9/11> al-queda was behind it

US attacked on september 11 by Osama bin Laden and Al qaeda in afghanistan.

But they said that also Saddam hussein and iraq have something with 9/11

(Iraq başkenti Baghdad)

Mission accomplished

Islamic state of iraq(ISIS) former soldiers of iraq because after mission acomplished they were
unemployed and they were angry to US they formed rebel groups

‘’axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world’’

‘’the security of the world requires disarming Saddam hussedin’’ said W.bush

WMDs > iraq has it

2002 UN resolution 1441 > giving chance to Saddam hussein to give up WMDs

_-------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------

Syrian conflict 10 years

Its all started back in 2011. The arab spring was happening and leaders in tunisia and egypt had
already been overthrown.

And syrian ppl decided to send their president a message.

The children were arrested and tortured and ppl started protesting.

Syrian military backed by iran and russia

Free syrian army > against Assad

Uprising becomes a civil war.

-----------------------------------
US withdrawal from Afghanistan

Around 1980s afghan guerillas called the mujahideen fought a soviet occupation for nine years. They
even got money and weapons from the CIA

In 1989 the soviets pulled out and the next few years were pretty chaotic. By 1992 there was a full-
blown civil war with tribal leaders fighting for power.

Two years later a militia called the Taliban started getting attention.

By 1996 the Taliban had seized the capital and they declared afghanistan an islamic emirate and
started imposing their own strict interpretation of islamic law.

Then 9/11happened.

The US was after al-qaeda’s leader, osama bin laden, who was hiding out in afghanistan with the
taliban’s help.

Then US invaded afghanistan.

--------------------------

--------------------------

DECEMBER 28 IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM SLAYT

>The U.S. then supported the long, repressive reign of the shah of Iran, whose security services
brutalized Iranian citizens for decades.

>In 1951, the Iranian Parliament chose a new prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, who then led
lawmakers to vote in favor of taking over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, expelling the company’s
British owners and saying they wanted to turn oil profits into investments in the Iranian people.

>The U.S. feared disruption in the global oil supply and worried about Iran falling prey to Soviet
influence. The British feared the loss of cheap Iranian oil.

>Mossadegh was replaced by a much more Western-friendly prime minister, hand-picked by the CIA.
The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957

>Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a country could request American economic assistance and/or aid
from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state.

>The United States and Iran signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement as part of the United States
Atoms for Peace program. The agreement provided for U.S. technical assistance and the lease of
enriched uranium to Iran. It also called for research cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy uses.

November 1967

The Tehran Nuclear Research Center, supplied by the United States, opened. It was equipped with a
5-megawatt nuclear research reactor called the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), fueled by highly
enriched uranium.

July 1968

Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Parliament ratified it in February 1970.
Uranium enrichment was allowed under the treaty.

May 1974

Iran signed the NPT’s Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The
safeguards allowed inspections for the purpose of verifying that nuclear enrichment for peaceful
nuclear energy is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

1975

The Ford administration expressed support in principle for the shah’s plan to develop a full-fledged
nuclear power program to diversify Iran’s energy sources. The shah wanted the capacity to generate
23,000 megawatts of electricity with the ability to reprocess U.S.-supplied fuel.

April 1976

President Gerald Ford issued National Security DecisionMemorandum 324 supporting the shah’s
ambitions and helping Iran formulate a plan to build 23 nuclear power reactors. But the
administration refused to allow Iran to have the independent reprocessing capabilities sought by the
shah.

>Ford’s memorandum instead approved a multinational reprocessing plant in Iran that would also
enable the United States to participate in the project. Iran rejected the multinational option and
pushed for a comprehensive national nuclear program.
August 1977

President Carter reopened negotiations on the shah’s quest for a nuclear energy program.

January 1978

Iran and the United States initialed a nuclear agreement in which Iran agreed to safeguards beyond
NPT requirements. In return, the United States granted Iran "most favored nation" status for
reprocessing so that Iran would not be discriminated against when seeking permission to reprocess
U.S.-supplied fuel.

1979

After the 1979 revolution, the United States stopped supplying highly enriched uranium for the
Tehran Research Reactor.

July 31 – Kraftwerk Union terminated work on the Bushehr reactor when Iran failed to make
payments.

1979: Iranian revolution

The US-backed Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, is forced to leave the country on 16 January
following months of demonstrations and strikes against his rule by secular and religious opponents.

