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The United States vs.

The World:
A Theoretical Look at Cultural Imperialism
ReseAnne Sims

If indeed the United States is acting as a "crystal ball" for the rest of the world, many
would certainly question exactly what it is the world is seeing through the American
eye. From scholars such as Herb Schiller to foreign government officials such as former
French Minister of Culture Jack Lang, individuals and governments around the globe
have expressed concern regarding the influence of American cultural products on both
local and national cultures. Often expressed in the term "cultural imperialism," this
concern has become a topic of debate in not only scholarly circles, but in economic,
legal and legislative arena as well.
When argued from an empirical basis, the facts and figures of American cultural
popularity around the globe make the case for "cultural imperialism" seem virtually
undeniable. Cultural products now make up the second largest Unites States' export
behind aircraft.(1) In 1992, the United States purchased only $288 million in cultural
products from the nations of the European Community (EC) combines, while the EC
nations bought $3.7 billion in U.S. cultural products, including films and television:
more than 10 times the United States' import expenditures.(2) Of the Top 100 films in
1993, 88 were American with France's "Les Visiteurs" as the highest ranking foreign
feature film at #27.(3) Shows such as Beverly Hills 90210, Santa Barbara, Rescue 911
and Dynasty ranked among the top television shows in the Czech Republic, Poland and
Russia.(4) Teens sport baseball caps featuring American professional and college teams
while listening to the latest Top 40 favorites from REM, Whitney Houston, Spin
Doctors and Aerosmith on their Sony Walkmans.(5)
On the surface it would certainly appear that the United States has taken over through
its cultural popularity. However, such empirical evidence only focuses on the
"imperialism" aspect of the equation and offers all too simple "proof" of what is a more
complex social and cultural debate. The purpose of this paper is to examine the
phenomenon of globalization that has taken place rapidly in the last few decades and to
question the charge of "cultural imperialism" as it relates to current media theory.

Media Heard `Round the World

As futurists in all industries look ahead to not only the turn of a century, but of a new
millennium, the prospects of coming technologies and interconnected communication
networks are immense. In exploring the boundaries of our current information society,
one must wonder if the actual developments that lie ahead will expand beyond even the
most visionary of expectations considered today - much as the developments of this
century have certainly surpassed the expectations of generations in the late 1800s. What
have now become everyday amenities, from indoor plumbing to television, were at the
turn of this century almost non-existent or even relegated to the realms of science
fiction.
Communication which took several days or was virtually impossible can now be
accomplished in a matter of seconds. In 10 seconds (or often less), we can have the
world literally at out fingertips with the click of a mouse, the touch of a dial pad or the
flick of a remote control. Places that were once unreachable can now be brought into
our living rooms and even the most remote locations, such as Antarctica, are now
accessible via electronic mail. Despite turmoil, technology has allowed communication

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to continue during events such as the 1991 Russian Coup and the Bosnia-Serbia War,
where e-mail communication remained possible when other communication was not.
This is the age of globalization.
The effects of globalization provide an excellent starting point for the assessment of
cultural imperialism as they can be examined on several levels of analysis. First, let us
consider the implications of globalization on a structural basis in regard to
infrastructure, both technological and organizational, as this is one of the few areas
which seems to elicit agreement.

McQuail (1994) states three trends in media that address changes both technologically
and organizationally: 1) a growth in the concentration of media ownership around the
globe, 2) the emergence of an "information economy" with information now seen as a
product and its transfer as industry, and 3) an increase in deregulation, privatization
and/or liberalization of the media. While briefly elaborated here in regard to their
development, each of these trends will be more fully explored later in terms of their
effects.
First, a growth in the concentration of media ownership has certainly been evidenced,
perhaps most notably by the 1989 merger of Time-Warner to create the largest media
corporation in the world merging assets worth more than $8.7 billion. In addition to the
corporate-oriented mergers, the last decade has also seen the rise of the "media mogul" -
individuals who have amassed huge media organizations, such as Ted Turner, Silvio
Berlusconi, and Rupert Murdoch. While most often discussed in regard to the "big
names" mentioned here, this trend has also infiltrated the emerging mediascape in
Eastern Europe as Hungary is slowly but surely growing its own media mogul Tamas
Gyarfas. In addition to owning 57% of NAP-TV (the only non-state controlled network
in Hungary), Gyarfas also publishes a weekly sports magazine, a TV and radio guide
and the Hungarian equivalent de the "yellow pages." Another trend towards vertical
integration of hardware and software corporations has developed, such as the purchase
of CBS Records by Sony in the late 1980s, giving these corporations control of the
production process from beginning to end.

Smith (1990, p. 15) summarizes the second trend in his statement that "we are now
living in a society in which the information industries have become basic to the
economy rather than peripheral." The rise of an "Information Society," which was
conceived of in Japan (Ito, 1981 in McQuail 1994), indicates a shift in society where
manufacturing is no longer the most common form de employment. The proliferation of
service-oriented jobs creates a change in society wherein the term "labor" shifts from a
physical to more mental meaning and the workforce must become increasingly
technologically advanced. The latter can be most easily evidenced by the growing
number of industries using computers and other new information and/or communication
technologies.
In addition, through something of a "trickle-down" technology process, the increase of
computer capabilities and the number de on-line information resources has had an effect
on almost every area of society: a computer with modem and a phone line can link
anyone to anywhere. With the invention and recent popularity of CD-ROM, massive
amounts of information, such as a complete set of dictionaries or the contents of a
research database, can now be stored on a small compact disc.
Certainly, this trend will have important ramifications for the countries of Eastern
Europe as they move from an "information-controlled" society to a participant in a
global scene in which the information explosion has occurred over time. For these

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countries, the information explosion is occurring on top of other already rapid and
somewhat disorienting changes while the rest of the world has grown accustomed to the
plethora of information sources now readily available. Not only will the influx of
information affect how these countries retrieve information and come to understand
what has been for many years the "outside" world, it will also affect what they know
and how they see themselves in the global scene.
So, how much information is there? Robertson (1990) takes an interesting approach to
answering this question and quantifying the extent to which information has "exploded"
since the coming of the computer age through a unique historical perspective. Although,
by his own admission, his estimates can be criticized as rough, he maintains that even
such rough estimates would offer insight as to the quantity of information required for
different levels of civilizations. To construct his estimates, Robertson uses information
theory based on "bits" (6) in which the base unit of measure is a letter of the alphabet
which is slightly less than 5 bits of information. What Robertson then suggests is that
the computer revolution is similar to past technological advances that have
revolutionized the world and makes a case through which history can provide us a view
of the nature of changes occurring in the current information age. The computer, he
suggests, "could be the invention that will change civilization to a degree not seen since
the Renaissance" (p. 236). Perhaps more importantly in our arrival as a "level 4" (7)
civilization is the possibility de technology allowing us to more easily find and utilize
the plethora of information now available, which was a hindrance to the Level 3 society
at which we began to produce information beyond our ability to use it (p. 245).

