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Transactions on Vehicular Technology
On the Physical Layer Security of Underlay
Relay-Aided Device-to-Device Communications
Majid H. Khoshafa, Student Member, IEEE, Telex M. N. Ngatched, Senior Member, IEEE, and Mohamed H.
Ahmed, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we study the underlay relay-aided
Device-to-Device (D2D) communications to improve the physical
layer (PHY) security of the cellular network. We propose a
cooperative scheme, whereby the D2D pair, in return of being
allowed to share the spectrum band of the cellular network, serves
as a friendly jammer, through its multiple-input multiple-output
relay, to degrade the wiretapped signal at an eavesdropper. This
paper aims to show that spectrum sharing is advantageous for
both D2D communications and cellular networks with respect
to reliability and robustness for the former, and the physical
layer security enhancement for the latter. To assess the proposed
cooperative system model, closed-form expressions for the D2D
outage probability, the secrecy outage probability, and the proba-
bility of non-zero secrecy capacity are derived. More importantly,
the benefits due to the cooperation scheme are verified through
numerical and simulation results.
Index Terms—Device-to-Device communications, physical layer
security, outage probability, secrecy outage probability.
I. I NTRODUCTION
D evice-to-Device (D2D) communications is considered as
one of the most important technologies for the fifth-
generation (5G) and beyond networks. In D2D communi-
cations, two close D2D users exchange information directly
rather than relaying the information through the base station
(BS) [1]. There are many advantages of D2D communications
over the conventional cellular networks, for instance, low
power consumption, high spectral efficiency, and short delay.
It is worth noting that D2D communications have many
significant applications like traffic offloading, disaster relief,
content sharing, and file sharing [2].
As a result of the open wireless medium, security is con-
sidered as a critical issue in wireless networks. Physical layer
(PHY) security, first explored by Wyner [3], is of great interest
as an essential strategy to protect the information. To this end,
the natural randomness of communication channels and noise
is utilized to reduce the wiretapped data. More specifically,
the received signal by eavesdroppers is confounded with
respect to the quality of service (QoS). More importantly,
This research was supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering
Research Council (NSERC) of Canada under its Discovery Grant (DG)
program (RGPINs 2019-04626 and 2014-03638).
M. H. Khoshafa and T. M. N. Ngatched are with the Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering, Memorial University of Newfound-
land, St. John’s, NL A1B 3X5, Canada (e-mail:{mhakhoshafa@mun.ca,
tngatched@grenfell.mun.ca}).
M. H. Ahmed is with the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer
Science, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Canada (e-mail:
mahme3@uottawa.ca).
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PHY security is independent of the computational complexity
as compared to the cryptography in the higher layers. As a
result, eavesdroppers that have high powerful computational
abilities do not affect the level of security. In addition, PHY
security approaches have a high scalability [4].
The advantages of cooperative communications, in the con-
text of PHY security, have been extensively studied. More
specifically, both relaying and diversity techniques have been
extensively utilized to increase the security level against eaves-
dropper attacks in the wireless transmission [5]. Moreover, co-
operative jamming has also been comprehensively investigated
to increase the secrecy capacity. To this end, a relay terminal is
chosen to interfere with the wiretapping signal by transmitting
a jamming signal [6], [7]. With this in mind, cooperative
jamming and relaying [8], [9] have been considered as leading
approaches to increase the security level efficiently.
As a matter of fact, multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
relays are extensively utilized in PHY security to increase the
secrecy capacity of the cellular networks. The opportunities
and challenges of MIMO relaying technologies in PHY secu-
rity was investigated in [10], [11]. Recently, MIMO relaying
has been used to improve the PHY security of mmWave
band [12]. However, multiple radio frequency chains related
to multiple antennas are expensive with respect to hardware,
size, and power. To limit these drawbacks, antenna selection
is an inexpensive low-complexity choice to achieve several of
the benefits of MIMO systems. The secrecy performance of
transmit antenna selection (TAS) was examined in the MIMO
channels for selection combining [13] and maximum-ratio
combining [14]. For the outdated channel state information
(CSI), the TAS technique was investigated in [15].
A. Related Work
As a result of spectrum sharing between D2D and cellular
users, interference is considered as harmful. To limit this
drawback, most current works on inband underlay D2D com-
munications aim at mitigating and overcoming the interference
between the cellular users and the D2D pairs [16]. However,
from a PHY security viewpoint, before-mentioned interference
could be advantageous, since it could be used to confound
the eavesdroppers [17]. Considering PHY security in underlay
D2D communications, some techniques are used to enhance
the secrecy performance of the D2D communications. Two
techniques for PHY security, namely, guard zone and artificial
noise (AN) were utilized to improve the security level of
the D2D communications [18]. To guarantee a secure D2D
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Transactions on Vehicular Technology
2

link, the authors in [19] utilized the BS as a cooperative TABLE I

jammer to confound the eavesdropping signal by generating TABLE OF S YMBOLS
AN to interfere with the eavesdropper. However, the QoS of Symbols Description
cellular users (CUs) should be taken into account when the PB BS transmitted Power
P D2D transmitted Power
BS generates AN. To do so, the jamming signal should be PJ Jamming transmitted power
orthogonal to the null space of the main channels [20]. In [21], ya Received signal at node a
2
σa AWGN variance at node a
the PHY security of D2D communications, multihop relaying na AWGN at node a
scheme, was studied, only from the viewpoint of improving TR Receiving antenna at R
the security level of D2D users only. RD Transmitting antenna at R
RJ Jamming antenna
It is worth mentioning that a few works have studied NJ Number of jamming antennas
the improvement of the PHY security of cellular networks ND Number of data antennas
hab Channel coefficient of ab link
utilizing the potential of D2D links [22]. In [23], the use of λab Mean of the channel gain
the interference generated by the D2D links to confuse the xd D2D signal
xb BS transmitted signal
eavesdroppers and thus enhance the security of the cellular xj Jammimg signal
network was studied. To enhance the security level of the γab SINR of ab channel
CUs, the authors in [24] analyzed joint power control for ρab Correlation coefficient between a and b
γ̄a Average SNR at node a
the D2D users and CUs. By enhancing the resource sharing, γD2D End-to-end SINR of the D2D communications
spectral efficiency provisioning for D2D links and security γup Upper bound SINR of the D2D link
CS Secrecy capacity
improvement for CUs were obtained in [25] [26]. CC capacity of cellular user
All works mentioned above particularly study the case CE capacity of eavesdropper
Pout D2D outage probability
where the direct links are available between D2D nodes. SOP Secrecy outage probability
However, in some scenarios, the distance and channel condi- SOP∞ Asymptotic SOP
tions may be unfavorable for direct communication. In these Rd D2D transmission rate
Rs cellular secrecy rate
situations, the performance of the D2D communication can fX (.) PDF of random variable X
be improve by using network-assisted transmission through FX (.) CDF of random variable X
∞
FX (.) Asymptotic CDF of random variable X
relays. Such a technique, relay-aided D2D communication, Pr(.) Probability of an event
can provide more reliable QoS for connection between indirect G AF relaying gain
Ga Secrecy diversity order
D2D users. In practice, for smart cities, machine-to-machine Gd Secrecy array gain
(M2M) communication is considered as a valuable application µ1 γ̄r λtr
for relay-aided D2D communication [27]. In this case, inside µ2 γ̄d λrd
µ3 γ̄bd λbd
a macro-cell for some city blocks, automated sensors are used ω1 γ̄c λbc
when the proximity between devices and/or link conditions be- ω2 γ̄jc λjc
ω3 γ̄e λbe
tween nodes are unfavorable. To the best of our knowledge, no ω4 γ̄je λje
work has been reported in the open literature investigating the ϕ 2Rd −1
PHY security of relay-aided underlay D2D communication. β 2Rs
α β−1

