1. Primicias vs Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953.

Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses, namely, (1) with a
violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien
without the approval of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to section
2713 of the Revised Administrative Code in that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and
certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance from the
Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.
On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be
appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of
Republic Act No. 409 which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the
Municipal Court, or the Court of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code
of Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal.
On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with the promulgation of the
Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but expressly
repealed. The Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule- making power, expressly omitted the portions of the
Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of Court. Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner
now comes to this court imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.
Issues:
Whether or not the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right, and the
duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.
Ruling:
Yes, a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right. The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by
section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive
law and as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. The aid may be invoked in the
manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, and this right has been declared absolute and substantial by this
Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked. The intervention of the assessors is not an empty
formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or the spirit of the law. It is another security
given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without
vitiating all the proceedings.
The contention of respondents we reckon is predicated on the assumption that the provisions on assessors of the
Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed. Such is not the case. We have already pointed out that the
basic provisions on the matter partake of the nature of substantive law and as such they were left intact by the
Supreme Court.
t is therefore the opinion that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right to
the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of

Pampanga, Respondent.

G.R. No. L-2068 | October 20, 1948 | 81 Phil 648 | En Banc | Justice Tuason

Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Powers of the Supreme Court | Rule-making Power

Rule denying accused of his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him in a preliminary
investigation held to be only an adjective law and therefore constitutional (preliminary investigation — not
essential part of due process).

Bustos vs. Lucero

FACTS:
A warrant of arrest was issued for petitioner Bustos on the strength of the testimony of the complainant and certain
witnesses. In the preliminary investigation, his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she
and her witnesses could be examined and crossexamined. The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking
Sec 11 of Rule 108, and the objection was sustained. Said Sec 11 denies the defendant the right to cross-examine
witnesses in a preliminary investigation. Bustos now contends that said Sec 11 infringes [the now Art VIII, Sec 5(5)
of the Constitution]. It is argued that the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs substantive
rights, to wit, his statutory and fundamental right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution.

ISSUE:

Does the rule in question impair substantive rights thereby violating the constitutional limitation on the rule-making
power of the Court?

RULING:

No. The rule in question is an adjective law and not a substantive law which creates substantive rights.¹ Preliminary
investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution. Therefore, it is
not an essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and thus, mere restriction of the privilege
formerly enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition. In the latter stage of the
proceedings, the only stage where the guarantee of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the
right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. As a rule of evidence,² said Sec 11 is also
procedural. The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We cannot tear down Sec
11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules.
The distinction between “remedy” and “substantive right” is incapable of exact definition. This being so, it is
inevitable that the SC in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to
tolerate, if not to expect, such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive
him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage.

¹ Substantive law and adjective law, distinguished. – Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights, or that
which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action. Adjective or remedial law prescribes
the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is
that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished
from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be
punished .

² Evidence—the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings. It is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in
private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished.
(Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice.)

2. SALVADOR A. ESTIPONA, JR., Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 3, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

FACTS: Estipona was charged with an offense under RA 9165. He wants to enter into a plea bargaining agreement
but Judge Lobrigo did not allow him to do so because Section 23 specifically prohibits plea bargaining in drugs
cases. Estipona argues that Section 23 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Is Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases, unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes, Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it violates the equal protection clause
since other criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.) are allowed to plea bargain but drug offenders are not, considering
that rape and murder are more heinous than drug offenses. Second, it violates the doctrine of separation of powers
by encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the constitution. Plea-bargaining is
procedural in nature and it is within the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court.

3.G.R. No. 156284. February 6, 2007

AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, petitioner, vs.
MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, MARCIAL SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF PASIG and MARIKINA, RIZAL, respondents
FACTS:
Augusto Gomez, as special administrator of the intestate estate of his aunt Consuelo Gomez, filed 2 civil cases
against the defendants.
Augusto claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he is impugning, the signatures of the donee (Consuelo) were
jotted down before the bodies of the Deeds were typewritten. Respondents maintain that the bodies of the Deeds
were encoded first, and then, a clashing presentation of expert witnesses and circumstantial evidence ensued.
Augusto's expert claims she is certain of the answer: the signature came first. Respondents' expert, on the other
hand, says that it is impossible to determine which came first accurately.
The only direct evidence presented by Augusto on this matter is the testimony of Zenaida Torres, Document
Examiner of the NBI. Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own expert witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief of
Document Examination of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct evidence presented by respondents includes
testimonies positively stating that the Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in their completed form in the
presence of Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian himself, and that of several of
the respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr., who allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.
Trial Court dismissed the complaints of Augusto. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision.
Petitioner Augusto claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of the notary public (who
notarized the assailed Deeds of Dontion), Jose Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom the Court
had dismissed from the service in Garciano v. Sebastian. Augusto posits that the dismissal of Judge Sebastian from
the service casts a grave pall on his credibility as a witness.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Augusto may impeach Jose Sebastian as a witness.
HELD: NO.
It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally a witness for petitioner
Augusto. As such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court prohibits petitioner from impeaching him: SEC. 12.
Party may not impeach his own witness.
— Except with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of section 10, the party producing a witness
is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of his
adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the party
presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character.
He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross- examination must only be on
the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being worthy of credit, and
that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness "would enable the party to destroy the witness, if he spoke
against him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in his hands of destroying his
credit, if he spoke against him."
Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or hostile witness. Jose
Sebastian is also neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile witness, the third
paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in relation to Section 11 75 of the same Rule, only allows the party calling
the witness to impeach such witness by contradictory evidence or by prior inconsistent statements, and never by
evidence of his bad character. Thus, Jose Sebastian's subsequent dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit
him as a witness in this case.
Jose Sebastian has never been convicted of a crime before his testimony, but was instead administratively sanctioned
eleven years after such testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and the
Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of this, Jose Sebastian's testimony is
supported by the records of the notarial registry, which shows that the documents in question were received by the
Notarial Registrar on 2 July 1979, which was four months before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979.

4.People v Alicando GR No. 117487 (December 2, 1995)

Facts: Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested and during
the interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the assistance of a counsel. By virtue of his uncounseled
confession the police came to know where to find the evidences consisting of the victim’s personal things like
clothes stained with blood which was admitted to court as evidences. The victim pleaded guilty during the
arraignment and was convicted with the death penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review. 

Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the accused.

Held: Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He was not informed
of his right to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information against him was written in a
language he could not understand and was not explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the
rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The lower court also violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant
without conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and full understanding of the accused of the consequences
of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted by the court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible because
they were due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide the accused with due process of the law.
Thus the SC annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the case back to the lower
for further proceeding.