This emergence of an "information society" offers several questions to be considered in


regard to media imperialism as it brings to play theories regarding the flow of
information worldwide. As will be discussed later, these considerations constitute the
basis for core-periphery and development theory which are central to the cultural
imperialism debate both pro and con.

The third trend McQuail identifies centers on the proliferation of deregulation,


privatization and liberalization of the media. Perhaps, no place is this trend more
pronounced than in East/Central Europe since the fall of Communism in 1989. The
movement from a state-owned and operated system to what has yet to become a "free
market" has opened a "Pandora's Box" of ownership, regulation,and production issues
for these formerly communist countries. Complicated by not only the diversity de new
technology and ongoing development of policy within already established systems, but
economic uncertainty as well, the countries of East/Central Europe can look to the West
for guidance only to a certain extent. Whereas the United States has developed its media
policies over time as new technologies were developed, the countries of Eastern Europe
have the task de forming policy for all phases of regulation not only for a new medium,
but for several and within a limited time frame. The technology is there now - from
cable to satellite - knocking on the door of countries in which information and the media
have been tightly controlled under Soviet domination for several decades.
As these new technologies (along with foreign investors) line up, ready and waiting, for
the now "Virtual Curtain"(8) to lift, the countries of East/Central Europe faces the more
immediate problem of infrastructure. Instead of being allowed the luxury de
development time, as the West has enjoyed, these countries face complex internal
questions in addition to the external concerns of incoming technology. An additional
effect of deregulation and privatization in the media of East/Central Europe is the
concern of technological "leapfrogging" in which technology, such as wireless and

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cellular communications, are growing faster in emerging countries than in developed
nations as a means of overriding the lacking infrastructure which will take time to build.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that the usage of analog cellular systems in
Eastern Europe grew 245% in 1993. (9)
This section has focused on laying the groundwork for the cultural imperialism debate
through an examination of globalization and current trends along with their theoretical
backgrounds by focusing on technology and the changing mediascape. To assess the
effects of these changes in terms of cultural imperialism, the next step is to examine the
nature of culture itself.

Toward a Definition of Culture


While technology set the stage for globalization, taking the spotlight in the debate over
its effects is the question of culture. Although seemingly basic, the question of "What is
culture?" holds important considerations for this debate since it is the nature of culture
itself that the imperialism argument can first be questioned. The answer may not be as
simple as it appears. Even Webster's Dictionary offers many choices: "civilizing
tradition, folklore, instruction, law, custom, knowledge, arts, sciences, education,
mores." The true definition of culture most likely lies in a combination of each of these
possibilities: a mixture of the mental, physical, intellectual and creative aspects of a
society. As with any mixture, this view bases itself in movement - the interaction of
these collective parts to create a nebulous whole called "culture." Media theorists
themselves have addressed this very question. Smith (1990, p. 171) asks, "Can we speak
of culture in the singular?" His answer defines culture as "a collective mode of life, a
repertoire of beliefs, styles, values and symbols." In this context, he asserts, culture can
only be referred to in terms of cultures since this "collective mode of life" necessitates
"different modes and repertoires in a universe of modes and repertoires." Fiske (1989, in
McQuail 1994, p. 94) defines culture as "the constant process of producing meanings of
and from our social experience." Much like the mixture analogy in the preceding
paragraph, this view sees culture as active - a process rather than a fixed set of values
that can be delineated (see also Carey 1975 in McQuail 1994). Here McQuail (p. 95)
makes an excellent point in that culture itself is a "reflection of the complexity of the
phenomenon" due to the multiple ways in which the word "culture" is used.

Despite acknowledgement of culture as a process by cultural imperialism proponents


such as Schiller (1990, p. 2), what we find most often in the arguments, however, is a
conceptualization of culture in the singular whether it is in the form of an identifiable
national culture that is to be defended or in criticism of an emerging "global culture"
that threatens to overtake it. Ironically, both critics and proponents of the culture
imperialism debate deny the probability of a global culture albeit under different
auspices.

Why not the possibility of a global culture? Smith (1990) makes several arguments for
its impossibility. First, unlike imperialist movements of the past, the current idea of a
global culture operates well beyond its place of origin through both time and space - it
maintains no true ties to its place of origin and operates in McLuhan's concept of
acoustic space. Smith writes, "It (today's global culture) is context-less, a true melange
of disparate components drawn from elsewhere and nowhere, borne upon the modern
chariots of global telecommunications systems" (see also Meyrowitz 1985). Secondly, a
global culture maintains no tie to a common past and therefore, unlike national culture
is basically memoryless. Here Smith makes the point that there are no "world

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memories" that would bring cohesiveness to a common culture: those memories that do
exist remind humanity more of its differences than its similarities. Thirdly, Smith states
that a global culture is "essentially calculated and artificial" with its creation firmly
routed in technology and the transnational systems of telecommunications through
which it is disbursed. Detached and neutral, it relies on technology more than humanity
for its very existence.
So then, what does create or maintain a culture? Here Smith outlines three essential
ingredients for the cultural mixture: 1) a sense of continuity between succeeding
generations, 2) shared memories of specific events and persons that were turning points
of collective history and 3) a sense of common destiny. Through these components a
Construction of "identity" is created among a population that shares "common
experiences and one or more cultural characteristics such as language, customs or
religion." Ethnohistory, which Smith defines as myths, valuees, memories and symbols,
plays a large role in the shaping of this sense of identity and generates a cohesiveness
that the "global culture" cannot.
Featherstone (1990) although critical of the idea of a global culture, does speak of the
globalization of culture in that what may be emerging are "third cultures" that are part
of diverse cultural flows. Brand (1993 in Stephens 1993) seconds this idea in his
suggeestion that we may all have begun to share a "second culture" that our "first
cultures will continue to hold out in resistance" to. Again, the developments of
East/Central Europe since 1989 provide current evidence of the power of culture. Since
the fall of Communism, nowhere else in the world has the geo-political scene become
more intriguing as countries seperate peacefully or by war - and new countries emerge.
These changes bring a host of questions tothe cultural debate as well. Even among the
emerging "cohesive" states reside several ethnic minorities who so not always claim the
nationality of the country in which they reside: "The Cold War and its politico-
economic and military blocs obscured the fact that the continent (Europe) is still a
mosaic of nationalities, not all of which have their own countries (Schlesinger 1994)."
Featherstone further supports this criticism of the idea of a global culture with ideas
drawn from Durkheim, who believed that as societies expanded, the degree of
differentiation within the society itself grow to such a point that the members of that
society retain little in common aside from their humanity. To date, such a consciousness
that recognizes this common trait has yet to be realized within few, if any societies.

