Greek Poleis and the Roman Empire:

Nature and Features of Political Virtues in an Autocratic System

Introduction

To emphasize the relevance of the gap which Plutarch envisaged between the political situations
of past and present Greece, recalling a few passages of these same Praecipua will suffice. “Nowadays”,
Plutarch asks, “where the affairs of the cities no longer include leadership in wars, nor the overthrowing
of tyrannies, nor acts of alliances, what opening for a conspicuous and brilliant public career could a
young man find?” (805A). Later on, after affirming that “the greatest blessings which States can enjoy
are peace, liberty, plenty, abundance of men, and concord”, Plutarch goes on to observe that “so far as
peace is concerned the peoples have no need of statesmanship at present, for all war, both Greek and
foreign, has been banished from among us and has disappeared; and of liberty the peoples have as great
a share as our rulers grant them, and perhaps more would not be better for them” (824C). These same
ideas are echoed in a passage of the A sent res publica gerund sit, where Plutarch observes that in the
present day – “when one lives in luxury in states that are free from tyranny or any war or siege” –
continuing one’s political activity is much easier and safer than in past times, when physical requisites
could discourage or even hinder an elderly man from engagement in politics (784F). In all these passages
Plutarch ostensibly considers the present situation as happier for the Greeks than that of past ages; but
the same Plutarch denounces, a few lines after the second quoted passage of the Praecipua, “the weak
condition of Greek affairs, in which it is best for wise men to accept one advantage – a life of harmony
and quiet – since fortune has left us no prize open for competition” (824E). I will deal extensively with
this apparent contradiction inside Plutarch’s mind. For the moment, it is enough to point out Plutarch’s
consciousness of the diversity between the ancient and modern Greek political situations, and of the
effects it is likely to produce on the characters of statesmanship in single Greek poleis. Returning to the
first of the above-mentioned passages, it is useful to remember the context in which it is inserted:
Plutarch is dealing with the ways a young man may best begin his political career, and, in the fields of
both external and internal politics, excludes the most traditional ones, which assumed a situation of
complete autonomy on the part of the political subject. What then does he suggest as the Greek POLEIS
and the roman empire 85 most convenient point of departure in the present situation? “There remain”,
he says, “the public lawsuits and embassies to the emperor, which demand a man of ardent
temperament and who possesses both courage and intellect” (805A). As far as embassies are concerned,
Plutarch recalls later having taken part, when still young, in one which his motherland, Chaeronea, had
sent to the proconsul (ἀντιστρατηγός), the provincial governor of Achaia (816D), and which apparently
had been the beginning of his own career, considering that Plutarch had the main responsibility in its
handling and that its results were presumably profitable for the town (otherwise Plutarch would not
have mentioned the episode). As for lawsuits, possible different occasions for them are enumerated:
one may complain to the local authorities who do not care about useful improvements in the managing
of public affairs, or denounce a single politician’s bad practices, or even better protect a weak client
against a powerful opponent (805B). Finally, Plutarch mentions in this context “boldness of speech in
behalf of the right against a wicked governor (ἡγεμῶνα μοχθηρόν)”: as we will see later, the provincial
governor is, together with the emperor, the real interlocutor of the statesman of a polis, the man whose
mere presence marks the limits of both the latter’s political autonomy and that of the polis itself.
According to Plutarch, the reason for referring everything to the sovereign officials is the “greed and
contentiousness of the foremost citizens”, who, not accepting being defeated by their fellow citizens,
“call in those who are mightier [τοὺς κρείττους, the Roman officials]”, and, as greek POLEIS and the
roman empire 91 a result “senate, popular assembly, courts, and the entire local government lose their
authority” (815AB). So, the real problem would seem to be that the Greeks themselves were unable to
profit even from the fixed amount of liberty the Roman government would have liked to give them. But
at the end of his booklet Plutarch again states that it is the Roman dominion which has to be attributed
the responsibility for this situation: “What sort of power is it which a small edict of a proconsul may
annul or transfer to another man and which, even if it lasts, has nothing in it seriously worthwhile?”
(824EF). Summing up, it appears that Plutarch is genuinely uncertain as regards the final responsibility
for the political weakness of the Greek world – aside from the problem of how to explain Greek decline
against the background of the overall happiness of the Roman times.

OBJECTIVES

This paper surveys some of the antecedents of the particular characteristics which mark
Plutarch’s idea of the perfect statesman: better said, of the perfect Greek statesman in a situation of
autocratic external control of the city-state, i.e., in the context of the Roman Imperial age in which
Plutarch himself lived1 . It illustrates and evaluates how Greek Roman thoughts shaped up the idea of
rights philosophically in classical period. The first point to make is, in fact, that in his statements Plutarch
accurately distinguished the politicians of his own lifetime the great men both of Greek and Roman past
history .This is not to deny that his historiographical ideas were strongly influenced by, and imbued with,
contemporary problems and impressions, but simply to acknowledge Plutarch’s keen awareness that
the world of his heroes was completely different from that of his own times, especially as regarded its
political aspects and requirements. Reviewing once again the history of the two peoples as represented
by the most influential personages of both sides, Plutarch aimed at reaffirming the dignity, not to say
the superiority, of Greek values and culture over Roman ones. The objective to conceal as far as possible
the Roman presence, to safeguard the political prestige of the municipal organization, demanded indeed
that the Plutarchan statesman possess a complete set of virtues which, in general terms.

DISCUSSION

This discussion focuses the topic These negative effects of political activity became even more
dangerous in a context like that of the Greek towns in the Roman Empire. The Romans, in fact, not only
could tolerate any political excesses, not to say disturbances, inside or outside towns, but also
demanded that there will be at any rate respected. it was easily to be expected that the local political
leaders, or most of them, aimed at obtaining the support of the Roman provincial authorities, first the
governors, in order to overcome their rivals.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of this Greek Poleis and the Roman Empire: Nature and Features of Political
Virtues in an Autocratic System: to Doi, there is no reason at all for strife between the two towns the
quarrel is merely about the ‘primacy’, that is, the honorific titles they claim, which ought to sanction the
superiority of one of them above the other: “objects of utter contempt in the eyes of all persons of
discernment especially in Rome excite laughter and, what is still more humiliating, are called ‘Greek
failings. In this case, unlike in Aristides’, we are dealing with a strict contemporary of Plutarch’s. After
considering Doi’s positions, it should be easier to understand Plutarch’s point of view, and in particular
to realize why he believes that it makes sense, anyway, to give political instructions to the category of
local statesmen; that is, to define the kind of statesman who would be able to cope in the best (moral
and political) way with the difficult situations of his times.

REFERENCES

Van der Stock (2002); De Blois et al. (2004) and (2005); see also Boulogne (1994)

I ought to refer to Desideria (1978), (1991), (1994b), and, for the particular situation of Tarsus, (2001).

Desideria (1986), (1994a), and (2002); in those essays the most relevant recent bibliographical
contributions are conveniently quoted, but I would like to add at least Merola (2001).

Renoirs (1951) and Carriere (1977) – which are alluded to in the text – and the quite recent collections
of essays: Starter