>Two weeks later, Islamic religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini returns from exile. Following a
referendum, the Islamic Republic of Iran is proclaimed on April 1.

1979-81: US Embassy hostage crisis

The US embassy in Tehran is seized by protesters in November 1979 and American hostages are held
inside for 444 days. The final 52 hostages are freed in January 1981, the day of US President Ronald
Reagan's inauguration. (resmen işe başlama)

Continuity & Change in Iran Domestic and Foreign Policy

February 1984

German engineers returned to Iran to do a feasibility study to complete the Bushehr reactor.
March 24 – Iraq’s attack on the Bushehr nuclear power plant did serious damage.

December – Iran opened a nuclear research center at Isfahan with China’s assistance. In 1985, China
supplied the center with a "training reactor."

May 1987

After 18 months of negotiations, Argentina concluded a $5.5 million deal with Tehran to supply a
new core for the Tehran Research Reactor so it would operate with only 20 percent enriched
uranium, instead of the previous 90 percent. In 1989, Argentina replaced the core.

October 1990

Iran decided to rebuild the damaged Bushehr nuclear power plant.

August 1992

Russia and Iran signed a cooperation agreement on the civil use of nuclear energy, including
construction of a nuclear power plant.

January 1995

Iran signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to build a light water reactor at
Bushehr under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Russia was under a
contractual obligation to complete the plant within 55 months. The project’s completion was delayed
until August 2010.

May 1997

The IAEA expanded the Safeguards Agreement by adopting the Additional Protocol. Under the latter,
inspectors would be allowed to conduct short notice inspections and be provided with multiple
entry/exit visas. Iran signed the Additional Protocol in 2003, but had not ratified it as of 2010.

February 1998

The Clinton administration opposed Iran's nuclear energy program on grounds that Iran had
sufficient oil and gas reserves for power and that work on the nuclear power reactor could indirectly
contribute to a weapons program.

May 1999

Russia said Iran wanted to expand nuclear cooperation, potentially including the building of a second
nuclear power plant.

March 2000

President Clinton signed the Iran Nonproliferation Act, which allowed the United States to sanction
individuals and organizations providing material aid to Iran’s nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic
missile weapons programs.
March 2001

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Khatami signed nuclear and military
cooperation accords. Khatami said Iran wanted a second nuclear power plant after the completion of
Bushehr.

2002

Jan. 8 – Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani said, "Iran is not seeking to arm itself with non-
conventional weapons."

Aug. 15 – The National Council of Resistance of Iran, an exiled opposition group, revealed that Iran
was building two secret nuclear sites – a uranium enrichment plant and research lab at Natanz and a
heavy water production plant in Arak. President Khatami acknowledged the existence of Natanz and
other facilities on Iran's state-run television and invited the International Atomic Energy Agency to
visit them.

Sept. 1 – Russian technicians began to assemble heavy equipment in the Bushehr reactor, despite
U.S. attempts to convince the Russians not to participate. But the plant faced frequent delays in
construction.

2003

Feb. 9 – President Khatami said Iran had discovered and extracted uranium in the Savand area. He
cited Iran’s “legitimate right to obtain nuclear energy for peaceful aims” and expressed readiness to
accept international inspections of its nuclear activities.

May 6 – Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization presented the UnitedNations with a sketch of Iran's
nuclear program, insisting that the program was peaceful.

June 19 – An IAEA report did not find Iran in violation of the NPT but said Iran should have been more
forthcoming about the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and the Arak heavy water production
plant. The U.N. watchdog agency later urged Iran to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol to the
Safeguards Agreement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would allow inspectors more
access to nuclear sites and the right to sudden inspections.

Aug. 26 – IAEA inspectors found traces of highly enriched uranium at Iran's Natanz nuclear plant. Iran
claimed the traces came from equipment imported from another country.

Sept. 25 – U.N. weapons inspectors found traces of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium at a
second site near the capital city of Tehran. The IAEA set a deadline of Oct. 31 for Iran to prove it was
not making nuclear weapons.

Oct. 21 – In talks with Britain, France and Germany (EU-3), Iran agreed to suspend uranium
enrichment and processing activities and to open nuclear sites to unannounced inspections by the
U.N. watchdog agency. It also agreed to sign the Additional Protocols of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Dec. 18 – Tehran signed the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Safeguards
Agreement. The Additional Protocol granted IAEA inspectors greater authority in their nuclear
verification programs. Since then, Iran has at times voluntarily allowed more intrusive inspections,
but the Iranian parliament has not yet ratified the Additional Protocol.

