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G.R. No. 240053, October 09, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, v. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO

AND JULIUS LACANILAO, RESPONDENTS.

HERNANDO, J.:

The peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the present case give rise to a novel
question of law. May a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane Veloso (Mary Jane), who
was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to death by the Indonesian
Government and who is presently confined in a prison facility in Indonesia, testify by
way of deposition without violating the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness
by the accused? 

This petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
December 13, 2017 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149002 which
granted respondent's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and reversed the August
16,2016 Resolution3 of the Regional Trial Court (trial court), Branch 88, of Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, granting the motion of the prosecution to take the deposition by
written interrogatories of Mary Jane in Indonesia.

The Factual Antecedents

Mary Jane, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius) were
friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation
and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in
Malaysia. Believing that the job was a ray of hope, Mary Jane scraped whatever meager
money she had and when the amount was not even enough to pay Cristina and Julius
as placement fee, she resorted to borrowing from relatives. Still, the amount gathered
was insufficient prompting Mary Jane's husband to sell even their precious motorcycle.
On April 21, 2010, Mary Jane, together with Cristina, eventually left the Philippines for
Malaysia. However, to Mary Jane's dismay, she was informed by Cristina upon their
arrival in Malaysia that the job intended for her was no longer available. After spending
a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to Indonesia for a seven-day holiday
with a promise that she will have a job upon her return in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary
Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her trip.

Upon Mary Jane's arrival at the Adisucipto International Airport in Yogyakarta,

Indonesia, she was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly carrying 2.6
kilograms of heroin inside her luggage. She was accordingly charged with drug
trafficking before the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Mary Jane sought comfort from her family in the Philippines and informed them that
she was currently detained in Indonesia. Mary Jane's family immediately confronted
Cristina who instead of helping them even threatened them to keep the matter to
themselves and not to divulge the same especially to the media. She even told Mary
Jane's family that she is part of an international drug syndicate who would spend
millions to get Mary Jane out of prison.
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However, in October 2010, the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia,

convicted Mary Jane of drug trafficking and sentenced her to death by firing squad.
After the affirmance of her conviction by the High Court and the Supreme Court of
Indonesia, Mary Jane and eight other felons who were similarly convicted of drug-
related offenses were brought to a prison facility in the island of Nusakambangan, off
Central Java, Indonesia, to await their execution by firing squad, which was originally
scheduled on April 9, 2015 but later rescheduled to April 28, 2015. Eventually, the eight
companions of Mary Jane were executed by firing squad. Presently, Mary Jane is
detained at the Wirogunan Penitentiary in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Cristina and Julius were arrested by the operatives of the
Anti-Human Trafficking Division of the National Bureau of Investigation. Thereafter,
they were charged with qualified trafficking in person in violation of Section 4(a) in
relation to Sections 3 (a) and 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208, otherwise known as
"Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" docketed as Criminal Case No. SD (15)-
3723.4 Cristina and Julius were likewise charged in two separate Informations with the
crime of illegal recruitment as penalized under Section 6, par. (k) and (1) of R.A. No.
8042, otherwise known as "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of
1995," and estafa in violation of Section 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SD (15)-3724,5 and SD (15)3753,6 respectively, filed
before the trial court. Upon arraignment, Cristina and Julius entered a plea of "not
guilty" on all charges.

On March 31, 2015, representatives from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, and the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) went to Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary Jane. She executed a
document known as "Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Mary Jane Fiesta Veloso. "

In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, Mary Jane maintained her innocence and narrated how
she was recruited by Cristina and Julius. She alleged that while in Malaysia, she and
Cristina stayed at Sun Inn Lagoon since her supposed employer was not in Malaysia.
Cristina has a boyfriend named Prince whom she conversed only by phone. Prince has a
brother named "Ike. " On April 24, 2010, Mary Jane and Cristina went to the hotel
parking lot and met with "Ike " who was on board a white car. They then went inside
the car wherein "Ike" handed the luggage to Cristina. When they returned to the hotel
room, Cristina gave Mary Jane the luggage. Mary Jane noticed that it was unusually
heavy but, upon checking, found nothing inside. She then asked Cristina why the
luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The luggage
was the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was
apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.

On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the Indonesian
Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the
Indonesian Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in
police custody, and her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.

Thus, on April 28, 2015, or a few hours before the scheduled execution of Mary Jane,
the President of Indonesia, His Excellency Joko Widodo, granted her an indefinite
reprieve. The Cabinet Secretary of the Indonesian Government informed the public that
President Widodo received reports about the on-going legal proceedings in the
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Philippines with respect to the case of Mary Jane, and that her recruiters were already
in police custody.

Hence, pursuant to its obligations under the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters entered into by Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty), the Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of
Mary Jane to afford her an opportunity to present her case against Cristina, Julius, and
"Ike" who were allegedly responsible for recruiting and exploiting her to engage in drug
trafficking.

The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative to the
taking of Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:

(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;   

(b) No cameras shall be allowed;   

(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and   

(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing. 

Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of
Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories. "7 It averred
that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon written
interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is
out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the court due to her
imprisonment. The prosecution also pointed out that Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
applies suppletorily in criminal proceedings and the use of deposition upon written
interrogatories in criminal cases is not expressly prohibited under the Rules of Court.
Further, it pointed out that the Supreme Court has allowed dispensation of direct
testimony in open court under the Rules of Environmental Cases and the Judicial
Affidavit Rule. Lastly, the OSG averred that Cristina and Julius will still have an
opportunity to examine Mary Jane by propounding their own set of written
interrogatories through the designated consular officer who will be taking the
deposition; moreover, they were not precluded from objecting to the questions and
answers.

