
late Middle Ages and the early Modern Age, everyone consumed a meat
ration of little less than 50 grams to little more than 100 grams per
day, that is around a quarter to half the present average of European
consumption.
The range of values for average meat consumption was, however,
considerable. For the great majority of the population consumption
of meat was extremely modest, whereas for the rich minority it was
greater than that of the present day. There was a tendency towards
the consumption of great quantities where income permitted.12 Noble
families, princes and high clergy often reached levels of consumption
11
Livi Bacci (1987), p. 128.
12
Elias (1937).
of more than 5,000 calories per day, principally because of the meat
on their tables.
It is known that little meat was eaten in agricultural regions whereas
in mountain areas the situation was somewhat different. Here, flank-
ing an often poor agriculture, hunting and breeding of wild animals in
woodland areas contributed conspicuously to the diet. Butter, cheese,
and milk raised the protein supply: the diet of the mountain dweller
was often richer than that of the farmer on the plains.
In addition to the diversities between rich and poor, town and coun-
tryside, there were strong geographical differences in the consumption
of meat in Europe. In some northern countries, such as England and
Scandinavia, the presence of meat in the diet was relatively high, whereas
towards Central Eastern Europe and above all, towards the South, there
was a gradual fall in consumption. In France and Germany, it was lower
than in England. In Poland and Russia in the East, and Italy, Spain and
Portugal in the South, it was lower still.
On a world scale, the variety in consumption of meat was consider-
able, as we can notice looking at the differences in the 16th century. First
of all, in this epoch there were civilizations without meat, or almost,
as was the case in the Americas. When Columbus landed in the New
World, oxen, horses, goats, sheep, and chickens were unknown and were
introduced only by him during his second journey. Therefore, there was
almost no meat available. It has been suggested that human sacrifices
in the Aztec civilizations served to provide the necessary protein for
the aristocracy and clergy.13 Cannibalism was, therefore, an expedient
to secure a diet richer in protein.
The consumption of meat was also limited in Asian civilizations, India
being a typical example.14 It is well-known that cattle were numerous
in India in the early Modern era and that there was a religious taboo
regarding their use for consumption. This taboo presumably originated
from demographic pressure, in that the conservation of the bovine pat-
rimony was fundamental in order to carry out agricultural labour. The
taboo subsequently remained even when the reasons which generated
it actually ceased to exist. In India, however, there was a very limited
consumption of other meats, as pork, chicken and eggs were also taboo.
This was partly compensated for by consumption of proteins from milk,
13
Harris (1977).
14
Chandra (1982), p. 461.
consumption 301
butter and cheese. In China, however, although these dairy foods were
known, they were rarely consumed; due partly to the peasants’ belief
that to drink milk was to establish a degree of relationship with the
animal.15 Very little meat was consumed due to the limited presence of
animals in Chinese agriculture. In the 17th century it was noted that,
“the most commonly consumed animal at the table was the domestic
pig”;16 and this only in the towns, not in the countryside,17 where the
diet was almost exclusively vegetarian and based, for the most part, on
rice. The Japanese consumed even less meat. The Florentine Francesco
Carletti wrote of them, in the later years of the 16th century, that “they
have calves, but among the Gentiles and even among Christians these
are rarely eaten because of their superstition, nor do they drink their
milk, considering it no less disgusting than it would be for us to drink
raw blood”.18 Instead they consume—he continued—chickens, thrushes,
pheasants, goats and pigs. Fish was a fundamental source of protein
for the Japanese populations.
The consumption of animal products was probably high among the
nomadic populations of central Asia, of the Middle and Near East and
among the hunting populations of Africa. In Arabia and North Africa,
meat and milk products were a predominant part of the diet and the
condiment used was animal fat or butter.19 In these civilizations people
lived prevalently by animal rearing or hunting. Numerically speaking
they were however scanty minorities compared to the agricultural
populations.
In areas where agriculture is traditional, it is obvious that an increase
in the population causes the number of working animals to decrease
unless agriculture can be organised in such a way as to employ these
without reducing the availability of food energy for human consump-
tion. We know that in certain areas of Europe, in the late 17th century,
the population managed to produce greater quantities of both cereals
and animal products.20 However, in the long term, although indispensa-
ble for agriculture, animals represented something of a threat to human
nutrition, since livestock reduced the extent of arable.
15
Gourou (1940).
16
Carletti (1701), p. 109.
17
Gernet (1959).
18
Carletti (1701), p. 109.
19
Lombard (1971).
20
As seen in Chap. III regarding mixed agriculture.
In some cases, fish represented an important alternative source of

protein for a diet poor in meat. However, the rapidity with which fish
rots prevented its wide commercialisation; therefore the further the
distance from seas and rivers the more unlikely its consumption. Fish
was considered a delicacy at the tables of the rich and a necessity for
certain religious orders for which the consumption of meat was pro-
hibited. The remaining population consumed very little fish. However,
it is possible that the increased number of religious fast days may have
resulted in a more frequent presence of fish at the table (even though
the admissibility of fish on these occasions is uncertain and was often
a source of dispute).21
Available evidence indicates a modest consumption of fish in Europe;
merely a few grams per head per day. In the 15th and 16th centuries,
however, commercialisation of dried and salted fish favoured wider
consumption (Figure 5). English, French, and Dutch ships began cod
fishing in the waters of Newfoundland. By the end of the 17th century
this activity engaged about 1,500 ships, yielding some 90,000 tons of fish
per year,22 which, once salted, was transported throughout the whole
of Europe. It was a standard commodity in the hold of the English and
Dutch ships, which, at the end of the 16th century, regularly sailed to
the Mediterranean.
1.4. Carbohydrates
Before recent changes, the diet of the greater part of mankind was based
largely on cereals, therefore on carbohydrates. With the exception of
shepherd and nomadic populations, living on the margins of the rural
civilizations, cereals constituted the basic nutrition for the great majority
of people—maize to the West in the Americas, rice in the Orient and
the Far East. In Europe, the predominant cereal was wheat together
with less important cereals such as rye and barley (Figure 6).
Average consumption oscillated between 170 and 360 kg per year.23
Half a kilogram of bread per day supplied some 1,600–1,700 calories.24
21
Visceglia (1991), p. 220.
22
Braudel (1979), I, Chap. 3. See also Michell (1977).
23
Numerous data are found in Livi Bacci (1987), pp. 122 ff.
24
On the relationship between bread and cereal see Fiumi (1953), p. 328.
consumption 303
Herring fishing
codfish
codfish ling
ISLANDA
ling mackerel
small plaice hake
turbot
FAEROER
SHETLAND
Bergen
codfish
salmon
ling
Scania
codfish
Whistby mackerel
Whistby eel
Trideford Great
sardine Yarmouth
salmon
Rotterdam
mackerel Brighton
hake Dunkerque
Dieppe
codfish
Oleron
sardine
tuna
hake EASTERN
turbot MEDITERRANEAN
Valladolid AND BLACK SEA
sardine mackerel
anchovy anchovy
codfish herring
sturgeon
tuna
mackerel
NORTH-WESTERN
AFRICA
sardine
anchovy
tuna
Source: based on Michell (1977).
Fig. 5. Herring fishing and main fishing areas in Europe (17th and 18th
centuries).
millet oats
barley wheat
Source: Revel (1979), p. 85.
Fig. 6. The European cereals in an 18th century print.
Considering that the ordinary quantity consumed on a daily basis was

greater than half a kilogram and that the necessary daily calorie intake
is 2,000–2,500, it can be deduced that the diet was prevalently based
on cereals and bread, which supplied about 80 percent of the necessary
calories. This was supplemented by some meat and other foodstuffs,
depending on the diverse geographical and environmental conditions
(Figure 7).
consumption 305
A diet based almost exclusively on wheat is influenced by the various

agricultural fluctuations that are determined by meteorological condi-
tions. A bad year is not synonymous with hunger when the diet is varied.
In the forestry and pasturage based economies of the early Middle Ages,
periods of hunger did not occur, but they were frequent when, in the
late Middle Ages, agriculture became increasingly cereal-based, due to
demographic growth. The diet underwent a change for the worse. As we
have seen, the meat ration continued to diminish where that of bread
remained unchanged. However, the quality of the latter worsened and
it became darker in colour, heavier and less nourishing, because of the
use of inferior cereals.
The source of carbohydrates was increased by new products intro-
duced into Europe from America, which, towards the end of the 17th
century, were to afford an established addition to the diet. These products
gave rise to the most radical change in consumption that Europe was
to see during the course of the early Modern Era. The most significant
of these were potatoes and maize and, of secondary importance, rice.
In fact, potatoes and maize actually represented a parallel revolution:
the former in the North and the latter in the South.25
The Florentine Francesco Carletti first came across potatoes at the end
of the 16th century near Lima, in Peru. He described them as “certain
roots called <<patatas>>, white in hue, which, when boiled or roasted
under charcoal have a flavour more delicate than our chestnuts and
can be served in the place of bread”.26 During the 17th century, they
almost remained absent from the tables in Europe, and although they
were known, they were used as fodder for animals and were consumed
only by the poorest people. The consumption of the potato became
established to the north of a dividing line running from Austria to
Switzerland, to northern France and including the whole of the British
Isles. During periods of faster demographic growth such as the 17th
and 18th centuries, the populations of northern Europe began to rely
increasingly on potatoes as a substitute for ever more expensive bread,
produced with poorer quality flours.
In the Mediterranean areas of Europe, the potato was not so wide-
spread. In these regions, during the same period, the cultivation and
consumption of maize acquired a similar importance. The quantity of
25
On the topic of new agricultural products in early Modern Europe, see Masefield
(1967).
26
Carletti (1701), p. 56.
Hunstanton Sweden
1342 1300 B 1573 900 C
Sedgeford
1424 700 B
Holland
England 1798 325 C
1826 260 B
Nowe Miasto Russia
Paris 1560-70 620 B 1896-1915 699 B
th th
17 -19 c. 450-600 B
Gavaudan Poland
1754-67 713-767 B Germany 16th c. 1000 B
France
1781-90 552-704 B 16th c. 1200 B
1803-12 551 B
Italia
Languedoc
1861-70 494 C Bologna
1480 1150 C
1871-80 543 C 1593 510 C
1580-90 1440 C
Toulouse 1790 545 C
18th c. 689 C
Genova
Florence
1382 685 B
1338 712 C
Sicily
1680 682 C
1700 793 C Rome
16th 759 C
17th 641 C Greece
18th 473 C Antiquity 900 C
Source: Livi Bacci (1987), p. 124.
Fig. 7. Daily cereal (C) or bread (B) per capita consumption in grams per day in some
European cities and countries (14th–20th centuries).
available foodstuffs benefited from the arrival of maize whereas the

quality actually suffered. The lack of protein and, above all, of vitamins
(in particular niacin or nicotinic acid or vitamin PP) in maize compared
to other foodstuffs exposed the populations to pellagra when maize was
the only or main nutrient. This was a chronic disease recurring season-
ally, the symptoms of which were erythema, followed by diarrhoea and
paraesthesia, eventually causing damage to the nervous system and even
death. This was a true affliction for the peasants of the Po Valley during
the 19th century. Grain, more expensive than maize, disappeared from
the table; meat was not regularly consumed. Together with wine, only
polenta remained a staple part of the diet.
consumption 307
1.5. Beverages
Through the ages, water has naturally been the most common beverage,
especially in rural areas. However, in the Middle and Early Modern
Ages, wine and beer played a much more important role than they do
today. Whilst nowadays wine and beer represent a supplement in an
already rich, perhaps excessively rich, diet, in past times they accounted
for a significant part of the caloric intake in a diet frequently lacking
in nutritious value.
Wine producing countries were to be found south of an imaginary
line, running from the Loire to the Crimean Peninsula. Further north
the vine could not be cultivated due to the unsuitable climate. In the
South of France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, wine consumption was
common to all social groups, both in urban and rural areas. Per capita,
daily consumption of between half and one litre was not unusual; that
is a caloric intake of about 500–700 calories. Wine and beer played an
important role in a diet of between 2,000 and 2,500 calories. The divi-
sion between the Europe which consumed butter to the North and that
which consumed oil to the South was also valid for beer to the North
and wine to the South. Beer was the predominant alcoholic beverage
in England, the Netherlands, Germany, parts of Bohemia, northern
Hungary, Poland, Russia and Scandinavia.
During the 17th century, alongside new foods, new drinks also
became popular. However, from a merely nutritional point of view their
importance was limited and they only marginally modified the general
availability of calories for the inhabitants of the continent. They were,
nevertheless, important from a social viewpoint, as they introduced
new customs and new forms of socialisation. They also played an
important role from an economic point of view and their production
and commercialisation set in motion both men and capital in Europe
and elsewhere. What characterises these new beverages is the fact that
they are closely linked to New World trade.
Not all beverages which became popular in the 17th century origi-
nated from America and Asia. Spirits were already known in the late
Middle Ages and used for medicinal purposes. However its popularity
as a beverage only dates back to the 17th century.
Growth in the consumption of spirits only slightly concerned south-
ern Europe. This was also the case for another new beverage—tea, which
gained in popularity during the 17th century. Tea was native to eastern
Asia, where a hot wet climate was particularly favourable for the ripen-
ing of the plant. Whilst in England and the Netherlands tea met with
widespread popularity throughout society, in France consumption was
low, and in Spain and Italy it was virtually unknown. In Russia it was
already widespread in the 16th century.27
Coffee was another 17th century beverage which gradually became
popular. It seemingly originated in Africa, probably in Ethiopia, and the
first figures regarding its consumption date back to the middle of the
15th century. In Europe, coffee made its appearance in the 17th century.
It was already well-known in Venice in 1615, in Paris in 1643 and in
London by 1651. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Marseilles imported
large quantities of coffee of Yemeni origin from Egypt.28 Indirect evi-
dence of general coffee consumption throughout Europe during the
18th century is indicated by the spread of shops in which coffee was
sold and drunk, that is, coffee shops or more simply cafés. The new
product thus created a new form of socialising which was destined to
have great success in the future. The cafés were meeting places where
it was possible to have discussions, read newspapers, play billiards etc.
It would seem that the first coffee shop was opened in Venice in 1647.
However, coffee shops opened in swift succession in all major and
subsequently minor European cities; starting in London, then Paris,
Hamburg and the Dutch cities. In London in 1710 there were at least
2,000 cafés.29 In Vienna they numbered 37 in 1737, 48 in 1770, 64 in
1784 and more than 80 in 1791.30
Cocoa was a beverage which originated in central and southern
America. Its consumption was limited for a long time to the higher
social classes as it continued to be an expensive consumer product;
considerably more so than tea or coffee. In 1520 cocoa arrived in Spain
for the first time, reaching the Netherlands in 1606, France at the mid-
dle of the 17th century and England in 1657.31
Destined for greater popularity was sugar; this was partly due to its
simultaneous diffusion with beverages such as tea, coffee and chocolate,
to which it was soon to become a complementary product. During the
late Middle Ages it was used for medicinal purposes and the sale was
only permitted in apothecaries. Sometimes it was added in the making of
27
Braudel (1979), I, Chap. 3.
28
Black (2002), p. 59.
29
Mc Kendrick-Brewer-Plumb (1982), pp. 269–70.
30
Sandgruber (1982), p. 193.
31
Chiapparino, Romano (eds.) (2007).
consumption 309
certain cakes, but honey was generally used for the sweetening of food.
In 1520 a new era dawned in the history of sugar when the cultivation of
sugar cane was established in Brazil, and the use of the product passed
from medicinal purposes to that of a sweetener and delicacy. Soon sugar
cane was also cultivated in Madeira, the Azores and the Canary Islands.
During the course of the 17th century, sugar consumption increased
together with rapid growth in European importation.
Along with these new commodities, tobacco played an important
part in the life of society, gaining popularity over the same period as
tea and coffee. It was a stimulant with origins in the New World, the
cultivation of which spread to Europe and Asia in the second half of
the 16th century. During the 17th century this product experienced an
even more rapid rise in popularity than tea or coffee had done previ-
ously. An Italian doctor, Bernardino Ramazzini, wrote at the end of
the 17th century that “that powder made of grass from Nicot is, at least
in Italy, the invention or rather the vice of the century; so widely used
by women, men and even youngsters that the purchase of this powder
accounts for part of the families’ daily expense”.32 In England, at the
end of the 17th century and during the early decades of the 18th, the
tobacco consumed per capita including that of illegal importation, was
1 kilogram per annum.33
1.6. Food consumption over the ages

When considering the evolution of food consumption from the late
Middle Ages, it can be seen that rations had the tendency to decrease
in quantity and worsen in quality. The amount of meat diminished and
bread became ever darker due to the use of poorer quality flour. The
introduction of the potato and maize compensated, at least quantity-
wise, for the poorer diet. However, quality-wise it was far from improved
especially when the diet was almost totally made up of potatoes or
polenta. From the late 17th century onwards, in some areas of England,
agriculture became more productive and the food regime improved
qualitatively, due to the increased consumption of meat and cheese.34
32
Ramazzini (1713), Chap. XVII. On Italy see, the valuable book by Capalbo which
is devoted to the State of the Church, (1999).
33
Shammas (1993), p. 180.
34
Still uselful is Gilboy (1930).
Table 1. Height of soldiers in several European countries from 1740 to 1840

(in centimetres).
England Sweden Lombardy Austria Hungary Bavaria
1740–50 170.2 169.5 168.4 164.9 168.2 167.6
1750–60 169.2 167.9 166.6 165.7 166.9 168.1
1760–70 170.1 168.4 166.0 165.5 166.0 166.3
1770–80 169.4 166.5 165.3 166.1 163.9 165.2
1780–90 168.7 166.6 165.3 164.0 164.9 166.3
1790–00 168.4 166.5 165.8 162.7 164.9 167.7
1800–10 168.2 167.3 164.5 162.8 163.3
1810–20 168.7 168.0 164.5 165.5
1820–30 168.5 171.1 165.8 165.6
1830–40 168.7 171.0 164.1 165.4
Source: A’Hearn (2003).
Note: decades include the year of birth.
Indirect, but significant proof of dietary deterioration is found in the

evidence of modifications in the physical structure of the European
population. The measurements of height and weight at a specific
age, that is the age at which growth ceases and the ultimate height is
reached and above all the rate of change during puberty “accurately
reflect the situation of the nation’s public health and its inhabitants’
average nutritional condition”.35 It would seem that, over the course of
time, starting in the late Middle Ages, there was a decrease in average
height. In the second half of the 18th century and the first two decades
of the 19th century, both wages and living conditions deteriorated
considerably and, contemporaneously, average height decreased by a
few centimetres (Table 1). We have already seen from the point of view
of supply how the second half of the 18th century was a tough period
for the European populations. After this date there was a more marked
tendency to growth in northern European rather than in southern and
eastern countries.36
35
Fogel, Engerman, Floud, Friedman, Margo, Sokoloff, Steckel, Trussell, Villaflor,
Wachter (1983).
36
Komlos (1998).
consumption 311
1.7. Durable goods: the assets of the poor