B. Main Contributions
In this work, the PHY security of the cellular network is
examined. In the proposed scenario, the D2D communica-
tions are used to generate jamming signals to enhance the
security level of the cellular network in return of sharing
its spectrum. Unlike the exiting work on the PHY security
of underlay D2D communication in the cellular network, we
investigate the PHY security of the cellular network where
a MIMO relay serves the D2D pairs. To do so, the antenna
selection approach is utilized to simultaneously enhance the
security level of the cellular network and improve the D2D
data transmission. To confound the eavesdropper, the transmit
antenna selection at the MIMO relay is used to generate
jamming signals. Consequently, the secrecy capacity of the
cellular network is increased. At the same time, the reliability
and robustness of the D2D communications are improved as
a result of utilizing the relay through antenna selection. By
using antenna selection strategy at the relay, the high hardware
complexity of multiple antennas is avoided, while its reliability
and robustness advantages, and diversity is maintained.
The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows.
• A cooperative system is introduced where the MIMO
relay helps as a friendly jammer while transmitting the
D2D data.
• An antenna selection strategy is employed to enhance the
secrecy capacity of the cellular network by degrading the
wiretapped signal at an eavesdropper and to improve the
traffic capacity for D2D communication.
• Considering perfect and outdated CSI cases, the analysis
is carried out to evaluate the secrecy performance of
the cellular network with respect to the secrecy outage
probability (SOP) and the non-zero secrecy capacity. Fur-
thermore, the outage probability of D2D communication
is also analyzed. Additionally, closed-form expressions
are derived.
• Asymptotic analysis is carried out in high transmit power
regime for the cellular network.
• Simulations results are presented where the derived ex-
pressions are evaluated and verified. The advantages due
to the presence of D2D communications are highlighted.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows: In Section

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Transactions on Vehicular Technology
Fig. 1. System Model.
II, the system model is illustrated. The performance of the
cooperative system model is investigated in Section III. The
performance with outdated CSI is studied in Section IV.
In Section V, the main results are discussed. Finally, the
conclusions are drawn in Section VI. A list of symbols utilized
in this paper is presented in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As depicted in Fig. 1, an underlay D2D network with MIMO
relaying sharing the spectral with the cellular network in a
particular environment is considered. The cellular network
consists of a BS as well as a cellular user, C, communicating
in the presence of an eavesdropper, E, each equipped with a
single antenna. The D2D communications consist of a D2D
transmitter, T , a D2D receiver, D, and a MIMO amplify-and-
forward (AF) relaying, R, equipped with NJ antennas for
sending jamming signals to confound E and ND data antennas
for receiving D2D signal at R and re-transmitting the signal
to D. Besides, all the channels coefficients are modeled as to
experience flat fading with Rayleigh distribution. Furthermore,
the transmission of D2D users is set up during two phases,
while the cellular transmissions occur once in one phase. To
this end, cellular and D2D transmissions are considered to
be fully synchronized for each phase. In the first phase, T
transmits the D2D signal to R, while C remains silent to
guarantee the cellular link security [28], [29]. In the second
phase, at R, the amplified signal is re-transmitted to D. As
compensation for security provisioning of the cellular network,
the D2D pairs are permitted to share spectrum bandwidth;
that is, high spectral efficiency is gained. Therefore, for both
networks, a win-win situation is enabled. To simplify matters,
we indicate TR as the receiving antenna in the first phase, and
RD as the transmitting antenna in the second phase. Similarly,
RJ denotes the jamming antenna.
The channel coefficients for the T → TR, RD → D, RJ →
E, RJ → C, RJ → D, BS → C, BS → D, BS → E links are
denoted as htr , hrd , hje , hjc , hjd , hbc , hbd , and hbe , respec-
2 2
tively. Also, |hab | represents the channel power gains, which
are independent and exponentially distributed with a mean of
2 G 2 |hrd | σr2 + PB |hbd | + σd2
λab = E[|hab | ], where ab ∈ {bc, bd, tr, rd, be, je, jd, jc}. In
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addition, σc2 , σr2 , σe2 , and σd2 represent the variances of the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at C, R, E, and
D, respectively. It is assumed that T and R have the same
transmitted power, P . With this in mind, the received signal
at TR, in the first phase, can be expressed as
√
yR = P htr xd + nr , (1)
where xd is the D2D transmitted signal, and nr is the AWGN
at R. The transmitting antenna RD, in the second phase, is
chosen to maximize the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) at D. Then using the relaying gain G, RD re-transmits
the amplified signal to D. Thus, the received signal at D can
be expressed as
√  p
yD =G hrd P htr xd + nr + PB hbd xb
(2)
p
+ PJ hjd xj + nd ,
where xb is the BS transmitted signal, PJ is the jamming
transmitted power, xj is the jamming signal, and nd is the
AWGN at D. It is assumed that the interference at D from RJ
can be eliminated by using interference cancellation [30] since
the coefficient hjd and the jamming power PJ are presumed
to be available at D. The received signal at C, in the second
phase, can be expressed as
p p
yC = PB hbc xb + PJ hjc xj + nc , (3)
where nc is the AWGN at C. Similarly, at E, the received
signal, in the second phase, can be expressed by
p p
yE = PB hbe xb + PJ hje xj + ne , (4)
where ne is the AWGN at the E. We assume that the received
signals at C and E are not affected by the interference from T
since T is located far away from both C and E, and transmits
with low power [31], [32]. It is noteworthy that since the
data transmission power of RD is lower than the jamming
transmission power of RJ, the interference at C, which is
generated by RD, can be neglected. It is also notable that the
D2D users are unlikely to be wiretapped as a result of their
low transmit power as compared to cellular users. Therefore,
as common in the literature (e.g., [24] and [33]), in this work,
we only investigate the secrecy performance of the cellular
network. More importantly, in this paper, our main goal is to
investigate the mutual benefit of the cooperation between the
cellular and the D2D networks. In particular, the potential of
the relay-aided D2D communication to enhance the security
of the cellular network, while improving its reliability and
spectral efficiency is studied. Towards this end, the relaying
gain G, for AF relaying scheme, is given by [34], [35]
s
P
G= 2 . (5)
P |htr | + σr2
For the end-to-end D2D link, the instantaneous signal-to-
interference-and-noise ratio (SINR), γD2D , can be obtained
by plugging (5) into (2) as
2
G 2 P |htr | |hrd |
γD2D = 2 2 , (6)
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After some algebraic manipulations, one can get where FγR (.) and FγD (.) are the cumulative distribution
γR γD functions (CDFs) of γR and γD , respectively. The PDF of γR
γD2D = , (7) in (12) can be expressed in terms of the binomial expansion
γR + γD + 1
as [39, eq. (1.111)]
where γR represent the SINR at R, which can be expressed
ND −1
as
   