2004

Feb. 22 – Iran acknowledged having secretly bought nuclear parts from international sources,
although Tehran continued to insist that its goal was electricity production and not nuclear
weapons.

Nov. 14 – In negotiations with Britain, France and Germany, Iran accepted the Paris accord, which
recognized Tehran's rights to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and reaffirmed Iran's
commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. In exchange, Iran voluntarily agreed to temporarily
suspend uranium enrichment activities and allow the IAEA to monitor the suspension.

Nov. 15 – The IAEA reported that it had not found any evidence that Iran had tried to develop
nuclear weapons, although it could not rule out the existence of nuclear materials that had not been
declared.

Nov. 22 – Iran invited the IAEA to monitor the suspension of all enrichment-related activities.

2005

Jan. 17 – President Bush said military action against Iran remained an option, "if it continues to
stonewall the international community about the existence of its nuclear weapons program."

Aug. 9 – Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the “production,
stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.”

Aug. 11 –The IAEA urged Iran to suspend all enrichment activities and re-instate IAEA seals.

Sept. 24 –The IAEA found Iran in noncompliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and decided to
refer Tehran to the U.N. Security Council for further action.

2006: Start of UN Sanctions

Feb. 4 – The IAEA voted to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council for its non-compliance with its NPT
Safeguards Agreement obligations.

July 31 – The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1696 demanding that Iran suspend its uranium
enrichment activities within one month.

Aug. 26 – Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inaugurated a heavy water production plant at
Arak. The United States expressed concern that the heavy water would be used in the heavy water
reactor at Arak to produce plutonium, an ingredient in making nuclear weapons.
Oct. 2 – President Bush signed into law the Iran Freedom SupportAct, which imposed economic
sanctions on nations and companies that aided Iran's nuclear program.

Dec. 23 – The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1737, sanctioning Iran for its failure to
comply with Resolution 1696 and halt uranium enrichment.

2007

March 24 – The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1747, which banned the sale of arms to
Iran increased the freeze on assets.

2008

Feb. 22 – An IAEA report concluded that Iran had not fully answered the international community's
questions about its nuclear program and testing of new centrifuge technology for faster uranium
enrichment.

March 3 – The U.N. Security Council approvedResolution 1803, imposing further economicsanctions
on Iran.

Sept. 26 – The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1835 which reaffirmed three earlier rounds of
sanctions against Iran. No new sanctions were imposed, largely because of objections by Russia and
China.

2009

Oct. 1 – Iran met in Geneva with permanent members (Britain, France, USA, China, Russia) of the
U.N. Security Council and Germany —P(5)+1 to discuss Iran's nuclear program. The parties outlined
a proposal for Iran to ship 80 percent of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium from Natanz to Russia.
The shipment would then go to France for further enrichment and fabrication of fuel rods for the
Tehran Research Reactor, which produced isotopes for medical use.

Oct. 19-21 – The early October talks in Geneva were continued in Vienna with the presence of the
IAEA, on the transfer of Iran’s low-enriched uranium. A consensus was reached on a draft agreement.
The United States, France and Russia approved the agreement, but Iran backed down due to
domestic opposition.

2010

May 17 – Turkey, Brazil and Iran agreed to a nuclear deal similar to the agreement outlined in
Geneva in 2009. The United States and Europeans rejected the deal because Iran had increased its
uranium stockpile. Washington also believed the move was a delaying tactic to avert sanctions.

June 9 – The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1929, imposing sanctions on Iran. They
included tighter financial measures and an expanded arms embargo. President Ahmadinejad said the
sanctions were a "used handkerchief that should be thrown in the dustbin," and that they were "not
capable of harming Iranians."
June 24 – US Congress approved the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010. The bill expanded existing U.S. sanctions on Iran.

July 26 – The European Union passed sanctions, which banned technical assistance to Iran’s oil and
gas industry.

Dec.6-7 – Iran met in Geneva with members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany for
negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. The group agreed to meet again in January 2011 in
Istanbul.