Over the centuries, the expenditure on durable goods modified to a
much lesser degree for the poor, than for the wealthy. In the case of
the former, instead of new models of expenditure we find only slow
changes within an essentially stationary picture. Entering into a farm-
house of the early Modern Age we would find trestles, tables, benches,
and andirons for the fire, with cooking equipment such as cauldrons,
frying pans, saucepans, dishes and mortars. The goods in the bedroom
are of greater value: wooden bedsteads, sheets, blankets, mattresses, with
clothes and linen in chests. Agricultural equipment is another important
item in the property of a farming family, nevertheless constituting a
lesser annual expense.37
The state of affairs of poor or humble city families was not very dif-
ferent to that found in the country, with the exception of the absence
of goods such as agricultural tools, which were strictly linked to rural
work.38 Everywhere in Europe, the possessions of the poor were similar,
and were mostly made up of tables, chairs, stools, chests, beds, and
clothes.39
The bed, with its linen and garments, was the most important item
among the assets of the poor. Once purchased or home produced,
fabrics were subjected to intense use, year after year, patched up and
handed down from generation to generation until completely worn
out. However, it is also true that other domestic objects, such as tables,
beds, and agricultural tools, were on average much longer lasting, hence
constituting a lower annual expense.
It is not surprising that the textile industry was the most important
industry virtually up to the present day. The three most common textile
fibres used by humble families were wool and linen, then hemp. Silk
was almost completely absent,40 but cotton was known from the late
Middle Ages onwards, although only becoming widespread from the
end of the 17th century. Of the two most common fibres, linen pre-
vailed in the bedroom and kitchen (sheets and tablecloths) and wool in
clothing. When these fibres were not processed within the family in the
form of cottage industry, they were bought locally. The artisan of the
37
Mazzi-Raveggi (1983).
38
De la Roncière (1982), p. 391 and (1976).
39
Minchinton (1973).
40
Battistini (2003).
village or town supplied the farmer and his family with textiles. Only
certain fabrics came from a distance, such as pure cotton, or flax and
cotton fustian, and sometimes lengths of linen. Textiles of the wealthy,
therefore, originated in distant regions, whilst those of the poor came
from nearby areas. Humble families only began to be supplied with wool
from distant industries from the end of the 16th century, following the
wide circulation of the new draperies from England.
During the early Modern Age, this generally static picture saw the
introduction of various innovations. From the 16th century onwards,
silk was increasingly used also among the middle-lower classes of soci-
ety. The 17th century popularisation of cotton was wider and affected
both rich and poor. This was a consequence of European imports of
Indian calico, by the English East India Company.41 Throughout the
first half of the 17th century these imports, which began around 1620,
remained insignificant, but between 1674 and 1679 they had already
risen to more than 550,000 pieces per year. In this era, the Dutch East
India Company also imported about 100,000 pieces.42 Between 1720
and 1740, the imports of the English Company alone had risen to
800–850,000. Rapid growth in national production was to be added to
these imports.43 Cotton fabrics were frequently called “indians” and in
1708 Daniel Defoe wrote about these saying that houses, living rooms,
bedrooms were invaded: curtains, pillows, chairs, and also beds were
exclusively calico and indians.44
Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, there was an increase in
the quantity of textiles possessed even by humble households as a
consequence of the diffusion of cotton, but not only for this reason.
From data relating to the expansion of the European textile industry, it
cannot be concluded that the circulation of these new imported fabrics
came about at the expense of continental production, as each person
was in possession of more fabrics. This has been noted particularly in
England, where the phenomenon seems well documented, starting from
the second half of the 17th century. Every family possessed a greater
number of sheets and tablecloths and curtains appeared at the windows
more frequently than before. Clothes, especially shirts, also became
more numerous. English scholars have spoken of a “great re-clothing
41
Coleman (1977), p. 162.
42
De Vries (1976), p. 137.
43
Glamann (1977).
44
Cit. in Braudel (1979), II, Chap. 2.
consumption 313
of rural England”.45 The picture is irregular and generalisations cannot

be made even for northern Europe. In Friesland, for example, in the
second half of the 17th century, there was an increase in the number
of window curtains, and perhaps a small rise in the quantity of clothes
each person owned. However it would seem that there was a reduc-
tion in possession of fabrics such as blankets, sheets, tablecloths and
napkins.46 In the first half of the 18th century, the quality and number
of clothes owned per person increased in the countryside near Paris;47
whilst the lower class families in Paris followed suit during the same
century.48 “The luxury of the peasants” began to be talked about, with
exaggeration, in some areas of Italy, Switzerland and Germany, because
of the spread of less well-worn clothes in the countryside.49 In reality
only a few sheets or some blankets appear in houses, but otherwise
there was no change.
1.8. New expenditures

Starting from the late 17th century innovations in consumer durables
were not limited to textiles. We can try to list those changes that have
been most frequently identified as taking place within humble and even
poor households, beginning with cutlery, glasses, dishes, and cups. The
increase in use of these objects is a gradual phenomenon, differing from
region to region, and tied to new habits and table manners. Cutlery,
dishes and glasses became more numerous, because these became
individual and were no longer shared, as was previously the custom.
Throughout the 17th century, the fork, in particular, became widely
used and even appeared in humble families. In the Netherlands, the
increase of cutlery, plates, glasses, and cups came about in the late 17th
century in conjunction with the appearance of watches, porcelain, and
books.50 Glass in windows was of more regular use and better quality
furniture more abundant. Homes became more comfortable; they were
built of bricks rather than wood and the rooms were more numerous.
There was a tendency to separate private space from that of work, and
45
Spufford (1984).
46
De Vries (1975), pp. 218 ff.
47
Baulant (1975).
48
Roche (1989).
49
Malanima (1990).
50
De Vries (1974), pp. 216 ff.
hence distinguish the different environments. The hearth and fireplace

replaced the fire in the middle of the kitchen.51 In 18th-century Paris,
all these changes initially concerned privileged social groups, before
slowly extending to include the rest of the population.52 In some
European regions, such as the Netherlands and perhaps Flanders,
even pictures on the walls became more frequent. Between 1580 and
1800, it has been calculated that 10 million pictures were introduced
into Dutch houses.53 A genuine painting industry worked to meet this
demand. Books also began to appear in humble dwellings and in 1700
ballads, booklets and stories could be found in English houses, and
from 1720–30 literary works in instalments appeared.54 Furthermore,
in the 18th century, newspapers began to appear in cities and in the
year 1753, 7 million copies were published in Europe.55 During the 17th
century, other increasing expenses were those of services for leisure
time; public houses, theatre and music. These were first seen in cities
and amongst the wealthy; however, with time, the poor began to follow
suit. Moralists feared propagation amongst country people.
According to some historians, these changes would have brought
about a rise in the standard of living in England. This seems evident
when an assessment is made for the low social strata in the period
between the middle of the 16th century and the end of the 17th century.
The change has been summed up in these words: “before 1550 their
houses contained the basic furniture; benches, a table, stools, and beds,
a small amount of domestic linen, and essential cooking and eating
vessels. By the end of the 17th century people had a choice of so many
different qualities of linen for domestic use and personal wear that it is
impossible to count them; many more iron, brass, and copper pots lined
the shelves of the kitchen, buttery and dairy; there were innumerable
different qualities in pewter ware”.56 This improvement in living condi-
tions was accelerated during the 18th century, bringing about a sort of
“consumption revolution”, in the opinion of some scholars.57
51
Shammas (1990).
52
Cornette (1989), pp. 483 ff.
53
Van der Woude (1991).
54
Mc Kendrick, Brewer, Plumb (1982), pp. 267 ff.
55
De Vries (1976), p. 189.
56
Thirsk (1978), p. 106.
57
Mc Kendrick-Brewer-Plumb (1982). See also De Vries (2008).
consumption 315
250 250
200 200
agricultural
prices
150 150
100 industrial 100

prices
80 80
1660 1680 1700 1720 1740 1760 1780 1800 1820
Source: De Vries (1993), p. 88.
Fig. 8. Indices of agricultural and industrial prices in England from 1660 until
1820 (9 years mobile averages).
As we have seen, per capita agricultural output decreased during the

second half of the 18th century and, in the long term, the consump-
tion of agricultural products diminished both in quantity and quality.
In years of poor harvests and high prices, the primary expenditure of
the population was most certainly for food. Food is inelastic to income
changes. Within the domestic economy, there was little possibility of
purchasing other sorts of goods. However, when harvests were more
abundant, some money was available for clothing and furniture, and
these survived for many years. Purchases of such commodities were
favoured by the decline in prices of several non-agricultural goods as
regards those produced in agriculture (Figure 8).
So, by the end of the 18th century, a large part of the European
population had a greater variety of durable goods at their disposal.
Families had curtains at the windows and possessed more tables and
chairs than ever before, but they sat at a table which, although better
laid, was actually more meagre as less food, and of poorer quality, was
consumed. The difference between the pace of agriculture and that of
industry is reflected in the consumption of goods from each sector.
Source: Lucerne Chronicles, 1513.

Fig. 9. Being rich in medieval Germany.
1.9. From feudal nobility to court aristocracy

We can discern a gradual modification in the model of expenditure
of the European nobility over the centuries, accompanying their evo-
lution from the feudal society to urban aristocracy. In the 11th and
12th centuries nearly all noble families lived outside the towns. Their
substantial incomes were employed to finance war, for the purchase
of arms and for the maintenance of armies, but also for hospitality,
servants, journeys, and donations to religious orders.58 Their desire to
distinguish themselves from others led to expenditure for a safer and
more spacious abode and more exclusive attire. In most cases, however,
clothing remained simple and ordinary and the residence or castle was
58
Duby (1973), Chap. VIII, 3.
consumption 317
furnished in a functional manner with chairs, tables, trunks and beds.

Few were the luxuries and comforts in this style of life, which was
inherited, at least in part, from the customs of the barbarian populations
that settled the continent in the early Middle Ages (Figure 9).59
In the late Middle Ages, the recovery of trade helped change the habits
in noblemen’s expenditure.60 The possibilities of purchase multiplied
along with the expansion of trade and the increased production of goods
such as cloth, clothing, leather and metal items. An even greater change
came about when the nobility abandoned their country residences and
went to live in the towns. It was through their living alongside the ris-
ing groups of society, rich merchants, entrepreneurs and professional
people, that new customs were acquired. Their expenditure for military
purposes decreased as the town and state militia gradually became better
organised. Expenditure on servants, hospitality and dining also dimin-
ished, whilst those on clothing, furniture and the residence increased.
A new model of expenditure was taking shape.61
This new model of behaviour among the aristocracy seems to have
progressed especially in areas where the aristocracy took up earlier
residence in towns; for example in central and northern Italy.62 It is
possible that in the early stages of this change, the aristocracy brought
typical feudal customs to the towns. Their town dwellings were rela-
tively modest, as was their attire. It was in the 15th century, during the
Renaissance, that the aristocracy’s increase in expenditure gave rise to a
society where consumption was acquiring a central role. The building of
palaces, greater quantities of furniture, more money spent on clothing
and linen, were all factors which expressed these new tendencies and
subsequently spread beyond the Alps to become the custom of high levels
of society throughout Europe between the 16th and 17th centuries.
The English evolution is particularly interesting.63 The English aris-
tocracy did not abandon its castles until the middle of the 16th century:
much later than the Italian nobility. It was then that the most important
families in the Kingdom began to build luxurious town dwellings and
consequently the castles fell into disrepair. Town life and proximity
to the court caused a change in their habits and customs; armies were
59
Gurevic (1970), pp. 59 ff.
60
See also Duby (1962), P. III, 3.
61
Elias (1937).
62
See especially the important works by Goldthwaite (1980), (1987), (1993), who
stressed the changes in the habits of the aristocracy in Renaissance Italy.
63
Stone (1965).
disbanded, superfluous servants were sent away and arms were left to
rust.64
1.10. The clothes of the wealthy

Among the European aristocracy, clothing and linen became increasingly
important items of expenditure, counting for some 10 to 20 percent of
the total.65 This expense, contrary to that for food, increased parallel to
income and only ceased to grow in absolute terms when income reached
high levels. Its income elasticity was high. Of all the quantity of cloth
transported long distances across the seas and along the roads of Europe
between the 12th and 18th centuries, and of all that was produced in the
most important industrial areas the greater part was for the consump-
tion of the higher social groups and the rich town dwellers.66
Fashion emerged as a new phenomenon among European noblemen
from late medieval times and attention to clothing became an expedient
by which privileged classes distinguished themselves from the lower
groups. In time, the changing of styles became a deliberate choice of
entrepreneurs and merchants in order to sell more. Traces can be found
leading back to medieval times of such deliberate changes in fashion to
stimulate demand and hence increase production. The conscious crea-
tion of fashion and its annual change seem, however, to have taken place
after the late Middle Ages, and only came about in the 17th century,
together with the term “fashion” itself. From 1660 onwards, the French
court at Versailles appears to have played a decisive role in deliberately
determining fashion, to the advantage of producers, especially the silk
manufacturers of Lyons. “They invent new forms of apparel every day”
was the comment in Holland, regarding the French.67
The French system rapidly spread. The directors of the East India
Company wrote in 1681: “remember as a constant and general rule
that all types of printed silk must be modified every year in cut and
design, so that English ladies, and indeed the French, and those of other
European countries will spend double for a new article never before
64
Girouard (1978).
65
See the example studied by Pinchera (1999) and (2000) for models of consump-
tion of the Italian aristocracy.
66
The topic is developed in the fine bbok by Belfanti (2008).
67
Ribeiro (1984), p. 20.
consumption 319
seen in Europe, even if of inferior quality, rather than on a better qual-

ity silk that was fashionable the previous year.”68
1.11. Within the palace

Regarding their residence, the medieval nobilities were much less
demanding than their early Modern Age descendants. Externally the
abodes sported elaborate defence systems, whereas inside they were
rudimentary, often with few rooms, as it was frequent for many peo-
ple to share the same quarters: the master slept with his servants and
the lady with her maids. The furniture, although most certainly more
elaborate than that of the rest of the population, was essential and not
luxurious.
Town life brought about changes to the houses of both the nobil-
ity and the wealthy. Rooms became specific and were assigned to the
various family members. The external aspect of the building was to
demonstrate the social standing of the inhabitants and the degree of
luxury they could afford. This factor contributed to the transformation
of towns and especially of the capital cities such as Madrid, London,
Paris, Vienna, Naples and Rome. In addition to a luxurious city dwell-
ing, a similarly sumptuous country residence became a necessity as the
seasons of the year, like the rooms in the house, gained a particular
significance. A certain period of the year, usually the summer season,
was set aside for taking a break from city life and a change of scene
was required.
As has been frequently suggested, if the income of the nobility had
been invested more profitably, rather than on numerous palaces, churches
and works of art, the economy would have been stimulated more
effectively. But we have to remember that opportunities for investment
were limited for long periods of time. Malthus’ opinion is acceptable
when he claims that a haphazard passion for accumulation on behalf
of these upper class societies was inevitably to lead to a supply of goods
far higher than that which the structure and habits of such a society
would have allowed to be profitably consumed.69 The aristocratic nature
of the European society took root in a world where opportunities for
productive investment were limited so it was the consequence and not
the cause of a stationary economy.
68
Glamann (1977), III, 4.
69
Malthus (1820), II, 1.
2. Investment
2.1. The role of capital

Precisely that part of output which forms capital has always been con-
sidered to play a central role in economic development. It has been
said that the problem with development is to understand the process
by which an economy that invested and saved less than 5 percent of
its revenue could develop to a level where it saved and invested more
than 10 percent.70 By capital formation we mean the yearly addition to
the stock of capital material goods utilised in order to produce, that is,
the addition to produced resources employed in the various production
cycles. Capital goods are also consumed, however their consumption
requires a much longer period of time than other consumables.
Today natural resources are often excluded from the production
functions utilised in economics, since their contribution to product
formation is relatively insignificant in advanced modern economies. It
was not so in traditional agrarian economies, where land represented
about 50 percent of the resources employed in production, whilst capital
(buildings, equipment and machinery) represented the other 50 percent;
for example in Italy in 186171 and even more so in late 17th century
England.72 In 15th century Tuscany, “approximately 53 percent” of
total wealth “represented holdings in real estate”.73 It does not seem
incorrect, however, to consider land and other natural resources as a
kind of capital. As the economist Luigi Einaudi maintained, “land is
not a divine creation, it is a human construction. In nature there are
no cultivable lands; there are only marshes, forests, and deserts, uncul-
tivated and unproductive lands”.74
Until the time of the Industrial Revolution circulating capital in the
form of raw materials and stocks always prevailed over capital assets
such as plants, equipment and buildings.75 Only with the development
of complex techniques characteristic of the industrial era was there the
tendency to increase the number of plants and equipment. Thus capital
assets took on greater importance. Furthermore, before the Industrial
70
W. A. Lewis (1955), Chap. III.
71
Goldsmith, Zecchini (1999).
72
Kuznets (1968), p. 34.
73
Herlihy (1978), p. 135.
74
Einaudi (1949), p. 22.
75
Hicks (1969), Chap. 9.
investment 321
Revolution, capital formation was mostly a substitution of depreciating

equipment and buildings. The agricultural sector is a prime example.
Quantitatively, the annual investment made in tree-planting, land
improvement, the purchase of ploughs, the renovation of buildings etc.
was ordinarily very modest. The same applies to industry. Before 1850
approximately 80–90 percent of the capital of the wool industry in West
Riding was made up of stocks such as wool, yarn and textiles. Only
3–6 percent was made up of implements.76 Fixed capital was, therefore,
limited. It was for the greater part made up of buildings which have a
low productivity, hence, very little remained for the creation of produc-
tion plants and equipment. In 1760 England, fixed capital in the form
of machines and equipment for transport made up only 8 percent of
the total fixed capital, (excluding residential buildings). In 1830 it had
risen to 14 percent and in 1975 to 45 percent.77
We have seen that in pre-modern European economy, labour pro-
ductivity diminished and per capita product remained stable only
thanks to the rising number of workers and the increase in working
time. Decreasing labour productivity, revealed by the decline in real
wages, depends primarily on the diminution of natural or produced
resources (that is capital) per worker. It must now be explained why
this diminution took place in pre-modern Europe.
Capital formation depends primarily on two variables: the availability
of resources to be invested, that is the possibility of saving; and the
yield of investment, that is the marginal efficiency of capital, as Keynes
called it, represented by “the relation between the prospective yield of
one or more unit of that type of capital and the cost of producing it”.78
We have to take into consideration the following elements that can
influence capital formation:
1. income distribution. Since the large majority of the pre-industrial

population had very low incomes at their disposal, and was therefore
not able to put money aside, one must query whether the distribu-
tion of income which was common at the time, permitted savings.
The less equal this is, the greater opportunities exist to increase
investments and promote development;
76
Hudson (1986), p. 30.
77
Maddison (1982), p. 53.
78
Keynes (1936), p. 135.
2. financial institutions. It is possible that savings existed, but were

not particularly mobile and thus demand and supply were unlikely
to meet. If financial intermediaries are absent, there may be those
who need capital but are lacking in funds, whereas those who have
the possibility of saving lack the opportunity to invest;
3. mentality. As long as there is formation of capital, opportunities
for productive employment must exist and, among those, a cultural
climate favourable for investment;
4. productivity of capital. As will be seen, in agricultural societies of
the past it is the lack of opportunities for productive employment
or low marginal efficiency of capital that keeps investment low and
diverts the assets to unproductive employment. This low capital
productivity, depending on the technical characteristics of the pre-
modern economy, will appear as the main cause of its low capital
formation.
2.2. The distribution of wealth and income