ND X ND − 1 γ (k + 1)
P 2 2
γR = 2 |htr | = γ̄r |htr | , (8) fγR (γ) = (−1)k exp − .
σr µ1 k µ1
k=0
(17)
and γD represents the SINR at D, which can be expressed as To derive fγD (γ), we use [38]
2
P |hrd | γrd Z ∞
γD = 2 = , (9) fγD (γ) = (x + 1)fγrd (γ(x + 1))fγbd (x) dx, (18)
σd2 + PB |hbd | 1 + γbd 0
2 2 Pd where fγrd (.) is given by
where γrd = γ̄d |hrd | , γbd = γ̄bd |hbd | , γ̄d = σd2
, and
PB
γ̄bd = Let us define µ1 = γ̄r λtr , µ2 = γ̄d λrd , and
σd2
. ND X
ND −1 
ND − 1
 
γ (k + 1)

µ3 = γ̄bd λbd . The receiving antenna at R is selected for fγrd (γ) = (−1)k exp − ,
µ2 k µ2
the best data transmission performance in the D2D network. k=0
(19)
Moreover, the maximum channel gain can be determined by
and fγbd (.) is given by
using
2 2  
|htr | = max |hti | , (10) 1 γ
i=1,..ND fγbd (γ) = exp − . (20)
µ3 µ3
and
2 2 By plugging (19) and (20) into (18), the PDF of γD , after
|hrd | = max |hid | , (11)
i=1,..ND some algebraic manipulations, can be obtained as
2 ND −1
The probability density function (PDF) of |hυ | is given by
   
ND X k ND − 1 γ (k + 1)
fγD (γ) = (−1) exp −
ND

γ
 
γ
ND −1 µ2 µ3 k µ2
k=0
f|hυ |2 (γ) = exp − 1 − exp − .  
λυ λυ λυ γ(k+1) 1
(12)  1 + µ2 + µ3 
×  2  .
where υ ∈ {tr, rd}. γ(k+1) 1
µ2 + µ3
(21)
III. P ERFORMANCE A NALYSIS
From (17) and (21), FγR (γ) and FγD (γ) are easily obtained
In this section, a thorough analysis of the proposed system is as
performed. In particular, closed-form expressions of the main
NX D −1
(−1)k NDk−1

  
performance metrics, i.e., the D2D outage probability, the SOP, γ (k + 1)
FγR (γ) = ND 1 − exp − ,
and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity are provided. (k + 1) µ1
k=0
Moreover, the advantages of the proposed scheme are investi- (22)
gated. Furthermore, the asymptotic analysis is presented. and
 


NXD −1
(−1)k NDk−1 exp − γ (k+1)
µ2
A. D2D Outage Probability FγD (γ) = ND 1 −   .
(k + 1) 1+ γ (k+1)µ3
k=0 µ2
The outage probability of D2D communication, Pout , is
(23)
given by
By substituting (22), (23) in (16), Pout can be obtained as in
Pout = Pr (γD2D ≤ ϕ) , (13) (24) at the top of the next page.
where ϕ = 2Rd − 1, and Rd is the data rate of the D2D
communications. Since the expression in (7) is mathematically B. Secrecy Outage Probability
intractable, a tight upper bound, γup , is utilized to find the The secrecy capacity, CS , can be expressed as
SINR of the D2D communications as [36], [37] 
CC − CE , γC > γE
CS = (25)
4
γD2D ≤ γup = min (γR , γD ) . (14) 0, γC ≤ γE
where CC and CE are the cellular and eavesdropper capacities,
Hence, Pout can be expressed as
respectively. In this respect, CC can be obtained by
Pout = Pr (γup ≤ ϕ)  
(15) γbc
= Pr (min (γR , γD ) ≤ ϕ) . CC = log2 (1 + γC ) = log2 1 + , (26)
1 + γjc
Pout can be further expressed as [38] 2 2 PB
where γbc = γ̄c |hbc | , γjc = γ̄jc |hjc | , γ̄c = σc2 , and γ̄jc =
Pout = FγR (ϕ) + FγD (ϕ) − FγR (ϕ)FγD (ϕ), Pj
(16) σc2 . Let us define ω1 = γ̄c λbc , and ω2 = γ̄jc λjc .

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D −1
NX
 
D −1
NX
(−1)k NDk−1 (−1)m NDm−1


2 − 1 1
Pout =ND  −     − ND
k+1 exp ϕ (k+1) exp ϕ (k+1) 1+ ϕ (k+1)µ3
m=0
m+1
k=0 µ1 µ2 µ2
     
1 exp − ϕ (m+1)
µ2
×   1−     1−    .
ϕ (k+1) ϕ (m+1)µ3
exp µ1 1 + µ2
(24)

In addition, CE can be obtained by In a similar manner, the PDF of γEI is obtained as

 
γbe NJ X
NJ −1 
NJ − 1
 
γ

CE = log2 (1 + γE ) = log2 1 + , (27) fγEI (γ) = (−1)k exp −
1 + γje ω3 ω4 k ω3
2 2 PB  k=0
where γbe = γ̄e |hbe | , γje = γ̄je |hbe | , γ̄e = σe2 , and γ̄je = (34)

(k+1) γ
Pj  1 + ω4 + ω3 
σe2 .
Let us define ω3 = γ̄e λbe , and ω4 = γ̄je λje . Thus SOP ×  2  .
can be written as (k+1) γ
ω4 + ω3
SOP = Pr (CS < Rs ) , (28) Lemma 1: SOPI is given by (35) at the
  top of the next
ω1 ω3 (k+1)
where Rs represents the target secrecy rate of cellular trans- page, where A1 = β1 ω + α , A 2 = ω4 , A3 =
2
mission.
  