Where Does the World End?

Scholars, such as Schiller (1981) and Hamelink (1990), have maintained that despite the
advent of our current information society, infromation itself and its technology have
remained in the hands of the economically elite. This criticism is most commonly
expressed in terms of core and periphery theory which maintains that gloabl imbalances
exist between "core" (i.e.rich, industrialized nations of the First World) and "periphery"
nations (i.e. poorer, rural countries of the Third World) in both the flow of media
products and information. In this view, information and its technology are controlled by
the core nations, and its flow is seen as uni-directional from the core to the periphery
with little opportunity for peripheral nations to participate in the process (Hamelink
1990).
Hamelink (1990) offers a variety of empirical evidence to support the core and
periphery view of the world. The following statistics were gathered from UNESCO in
1989 (10):

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* The peripheral countries of the world own only 4% of the world's computer hardware.
* 75% of the world's telephones (700 million) can be found in the 9 richest countries,
while the poorest countries own less than 10%.
* There are more telephones in Japan than in all the countries of Africa, which as a
continent had (in 1988) four times the population of Japan and 80 times the land mass.
* In 39 peripheral countries, there were no newspapers and in 30 others there was only
1. There are more than 1600 daily papers today (1995) in the United States alone.
* Europe produced an average of 12,000 new books per year, while Africa produced
under 350. In addition, Europe averages 1,400 libraries per country to 18 in Africa.
LaPlante (1994) notes that by the end of 1992, Eastern Europe has installed just 15.65
telephone lines per 100 people compared to more than 45 lines per 100 in Western
Europe.
Despite the numbers, what some recent scholars are suggesting is that the age of core
and periphery are over (Featherstone,1990; Appadurai, 1990). What Featherstone
suggests is sthat the current gloabl cultural flows produce 1) both cultural homogeneity
and cultural disorder and 2) transnational or "third cultures." Both homogeneity and
disorder emerge as cultures, once somewhat isolated or limited, become linked and the
interaction produces "more complex images of the other as well as generating identity-
enforcing reactions."

Appadurai (1990) further addresses this new "non-isomorphic" path of global cultural
flows and ultimately questions the former core and periphery models through his
conceptulaization of interacting "disjunctures" or relationships within these flows. He
conceives of global cultural flow in five dimensions: ethnoscapes, finanscapes,
technoscapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes.
Ethnoscapes refer to the flow of peoples (immigrants, refugees, tourists, inc.)
throughout the globe as we become increasingly mobile. Technoscapes include the flow
of machinery, harware and software, through the production processes of TNCs,
national corporations and governments. Finanscapes involve the flow of money through
currency markets and stock exchanges.
Mediascapes consist of the flow of images and information from the various forms of
media and growing interactive technologies. Lastly, Ideoscapes are similar to
mediascapes in that they are image-oriented, however they are more often political in
nature and deal with the flow of ideology throughout the globe.
In Appadurai's model, there is no traditional core and periphery to be designated and as
such represents the "non-isomorphic" paths in which culture now flows. This change in
flow is due not only to massive interlinking information and technological systems, but
also to "deterritortialization" as well. People, money, products, media, etc. move
throughout the globe creating cultural pockets outside of their previously national
boundaries, therefore changing the idea of a nation-state that "contains" or serves as the
boundary of culture. The final point to Appadurai's model lies in the fact that "both
sides of the coin of global cultural process today are the products of the infinitely varied
mutual contest of sameness and difference on a stage characterized by radical
disjunctures between different sorts of global flows and the uncertain landscapes created
in and through these disjunctures (p. 308)."
Appadurai's mode exemplifies the changing world market that the East/Central
European contries face. The previous Cold War polarity no longer exists and the "world
order" grows more complex everyday. There is a "reshuffling" of the world's power in

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porcess, in which not only do the re-emerging countries of East/Central Europe fave the
task of crerating their own identities, they must do so in relation to this ever-changing
global scene.

Life and Times of the Media Mogul

In examining the impact of gloablization, Ferguson (1992) asks a pertinent question:


quite simply, "who is being globalized (or de-globalized), to what extent and by
whom?" While the cries have gone out regarding American dominance, the mediascape
reflects a much more complex and internation playing field. Despite a concentration of
media ownership in the past decade, the nationalities among this ownership group have
remained somewhat mixed: Time-Warner (USA), Bertelsmann AG (Germany),
Sony (Japan), Berlusconi (Italy), Murdoch (Australian-American(11)). Helena Cerna, in
her response to my post on the Internet (which will be discussed later), makes a very
good point regarding these TNCs: "If you look at it from the perspective of multi-
national corporations, you could make the case that in thier aggressive global marketing
they are imperialist, but they are only interested in selling their products, not in
American cultural megalomania. In terms of Eastern Europe, the people are in a process
of discovering products that were forbidden, therefore they will embrace anything
American, but as it has already been expressed, it will wear off. Also, this phenomenon
is much less pronounced in non-urban areas. The Ce is still very much alive and the
tradition will certainly survive American capitalism, as it survived Hapsburgian
reformation, German domination and Soviet mornalization."