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be made
before and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules of
Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open court and
the use thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that such method of
taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet
her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, they
claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced because the affiants therein were
still subject to cross-examination.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

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In its Resolution dated August 16, 2016, the trial court granted the prosecution's
motion subject to the following conditions:

1. Considering that the Prosecution has already submitted their proposed questions
in the written interrogatories, the accused, through counsel, is given a period
often (10) days from receipt of this Resolution to submit their comment to the
proposed questions on the deposition upon written interrogatories for the
witness Mary Jane Veloso. Upon receipt of the Comment, the Court shall
promptly rule on the objections;    
2. The Court shall schedule the taking of the deposition in Yogyakarta, Indonesia,
which shall be presided by the undersigned trial judge. The final questions for
the deposition (after ruling on the Defense objections), shall be propounded by
the Consul of the Philippines in the Republic of Indonesia or his designated
representative. The answers of the deponent to the written interrogatories shall
be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the Office of the Philippine Consulate
in the Republic of Indonesia;   
3. The transcribed copy of the answers of the deponent shall be furnished the
accused, through counsel, who shall thereafter submit their proposed cross
interrogatory questions to the Prosecution within ten (10) days from receipt;     
4. The Prosecution is given the same period often (10) days from receipt of the
proposed cross interrogatory questions of the Defense stating the ground for the
objections. Upon receipt of the comment, the Court shall promptly rule on the
objections:   
5. The Court shall schedule the conduct of the cross interrogatory questions for the
deposition of Mary Jane Veloso in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, which shall be presided
by the undersigned trial judge. The final questions for the written cross
interrogatories (after ruling on the Prosecution's objections) shall be propounded
by the Consul of the Philippines in the Republic of Indonesia or his designated
representative. The answers of the deponent to the written cross interrogatories
shall be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the Office of the Philippine
Consulate in the Republic of Indonesia;
6. Unless the Prosecution opts to conduct re-direct written interrogatories, the
testimony of Mary Jane Veloso by way of deposition upon written interrogatories
shall be deemed terminated. In case the Prosecution propounds re-direct written
interrogatories on the deponent, the above-mentioned procedure for the conduct
of direct and cross interrogatories shall be observed. 8

Cristina and Julius immediately filed their "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to
Suspend Period of Time to File Comments to Proposed Questions for Deposition of Mary
Jane Veloso. "9 However, the trial court denied their Omnibus Motion in its November 3,
2016 Resolution.10     

Undeterred, Cristina and Julius filed a Petition for Certiorari  and Prohibition with Urgent
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction 11 before the Court
of Appeals averring that the trial court judge gravely abused her discretion in the
issuance of the assailed Resolutions.     

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:     

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Finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the appellate court, in its
assailed December 13, 2017 Decision, granted the Petition for Certiorari and reversed
the August 16, 2016 Resolution of the trial court. It held that, contrary to the RTC's.
findings, the conditional examination of witnesses in criminal proceedings are primarily
governed by Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. According to the appellate
court, the State failed to establish compelling reason to depart from such rule and to
apply instead Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which only applies in civil cases.
Thus, pursuant to Rule 119, the taking of deposition of Mary Jane or her conditional
examination must be made not in Indonesia but before the court where the case is
pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88, and
that Cristina and Julius, being the accused in the criminal proceedings, should be
notified thereof so they can attend the examination.     

The appellate court further reasoned that to allow the prosecution to take the
deposition of Mary Jane through written interrogatories will violate the right of Cristina
and Julius as the accused to confront a witness or to meet the witness face to face.    

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought for reconsideration12 but it was denied

by the appellate court in its June 5, 2018 Resolution. 13     

Aggrieved, the OSG filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court before this Court alleging mainly that: (a) the Court of Appeals erred
in giving due course to Crisitina and Julius's petition for certiorari because there was
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law; in
addition, the OSG contended that the Petition for Certiorari should not have been given
due course considering the lack of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court; and; (b) Rule 23 of the Rules of Court with
respect to deposition under written interrogatories can be applied suppletorily in the
taking of the testimony of Mary Jane given her extraordinary circumstances. Meantime,
spouses Cesar and Celia Veloso, parents of Mary Jane, filed a "Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-In-Intervention." 14 They prayed to be allowed
to intervene, on behalf of Mary Jane, in the instant proceeding for the purpose of
protecting and preserving their daughter's substantial and immediate interest. Attached
to their motion was their Petition-in-Intervention. 15     

The OSG, on the other hand, submitted its Manifestation and Motion.16 It informed the
Court that the trial court proceeded with the hearing of the criminal cases in accordance
with A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, or the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal
Cases. The prosecution has only Mary Jane to present as a witness. Hence, the OSG
prays that the Court immediately resolve the instant Petition for Review and to suspend
the application of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the criminal proceedings before the trial
court.     

In this Court's March 27, 2019 Resolution, 17 it denied the motion for intervention of
Mary Jane's parents for failure to establish legal interest in the instant case that is
actual and material as well as direct and immediate. The Court likewise denied the
OSG's prayer to suspend the application of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the criminal
proceedings before the trial court for lack of basis.

Issues
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(a) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari, and;       

(b) Whether Mary Jane's testimony may be validly acquired through deposition by
written interrogatories.       

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition impressed with merit.    

On Procedural Matters     

The OSG avers that the appellate court erred in giving due course and granting the
respondents' Petition for Certiorari there being other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law. It further argues that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the State's motion to allow the taking
of Mary Jane's testimony by deposition through written interrogatories.     

The Court agrees.     

Impropriety of the writ of certiorari

before the Court of Appeals     

A writ of certiorari is limited in scope and narrow in character. It is available only to

correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion. In other words, certiorari is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction,
and not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the
lower court. Thus, any alleged errors committed by the trial court within the bounds of
its jurisdiction and in the exercise of its discretion are mere errors of judgment,
correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
and not by a petition for certiorari.18     

The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Cruz v. People,19 citing Delos Santos v.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company20 is instructive on the scope of certiorari:

We remind that the writ of certiorari - being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in
character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of
courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or authority in law to perform) - is not a
general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error
committed by a lower court.       