2011

May 23-24 – The E.U. imposed sanctions on more than 100 individuals and companies tied to Iran's
nuclear program while the United States sanctioned seven foreign companies involved in supplying
Iran with refined oil. It also blacklisted sixteen firms and individuals involved in the missile and
nuclear programs.

May 24 – An IAEA report found that Iran had significantly increased its low-enriched uranium
production and slightly increased its number of centrifuges.

Sept. 2 – An IAEA report found that Iran had not suspended its uranium enrichment related
activities and was not cooperating enough with the IAEA.

2012

Jan. 23 – The EU imposed an oil embargo on Iran, effective July 1, 2012. The EU made up 20 percent
of Iran’s oil sales.

March 6 – The P5+1 agreed to resume talks with Iran over its nuclear program.

April 14 – The P5+1 met in Istanbul to discuss Tehran's promised “new initiatives” on its nuclear
program.

May 23-24 – The P5+1 held inconclusive (sonuçsuz/yetersiz) talks with Iran in Baghdad.

Oct. 15 – The EU targeted Iran’s nuclear program with new sanctions on its financial, energy, trade,
and transport sectors.

Dec. 13 – The U.S. Treasury and State Department imposed sanctions on seven Iranian companies
and five individuals for “proliferating weapons of mass destruction”

Dec. 21 – The U.S. Treasury Department froze the assets of four Iranian companies and one executive
for links to Tehran’s missile and nuclear programs.

2013

Sept. 26 – Foreign ministers from P5+1 countries and Iran met on the sidelines of the U.N. General
Assembly and agreed to hold a new round of talks in Geneva.
Sept. 27 – President Barack Obama called Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in what was the first
direct communication between a U.S. and Iranian presidents since the 1979 revolution.

Oct. 15-16 – Diplomats from P5+1 countries and Iran met in Geneva to solve the nuclear dispute.
They committed to meeting in November to continue talks that were “substantive and forward
looking.”

Nov. 24 – Iran and the P5+1 reached an interim agreement that would significantly constrain
Tehran’s nuclear program for six months in exchange for modest sanctions relief.

2015: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

Foreign ministers from Iran and the P5+1 held a series of bilateral meetings in 2015. Talks also
continued at the deputy foreign minister level. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director
visited Rouhani and other officials in Tehran.

July 20 – The U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2231 endorsing the final deal.
The deal and its annexes were also delivered to the U.S. Congress, beginning a 60-day review period.

2018

May 8 – President Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA. The United States and
European allies were unable to come to a compromise that would allay the administration’s
concerns.

>Trump also announced his intention to reimpose sanctions on Iran that were lifted or suspended
under the JCPOA. The United States gave businesses three to six months to comply with U.S.
sanctions or face penalties.

>Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union reaffirmed their commitment to the JCPOA
soon after the announcement. Iranian officials condemned the U.S. move.

>June 5 – Supreme Leader Khamenei ordered the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI) to prepare for
increased uranium enrichment if the JCPOA were to collapse. AEOI director Ali Akbar Salehi
announced plans to increase production of uranium.

Nov. 5 – U.S. sanctions prohibiting the purchase of Iranian oil went into effect. The United States
granted waivers to eight countries—China, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and
Turkey—allowing them to continue importing Iranian oil at reduced rates. On November 12, the
IAEA quarterly report reaffirmed Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA.

2019

March 22 – The United States sanctioned several individuals and entities involved in Iran’s past
nuclear weapons program.
May 8 – President Rouhani announced that Iran would stop complying with parts of the 2015 nuclear
deal.

May 27 – President Trump offered to negotiate a new nuclear deal with Iran and identified nuclear
weapons as his priority.

July 8 – Iran began enriching uranium past the 3.67 percent mark specified by the 2015 nuclear
agreement. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announced that it was enriching uranium at 4.5
percent.

2020

On 3 January 2020, Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian major general, was assassinated by the United
States via a drone strike at Baghdad International Airport.

Jan. 5 - Iran announced that it would no longer abide by restrictions on uranium enrichment imposed
by the 2015 nuclear deal, known as (JCPOA).

Nov. 27 - Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, widely believed to be the pioneer behind Iran’s nuclear weapons
program, was assassinated in a roadside attack in Tehran. Iran blamed Israel and vowed retaliation.
(misilleme/öç)

Dec. 1 - Iran’s parliament, which is dominated by conservatives and hardliners, passed a bill requiring
the government to immediately resume enriching uranium to 20 percent.