While concern over the media content may point a finger to the United States, in terms
of ownership it would possible be more appropriate to speak of Western
"Europeanization," and turn the pointing finger toward Italy. In addition to Berlusconi,
Italians Mariano Volani and Nicola Grauso are involved in significant joint ventures
with Czech publisher FTV Premiera and Polonia 1 in Poland respectively. In Poland,
52.4% of foreign trade and investment in 1993 came from the EU, with the U.S. taking
the largest part of the remaining investment with 29.4%. However, among the Top 10
companies with direct foreign investments, only 2 are from the EU, and a majority of
the list are based in Italy and the United States. Although welcoming such joint
ventures, most East/Central European countries are rapidly enacting laws to regulate
what percentage of a media venture may be owned by foreign interests. Currently, most
policies hover around the 40% mark.
One of the criticisms of this process toward concentrated ownership of media systems
and industries is that in spite of a proliferated number of media avenues, this
concentration effectively strangles local, regional or national production in countries
that are economically disadvantaged. Straubhaar (1991) contradicts this thinking
through an examination of regional transnationals that have developed in Latin America
and many of his findings could easily be extrapolated to developments in East/Central
Europe.
Building on earlier discussion of core and periphery theory, Straubhaar criticizes recent
assumptions that new technology would strengthen the imbalances of
media/information flows around the globe. While new technology has opened doors for
the influx of American cultural products, it has also increased national production as
well as the development of specific genres taken from US models and re-creatd into
distintly Latin American genres. For example, the Latin American telenovela, based on
US soap operas, now enjoys a huge popularity throughout Latin America as well as in

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the United States. Evidence of this can be seen in East/Central Europe as well through
popular local productions such as Poland's "Polish Zoo," "A Forty-Year-Old Man" and
Hungary's "Family Inc." and "Freddie the Enterprising Ghost." Although the formats
may be borrowed from American shows,the result is a distinctly local product.
Straubhaar also credits the influence of First World influences for the "decreased cost
and increased flexibility in television technology." This influence has allowed for a
growing number of television producers throughout LAtin America. Straubhaar takes
the view that even within a "dependency" or "imbalance" situation, development can
occur in the "periphery" nation. For the countries of East/Central Europe this cna
perhaps be most easily evidenced in terms of foreign production. Already well-known
for its beautiful locations, the dissolution of the "Iron Curtain" has made it much easier
for foreign producers to utilize the resources of these countries when shooting for both
film and television. In 1993, East/Central Europe host shoots such as "Schindler's List,"
and "M. Butterfly," as well as Euro-productions from France, Italy and Germany.
Production costs in East/Central Europe cost approximately 40% less than the cost to
shoot in Western Europe or the United States (12).

Assumptions of Cultural Imperialism

In the sections of this paper, several ideas related to the globalization phenomenon and
charges of cultural imperialism have been explored seperately. While valuable
discussions in and of themselves, it is important to draw together specific aspects
andevaluate some of the basic assumptions of and areas for cirticism in the cultural
imperialism argument in terms of media power, its role in society and in regard to its
audience.

In regard to media power, the cultural imperilaism argument offers an almost


omnipotent view of the media that cannot be throughly justified. What it offers in terms
of the media's power to affect cultural change is a dominance and transmission-based
model, which seems implausible in the pluralistic and ever-expanding mediascape.
What makes sense in regard to certain aspects of the debate such as the conglomeration
of ownership, routinized production, and possibly formatted content, doesn't apply in
terms of new media technology, the audience and effects (13). In adopting such a
dominance image of the media, creates an environment of codependency (to borrow
from the realm of popular psychology) that casts the audiences as the victims of an all-
powerful media system and its messages. This image also infers a one-way flow of
communication that is most often supported through the core and periphery theory and
statistics addressed earlier. While this may be evident in terms of information flows on
an information theory quantitative estimate, the reality is that as media technology and
economis become more intertwined, this seemingly one-way flow reverses itself into a
two-way flow in which what sells abroad influences what Americans see at home.
Michael Soloman, president of International Television for Warner Brothers further
corroborates this reversal (14):

"Our numbers are very important to this company. If we have a TV movie based on
some very American theme, some social issue or what we call `disease of the week,' we
try to not produce it. Soft pictures, cute romantic comedies are very hard to sell outside
the United States. But if you have a suspense drama, an action-adventure-type drama,
that sells abroad. That's the type of program we want. It's got to have that universal
theme.

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This reversal typifies McLuhan's (McLuhan and Fiore 1994) cencept of the Tetrad, a
model created to explain the human thought process in terms of interaction between
left-brain (visual space) and right brain (acoustic space). What McLuhan states is that
since all media technologies or images are artifacts, the Tetrad can be used to explain
the process of chiasmus, a state of "continual, potential transformation (p. 6)," as the
artifact is pushed to its fullest potential. In the above example, the flow of American
media to foreign markets follows this Tetradic process: 1) the export of American
product enlarges the information and entertainment availabilities to foreign markets, 2)
this erodes or obsolesces local and/or national media products, 3) images of local and/or
national cultures are then retrieved and 4) this reverses into the influence of media
products and imports based on preferences of local and/or national culture. In addition,
the Appadurai model examined earlier offers a more viable basis for theory regarding
the current media and technologic arena.

Cultural imperilaism also makes a definite assumption of the media's role in and its
influence on society. What emerges is a view of media and technology that is highly
deterministic and devalues the role and importance of the cultural aspects of this
argument. Ferguson (1992, p. 72) states:
"Nevertheless, despite this more visible world of `the distant other' and a more
interconnected world political and cultural economy, we cannot infer from this an
homogenized global metaculture. To do so would be to ignore the historical role of
stratification systems based on caste, class or party, on ethnic cultures defended by
bloodshed or kinship traditions linked to religious proscriptions stronger than any
claims that might be made for the reductionist power of global media."