It has been said that the ancien régime society could be schematically
depicted as a two-class society, made up of gentlemen on the one hand
and of those who were not gentlemen on the other.79 The first group
must have included approximately 10 percent of the population and
the second group the rest. The nobility represented three percent of
the European population in the 18th century.80 The remaining percent-
age of higher society was made up of landowners, professional men,
important tradesmen. How much income did this 10 percent of the
population control? A common opinion, based, however, on very scanty
direct evidence, is that pre-modern agrarian societies were much more
unequal than our modern societies.81 We often read about the inequality
dominating in the ancient world, the Middle Ages, the European and
non-European civilizations.
More reliable information is available regarding the distribution of
wealth than that of income. Wealth distribution may merely suggest
the degree of income inequality since it is in fact always much more
unequal than income distribution. It therefore seems possible to state
that in the ancien régime the richest 10 percent of the population
79
Stone (1965), Chap. 2.
80
Meyer (1973), p. 31 ff.
81
Goldsmith (1987), p. 236.
investment 323
often possessed over half the wealth.82 Today, in the United States, 10
percent of the population earn almost one third of the income and
control more than half of the wealth. In Florence, at the beginning of
the 15th century, one percent of the population possessed more than
a quarter of the total wealth and one sixth of the total wealth of the
Florentine Republic: a fortune which was, as a whole, higher than that
of 87 percent of the poor taxpayers;83 10 percent owned 68 percent of
the wealth. We have no knowledge about the percentage of income that
this superior 10 percent controlled. No doubt, however, inequality in
income distribution was lower than in wealth. In 1460, in Constance
(Germany), 10 percent of the population had command of 76 percent
of the riches of the city, whilst 62 percent of the poor owned a mere
two percent. In Heilbronn, 63 percent of the entire patrimony was in
possession of the richest 10 percent. In Erfurt, in 1511, seven percent
of the population owned 66 percent of the wealth. In Lyons, in 1545,
the richer 10 percent were owners of 53 percent of the wealth.84
Certainly income distribution was much less unequal.85 In England,
towards the end of the 17th century, the richest 5 percent of the popu-
lation had at their disposal 28 percent of income. The Lords, baronets,
knights, clergy, farmers, officials and artisans, made up little more than
half of the population and their average income was 67 pounds a year.
The other half of the population had at their disposal an average annual
income of less than 20 pounds and included sailors, farmers, cottagers,
soldiers, tramps and the poor in general.86
It has been seen87 that in pre-modern economies per capita output
varied within a relatively narrow range. The minimum of this range was
around 700 international 1990 dollars, barely consistent with survival.
When GDP per capita approached this low margin, there was little
room for inequality. Only when national income rose could the space
for inequality widen. Scanty information available on the distribution
of income during the 18th and 19th century demonstrates that higher
economic inequality existed where the per capita income was higher.88
82
Cipolla (1974), p. 24 (source of some of the following data on the distribution
of wealth).
83
Herlihy-Klapisch-Zuber (1978), Chap. 9, and Herlihy (1978).
84
Cipolla (1974), p. 24.
85
See especially the article by Van Zanden (1995).
86
Coleman (1977), p. 6.
87
In Chap. VI.
88
Malanima (2000).
Setting1 equal to maximum inequality and complete equality to 0,89

today in West European countries the figure is around 0.350. During the
18th century in two quite prosperous economies such as the Netherlands
and England, personal inequality exceeded 0.500.90 In the Kingdom of
Naples and in central-northern Italy, it was around 0.250–0.300 during
the 18th and 19th centuries, that is less than what it is today.91
According to Simon Kuznets, fluctuations in inequalities would have
characterised modern growth. Inequality would have risen during the
first phase of economic development when the transition of pre-indus-
trial society was more rapid; then stabilised for a certain period; and
subsequently diminished.92 The reason for this relationship is the flow
of the peasant population towards industry during the first phase of
economic modernisation, and then the passage from low-productivity
agricultural activities to more productive forms of employment where
wages were higher. Inequality increased since part of the population
began to enjoy a higher income and then became wealthier in a society
still dominated by agrarian poverty. When the passage from agriculture
to industry involved the majority of population, there was a decline in
inequality because of the migration of the poor agricultural population
towards better paid jobs. The point of departure is the poor dualistic
society of pre-modern times where a relative equality in poverty exists;
the point of arrival is the non-dualistic society of the developed countries
with a relative equality at a higher level of average income.93
If we express inequality as a function of per capita income, then
inequality describes an inverted U curve (Figure 10), according to the
following second degree equation:
YINQ = α + β1 y + β2 y 2
where YINQ is inequality (computed according to a statistical concen-
tration index such as the Gini index); y is per capita income and α, β1
and β2 are constants).
As mentioned before, direct evidence on pre-modern inequality is
extremely poor. We know that in countries such as England and the
89
This refers to the measurement of equality based on the so-called Gini index.
90
Van Zanden (1995); Soltow (1968).
91
Malanima (2000), p. 208 and (2006d).
92
Kuznets (1955).
93
The thesis expressed by Kuznets was and still is, however, the object of debate. See,
in any case, the summary presentation of the debate in Williamson (1991), ch. 1.
investment 325
i
B
y2 y1 y3 y
Fig. 10. The relationship inequality-per capita product according to Kuznets.
Netherlands, in the period of their early modern economic rise, inequal-

ity was high; that it was probably high in the Florentine Republic during
the Renaissance; that it was low in the Kingdom of Naples at the begin-
ning of the 19th century, which was a dark age for Italy on the whole. A
decline in inequality occurred in France in the same period.94 Looking
at the graph, England and the Netherlands in the 17th century, and part
of the 18th century, were progressing in terms of per capita income,
from y1 to y3, and inequality was rising from A to B. However, these
were exceptions. If we accept the trend of per capita output presented
in chapter VI, we can deduce that, since several European countries
were moving from y1 to y2 in the meantime, then, probably inequality
was diminishing from A to C and that, in the whole of Europe, between
1500 and 1800 a stagnation both in social stratification, and in income
distribution, is more probable.95
It can be presumed that in the past, as happens today, 30–40 per-
cent (and sometimes more) of annual output flowed into the hands
of the 10 percent richest families. Since 90 percent of the population
had only a minimum subsistence, we could simplify by saying that the
94
Morrisson-Snyder (2000).
95
Contrary to the opinion of Hoffman, Jacks, Levin, Lindert (2002). I re-examine
the topic in a more formal way in Chap. VIII.
entire surplus (the quota of output above the minimum which allowed
reproduction of the system) was appropriated by superior social groups
and especially by the nobility.
Such a degree of inequality in income distribution can allow produc-
tive investment. Following a calculation of Kuznets,96 we could assume
that in the society of the ancien régime, 5 percent of the population
controlled 25 percent of income; therefore 95 percent had the remaining
75 percent at their disposal. This 95 percent of society consumed all its
income without the possibility of either saving or investing and only the
upper five percent could save. If privileged groups consume three times
more than the rest of the population, the saving would be 13 percent of
national income; if they consume five times more, the saving would be
five percent; if their consumption is higher, every form of saving would
disappear. If we take the upper 10 percent of society controlling 30–40
percent of total income, savings rise. Although uncertain, these results
demonstrate that the saving potential of pre-modern economies was
high. As Kuznets himself suggested, about the question if during the
17th and 18th centuries “the material capital formation proportions”,
at least in the most advanced economies of the time, “were significantly
below, or different from, the capital formation proportions associated
with modern economic growth, I would hesitate to give a definitive
answer”.97
If what we know about personal income distribution in pre-modern
economies suggests that potential for saving existed and that a capital
formation of more than 10 percent of product existed as well, why does
our knowledge of labour productivity suggest that capital per worker
diminished and then capital formation was lower than demographic
rise? We have to look at the other variables influencing capital forma-
tion in order to find an answer.
2.3. Financial institutions

Institutions capable of transforming the availability of savings into
capital are a prerequisite for investment. Banks and financial institu-
tions play this role, and without them it is possible that the individual
may not find a productive way to invest. These institutions existed in
medieval and early modern times. As from the era of trade revival during
96
Kuznets (1968), p. 33.
97
Kuznets (1968), p. 29.
investment 327
the high Middle Ages, historians have often documented them, starting
from Italian cities. During the commercial expansion of the 11th–12th
centuries, the establishment of limited liability for the investor was of
great importance. It emerged in sea voyages with the contract of the
commenda. The director of the activity was responsible personally and
in toto, with all his assets, while the investors could only lose the capital
invested, their wealth remaining safe. It is evident that in this way, those
who did not intend to participate personally in commercial activities,
and were purely investors, could feel sufficiently protected. Limited
responsibility favoured the formation of savings and their transfor-
mation into capital. The concept of limited responsibility spread from
the commenda to be adopted in many other merchant and financial
institutions. The limited partnership, for example, is none other than
the application of the same principle, to commercial, industrial and
credit companies. Even the privileged companies which operated dur-
ing the 17th and 18th centuries in northern Europe and were created
for ocean voyages developed the principles of the commenda. Thus, the
opportunity of investment was offered to multitudes of small savers, on
the basis of a division between investment and management.
In the cities, despite the fact that the majority of investments were
made by the bourgeoisie and nobility, a large part of the population
participated in the formation of capital, although with meagre savings.
When examining the surviving records of medieval notaries, or deeds
of establishment of business societies, it is always surprising to note
among the investors the sizeable presence of small artisans, shopkeepers,
house owners, widows trying to make their savings yield, and the young
in search of fortune. In this way small funds, which would otherwise
have been unused, found productive investment.
Generally speaking, these institutions were exclusively an urban
phenomenon and their diffusion was extremely limited. The scarcity
of capital, together with the risks involved, curbed investment and,
as Keynes wrote, this meant that the propensity to invest in this pre-
industrial world remained weaker than the propensity to save.98 Those
who had savings at their disposal might find it preferable to hoard
money or precious goods, such as gold and silver objects, and jewel-
lery. On the eve of the Industrial Revolution in England, there was an
98
Keynes (1936), pp. 347–8.
abundance of unutilised savings.99 Where credit institutions actually

existed, the funds were often made available for those in difficulty,
usually for excessive expenses, rather than for loans for productive
purposes. Thus, in this case, we could call them consumption loans
rather than productive loans. With reference to England, at the end
of the 17th century, Dudley North wrote: “not even the tenth part of
money loaned with interest in our country is made available to busi-
ness men . . . but it is used to enhance luxury, and ease the expenses of
those who, although important landowners, spend more rapidly than
permitted by their land rent”.100
Similar opportunities of investment did not exist for the mass of
the rural population, but it would be a mistake to conclude that in
the countryside at that time, only nobles, important landowners and
wealthy tenants made investments. This is true only if one considers
the problem in monetary terms. In fact, most of the capital in the form
of rural arrangement, tree plantations, ditches, roads, and buildings,
came from that specific type of investment which is labour on the part
of the farming families. This work was not carried out to cover current
expenditure, but to enlarge or restore the base of future expenditure,
that is capital. In the farming economies of the ancien régime, not all the
capital was made up of monetary savings then invested. Work devoted
to the formation of material equipment, permitting the expansion of
the productive bases, was also a kind of investment. Any estimate of the
formation of capital before the Industrial Revolution should incorporate
the fact that in rural areas, more labour than savings was invested, thus
modelling the structures of the agricultural world.
2.4. The propensity to invest

In pre-industrial Europe, the superior groups of society, and in par-
ticular the nobles, had an adequate income to allow the formation of
capital. As has been seen, a formation of capital equal to 10 and even
20 percent of gross output would not have been impossible. It has been
pointed out that capital is, after all, the effect of the “human attitude
towards risk taking and earning”.101 Thus the question is: did this atti-
tude exist? The prevailing ideology towards wealth and profit was not
99
R. Davis (1979), p. 74.
100
Cit. in Stone (1965), Chap. 9.
101
Kaldor (1954).
investment 329
favourable to productive investment. A favourable attitude towards

riches was only formed very slowly within European culture. Ambitions
towards improvement in living conditions filtered slowly into the ideals
of the majority of the population. Both in the rural world and in most
of the urban populations these conditions were considered unchange-
able. An alteration in the relative value attributed to economic assets
on one hand and free time on the other, favouring economic assets,
was necessary in order to modify this attitude.102
Moreover, the behaviour of the nobility, who more than others had
high incomes and thereby real possibilities of investment, was nega-
tively oriented towards productive investment. They did not, however,
consider it improper to pursue international trade and finance great
enterprises. In Elizabethan England, Count George Talbot, an influential
member of the gentry, not only supervised the management of his lands,
but owned a ship that transported minerals, and was the most important
owner of ironworks in the country. He also managed steelworks and
was the owner of collieries and glassworks. There is no lack of similar
cases amongst landowners and mining and industrial businessmen,
even in Eastern Europe, and the same is true for Mediterranean Europe.
Here, the nobility lived in cities from the late Middle Ages onwards and
participated in trading and industrial activities with investments. The
nobles’ commitment was reinforced by the fact that the most successful
merchants continually penetrated the ranks of the aristocracy.
It has been customary to associate productive investment with
the bourgeois groups much more than with the nobility. The word
bourgeois has taken on different meanings throughout history. For
medieval and early modern times it has been used by the historians to
indicate those families, who were almost always city dwellers, capable
of making a profit through involvement in commercial banking and
industrial activities and of gaining high social status, midway between
the multitude of poor and the few nobles. As from the time of the
revival of the city dwellers’ economies, during the high Middle Ages,
according to Henri Pirenne, the trader contrasted the way of living of
the dominant agricultural civilization.103
In the ancien régime, the position of the bourgeois in society was,
however, very unstable. The maximum ambition of a trader’s family
102
De Vries (1993), p. 111.
103
Pirenne (1927), Chap. 5.
was always nobility: the bourgeois status was lived as a transitional

condition. Usually, therefore, after the first generation of traders had
accumulated riches, the second already began to adopt the ways and
living standards of nobles and to secure their wealth through the pur-
chase of land and estates. The third generation lost every bourgeois
feature, including the propensity to invest.104
2.5. Investment yield

The propensity to invest, however, depends not only on mentality,
social values and available financial institutions, but, above all, on the
expected return. This is high in a dynamic, innovative economy. It is
not so in an advanced or mature agrarian economy such as that prevail-
ing in Europe during medieval and early modern times, as the notably
low interest rates of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries demonstrate,
which remained ordinarily in the range 2–4 percent.105 Their increase
only came about during the 19th century with industrialisation. Such
low interest rates indicate that the availability of capital was high, the
demand low and the rate of profit, which is usually close to interest
rates, modest.
Kuznets advanced the hypothesis that, although income distribution
allowed for saving in pre-modern economies, low capital formation
depended on the shorter economic life of depreciable capital: “the
physical life of capital goods in pre-modern times was relatively short
since they were subject to devastation by fire or other natural hazards,
or required important annual replacements or maintenance to survive,
or they deteriorated rapidly in the process of use even with full current
maintenance.”106 So a large part of the yearly investment was used to
substitute the depreciating capital. Net capital creation, as a conse-
quence, was small. This is probably true. We can add, however, that
new capital goods consisted mainly of buildings, that is of unproduc-
tive or low productive investments.107 The investment did not create
the conditions for an increase of productivity through the creation of
equipment and tools.
Traditionally, the static nature of the medieval agrarian economy is
said to have been caused by limited investment, above all by the aris-
104
Pirenne (1914).
105
Homer-Sylla (1902). See also data collected by Epstein (2000), pp. 20–23.
106
Kuznets (1968), p. 47.
107
See the fine reconstruction of the huge investments by the public authorities in
early modern cities in Blockmans (2003).
investment 331
Fig. 11. A Renaissance investment. A Tuscan villa (by Giusto Utens).
tocracy, who, possessing available capital, immobilized this in palaces,

villas, churches and expenditure on luxury items according to social
requirements and mentality (Figure 11). However, the inverse of this
situation should not be disregarded, in as much as the scarce productiv-
ity of investment in an agrarian economy which experienced technical
constraints to expansion resulted in discouraging productive invest-
ment. This was the reason why existing saving was invested in areas of
particular social relevance. Seen from this perspective, the expenditure
pattern of the wealthy is transformed from a cause into an effect.
2.6. Capital formation in the long term

From the end of the 19th century, gross capital formation, that is total
investment including depreciation (the substitution value of capital
goods) amounted rate-wise to something between 10 and 25 percent
of the gross national product in the industrialising or industrialised
countries: less than a fifth of the total income, in most cases. The net
formation of capital (investment due to depreciation excluded) was
less, amounting to some 6–15 percent. What can be said about capital
formation in pre-modern economies? As is frequently the case, there is
a lack of quantitative data. The earliest data go back to the 18th century
and are estimates made by contemporaries. With regard to Europe

from 1500 to 1750, the hypotheses forwarded are not based on facts,
but on reasonable assumptions regarding production, possible savings
in a society like that of the ancien régime and the demographic trends.
It can be concluded that the gross creation of capital constituted some
5–10 percent of GDP, but the net formation—substitution of depre-
ciating capital detracted—was almost nil.108 “One may ask—Kuznets
wrote—whether there was any fixed, durable capital formation, except
for the <<monuments>>, in pre-modern times, whether there was any
significant accumulation of capital goods with a long physical life that
did not require current maintenance (or replacement) amounting to
a high proportion of the original full value”.109 What is certain is that,
first in England, and then elsewhere, investments tended to increase in
the 19th century. At the end of the 17th century and in the early years
of the 18th century, the formation of capital in England corresponded
to about 5 percent of income; it increased after 1750 and only between
1830 and 1850 did it reach 10 percent.110
A picture of the long term dynamics of investment is more easily
deducible from indirect information than from the few scattered direct
data. Economic theory suggests that when the formation of capital
is lower than demographic growth, the marginal product of labour
diminishes and with that, wages also drop. Here we can assume that
natural resources, when modified by investments of capital and work,
are a quota of capital.111 The opposite occurs when the accumulation of
capital is higher. On examination of real wages, an increase is observ-
able, as we know, in the late Middle Ages, as is a decrease from 1500
onwards, with an interruption in the 17th century and an accentua-
tion between 1750 and 1820. An upturn ensued. It can be concluded
that the capital per worker increased when the population fell. As the
population increased, investment slowly followed suit. Paradoxically,
only demographic crises engendered formation of capital. In the capital-
labour ratio, the decrease in the denominator was the decisive element,
rather than the increase of the numerator. Only in the 19th century
108
Le osservazioni di Braudel (1979), II, Chap. 3.
109
Kuznets (1968), p. 48.
110
Deane (1961) and (1967), Chap. X.
111
I come back to this topic in the following Chap. VIII.
public expense 333
did the situation in European countries begin to modify, in some cases

sooner and in others later. The denominator (population) increased,
but the numerator (capital) increased more rapidly.
3. Public expense
3.1. Public power