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari
was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the
inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the
party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to
determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's judgment was
rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand,
they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was
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available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and
corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the
inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according
to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial
acts.       

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same
as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the
power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or
situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari
to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly
provides the requirements for that purpose[.]       

x x x x       

Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding.
(Citations omitted)

It must be emphasized that the errors imputed against the trial court by Cristina and
Julius in their Petition for Certiorari pertained only to its appreciation of the factual
milieu, and the application of pertinent law and rules. Plainly, their Petition
for Certiorari did not contain factual allegations that can support a finding of grave
abuse of discretion. These alleged errors, if at all, amounted only to erroneous exercise
of the lower court's judgment, an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction, which
does not justify Cristina's and Julius's resort to a certiorari proceeding.     

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment

that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perfonn a duty enjoined by law."21 It arises when a lower court or tribunal violates
and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 22 The Supreme
Court explained in Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio,23viz.:

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done
in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
"evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition
for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower
court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having
been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that
such act was patent and gross, x x x.
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In the case at bench, respondents did not even attempt to show that the trial court
abused its discretion, much less that the exercise thereof was so patent and gross and
to amount to lack of jurisdiction; in fact, even the appellate court simply stated in its
assailed Decision that the trial court merely erred, and not abuse its discretion,
much more grave, in applying Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure instead of Rule
119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which particularly deals with the conditional
examination of a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane in this case, in criminal cases.
Notably, the appellate court did not specify the circumstances in support of its
conclusion that the trial court arrived at its conclusion in an arbitrary and despotic
manner. On the contrary, a close examination of the trial court's judgment shows that
it was anchored on the peculiar incidents surrounding the case, and applied
jurisprudence and rules which it believed were pertinent. It has in fact judiciously
discussed the rationale for its decision to allow the taking of Mary Jane's deposition
through written interrogatories in this wise:

First, Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring
prosecution witnesses who are either sick or infirm or has left the Philippines without
any date of return, to deliver their testimony in open court cannot be applied to the
private complainant, because her situation as a death row convict in a foreign country
incapacitates her from making decisions, on her own, to take the witness stand. Such
decision to testify and the manner by which her testimony is to be given depends on
the Indonesian authorities before whom she was sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of death;       

Second, considering the inapplicability of Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Court found it appropriate to apply in a suppletory manner,
Sec. 23 of the Revised Rules of Court for the taking of the private complainant's
deposition upon written interrogatories. Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court
specifically provides that the deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken
only by leave of court upon such terms as the court prescribes;       

Third, in the case of People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey Webb xxx, the Supreme
Court categorically declared that "due process is not a monopoly of the defense. The
State is entitled to due process as much as the accused". To deny the motion of the
Prosecution would result in a highly inequitable situation where the sole witness relied
upon by the Prosecution to establish their case would be denied the opportunity to
present her case due to procedural technicalities which are beyond her control;       

Fourth, the deposition sought by the Prosecution is specifically aimed at perpetuating

the testimony of the private complainant, thus said deposition may be allowed at any
stage of the proceedings and even on appeal pursuant to Rule 24 of the Revised Rules
of Court in the separate opinion of former Chief Justice Hilario Davide in the previously
cited case of People vs. Webb, be affirmed that depositions may be allowed in criminal
cases and may be taken at any time after the commencement of the action whenever
necessary or convenient, x x x;       

xxxx       

Fifth, the offense involved in this case, i.e. qualified human trafficking, is a major

transnational crime committed across continents. Unlike the previously cited cases of
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Cuenco and Go where the offenses involved are non-index crimes (i.e., estafa and other
deceits), the subject suit involves a major transnational crime that cuts across borders
and is a principal policy concern among nations. Thus, the Court believes that the
Prosecution should not be denied the opportunity to prove its case, thus assuring the
global community that the Philippines is committed to fight such modern day
menace[.]24     

Indubitably, there was absence of any proof that the grant of the taking of deposition
through written interrogatories by the trial court was made in an arbitrary, whimsical,
and capricious manner. There was no patent abuse of discretion which was so gross in
nature thereby amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. 25 What was only
apparent in the instant case was that the trial court properly considered the
extraordinary circumstances surrounding the plight of Mary Jane, in relation to
applicable rules and jurisprudence. Suffice it to state that the Decision of the trial court
was not without rhyme or reason. Clearly, there was an honest effort on the part of the
trial court to support its ratiocination and conclusion based on facts and law.  

As already adverted, the case at hand is unprecedented. It involves novel issues and
poses difficult questions of law. It is settled jurisprudence that "[a] doubtful or difficult
question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard, the law always
accords to public officials the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duties, xxx Any person who seeks to establish otherwise has the
burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive." 26 As such, no abuse of discretion, much more
grave abuse of discretion, may be successfully imputed against the trial court.     

In fine, this Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court and in holding that respondents' resort to a
Petition for Certiorari was proper.     

This now brings our discussion to the substantive issues.     

On Substantive Matters     

The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e., Mary Jane's
conviction by final judgment and her detention in a prison facility in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, while awaiting execution by firing squad; the grant by the Indonesian
President of an indefinite reprieve in view of the ongoing legal proceedings against
Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions attached to the reprieve
particularly that Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia, and any
question propounded to her must only be in writing, are more than enough grounds to
have allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.     

The OSG's contentions are meritorious.     

The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate court that the State
failed to show compelling reasons to justify the relaxation of the Rules and the
suppletory application of Rule 23. The Court also cannot agree to its declaration that
the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius to confront a witness will be violated since
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safeguards were set in place by the trial court precisely to protect and preserve their
rights.     