As stated earlier in this paper, the process of culture is much more complex than the
cultural imperilaism argument gives it credit for. McQuail (1994) cites three elements
which need to be addressed in answering the question of whether or not media can
affect social change; 1) technology and the form and content of media, 2) changes in
societal structure and institutions and 3) distribution of a population's opinions, beliefs
and attitudes. Following earlier dicussion of cultural imperilaism;s view of media
power, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the the theory of cultural imperialism
follows that model of Mass Society Theory.
Although something of a theoretical dinosaur, it is this model that most closely
resembles the images of society and its ability to be influences according to cultlural
imperialism: centralized media, one-way transmissions, identity is media-dependent
with the media viewed as manipulative and controlling. And, as witnessed by the fall of
Communism, even such a powerful, centralized media combines with military force
were not enough to stop the changing of society.
What then must the imperilaist argument make of the media message? Sepstrup (1989,
in McQuail 1994) answers this question by reminding us that the path from transmission
to culturla consequnece is much more complicated in the international sphere.
Even assuming the homogenization of media messages due to concentrated ownership
or Western bias, cultural imperilaism denies the power of the audience to interpret the
message on its own contexts or to form its own meanings from the message.
Smith (1990) states:
"Images and cultural traditions do not derive from or descend upon, mute and passive
populations on whose tabula rasa they inscribe themselves. Instead, they invariably
express the identities which historical circumstances have formed, often over long

9
periods."
Elaborating on this idea, Straubhaar (1991) re-asserts the concepts of active audience
theory and a preference among cultures to view regional or national media products.
Straubhaar draws on the past research and predictions of Pool (1977) and Read (1976)
that although "dependent" bu many estimations, loval cultural producers would
eventually begin to compete con American products and as these productions increase
and become more readily available, audiences would prefer regional or national
products to international products. Two trens in research are used by Straubhaar to
support Pool's predictions: 1) uses and gratifications research, which gives power to the
audience in terms of its selectivity and 2) the active perticipation of the audience in
interpreting media content. In arguing the active audience perspective, Straubhaar
quotes Fiske (1987) who said,"these audiences actively read television in order to
produce from it meanings that connect with their social experience."

Another possible criticism for the cultural imperilaism argument lies in its equation of
culture with consumerism and again denies the complexities of culturla development.
Included as one of the seven "myths" of globalization, "Global Cultural Homogeneity"
according to Ferguson (1992) implies that consumption of the same cultural products
(from TV and fast food to cars and architecture) assumes or even creates a
"metaculture" based solely on consumption. Also refuting this idea of a "metaculture" is
a response from the Internet from Eugene Homan in Finland. In his response to my
questions about cultural influences in his country, Holman states that the Finnish culture
has rejected such American staples as fast food: "...it never really caught on.
Burger King and KFC went bust. McDonald's is holding it's own, but more as a drive-
thru snack restaurant than a general eatery." Consequently, Ferguson posits, "Global
Cultural Homogeneity" as a myth must either presume a global cultural economy that
completely ignores local, regional or national influences, or it must assume cultural
identities that exist only within "political borders or are conferred on a transhistorical
world society basis by an ethic of consumption (or exploitation)." As discussed earlier,
specifically in terms of East/Central Europe, this simply is not the situation in either
case.

Views from the Infobahn

In the plethora of technology, few are taking the spotlight as often as the "information
superhighway." Started 25 years ago as a part of the Department of Defense, the
Internet (or Infobahn as is gaining popular usage) now brings together over 20 million
people on-line worldwide. Except for a lapse between Hawaii at 157 degrees West and
Fiji at 178 degrees East, the Internet almost circles the globe and last year carried over
12 million megabytes of information among 128 countries (15). A physical
manifestation of McLuhan's idea of acoustic space, the Internet allows its "netizens" to
be both everywhere and nowhere at once. Location in cyberspace depends more on
information than physical geography with its users connecting through thoughts and
interests across any and all boundaries. In this new electronic frontier, the burgeoning
global village continues to emerge.

In exploring the debate over cultural imperialism, it seems important to gather opinions
and insights from the citizens (and nationals) of countries where the debate is a reality.
Currently, one of the "hotbeds" of this debate lies in the rapidly chanigng countries of
East/Central Europe. The following ocmments, quoted verbatim, were received in

10
response to postings to several newsgroups under the soc.culture. listing on the Internet
(16). My posting simply asked for respondents living in or native to Eastern Europe that
would be willing to talk about the idea of "cultural imperialism" within their home
country. Surprisingly, few of those responding expressed concern over the idea of
cultural imperialism noting past history, "fad-ism" or just general skepticism as reasons
for their lack of concern. While not a truly representative sample, their responses (both
pro and con) as support to the active audeince theory and strength to the the resiliency
and ability of audeinces to interpret for themselves.

The Netizens Speak

"Here's a view that might be contrary to what most people might send. When I am in
Poland, I workout every day (jog and lift wieghts), to many Poles, especially those of
the older generations, such behavior is a sign of Americanization... The ancient Greeks
were the ones to invent the Gymnasium (at least we think so, temains of exercise halls
at known to be found in ancient Mesopotamian ruins), so as far as I am concerned
working out is as much a sign of 'suffering' from American influence as it is a sign of
suffering from Babylonian cultural imperialism."

Second message:

"... a couple of new thoughts occurred to me on that topic (cultural imperilaism). 1)


Cultural/societal/etc. change under the influence of other people might be good in some
cases. For example, in the 14th century it was common for the military leaders to join
batttle with their knights. Unfortunately, often when the leader was killed or wounded,
an otherwise winnable battle was lost. This was not practiced by the Turks and Tartars...
Poles accepted this innovation: the leader would situate himself behins the troops and
command through messengers. The benefits are obvious. 2) The point you made about
the strength of the local cultures seems to be important. Had you spoken with anyone in
the Russian Imperial court in the 14th and early 15th centuries, chances are they
would've been speaking Polish... in the 19th century, French would have been the
language of the upper class.
Would that mean the Russians were Polanized in the 14th century or Romanized in the
19th - probably not."

Pawel Dobrowol

Poland

***

"American cultural imperialism is a misnomer. As someone has already pointed out in


this debate, the Americanization going on in the Czech Republic and throughout the
world is self-inflicted, so one shouldn't blame it on America. It isn't America's fault
that Czechs crave and flaunt eeverything American in the same rather obsessive way
they still shun and damn anything Russian...
I will continue cultivating my Czech and reading Czech literature. Besides, being a
native speaker of a doomed language reather strikes my fancy..."