The state is the superior institution which supplies services that would
be very difficult, if not impossible, to procure via market transactions.
Observed in this broad sense, the state is a very ancient institution.
When considering Europe, at the outset, attention must be drawn to
two aspects which influenced the economy:
1. a first characteristic of the history of European political institutions is

the long-lasting dispersal of power over the centuries and the recon-
struction into territorial states of various dimensions in different
parts of the continent. Towards the 10th century, feudal structures
prevailed, comprising several centres of power, feudal dominions,
then towns, while the superior institutions, such as the empire and
the monarchy, lacked effective power. Small rival states were formed,
which then proceeded to unify the territory into larger structures.
This reconstruction was usually the initiative of a central unifying
force such as a king, a seignior, owner of considerable territory or
a town which extended towards the areas of lesser resistance.112 The
recomposing of power became an important historical feature of
the period between the 15th and the 18th century.113 The so-called
national states which formed during this period while proceeding to
recompose greater political structures, promoted the concentration of
power, depriving feudal lords and cities of authority and becoming
an absolutist monarchy.114 The central government then proceeded
to delegate the power throughout the territory by means of admin-
istrative institutions which were much more powerful than in the
past (royal and military officials . . .). Hence the number of political
units diminished. In Europe some 1,000 have been calculated to
112
Näf (1951).
113
Vicent Vives (1960).
114
Oestreich (1969b).
have existed towards the 14th century; 500 in the 16th century and
25 in 1900;115
2. the second characteristics relates to the lack in early modern Europe
of imperial structures similar to those of the antiquity and of
other parts of the world. By empire we refer to a political system
comprising substantial territory, the centre of which is made up
of an emperor and his court.116 In Europe, despite the short-lived
attempts of Charlemagne, Charles V, Phillip II and Louis XIV, no
stable empire emerged. The failure of these political formations in
Europe was possibly due to the numerous rival seats of power. Early
modern “European state life implies that any power is limited, at
an early stage, in its expansion”, Otto Hintze wrote.117 “In the place
of a universal monarchy, as existed in ancient times, a system of
multiple strong powers is established, which, despite all ensuing
conflicts, tends continually towards a balance.” Therefore numerous
seats of power with various allies amongst them always represented
an impediment to the formation of one unifying superior power.
Alongside this transition from dispersion to concentration there was

an increase in the revenue of the European States and growth in
expenditure. It is mainly on the revenues and public expenses that the
economic historian must focus.
3.2. The revenue: late Middle Ages

The same tendency towards concentration that accompanied political
power throughout European history was visible in the field of public
finance. Here, too, the trend was from dispersion of taxation to one of
concentration in public offices. In feudal times imposition of taxes, such
as the fodrum, by central power, whether imperial or royal, was exiguous
and for long periods totally nonexistent. Taxes were in fact collected
by the local lords and subsequently by the cities, which were, initially,
a sort of collective feudal lord. In most cases taxes were entangled with
the rent of the land, which the lords received from their peasants, and
it was difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between how much the
lords levied from their servants as rent for the land they cultivated and
115
Jones (1981), Chap. 6.
116
Eisenstadt (1961).
117
Hintze (1929), p. 173.
public expense 335
how much was compensation for the protection and safety that they
provided. This age of public finance was defined by Schumpeter as the
age of domain state.118
Furthermore there was no distinction between those who offered
protection on the one hand and those who benefited from such services
on the other. In the case of war, the lord’s men took part directly in
armed combat and through this involvement they put at the disposal
of the public powers that military force which today is financed by
public taxation. The same can be said for the medieval cities, where
the inhabitants also carried out guard duty and military service. Over
time a division of roles took place. Where formerly the two different
figures of soldier and citizen were united in the same individual, they
subsequently separated and the citizens started to pay taxes in order to
finance the upkeep of the army. From the 13th century onwards, the
tendency was towards the concentration of payments into the hands
of the central power, whilst at the same time individual services started
to disappear. It was however a trend, as taxation on behalf of various
institution continued to exist to a greater or lesser degree throughout
the continent. During the 18th century it was common practice in
France, Germany and elsewhere for the lords to collect taxes from fairs,
markets, roads and from the inhabitants of their fiefs.
It is difficult to estimate how important these taxes were with respect
to the national income of each state. Obstacles to the increase in taxa-
tion were, on the one hand, the low level of output and on the other,
the scarcity of money.119 Several suggestions have been put forward
regarding the level of taxation in pre-modern Europe. It would seem
that towards the 17th century the public budget of the Mediterranean
states, with a total population of approximately 60 million inhabitants,
was equal to 3–4 percent of national income.120 Subsequently the per-
centage increased. As far as Europe is concerned, it seems reasonable
to assume that tax collection during the early modern centuries, was on
average between 5 and 10 percent of the gross product.121 Due to the
discontinuity of military activities these values underwent significant
changes. In Florence in 1427, the budget of the Republic was equal to
118
Schumpeter (1918).
119
Ardant (1975), pp. 174–78.
120
Braudel (1966), I, P. II, Chap. 1.
121
Cipolla (1974), p. 67. The evaluation of 10 percent as maximum value is supplied
by Braudel (1979), III, Chap. 4.
30 percent of overall output; in England, at the end of the 16th century

it equalled only 1–2 percent, whilst in the United Provinces towards
1650, it was 25 percent.122
3.3. Taxes and loans

Despite important differences between the methods of tax collection
and the financial structures in early Modern European states,123 it is
possible to identify some common elements and common lines of
development. In Italian cities, during the late Middle Ages, many
innovative solutions regarding financial structures were devised.124 In
some cases they served as an example for successive developments in
other European regions, whilst sometimes these regions rediscovered
these solutions. In Italian cities, during the 14th and 15th centuries,
the main source of revenue was from taxes and loans. Another source,
which was at the time of more importance north of the Alps than in
Italy, was that of inherited property and the public assets of the Crown,
which were above all land, woods and mines. These assets were rented
out and sometimes represented an important item in the royal income.
This was above all true in the Kingdoms of France and England during
the 13th and 14th centuries.125 However, over the centuries, many of
these were sold and their importance diminished. In England in 1450
the property of the Crown was equal to 5 percent of the landed estate
of the entire kingdom, two centuries later it was of even more modest
importance.126
Taxes could be divided into two categories, direct and indirect.
During the 13th century, indirect taxes were still less significant than
direct taxes. Fourteenth-century Italian cities saw the former gaining
in importance. Direct tax was abandoned in Venice at the middle of
the 13th century only to be revived in 1439.127 Indirect taxes weighed
heavily upon consumption, especially upon wine and other commodi-
ties of prime necessity, on goods in transit, on contracts, dowries, wills
and, in the large commercial cities, on import and export trade. Before
1370, France already had such a tax, the aides (general tax on internal
122
Goldsmith (1987).
123
Ardant (1975), pp. 182 ff.
124
Luzzatto (1948), pp. 264 ff.
125
Miller (1963).
126
Coleman (1977), pp. 43 ff.
127
Luzzatto (1963).
public expense 337
sales). In England the exportation of raw wool made up one of the

most sizeable sources of income for the Crown. In Florence, in the
first half of the 14th century, the levy on doors constituted the most
important source of indirect taxation. Taxation on wine, contracts, fines,
butchering and salt was also significant.128 Indirect taxation could weigh
heavily on both individuals and on possessions and commodities. At
least initially, taxation was not collected on an annual basis, but several
times a year and sometimes not for several years, depending on their
necessity. This, for example, was the case of the personal tax imposed
in England in 1377, 1379 and 1381.129 Only with the passing of time
was its collection formalised, making it an annual levy. It appeared in
Italy under the name of libra.130 For the greater part direct taxation bore
heavily on real estate. This came about because, in the past as today, it
was difficult to control movable ownership.
Since public expenditure was, and still is, extremely erratic, above
all in times of war, and considering that direct and indirect taxation
only reached the state funds very slowly, it was frequently necessary to
deal with this problem in a different way. The most rapid method was
public debt, which came into use from the 13th century onwards.131
In times of need, in order to meet with the requirements of the state,
citizens could be either called upon to, or forced into giving up their
assets. Loans could therefore be divided into two categories, spontane-
ous and compulsory. The latter were very similar to direct taxation, the
only difference being that they had, at least in theory, to be refunded.
These loans received guaranteed interest from capital assets earned
through state revenue. In many cases interest payment for the public
debt obliged the government to either take on more debts or increase
direct and indirect taxation. Credits for these loans soon became freely
negotiable. The various debts acquired over the ages by the state were
in time consolidated into one financial body, which in Italy frequently
became known as “Monte”. In Genoa spontaneous loans were known
as “compere”, since the collection of certain taxes was entrusted to the
creditors. In 1407 the creditors of the State of Genoa united, forming
the “Casa di San Giorgio”, which in turn formed a sort of state within
the state, having at its disposal all the sources of capital assets of the
128
De La Roncière (1968).
129
Miller (1963).
130
Fiumi (1957).
131
Piola Caselli (1997), pp. 215 ff.
public sector. In Spain the word “juros” indicated the annuity bonds
emitted by the government which yielded yearly interest.
Another source of income was that of the monopolies. In this case the
monopoly was the legal body with which the state reserved the rights
of production and sale of certain goods or services, forbidding such
activity by third parties. In some cases it was difficult to distinguish the
monopoly from a form of indirect taxation. This was the case with the
monopoly on the sale of salt; since all citizens were obliged to buy a
specific amount of salt. Already existent in France at the end of the 14th
century, the tallage (gabelle) was the proceed from the monopoly on
the salt trade on behalf of the Crown. In some cases the salt monopoly
was of considerable importance. In Venice, at the middle of the 15th
century, the total revenue from taxation was 667,250 ducats, of which
165,000 ducats came from the Salt Office.132 Other important monopo-
lies for the public revenues of early modern European states were those
of pepper in Portugal, silver in Spain, copper in Sweden and alum in
the Papal State.
3.4. Revenue: the early Modern Age

In the Mediterranean area, at the end of the 16th century, the total
annual budget of the states amounted to 48 million gold ducats.133 The
annual balance in Castile was 9 million, that of France 5 million, that
of Venice and its empire 3.9 million and that of the Turkish Empire 6
million. As the overall population of the Mediterranean countries was
approximately 60 million, each inhabitant contributed less than one gold
ducat to the public finance every year. However to this must be added
taxation on behalf of local authorities and above all by feudal lords and
the Church. Although this was lower by far than public imposition, it
added to the burden of taxation on the population.
From the 16th century onwards, the nature of the financial system
which had developed during the late Middle Ages did not change.134
However, what did change considerably was the volume of taxes col-
lected from various states. This increase was partly the effect of the
reduction and sometimes the total disappearance of the taxes collected
by the feudal lords, although generally it was the result of growing taxa-
132
Luzzatto (1948), p. 266.
133
Braudel (1966), I, P. II, Chap. 1.
134
Some general aspects of the problem are illustrated in Parker (1974).
public expense 339
tion. On average, taxation never absorbed a quota of national revenue

equal to that of the modern day. Nevertheless in some regions during
certain periods it did constitute a hefty and sometimes excessive burden
on the population. In general it can be said that the brunt of these taxes
was borne by the lower social classes, both urban and rural, whilst the
nobles and the Church enjoyed partial or total exemption.
There are various reasons for the rise in taxation, which was par-
ticularly evident during the early Modern Age. The main reason was
the expansion in the functions of states, in an epoch when they were
consolidating their foundations. Taxation rises covered above all
expenditure for defence and the organisation of armies that put a
great strain on public finances, as did to a lesser extent the growth of
bureaucracy and of court expenses.
In France, taxation was founded on indirect taxes such as the gabelles
and the aides (on wine, liqueurs, candles, tobacco, and soap) and on
direct tax: the taille, which bore heavily on properties. In the North of
the Kingdom nobles and the clergy were exempt. The taille was higher
in the pays d’election, where the Crown collected the tax directly, rather
than in the pays d’état, where it was decided upon and collected by pro-
vincial assemblies. During the 17th century, the growth of these taxes
was considerable and in 1600–04 they amounted to some 20 million
livres per year; by 1660–80 they had reached 100 million; at the end
of the century 200 million.135 By the middle of the century annual tax
collection was equal to 700 tons of silver, whilst 50 years previously it
had been half that amount.136 If the tax burden is calculated in days of
work necessary to pay the taxes, it tripled in the hundred years follow-
ing 1580. In real terms by 1683 taxes were five times higher than they
had been in 1515. In 17th-century northern France, once an average
farming family had paid the state taxes, a tithe to the Church, taxes to
the lord in goods (champart) and subtracted grain to be sown, only half
of the cereal harvest remained.137 An effect of this increasing taxation
was the worsening of living conditions amongst the lower classes and
a widening of social distances (which, as we know, were also growing
for other reasons). All this contributed to the social rebellions which
exploded in several areas of France during the 17th century: 1636
135
Kriedte (1980), pp. 92–3.
136
Lis-Soly (1979).
137
Goubert (1956).
Nouveaux croquants (South-West); 1639 Nu-pieds (Normandy); 1658

Sabotiers (Sologne); 1662 Lustrcrus (Boulonnais); 1675 Bonnets Rouges
(Brittany). Opposition towards the royal taxation was one of the recur-
ring reasons for the revolts. Since tax increase reduced the solvency of
the peasants towards the landlords, they frequently incited the peasants
to rise against the royal tax collectors.138
In Spain, around the middle of the 17th century, total output was
180 million ducats. Tax collection was equal to 20 million ducats, thus
representing 11 percent, which was an extremely high figure for this
period.139 According to Gregory King, at the end of the 17th century,
the European countries in which per capita taxation was highest were
Holland, France and England.140 It has been suggested that between 1520
and 1670 tax collection throughout Europe tripled in real terms.141 It is
also thought that economic difficulties and the so-called “17th century
crisis” were partially caused by increases in taxation.142
3.5. Expenditure
Before the recent growth of what is defined by some as the social state,
or by others as the welfare state, two were the main items of public
expenditure: 1. war and defence; 2. court and bureaucracy.
3.6. War and defence

The early modern European state is not only an agent of unification
but also a system of power.143 The concept that the state should also
be responsible for education, public health and infrastructures slowly
began to take shape. Military expenditure absorbed the largest share
of public revenue reaching exceptionally high levels in wartime. “After
all, taxation was the chief means by which the builders of states from
the 16th century onwards supported their expanding armies, which
were in turn their principal instrument in establishing control of their
frontiers . . . Conversely in those first centuries, military requirements
138
Amongst a wide variety of studies devoted to to social unrest in France see
Lublinskaya (1968).
139
Ortiz (1960), pp. 180–5.
140
Minchinton (1973), p. 67.
141
Rabb (1975), p. 61.
142
Steensgaard (1978).
143
See especially the still important work by Heckscher (1931).
public expense 341
were the main incentive for the imposing of new taxes and regulation
of the old ones”.144
In those times not only did expenditure for war consume all the state
revenue, but frequently it caused overspending and it was therefore
necessary to borrow money. As a consequence, public deficit became
a burden over a long period of time. In the late Medieval and early
Modern Ages expenditure for war tended to rise continually, and
dragged taxation and public deficit in its wake. In feudal times this
expense had been relatively low because in periods of need the male
inhabitants took up arms, becoming occasional soldiers taking part
in military action. The engagement was rarely protracted for more
than two or three weeks. The situation was not much different with
the town militia underpinning the power of the communes in the late
Middle Ages. In this case, the citizens also participated directly in the
defence of the town. It is only from the 13th century onwards that a
transformation took place. The Italian towns, and states forming north
of the Alps, began to employ specialised soldiers, with greater military
expertise than citizens. The mercenary militia dominated the battlefields
throughout Europe until the end of the 16th century and in some cases
beyond. Warfare was becoming more complex and therefore required
expertise and greater commitment.
The military were also much more numerous than previously. During
the early Modern Age, the numbers of men employed by the army and
navy increased continually. Whereas before the 17th century it was rare
that more than 30,000 men were engaged in a battle, in the second
half of the 17th century in peace time the French army was made up
of 150,000 men and in times of war, of some 400,000 men (more than
five percent of the male population between the ages of 16 and 40).145
In England until the mid 16th century, the army consisted of various
bands of men, each led by a nobleman, according to the feudal model.
It was only after 1558 that the Crown undertook to maintain an army
and, from then on, military expenditure increased incessantly. In the
18th century it accounted for 30–40 percent of government spend-
ing in times of peace; a figure which rose to 60–80 percent in times
of war.146 In the 18th century, the Swedish army was constituted of
144
Tilly (1975), p. 23.
145
De Vries (1976), p. 204.
146
O’ Brien (1988), p. 2.
110,000 men and in Prussia the stable army of the first half of the
17th century comprised 29,000 soldiers, increasing to 83,000 by 1739.
The fleets must also be taken into consideration. In England, the navy
counted some 4,000 men in the time of Charles I (1625–49) and this
figure rose to 16,000 by 1660. The navy sported 1,045 cannons in 1661
and 12,000 in 1677. Between 1714 and 1763 the tonnage of the British
Navy doubled. Under Colbert the French fleet increased. In 1661 it
was made up of 30 vessels, whereas in 1683 it had 174, with a further
68 under construction.
Parallel to the building of national armies there was a decisive change
in the technology of warfare, which implied an important change in state
expenditure. Once swords, arrows and lances had been adequate. With
the discovery of gunpowder, even if blades did not disappear, the use
of cannons, guns and bombs increased. This tendency was accentuated
over the years by the military competition between the states. Apart
from investment in weaponry, an army requires continual funds for its
maintenance: from expenditure for food to footwear and uniforms, the
latter coming into common use between 1660 and 1700. During long
periods of military action, such as the Thirty Years War, the govern-
ment incurred a notable rise in military expenditure. In this period a
kind of “military revolution” took place.147
In the case of some pre-modern civilizations military expendi-
ture has been revealed to account for one to two thirds of the state
budget.148 It is presumed that during the 15th century expenditure for
military purposes absorbed something between 5 and 15 percent of
national income.149 In 16th-century Spain the cost of war rose from
2 million ducats per year in the first half of the century to 8 million
in the 1570s and 13 million in the 1580s.150 Subsequently the expendi-
ture for defence, as a ratio to income, remained more or less the same
throughout Europe.
3.7. Court and bureaucracy