ω3 1 + k+1ω4 , A4 = ωβ1 + ω13 , Ei(.) is the exponential
integral function [39, eq. (8.21.1)], β = 2Rs , and α = β − 1.

1) Jamming Antenna Selection Approaches: According to Proof: See Appendix A. 

the availability of the channel gains R → E, we propose two
approaches for the antenna jamming selection as follow. Case II: For a passive E, where the channel gains of E are
unknown, the criterion of jamming antenna selection is based
on minimizing the interference towards C. In this case, E will
Case I: For active E, where the channel gains of E are see a random jamming signal. In doing so, we use
known, the criterion of jamming antenna selection is based on 2 2
maximizing the interference to E. In this case, C will see a |hjc | = min |hkc | . (36)
k=1,..NJ
random jamming signal. In doing so, we use
Similarity, using the steps of the derivation of (33), the PDF
2 2
|hje | = max |hke | . (29) of γCII , can be obtained as
k=1,..NJ
  
Henceforward, the expressions related to Case I and II are NJ exp − ωγ1  1 + NJ + γ 
ω2 ω1
provided with subscripts I and II, respectively. In this respect, fγCII (γ) = 2  . (37)
ω1 ω2

NJ γ
the PDF of γCI is written as ω2 + ω1
Z ∞
fγCI (γ) = (x + 1)fγbc (γ(x + 1))fγjc (x) dx, (30) Thus, the CDF of γCII is given by
0   
NJ exp − ωγ1
where fγbc (.) is given by FγCII (γ) = 1 − . (38)
  NJ + ωω21γ
1 γ
fγbc (γ) = exp − . (31)
ω1 ω1 Similarly, the PDF of γEII can be obtained
In this respect, the cellular user experiences a random interfer- 
 
ence channel hjc generated from RJ, and so fγjc (.) is given exp − ωγ3  1 + 1 + x 
ω4 ω3
fγEII (x) = 2  . (39)
by ω3 ω4

1 x
ω4 + ω3
 
1 γ
fγjc (γ) = exp − . (32)
ω2 ω2 Using the same steps of the derivation of (35), the SOP for
By plugging (31) and (32) into (30), fγCI (γ) can be obtained Case II, SOPII , can be obtained
 as in (40) at the top of the

1 NJ ω1 1 1
as    next page, where B1 = β ω2 + α , B 2 = ω3 1 + ω4 ,
exp − ωγ1  1 + 1 + γ 
 
β 1
ω2 ω1 and B3 = ω1 + ω3 .
fγCI (γ) = 2  . (33)
ω1 ω2

1 γ
ω2 + ω1

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α NJ −1


NJ ω1 J −1
NX (−1)k
exp − ω1

k(A3 − A1 )

Ei [−A4 A2 ] Ei [−A4 A1 ]

SOPI =1 − −
ω2 ω4 β (A1 − A2 ) (A1 − A2 ) exp (−A4 A2 ) exp (−A4 A1 ) (35)
k=0
 
A4 Ei [−A4 A2 ] 1
+ (A3 − A2 ) + ,
exp (−A4 A2 ) A2
    h i 
B3 ω3
NJ ω1 exp − ωα1 (B − B ) Ei − ω4 Ei [−B B ]

ω3

2 1 3 1
SOPII =1 −         −  + B2 −
ω2 ω4 β B1 − ω 3
B1 − ω 3
exp − B3ω4ω3 exp (−B3 B1 ) ω4
ω4 ω4
 h i  (40)
B3 Ei − B3ω4ω3 ω
×   + 4  ,
exp − B3 ω3 ω3
ω4

C. Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Analysis Here, the SOP∞

II can be obtained using
−GdII
Here, the secrecy performance at high SNR, i,e., when γ c → SOP∞
II = (GaII γ c )
−GdII
+ O(γ c ), (45)
∞ is introduced to get a better understanding of the proposed where GdII = 1, and GaII is given by
system behavior. In this scenario, we consider that γ c >>    
γ e . As γ c → ∞, the asymptotic expression of SOP can be (N + ω ) β ω3 exp ω14
J 2 
expressed as GaII =  α+
  NJ λbc ω4
−G
SOP∞ = (Ga γ d ) d + O γ d−Gd , (41)  −1
1
× Γ 0, .
where Gd and Ga denote the secrecy diversity order and the ω4
secrecy array gain, respectively. O(.) represents the higher
order terms. To be more precise, Gd characterizes the SOP∞ , D. Probability of Non-zero Secrecy Capacity
and Ga describes the SNR advantage of SOP∞ relative to the It is well known that a non-zero secrecy capacity is obtained
reference curve (γ c )−Gd . when γC > γE . The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity,
1) SOP∞ ∞
I : – Case I. To derive SOPI , the exponential Pr(CS > 0), can be formulated as
function and the polynomial in (59), given in the Appendix A,  
1 + γC
are first expanded with the help of [39, eq. (1.211.1)] and [39, Pr(CS > 0) = Pr > 1 = 1 − Pr(γC < γE ), (46)
1 + γE
eq. (1.112.2)], respectively. Subsequently, we keep the first
two terms, and the higher-order terms are ignored. Hence, the where Z ∞
asymptotic CDF, Fγ∞ C
(.), is derived as Pr(γC < γE ) = FγC (γ)fγE (γ) dγ. (47)
I
0
1 γ
Fγ∞ (γ) = (ω2 + 1) x + O( ). (42) 1) Pr(CS > 0)I : – Case I: By plugging (59) and (34) into
C I ω1 ω1 (47), and with the help of partial fraction expansion, thereafter
Now, the SOP∞
I can be obtained using [39, eq. (3.352.4)] and [39, eq. (3.353.3)], Pr(CS > 0)I is
−GdI
SOP∞
I = (GaI γ c )
−GdI
+ O(γ c ), (43) given by (48), as shown at the top of the next page.
2) Pr(CS > 0)II : – Case II: By plugging (38) and (39)
where GdI = 1 and GaI is given by into (47), and using the same steps for the derivation of (48),
" NJ −1     Pr(CS > 0)II is given by (49), as shown at the top the next
(ω2 + 1)NJ X k NJ − 1 k+1
page.
GaI = (−1) exp
λbc ω2 ω4 k ω4
k=0
−1
IV. P ERFORMANCE A NALYSIS WITH O UTDATED CSI
 
(k + 1) ω4 α
×ω3 β Γ 0, + ,
ω4 (k + 1) As a result of some circumstances like the mobility and
where Γ(., .) is the upper incomplete gamma function [39, eq. the delay of the feedback, the outdated CSI (indicated here as
(8.350.2)]. hab ) may vary from the actual
√ CSI denoted as hab , giving
e
by [40] hab = ρab hab + 1 − ρab wab , where ρab is the
e
2) SOP∞II : – Case II. Using the same steps for the deriva- hab and hab , wab is a circularly
correlation coefficient between e
tion of (42), the asymptotic CDF, Fγ∞ C
(.), for Case II can be symmetric complex Gaussian random variable (RV) having
obtained as the same variance as the RV hab where ab ∈ {tr, rd, je, jc}.
 