11
David Chroust

Czech Republic

***

"On the word 'imperialist:' this is one of those words that gives me the cramps. On the
impact of American culture in Bulgaria: well, I happen to consider cultural interaction a
good thing. Wariety is good. It can be argued that American is kind of a low level (see
all the arguments of the French)... personally, I don't think so. There are areas of
American culture I think are of very high quality. It is a matter of measure and dtaste.
There is no way... to say whether the effects... are good or bad. Take jazz, for example.
What is jazz? Imperialism? Then there are forms of imperialism I really love and
appreciate and I will be eternally grateful to America for them... if anyone calls this
imperialism, well, then imperialism is welcome"

Georgy Ganev

Bulgaria

"I agree that everything American is now in vogue in Czechosilesia... On the other
hand, I wouldn't put so much weight on the cultural area... many people there just don't
care about good art. For instance, they prefer simple movies full of suspense and
violence - and at this, Americans are the best. If they were not available, they would
watch Czech movies of similar kind, which I don't see as any imporovement...
(responding to a poster who reported seeing Lithuaian folk singers virtually ignored in a
Czech square) Let me assure you that if those people has been American no big crowds
would have been there either. Folk songs as nice as they are, are out of touch. 'Spadlas
peca a ja na nu' is surely cute, but Pink Floyd's music is certainly more related to my life
experience... To sum it up, I am not afriad of or surprised that the majority of consumed
goods is from the former West. It is natural. The really dangerous thing woulf be if it
killed the truly Czech art and so far it seems that is not the case."

Peter Habala

Czech Republic

***

"The MTV boom is since long gone here in Sweden and today influences from
Germany and France are growing stronger. Some of us have actually abandoned the
word Internet in favour of Infobahn. In a few years, I predict that you will see the same
situation in Eastern Europe... I do believe it is a trend, which will pass in some time, as
other cultures influence the Eastern European lives more than the American."

Dag Salag

Croatian living in Sweden

***

12
"I doubt that it is an American people's will or anything of that sort. Maybe communism
just failed and some are unhappy, trying to prevent another nechanism through which to
dominate the world..."

Mihai O.

No nationality given

***

"> I have to question whether you can call it imperialism.

I don't think so - excuse of cultural imperialism is a favorite only with left-leaning


circles. Nobody from those leftist idiots was complaining when Russians were
dominating Czech culture until recently..."

Ross Hedvicek

Czech Republic

***

"I have just returned from a month in the area of Navy Bor and a couple of days in
Praha. I was dying there from the American rock music. I cannot stand it here. I thought
I would here some great Czech music. Only one song in between about 10 America
songs... I hope to God that they do not see the USA as the savior. God help them! God
help the USA to live up to what they think we are. We are not the land of the free. We
are the land of the morons who worship useless plastic objects, pour chemicals into the
ground and try to get others hooked on the same."
Paul Gottlieb

United States

"I've lived in the Czech Republic for the past four years and I've seen with my own eyes
the displacement of Czech culture by shit from the US. My Czech wife and I used to eat
breakfast everymorning at a traditional milk bar on Brno's town square until it was
replaced by a McDonald's. You should understand though that the 'natives' bring this
upon themselves often times...
Brno's town hall has been wooing McDonald's ever since I moved here. Czechs, in
general, think the more American culutral presence here, the more it indicates that the
Czech Republic has become a part of the West... My son attends a nursery school
in our neighborhood. One neighbor told us that she would send her child to a different
nursery because our son's school didn't have enough Barbie dolls and other western
toys."

Jeff Bowyer

Czech Republic

13
***

">Is the influx of American products undermining the native culture?

Not really. The native culture survives well with respect to such essentails as basic
patterns of human interaction, eating habits,
clothing and choice of luxury items. Since Finns have more experience with American
products, they are critical. American fzst food never really caught on (Burger King and
KFC went bust or never made it). McDonald's is holding its own, but more as a drive
thru snack restaurant than as the general eatery it serves as in the US... My personal
opinion is that America is admired as a distance and respected for its accomplishments...
On the other hand, many Finns and Estonians can't help laughing at the paradox of
multi-ethnic America with its variations of variations... producing people who can only
speak English (and often write it porrly) and have little first-hand experience with or
mastery of foreign cultures."

Eugene Holman

Finland

***

"Ciao, we borrowed that from the Italians :-) It's comfy and doesn't bother anyone as
long as it correspnds to 'bye' put at a socially proper place. It's become as Bulgarian as
'Mercy!'... figure that out."

Vess Velikov

Bulgaria

Cultural Influence vs. Cultural Imperialism

What are we too make of all of this? While the possibility certainly exists for a modern-
day "Tower of Babble", such a view takes an inherently negative approach and
expectation of what the future holds. Charges of culturla imperialism unfortunately, also
contribute to a negative world view that seems in and of itself potentially damaging.
Through the criticisms of cultural imperilaism in terms of its views of media power, role
in society and view of the audience, a point that need to be made in conclusion is the
inherently paternalistic attitude these charges take toward native cultures.
At best, the culturla imperialism view offers a mixed message by defending the non-
dominate cultures and further undermining their innate power and cohesion. To say "we
are proctecting the native cutlures" implies that the culture is not strong or resilient
enough to withstand influence and change on its own, which throughout history has not
been the case. One only has to look to East and Central Europe for historical evidence.
Despite many years of Soviet domination (on all levels of society, not just culturally),
native cultures and old identities have survived as the geopolitical changes now taking
place certainly prove. While some exhibit a pore positive manifestation of this process,
such as Czechoslovakia's 1989 "Velvet Divorce," others have manifested in a more
violent manner that sadly graces our front pages everyday as we hear more of the
tragedy of war in Bosnia and Chechnya.

14
Instead, such examination of global theories can also offer a way of better
understanidng the complex and diverse world in which we are all now operating. In
Durkheim's opinion the "idea of a human person" was possibily the one "culturlaa ideal"
that could provide a means of unification within an increasingly interdependent world.
While it may seem to some idealistic, it si such as commitment to humanity that will
ultimately provide the most understanding between the inhabitants of an increasingly
more intimate Planet Earth.
"The central political task of the final years of this century, then, is the creation of a new
model of coexistence among the various cultures, peoples, races, and religious spheres
within a single interconnected civilization."
Vaclav Havel, President of the Czzech Republic, in his acceptance speech for the
Philadelphia Liberty Medal at Independence Hall on July 4, 1994.