Increase in military expenditure is the most obvious aspect of the
constitution and consolidation process undergone by the various
147
Roberts (1967), pp. 202–4.
148
Goldsmith (1987), p. 249.
149
150
Mc Neil (1982), Chap. 3.
public expense 343
states, but there were other items in the list of expenses. The forma-
tion of stronger and larger central governments generated an increase
in expenses for the court. The court was an extensive community of
aristocrats and officers formed around the monarch and his family
and these indulged in costly customs. Moreover, the passage of power
into the hands of a central government and the demotion of existing,
secondary powers which had previously detained territorial authority
necessarily required a bureaucratic system stemming from the central
government to articulate and enforce this central power. Between the
beginning of the 16th century and the end of the 17th, the number of
civil servants increased to enforce the law, collect taxes and to control
the economy. State formation meant the proliferation and specialisa-
tion of new tasks.151
The cost was, at times, so high as to result in a sale of offices; a prac-
tice widely used throughout Europe in the 17th century, especially in
France. Greater contact with foreign countries required a wider diplo-
matic network, necessitating representatives to live abroad, either on a
temporary or a permanent basis. It can be presumed that the doubling
of the population between 1520 and 1670 was accompanied by a four-
fold increase in bureaucracy.152 It would possibly be an exaggeration to
imply that this process generated a “colossal bureaucratic apparatus, a
huge central administrative structure managed by ever more numerous
“courtesans” and “officials”.153 Despite the increase in the functions of
the European states, their structure remained somewhat inconsistent
when compared both to that of contemporary states and many previous
empires. More plausible is the idea that the consolidation itself of these
states ended up by creating even greater difficulties, as the changes took
place during a period of economic difficulty, as was the case between
the mid 16th and the end of the 17th century. The expenditure for the
new state system and for the extravagance of the court “could only be
sustained if society itself developed both economically and demogra-
phically”.154 Unfortunately this did not occur over that lengthy period
of time.
151
Oestreich (1969a), examines the process with reference to Germany.
152
Rabb (1975), p. 61.
153
Trevor Roper (1959).
154
Trevor Roper (1959).
3.8. The states and their economies

A negative vision of the role played in economic life by the national
and regional states of the early Modern Age has long prevailed. This
was initially diffused by the economists of the second half of the 18th
century. The mercantilist state was, in their opinion, an impediment
to the economy rather than a sustaining and stimulating element.
Governments could only promote the wealth of their people by limiting
the functions of the central power. Only recently has this perspective
changed. More numerous functions of importance to development
have been attributed to the pre-modern state. It is the opinion of
some historians that the system of national and regional states which
prevailed on the continent during the centuries of the Modern Age
contributed to economic growth and, together with technology, resulted
in other civilizations being overtaken in terms of wealth. At this point,
certain aspects of the influence of the state on the economy must be
examined.
Firstly taxation and war expenses. What, on closer scrutiny, did the
birth of the state actually imply in late medieval times and the early
Modern Age? It meant, principally, that the purchasing power of the
population was reduced because of continually increasing fiscal pressure;
secondly, state income from taxes was employed for the purchase of
cannons, gunpowder, guns, uniforms and fortifications. Other aspects of
public expenditure were of infinitely lesser importance. As is always the
case, two opposing positions emerged on this matter. In 1911, Werner
Sombart, in his work on war and capitalism, maintained, that from
the beginning of the 16th century it was exactly this demand created
by war that pushed states into spending. It stimulated the creation of
mining companies, steelworks and several new economic activities,
and, finally, the formation of a capitalist economy. Other experts main-
tain, to the contrary, that war during the 15th and 16th centuries was
actually responsible for the destruction of material goods, rather than
the creation of wealth. Such being the case, England, which witnessed
the greatest progress in the Modern Age, was in fact the country least
involved in warfare.155
The problem is not easily solvable as there are many facets which
vary according to place and era. A certainty is, however, that the crea-
155
Nef (1954), Chap. 1.
public expense 345
tion of states and the increase in military expenditure provoked a shift

(not a particularly strong one) in the structure of demand, with two
main effects:
1. since taxes are paid in currency, their increase results in a diffusion

of the monetary economy and the contact with the market (more
must be sold in order to pay the taxes and this situation is possible
only by increasing production or reducing self-consumption): market
forces developed in the economy;
2. demand for consumer and durable goods diminished or stagnated,
whereas it increased in the sectors involved in the production of
arms (above all mining and metallurgy) and maintaining supplies
for the military. It has been calculated that the fiscal demand in
France during the first half of the 17th century corresponded to 10
million hectolitres of grain, the exact amount necessary to feed 15
percent of the population of the entire Kingdom.156
Thus, in the early Modern Age, public demand stimulated the weapon
and uniform industries. This situation came about at the expense of
other capital goods. Whereas the latter could have been employed to
increase wealth, the former remain unutilised (when there are no wars)
and serve only to destroy wealth. It is not easy to discern which way
the balance between the positive and the negative effects actually went.
It could have been in favour of the state, in situations where public
demand stimulated employment of previously unexploited resources
(labour, capital, land) to create employment, income and growth. It
could, on the other hand, have fallen in the opposite direction when
government demand subtracted resources from other more productive
purposes (investments in agriculture and commerce, employment in
the more efficient sectors).
Agreement is more easily reached on other aspects of state functions
during the early Modern Age. Probably the European political structure,
made up of many rival states, rather than one large empire, favoured
both economic and military competition.157 Interference in economic
affairs on behalf of the state was probably less constraining. Furthermore
in order to surpass the neighbouring states, each state attempted to
156
Lis-Soly (1979).
157
Jones (1981), Chap. 6.
promote business by attracting foreign merchants and industries and

by increasing exportation and decreasing importation. Some income
was allocated to the formation of capital assets useful for society, such
as ports, roads, bridges and ships which all favoured improvement in
communications.158 In France, the state initially controlled the nodal
points for the circulation of goods, that is the markets and fairs; but later
its sphere of economic action spread to the monetary system, the postal
system which was the creation of the state, and the road network.159
Beside this development it must not be forgotten that the function of
the state, although less evident, was just as important particularly in the
creation of a more orderly institutional framework which made trade
safer and ensured protection for property. The security of ownership
and thus the certainty that material benefits from a specific activity
would be of advantage to those who were engaged in such activities
was evidently a powerful stimulus to become involved in the economy.
States such as England and Holland had from the beginning of the
17th century greater success in the safeguarding of property, thereby
experiencing a higher growth rate than others.160
4. Conclusion
Before modern growth, private consumption made up an important

part of aggregate demand. Since per capita income was about 15–20
times lower than that of today in developed countries, this was, above
all, utilised to satisfy basic needs. These needs made up over 85 percent
of total expenditure, while public expenditure accounted for approxi-
mately 5–8 percent. Thus there remained a quota of around 5 to 10
percent available for investment. As a significant part of this percentage
was taken up by depreciation, by circulating capital—seeds and raw
materials—and by building, little remained for tools and new systems
of production. The growth of capital which was effectively productive
was frequently lower than that of demographic growth (Table 2).161
158
Rostow (1975), pp. 46 ff.
159
160
It is the opinion of North-Thomas (1973) and (1970).
161
In the table, public expenditure only refers to the expense of consumption and
neither to that of investment, which is included under the voice “investment”, nor to
transfers. Total public expenditure was, in 2000, 43.4 percent of gross product.
conclusion 347
Table 2. The employment of the gross product in early Modern Europe and
the EU in 2000 (percentages).
Europe European
Early Modern Union 2000
Consumption 85–90 58,1
Investment 5–10 20,8
Public expenditure 5 21,1
Another difference is apparent from a comparison between the demand

for goods for private consumption in the past and in the present.
Nowadays, in developed countries, food consumption absorbs approxi-
mately 30 percent of income, thereby signifying that other expenditure
amounts to approximately 70 percent, including durables. In early
Modern Europe the situation was the exact opposite: 70 percent of
income went towards nutrition, whilst 30 percent covered all other
needs. It is important to consider the part of the family budget set aside
for industrial goods. In an economy in which demand for investment
products is limited, this demand alone provides an impulse towards
faster technological progress. In pre-modern societies, of the 30 per-
cent which was not destined to food purchase, at least 10 percent was
absorbed by heating, rent and taxes, leaving a residue of 20 percent. At
least 10 percent of this was spent on objects from local artisans; a sector
in which innovation was very modest. Of the remaining 10 percent at
least half was spent by the wealthy on luxury products such as crys-
tal, precious cloth, and furniture etc. These were produced by skilled
craftsmen and made up a sector characterised by the high intensity
of qualified labour and the use of precious raw materials and which
produced valuable goods destined to a limited market. Therefore, it
is not in this sector that the development of industrial machines and
techniques came about. Even if public demand for industrial goods and
investment assets is added to private demand, industrial development
was only stimulated to a very small degree by the “mass demand” of
low priced goods intended for the majority of the population.
CHAPTER VIII
PREMODERN ECONOMIES
Previous chapters have examined the developments of agriculture, trade

and industry as well as the structure of demand in the pre-modern
European economy. Special attention has been paid to technical con-
straints, particularly those deriving from knowledge in the field of
exploitation of energy sources.
Three specific themes shall now be briefly re-examined summarising
what has been previously shown:
1. essential differences between pre-modern agricultural economies

and the modern economy;
2. the functioning of the pre-modern agricultural economy;
3. long-term economic evolution during the millennium prior to the
19th century.
While in previous chapters the complexity of the European pre-modern

economy has been emphasised, here a simplified view will be presented
in order to highlight the specific interdependence of the variables in a
complete model.
1. Past and present economies
To get a sense of the specific features of past agrarian economies we

will contrast them with those of present advanced economies.1
1.1. Levels in time

Productive capacity is the essential difference between past and pres-
ent economies. Today, the worldwide annual production of goods and
services is approximately 40–60 times higher than that of the late 18th
1
On the difference between present and past economies see the notes by Lucas
(2002) and especially the Introduction.
350 chapter viii – pre-modern economies
century. As we have seen, increase on a per capita basis has been six-
fold.2 Today, part of humanity can afford not merely the bare essentials
for subsistence, but also the inessential, whereas, in the past, production
techniques ensured mankind little more than survival. We have seen
how this difference in the productive capacity depended essentially
on the technical possibility of performing useful work through the
exploitation of energy carriers; this today is high, while in the past it
was modest.
The productive capacity of past agricultural societies varied within
a narrow range of values between mere subsistence and a maximum
not higher than two to three times the necessary requirements for
survival.
1.2. Stability and instability

When we focus on a specific area, the main feature of a pre-modern
agrarian economy is long-term equilibrium, or stability, of gross output.
This equilibrium was maintained by a fall in per capita output when-
ever population rose and an increase when population diminished. The
main differences between pre-modern and modern economies can be
summarised by the two following features:
– in pre-modern economies gross output is stable in the long term,

but unstable in the short, due to frequent famines and epidemics;
– in modern economies product is unstable in the long term (charac-
terised as it is by strong growth), but usually stable in the short.
However, we saw that, on the European scale, gross ouput underwent

remarkable growth, through extensive processes.
1.3. Divergence among regions

Today, in the economies at the top of the world hierarchy, per capita
output is as much as 70 times higher than in those at the bottom. Such
a strong difference could not have existed in the past as a consequence
of the narrow range of per capita output variation. In one region people
could enjoy an average income not more than two to three times
higher than in another. It is difficult to specify if, in 1800, the average
2
In Chap. VI.
past and present economies 351
European was better off than the average inhabitant of China. What we
know for sure is that a remarkable economic disparity could not have
existed. Recent research has shown how, at the beginning of the 19th
century, inequality among countries was modest, and how it increased
simultaneously with modern growth.3
1.4. Structural change

As Adam Smith stated, the capacity to consume food is limited by the
capacity of everybody’s stomach. The implication is that agricultural
consumption is inelastic to income changes. This is the reason why the
increase in per capita income does not result in a proportional rise in
food demand. The consequence has been a deep structural change. In
relative terms, the growing economies began to turn increasingly away
from agricultural goods, to the production of industrial commodities
and services. In the second half of the 19th century about 50 percent
of the labour force was still employed in agriculture, whereas today, in
modern advanced economies, this figure is less than 5 percent. In past
economies, given the overall stability of agricultural output per capita,
drastic changes in the structure of the economy did not occur, although
small variations were not unknown. For long periods of time agriculture
on the one hand, and industry and services on the other maintained
both their relative importance and their main characteristics.
1.5. Personal distribution

Past societies were not more unequal than ours. The wealthiest 10 per-
cent of the population had at its disposal about 30–50 percent of the
annual income; more or less as it is today. Nevertheless a radical change
has taken place in the nature of inequality. Today the remaining 90
percent of the population shares the relative equality of well-being (at
least in advanced European economies), whilst yesterday it was mainly
the equality of poverty that was shared. Although several social groups
existed yesterday as they do today, following L. Stone we could simplify
past social structure as divided into two groups:4 the wealthy, usually
important landowners, and the poor, whose income came primarily
3
See especially Milanovic (2005), Figures at p. 141, and Bourguignon, Morrisson
(2002).
4
Stone (1965), Chap. 2.
from their work. As we will see, this simplification will be useful in the
elaboration of our model.
1.6. Capital formation

In past societies, possibilities of investment existed. Inequality allowed
the formation of savings by few very rich, and thus capital formation
of 10 percent was not impossible.5 However, the decline of wages for
long periods of time suggests that capital formation was slower than
the rise in population. It is possible to solve this contradiction between
the potential of capital formation and actual productive investment by
making reference to:
1. the fast depreciation of fixed capital in past economies and the

necessity of deploying a large percentage of savings to meet this
depreciation;
2. the modest or nonexistent productivity of many investments, pri-
marily buildings and personal services. Productive capital formation
was zero or almost zero for long periods of time.
1.7. Market
Today, the coordination of economic life is based on markets and prices.
These work as “an invisible hand”, as Smith stated, able to regulate the
interdependence of men and their economic activities. The market is
founded on mobility of goods and production factors which have devel-
oped over the past two centuries, following the drastic reduction in the
cost of transport, owing to the introduction of the railway, steamships
and other forms of communication. Both space and time have been
remodelled. The spread of market mechanisms was based on these
important technical transformations. It is apparent that difficulties in
transport and in the circulation of people, capital and goods represent
a substantial impediment to market expansion. Historians have sug-
gested the existence of “commercial revolutions” in several different
periods, rises in monetary exchange, declines in transaction costs and
improvements, favourable to exchange, in the institutions. We have
seen how these changes in the rules of the market and institutions
actually encouraged development. Contrary to this, basic transportation
5
In Chap. VII, par. 2.
a model of an agrarian economy 353
techniques remained stationary and transport costs continued to be

high, especially in relation to many cheap, heavy goods. The important
exception was transportation by sea.
2. A model of an agrarian economy
2.1. Decreasing returns

Modern growth is believed by some to have modified the very essence of
the economy. The accumulation of knowledge and its diffusion, invest-
ment in research and the formation of human capital are believed to
represent the base for never-ending productivity increases. According
to this view, present day economic growth is boosted by past economic
growth in this apparently cumulative process: where greater investment
is made in the field of knowledge, growth will be higher and, conse-
quently, greater investment will be made in the field of knowledge and
research where per capita output is higher. This opinion is based on the
assumption that increasing rather than decreasing marginal productiv-
ity of labour characterizes modern economy, and the return of that
intangible capital known as knowledge is the increase in productivity.6
According to this approach, decreasing returns do not exist or will not
exist in the future; if do they exist, they are more than compensated
by increasing technical knowledge. It has been said that “more people
produce more ideas, which in turn makes additional population growth
possible”.7
The economy examined in this book is, on the contrary, an economy
where decreasing returns existed and prevailed over the increasing
returns of knowledge and human interaction. The interplay of the
contradictory forces of increasing and decreasing returns; the forces of
growth and the forces of decline have been considered. The phase that
has been analysed in this work is the last one of an agrarian economy
whose possibilities of growth consisted primarily in extensive progress.
The annual rate of formation of new capital—excluding the replace-
ment of depreciating capital—was lower than the rate of increase of
the population, and, since the pace of technological change was slow
6
Romer (1986), p. 1003 and (1990).
7
Ch. I. Jones (2001).
in agriculture, which represented the main economic sector, the curve

of total output increased less and less.
2.2. The production function

A synthesis of the inner mechanisms of past agricultural economies can
help summarise the details of the preceding chapters in order to present
a general overview.8 The aim is the analysis of the interdependence of the
following phenomena: population, natural resources, capital, technique
and human capital, output, incomes and structural change.
Neo-classical models of growth take into particular consideration
capital formation in relation to the exogenously assumed rate of
population growth.9 However, when used for pre-modern traditional
economies, they need some adapting.10 In these economies, the central
variable was not capital formation, but the demographic growth rate.
For simplicity’s sake, we can assume that the system is composed of just
one sector producing one commodity (cereals, for instance), and that
output, consumption, and capital are expressed in joules (or calories
if preferred). This is the only input for biological engines such as men
and working animals. By means of the metabolism of this input, matter
is modified (in its form or location) in order to satisfy human needs
or wishes. In addition, this output can be used as seed. Both labour
(L) and capital (K) are converters of this input into useful energy. The
introduction of money would make the model more realistic but, at the
same time, more complicated. Such simplified assumptions are quite
common in the literature.11 Later on a non-agricultural sector will be
considered and an attempt made to represent a two-sector model.
The starting point is the production function:
Y = AF (K , L) (1)
where the product (Y ) is a function of labour (L) and capital (K). K
encompasses land and other natural resources and so not only includes
livestock, seed, buildings and tools, but also arable land and the forests
exploited by human beings. Given that natural usable resources, such
8
The following model has already been used in Capasso, Malanima (forthcoming)
with reference to Italy.
9
On neoclassical growth models now see the overview by Daniele (2008).
10
This possibility of adapting growth models to pre-modern economies was already
clear to Solow (1970), Chap. 2.
11
See, for instance, Solow (1994), pp. 17 and ff.
as land, cannot change much and given that these are jointly employed
with labour, only relatively small changes of capital are affordable with
relatively small amounts of energy. Sizeable changes are unafford-
able in terms of energy outlay. For this reason, the stock of capital is
considered to be only slightly modifiable. In fact, during the period
under consideration, capital tended to remain constant at a long-term
equilibrium value.
We may, however, not exclude the possibility that K can change
exogenously, both in the short and long term, due to external factors
such as climatic changes. Indeed, the opinion held by the classical
economists that natural resources are invariable is actually impossible
to support, given the influence of climatic changes. Particularly harsh
temperatures, for example, certainly reduces land fertility, that is the
efficiency of this main energy converter. Long-term climatic changes
can reduce or widen the extension of arable land, especially in hilly and
mountainous territories. In fact, colder weather forces cultivation to be
carried out below heights which would otherwise supply usable land.
The state of technology is captured in the parameter A. This incorpo-
rates the technical content of tools, as well as the stock of knowledge,
expertise and skills employed in the process of energy conversion
(production): that is, all those factors which are able to increase the
efficiency of an energy converter (the ratio of the output of useful
energy compared to the total energy input). Borrowing more recent
terminology, one would call this factor “human capital”. This exper-
tise is essentially uniform among workers and does not change greatly
over the period we are considering (at least in the agricultural sector
on which we now focus).12
2.3. The intensive production function