5.JEFFREY MIGUEL Y REMEGIO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 227038, 2017-07-31

Facts:
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45 in the morning of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan operative of
Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati City named Reynaldo Bahoyo (BB Bahoyo) was doing his rounds when he
purportedly received a report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street.
BB Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Anthony Velasquez (BB Velasquez) then went to the said
street and saw a visibly intoxicated person, which they later identified as herein petitioner, urinating and displaying
his private parts while standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty lot.
BB Velasquez then repeated the request for an identification card, but instead, petitioner emptied his pockets,
revealing a pack of cigarettes containing one (1) stick of cigarette and two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried
marijuana leaves, among others. This prompted BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez to seize the foregoing items, take
petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as well as the seized items, over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo (SPO3
Castillo).
After examination, it was confirmed that the aforesaid rolled paper contained marijuana and that petitioner was
positive for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites, both dangerous drugs.[8]
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter, presented a different version of the facts. According to
him, he was just urinating in front of his workplace when two (2) Bantay Bayan operatives, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB
Velasquez, approached and asked him where he lived
Thereafter, he was taken back to the barangay hall where they showed him two (2) sticks of marijuana joints
allegedly recovered from him.[9]
RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
The RTC found that BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez conducted a valid warrantless arrest, as petitioner was
scandalously showing his private parts at the time of his arrest.
Therefore, the resultant search incidental to such arrest which yielded the seized marijuana in petitioner's possession
was also lawful.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[13] to the CA.
the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction.[15
It held that the search made on petitioner which yielded the seized marijuana was validly made as it was done
incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts on public.
Issues:
whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
valid warrantless arrest was made on petitioner on account of the alleged public display of his private parts...
inadmissible
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
In this relation, it is worth noting that his arresting officers, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, are mere Bantay
Bayan operatives of Makati City. Strictly speaking, they are not government agents like the Philippine National
Police (PNP) or the National Bureau of Investigation in charge of law enforcement; but rather, they are civilian
volunteers who act as "force multipliers" to assist the aforesaid law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and
security within their designated areas.[22]
In this light, the Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan or any barangay-based or other volunteer
organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace and order in their respective areas
have the color of a state-related function.
As such, they should be deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights under
Article III of the 1987 Constitution to them.[26]
In this case, the prosecution claims that the BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez simply responded to a purported report of
a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street which led to petitioner's arrest. On the other hand, petitioner
maintains that he was just urinating in front of his workplace when the Bantay Bayan operatives suddenly
approached and questioned him, and thereafter, frisked and arrested him.
On the basis of the foregoing testimonies, the Court is inclined to believe that at around past 12 o'clock in the early
morning of May 24, 2010, petitioner went out to the street to urinate when the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced
upon him.
Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct of an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering that there was no
overt act constituting a crime committed by petitioner in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Neither do these circumstances necessitate a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest as the arresting Bantay Bayan
operatives do not have any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had just committed an offense.
All told, the Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on the person of petitioner.
Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on account of such search is rendered inadmissible in
evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Principles:
In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite
the proper provision of the penal law."[20]
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
In People v. Lauga, this court held that a "bantav bayan," in relation to the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, "has the color of a state-related function and objective
insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]"
Section 2,[27] Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or
on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -
the process cannot be reversed.

6.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. 15TH DIVISION OF CA, GR No. 189206,

2011-06-08
Facts:
The subject of this petition for certiorari is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82647
allowing the quashal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati of a subpoena for the production of... bank
ledger.
This case is incident to Civil Case No. 99-1853, which is the main case for collection of sum of money with
damages filed by Industrial Bank of Korea, Tong Yang Merchant Bank, First Merchant Banking Corporation, Land
Bank of the Philippines, and Westmont Bank
(now United Overseas Bank), collectively known as "the Banks" against Domsat Holdings, Inc. (Domsat) and the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).  Said case stemmed from a Loan Agreement, [2] whereby the Banks
agreed to lend United States (U.S.)
$11 Million to Domsat for the purpose of financing the lease and/or purchase of a Gorizon Satellite from the
International Organization of Space Communications (Intersputnik).
The controversy originated from a surety agreement by which Domsat obtained a surety bond from GSIS to secure
the payment of the loan from the Banks.  We quote the terms of the Surety Bond in its entirety.
When Domsat failed to pay the loan, GSIS refused to comply with its obligation reasoning that Domsat did not use
the loan proceeds for the payment of rental for the satellite. GSIS alleged that Domsat, with Westmont Bank as the
conduit, transferred the U.S. $11 Million loan... proceeds from the Industrial Bank of Korea to Citibank New York
account of Westmont Bank and from there to the Binondo Branch of Westmont Bank. [5] The Banks filed a
complaint before the RTC of Makati against Domsat and GSIS.
In the course of the hearing, GSIS requested for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to the custodian of records
of Westmont Bank to produce... document

1.

Ledger

2.

All applications for cashier's/ manager's checks... s and bank transfers funded by the account of DOMSAT Holdings,
Inc.
 3. Ledger covering the account of Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. with Westmont Bank (now United Overseas
Bank), any and all documents, records, files, books, deeds, papers, notes and other data and materials
relating
4. All applications for cashier's/manager's checks funded by the account of Philippine Agila Satellite
The RTC issued a subpoena decus tecum on 21 November 2002. [
On 26 June 2003, another Order was issued by the RTC denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the banks.
[11]  On 1 September 2003 however, the trial court granted the second motion for reconsideration filed by the banks.
The previous... subpoenas issued were consequently quashed
The trial court invoked the ruling in Intengan v. Court of Appeals, [13] where it was ruled that foreign currency
deposits are absolutely confidential and may be examined... only when there is a written permission from the
depositor.
Issues:
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when it favorably considered respondent banks' (second)
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 9, 2003 despite the fact that it did not contain a notice of hearing and was
therefore a mere scrap of paper.
Respondent judge capriciously and arbitrarily ignored Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA 6426) in
ruling in his Orders dated September 1 and December 30, 2003 that the US$11,000,000.00 deposit in the account of
respondent Domsat in Westmont Bank is covered by the... secrecy of bank deposit.
Since both respondent banks and respondent Domsat have disclosed during the trial the US$11,000,000.00 deposit,
it is no longer secret and confidential, and petitioner GSIS' right to inquire into what happened to such deposit can
not be suppressed
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals resorted to a liberal interpretation of the rules to avoid miscarriage of justice when it allowed
the filing and acceptance of the second motion for reconsideration.  The appellate court also underscored the fact
that GSIS did not raise the defect of... lack of notice in its opposition to the second motion for reconsideration.  The
appellate court held that failure to timely object to the admission of a defective motion is considered a waiver of its
right to do so.
It is our considered opinion that Domsat's deposit of $11,000,000.00 in Westmont Bank is covered by the Bank
Secrecy Law, as such it cannot be examined, inquired or looked into without the written consent of its owner.
The ruling in Van Twest vs. Court of
Appeals was rendered during the effectivity of CB Circular No. 960, Series of 1983, under Sec. 102 thereof, transfer
to foreign currency deposit account or receipt from another foreign currency deposit account, whether for payment
of legitimate obligation or otherwise, are... not eligible for deposit under the System.
Petitioner, therefore, had inappropriately invoked the... provisions of Central Bank (CB) Circular Nos. 343 which
has already been superseded by more recently issued C
B Circulars
CB Circular 343 requires the surrender to the banking system of foreign exchange, including proceeds of foreign
borrowings.  This requirement,... however, can no longer be found in later circulars.
even if this procedural infirmity is discarded for the broader interest of justice, the petition sorely lacks merit.
GSIS insists that Domsat's deposit with Westmont Bank can be examined and inquired into.  It anchored its
argument on Republic Act No. 1405 or the "Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits," which allows the disclosure of bank
deposits in cases where the money deposited is the... subject matter of the litigation.  GSIS asserts that the subject
matter of the litigation is the U.S. $11 Million obtained by Domsat from the Banks to supposedly finance the lease
of a Russian satellite from Intersputnik.  Whether or not it should be held liable as a... surety for the principal
amount of U.S. $11 Million, GSIS contends, is contingent upon whether Domsat indeed utilized the amount to lease
a Russian satellite as agreed in the Surety Bond Agreement.  Hence, GSIS argues that the whereabouts of the U.S.
$11 Million is the... subject matter of the case and the disclosure of bank deposits relating to the U.S. $11 Million
should be allowed.
GS
IS also contends that the concerted refusal of Domsat and the banks to divulge the whereabouts of the U.S. $11
Million will greatly prejudice and burden the GSIS pension fund considering that a substantial portion of this fund is
earmarked every year to cover the surety bond... issued.
The Banks maintain that Republic Act No. 1405 is not the applicable law in the instant case because the Domsat
deposit is a foreign currency deposit, thus covered by Republic Act No. 6426.  Under said law, only the consent of
the depositor shall serve as the exception for... the disclosure of his/her deposit.
Republic Act No. 1405 provides for four (4) exceptions when records of deposits may be disclosed.  These are under
any of the following instances: a) upon written permission of the depositor, (b) in cases of impeachment, (c) upon
order of a competent court... in the case of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials or, (d) when the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation, and e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money
Laundering Act (AMLA), the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) may inquire into... a bank account upon
order of any competent court. [22]  On the other hand, the lone exception to the non-disclosure of foreign currency
deposits, under Republic Act No. 6426, is disclosure upon the written permission of the deposito
Thus,... Republic Act No. 1405 is considered a law of general application.  On the other hand, Republic Act No.
6426 was intended to encourage deposits from foreign lenders and investors. [24] It is a special law designed
especially for foreign currency... deposits in the Philippines.  A general law does not nullify a specific or special
law.  Generalia specialibus non derogant. [25] Therefore, it is beyond cavil that Republic Act No. 6426 applies in
this case.
The basis for the application of subpoena is to prove that the loan intended for Domsat by the Banks and guaranteed
by GSIS, was diverted to a purpose other than that stated in the surety bond.  The Banks, however, argue that GSIS
is in fact liable to them for the... proper applications of the loan proceeds and not vice-versa.  We are however not
prepared to rule on the merits of this case lest we pre-empt the findings of the lower courts on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
Principles:
Thus,... Republic Act No. 1405 is considered a law of general application.  On the other hand, Republic Act No.
6426 was intended to encourage deposits from foreign lenders and investors. [24] It is a special law designed
especially for foreign currency... deposits in the Philippines.  A general law does not nullify a specific or special
law.  Generalia specialibus non derogant. [25] Therefore, it is beyond cavil that Republic Act No. 6426 applies in
this case.
Applying Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, absent the written permission from Domsat, Westmont Bank cannot
be legally compelled to disclose the bank deposits of Domsat, otherwise, it might expose itself to criminal liability
under the same act.
7.
8. LORENZANA VS. LELINA G.R. No. 187850, 17 August 2016;
RTC
Judge Jardeleza
Civil case/Quieting(remove a cloud) of title (4yrs prescription if not in possession of the
petitioner, No Px if the title is with the petitioner)
Petition for review of certiorari
Petitioner lorenzana
Respondent lelina
Date: august 2016
Place:ILocos Sur