ENDNOTES

1. Rockwell, John, "The New Colossus: American Culture as Power Export," The New
York Times, January 30, 1994: section 2.
2. Schlesinger, Philip, "Europe's Contradictory Communicative Space," Daedalus,
March 22, 1994.
3. Rockwell, John, "The New Colossus: American Culture as Power Export," The New
York Times, January 30, 1994: section 2.
4. Rockwell, John, "The New Colossus: American Culture as Power Export," The New
York Times, January 30, 1994: section 2.
5. Rockwell, John, "The New Colossus: American Culture as Power Export," The New
York Times, January 30, 1994: section 2.
6. A bit is approximately the quantity of information needed to decide between two
alternatives. A letter of the alphabet contains approximately 5 bits of information and
this is the basis for Robertson's estimates. The idea of bits is taken from Shannon,
however, Robertson does not reference the exact work in this article.
7. Robertson breaks down civilizations into levels reflecting the technology and amount
of available information present. The levels he designated are as follows: Level O =
Pre-language/107 bits available, Level 1 = Language/109 bits, Level 2 =Writing/1011
bits, Level 3 = Printing/1017 bits, and Level 4 = Computers/1025 bits. To put these
amounts into some perspective, Robertson gives the example that a person speed
reading at a rate of 1,000 words per minute could read 6 hours a day for 70 years and
still only have read 2 x 1011 bits of information - the same amount a fast computer can
read in a matter of minutes.
8. Taken from: LaPlante, Alice, "Eastern Europe's Virtual Curtain," Computerworld,
September 12, 1994.
9. LaPlante, Alice, "Eastern Europe's Virtual Curtain," Computerworld, September 12,
1994.
10. Admittedly, these figures need to be updated. However, they still serve to illustrate
the foundation on which core and periphery theorists base the bulk of their arguments in
terms of quantitative measures. East/Central Europe, while not specifically mentioned,
remains, by core-periphery standards, to be a periphery region.
11. Although it seems incredibly "politically correct," I use the term Australian-
American to reflect the fact that Murdoch changed his citizenship because he felt it was
important for him as a "media mogul" to be a part of the American cultural industry.
However, a more plausible explanation would be laws restricting foreign ownership of
American media to 25%.

15
12. "Big Buck Bonanza in Local Shoots," Variety, August 16, 1993.
13. Categories of analysis were taken from McQuail 1994, p.70, in his discussion of the
dominance vs. pluralist models of media power.
14. Excerpted from The New York Times, June 2, 1991.
15. Holderness, Mike, "Welcome to the Global Village," Geographical Magazine (May
1994): 16-19.
16. Messages were posted to the following Internet newsgroups under the soc. culture.
listings: .bulgaria, .balkans, .czecho-slovak, .croatia, .poland, .soviet, .hungary,
and .baltics. The responses came from a wide range of people and places: the "closest"
response came from a Bulgarian national in Waco, TX and the futhermost came from a
Croatian national now living in Sweden.

Bibliography
Appadurai, Arjun, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,"
Theory, Culture & Society 7 (1990):
295-310.
Featherstone, Mike, "Global Culture: An Introduction," Theory, Culture & Society 7
(1990): 1-14.
Ferguson, Marjorie, "The Myth aboit Globalization," European Journal of
Communication 7 (1992): 69-93.
Hamelink, Cees (1990). Information Imbalance: Core and Periphery in Questioning the
Media: A Critical Introduction. London, Newbury Park: Sage, pp.217-229.
LaPlante, Alice, "Eastern Europe's Virtual Curtain," Computerworld, September 12,
1994.
McLuhan, Marshall and Fiore, Q. (1968). War and Peace in the Global Village. New
York: Bantam Books.
McLuhan, Marshall and Powers, Bruce (1993). The Global Village: Transformations in
World Life and Media in the 21stCentury. New York: Oxford University Press.
McQuail, Denis (1994). Mass Communication Theory (Third Edition). London: Sage.
Meyrowitz, Joshua (1985). No Sense of Place. New York: Oxford University Press.
Schiller, Herbert (1981). Who Knows: Information in the Age of the Fortune 500.
Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Schlesinger, Philip, "Europe's Contradictory Communicative Space," Daedalus, March
22, 1994.
Sepstrup, P., "Research into Internation TV Flows," European Journal of
Communication 4 (1989): 393-408.
Smith, Anthony D., "Towards a Global Culture?," Theory, Culture & Society 7 (1990):
171-191.
Smith, Anthony D., "Media Globalism in the Age of Consumer Sovereignty," Gannett
Center Journal (Fall 1990): 1-17.
Straubhaar, Joseph D., "Beyond Media Imperialism: Asymetrical Interdependence and
Cultural Proximity, " Critical Studies in Mass Communications 8 (1991): 39-59.

16
Basis of Legitimacy
Domination is defined as the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed
by a given group of people. A certain minimum of voluntary submission is necessary; thus on the part of
the submitter there is an interest (whether based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience.
- Not every claim protected by custom or law involves a relation of authority. For instance, if I ask
Charles to pay me for the work i do as fulfillment of our contract, I am not exercising authority over him.
- The legitimacy of a system of authority may be treated sociologically only as the probability that to a
relevant degree the appropriate attitudes will exist and the corresponding conduct ensue.
- Obedience means the action of the person 'obeying' follows a course such that the content of the
command can be taken as the reason for his/her action.
3 Pure Types of Legitimate Authority
1. Rational/legal grounds. belief in the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those
elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. Authority held by legally established
impersonal order, extends to people only by virtue of offices they hold.
2. Traditional grounds. established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of
the status of those exercising authority under them. Authority held by person of the chief who occupies
the traditionally sanctioned position of authority; matter of personal obligation and loyalty within the
scope of tradition.
3. Charismatic grounds. devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character
of an individual person, and of the normative pattern or order revealed by him. Leader obeyed by personal
trust in him, his revelation, heroism, coolness, as far as those qualities fall within the scope of the obeyers
belief in his charisma.
Rational Legal Authority with a Bureaucratic Administrative Staff
Typical person in authority occupies an office. Person who obeys authority does so only in his capacity as
a member of the corporate group, and what he obeys is only the law. Fundamental Qualities: 1)
continuous organization of official functions bound by rules
2) specified spheres of competence involving a) sphere of obligations as marked out by a specialized
division of labor, b) provision to incumbent of necessary authority to do his sphere of thangs, c) necessary
means of compulsion clearly defined and their use subject to definite conditions.
3) organization of offices follows principle of hierarchy.
4) rules which regulate conduct of an office can be either technical rules or norms. when their application
is fully rational, specialized training is necessary.
5) office holder separated from ownership of means of production and administration (first of all,
separation of house from workplace)
6) complete absence of appropriate of position by incumbent
7) acts, rules and decisions are formulated and recorded in writing

Marxist Media Theory

Daniel Chandler

Gramsci and hegemony

Antonio Gramsci, an Italian (1891-1937), was a leading Marxist thinker. Like


Althusser, he rejected economism, insisting on the independence of ideology from
economic determinism. Gramsci also rejected crude materialism, offering a humanist
version de Marxism which focused on human subjectivity.