1 ω2 γ Hence, the conditional PDF fγeab |γab (.) is given by (50)
Fγ∞ (γ) = + 1 γ + O( ). (44)
CII
ω1 NJ ω1

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    h   i

 ω1 ω1 +ω3
NJ ω1 (−1) J −1
NX A 3 − k NJ −1 Ei − A 2
Pr(CS > 0)I =      ω2   k   
ω1 ω3
 
ω2 ω4 ω1
− A ω1
− A exp − ω1 +ω3
A
k=0 ω2 2 ω2 2 ω1 ω3 2
h  i    h   i  (48)
ω1 +ω3 ω1 +ω3
Ei − ω2 ω3 ω1 ω3 Ei − ωω11+ω ω3
3
A2 1
−     + (A3 − A2 )      +  .
exp − ωω12+ω 3
exp − ω1 +ω3
A A2
ω3 ω1 ω3 2
    h  i
N ω B2 − NJω2ω1 Ei − ωω11+ω ω4
3

Pr(CS > 0)II =  J 1        

NJ ω1 ω3 NJ ω1 ω3 ω1 +ω3
ω2 ω4 ω2 − ω4 ω2 − ω4 exp − ω1 ω4
h  i    h  i  (49)
(ω1 +ω3 ) NJ ω1 +ω3 ω1 +ω3
Ei − ω2 ω3

ω

ω1 ω3 Ei − ω1 ω4 ω
3 4
−     + B2 −     +  .
exp − (ω1 +ω3 ) NJ ω4 exp − ω1 +ω3 ω3
ω2 ω3 ω1 ω4

Proof: See Appendix C. 

! √
γ + ρ2ab x
 
1 2ρbc γx
fγeab |γab (γ/x) = exp − , I0 By plugging (52) and (53) into (51), Pout can be obtained.
∆ab ∆ab ∆ab
(50) B. Secrecy Outage Probability
where γeab and γab are the SINRs for the actual and outdated

In this section, SOPs for outdated CSI, SOPI and SOPII ,
CSI for the ab channel, ∆ab = 1 − ρ2ab γ̄ab , and I0 (.) is the
are studied for both cases, respectively.
zero-order modified Bessel function of the first kind [39, eq.
1) Case I : Now, we derive the PDF expressions of the
(8.445)].
actual channel gains.
Lemma 4: The PDF of γ eEI can be obtained as
 
A. D2D Outage Probability NXJ −1 (−1)k
NJ −1


exp − ωγ3
k
In this section, the D2D outage probability for outdated CSI, fγeEI (γ) =NJ

k=0
ω3 ∆je (k + 1) + ρ2je ω4
Pout , is investigated. To obtain the lower bound Pout , we have   (54)
(k+1) γ
1 + ∆je (k+1)+ρ 2 ω +
Pout = FγeR (ϕ) + FγeD (ϕ) − FγeR (ϕ)FγeD (ϕ). (51) ×  je 4 ω3
2  .
 
(k+1) γ
Lemma 2: The CDF of γ eR can be obtained as ∆je (k+1)+ρ2 ω4
+ ω3
je

NX
D −1  
ND − 1
FγeR (γ) =ND (−1)k
k Proof: See Appendix D. 
k=0
 
(k+1)γ
 (52)
1 − exp − ∆tr (k+1)+ρ 2 µ
1 Lemma 5: SOPI can be obtained as in (55) at the top
tr
× , ω3 (k+1)
(k + 1) of the next page. where D1 = ∆ (k+1)+ρ , and
  ( je je 4 )
2 ω

ω3 (k+1)
D2 = ω3 1 + ∆ (k+1)+ρ


where ∆tr = 1 − ρ2tr µ1 . ( je
.
je 4 )
2 ω

Proof: See Appendix B.  Proof: See Appendix E. 

Lemma 3: FγeD can be obtained as 2) Case I : In the following lemma, SOPII is derived for
Case II.
D −1
NX
(−1)k NDk−1


Lemma 6: SOPII can be obtained as in (56) at the
 top of the
FγeD (γ) =ND 
k+1 1
next page, where H1 = β α + N ∆ +ρ2 ωNJ ω1
.
k=0 ( J jc jc 2 )
 
(k+1) γ
 (53)
exp − ∆rd (k+1)+ρ 2
× 1 − rd µ2
, Proof: See Appendix F. 
(k+1) µ3 γ
1+ ∆rd (k+1)+ρ2rd µ2 V. R ESULTS AND D ISCUSSION


where ∆rd = 1 − ρ2rd µ2 . In this section, we present the numerical and simulation
results to verify the analysis carried out in the above sections.

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    
NJ −1 ω1 +ω2 α
exp − ωα1


NJ ω1 J −1
NX (−1)k k D2 − β ω2
SOPI =1 −
      
ω2 β ∆je (k + 1) + ρ2je ω4 ω1 +ω2 α
− D ω1 +ω2 α
− D
k=0 β ω2 1 β ω2 1
 h   i h  i 
(ω1 +ω3 β) (ω1 +ω3 β) (ω1 +ω2 α)
Ei − ω1 ω3 D1 Ei − ω1 ω3 β ω2
×    −     + (D2 − D1 ) (55)
(ω1 +ω3 β) (ω1 +ω3 β) (ω1 +ω2 α)
exp − ω1 ω3 D 1 exp − ω1 ω3 β ω2
  h   i 
ω1 +ω3 β
ω1 ω3 Ei − ω1ω+ω 1 ω3
3 β
D1 1 
×     + ,
exp − ω1 +ω3 β
D D 1
ω1 ω3 1
      h  i
ω4 +1 β ω3 +ω1
NJ ω1 exp − ωα1 ω3 ω4 − H 1 Ei − ω1 ω4
SOPII =1 −        
ω3 ω3 β ω3 +ω1
2