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court

is inapplicable in the instant case     

In its assailed Decision, the appellate court held that the deposition of Mary Jane's
testimony through written interrogatories in Indonesia is not sanctioned by Section 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the pronouncements of
the Court in Go v. People27 and Cuenco vda. De Manguerra v. Risos28 that Section 23 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure should not be given any suppletory application. It held that
"just like a witness who is sick or infirm, Mary Jane's imprisonment in Indonesia
presents a limitation on her mobility."29 According to the Court of Appeals, Section 15,
Rule 119 which applies to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal
cases, Mary Jane's deposition must be taken before the court where the case is
pending. In other words, the appellate court opines that Mary Jane's testimony must be
taken before the trial court, where the cases of respondents are being heard, and not in
Indonesia.     

The Court begs to differ.     

Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it satisfactorily appears

that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as
directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case
is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The
statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. (Emphasis
Ours.)     

Under the foregoing provision, in order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be
taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be shown that the said
prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by
the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning.     

Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. She is neither too sick
nor infirm to appear at the trial nor has to leave the Philippines indefinitely. To recall,
Mary Jane is currently imprisoned in Indonesia for having been convicted by final
judgment of the crime of drug trafficking, a grave offense in the said state. In fact, she
was already sentenced to death and is only awaiting her execution by firing squad. Her
situation is not akin to a person whose limitation of mobility is by reason of ill-health or
feeble age, the grounds cited in Section 15 of Rule 119. In fact, Mary Jane's
predicament does not in way pertain to a restriction in movement from one place to
another but a deprivation of liberty thru detention in a foreign country with little or no
hope of being saved from the extreme penalty of death by firing squad.     
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It thus necessarily follows that the cases of Go v. People and Cuenco vda. De Manguera
v. Risos are not on all fours with the present case. The circumstances of the prosecution
witnesses in the cases of Go and Cuenco demanded and justified the strict adherence to
Rule 119. The witnesses in both cases anchored their allowance to testify by way of
deposition on their claims that they were too sick or infirm to testify before the court.
In the case of Go, Li Luen Pen who returned to Cambodia claimed that he was
undergoing treatment for lung infection and could not travel back to the Philippines due
to his illness.    

Similarly, in the case of Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra averred that
she would not be able to testify before the trial court due to weak physical condition
and age. Note, however, that despite the limitation in the mobility of Li Luen Pen and
Concepcion, they can still undoubted voluntarily take the witness stand and testify
before the trial court should they get better or so decide.     

This is not the same in the case of Mary Jane. She cannot even take a single step out of
the prison facility of her own volition without facing severe consequences. Her
imprisonment in Indonesia and the conditions attached to her reprieve denied her of
any opportunity to decide for herself to voluntarily appear and testify before the trial
court in Nueva Ecija where the cases of the respondents were pending.    

Unfortunately, in denying the State's motion for deposition through written

interrogatories and effectively requiring the presence of Mary Jane before the RTC of
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the Court of Appeals appeared to have strictly and rigidly
applied and interpreted Section 15, Rule 119 without taking into consideration the
concomitant right to due process of Mary Jane and the State as well as the prejudice
that will be caused to Mary Jane or the People with its pronouncement. Considering the
circumstances of Mary Jane, the Court of Appeals demanded for the impossible to
happen and thus impaired the substantial rights of Mary Jane and the State. It was akin
to a denial of due process on the part of Mary Jane as well as of the State to establish
its case against the respondents. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in the present
case made it impossible for Mary Jane to appear before the RTC of Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija. Just like when Mary Jane was recruited by the respondents and taken
advantage of because of her poor condition, the same scenario is being repeated
because the respondents are again taking advantage of Mary Jane's dire circumstances
which they themselves put her in, by depriving her the opportunity to speak and obtain
justice for herself. The Court of Appeals did not take into account the fact that the case
of the prosecution against Cristina and Julius can only be erected through the testimony
of Mary Jane herself.     

Moreover, by denying the prosecution's motion to take deposition by written

interrogatories, the appellate court in effect silenced Mary Jane and denied her and the
People of their right to due process by presenting their case against the said accused.
By its belief that it was rendering justice to the respondents, it totally forgot that it in
effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well as the People. By not allowing Mary Jane
to testify through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of the
opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the
Philippine Government the chance to comply with the conditions set for the grant of
reprieve to Mary Jane.     
 12

It is well to remind the Court of Appeals at this point that as held in Secretary of Justice
v. Lantion,30 "[t]he due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are
not only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly,
they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit
with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their
interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of
meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to
the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The
requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the
Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement.
Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts
instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause 'gradually ascertained by
the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they
arise' (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to 'the embodiment
of the sporting idea of fair play' (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs.
City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of
justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366)." Thus, it behooved upon the Court of Appeals to have provided some leeway in
its interpretation of the subject provision.     

At this juncture, we find the discussion on the matter by Justice Florenz D. Regalado
instructive and relevant, viz.31:

1. Rules 23 to 28 provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted
to by a party to an action, viz

a. Depositions pending action (Rule 23);       

       
b. Depositions before action or pending appeal (Rule 24);       
       
c. Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25);       
d. Admission by adverse party (Rule 26);       
       
e. Production or inspection of documents or things (Rule 27); and       
       
f. Physical and mental examination of persons (Rule 28);       

Rule 29 provides for the legal consequences for the refusal of a party to comply with
such modes of discovery lawfully resorted to by the adverse party.    

2. In criminal cases, the taking of the deposition of witnesses for the prosecution
was formerly authorized by Sec. 7, Rule 119 for the purpose of perpetuating the
evidence to be presented at the trial, without a similar provision for defense
witnesses. However, in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, only the
conditional examination, and not a deposition, of prosecution witnesses was
permitted (Sec. 7, Rule 119) and this was followed in the latest revision (Sec.
15, Rule 119).
       
3. Depositions are classified into:
 13

a. Depositions on oral examination and depositions upon written interrogatories;

or      
b. Depositions de bene esse and depositions in perpetuam rei memoriam.     

 Depositions  de bene esse are those taken for purposes of a pending action and are
regulated by Rule 23, while depositions in perpetuam rei memoriam are those taken to
perpetuate evidence for purposes of an anticipated action or further proceedings in a
case on appeal and are now regulated by Rule 24.