Following a standard practice in economics, we will assume specific
features for this production function (1):
1. constant returns to scale in its two arguments K and L: doubling

the quantities of K and L, with A held fixed (that is technique and
human capital), doubles the amount produced;
12
We know that in non-agricultural sectors the situation is different. Non-agricultural
sectors will be introduced later on in this Chap.
2. the marginal product of both factors, K and L, is positive, but decreas-

ing:13 marginal returns to L and K are thus diminishing.
These features of the production function, among others, offer the clear
advantage of permitting us to express variables in intensive form. In
fact, equation (1) can be rewritten as:
Y ⎛L⎞
= AF ⎜ ⎟ (2)
K ⎝K ⎠
where Y/K is the amount of output per unit of capital and L/K the
amount of labour per unit of agricultural capital. This intensive form
of the production function is similar to the one employed primarily
by Solow (1956 and 1970). Solow’s model assumes population to be
an independent variable characterised by a constant rate of growth. In
our model, following the classical tradition, population is not assumed
as rising at a constant rate, but depends on consumption and output.14
While in Solow’s model, the production function is divided by L, in
order to build the intensive form, and then the dependent variable is
Y/L, here it is divided by K.
A first simplified version of the intensive production function is
presented in Figure 1. Later, new variables will be considered.
The symbols indicate:
Y/K output in joules (Y ) per unit of capital (K ), also including agri-
cultural land in capital;
L/K the ratio of labour force to capital (the labour force is here
assumed to be equal to the same share of the total population).
Since I assume the possibility of small changes in K to be lower than
the rate of growth of population, then the L/K ratio is increasing. It
diminishes only because of sudden changes in population and avail-
ability of resources (because of climatic changes).
2.4. Labour productivity

The graph represents the increase of output as soon as the workforce
increases. Whilst moving from the intersection of the axes to the right,
the ratio L/K rises (more labourers for any unit of K ), simultaneously,
output per unit of K, that is Y/K, increases, but less than proportionally,
13
In short, FK > 0, FL > 0, FKK < 0, FLL < 0.
14
For the classical model see Samuelson (1978).
Y_
K
E3
E2
K
Y_ = f L_
K
E1
0 L_
K
Fig. 1. Production function.
as the curve, concave towards the horizontal axis, shows. The concav-
ity is the consequence of the diminishing returns to labour. If K rises,
as a consequence, for instance, of good climatic conditions, while L is
stable, the ratio L/K diminishes and we move towards the origin of the
axes, where output is lower. Favourable climatic conditions result in
increase of K, and then represent true “capital formation”. This curve
shows the total energy produced per unit of capital available in the
system. Hence, by using a metaphor, we can define this energy as the
output of the “hands” of the economy.
The graph also represents the changes in the marginal productivity of
labour (MPL). MPL is the slope of the curve of Y/K. It declines whenever
L/K increases, since K per worker falls and, as a consequence, the output
of a new labourer decreases. It can be seen that the slope of the tangent
in E1 is steeper than in E2 and in E2 it is steeper than in E3, where the
slope is nil. That means that in E1 the productivity of labour is higher
than in E2 and in E2 it is higher than in E3. On the contrary, the output
per capital (Y/K) is rising, although at a decreasing rate. Supposing that
capital is only made up of land, the productivity of land rises. This has
already been discussed, in Chapter III and VI: the increase of popula-
tion at a faster rate than capital results in declining capital per labourer
and declining productivity of labour, while land productivity rises.
A sudden increase in mortality, due for instance to epidemics, results in

a sudden fall of L and in a movement of L/K towards the origin, since
the result of the ratio is diminishing. The consequence is a diminution
of Y/K and, at the same time, a rise in labour productivity and then
labour incomes.15
2.5. Mouths and hands

The system has first of all to face the immediate needs of the population.
Hence, very simply, we can write the energy needed for mere survival
of existing population as:
βL (3)
where β is the per capita amount of energy (joules or calories per year)
required to keep population constant at L. Dividing the latter by K,
we obtain the minimum amount of energy that the system requires to
sustain itself in terms of capital in order to keep population stable:
L
β (4)
K
Since the energy requirement in joules is the same for all workers, the
needs of these are represented as a straight line in a diagram in which we
measure L/K on the horizontal axis (Figure 2). So output is represented
by the curve and needs by the line. Using a metaphor analogous to the
previous one, we could call these the “mouths” of the economy.
Whenever the economic system is able to produce (Y/K) more than
is required for simple reproduction (β L/K), population can grow. We
can, therefore, rewrite equation (3) in the following way:
β (L + ΔL) (5)
where L represents the population existing in the year t-1 and ΔL rep-
resents the increase in population in a specific year t (that is the net
increment of population from time t-1 to time t). Since in our model
population increase depends on the possibilities of consumption, and
since consumption is a function of ouput Y/K, the latter will ultimately
drive the dynamics of population and the economy. The economy is
driven by the relationship between the needs and the output of the
dY d 2Y dY d 2Y
15
All this means > 0 and 2
< 0 , while < 0 and <0.
dK dK dL dL2
Y
_
K
Y_
K
=f KL_
L
_
β K
0
L
_
K
Fig. 2. The intensive production function.
economy: the mouths and the hands. The system can only grow and
develop in terms of population (capital is constant) if there is sufficient
energy. In graphical terms, this implies that population can grow only if
the concave production function is above the straight line in Figure 2.
Vice versa, population will shrink and decrease when the straight
line is above the concave production function. The movement of this
simplified economy is not very different from that of the ecosystems,
whose growth depends on the difference between the net production
of vegetable matter (our hands) and maintenance (our mouths). Up to
the intersection of Y/K with βL/K, the system is growing and is in a
“young” or “blooming” state. When the point of intersection is reached,
the system is “mature” and a steady state or climax is reached in the
ecosystem.16
When referring back to economics, the implication of what has just
been said is that output is only utilised to cover consumption needs.
We know that in a real economy it is not so, but a part of output is
utilised as investment.
16
See especially Odum (1969).
2.6. Equilibrium
Following a standard assumption, it can be seen that in the neoclassi-
cal growth model output per unit of capital Y/K, can be divided into
two parts representing both a fixed percentage of aggregate output
i.e. consumption and capital formation. Indeed, we know that in a
pre-modern agricultural economy consumption represents about 90
percent of total output.
As a result of this empirical evidence, it is possible to assume that a
fixed fraction of output, c, represents consumption and is destined to
feed population. Hence:
β (L + ΔL) = cY (6)
This equation implies that a fixed fraction of output, cY, is employed
to provide the minimum level of energy in order to permit the survival
and in some cases the growth of the population, ΔL. This also implies
that the complement fraction of output, (1–c)Y, is employed in capital
formation (10 percent in our example). Although investment originates
particularly from the richer 10 percent of the society, peasant families
also invest (especially labour time and usually to replace the depreciat-
ing capital).
As already discussed, capital formation (1–c)Y/K, beyond the replace-
ment of the depreciating capital, is employed in non productive or low
productive investments. “Unproductive” refers to the fact that some
activities are not strictly connected to the process of production of agri-
cultural goods and do not result in the growth of the economic system
(as seen in Chapter VII). These include, for example, the construction
of buildings, palaces and churches, personal services, the financing of
wars and other activities such as works of art, none of which results
in the growth of the economic system. Indeed, as outlined above, this
economy only grows when agricultural productive factors, i.e. labour
and capital, increase. The fraction of agricultural output (energy) which
is not directly employed in sustaining labour is, in this sense, a waste
of energy for the economy and the system.
Population can expand or decline depending on the amount of
available resources. Expressing variables in terms of capital, we can
represent graphically the working of the economy in the following
way. When population is constant (long-term equilibrium), i.e. ΔL = 0,
the amount of output employed in agriculture is just sufficient to allow
the population to survive. If this is the case, the equation (6), can be
written as
L Y
β =c (7)
K K
Given the concavity of the production function Y/K, the fixed fraction
cY/K is also represented by a concave curve. The relationship between
this curve and the line of survival, βL/K, determines the general dynam-
ics of population and economy on the whole.
2.7. The dynamics of the economy

The working of the economy is the following (Figure 3). When labour
per unit of capital, L/K, is below the level that keeps population at its
survival level (equation (7)), the cY/K curve will be above the survival
line βL/K. This implies that consumption will be sufficient to sustain
the existing population and to allow demographic growth. In this
case the workers or “hands” are very productive and can adequately
sustain the living “mouths”. Population and labour will then increase, as
will the L/K ratio, until equilibrium in the equation (7) is re-established.
If the number of workers is too high, the opposite occurs.
What will determine the economy being outside the equilibrium
(L/K)* and cause population to increase or decrease? The production
Y
_
K
K
Y_ = f L_
K
E
c Y
_
K
L
_
β K
0
* L
_
KL_ K
Fig. 3. The production function: the general framework.
function depends on many factors, both endogenous and exogenous.

Shocks in the production function, for example in A (technology and
human knowledge) or in the given stock of capital K, will shift the
production function and determine a temporary surplus or deficit in
the amount of energy required to sustain the system. When this occurs,
the economy will move towards the long-term equilibrium as described
above. For example, particularly good weather conditions will generally
allow the productivity of land and rural capital to increase (hence K
rises). The L/K ratio will shift to the left and the cY/K function will be
higher than the level of subsistence. More resources will be available
and population will increase, at least temporarily.
2.8. A general framework

This simple model is able to depict many features of the pre-modern
economy, during the period analysed, such as the occurrence of epi-
demics, the thriving late medieval economy, or the general decline in
the early modern age.
One well known fact of pre-modern economies is indeed that wages
were often close to the survival rate. If this is the case, one can argue
that the equilibrium level of labour must be such that the wage rate,
that is the slope of the production function, Af I(L/K), equates the slope
of the survival line, βL/K. This can be clearly seen in Figure 3. In the
long run, the equilibrium level of labour per unit of capital, (L/K)*,
is such that the slope of the production function in E is β, that is the
slope of βL/K. We are implicitly assuming that the yield of labour per
unit of capital, i.e. the wage rate, is just enough to cover consumption
needs and thus sustain the population.17
We can also determine how the economy adjusts when it is outside
the equilibrium. For lower levels of labour per unit of capital, that
is for L/K<(L/K)*, the slope of the production function increases, as
does the wage rate. When this occurs more resources can be devoted
to increasing population, the L/K ratio will increase until long-term
equilibrium is reached. Of course the opposite will occur for higher-
than-equilibrium levels of L/K. An important feature of the model is
the convergence towards a steady state which occurs when cY/K =
βL/K. With long-term steady state equilibrium, the amount of output
17
Here I assume that consumption needs only originate from the working popula-
tion, however this is in reality not so. Landowners also consume. Their food consump-
tion is, however, a small—and here negligible- quota of overall consumption.
destined to consumption is just sufficient to cover the needs of a stable

population. Decreasing returns to factors of production (the concavity
of the production function) ensure convergence towards steady state
labour/capital levels (L/K)*.
2.9. The oscillations

Despite long-term stability, this agrarian system was, as Malthus wrote,
also characterised by continual short-term “oscillation between happi-
ness and misery”.18 Given the great annual fluctuations in agricultural
output, it may also be said that the production function and therefore
the f(.) function is not stable over time. This can indeed shift upwards
or downwards in periods of abundance and shortages in agriculture.
Correspondingly, the yield of labour and the amount of available prod-
uct to sustain the economy will increase or decrease, as will population
(although the adjustments of population throughout the rise in fertility
are not as rapid as those caused by the rise in mortality).
Although in this model population growth is endogenous and
depends on the difference between cY/K and βL/K, a fall in popula-
tion is only favoured by the rise of the L/K ratio. Epidemics are, in
fact, more probable whenever population density increases (as seen
in Chap. I). These are, however, not merely determined by the rising
ratio and it is important to remember that many do not depend on
nutritional stress, chance playing a vital role in their occurrence.19 We
can only say that the proximity of the L/K ratio to (L/K)* increases
the probability or enhances the spread of epidemic mortality. Both
the 14th and 17th centuries (when the density of population was high)
were ages of epidemics, whereas, despite rapid population growth, the
18th century was not.
We may therefore recapitulate saying that:
a. whenever the economy moves towards the right, capital per worker,
labour productivity and per capita GDP diminish, while the L/K
ratio rises;
b. whenever the system moves to the left, capital per worker, labour
productivity and per capita GDP increase. The L/K ratio diminishes
either as a consequence of the decline in L or the increase in K.
18
Malthus (1798), Chap. 1.
19
As seen in Chap. 1.
Y
_
K
K
Y_ = f L_
K
c Y
_
K
L
_
β K
0
KL_ 1 *
KL_
L
_
K
Fig. 4. The production function: the late Middle Ages.
We can now turn to analysing some well-known historical patterns

which have characterised the period we are studying.
2.10. The late Middle Ages

After the epidemics of the 14th and early 15th centuries, the economy
was flourishing, at least in per capita terms (Figure 4).
A particularly high level of output per unit of labour allowed popu-
lation growth, as well as providing the resources which facilitated an
increase in both art production and the construction of buildings.
This occurred because the population per unit of available capital was
particularly low. In other terms, there was an abundance of capital
and, hence, both the productivity of labour and per capita output were
higher. Following the theoretical framework just developed, this can
be described as a situation in which the long-term equilibrium has not
been reached, L/K1<(L/K)*. If this is the case, labour productivity and
the slope of the production function (represented by the tangent to
the Y/K curve) is higher than the slope of the survival line. An excess
of resources can be devoted to population increase and to unproduc-
tive activities (for example art). Population per unit of capital grows
and the economy slowly moves towards the long-term equilibrium
in (L/K)*.
2.11. The early Modern Age

As the economy grows, the yield of labour decreases. Population in
Europe rose from a little less than 70 million people in 1400 to 107 in
1600, to 115 in 1700 and 189 in 1800, only reaching long-term equilib-
rium in the 17th and 18th centuries. At this stage, the yield of labour per
unit of capital was just sufficient to sustain a living for the population.
The relative stability of gross output entailed, in this case, a fall in per
capita income. Furthermore, the Little Ice Age resulted in a diminish-
ing K (which, we must remember, also includes natural resources). The
lower temperatures resulted in a decline in capital formation and an
increase in the L/K ratio. The L/K ratio also increased for this reason.
Given the level of capital, wages were at the subsistence level (with the
exception of some periods during the 17th century) and population
was striving to survive, let alone increase. In graphical terms it can be
argued that the labour/capital ratio was very close to, or coincided with,
the long-term value, L/K = (L/K)* (in the previous Figure 4).
We can also argue that, in some periods, the European economy
was even below this level; especially in the decades between 1790 and
1818. The consequence was that, in order to secure the subsistence
of the population (βL), substitution of the depreciating capital by the
peasant families (included in (1–c)Y/K, as previously seen) was lower
than that required to ensure the simple reproduction of the system.20
It was a period of ecological crisis.21
Things did not change, in spite of extensive agricultural progress sup-
ported by rising temperatures and the spread of the potato and maize,
between 1650 and 1820. Because of these changes, together with labour
intensification, the same workers (L) were able to produce more. This
permitted further increases in population and resulted in an upward
shift of the production function (Figure 5). The disappearance of the
plague reinforced this shift. The cAf(.) curve also shifted upwards and
20
Examples could be the over-exploitation of forests, decline in livestock, diminu-
tion of seed per hectare, neglect of the maintenance of farms.
21
See the concept of “ecological crisis” put forward some years ago by Pomeranz
(2000) in a global perspective for the same period.
Y
_
K
K
Y_ = f L_
K
c Y
_
K
L
_
β K
0
* L
_
KL_ K
Fig. 5. The production function: the 18th and early 19th centuries.
the equilibrium level of labour/capital ratio increased (in the direction

of the dotted curve). Labour intensification resulted in an upward shift
of the Y/K curve. The consequence was the increase of population and
a re-establishment of the equilibrium in (L/K)*, with the same wage
rate as before (represented now by the slope of the dotted curve of
output Y/K).
2.12. The start of economic modernisation

Only after 1820 did genuine Modern Growth emerge. As a conse-
quence of technical changes and of an increase in capital formation,
the displacement of the Y/K to the left definitively changed the shape
of the production function. Both rapid improvements in technology
and the higher capital formation upset the pre-modern equilibrium.
The consequence was a rise in both labour productivity and in GDP
per capita.
In our framework, technical change and scientific progress are exog-
enous (as seen especially in Chapter II), while human capital formation
is endogenous and is the result of human interchange, particularly in
the cities (as noticed in Chapter V). In those cases, in the L/K ratio, K is
distribution 367
rising and the result is movement towards the origin of the axes, where
labour productivity is higher. Greater numbers of town dwellers and
more contact with urban culture of the population as a whole meant
a rising exchange of ideas and practices based on learning-by-doing.
It was the background against which it became possible to capture
exogenous technical change and scientific advance.22
3. Distribution
3.1. Labour incomes and surplus

So far income distribution does not appear in the model. It can, how-
ever, be easily derived from previous production function.23 In our
one-sector model there are two social groups: the owners of land and
capital, and the workers. In past agrarian economies, since the main
productive resource was land, while the productive capital (tools, live-
stock and machines) played a marginal role, we can assume that the
productive factors were distributed between landowners and workers.
The previous production function permitted the distinction between
the quota of social income remunerating land and capital and the quota
remunerating labour.
In the upper panel of Figure 6 our production function is represented,
while in panel B the wage rate is represented, on the vertical axis, MPL,
and, on the horizontal axis, the ratio L/K, as in A.24 APL is the average
labour productivity, resulting from the ratio Y/K to L/K, and, then,
simplifying, Y/L. The average output of labour is always higher than
the marginal output of labour and (APL–MPL) corresponds to what we
might call surplus. In a one-sector agricultural economy this can be
identified with rent of land and interest of capital: i.e. the incomes of
the upper share of the simple two-class society. The line S is the level
of subsistence or the minimum consistent with survival. As long as
the downward sloping line of marginal labour productivity is higher
22
See the stress on urban progress and growth throughout human capital formation
in Lucas (1988). In an historical perspective see the important work by Mokyr (2002)
on the “knowledge economy”.
23
For the discussion of the topic of distribution in this part, Kaldor is still of great
interest (1956).
24
In B both MPL and S are respectively the derivatives of Y/K to L/K and, then,
simplifying dY , and the derivative of β L/K, which is simply a straight line.
dL
than S, wage is higher than survival. A part of the wage can sustain
population rise: new families form, the age of marriage diminishes.
Marginal product diminishes contemporaneously with the rise of L/K,
and intersects the subsistence line in C1; corresponding to E in section
A of the graph. Here the wage is merely sufficient to cover the basic
needs of the population. Note the downward inclined curve of the aver-
age product, APL, with a lesser slope compared to that of PML. Beyond
this point, workers, in order to survive, have to intensify their work
and displace both MPL and APL upward and the production function
in the direction of the dotted curve (in section A).
Y
_
K
Y_
K
=f KL_
E
c Y
_
A K
L
_
β K
0
L
_
K
MPL
APL
A B
E C
A B1
B
APL
C1
S
MPL
O
D F L
_
K
Fig. 6. Production function and distribution.
distribution 369
3.2. Subsistence and wage