*deed of sale will not prescribe, it can only be annulled

 9. Republic v. Spouses Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016

RTC
Judge Leonen
Civil case/Recovery of ill gotten wealth
Petition for review of certiorari
Petitioner ROP
Respondent Gimenez
Date: January 2016
Place:

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the two Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 and
September 13, 2006.

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a Complaint  for
Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the
Sandiganbayan. “The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies,
agents[,] or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]” 

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business interests, income,
and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. The Republic presented thetestimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier,
Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and
Development Department of PCGG. Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by
the Gimenez Spouses.

The Republic eventually manifested that it was “no longer presenting further evidence.”Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 “to file its formal offer of evidence.”

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved “for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28, 2006, within
which to file [its] formal offer of evidence.” This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the
same date. On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which
to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May
8, 2006. Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file its
Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated
its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of
Evidence.

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence. He argued that the Republic showed no
right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of failure to prosecute. Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to
evidence.
On June 15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit
Attached Formal Offer of Evidence. The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of documentary exhibits attached
to the Motion: EXHIBITS A TO G (and series consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax
Withheld On Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At Source, Schedule of Interest Income, Royalties and
Withholding Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from 1980-1986 proving his
legitimate income during said period) among others.

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion
for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss. According to the
Sandiganbayan: While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the higher ends of substantial
justice militate against dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds, the circumstances of this case show that the
ends of justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Court’s
orders. Rules of procedure are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases.

The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified true
copies. However, the persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were not presented. Hence,
the evidence lacked probative value.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer
to Evidence filed by the defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez and adopted by defendant Fe Roa Gimenez is GRANTED.
The case is then DISMISSED.

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that the petitioner’s evidence has no probative value and granting
respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence

HELD:

Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s functions prescribed under
Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b), and form part of the official records of the PCGG: “Certifications as to the
various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her salaries and compensation during her stint as a
public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared income of
spouses Gimenezes; the Articles of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on
various corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove that they acted as
conduit in the disbursement of government funds.“

On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not “official issuances of the
Philippine government.”They are mostly notarized private documents. Petitioner’s evidence has no probative value;
hence, a dismissal on demurrer to evidence is only proper. Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that the
Sandiganbayan did not err in holding that the majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has no probative value,
considering that most of these documents are only photocopies.
The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.

Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are classified as either public or
private. Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Courtprovides:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers,

whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court pronounced:
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence
in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged
before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or
because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing,
deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character
of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner
allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.

The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court is material with
regard to the fact the evidence proves. In Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,138 this court
ruled that:
. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated:
....
“Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer” include those specified as public documents
under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath, or jurat portion
of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under Section 23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact
which gave rise to their execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is proof that Philtrust had been
served with Written Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is
proof that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. Additionally, under Section 30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in notarized
documents is prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized
Answer to Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same).
The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution of the different kinds of
public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly performed. As regards affidavits,
including Answers to Interrogatories which are required to be sworn to by the person making them, the only portion
thereof executed by the person authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public merely attests that the
affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though
affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be received with caution.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation, this court discussed the difference between mere copies of audited
financial statements submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which
are public documents under Rule 132, Section 19(c) of the Revised Rules of Evidence:

The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of SMMC. Financial
statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow) show the fiscal condition
of a particular entity within a specified period. The financial statements prepared by external auditors who are
certified public accountants (like those presented by petitioner) are audited financial statements. Financial
statements, whether audited or not, are, as [a] general rule, private documents. However, once financial statements
are filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become public documents.

Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, this court held that mere collection of documents by the PCGG does not
make such documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make them
per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and
private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the Commission’s
investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these
documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate,
“[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses.” Witnesses can testify
only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception. Thus,
Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the
documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court.
Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a
notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not
generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiant’s
statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally
rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
(Citations omitted)

Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its main reason
for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no evidence to consider due
to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the totality of evidence on which
petitioner built its case.

Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from the second assailed
Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented by petitioner during the 19
years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any basis or
justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses.

Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a presumption that
respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s incumbency as public officer and which
total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful
income or properties.

The Sandiganbayan should have consideredAtienza v. Board of Medicine, et al. where this court held that it is better
to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to outright reject it based on very rigid
and technical grounds.

A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth. In case of doubt,
courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence.An order
granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits. This is because while a demurrer “is an aid or instrument
for the expeditious termination of an action,” it specifically “pertains to the merits of the case.”

To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary evidence essentially
deprives one party of due process. PETITION GRANTED.

10 . G.R. No. L-7969             October 5, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
CHUA MO, defendant-appellant.

Jos. N. Wolfson, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee. 