4. The court may determine whether the deposition should be taken upon oral
examination or written interrogatories to prevent abuse or harassment (De los
Reyes vs. CA, et al, L-27263, Mar. 17, 1975).     

The extraordinary factual circumstances

surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant
the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court

Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane's
testimony as a prosecution witness proper?   

The Court rules in the affirmative.   

At the outset, the Court is always guided by the principle that rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.32 Simply put, rules of procedure
should facilitate an orderly administration of justice. They should not be strictly applied
causing injury to a substantive right of a party to case. This precept has been
elucidated by the Supreme Court in De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan33 to wit:

[T]he rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality. This power to
suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to
alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now
compelled to do in this case. And this is not without additional basis, x x x

There are several instances wherein the Court has relaxed procedural rules to serve
substantial justice because of any of the following reasons: (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the
merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (t) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.34
       
Nonetheless, the Court always reminds party litigants that bare invocation of "the
interest of substantial justice" is not a magic phrase that will automatically oblige the
Court to suspend procedural rules. To stress, "[procedural rules are not to be belittled
or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the
 14

most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an

injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed."35

The 2004 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, also known as the
ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, was entered into by the Southeast Asian
countries namely: Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of
Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, Republic
of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam. The Treaty aims to improve the effectiveness of the law
enforcement authorities of the state parties in the prevention, investigation and
prosecution of offenses through cooperation and mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters.

Article 1, paragraph 2(a) of the Treaty states that mutual legal assistance can be
rendered by the state parties in case of taking evidence or obtaining voluntary
statements from persons, among others. The legal assistance sought by the
Requesting Party from the Requested Party is not without limitations. In fact, Article 3
of the ASEAN ML AT has laid down guidelines on limitations on assistance. In particular,
paragraph 7 of the said Article states that the Requested Party can render legal
assistance subject to certain conditions which the Requested Party must observe.

To recall, the Indonesia Government imposed the following conditions in taking the
testimony of Mary Jane:     

a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;     

b) No cameras shall be allowed;       

c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present;       

d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.

Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a
deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave
offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to
perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how
to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open court because he is
imprisoned in another country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said
Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long
as there is compelling reason.

In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court had relaxed the procedural rules by applying
suppletorily certain provisions of the Rules on Civil Procedure in criminal proceedings.
 15

For one, in Caños v. Peralta36 the Supreme Court held that the trial court judge did not
abuse his discretion when it ordered the consolidation and joint trial of the criminal
cases that were filed against petitioner Adela J. Canos. It reasoned, among others, that
consolidation of cases is authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure.

The same rule was applied in Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court37 and Cojuangco.

Jr. v. Court of Appeals38 wherein the Supreme Court upheld the consolidation of the
criminal case and civil case that were respectively filed against the petitioners therein.

On that score, the Court finds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally construe
procedural rules for the orderly administration of substantial justice.

The conditions with respect to the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane that were laid
down by the Indonesian Government support the allowance of written interrogatories
under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent provisions of which read:

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject
of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of
any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of
witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a
person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the
court prescribes.   

Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries. — In a

foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by
commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) the person referred to in section 14
hereof. 

Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of

interrogatories. — A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon written
interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party with a notice stating the name
and address of the person who is to answer them and the name or descriptive title and
address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken. Within ten (10) days
thereafter, a party so served may serve cross-interrogatories upon the party proposing
to take the deposition. Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct
interrogatories upon a party who has served cross-interrogatories. Within three (3)
days after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-
interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.

A strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the grant of
reprieve by the Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony, being the
victim, is vital in the prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were filed against
Cristina and Julius. This has been recognized by no less than the Indonesian President,
 16

His Excellency Joko Widodo, who granted the reprieve precisely to afford Mary Jane the
opportunity to participate in the legal proceedings obtaining in the Philippines.

Besides, the disallowance of the written interrogatories is not in congruence with the
aim of ASEAN MLAT, that is to render mutual legal assistance in criminal matters
among signatory states including the Philippines. The ASEAN MLAT is enforced precisely
to be applied in circumstances like in the case of Mary Jane. It recognizes the
significance of cooperation and coordination among the states to prevent, investigate
and prosecute criminal offenses especially if perpetuated not only in a single state just
like in the case of drug and human trafficking, and illegal recruitment, the very charges
that were filed against respondents. 

Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court
sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of
testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.

The deposition by written interrogatories

is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process

Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to due
process.

The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the
parties have their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the government to follow
a fair process of decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just
as an accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due
process in criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to present
its evidence in support of a charge.39

Here, the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it granted the taking of Mary
Jane's deposition by written interrogatories. The grant of the written interrogatories by
the Indonesian Government perceives the State's opportunity to present all its desired
witnesses in the prosecution of its cases against Cristina and Julius. It is afforded fair
opportunity to present witnesses and evidence it deem vital to ensure that the injury
sustained by the People in the commission of the criminal acts will be well compensated
and, most of all, that justice be achieved. Hence, the right of the State to prosecute
and prove its case have been fully upheld and protected.

Further, the right of the State to prove the criminal liability of Cristina and Julius should
not be derailed and prevented by the stringent application of the procedural rules.
Otherwise, it will constitute a violation of the basic constitutional rights of the State and
of Mary Jane to due process which this Court cannot disregard.

The fundamental rights of both the accused and the State must be equally upheld and
protected so that justice can prevail in the truest sense of the word. To do justice to
accused and injustice to the State is no justice at all. Justice must be dispensed to all
the parties alike.40 As aptly held in Dimatulac v. Villon41:
 17

The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer
justice." He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a
religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of
the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with
impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in him.
Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive
jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be
exercised within reasonable confines. The judge's action must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party
to due process of law.     