In previous chapters it has been seen that wage cannot always be
assumed to be at the level of subsistence (S) as the classical economists
were inclined to think. In several periods it exceeded mere survival.
When this was so, workers could enjoy higher living standards, since
the level of their income included the section exceeding the survival
between the line S and the line EC. The marriage age could dimin-
ish and the population rise (as seen in Chapter I). Demographic rise
implied, however, a displacement towards the point C1, where wage is
equal to mere survival. Note how the rectangle between line S and line
A1B1 reaches its largest area exactly in correspondence with point E of
graph A. Here the income of landowners, together with the owners of
capital, is at its highest. The difference (APL–MPL) is, in fact, the highest
compatible with survival. If this difference shrinks and MPL becomes
lower than S there is no alternative for workers than not paying the rent,
or diminishing family numbers and then re-establishing the equilib-
rium in (L/K)*. We know that another possible outcome, when people
were pushed below the S line, was the decrease in stature, as happened
in the decades between 1760–1820, when the Europeans diminished
some 3–5 centimeters. Decline in stature can replace mortality in some
cases. Needless to say, it equally results in a decline of the population
volume. In this case, while the higher group of our simplified society
reaches its maximum income, the other 90 percent of the population
is equal in poverty.
When B1 shifts downward until the intersection of APL with S, one is,
in the production function, right on the intersection of Y/K with βL/K
in the upper part of the diagram. Here labour marginal productivity is
zero. In this case a possible outcome would be the total disappearance
of the working population and the landowners’ income at the S level,
which is at the level of mere subsistence. In that case surplus must be
devoted to consumption of the wealthy. No investment is possible.
Naturally it is only a hypothetical solution. We could hence describe
the portion of the rectangle representing the difference between the
rectangle of gross product and the rectangle of subsistence as the “space
of inequality”. When labour productivity is high, labour incomes are
high and not evenly distributed. The social composition is more com-
plex. Between land and capital owners and those crushed at the level
of subsistence there is space for social differentiation. When labour
income is the subsistence level, 90 percent of the population must be
equal. In this case the higher 10 percent owns 30–40 percent of total
income, the other 90 percent owning the other 60–70 percent.
4. A dualistic economy
4.1. Recent growth

Up to this point, the model, has been compressed into a single sector
in order to simplify the presentation and describe the equilibrium of a
traditional economy. A two-sector model is now necessary in order to
represent the passage of this economy from the traditional equilibrium
towards the dynamic equilibrium which has characterised modern
economy since about 1820.
From a technical point of view, as has been seen, agriculture was a
relatively stationary sector during the late medieval and early modern
age, whereas, the commercial and industrial sectors on the other hand
were considerably more dynamic. Development was taking place in the
cities which were the centres of industry and trade. Here the advantages
of communication and exchange resulted in innovations and further
opportunities for growth.25
The pre-modern European economy can be defined as a dualistic
system. Dualistic means that two different systems of organisation and
functioning co-existed within the same economy: one more sophisti-
cated and dynamic, the other traditional and relatively backward.26 As
we have seen, dualism characterizes European history throughout the
19th century until the era of industrialisation.
In the last two centuries, the growth of per capita output has been
accompanied by a rapid structural change, and urban-rural dualism
has disappeared in the developed economies of the Western world.
Productivity has risen both in agriculture, on the one hand, and industry
and services, on the other. The rising demand for labour in fast growing
urban sectors, the increasing productivity in these sectors, and hence
rising wages, has drawn workers from agriculture towards modern
industrial activities and services. Since the demand for agricultural
goods is inelastic to income, the modern increase in labour productivity
25
On the so-called economy of knowledge see Mokyr (2002).
26
The term “dualism” has been employed with this meaning by Fei–Ranis (1964)
and (1966). W. A. Lewis (1954) is still important on the matter.
a dualistic economy 371
in the primary sector has resulted in a relative decline in employment

in this same sector. Fewer workers were able to meet the demand of
food and raw materials of the whole population. During the 19th and
20th century, Europe experienced the migration of agricultural workers
from the countryside towards the cities, or from agriculture towards
the industry and services.
4.2. A two-sector model

Two sectors will be now considered, the agricultural-rural and the
industrial-urban, producing two different types of goods: grain in
agriculture and textiles in industry. The industrial sector is located in
the cities. The urban location depends on the economies (internal and
external) from cooperation and interrelation. While agriculture implies
dispersion, industry implies concentration. Thus structural change
means growth in urbanisation.
Production functions in agriculture and industry are different. In
agriculture, goods are produced using labour (La) and natural resources
(R), whereas in industry they are produced by means of labour (Li)
and capital (K). Here the differentiation between natural resources and
capital becomes useful. The only mobile factor is L, while resources are
immobile and capital is a specific factor (connected as it is to a particular
usage, it cannot be converted to a different kind of production). These
two different production functions are:
Ya = F (La, R) (8)
Yi = F (La, R) (9)
where Y is the output and (a) and (i) refer to agriculture and industry.
The price of cereals is simply Pa = Yi/Ya and the price of textiles is Pi =
Ya/Yi. Things do not change if agricultural goods are still expressed in
joules (or calories); in that case we have a specific amount of textiles
per joule or joules per textile. Price is, in any case, the ratio between
agricultural output (grain) and industrial output (textiles).
The wage in agriculture is:
wa = MPLa ∙ Pa (10)
where wa is wage in agriculture, MPLa is the physical marginal labour
productivity and Pa the price of the goods produced in agriculture.
In industry the wage is:
wi = MPLi ∙ Pi (11)
where the only difference with equation (1.10) is the subscript i refer-
ring to industry.
Finally:
L = L a + Li (12)
where total labour (L), equal to 100, is the result of the sum of agricul-
tural labour (La) and industrial labour (Li).27
For the following development of the model, it is important to
remember that the demand for textiles is highly income elastic, whereas
that for cereals is inelastic.
4.3. City-countryside
Figure 7 represents marginal labour productivity in both sectors (on
the axes of the ordinates) as a function of the percentage of labour
employed (on the axis of the abscissae).
The agricultural sector is to be found on the vertical axis, on the
right, while industry is represented on the left. Both curves decline as
soon as the input of labour increases as the consequence of diminish-
ing returns to labour. In other words, labour productivity is inversely
related to the labour force employed in the sector. As can be seen in
the figure, the diagram of Figure 6 (section B) for agriculture has been
combined with another for industry (without the line of the average
labour product). The figure is thus a further development of the previ-
ous production function.
In E (10), (11) and (12) equate and the equilibrium exists. The level
of productivity (PMLi=PMLa) and wages is the same in both sectors
(wi0=wa0) since the mobility of labour equalises these. However, a city-
countryside wage differential usually exists and it constitutes the force
of attraction of the peasant population to the urban centres.28 In the
figure, the differential is represented by the base of the triangle with
its vertex in E, and then by the difference between wi1 and wa1. The
area of the triangle increases whenever the city-country productivity
differential widens.
27
Setting total labour equal to 100, the distribution of total employment between
agriculture and industry is an endogenous variable, while population movement
becomes exogenous engendering a displacement of the straight line of productivity
instead of a movement along the straight line.
28
Differential can be represented by wi/wa.
MPLi MPLa
w
wi2 w
wi1 E
wa2
wi0 wa0
wa1
MPLaPa
MPLiPi
l1 l2
Li La
Fig. 7. A two-sectors economy: growth.
4.4. Growth
Before the modern structural change, a much higher percentage of
workers were employed in agriculture (as can be seen on the horizontal
axis: the abscissa l1 in Figure 7). The percentage of labour in agriculture
corresponds to the part of the horizontal axis at the intersection with
the vertical one on the right of l1. Labour employed in industry is the
remaining segment of the horizontal axis on the left.
In case of an exogenous shock (e.g. an innovation in textile technol-
ogy) and the subsequent productivity growth in industry, the line MPLiPi
moves to the right. The percentage of workers employed in industry
increases from l1 to l2 (as can be seen on the horizontal axis); while in
agriculture this decreases. Unproductive agricultural workers and those
whose productivity is low find occupation in industry,29 whilst the gap
between urban and rural wages widens. It is represented by the difference
29
W. A. Lewis (1954) is still considered to be an expert on the matter.
in the ordinates of wi2 and wa2, which is wider than the previously
existing difference between wi1 and wa1.
If productivity in industry continues to rise and the line of marginal
product moves further to the right while the differential in urban-rural
productivity widens or simply remains stable, the number of work-
ers in industry rises and wages increase. The centre of gravity of the
economy gradually shifts from the agricultural to the industrial sector.
In this case the urban-rural differential in wages constitutes a dynamic
disequilibrium supported by a difference in productivity.
Whenever the supply of labour in agriculture is elastic due to the
presence of low-productive or unproductive workers, or to the rise in
productivity which frees the labour force, since fewer workers are then
able to produce what many more produced previously, the straight line
MPLiPi moves further to the right. If, by contrast, there is no progress
in agricultural productivity, the inelasticity of the labour supply from
the countryside becomes an obstacle to further growth. The industrial
revolution must be accompanied by the agricultural revolution.30 If,
in fact, labour supply becomes inelastic, the straight line of marginal
productivity in agriculture moves to the left, where wages are higher
because of the rise in prices. If in Pa = Yi/Ya, Yi rises while Ya is stable,
both Pa and MPLaPa increase. Agricultural wages can even become
higher than in industry for jobs requiring the same level skill. The sta-
tionary nature of agriculture can compromise the possibilities of growth
and turn the terms of trade against the advanced sector. The expansion
of the urban sectors may be stopped because the price of subsistence
goods rises and profits fall. As a consequence, the incentives for rural
populations to move towards the towns diminish.
The movement of MPLi towards the right represents what actually
happened in many economies during the last two centuries: innova-
tions in industry were accompanied by a flow of agricultural workers
to the cities in search of employment in the new, expanding sectors of
industry and services. Productivity also rose in agriculture, this result-
ing in increasing elasticity of the labour supply to the industrial sector.
Urbanisation, industrialisation and structural change were developing
at the same time and transforming the organisation of the economy
and society.
30
Kaldor (1954).
However, such development also played a role in pre-modern

economies. The remarkable growth of London and other English cities
between 1650 and 1750 can be seen as a case of urbanisation following
significant changes in urban and rural productivity.31 On the whole,
English urbanisation follows this movement closely from the late Middle
Ages onwards whilst in the Netherlands the same pattern can be found
in the 16th and 17th centuries.
In our two-sector model, structural change is represented by the
displacement of the economic equilibrium further towards the right
and thus towards industry. The weight of the agricultural sector
shrinks with respect to both sectoral employment and its contribution
to national output.
4.5. Decline
Over the long period under consideration, the situation developed
differently from the previous model. The previous chapters can be
summarised as follows:
1. no deep structural change took place;

2. a slight rise in urbanisation occurred from 1300 (although with dif-
ferences in different countries).32
In the period we have examined, the decline in labour productivity

occurred both in agricultural and in urban sectors, but was lower in
the latter, and the gap in wages continued to attract workers from the
countryside towards the cities. In this case, the previously mentioned
differential wi/wa widened because of the greater decrease in the denomi-
nator of the ratio and therefore urbanisation continued to rise. Our
modern world witnesses many cases of huge urban growth in presence
of very low levels of labour productivity in agriculture. People move
to the cities simply because there is no opportunity of employment in
the countryside.
In Early Modern Europe the rise in urbanisation is likely to have
occurred as a consequence of the migration to the cities of low or
non-productive workers from the countryside looking for some form
31
Refering to the important article by Wrigley (1967).
32
Here I refer only to the average European urbanisation rate. Differences in urbani-
sation have already been dealt with in Chapter VI.
MPLi MPLa
MPLaPa w
w
wi1
1
wa1
wi2
2
wa2
MPLiPi
Li l1 l2 La
Fig. 8. A two-sector economy.
of occupation or living on charity. In this case, the migration of unem-

ployed workers from the countryside neither results in an increase of
agricultural productivity, nor in an increase of agricultural prices, as
would be expected in the case of full employment. The curve relating
to agriculture is displaced towards the right when productivity and
wages are lower. Migration flows towards the cities also result in a
decrease of productivity in the urban sectors. Real wages drop both in
agriculture and the cities, but in the dualistic pre-modern economy,
secondary and tertiary occupations are relatively more dynamic and the
wage differential widens. The slowly rising urbanisation is supported
by intensification of labour, in the background.
In Figure 8, while both curves of marginal product move, to the right
(in the case of agriculture) and to the left (in the case of urban sectors),
the new intersection in point 2 implies a wide differential in wages
and more labour employed in non-agricultural activities (from l1 to l2),
resulting in higher urbanisation. As can be seen, a drop in agricultural
and non-agricultural productivity can result in a rise in urbanisation.
This is the reason why in the European dualistic economy urbanisation

rose while productivity was declining.
The transition towards modern growth from about 1820 onwards
derived from the fast and wide introduction of new technology both
in industry and agriculture. The evolution of useful knowledge was
not caused by economic developments. It was an exogenous change.
The slight, but continuous decline in labour productivity since the late
Middle Ages only prepared the background which supported the intro-
duction of new techniques. While the dualistic European economy can,
until about 1820, be represented by the graph in Figure 8, from 1820
onwards it is better represented by the graph in Figure 7.
4.6. The model

Ricardo and Malthus were among the great ancestors of modern eco-
nomics, and many of their views have actually been incorporated into
present economics; with the consequence that Ricardo and Malthus
have affected the way economists approach the modern economy.
The obvious relationship between population rise and possibilities of
consumption is often referred to as Malthusian.33 It was well-known,
however, even before the birth of Malthus. The relationship between
consumption and population is also the starting point of the foregoing
model. On the other hand, some important elements of the classical
approach are not supported by our analysis:
– classical economists assumed the resource availability to be a given.

It has since been seen that climatic changes, better understood today,
were of fundamental importance in short-term and long-term move-
ments in the economy;
– classical economists agreed on a distribution theory, where wages
were stable at the level of subsistence, and this theory has proved to
be a fundamental base for their analysis. However, historical evidence
shows that this was not so and that, in past civilizations, important
changes took place in the level of wages. An analysis of wages (and
output distribution on the whole) as determined by marginal factor
productivity corresponds much better to past evidence;
33
See Clark (2007b), pp. 19 ff. for a presentation of the past in Malthusian terms.
– classical economists were generally convinced that technical change

was unable to modify the substance of the economy and that it could
only temporarily remove the obstacles to economic growth. We
know nowadays that it has not been so. Our knowledge of economic
development in 19th and 20th centuries contributes to better focus
the technical limits to growth.
5. The mature agrarian economy
Agricultural societies began to develop some 10,000 years ago. A phase

of acceleration in the structuring of the agrarian civilizations occurred
between 4,000 and 3,000 years BC, with the exploitation of animal
power in agriculture, the formation of new political structures—the
large empires of the Near East-, and the building of the first cities.
The 1,000 years we have focused on in this work constitute the phase
of maturity of this system: the phase, that is, when extensive growth
prevailed. It must, however, be noticed that, together with fundamen-
tal stability or stagnation, many new features take place in this last
phase thus preparing for the following discontinuity in the economy.
The tension between basic stability and dynamism appears as a strong
thrust to overcome the constraints. Let us recall the main features of
the economic system we have dealt with.
5.1. Dynamism
If we compare the European economy at the beginning of the 19th
century with that of ten centuries earlier, the development over this
long period of time is striking. The population increased fivefold, from
40 to almost 200 million. Population density rose from 6 inhabitants
per square kilometre (not including Russia) in the 10th century to
30 in 1800. In the 10th century, cities were few and their popula-
tion scarce, whereas in the early 19th century they were numerous,
densely populated and rich in quality buildings such as churches and
palaces. The rate of urbanisation at least doubled in this millennium
and some industrial goods improved in quality and became relatively
cheap even for the poor. In the 10th century goods such as nails or
other iron objects were extremely expensive whereas by 1800 they had
become cheap products. In the late Middle Ages, silk articles had been
luxury goods possessed by kings and popes, only becoming accessible
to the rich and middle social classes in the 19th century. Considerable
the mature agrarian economy 379
improvement came about with new water and wind driven machinery
being introduced into industrial activities. The spread of gunpowder,
cannon and arquebus had transformed the art of war. Printing, from
the 15th century onwards, had permitted a wider diffusion of informa-
tion, initially through books, later through gazettes and newspapers.
New types of consumer goods, from tea and coffee to chocolate, had
made their appearance and modified customs. Profound changes had
taken place on the seas and ships had become more numerous and
more efficient in their exploitation of wind power. European naval
dominance had been established worldwide. It was above all due to
the wider use in Europe of wind-power and gunpowder that major
development had been accomplished in the employment of energy
sources in the early Modern era.
It is necessary to underline that these changes, in both industry and
services, had been more rapid than population growth. Thus, at the
end of the 18th century, each European inhabitant had at his disposal
a larger quantity of goods originating in secondary and tertiary sectors
than his ancestors. This type of progress interested the whole continent
to various degrees. Over the centuries, however, some north European
regions were affected more. Although Southern Europe, and above all
Italy, saw no decrease in absolute terms in commerce and industry,
from the 17th century onwards development was slow. In 1800 the
Euro-Mediterranean civilization was much less Mediterranean and
much more continental than in 1300.
5.2. Stagnation
The situation of the primary sector, however, turned out very different
compared to the secondary and tertiary sectors. It is to be remembered
that in agrarian civilizations of the past, the primary sector produced
from 40 to 60 percent of aggregate output, occupying 50–70 percent
of the active population. When considering the whole of Europe, the
greatest progress was achieved between the 9th and 13th centuries:
from the use of horses and mules to new types of ploughs and forms
of crop rotation. Later a general diffusion of these new techniques was
more important than innovative change. During the 16th century and
then again from the end of the 17th century an extensive process, above
all at the expense of woodland, and intensification in the exploitation
of land accompanied population increase. The major episodes of this
long evolution were represented by the spread of maize and potatoes
in agriculture and intensified land cultivation in the damper lands of

the North. Irrigated agriculture, such as was frequent in China during
the same period, was more successful than the European intensifica-
tion in the use of land. This change had allowed population growth,
but no increase in the availability of goods on a per capita basis; even
though in China during the 19th century the economy was finally hit
by both the “absolute shortage of land” due to the exhaustion of new
land and the relative shortage of land due to the lack of any new land-
saving technology.34
In Europe, from the 15th century, and perhaps even from the 12th
century to the beginning of the 19th century, per capita availability
of agricultural goods diminished due to low demographic pressure.
Labour productivity had fallen with time, because the rural population
had grown more than capital formation. The surging back of the rural
population into the cities, where innovative processes had become
more frequent, had also caused a lowering of labour productivity in
urban areas. Urban wages, an indirect indicator of labour productiv-
ity, had diminished with the population increase during the 16th and
18th centuries.
As regards the rural economy, it is not only productivity which
remained low over the centuries. The communication routes did not
change; means of transport did not improve; rural markets increased in
number, but the volume of their exchanges did not exceed the increase
in population. From the 17th century onwards it is true that rural
industry became a widespread phenomenon in some areas of Europe.
It was a way for people to alleviate poverty and for the merchant entre-
preneurs to employ labour which was cheaper in the countryside than
in the towns. Such clear-cut statements could be specified by looking
more closely at local developments and time differences, as has been
done in previous chapters. On the one hand, a dynamic urban world
existed and, on the other, a static rural one which, in general, condi-
tioned the possibilities of expansion of the economy. And this rural
world enhanced gross output through extensive progress both in space
and labour time.
The most difficult period in this urban-rural development is to be
seen in the second half of the 18th century and in the first two decades
of the 19th century. This is the moment when the tension between
34
Deng (1999), p. 179.
the mature agrarian economy 381
aspirations and constraints, typical of the European society, reached