2021

April 6, 2021: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA met for its first consultative session in Vienna. They
established two working groups: one tasked with outlining which sanctions against Iran the United
States must lift to re-enter the deal, and the other with what nuclear limits Iran must revert to in
order to meet its own obligations under the agreement.

April 13, 2021: Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has begun to boost
enrichment levels to 60 percent

April 15, 2021: The Joint Commission met in Vienna for the second round of talks to discuss the
progress of the two working groups.

April 27, 2021: The third round of talks

May 7, 2021: Fourth round of Vienna talks

May 25, 2021: Fifth round

June 20, 2021: Sixth round

Iran’s Nuclear Program

2015 agreement

Trump imposed new sanctions on Iran

----------------------------------

---------------------------------

--------------------------------

CHINA & RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST

China’s evolving role in the Middle East

>China has become an increasingly significant player in the Middle East in the past decade.

>While it is still a relative newcomer to the region and is extremely cautious in its approach to local
political and security challenges, the country has been forced to increase its engagement with the
Middle East due to its growing economic presence there.

>China’s relationship with the Middle East revolves around energy demand and the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013. It is a strategy that seeks to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via
land and maritime networks with the aim of improving regional integration, increasing trade and
stimulating economic growth.

>In 2015 China officially became the biggest global importer of crude oil, with almost half of its
supply coming from the Middle East.

>As a strategically important crossroads for trade routes and sea lanes linking Asia to Europe and
Africa, the Middle East is important to the future of the BRI – which is designed to place China at the
centre of global trade networks.
>For the moment, China’s relationship with the region focuses on Gulf states, due to their
predominant role in energy markets.

>>>China’s engagement with Middle Eastern countries is reflected in two key Chinese government
documents:

1) the 2016 “Arab Policy Paper”

2) the 2015 “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st- Century
Maritime Silk Road”.

>The cooperation framework outlined in these documents focuses on energy, infrastructure

construction, trade, and investment in the Middle East.

>They barely mention security cooperation – in line with Beijing’s narrative that its involvement in
the region does not advance its geopolitical goals.

> Beijing is careful to avoid replicating what it sees as Western intervention and puts forward a
narrative of neutral engagement with all countries – including those that are at odds with each other
– on the basis of mutually beneficial agreements.

From economic interests to political and security engagement?

> To date, China has concluded partnerships agreements with 15 Middle Eastern countries.

> It participates in anti-piracy and maritime security missions in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of
Aden, and has conducted large-scale operations to rescue its nationals from Libya in 2011 and Yemen
in 2015.

> It has increased its mediation efforts in crises such as those in Syria and Yemen – albeit cautiously
so; was instrumental in persuading Tehran to sign the Iran nuclear deal; and appointed two special
envoys to Middle Eastern countries in conflict.

> Moreover, China’s establishment of its first overseas military base, in Djibouti, as well as the
probable militarisation of the Pakistani port of Gwadar, contributes to the growth of the country’s
military presence near crucial maritime chokepoints the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.

> Finally, China has supplied arms to several Middle Eastern countries, albeit on a small scale.

> Beijing has been extremely careful not to become too involved, still believing that the US can
take responsibility for managing security in the region.

> China has played next to no role in easing geopolitical tension in the Middle East, as indicated by
the distance its political representatives maintain from major conflicts there.
> While China has worked with Russia on the UN Security Council to protect the Syrian regime, this
stems from its desire to adhere (bağlı kalmak) to the principle of non- interference rather than its
direct interests in the Syrian conflict.

> Given the recent series of incidents in the Strait of Hormuz that increased tension between Iran and
its geopolitical opponents, China could be forced to take on a greater security role to protect the
freedom of navigation crucial to its energy security.

> Beijing has kept to a very cautious line following the recent incidents, showing that it is not ready
yet to step in significantly.

> However, a few announcements have marked a departure from this traditional rhetoric.

> The Chinese ambassador to the United Arab Emirates announced in August 2019 that China might
participate in maritime security operations in the strait.

> The following month, Iranian sources declared that China would be involved in a joint naval drill
with Iran and Russia in the Sea of Oman and the northern Indian Ocean.

> It seems that China will most likely continue its anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations as usual
– but these announcements are striking in the sense that they would have been unthinkable only a
few years ago.

China’s challenge to US dominance in the Middle East

> China remains a major buyer of oil and natural gas from Middle Eastern exporters.