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be
dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended
parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict
of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice, and an acquittal is not necessarily a
triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also
mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on
one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other. (Emphasis Supplied.)

No violation of the constitutional right

to confrontation of a witness

Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional
right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.

The right to confrontation of a witness is one of the fundamental basic rights of an

accused. It is ingrained in our justice system and guaranteed by no less than the 1987
Constitution as stated under its Article III, Section 14(2), to wit:

Section 14. (1) x x x     

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)

The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but
also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-
judicial powers.42 It has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2)
secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.43

True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light
of the prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and conditions laid down by the trial
court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way
 18

of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional

right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to file
their comment and may raise objections to the proposed questions in the written
interrogatories submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly rule
on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions would be asked by the Consul of
the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of Mary Jane
to the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the
same would be given to the counsel of the accused who would, in turn, submit their
proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the prosecution
raised any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly rule on the same, and
the final cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane will then be
conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in
verbatim and a transcribed copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution.

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been
upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition, the trial
court judge will be present during the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane.
This will give her ample opportunity to observe and to examine the demeanor of the
witness closely. Although the deposition is in writing, the trial court judge can still
carefully perceive the reaction and deportment of Mary Jane as she answers each
question propounded to her both by the prosecution and the defense.

Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally safeguarded. The
parameters laid down by the trial court are sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane
will give her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury charge. She is
still subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the presence of any falsehood in
her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines enable the trial court judge to observe her
demeanor as a witness and assess her credibility.

Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized

exceptions to the right to confrontation. 44 In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to state
that Mary Jane's deposition through written interrogatories is akin to her dying
declaration. There is no doubt that Mary Jane will be answering the written
interrogatories under the consciousness of an impending death - or execution by a
firing squad to be exact. To stress, Mary Jane has been convicted by final judgment and
sentenced to death by firing squad. Mary Jane has already availed of all available legal
remedies and there is no expectation that her conviction will be overturned by the
Indonesian authorities. The only purpose for the grant of the reprieve was for Mary
Jane to assist the prosecution in erecting its case against her recruiters and traffickers.
There was nary any mention that the outcome of the legal proceedings here in the
Philippines will have a concomitant effect in Mary Jane's conviction by the Indonesian
authorities. That Mary Jane is facing impending death is undisputed considering the
nature of her reprieve which is merely temporary. It is therefore not a stretch of
imagination to state that Mary Jane's declarations in her deposition "are made in
extremity, [she being] at the point of death, and x x x every hope of this world is gone;
when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most
powerful considerations to speak the truth," 45 to vindicate oneself, and to secure justice
to her detractors.
 19

All told, the Court finds reversible error in the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals.
It erred when it gave due course to the Petition for Certiorari of Cristina and Julius
considering that the errors ascribed therein were mere errors of judgment which do not
lie in a certiorari proceeding. More importantly, the trial court did not gravely abuse its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the taking of
testimony of Mary Jane by way of deposition through written interrogatories in light of
the conditions of Mary Jane's reprieve and her imprisonment in Indonesia. These are
compelling reasons to liberally construe the procedural rules and apply suppletorily the
Rules on Civil Procedure. Yet still, the fundamental rights, not only of the State, but
also of the accused Cristina and Julius have been fully and equally protected and
preserved in the pursuit of justice.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant petition. The December 13, 2017

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149002 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The August 16, 2016 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the deposition will be taken before our Consular Office and officials in Indonesia
pursuant to the Rules of Court and principles of jurisdiction.

The recommendation by the Office of the Solicitor General for this Court to promulgate
a set of rules for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar in transnational cases that may
arise in the future, where a prosecution's vital witness in a criminal proceeding is
unavailable for reasons other than those listed in Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis the enforcement of the accused's constitutional right to
confront witnesses face-to- face is NOTED and REFERRED to this Court's Committee
on Revision of the Rules for its appropriate action.       

SO ORDERED. 
 20

G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB

OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON,
JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and
Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land
Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador
and Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions
with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent
heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to
dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N.
Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their
failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the
substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that
could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del
Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be
determined only after trial.1

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss
on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare
allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground
that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal
on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late.5 This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.6
 21

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this
was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration.
When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were
well within the reglementary period for appeal.7

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day
period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was
the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held further:

Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within
the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance
with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory.8

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the
Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors
allegedly committed by the appellate court:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS’ PETITION

FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE
ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-
36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN
AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT
PETITIONERS’ APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST
OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL
ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS
"FINAL ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL
REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES
DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998
COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.

IV.
 22

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN
THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE
THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE
FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.9

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed
their notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely
a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the
Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.10 The period to appeal is fixed by
both statute and procedural rules. BP 129,11 as amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment
appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
(emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or
final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations
of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.12

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which
dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed
when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-
day reglementary period to appeal ¾ the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the
July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,13 the trial court declared
petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of
dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of
 23

the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time
dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ―
for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his
complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial
court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of
a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.14 where
we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final
order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998
denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal
the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998),
petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration.
According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.15 It ruled
that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal,
had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.
Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from
receipt of the "final order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial
court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the
notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar cases,16 premised on the long-settled
doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional.17 The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts
must become final at some definite time fixed by law.18

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and
filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of
appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the
judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein
provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing
received notice of the denial of said motion.19 (emphasis supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129,
however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization20 that drafted BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the amendment was to shorten the
 24

period of appeal21 and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required
strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of
notices of appeal,22 and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of

Libmanan,23 however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the
rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts
to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should
be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the
constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do
certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by
the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not
been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the
Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to
undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare
cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to
prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.25

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.26 It has the sole prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the
speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals,
particularly Rules 42,27 4328 and 45,29 the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or
more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 30

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15
days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence,
the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days
 25

from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the
appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still
applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify
any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts
become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal
period should be counted – from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of
notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order")
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may
be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after
the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well
within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.34