Court of First Instance , manila

Judge Johnson
Criminal case/illegal possession of opium
Petition for review of certiorari
 Petitioner United States
Respondent Chua
Date: 1912
Place: City of Manila

JOHNSON, J.:

This defendant was charged with the illegal possession of opium, in violation of the provisions of the Opium Law. 

After hearing the evidence, the Honorable A.S. Crossfield, judge found the defendant guilty of the crime charged in
the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P300 and the costs of the action, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. 

From that sentence the defendant appealed. The defendant alleged in his defense in this court that the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila did not have jurisdiction to try him; that the testimony adduced during the trial of the
cause fails to show where the offense was committed. 

The complaint filed in the present cause alleges that "on or about the 19th of March, 1912, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Chua Mo, voluntarily, illegally and criminally was the owner and had in his possession
and under his control" a certain quantity of opium. 

The judge of the lower court, after hearing the evidence, made the following findings of facts:

From the evidence presented at the trial, I find that internal revenue agents went to the place described as
717 Calle Sacristia in the city of Manila, and entering the premises there found the defendant, etc.

It appears, therefore, that the complaint charges that the crime was committed in the city of Manila. The judge who
tried the cause found from the evidence presented that the crime was committed in the city of Manila. An
examination of the evidence adduced during the trial shows simply that the internal revenue agents, on or about the
19th of March, 192, entered the residence at 717 Calle Sacristia, etc., etc. There is nothing in the record which
shows where or in what political division of the Philippine Islands the said residence at No. 717 Calle Sacristia is
located. The judge of the lower court evidently took judicial notice of the fact that Calle Sacristia was one of the
public streets of the city of Manila. We have then the question presented whether or not a trial judge can take
judicial notice of the fact that a certain public street is located in a certain city or political division of the Philippine
Islands. Section 275 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions (Act No. 190) provides:

Matters judicially recognized.—The existence and territorial extent of states, and of the several islands
forming the Philippine Archipelago, their forms of government, and symbols of nationality, the laws of
nations, the admirality and maritime and history of the United States and of the Philippine Islands, the seals
of the several departments of the Government of the United States, and of the States of the Union, and of
the Philippine Islands, public and private, and officials acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of the United States and of the Philippine Islands, the laws of nature, and the measure of
time, the geographical divisions and of political history of the world, and all similar matters of public
knowledge shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may
receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own
information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence.

In the case of Marzon vs. Udtujan (20 Phil. rep., 232), this court held, under the provisions of section 275 above
quoted, that the trial court had a right to take judicial notice of the fact that a certain municipality or barrio was
within its jurisdiction. 
In the present case the question presented is whether or not the trial court had a right to take judicial notice of the
fact that certain house, upon a certain street, was within a city in its jurisdiction. Said section 275 above quoted
provides that trial courts may take judicial notice, among other things, of the geographical division of the state.
Cities and municipalities are created by public law. Their limits are also prescribed by public law. The streets are
laid out, surveyed and established by virtue of public authority. In the present case the complaint alleged that the
crime was committed in the city of Manila. The court, in his findings of fact "from the evidence, found that the
crime was committed in the city of Manila." We are of the opinion and so hold that the lower court was authorized,
under provisions of section 275, to take judicial notice of the fact that the house located at No. 717 Calle Sacristia,
was located within the city of Manila. 

Mr. Justice Gray, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202) in
discussing the right of the court to take judicial notice of territorial extent, said:

All courts of justice are bound to take judicial notice of the territorial extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the
government whose laws they administer . . . as appearing from the public acts of the legislature and executive,
although those acts are not formally put in evidence nor are in accord with the pleadings." (U.S. vs. Reynes, 9 How.,
127; Kennett vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38; Hoyt vs. Russell, 117 U. S., 401-404; Coffee vs. Grover, 123 U.S., 1;
State vs. Dunwell, 3 R. I., 127; State vs. Wagner, 61 Me., 178; Taylor vs. Barclay, 2 Sim., 213.)

So far as the facts of the political organization and operation of the State are determined by law, they are judicially
notices as a part of the law. The chief difficulty comes in distinguishing between what is contained solely and
abstractly in the law and what depends more or less on specific official acts done under the law or upon the
application of the terms of the law to concrete things. Courts should be permitted to give a liberal interpretation to
the law permitting them to take judicial notice of the facts mentioned in such laws, especially when a technical
interpretation would have the effect of defeating the very purpose and object of the law. (Wigmore on Evidence, sec.
2575.)

In the case of Master vs. Morse (18 Utah, 21) it was held that courts might take judicial notice that a certain city had
been surveyed into lots, blocks and streets and that judicial notice would be taken of such divisions. 1awphil.net

In the case of "The Apollon" (9 Wheaton, 362-374) the Supreme Court of the United States held that "public facts of
geographical divisions might be taken judicial notice of."

In the case of Peyrox vs. Howard (7 Peters, 324-342), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the court
would take judicial notice of the fact that the port of New Orleans was within its jurisdiction, as depending on the
ebb and flow of the tide. 

In the case of Board vs. State (147 Ind., 476) the supreme court of the State of Indiana held that trial courts might
take judicial notice of the area and boundary lines of a county.

The cases holding that courts may take judicial notice of the fact that certain towns are within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the courts are almost innumerable. (St. Louis I. M. and S. Ry. Co. vs. Magness, 68 Mo., 289;
People vs. Etting, 99 Cal., 577; People vs. Faust, 113 Cal., 172; State vs. Powers, 25 Conn., 48; Perry vs. State, 113
Ga., 936; Gilbert vs. National C. R. Co., 176 Ill., 288; Ham vs. Ham, 39 Me. 263; Commonwealth vs. Desmond, 103
Mass., 445; Baumann vs. Trust Co., 66 Minn., 227.)

In the case of Gardner vs. Eberhart (82 Ill., 316), the supreme court of Illinois held that the trial courts had authority
to take judicial notice of the subdivision of towns and city property into blocks, lots, etc. (See also Sever vs. Lyons,
170 Ill., 395.)

We believe, considering the ample provisions of said section 275 and the jurisprudence already established by
reputable courts, that we have authority for holding that the lower court committed no error in taking judicial notice
of the fact that the place where the crime was committed was within its jurisdiction. Therefore the sentence of the
lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered. 