> The Middle East accounts for more than 40 percent of China’s oil imports, and is also a key supplier
of the country’s liquefied natural gas.

> China is likely to be increasingly reliant on energy from the region in the coming years, as the
country is projected to dramatically increase its energy consumption and only modestly raise its
domestic production.

> Diversity is important for China. The country has long maintained a somewhat balanced
approach to its Gulf energy imports.

> Given the Gulf monarchies’ close ties to the United States, Beijing is concerned that Washington
could put pressure on them to disrupt the flow of oil into China.

> This concern increases the perceived importance of Iran, which China sees as more resistant to
US policy.

> At the same time, the current round of US sanctions on Iran underscores China’s reliance on the
Arab side of the Gulf.

>Chinese oil imports from Saudi Arabia rose significantly. Beijing is likely concerned about this level
of dependence upon one energy source.
>For China, another consideration is the United States’ central role in the protection of Middle
Eastern shipping lanes crucial to Chinese oil imports.

>This vulnerability has become even more evident during the Sino-American trade war.

> With its main strategic rival able to threaten its energy security in this way, China has one more
reason to expand its naval presence across the Indian Ocean – a process that could, in turn, lead to
a larger Chinese security presence in the Middle East.

Construction, trade, and investment

> The Gulf monarchies have been major sources of infrastructure construction contracts for Chinese
firms, such as those for Qatar’s Lusail Stadium – the lead venue for the 2022 FIFA World Cup – and
Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu Refinery and high- speed rail line that connects Jeddah with Mecca and Medina.

> Gulf Vision development programmes, which include major infrastructure projects, provide
opportunities for further cooperation. Chinese firms have been active throughout the Middle East,
often focusing on projects that lend themselves to the BRI goal of connectivity.

> Ports and industrial parks have been central to such cooperation, as they create an economic
chain that links China to the Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean.

> The United Arab Emirates’ Khalifa Port, Oman’s Duqm Port, Saudi Arabia’s Jizan Port, and Egypt’s
Port Said, and Djibouti’s Ain Sokhna Port all form part of this project. Chinese firms are also likely to
play a major role in reconstruction projects in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

China’s partnership diplomacy

> China has complemented its plans for economic cooperation in the Middle East with strategic
partnership diplomacy.

> Almost all of the strategic partnership agreements China has signed with countries in the Middle
East and north Africa came about in the past decade (the one with Egypt, signed in 1999, is the sole
exception).

> China has established comprehensive strategic partnerships with Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and the UAE, as well as strategic partnerships with Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman,
Qatar, and Turkey.

> Coinciding with the expansion of the BRI, this flurry of diplomatic activity indicates that Chinese
leaders increasingly perceive the Middle East as important to their political and strategic goals.

> China’s relative lack of security commitments in the region – in comparison to the US – can create
the impression that it does not take sides in regional rivalries or tip the scales in any of its partners’
favour.
> But this view misses the hierarchical nature of China’s partnerships, in which it privileges relations
with comprehensive strategic partners above others.

> It also fails to account for China’s preference for stability in the Middle East; status quo-orientated
states that are networked throughout the region offer more to Beijing than isolated states.

> As China’s economic and diplomatic engagement with the Middle East continues to grow, it
seems that security cooperation will soon follow – and there have been nascent (oluşmaya
başlayan) moves in this direction.

> The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) began visiting ports on the Arabian Peninsula as part of
the international anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, giving Chinese naval officers the opportunity
to develop relations with their Arab counterparts.

> China has also contributed UN peacekeepers to Lebanon since 2006. And there has been an
increase in Chinese private security contractors’ work in the Middle East, as part of a response to
deeper Chinese engagement with conflict-affected countries such as Iraq.

> China’s arms sales to the Middle East have also increased in recent years – even if they are still
minimal compared to those of Western states.

> Much of China’s success has been in filling orders that the US cannot because of congressional
oversight, in areas such as armed drones and ballistic missile systems.

> Chinese companies can supply complete systems and accompanying services without political
considerations. Nonetheless, Middle Eastern states generally prefer to purchase arms from the US,
due to its advanced technology.

> However, China’s decision to only sell drones to countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
the UAE implies that it supports status quo powers.

> It has not sold advanced systems to non-state actors or revisionist states such as Iran (while the
proliferation of armed drones is a real concern in the Middle East, it is likely to continue with or
without Beijing’s help).