NJ ∆jc + ρjc ω2 ω4 β H1 − ω4 H1 − ω4 exp − ω1 ω4
h   i    h  i  (56)
β ω3 +ω1 β ω +ω β ω3 +ω1
Ei − ω1 ω3 H1 
ω + 1

ω

ω
3
ω
1
Ei − ω ω ω
4 3 1 3 1 4 4 
−     + −     + ,
exp − β ω3 +ω1
H ω 3 ω 4 ω 4 exp − β ω3 +ω1 ω3
ω1 ω3 1 ω1 ω4

100 Exact (Simulation) ND = 1 100

Exact (Simulation) ND = 3
Exact (Simulation) ND = 10
Analytical Lower Bound
-1
10
Pout

10-1
Pout

10-2
- = 5 dB
- = 10 dB
- = 15 dB
10-2
10-3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 10 20
- (dB) 30 40 ND

Fig. 2. Simulation and analysis plots of the D2D outage probability, Pout , Fig. 3. The analysis plot of the D2D outage probability, Pout , vs number of
vs SNR, γ̄, for different number of jammimg antennas, ND , where γ̄ = γ̄r jammimg antennas, ND , for different SNR γ̄, where µ3 = 10 dB, and Rd =
= γ̄d , µ3 = 10 dB, and Rd = 1 b/s/Hz. 1 b/s/Hz.

Throughout the obtained results, the impact of the jamming
power, the average SINRs, and the number of antenna at
the jammer, NJ , on the secrecy performance of the cellular
network are studied. Without loss of generality, the variances
of the noise at all nodes are normalized to unity. Unless stated,
ω2 is 10 dB.
In Fig. 2, the exact (simulation) and the lower bound
(analysis) outage probability, Pout , for D2D communications
is depicted versus γ̄, where γ̄ = γ̄r = γ̄d . It turns out
that Pout of the D2D link decreases as γ̄ increases without
any outage floor. In addition, we find that Pout improves
significantly with increasing ND . Moreover, the performance
of D2D communications improves by using multiple antennas
relay in comparison to a single antenna relay. It is also
noteworthy that there is a perfect agreement, at high SNR,
between the simulation and numerical results, verifying the
preciseness of the analytical lower bound expression in (14).
In Fig. 3, Pout is plotted versus ND . In this respect, the
impact of ND on the D2D performance is determined and it
can be seen that Pout improves continuously with increasing
ND . Obviously, Pout decreases as ND increases, as expected.
Numerical results match well with the simulation results, thus
validating our analysis.
For Case I, SOPI is depicted in Fig. 4 versus γ̄c . In this
respect, the average SNR of the E, γ̄e , is set to 5 dB and 15
dB, and Rs is 1 b/s/Hz. With this in mind, it can be clearly
observed that SOPI decreases as NJ increases at the MIMO
relay given the fact that the wiretapped signal is degraded. The
generating jamming signals interfere with E, which means
that secure data transmission is guaranteed. Moreover, SOPI

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0 0
10 10
- = 15 dB
e

-1
10 -

Pr (CS > 0)I

e
= 5 dB
SOPI

- -1
= 5 dB 10
e - = 15 dB
e

10-2 Conventional System

NJ = 3 Simulation N = 10 Simulation
J

N = 10 Simulation N =3 Simulation
J
J
Analysis Conventional System
Asymptotic Analysis
10-3 10-2
0 10 20 30 40 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
- (dB) - (dB)
c c

Fig. 4. Analytical and Monte-Carlo simulation (Case I) of the secrecy outage Fig. 6. Analytical and simulation plots (Case I) of the probability of non-zero
probability, SOPI , vs SNR, γ̄c , for different γ̄e and NJ , where ω4 = 10 dB, secrecy capacity, Pr (CS > 0)I , vs SNR, γ̄c , for different γ̄e and NJ , where
and Rs = 1 b/s/Hz. ω4 = 10 dB.

0
10 100
- = 15 dB
e

10-1 -
II

= 5 dB
Pr(C > 0)

e
SOPII

-1
10
S

- = 5 dB -
e = 15 dB
e
-2
10 Conventional System
NJ = 3 Simulation
NJ = 10 Simulation
NJ = 10 Simulation
NJ = 3 Simulation
Analysis
Asymptotic Conventional System
10-3
Analysis
0 10 20 30 40 10-2
0 5 10
- (dB) -15(dB) 20 25 30
c c

Fig. 5. Analytical and Monte-Carlo simulation (Case II) of the secrecy outage Fig. 7. Analytical and simulation plots (Case II) of the probability of non-
probability, SOPII , vs SNR, γ̄c , for different γ̄e and NJ , where ω4 = 10 dB, zero secrecy capacity, Pr (CS > 0)II , vs SNR, γ̄c , for different γ̄e and NJ ,
and Rs = 1 b/s/Hz. where ω4 = 10 dB.

increases as γ̄c decreases and γ̄e increases, as expected. With
respect to Case II, Fig. 5 shows SOPII , versus γ̄c . It is
clearly that, for both γ̄e = 5 and 15 dB, SOPII increases
with more jamming antennas as shown in Fig. 5. Additionally,
we can observe that SOPII decreases as γ̄c increases and
γ̄e decreases, as expected. Furthermore, for both cases, the
asymptotic results are provided, where a perfect match with
the exact results can be observed as γ c → ∞. Again, there
is a tight agreement between the simulation and numerical
results, verifying the correctness of our analysis. It is worth
mentioning that in both Cases I and II, the secrecy capacity
of the cellular network increases as a result of using jamming
antenna at R.
To support our contribution, Figs. 4 and 5 illustrate the
security advantages that the cellular user can gain as compared
to the conventional system model, where there is no relay [41].
In the conventional system, there is no relay and T transmits
directly to R. Each transmission from T to R occurs in one
phase and the cellular transmits in the same phase. Equal
transmit power in both schemes, i.e., the conventional one
and the proposed one, is assumed to ensure a fair comparison.
It is worth mentioning that, when NJ = 1, both schemes
have the same performance. In this particular case, there is
no advantage of the proposed scheme. However, it can be
observed that the secrecy performance of the cellular network
significantly improves as NJ increases. At SOPII = 10−3 ,
we note a security improvement of 10 dB and 5 dB of the
proposed scheme over the conventional one when NJ = 10
and NJ = 3, respectively. According to Fig. 5, SOPII de-
creases from 0.015 to 0.0035 at 30 dB as the number of
jamming antenna increases from 1 to 10. With this in mind, it
is worthy for the cellular system to be silent in the first phase