11. DEGAYO vs. MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN G.R. No. 173148, 06 April 2015;

RTC
Judge Brion
Civil case
Petition for review of certiorari
Concept: judicial notice
Petitioner degayo
Respondent magbanua
Date: may 2006
Place:Iloilo
Facts:
The present case involves a property dispute, which gave rise to two civil cases for ownership and damages between
conflicting claimants over a parcel of land located on the northeastern bank of Jalaud River. The respondents 
Cecilia Magbanua-Dinglasan,  Johnny
Dinglasan, Pascualito Magbanua, Mariano Magbanua, Asuncion Magbanua-Porras, Amado Magbanua Jr.
(respondents) initiated the first civil case against Nicolas Jarencio, Cesar Jarencio, Myrna Olmo, Fredercio Sumvilla,
Herminio Sumvilla, Perpetuo Larano and Angelo Larano, the... tenants (tenants) of Lot No. 861. Degayo, on the
other hand, initiated the second civil case, which eventually reached this Court via the present petition.
records show that Lot No. 861 is a 36,864 sqm. parcel in the Cadastral Survey of Dingle, Iloilo, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2804, registered in the name of Degayo's deceased parents, spouses Marcelo Olmo
and Rosalia Labana. Lot No. 861 used... to be bounded on the southwest by the Jalaud River that serves to separate
Dingle from Pototan Iloilo.
Sometime in the 1970's the Jalauad River steadily changed its course and moved southwards towards the banks of
Pototan,... Degayo and the tenants believed that the area was an accretion to Lot No. 861. As a result, her tenants,
commenced cultivating and tilling that disputed area with corn and tobacco.
The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the disputed property was an abandoned riverbed, which should
rightfully belong to them to compensate for the erstwhile portion of Lot No. 7328, over which the Jalaud River
presently runs.
the respondents filed a complaint for ownership and damages against the tenants, with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo, Branch 27, entitled Cecilia Magbanua Dinglasan, et al. v. Nicolas Jarencio, et al, docketed as Civil
Case No. 16047. Degayo... sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 16047 but her motion was denied.
egayo never bothered to question the interlocutory order denying her motion for intervention by filing a petition for
certiorari
Degayo initiated the present suit against the... respondents for declaration of ownership with damages
In her complaint, Degayo alleged to have acquired Lot No. 861 by inheritance by virtue of a Quitclaim Deed and
that she had been in possession of that land since 1954. She likewise stressed that the area in dispute was an
accretion to Lot No. 861.
Meanwhile, notwithstanding the previous denial of her motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 16047, Degayo was
able to participate in the proceedings therein as a witness for the defense.
during her direct examination, Degayo testified on the same matters and... raised the same arguments she alleged in
her complaint in Civil Case No. 18328... he acquired Lot No. 861 by inheritance by virtue of a Quitclaim Deed; that
she had been in possession of that land since 1954; and that the area in dispute was an accretion to Lot
No. 861... he RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 16047, in favor of the respondents...
promptly filed an appeal but they failed to file an appeal brief, resulting to a dismissal of their appeal per resolution
dated June 20,... 1999.[3] The decision in Civil Case No. 16047 became final and executory on August 6, 1999.[4]
On November 7, 2005, the CA granted the respondents' appeal and reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC
Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 18328.
CA noted that the disputed properties are abandoned riverbeds. Being abandoned riverbeds, the property in...
question rightfully belongs to the respondents as the owners of the land now occupied by the Jalaud River.
Degayo sought a reconsideration of the CA Decision but the CA denied her motion in its May 19, 2006 Resolution.
[7] Aggrieved, Degayo filed the preset petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.
Issues:
he CA erred in taking judicial notice of the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 16047, which was not even presented
during the hearing of the present case;... es judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It also refers to the "rule that a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of... the parties or their privies in all later suits
on points and matters determined in the former suit.
Ruling:
THE COURT'S RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment." It also refers to the "rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of... the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters
determined in the former suit.
The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is
intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof.[36] Generally, courts are not authorized to "take
judicial notice of... the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge.[37]" While the principle invoked is considered to be the general rule, this
rule is not absolute.
With the conclusion that Civil Case No. 16047 constitutes res judicata on the present case, we see no reason to
engage in a discussion on the factual issues raised by the petitioner for they have been passed upon and considered
in Civil Case No. 16047.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

12. REPUBLIC vs. MANALO G.R. No. 221029, 24 April 2018;

SC/RTC
Judge Peralta
Civil case/Foreign divorce
Petition for review of certiorari
Petitioner ROP
Respondent Manalo
Date: April 2008
Place:Dagupan City
 13. EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 152392, 26 May 2005;
SC/RTC
Judge Callejo
Civil case
Petition for review of certiorari
Petitioner Expertravel and tours, inc
Respondent CA and Korean airlines
Date: May 2005
Place:Makati City

Facts:
On September 6, 1999, Korean Airlines (KAL), through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint  against Expertravel and
Tours, Inc. (ETI) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the collection of the principal amount
of P260,150.00, plus attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. The verification and certification against forum
shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was the resident agent and legal counsel of
KAL and had caused the preparation of the complaint.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint
through a resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999.   KAL
submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit of even date, executed by its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that
the board of directors conducted a special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended.
It was also averred that in that same teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty.
Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged,
however, that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.

The trial court issued an Order  denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo and
Suk Kyoo Kim that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999, during which
it approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted affidavit.

ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was inappropriate for the court to take
judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the motion in its
Order dated August 8, 2000. ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of the RTC. 

The CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition, ruling that the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping
executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court. According to the appellate court,
Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly authorized by the board resolution approved on June 25, 1999, and was the resident
agent of KAL. As such, the RTC could not be faulted for taking judicial notice of the said teleconference  of the
KAL Board of Directors.
ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the CA denied.Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the court should take judicial notice as to the use of teleconference as a means of conducting
meetings of board of directors for purposes of passing a resolution.

Held:
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be made by
individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more people in
two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together
under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles. This type of group communication may be
used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing - television-like communication
augmented with sound; (2) computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals, and (3)
audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying. 
Teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not alter the complexity of group communication.
Although it may be easier to communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to miscommunicate.
Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of meeting. 
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private corporations
is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued SEC Memorandum
Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be complied with related to such conferences.
Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of
persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate governance.
However, even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along
with the respondent’s Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been
one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty.
Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never took place, and
that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondent’s Board of Directors during the said teleconference was a
mere concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint
against the petitioner.

14. MANZANO VS. DESPABILA DERAS G.R. No. 148786, 16 December 2004;

SC/RTC
Judge Carpio Morales
Civil case
Petition for review of certiorari
Petitioner Roger manzano
Respondent Luz Despabiladeras
Date: 1989
Place:Camarines Sur