Conclusion

> In the face of inconsistent policies from the US and with an eye to a future with greater Chinese
power and influence, leaders in the Middle East have been receptive to Chinese outreach so far.

> The BRI addresses their domestic development concerns and, at the same time, signals Beijing’s
intention to become more invested in the region.

> This comes at a moment when Western countries, particularly the US, suffers from Middle East
fatigue.
> At this stage, it is hard to determine whether this is merely a hedging (korunma)strategy
designed to diversify their extra-regional power partnerships or if it signals the beginning of a
realignment that stretches across the Middle East to east Asia.

> It is clear, however, that China will be an engaged partner with a clearly articulated approach to
building a stronger presence in the region.

How have Russia’s policies in the Middle East changed since the Arab uprisings?

> The Middle East has historical and strategic importance for Russia. Imperial Russia and the Soviet
Union were both active external powers in the Middle East, enmeshed in rivalries with the Ottoman
Empire, the Persian Empires, and the British and the French Empires.

> During the Cold War, the Soviet rival in the Middle East was, of course, the United States.

> the Soviet Union was dissolved in late 1990 and the emerging Russia needed some time to
reorganize and stabilize in order to establish itself both economically and politically.

> Predicting Russia’s behavior has always been difficult, but it has become even more so over the
past several years.

> The 2008 war with Georgia, the 2014 intervention in Ukraine, and the 2015 Syrian campaign caught
policymakers and analysts off guard.

> The Kremlin has made an art out of surprising the world with its actions on the global stage. It is
clear that Russia has embarked on a more assertive and militaristic foreign policy in the Middle East
and elsewhere. Behind this assertiveness is a desire to re-establish Russia as a global power.

Drivers of Russian Policy in the Middle East

> Moscow’s assertive approach to the Middle East since the early 2000s has been largely driven by
strategic and economic concerns.

> Similarly, regional powers have their own reasons to engage with Russia.

> First, in 2005 President Putin described the breakup of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geo-
political catastrophe of the twentieth century.” He has never hidden his ambition to “restore” Russia
to the status of global power.

> The days when Moscow could entice allies through ideology are over. Instead of attraction and
persuasion, Russia has pursued hard diplomacy, economic inducements, military force, and other
coercive measures.

> Russia has been able to demonstrate to the U.S. and the EU that it plays a crucial role in ongoing
international conflicts.
> The country has established itself as a key player in Syria, Libya, and negotiations with Iran as well
as having extensive ties with Turkey and Israel.

> The so-called “Arab Spring” since 2011 has presented Russia with both significant security risks and
geo-political opportunities.

> The Kremlin has viewed the uprisings in several Arab countries as a re-play of the so-called “color
revolutions,” i.e., the toppling of pro-Moscow governments in Eastern Europe.

> Russian leaders have sought to block this bitter experience and stop what they consider a “Western
plot” against Russia’s national interests.

> Adapting an assertive foreign policy approach can serve to boost stability and legitimacy at home.

> In the last several years, Russia has been subject to European and American sanctions.

> Close cooperation with Middle Eastern countries can serve to offset the negative effects of these
Western-imposed sanctions.

> Russia has a large Muslim minority and several Islamic countries in its near abroad, i.e., the
Caucasus and Central Asia, are predominantly Muslim.

> Accordingly, Russian leaders have long perceived Islamic ideology and Islamists as significant
threats.

> Within this context, warm relations with Muslim countries in the Middle East and elsewhere would
enhance the Russian government’s image among its Muslim population and would enable Moscow
to contribute and shape the war against extremist groups in Syria and other Middle Eastern
countries.

> Economic interests are also a major driver of Russian foreign policy.

> Although the volume of trade between the two sides is relatively low, particularly in comparison
with other global powers such as the United States, the European Union, and China, economic ties
between Moscow and several regional powers have expanded since the early 2000s.

> Russia’s major exports to the Middle East include military equipment, machinery, oil and gas,
petrochemical, metallurgical, and agricultural products.

> The Middle East is the main destination for exports of Russian grains.

> In order to further boost trade relations, Moscow has occasionally offered to use national
currencies as a legal tender in bilateral trade instead of euros and U.S. dollars and has invited its
Middle East trade partners to form a free trade zone with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

> Investment is another major area of on-going cooperation between the two sides.