Gramsci used the term hegemony to denote the predominance of one social class over
others (e.g. bourgeois hegemony). This represents not only political and economic
control, but also the ability of the dominant class to project its own way of seeing the
world so that those who are subordinated by it accept it as 'common sense' and 'natural'.

17
Commentators stress that this involves willing and active consent. Common sense,
suggests Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, is 'the way a subordinate class lives its subordination'
(cited in Alvarado & Boyd-Barrett 1992: 51).
However, unlike Althusser, Gramsci emphasizes struggle. He noted that 'common sense
is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself' (Gramsci,
cited in Hall 1982: 73). As Fiske puts it, 'Consent must be constantly won and rewon,
for people's material social experience constantly reminds them of the disadvantages de
subordination and thus poses a threat to the dominant class... Hegemony... posits a
constant contradiction between ideology and the social experience of the subordinate
that makes this interface into an inevitable site of ideological struggle' (Fiske 1992:
291).
References to the mass media in terms of an ideological 'site of struggle' are recurrent
in the commentaries of those influenced by this perspective. Gramsci's stance involved
a rejection of economism since it saw a struggle for ideological hegemony as a primary
factor in radical change.
Criticisms of Althusser's theory of ideology drew some neo-Marxists to Gramsci's
ideas.

Stuart Hall

Stuart Hall, now Professor of Sociology at the Open University, was a major figure in
the revival of the British political Left in the 1960s and '70s. Following Althusser, he
argues that the media appear to reflect reality whilst in fact they construct it.
Janet Woollacott (1982: 108-110) offers a useful critique de Policing the Crisis, a key
work by Stuart Hall et al.(1978). The work reflects an analysis of the signifying
practices of the mass media from the perspective of Marxist culturalist theory inflected
through Gramsci's theory of hegemony, and 'an Althusserian conception of the media as
an ideological state apparatus largely concerned with the reproduction of dominant
ideologies', claiming relative autonomy for the mass media (Woollacott 1982: 110). For
Hall et al. the mass media do tend to reproduce interpretations which serve the interests
of the ruling class, but they are also 'a field of ideological struggle'. The media
signification system is seen as relatively autonomous.
'The news' performs a crucial role in defining events, although this is seen as secondary
to the primary definers: accredited sources in government and other institutions. The
media also serve 'to reinforce a consensual viewpoint by using public idioms and by
claiming to voice public opinion' (Woollacott 1982: 109).
Stuart Hall has also addressed theoretically the issue of how people make sense of
media texts. He parts from Althusser in emphasizing more scope for diversity of
response to media texts. In a key paper, 'Encoding/Decoding', Stuart Hall (1980), argued
that the dominant ideology is typically inscribed as the 'preferred reading' in a media
text, but that this is not automatically adopted by readers. The social situations of
readers/viewers/listeners may lead them to adopt different stances. 'Dominant' readings
are produced by those whose social situation favours the preferred reading; 'negotiated'
readings are produced by those who inflect the preferred reading to take account of
their social position; and 'oppositional' readings are produced by those whose social
position puts them into direct conflict with the preferred reading (see Fiske 1992 for a
summary and Fiske's own examples, and Stevenson 1995: pp 41-2). Hall insists that
there remain limits to interpretation: meaning cannot be simply 'private' and 'individual'
(Hall 1980: 135).

18
Hall's emphasis on ideology has been criticized for being at the expense of the
importance of ownership and control (Stevenson 1995: 35).

A Baseline Definition of Culture


People learn culture. That, we suggest, is culture's essential feature. Many qualities de
human life are transmitted genetically --an infant's desire for food, for example,
is triggered by physiological characteristics determined within the human
genetic code. An adult's specific desire for milk and cereal in the morning, on
the other hand, cannot be explained genetically; rather, it is a learned (cultural)
response to morning hunger. Culture, as a body of learned behaviors common to
a given human society, acts rather like a template (ie. it has predictable form and
content), shaping behavior and consciousness within a human society from
generation to generation. So culture resides in all learned behavior and in some
shaping template or consciousness prior to behavior as well (that is, a "cultural
template" can be in place prior to the birth of an individual person).
This primary concept of a shaping template and body of learned behaviors might be
further broken down into the following categories, each of which is an important
element of cultural systems:
systems of meaning, of which language is primary
ways of organizing society, from kinship groups to states and multi-national
corporations
the distinctive techniques of a group and their characteristic products

Several important principles follow from this definition of culture:

If the process of learning is an essential characteristic of culture, then teaching also is


a crucial characteristic. The way
culture is taught and reproduced (see reproduction in the glossary) is itself an
important component of culture.
Because the relationship between what is taught and what is learned is not absolute
(some of what is taught is lost, while
new discoveries are constantly being made), culture exists in a constant state of
change.
Meaning systems consist of negotiated agreements -- members of a human society
must agree to relationships between a
word, behavior, or other symbol and its corresponding significance or meaning. To
the extent that culture consists of
systems of meaning, it also consists of negotiated agreements and processes of
negotiation.
Because meaning systems involve relationships which are not essential and universal
(the word "door" has no essential
connection to the physical object -- we simply agree that it shall have that meaning
when we speak or write in English),
different human societies will inevitably agree upon different relationships and
meanings; this a relativistic way of
describing culture.

19
If you have read through other discussions/definitions of culture on these pages, you
probably already have the sense that there
is much disagreement about the word and concept "culture" and you probably already
realize that any definition, this one
included, is part of an ongoing conversation (and negotiation) about what we should
take "culture" to mean. For a very brief
history of this debate, see the glossary entry for "culture"; for interpretive discussions
and explorations of culture, visit the
"Exploring Culture" section of these pages.

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