Facts:
In 1989, during the months of August and September, respondent Luz Despabiladeras obtained on credit from
petitioner Roger Manzano various construction materials which she used in her construction project at the
Camarines Sur Polytechnic Colleges
(CSPC).
By petitioner's claim, he delivered to respondent during above-said period a total of P307,140.50 worth of
construction materials payable upon respondent's initial collection from CSPC, to bear 8% monthly interest until
fully paid.
Respondent having paid the amount of only P130,000.00 exclusive of interest, despite receipt of payments from
CSPC, petitioner filed on April 6, 1990 a complaint[2] against her for sum of money with damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Iriga City
In her Answer with Counterclaim,[3] respondent alleged that petitioner had substantially altered the prices of the
construction materials delivered to her... and that in addition to the P130,000.00 she had paid petitioner, she had
made additional payments to... petitioner via two checks
Petitioner filed his Reply and Answer to Counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that the two checks represented payment
for past obligations other than that subject of the case.
Branch 36 of the Iriga Regional Trial Court (the trial court) later granted petitioner's "Motion to Establish and
Enforce Plaintiff's Supplier's Lien" and accordingly ordered the President of the CSPC "to retain the sum of
P201,711.74 from the final payment due to the defendant
. . . pending final resolution of this case.
As required by the trial court, petitioner filed a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 to answer for any damages arising
from the grant and enforcement of supplier's lien.
Issues having been joined, the case was set for pre-trial.
After the pre-trial, the trial judge issued the following order:
Wherefore, it is mutually agreed that the... plaintiff shall submit an offer to stipulate showing an itemized list of
construction materials delivered to the defendant together with the cost claimed by the plaintiff within fifteen (15)
days furnishing copy thereof to the defendant who will state her... objections if any, or comment therein within the
same period of time.
nstead of submitting "an offer to stipulate," petitioner filed on October 24, 1990 a "Request for Admission"[6]
asking respondent to admit within 15 days from receipt the following:... plaintiff delivered to and defendant received
the various items particularly described in said annexes duly covered by the invoices respectively set forth therein;
That of the total amount of P314,610.50 representing the value of the goods described in Annexes A, A-1 and A-2,
plaintiff has paid only P130,000.00
No response to the Request for Admission was proffered by respondent until in the course of the trial of the case or
on April 8, 1991, respondent filed a list[7] of items admitted to have been delivered and those not admitted, noting
therein that
"Deliveries admitted do not bear the actual price agreed [upon] or the specifications requested,"
Petitioner later filed a Motion for Partial Judgment and Execution[9] alleging that "substantial justice would be
served if partial
Opposing the Motion for Partial Judgment and Execution,[11] respondent alleged:
That the motion... will still be litigated in order to determine the actual cost or value as the delivery receipts did not...
contain or reflect the true agreement between the parties
On February 21, 1994, the trial court issued the following order:[12]
Considering that the defendant, up to this time ha[s] not answered under oath the request for admission, dated
October 23, 1990, as prayed for by the counsel for the plaintiff, the facts requested to be admitted are hereby
confirmed.
By Decision[13] of July 7, 1997, the trial court found for petitioner.
x x x Despite receipt of said request for admission, defendant did not answer the same, under oath, consequently,
defendant is deemed to have admitted that plaintiff delivered to her and she received the goods delivered with the
total value of
P314,610.50 and that of the said total amount, she has paid only P130,000.00
There is no more need for the Court to examine and discuss the evidence submitted by the plaintiff to prove the
account of defendant because what has been admitted need not be proved.
At the Court of Appeals, respondent faulted the trial court
[for] ruling that defendant-appellant has admitted the facts requested for admission, particularly the matter of having
paid only P130,000.00... the Court of Appeals set aside that of the trial court and dismissed petitioner's complaint,
holding as follows:
The Court even required the appellee to present evidence on the
"matters" mentioned in the request for admission, or on the issue concerning payment and the balance of the
indebtedness. Aside from that, the appellee was even allowed to present evidence on rebuttal
Hence, petitioner's present petition for review on certiorari which raises the following issue:
Issues:
What is the legal consequence when a request for admission of material and relevant facts pursuant to Rule 26 is not
answered under oath within the period stated in the Rules by a party litigant served therefore?[17]
Petitioner contends that when respondent failed to deny under oath the truth of the material facts subject of
petitioner's Request for Admission, she is deemed to have admitted them : that he delivered to her, and she received
various construction materials costing a total of
P314,610.50, P130,000.00 of which had been partially paid.[18]
Petitioner further contends that the appellate court committed a reversible error "when it considered that the
agreement in the October 2, 1990 pre-trial and the request for admission dated October 23, 1990 refer to one and the
same thing;"[19] that
"even the trial court on November 15, 1990[20] required respondent to file her comment on the request for
admission, [which] comment is understood to mean the comment as required by Rule 26 which should be under oath
even the same is not stated in the... pre-trial order of November 15, 1990
Ruling:
Petitioner's arguments are impressed with merit.
At the commencement on April 6, 1990 of the action, the prevailing rule, Rule 26 of the 1964 Rules of Court,
Sections 1 and 2 of which were substantially reproduced in the present Rules,[24] provides:
SECTION 1. Request for admission. At any time after issues have been joined, a party may serve upon any other
party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of relevant documents described in and
exhibited with the request or of the... truth of any material and relevant matters of fact set forth in the request.
Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.
SECTION 2. Implied Admission. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted
unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof, or
within such further time as the court... may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed
serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an
admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he... cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters.
Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter requested shall be promptly submitted to the
court for resolution.
The agreement of the parties during the pre-trial conference of October 2, 1990, as reflected in the pre-trial order of
even date, was that "the [petitioner] shall submit an offer to stipulate showing an itemized list of construction
materials delivered to the
[respondent] together with the cost claimed by the [petitioner] within fifteen (15) days[,] furnishing copy thereof to
the [respondent] who will state her objections if any, or comment there[o]n within the same period of time." In
substantial compliance with said agreement,... petitioner chose to instead file a request for admission, a remedy
afforded by a party under Rule 26.
The above-quoted Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 should not be disregarded, as in fact the trial court did not, when it
ordered respondent to file comment thereon, just because the parties mutually agreed that petitioner submit "an offer
to stipulate."
For, as stated earlier, the request for admission is a remedy afforded any party after the issues had been joined.
Respondent having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon her under Rule 26, that is, to deny under oath the
facts bearing on the main issue contained in the "Request for Admission," she was deemed to have admitted that she
received the construction materials, the cost of... which was indicated in the request and was indebted to petitioner in
the amount of P184,610.50
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED

15. YUJUICO VS. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., G.R. No. 211113, 29
June 2015;
SC/RTC
Judge Perez
Civil case
Petition for Appeal from decision dated August 12, 2013 and resolution dated January 2014 of the
CA
Petitioner ADERITO Z. YUJUICO
Respondent UNITED RESOURCES ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., ATTY. RICHARD J.
NETHERCOTT and ATTY. HONORATO R. MATABAN,
Date: June 2015
Place: Pangasinan
16. PEOPLE VS. QUITOLA G.R. No. 200537, 13 July 2016;
SC/RTC
Judge Perez
Criminal case/Robbery with homicide
Petition for appeal from decision dated ay 2011 of the CA
Petitioner POP
Respondent Quitola
Date: July 2016
Place: Urdaneta City

Facts:
On March 15, 2008, the lifeless body of Maria Fe Valencia y Supan was found inside her rented
room at Nice Place Compound, Bgy. Nancayasan, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.8 Based on the joint
investigation conducted by P/Supt. Regis, Sr., P02 Ramos and their team, it was determined that
the victim suffered several stab wounds on her chest, right hand, left elbow, neck and back. The
initial investigation conducted disclosed that the victim entered the room at about 10:00 in the
evening of March 14, 2008, as recorded in the logbook of on duty security guard, Rodrigo Quitola.
The investigation also revealed that some of her personal belongings were missing.9 The
investigating team also found a broken knife with blood stains, uprooted hair strands of the victim,
other hair strands of unknown origin, and blood stains on the walls and floor.
In the course of the follow-up investigation, Police Officer 2 Herminigildo Ramos (PO2 Ramos) discovered that
accused-appellant, who happened to be the outgoing security guard of the Nice Place Compound on March 15,
2008, was seen by one Chat Siquig Baculad (Baculad). The witness, a coffee vendor, narrated that at around 5:30 in
the morning, the accused-appellant bought a cup of coffee from her. She noticed that the latter's right arm was
covered and when she asked him about it, he merely said he had an accident. According to the witness, accused-
appellant asked for her help in packing his and his pregnant wife's clothes as they were leaving the city, but she
declined. The witness left the compound and returned after a couple of hours. Upon her return, she chanced upon
accused-appellant and his wife boarding a black car, allegedly owned by Maria Fe Valencia (Valencia), with all their
belongings already loaded.

Upon finding out that accused-appellant, the security guard on duty, was nowhere to be found during the initial
investigations, the police investigators proceeded to his rented room in Camanang, Urdaneta City. When they got
there, the room was already abandoned. Convinced that accused-appellant was a possible suspect, the policemen
conducted further investigations. Accused-appellant's relatives from Natividad, Pangasinan averred no knowledge
regarding the whereabouts of accused-appellant. On September 8, 2008, accused-appellant was eventually arrested
in Aklan.