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC35 since the
Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 26

[ G.R. No. 223335, March 04, 2020 ]

TEROCEL REALTY, INC. (NOW PECHATEN CORPORATION), PETITIONER, LEONARDO

MEMPIN, RESPONDENT.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 137368 entitled "Terocel Realty, Inc. (now Pechaten Corporation) v. Hon. Andy S. De
Vera, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 28 and
Leonardo Mempin," for mandamus:

1) Decision1 dated July 23, 2015, affirming the dismissal of the petition for mandamus to
compel the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) - Branch 28, Manila to issue the writ of execution
in Civil Case No. 166014; and

2) Resolution2 dated March 8, 2016, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents

In Civil Case No. 166014 entitled "Terocel Realty, Inc. v. Leonardo Mempin" for unlawful detainer,
MeTC-Branch 28 rendered its Decision dated April 26, 2000, granting the complaint of petitioner
Terocel Realty, Inc. (now Pechaten Corporation) and requiring respondent Leonardo Mempin to
vacate subject property known as Lot 68, Block 5-E in Sampaloc, Manila.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court - Branch 12, Manila (RTC-Branch 12), by Decision dated August
10, 2001, affirmed. Following the finality of the RTC decision, petitioner moved for execution of
judgment on September 13, 2001. Respondent opposed. He claimed that he was one of the
prospective beneficiaries of the complaint for expropriation being then pursued by the City of Manila
pursuant to its Ordinance No. 8012. Among the properties sought to be expropriated was the lot in
question.3

By Order dated January 8, 2003, RTC-Branch 12 granted petitioner's motion for execution and
issued the corresponding writ of execution. It also denied respondent's motion to defer execution
under Order dated November 14, 2003. Per Sheriffs Report dated July 1, 2003, respondent was
alleged to have refused to vacate the property.4 On this score, respondent called the trial court's
attention to the expropriation complaint filed by the City of Manila sometime in December 2003
against petitioner, Alegar Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De Legarda. The complaint was docketed
SP No. 03-108565 and raffled to RTC-Branch 47.5

Records showed, however, that RTC-Branch 47 dismissed the complaint for expropriation. The
decree of dismissal was affirmed twice, first by the Court of Appeals6 and next, by this Court.7 This
Court's decree became final and executory per Entry of Judgment dated August 6, 2012.8

Thereafter, petitioner went back to MeTC-Branch 28 through another motion for execution. MeTC-
Branch 28 denied the same on the ground that it was filed beyond the prescribed five-year period for
execution by motion. Petitioner's motion for execution was filed only on February 15, 2013 or twelve
(12) years after the Decision dated August 10, 2001 became final and executory. According to
MeTC-Branch 28, the complaint for expropriation was not a supervening event which served to toll
the five-year prescriptive period. Besides, respondent was not even a party to the expropriation
case.9 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied through Order dated July 30, 2013.10
 27

Petitioner went to RTC-Manila via a petition for mandamus docketed as SCA No. 13-131042. It
sought to compel MeTC-Branch 28 to issue the writ of execution in the unlawful detainer case. The
case was raffled to RTC-Branch 54 which ruled that mandamus did not lie to direct a lower court on
how it should resolve a motion for execution.11

On petitioner's appeal,12 the Court of Appeals affirmed under Decision dated July 23, 2015. It ruled
that the expropriation case was not a supervening event which had the effect of freezing the five-
year period for execution of judgment by motion. The court emphasized that respondent was only a
prospective beneficiary of the City of Manila's land grant program, thus, his right, if any, was merely
inchoate.13 Besides, the expropriation case did not have the effect of precluding petitioner from
enforcing its own writ of execution against respondent in the unlawful detainer case.14

Too, it noted that even the ten-year period for execution by action had already expired as of
September 20, 2011.  More important, a writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the lower courts to
1âшphi1

execute judgment beyond the five-year or ten-year limits.

The Court of Appeals subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration under its assailed
Resolution15 dated March 8, 2016.

The Present Petition

Petitioner now invokes the Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse the
Decision dated July 23, 2015 and Resolution dated March 8, 2016. Petitioner reiterates that the
expropriation case and the subsequent writ of possession affecting the property were supervening
events which had the effect of suspending the execution of judgment in the unlawful detainer
case.16

In his Comment17 dated July 30, 2018, respondent essentially counters that the expropriation case
and unlawful detainer case are distinct actions which may proceed independently of each other and
that mandamus will not lie to compel a court of law to issue a writ of execution.

Issues

1) Did the complaint for expropriation constitute a supervening event which had the effect of
interrupting the five-year period for execution of judgment by motion in the unlawful detainer
case?

2) Does mandamus lie to compel execution of judgment by motion beyond the five-year
period?

Ruling

The petition utterly lacks merit.

Petitioner's motion for execution is already barred by prescription

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court governs execution of judgment by motion or by independent
action, viz.:

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory judgment or order
may be executed on motion with in five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such
 28

time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The
revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)

On one hand, a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five (5) years from
entry of judgment.18 On the other, execution by independent action is available in cases where the
five-year period had already expired. The action then must be filed before it is barred by the statute
of limitations which under the Civil Code is ten (10) years from finality of judgment.19

Here, it is undisputed that although petitioner filed its first motion for execution in the unlawful
detainer case within the prescribed five-year period, it never pursued the same and was therefore
deemed to have abandoned it. When petitioner, nonetheless, filed its second motion for execution,
twelve (12) years had already elapsed from entry of judgment (September 20, 2001). Undoubtedly,
the second motion was filed seven (7) years beyond the five-year period. Verily, therefore, MeTC –
Branch 28 correctly denied the second motion.

In petitioner's attempt to take out the case from the five-year prescriptive period, however, it asserts
that the filing of the expropriation case was a supervening event which served to suspend the five-
year period.