> Middle East oil producers own some of the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world. They want
to diversify their investment portfolio to include other major markets in addition to those of Western
Europe and the United States. Moscow seeks to attract some of these investments.
> Both Russia and several Middle Eastern countries are major oil and gas producers and exporters.

> A long time ago, the two sides decided that cooperation, rather than confrontation, would serve
their mutual interests. Major Russian energy companies, such as Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom,
Surgutneftegaz, and Tatneft, have made substantial investments in oil and gas sector in the Middle
East.

> Russia is not a member in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) but for several
years has coordinated its production policy with the Vienna-based organization.

> Generally, the two sides (Russia and OPEC) seek to maintain oil price stability and offset the
growing volume of US oil production.

> Similarly, Russia, along with several Middle Eastern countries, is a founding member in the Gas
Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), which has similar goals to those of OPEC.

> Arms deals have always been the cornerstone of Moscow-Middle Eastern relations since the time
of the Soviet Union.

> Most regional powers prefer Western over Russian arms. However, at least two challenges have
always complicated arms supplies from the United States and Europe: A) concern about human rights
and B) maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge.

> As a result, some Middle Eastern countries perceive Western governments as unreliable source of
weapons.

> Russia, on the other hand, does not impose such restraints on its arms deals. In the late 2010s,
Russia has been able to secure a major arms deal with Turkey, a NATO member, by selling it the S-
400 air defense system, despite strong opposition from the United States and the threat of sanctions,
which were eventually imposed in December 2020.

Limitations on Russian Middle East Policy

> Russia has many ways it can benefit from involvement in the Middle East.

> The two sides can provide each other with strategic and economic opportunities. However, this
ambitious desire to deepen mutual engagement confronts serious challenges.

> First, there is a huge mismatch between Moscow’s strategic objectives and its economic resources.
Unlike Middle Eastern oil exporters, the Russian economy is not deeply dependent on oil and gas
revenues, though these revenues do represent a large proportion of state budget.

>Low oil prices since 2014, and European and American sanctions, have limited Russia’s capacity to
exercise influence abroad.

>Arab Gulf states have identified Russia’s current economic need as a weakness that they can exploit
for their own political gain. Currently, Russia’s financial and economic capabilities do not match those
of the U.S. and EU and are not likely to do so in the foreseeable future.
> Second, Russia’s efforts to expand its influence in the Middle East pose another major challenge.

> In 2007 the state television channel Russia Today (RT) launched its Arabic service.

> By 2014, it had created a network of missions in the capitals of Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt.

>These efforts, however, have only made incremental gains in altering narratives in the region.

> Russia’s soft power still has a long way to develop in order to be able to compete with that of the
United States and Europe. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), France 24, and Voice of America
hold more resources and enjoy more credibility than RT.

> Third, despite limited economic resources and soft power, Russia has managed to establish and
maintain relations with almost all major regional powers including Egypt, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Israel, and Hamas.

> These relations with states and non-state actors who are at odds with each other have their own
limitations.

> Russia finds itself walking a tightrope to balance all these regional powers.

> For example, Moscow has had a hard time balancing its close ties with Israel, Iran, and Assad in
the on-going fighting in Syria.

> Another challenge is that this impartiality limits the depth of Russia’s bilateral relations.

>Finally, if the hostility further intensifies between these regional powers, Russia might be forced
to choose sides.

> Fourth, Russia does not only compete with the United States and Europe over influence in the
Middle East, it competes with China as well.

>Unlike Moscow, Beijing has so far chosen to avoid any security role similar to the Russian presence
in the Syrian civil war and more recently in the Libyan civil war.

>But, China enjoys key advantages over Russia. It controls substantial economic and financial
resources and in recent years has become the main trade partner to several Middle Eastern states.

>Equally important, China is the main consumer of oil and gas exports from the Persian Gulf. On
the other hand, Middle Eastern leaders have been using close ties with Beijing to show
Washington, Brussels, and Moscow that they have other options.

Conclusion

>Russia has always sought to export a different worldview to Middle Eastern countries than Western
powers have projected.

>This model has always reflected ideological orientation and perceived national interests.
> Moscow has never shown interest in supporting transparency and democratic values and has
always endorsed authoritarian leaders.

> Like the Chinese model, it focuses more on transaction and less on transparency and rule of law.

>As such, it appeals to many Middle Eastern governments.