On September 10, 2008, accused-appellant was interviewed by Joana Fe Tacason (Tacason), ABS-CBN field
reporter. The interview was conducted inside the detention cell. During said interview, accused-appellant voluntarily
relayed to Tacason that at early dawn of March 15, 2008, he was in the apartment of the deceased because he tried to
borrow money from her.11 He narrated that deceased refused to lend him money. In frustration, he got money from
deceased's bag he saw lying on top of the table.12 When asked what happened next, accused-appellant responded
with "Hindi ko na alam ang sumunod na nangyari. " The interview was taped and was aired the next day. The
recorded interview forms part of the records of the case as Exhibit "U".

The deceased's car, a black Mitsubishi Lancer with Plate No. AEM-184, was later surrendered by Raffy Quitola
(Raffy), accused-appellant's brother. Raffy claimed that the same was left in his possession by his brother, who paid
him a visit on August 17, 2008 and stayed with him for about a month. Surmising that the car was related to the
crime his brother was arrested for, Raffy turned over the car to the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Calamba,
Laguna.13

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation. According to accused-appellant, at around 9 o'clock in the
morning of March 15, 2008, he and his wife left for Cubao, Quezon City after he had rendered duty at the Nice
Place Compound the night before. Accused-appellant claimed that they were bound for Aklan for the reason that his
wife wanted to give birth there. He also denied visiting his brother in Laguna. More notable is his claim that his
confession before Tacason was merely prompted by fear.
17. PEOPLE vs. LAZARTE G.R. No. 89762, 07 August 1991;
SC/RTC
Judge Sarmiento
Criminal case/Murder
Petition for appeal from decision by the CA
Petitioner POP
Respondent Lazarte
Date: august 1991
Place: Taguig Metro manila
 18.. MABUNGA vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 142039, 27 May 2004;

SC/RTC
Judge Carpio Morales
Criminal case/robbery
Petition for appeal from decision by the CA for petition to review
Petitioner Mabunga
Respondent POP
Date: October 1994
Place: Romblon
Topic Disputable presumption
Facts:
 19.. MIDWAY MARITIME AND TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATION VS. CASTRO et. al., G.R.No. 189061, 06
August 2014;

SC/RTC
Judge Reyes
Civil case
Petition for appeal from decision by the CA for petition to review
Petitioner MIDWAY MARITIME AND TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATION
Respondent Castro
Date: August 2014
Place: Cabanatuan City
Topic Conclusive Presumption
 20 PEOPLE vs. ARPOSEPLE, G.R. No. 205787, 22 November 2017;
SC/RTC
Judge Martires
Criminal case/Violation of RA9165
Petition for Appeal
Petitioner POP
Respondent Arposeple
Date: November 2017
Place: Tagbilaran City Bohol
Topic:
Facts:
CRIM. CASE NO. 12852(Viol. of Sec. 5, Art. II, R.A. 9165)That on or about the 21st day of
September 2005, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together, and
mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and
knowingly, without any lega... legal purpose, sell, transfer, deliver and give away One (1)
transparent cellophane sachet containing small amount of white powdered substance
commonly known as shabu... powder which could no longer be measured in terms of weight,
but could not be more than 0.01 gram, for and in consideration of the amount of Five
Hundred Pesos (P500.00) Philippine currency, the accused knowing fully well that the
above-mentioned substance which contains METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE is a
dangerous drug and that they did not have any lawful authority, permit or license to sell the
same, to the damage... and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
CRIM. CASE NO. 12853(Viol. of Sec. 11, Art. II, R.A. 9165)... and knowingly have in their
possession, custody, and control two (2) pcs. empty transparent cellophane sachets
containing suspected shabu leftover which could no longer be measured in terms of weight,
but could not be more than 0.01 gram, the accused knowing fully well that the above-
mentioned substance which contains Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride is a dangerous drug and that they did not have any lawful authority, permit or
license to possess the same, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
CRIM. CASE NO. 12854(Viol. of Sec. 12, Art. II, R.A. 9165)... two (2) pcs. rolled aluminum foil
used as tooter; two (2) pcs. folded aluminum foil; two (2) pcs. disposable lighters; one (1) pc.
bamboo clip; and one (1) pc. half blade, the accused knowing fully well that the above-
mentioned items are the instruments, apparatus or paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking,
consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting or introducing dangerous drug into the body,...
At around 3:00 a.m. on 21 September 2005, Jimenez, who was the Assistant City Drug
Enforcement Officer, held a briefing at his office on a buy-bust operation to be carried out at
Ubujan District, Tagbilaran City.
At 3:05 p.m. on the same day, the Philippine Provincial Crime Laboratory Office of Camp
Francisco Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City (laboratory), received a request[31] for the laboratory
examination
On 22 September 2005, after the laboratory examination, De Guzman came up with
Chemistry Report No. D-117-2005[32] stating that, except for specimen "E" labelled as
PA/JS 09-21-05-06 YB, all the specimens were positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.[33]
It was also on 21 September 2005 that the laboratory received the request[34] for
drug/urine test on the appellants to determine whether they had used any prohibited drugs
The confirmatory tests on the urine samples of the appellants likewise gave positive results
for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride as evinced
Tara testified that at about 4:30 a.m. on 21 September 2005, while she was sleeping at the
house she was renting with Cory Jane Rama (Rama), she was awakened by the appellants
who wanted to borrow P200.00 to pay for the van that they hired to come back from
Tubigon, Bohol.
At about 2:00 a.m. on 21 September 2005, she observed a passenger van parked outside the
house and saw Sulogaol hand money to its driver. At about 3:00 a.m., she heard banging on
the door of the other house. Thinking nothing of the commotion, she went back to sleep.[43]
When Bohol woke up at about 6:00a.m., she saw a vehicle and four uniformed policemen
outside. She saw Arposeple and Sulogaol who, while resisting the policemen's arrest, claimed
that they did not commit any crime.
Arposeple testified that in the early dawn of 21 September 2005, he went to Tara's house to
borrow money to pay for the car rental.
At about 3:00 a.m., three men kicked the door, entered the house, and pointed their guns at
him and Sulogaol.
Sulogaol testified that in the early dawn of 21 September 2005, he and Arposeple were at
Ubujan District, Tagbilaran City, to borrow P100.00 from Tara, Arposeple's friend, to pay for
their v-hire fare.
Issues:
The sole issue raised by the appellants was the following:THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Ruling:
Criminal Case No. 12852, the court finds accused Pablo Arposeple y Sanchez and Jhunrel
Sulogaol y Datu, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5,
Article II, of R.A. 9165, embraced in the afore-quoted information.
Arguing that the essential elements of the crimes had not been established by the
prosecution with moral certainty, the appellants appealed before the CA, Cebu City.
An accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In all criminal cases, the presumption of innocence of an accused is a fundamental
constitutional right that should be upheld at all times,

21 CELEDONIO vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 209137, 01 July 2015;

 SC/RTC
Judge Mendoza
Criminal case/Robbery with force upon things
Petition for review of certiorari
Petitioner Celedonio
Respondent POP
Date: July 2015
Place: Malabon City
Topic:

FACTS:
That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused,with intent to gain and by means of force upon things, and without the consent of
the owner, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the
herein complainant by destroying the backdoor of said house, and once inside, take, rob
and carry away the following one gold bracelet 24K, 3 necklace 1 one 24K and 2 two
18K, 2 two digi cam Sony player, 1 one DVD portable 1 one wrist watch Tagheur, 1 one
sun glass Guess,1 one camera Canon, 1 one Gameboy advance, 1 one calculator, 1 one
discman Sony, 2 two pcs. 100.00 US dollar bill, 22 twenty two pcs., 2 two necklace 18K
worth, 2 two bracelet worth, 2 two gold ring, 1 one wedding ring worth 14K, 1 one wrist
watch swiss military, 1 one cellphone NOKIA 8250, 3 three pairs of earrings, 3 three pcs.
of 100.00 US dollars, 60 sixty pcs. of Php50.00 bills, 100 one hundred pcs. of Php20.00
bills, 15 fifteen pcs. of Php100.00 bills owned and belonging to CARMENCITA DE
GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainant, in the
aforementioned amount of Php223,000.00.
ISSUES:
1) WHETHER OR NOT THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S RULING THAT THE PETITIONER’S GUILT WAS PROVEN BASED ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 2) WHETHER OR NOT THE CA GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED ON THE
PETITIONER WAS ILLEGAL, RENDERING THE ARTICLES RECOVERED
INADMISSIBLE. 3) WHETHER OR NOT THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ADRIANO MARQUEZ WAS
ILLMOTIVATED IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. 1) Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of
some of the stolen items when the police officers flagged down his motorcycle during
their follow-up operation. He failed to give a reasonable explanation as to his possession
of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of

ownership over, is owned by him. 2) no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When
the police officers asked where the stolen items were, they merely made a general
inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-up operation. Records did not show that
the police officers even had the slightest hint that the stolen items were in Celedonio’s
 motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing that the police officers frisked
Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing either of any force
or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they made the inquiry. Celedonio
himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was asked if
the items were the stolen ones, he actually confirmed it. The police officers, therefore,
were left without any recourse but to take him into custody for further investigation. At
that instance, the police officers had probable cause that he could be the culprit of the
robbery. He did not have any explanation as to how he got hold of the items. Moreover,
taking into consideration that the stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police had to
immediately act on it. 3) contrary to Celedonio’s argument, Marquez was a credible
witness. Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of
the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated
and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit
22 TADEO-MATIAS VS. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 230751, 25 April 2018;
SC/RTC
Judge Velasco
Civil case
Petition for presumptive death of husband Wilfredo
Petitioner Tadeo-Matias
Respondent ROP
Date: April 2008
Place: Tarlac City
Topic:
Facts:
This is an appeal[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution[3]
dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467. The facts are
as follows: On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband, Wilfredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).[4] The allegations of the petition read: [Petitioner]
is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a resident of 106 Molave street,
Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City; [Wilfredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine
Constabulary and was assigned in Arayat, Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;] The
[petitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda,
Pangasinan x x x; After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their
conjugal home at 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City; [Wilfredo] continued
to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to
again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary; [Wilfredo] never came back from
his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or
communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives; That according to the service record
of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission, [Wilfredo] was already declared
missing since 1979 x x x; Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for
any news regarding [her] beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had
no answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they
know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army; [W]eeks
became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope, and after
more than three (3) decades of waiting, the [petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had
been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now
necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;
[T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at
least a declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court; That this petition is being
filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as
amended.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N.
MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines for purposes of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari.[8] On
November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the
Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed: WFIEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 15,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.
Issues:
The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of
the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not apply to the instant petition as it was
clear that petitioner does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking the
presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not that
provided for under Article 41 of the FC.
Ruling:
We deny the appeal. I The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive
death filed by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the
RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that
would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not
seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive
death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of
presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other
purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended."
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death
of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of
the FC.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and
Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 are
AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not a requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office or the
Armed Forces of the Philippines can grant and pay the benefits under Presidential Decree
No. 1638. Let a copy of this decision be served to the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines for their consideration. SO ORDERED.

23 DIAZ-SALGADO vs. ALSON G.R. No. 204494, 27 July 2016;

SC/RTC
Judge Reyes
Civil case
Petition for review of Certiorari
Petitioner spouses salgado
Respondent anson
Date: July 2016
Place: Pasig City
Topic:
24 DE JESUS VS. ESTATE OF DIZON G.R. No. 142877, 02 October 2001;
SC/RTC
Judge Vitug
Civil case
Petition : omnibus motion on dismissal of the complaint
Petitioner DE Jesus
Respondent: estate of decedent juan gamboa dizon
 Date: October 2001
Place: Quezon City
Topic: Legitemacy

25 PEOPLE vs. LIM, G.R. No. 231989, 04 September 2018;

SC/RTC
Judge Peralta
Criminal case/ Violation of RA9165 illega;l possession of MetHcl
Petition for Review of certiorari
Petitioner POP
Respondent Romy lim y miranda
Date: October 2010
Place: Cagayan de oro city
Topic: violation of sec 11 and 5 of RA 9165
Facts:
The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nang Romy. " Gorres came out and invited
them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching the television. When the CI
introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one inside the
bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as instructed. After he came out, he handed a small
medicine box to Lim, who then took one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu
and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.
IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of
white substance, and a disposable lighter. IOl Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet that
she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets.
Despite exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative from the media and
barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.
The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug specimens to
Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of the sachets of shabu
from the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a Forensic Chemist, and
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Bajas[7] personally received the letter-requests and the two pieces of
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PSI Caceres
got urine samples from Lim and Gorres and conducted screening and confirmatory tests on
them. Based on her examination, only Lim was found positive for the presence of shabu. The
result was shown in Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM-196 and 197-2010. With respect to the
two sachets of white crystalline substance, both were found to be positive of shabu after a
chromatographic examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings were reflected in
Chemistry Report No. D-228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own marking on the
cellophane containing the two sachets of shabu. After that, she gave them to the evidence
custodian. As to the buy-bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's office
during the inquest.
Issues:
Lim maintains that the case records are bereft of evidence showing that the buy-bust team
followed the procedure mandated in Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Ruling:
The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside, and Lim should be acquitted based on
reasonable doubt.
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be
authenticated prior to its admission into evidence... the proponent needs only to prove a
rational basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165
Amendment... photograph the same

amdmt... elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service

amdt... photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable
Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the
seizure or confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforement officers could justify
the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
not tainted
We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated
items at the place of arrest may be excused in instances when the safety and security of the
apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are
threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action of those who have the
resources and capability to mount a counter-assault.[26] The present case is not one of
those.
IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the marking and physical inventory of
the two sachets of shabu.
Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ
and the media to witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items.
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of
any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA
9165 must be adduced.
mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required
witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non- compliance.
In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials
arrived at the crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for
them to wait at Lim's house.[35] IO2 Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was made
in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and there were no available
media representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact them.[36] He
admitted that there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior to their
operation as they. might leak the confidential information.[37] We are of the view that these
justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply
with the law.
It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of
Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR may be excused as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items are properly preserved applies
not just on arrest and/or seizure by reason of a legitimate buy-bust operation but also on
those lawfully made in air or sea port, detention cell or national penitentiary, checkpoint,
moving vehicle, local or international package/parcel/mail, or those by virtue of a consented
search, stop and frisk (Terry search), search incident to a lawful arrest, or application of plain
view doctrine where time is of the essence and the arrest and/or seizure is/are... not
planned, arranged or scheduled in advance.
To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal
drugs are typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings. Relative
thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations
directs:... noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn statements/affidavits of the
apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.
Principles:
chain of custody... the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the
seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the evidence
is what the party claims it to be... prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the
trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims it to be.
Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; (2) the turnover of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the illegal drug by the investigating officer to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the
illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court
The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for non-compliance with the
procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended.
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical
inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s