its peak. It was a period of turmoil both in political and social life and
economy. Only at the beginning of the 19th century were technical
limits of the traditional rural economy overcome thanks to the radical
change in the energy system and in the methods of converting energy
into work. The ability to perform work, that is the production capacity,
increased enormously from that period onwards. Mechanisation began
and, with it, modern growth. In every country, economic development
coincided with the arrival of modern machines and the fuels to power
these.
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INDEX
Africa 4, 12, 56, 160 Carboniferous Era 52

agrarian individualism 121–23 central shop 206
agricultural ecosystem 98–100 centralised industry 206–08
agricultural revolution 136 champart 339
agriculture 95–157 charcoal 57, 60
akçe 197 chiftlik 128
amenorrhoea 33 China 4, 10–1, 16, 17, 27, 31, 34, 56,
America 4, 101, 102, 103, 167, 172, 60, 64, 67, 81, 85, 101, 103, 104, 106,
173, 175 154–55, 159, 160, 171, 215, 218, 226,
ancien régime 117, 123 227, 228, 232, 234, 237, 242
Antonine Plague 6 chocolate 189, 308, 379
arable 17, 95, 121, 134, 135, 163 cholera 23
aristocracy 300, 315–18, 329, 331 city 201, 206, 207, 215, 221, 223, 234,
artisan 203–06 239–52
Asia 4,12, 98, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173, climate 78–83
184, 226 cloth 224, 259
Asian paradox 102 coal 51, 52, 53–8, 60–4, 85, 88, 91, 94,
Austria 9, 16, 137, 140, 149, 153, 244, 224
245–46, 266, 275 cocoa 308,
coffee 173
Balkans 9, 16, 109, 125, 128, 244, colonisation 131
245–46 commenda 199
Bavaria 310 commerce 159–200
Bed 311 Commercial Revolution 175
beer 189, 258, 307 common lands 117–18, 122
Belgium 9, 16, 140, 149, 153, 245–46, company 199–200
275 consumption 293–319
Beverage 307–08 correlation 192
biological converter 50, 70 corvée 124, 127
biological system 53–6 cottager 118
biomass 78, 79, 80, 82 cotton 172, 227, 230
biotic potential 17 court 315, 317, 318, 334, 339, 340, 342,
birth control 39 343
birth rate 31–7 craft 203–06
Black Death 28, 256, 262 craftsmanship 203–06
Bohemia 125, 126, 128, 216, 219, 221, credit 198, 199
244 crisis 224, 273, 278, 285–86
bourgeois VIII 327, 329, 330 Croatia 109
bread 294, 302, 304, 305, 306 Czechoslovakia 153
breast-feeding 33
building industry 203, 204, 207, 210, death rate 21–30, 37
216, 235, 242, 268, 269 decline 221–24
Bulgaria 109 decreasing returns 159, 353
bureaucracy 339, 340, 342, 343 demand 292–346
demesne 124
capital 130, 225, 345, 346, 352, 353, demographic potential 20
354, 356, 358, 369, 371, 380 demographic transition 36
carbohydrates 118, 297, 302, 305 demography 1–46
MALANIMA_Index_417-421.indd 417 5/26/2009 12:51:28 PM
418 index
Denmark 275 feudal economy 128

density of population 14–6 financial institution 326
depreciation 331, 346, 352 Finland 40, 56, 163
devaluation 197, 198 firewood 57, 60
disease 18, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 45 Fisher equation 168–69
distribution 259, 263, 266, 279, 288, fixed capital 321
296, 321, 322, 323, 325, 326, 330, 351, Flanders 137, 160, 164, 173
367–69, 372, 377 fluyt 195
division of labour VII fodrum 334
domain state 335 food 342, 347, 351, 362, 371
Domesday Book 57 forces of decline VII–VIII 159, 253
domestic industry 202–03 forces of growth VII–VIII 159, 253
double entry 199 forest 52, 57–8, 63, 79, 89
dry agriculture 100, 103 France 9, 16, 29, 30, 33, 35, 39, 42, 56,
dry farming 103 88, 108, 110, 111, 118, 137, 138, 140,
dualistic economy VIII 149, 151, 153, 163, 215, 237, 245–46,
durable goods 296, 311, 313, 315, 332, 266, 275, 279, 289
345, 347 fuel 56–65
fulling mill 72–3
efficiency in the use of energy 54
enclosure121–23 galley 193
energy 49–94 GDP 255–91
energy carrier 49–94 Germany 9, 16, 39, 42, 56, 68, 86, 108,
energy consumption 49–94 110, 118, 137, 138, 140, 149, 153, 216,
energy converter 49–94 218, 221, 237, 245–46, 258, 266, 275,
energy sources 49–94 279, 289
energy system 49–55 glass 235, 313
energy transition 84–93 gold 169, 217
England 9, 16, 29, 39, 41, 88, 89, 91, Great Britain 86, 96, 111
109, 110, 112, 140, 149, 153, 163, 164, Growth 332, 334, 339, 340, 344, 345,
174, 216, 218, 221, 245–46, 250, 255, 346, 350, 351, 353–56, 359–61, 363,
258, 259, 260, 264, 266, 267–68, 272, 364, 367, 370, 371, 373–75, 377, 378,
279, 289, 310 379, 380, 381
environmental resistance 17, 20 guild 205
epidemic 21, 24–9, 31, 38, 42, 44, 45 guilder 198
epidemic transition 24 gunpowder 63–5, 224, 227
equilibrium 293, 350, 355, 360, 362,
364, 365, 366, 370, 375 horse 55, 65–8, 84
Euro-Mediterranean 9–10, 160 human capital 19, 251–52, 354–55
European population 1–46 Hungary 9, 15, 16, 33, 68, 125, 126,
exchange 257, 274, 352, 366, 370, 380 128, 137, 138, 153, 216, 219, 221,
expenditure 259, 293, 294, 296, 311, 245–46, 310
313, 315, 316, 318, 328, 331, 334, 337, hydraulic agriculture 101–03
339, 340, 342, 343, 344, 345, 347
exportation 172, 174, 293, 337, 346 importation 78, 79, 81, 103
income 257, 259, 261, 262, 263, 265,
fairs 185–87 270, 271, 284, 286, 291, 293–96, 299,
fallow 100, 103, 104, 119, 121, 133, 134, 315, 316, 318, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325,
135 326, 328, 329, 330, 332, 335, 336, 337,
family 107, 109, 118, 124, 127, 128, 338, 342, 344, 345, 346, 347, 350, 351,
138, 141, 143, 144, 151, 177 358, 365, 367, 369, 370, 372
famine 22, 113–15 income distribution 279, 321, 322, 323,
farm 102, 107, 108, 110, 111, 113 325, 326, 330, 367
fashion 318 increasing returns 159, 353
index 419
India 4, 10–1, 16, 17, 35, 56, 101, 103, manorial economy 123–29
159, 160, 171, 226, 227, 232, 242 mansus 124
Indochina 100 marginal efficiency of capital
Industrial Revolution 98, 136, 214, marginal product of labour 332, 353,
228, 234, 238 356, 357, 367, 369, 374, 376
industrialisation 211–17 market 176–82, 187–89
industrious revolution 238 market integration 190–93
industry 201–53 marriageable age 35–6, 41
inequality 279, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, mature agrarian economy 330, 378,
351, 352, 369 379, 381
infant mortality 39 Maunder’s Minimum 81
intensive production function 355, Meat 297–309
356, 359 mechanical converter 53, 70
interrupted coition 33 mechanical system 53–6
investment 293, 320–33 Medieval Climatic Optimum 79, 94
investment Mediterranean 12, 29, 57, 68, 161–63
Ireland 9, 13, 16, 35, 137 merchant 202, 205, 206, 211, 240
iron industry 232–34 merchant-entrepreneur 206
irrigation 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 135 Mesta 132
Italy 9, 16, 39, 41, 60, 68, 88, 91, 108, metallurgy 217, 232, 234, 235
137, 138, 140, 149, 151, 153, 218, 221, metal 203, 204, 207, 215, 216, 219,
245–46, 250, 259, 260–61, 263, 268, 228, 229, 232
272, 275, 279, 289 Mexico 101, 102, 103
migration 20–1
Japan 17, 98, 242 mining industry 210, 216, 224, 232,
234
knowledge VII 19, 235, 252 mixed farming 134–36
kogge 194 model 17–20, 349–81
Korea 17, 98 modern growth 90, 274–75, 277, 279,
285, 286, 324, 346, 351, 353, 366, 377,
labour 130, 360–80 381
labour productivity 129–56 modernisation 272, 324, 366
land productivity 129–56 monetary mass 197, 198
land rent 111, 113, 124, 127, 128, 129, money 111, 112, 124, 127, 168, 169,
188 170, 177, 188, 196–98,
late medieval crisis 278 Montenegro 109
latin sail 77 mortality crises 42–3
law of one price 178
leading economy 248–50 natural resources 320, 332, 354, 355,
life expectancy 38 365, 371
limited liability 199 Neolithic agricultural revolution 65,
lira 198 97, 98, 100
Little Ice Age 80–83, 139 Neolithic urban revolution 55
Livonia 164 Netherlands 9, 16, 56, 86, 88, 89, 91,
loom 227, 229, 230 112, 137, 138, 140, 149, 153, 163,
Lombardy 310 245–46, 250, 258, 265, 269, 279, 289
Lusatia 128 Norway 27, 137, 275
nobility 266, 296, 315, 316, 317, 319,
Macedonia 109 322, 326, 327, 329, 330
machine 69–78, 367, 320, 321, 347, nundinae 185
367, 379, 381
maize 45, 103, 136 Oceania 4
malaria 23 Oceans 160, 165–76
manor 106, 116–25, 127 open fields 118–19, 123
420 index
organisation 237–39, 370, 374 Purchasing Parity Power 274

Ottoman Empire 4 putting-out system 205, 206, 208
output 152–56, 255–91
ox 68 quantitative theory of money 167–68
pallia fresonica 211 reproducible energy sources 51

Pakistan 35 reserve 124, 127, 128
paper 236–58 resources 262, 320, 321, 332, 345,
Pasteurella pestis 25 354–56, 360, 362, 364, 365, 371
pauperism 265–67 rice 101, 102, 103, 106
Pax Mongolica 27 rivers 125, 131, 176, 177, 179, 180,
peasant economy 107–16 182–83, 185, 187, 189, 191
peasant household 107–09 roads 180, 181, 183–85, 187, 189, 191
peat 60–1, 63, 86, 89, 94 rotation 104, 105, 118, 119, 133, 135,
Persian mill 75–6 143, 153
personal income distribution 279, 321, round ship 193
322, 323, 325, 326, 330, 351, 367, 368, rural community 116
369, 372, 377 rural industry 206, 237, 238, 239
Peru 56, 167 Russia 9, 16, 27, 29, 126, 128, 137,
plague 8, 21, 23, 24, 25–30, 34, 42, 43, 138, 140, 159, 160, 163, 216, 242,
45 245–46
plough 145–47
Poland 9, 16, 27, 126, 128, 134, 137, saga fresonica 211
138, 153, 160– 163, 216, 219, 221, sail 77–8, 193, 195
244, 245–46, 259 Saxony 128
population 1–46, 272–74 Scandinavia 86, 111, 138, 160, 163,
Pomerania 128 216, 245–46
Portugal 9, 16, 245–46 Scotland 9, 16, 245–46
potato 45, 102, 106, 136, 137, 140, 143, sea 159–75
156, 284, 305, 309, 365, seigneurie 124
Potosi 167 Serbia 109
pound 198 serfdom 127, 128, 148
power 72–4, 52, 62, 66, 67–78, 85 shifting cultivation 100
precious metals 169–80 ship 162, 164, 166, 170, 176, 193–96
price 255–66, 269, 278, 279, 282, 286, shop 189–90
289, 290, 315, 352, 371, 374, 376 silk 172, 180, 181, 185, 204, 207, 208,
Price Revolution 170, 257 209–10, 218, 223, 227, 228, 229, 231,
printing 227, 235 232
production function 129–30, 320, 354, silver 169, 217, 257, 327, 338
355, 356, 357, 359–72 slash-and-burn 100, 103
productive capacity 129–56, 282–84 slave 69, 124, 172, 175
productivity 257, 262, 263, 266, 267, Slovakia 138, 216
269, 271, 273, 281–86, 321, 322, 324, Sound 163, 164
326, 330, 331, 352, 356, 357, 358, 362, Spain 9, 16, 39, 88, 91, 136, 137, 138,
363, 366, 367, 369, 370, 373–82 140, 149, 153, 164, 167, 216, 218, 222,
productivity of energy 90, 91 227, 245–46, 279, 289
propensity to invest 327, 328, 330 spice 162, 163, 167, 170, 173, 180
proto-industrialisation 206, 239, 240, spinning wheel 204, 206, 212, 227,
241, 249 229, 230
Provence 136 stagnation 260, 277, 285, 378, 379
Prussia 128, 131 state 294, 309, 311, 36, 322, 333, 334,
public expense 338, 340 335, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 345,
public revenue 346, 351
index 421
stature 297, 369 urbanisation rate 239–52

steam engine 54, 62–3, 65, 73 useful knowledge 377
structural change 281, 351, 370, 371,
373, 374, 375 vaccination 43
subsistence 362, 365, 367, 369, 374 vaine pâture 119
sugar 97, 172, 174, 175, 180, 181, 189, Verlagssystem 205
258 Vietnam 17
surplus 294, 326, 362, 367, 369 Village 116–23
Sweden 35, 40, 56, 88, 91, 137, 163, villages deserté 132
216, 275, 290, 310
swidden 100, 104 wage 203, 225, 237, 238, 241, 251, 256,
Switzerland 9, 16, 137, 245–46 262, 263–86, 369–72
war 21, 316, 335, 337, 340, 341, 343,
Taiwan 103 360
Thailand 103 water 44, 49, 50–5, 69, 70–8, 84, 86,
Tax 293, 294, 296, 335, 336, 338, 339, 87, 89, 94
340, 341, 344, 345, 347 watermill 70–4, 231
tea 172, 173, 174, 189 wealth 328, 330, 331, 340, 345, 347
technique 49–94, 225–28, 267, 320, wealth distribution 321, 322, 323, 325
347, 350, 353, 354, 355, 377, 379 wet agriculture 100–03, 106
technology 19, 49–94, 130, 156, 293, wet farming 100–03
342, 355, 362, 366, 374, 377, 380 wheat 103–06, 139–40
textile 162, 173, 222, 223, 224, 225, wheat prices 114–15
227, 229, 230, 235, 237, 258 wheelplough 145–47
Thirty Years War 22 wind 70–78
tobacco 137 windmill 74–77, 84, 94
town 210, 212, 215, 219, 222, 223, 237, wood civilisation 56
242, 249, 250, 251 wool 206, 212, 214, 215, 222, 224, 229,
trade 159–200 231
traditional agrarian system 55 working animal 50–1, 54, 55, 65, 66,
transaction cost 178–81, 193, 196 68, 80, 85, 87, 89
transport cost 179–81, 193, 200 working time 141–44
Tuscany 114, 191, 212, 255 workshop 203–11
two-sector model 354, 370, 371, 373, Wüstung 132
375, 376
Yersinia pestis 25, 29
United Kingdom 275, 280 yield 102, 103, 106, 123, 134, 136,
urbanisation 239–52 137–41, 154, 155, 156

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GEHS 5 G l oba l E c onom ic H i s tory Se r i e s

Pre-Modern European Economy

Paolo Malanima graduated from the University of Pisa and

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd i 5/26/2009 12:34:29 PM

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd ii 5/26/2009 12:34:31 PM

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd iii 5/26/2009 12:34:31 PM

Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated,

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by

printed in the netherlands

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd iv 5/26/2009 12:34:31 PM

List of Figures and Tables ................................................................ vii

Chapter I. Population ....................................................................... 1

Chapter II. Energy ............................................................................ 49

Chapter III. Agriculture ................................................................... 95

Chapter IV. Trade ............................................................................. 159

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Chapter V. Industry ......................................................................... 201

Chapter VI. Output .......................................................................... 255

Chapter VII. Demand ...................................................................... 293

Chapter VIII. Pre-modern economies .......................................... 349

Bibliography ........................................................................................ 383

Index .................................................................................................... 417

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MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd vii 5/26/2009 12:34:31 PM

Fig. 10. Temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere from

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd viii 5/26/2009 12:34:32 PM

Fig. 3. Commodities from western and eastern Europe in

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd ix 5/26/2009 12:34:32 PM

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MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xi 5/26/2009 12:34:32 PM

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xii 5/26/2009 12:34:32 PM

Table 3. Estimate, of the availability of power per capita from

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xiii 5/26/2009 12:34:32 PM

Table 4. Weight of the Florentine lira, English pound,

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xiv 5/26/2009 12:34:32 PM

Table 8. Per capita agricultural output in England, the

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xv 5/26/2009 12:34:33 PM

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xvii 5/26/2009 12:34:33 PM

specificity of these forces on the continent in comparison with those

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xviii 5/26/2009 12:34:33 PM

MALANIMA_F1_i-xxii.indd xix 5/26/2009 12:34:33 PM

The suggestions by Jan Luiten Van Zanden, Leandro Prados de la

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1.1. Successful reproduction

MALANIMA_F2_1-48.indd 1 5/26/2009 1:00:38 PM

Table 1. World population from 1 million years ago until

Source: data in Cohen (1995), App. 2.

MALANIMA_F2_1-48.indd 2 5/26/2009 1:00:38 PM

population will be 10 billion. At the beginning of the 21st century it

1.2. World population

MALANIMA_F2_1-48.indd 3 5/26/2009 1:00:38 PM

Table 2. Two different estimates of world population at the birth of Christ

Table 3. Distribution of world population per continent

In the 17th century, China numbered approximately 150 million

MALANIMA_F2_1-48.indd 4 5/26/2009 1:00:38 PM

Table 4. European population (with all Russia) as to the world

1.3. Europe and the rest of the world

MALANIMA_F2_1-48.indd 5 5/26/2009 1:00:39 PM

2. The European population

2.1. The long-term trend

MALANIMA_F2_1-48.indd 6 5/26/2009 1:00:39 PM

Fig. 2. European Population 1–2000 (without Russia) (log scale).

Table 5. European population (without Russia) 1–2000 (millions).