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10
0
100 - = 15 dB
e

10
-1 10-1
|

SOPII
| -
Pout

= 5 dB
e

10
-2 10-2
= 0.1 Simulation
jc
= 0.1 Exact (Simulation) = 0.9 Simulation
jc
= 0.9 Exact (Simulation) =1 Simulation
jc
= 1 Exact (Simulation)
Analysis
10-3
Analytical Lower Bound
10-3 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0 10 20 30 40
- (dB) -c(dB)
Fig. 8. The D2D outage probability, Pout , of outdated CSI vs SNR, γ̄, for Fig. 10. The secrecy outage probability, SOPII , of Outdated CSI (Case II) vs
different correlation coefficient values ρ, where ρ = ρtr = ρrd , γ̄ = γ̄r = γ̄d , SNR, γ̄c , for different correlation coefficient values ρjc and γ̄e , where the
ND = 3, µ3 = 10 dB, and Rd = 1 b/s/Hz. number of jamming antennas NJ = 3 and Rs = 1 b/s/Hz.

jamming antennas.
100 -
e
= 15 dB Regarding outdated CSI, Fig. 8 shows the exact (simula-
tion) and lower bound (analysis) outage probability, Pout , for
different values of the correlation coefficient ρ where ρ = ρtr
-1 = ρrd . We note that as ρ increases to unity, the performance
10 gain enhances substantially. Therefore, it can be concluded
|
that the availability of the CSI is essential in enhancing the
I

-
SOP

= 5 dB
e outage probability performance of the D2D communication.
-2
10
= 0.1 Simulation
je
= 0.9 Simulation
je
=1 Simulation
je
Analysis
-3
10
0 10 - 20 30
(dB)
c observe that SOPI increases as γ̄c decreases and γ̄e inecreases.
Fig. 9. The secrecy outage probability, SOPI , of Outdated CSI (Case I) vs
SNR, γ̄c , for different correlation coefficient values ρje and γ̄e , where the
number of jamming antennas NJ = 3 and Rs = 1 b/s/Hz.
to guarantee secure data transmission in the second phase. In
summary, the proposed system model has many advantages
over the conventional system such as improving the secrecy
performance of the cellular network, as shown in Figs. 4 and
5 and increasing the reliability and robustness of the D2D
communications, as shown in Figs. 2 and 3.
Figure 6 shows the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity,
Pr(CS > 0)I , for Case I versus γ̄c . It is obvious that
Pr(CS > 0)I increases as γ̄c increases for a fixed γ̄e . However,
Pr(CS > 0)I decreases with increasing γ̄e . Moreover, we note
that Pr(CS > 0)I decreases as NJ decreases. Simulation re-
sults are seen to conform with the analytical results, validating
the analysis. Furthermore, Fig. 7 represents Pr(CS > 0)II for
Case II versus γ̄c . Both simulation and analytical results are
shown, and match perfectly. It is clearly shown in Fig. 7 that,
for both γ̄e = 5 and 15 dB, Pr(CS > 0)II increases with more
Furthermore, a good match between the exact (simulation) and
lower bound (analysis) at high SNR can also be observed.
To study the influence of the outdated CSI case on the
secrecy performance, Fig. 9 illustrates SOPI for outdated CSI
Case I versus SNR, γ̄c , for different values of γ̄e and NJ
set to 3. Without loss of generality, the correlation coefficient
40 values ρje are set to 0.1, 0.9, and 1. From this figure, we can
In addition, we can clearly note that SOPI improves as ρje
increases to 1 because the secrecy capacity impoves with
perfect CSI.
Figure 10 illustrates SOPII for outdated CSI Case II. As
can be seen, for a fixed ρjc , namely, ρjc ∈ {0.1, 0.9, 1},
SOPII improves as γ̄c increases and ρjc increases to unity.
This clearly suggest that the outdated CSI can have a harmful
influence on the secrecy capacity for the cellular network.
Therefore, Figs. 9 and 10 clearly show that, in both Cases I and
II, the jamming antenna selection at the MIMO relay increases
the secrecy capacity for the cellular network. Furthermore, in
both cases, there is no outage floor. Moreover, the analytical
results and the simulation results match perfectly.
VI. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, a cooperative system model to simultaneously
increase the D2D reliability and robustness, and enhance the
secrecy capacity of the cellular network, in an inband underlay
D2D cellular system, is introduced. Towards this end, a MIMO
relay is utilized to confound the eavesdropper by transmitting

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jamming signals. A complete analysis, whereby closed-form A PPENDIX C

expressions for the different performance metrics are provided P ROOF OF L EMMA 3
for both perfect and outdated CSI cases. As revealed in
the analysis and simulation, the D2D outage probability, the The SINR at D for actual CSI can be expressed as
secrecy outage probability, and the probability of non-zero γ
erd
secrecy capacity are improved as a result of the cooperation. γ
eD = . (63)
1 + γbd
Obviously, the obtained results confirm the benefits of the
Now, we can determine the CDF of γ eD as
cooperation system by enhancing the security level of the Z ∞
cellular link and the transmission rate for the D2D users, FγeD (γ) = Fγerd (γ(x + 1))fγbd (x) dx. (64)
while utilizing the spectrum band of the cellular network. 0
Furthermore, simulation results match entirely with numerical Similarly, Fγerd (γ) can be derived following a similar proce-
results, validating the analysis. dure in the derivation of (52) and is obtained as
NXD −1  
A PPENDIX A ND − 1
Fγerd (γ) =ND (−1)k
P ROOF OF L EMMA 1 k
k=0
The SOPI can be further mathematically written as
 
(k+1) γ
 (65)
1 − exp − ∆rd (k+1)+ρ 2 µ
2
rd
Z ∞ × ,
SOPI = FγCI (ξ(γ))fγE I (γ) dγ, (57) k+1
0


where FγCI (.) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) where ∆rd = 1 − ρ2rd µ2 . By substituting (20) and (65)
of γCI , fγEI is the PDF of γEI given by (34), and ξ(γ) = in (64) and evaluating the integral, The CDF of γ
eD can be
2Rs (1 + γ) − 1. obtained as in (53).
Now, we derive FγCI as follows
Z γ
A PPENDIX D
FγCI (γ) = fγCI (ζ) dζ, (58) P ROOF OF L EMMA 4
0
where fγCI is the PDF of γCI given by (33). Then, by The SINR at EI is given by
substituting (33) in (58), the CDF of of γCI can be derived as γbe
  γ
eEI = . (66)
1+γ

exp − ωγ1 eje
FγCI (γ) = 1 − ω2
. (59) The PDF of γ eE can be obtained by using
1+ ω 1
γ Z ∞
By plugging (59) and (34) into (57), and with the help of fγeEI (γ) = (x + 1)fγbe (γ(x + 1))fγeje (x) dx, (67)
0
partial fraction expansion, thereafter [39, eq. (3.352.4)] and
[39, eq. (3.353.3)], SOPI is given by (35). where fγbe is given by
 
1 γ
fγbe (γ) = exp − . (68)
A PPENDIX B ω3 ω3
P ROOF OF L EMMA 2 To derive the PDF of γ eje , we use
The PDF of γeR can be derived by using Z ∞
Z ∞ fγeje (y) = fγeje |γjc (y/x)fγje (x) dx, (69)
fγeR (y) = fγeR |γR (y/x)fγR (x) dx. (60) 0
0 where fγje (.) is given by
By substituting (50) and (17) in (60) and using [39, eq. NJ −1    
(6.643.2)] and [39, eq. (9.220.2)], fγeR (y) can be derived as NJ X NJ − 1 γ (k + 1)
fγje (γ) = (−1)k exp − .
NXr −1
ω4 k ω4
  k=0
Nr − 1 (70)
fγeR (γ) =ND (−1)k
k Similarly, fγeje (γ) can be derived following a similar procedure
k=0
 
(k+1) γ
 (61) in the derivation of (61) and is obtained as
exp − ∆tr (k+1)+ρ 2 µ
tr 1
× , NXJ −1  
∆tr (k + 1) + ρ2tr µ1 NJ − 1
fγeje (γ) =NJ (−1)k
k

k=0
where ∆tr = 1 − ρ2tr µ1 . To derive the CDF of γ
eR , we have  
(k+1)γ
 (71)
exp − ∆je (k+1)+ρ 2 ω
Z γ je 4
× .
FγeR (γ) = fγeR (ζ) dζ. (62) ∆je (k + 1) + ρ2je ω4
0
By substituting (61) in (62) and evaluating the integral, the By substituting (68) and (71) in (67), the PDF of γ
eEI can be
CDF of γ
eR can be obtained as in (52). obtained as in (54).

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Transactions on Vehicular Technology
12

A PPENDIX E [4] N. Yang, L. Wang, G. Geraci, M. Elkashlan, J. Yuan, and M. Di Renzo,

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0018-9545 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Auckland University of Technology. Downloaded on May 27,2020 at 03:25:45 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TVT.2020.2994505, IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology
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MAJID H. KHOSHAFA (S’18) received his B.Sc.
in Communication Engineering from Ibb University,
Ibb, Yemen, in 2007 and his M.Sc. in Telecommu-
nications Engineering from King Fahd University of
Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), Dhahran, Saudi
Arabia, in 2017. From 2009 to 2010, he worked as a
Radio Network Planning and Optimization Engineer
in MTN Telecommunications, Sana’a, Yemen. He
was a Researcher and Teaching Assistant with the
Electrical Department, Faculty of Engineering, Ibb
University, from 2010 to 2013. He is currently
pursuing the Ph.D. degree with the Memorial University of Newfoundland, St.
John’s, NL, Canada. His research interests include wireless communications,
physical layer security, 5G enabling technologies, D2D communications, and
cognitive radio.
0018-9545 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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13
Telex M. N. Ngatched (M’05–SM’17) received
the B.Sc. degree and the M.Sc. degree in elec-
tronics from the University of Yaoundé, Cameroon,
in 1992 and 1993, respectively, the MscEng (Cum
Laude) in electronic engineering from the University
of Natal, Durban, South Africa, in 2002, and the
Ph.D. in electronic engineering from the University
of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa, in 2006.
From July 2006 to December 2007, he was with
the University of KwaZulu-Natal as Postdoctoral
Fellow, and from 2008 to 2012 with the Department
of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Manitoba, Canada, as
a Research Associate. He joined Memorial University in August 2012, where
he is currently an Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Engineering
One program at Grenfell Campus. His research interests include 5G and 6G
enabling technologies, visible light communications, power-line communica-
tions, optical communications, and underwater communications. Dr. Ngatched
serves as the Managing Editor of the IEEE Communications Magazine and as
an Associate Editor of the IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society.
He was the publication chair of the IEEE CWIT 2015, the Managing Editor of
the IEEE Communications Letters from September 2018 to March 2020, an
Associate Editor with the IEEE Communications Letters from 2015 to 2019,
and Technical Program Committee (TPC) member and session chair for many
prominent IEEE conferences including IEEE GLOBECOM, IEEE ICC, IEEE
WCNC, IEEE VTC, and IEEE PIMRC. He was a recipient of the Best Paper
Award at the IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference
(WCNC) in 2019. He is a Professional Engineer (P. Eng.) registered with the
Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Newfoundland and Labrador, St.
John’s, NL, Canada.
MOHAMED H. AHMED (M’96–SM’07) obtained
his Ph.D. degree in Electrical Engineering in 2001
from Carleton University, Ottawa, where he worked
from 2001 to 2003 as a senior research associate.
In 2003, he joined the Faculty of Engineering and
Applied Science, Memorial University where he has
worked as a Full Professor until Dec. 2019 and as
an adjunct Professor from Jan. 2020. Dr. Ahmed
is currently an LTA Professor at the University of
Ottawa. He has published more than 155 papers in
international journals and conferences. He served as
an Editor for IEEE Communication Surveys and Tutorials from 2007 to 2018
and as a Guest Editor of a special issue on Fairness of Radio Resource
Allocation, EURASIP JWCN in 2009, and as a Guest Editor of a special
issue on Radio Resource Management in Wireless Internet, Wiley Wireless
and Mobile Computing Journal, 2003. Dr. Ahmed is a Senior Member of the
IEEE. He served as a cochair of the Signal Processing Track in ISSPIT’14
and served as a cochair of the Transmission Technologies Track in VTC’10-
Fall, and the multimedia and signal processing symposium in CCECE’09. Dr.
Ahmed won the Ontario Graduate Scholarship for Science and Technology
in 1997, the Ontario Graduate Scholarship in 1998, 1999, and 2000, and
the Communication and Information Technology Ontario (CITO) graduate
award in 2000. His research interests include radio resource management in
wireless networks, multi-hop relaying, cooperative communication, vehicular
ad-hoc networks, cognitive radio networks, and wireless sensor networks. Dr.
Ahmed’s research is sponsored by NSERC, CFI, QNRF, Bell/Aliant and other
governmental and industrial agencies. Dr. Ahmed is a registered Professional
Engineer (P.Eng.) in the province of Newfoundland, Canada.