The issue is not novel. Republic v. Mangrobang20 enunciated: "In the ejectment case, the issue is
possession of the disputed property, while in the eminent domain case, the issue is the taking by the
State of the property by virtue of its power of eminent domain. Note, however, that the decision in
one will not necessarily affect the decision in the other." So must it be.

In any event, while in exceptional cases, the Court had allowed execution by motion even after the
lapse of the five-year period, these cases had one common denominator: the judicial debtor itself
caused or incurred the delay for its personal benefit or advantage.21

This is not the case here. As judicial debtor, respondent did not have any hand in the filing of the
expropriation complaint, the issuance of the writ of execution, or the supposed pronouncement of the
City of Manila that it did not plan to eject the actual occupants of the affected properties. In fact,
respondent himself was not even a party to the expropriation case nor a recognized beneficiary
thereof by the City of Manila.

Mandamus is not a proper remedy to compel execution of judgment

Under the Rules on Civil Procedure, a writ of mandamus may issue when there is a clear legal duty
imposed upon the office or the officer to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has
a clear legal right to the performance of such act.22 Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful
cases. It cannot be availed of against an official or government agency whose duty requires the
exercise of discretion or judgment.23 The writ of mandamus will not issue either to compel officials
to do something which is not their duty to do or which it is their duty not to do, or to give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.24

Here, petitioner is no longer entitled to execution of judgment either by motion or independent action
since its right to do so is already barred by prescription. Surely, it is the duty of the courts not to
enforce a stale judgment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 23, 2015 and Resolution dated
March 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 137368 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
 29

[ G.R. No. 205632, June 02, 2020 ]

BANK OF COMMERCE, PETITIONER, VS. JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The end of litigation, upon the finality of judgment, is essential for the effective and efficient
administration of justice. This Court is duty-bound to put an end to any machination, scheme, or
measure taken by any party to defeat or frustrate the implementation of its decisions. All litigants are
warned that this Court does not tolerate attempts to squander its time rehearing cases that are final
and executory.

This is a Petition1 filed by Bank of Commerce against Joaquin T. Borromeo (Borromeo), praying that
this Court hold Borromeo in indirect contempt of court, pursuant to Section 3(b), (c), and (d)2 of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court.

Borromeo was previously declared guilty of constructive contempt by this Court in its February 21,
1995 Resolution in In Re: Borromeo.3

From 1978 to 1980, Borromeo obtained several loans from Traders Royal Bank.4 Among these was
a P45,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage for over two (2) lots in Cebu City covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 59596 and 59755.5 A third Cebu City lot, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 71509, also secured a loan taken out by Borromeo.6 When Borromeo
defaulted on his loans with Traders Royal Bank, the bank then foreclosed the mortgages, and
eventually, the properties were sold to it. This led to protracted decades-long litigation between
Traders Royal Bank and Borromeo, as extensively documented in In Re: Borromeo:

A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R.
CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306

On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific
performance and damages against TRB and its local manager, Bias Abril, docketed as Civil Case
No. R-22506. The complaint sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed
properties only at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without need of paying
the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned. Judgment was rendered in his favor on
December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of
Appeals - docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 - the judgment was reversed, by the decision dated
January 27,1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of
redemption and can no longer compel defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question."

Borromeo elevated the case to this Court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By
Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for
failure. . . to sufficiently show that the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible
error in its questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is supported by
substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable law." Reconsideration was
denied, by Resolution dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied
by Resolution dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated April 19,
1989. The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the remand of the case to the court of
 30

origin for prompt execution of judgment. Entry of judgment was made on May 12,1989. By
Resolution dated August 7, 1989, the Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside
judgment, and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the Court merely noted without action his
manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals be overturned, and
declared that "no further motion or pleading . . . shall be entertained[.]"

2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750;

CA-G.R. SPNo. 22356

The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo initiated another civil
action in the same Cebu City Regional Trial Court by which he attempted to litigate the same issues.
The action, against the new TRB Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-8750. As might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the defense, dismissed by
Order dated May 18, 1990, on the ground of res judicata, the only issue raised in the second action -
i.e., Borromeo's right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB - having been ventilated in Civil Case No.
R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Bias C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank) (supra) and, on appeal,
decided with finality by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein.

The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485;

CA-G.R. SPNo. 28221

In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its
ownership over the foreclosed immovables. Contending that that act of consolidation amounted to a
criminal offense, Borromeo filed complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the
bank officers and lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly, given short shrift by
that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB
officers Jacinto Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja
and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario Ortiz and the
law firm, HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9485. The complaint
charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the
criminal cases just mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for
consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties in favor of the bank despite the pendency of Case
No. R-22506. This action also failed. On defendants' motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992
by the RTC (Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata (being identical with Civil Case Nos. R-22506
and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in favor of TRB), and lack of cause of action (as to
defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).    

Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by that
Court's 16th Division on October 6,1992, for the reason that the proper remedy was appeal.

4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368;

CA-G.R.SPNo. 27100

Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another civil
action for the same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario
Ortiz and the HERSINLAW law office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10368, and
was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of Money, Annulment of Titles with Damages." The
case met the same fate as the others. It was, on defendants' motion, dismissed on September 9,
1991 by the RTC (Branch 14) on the ground of litis pendentia.
 31

The RTC ruled that -

"Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, namely the Honorable
Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli Bustamante, Jacinto
Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the same persons or nearly all of them who are
impleaded as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders Royal
Bank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only difference is that more defendants
were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his
assistants,  Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion of the City Prosecutor and his two
assistants in Civil Case No. CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as apparently they had
nothing to do with the questioned transaction in said case[.]"

The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those sought in Civil Case No.
CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same - the alleged fraudulent
foreclosure and consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to TRB.

For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by another
Judge on November 11, 1991 - the Judge who previously heard the case having inhibited himself;
but this Order of November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by
Decision promulgated on March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon.
Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T. Borromeo), which decision also directed dismissal of
Borromeo's complaint.

5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452

When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith
made that event the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the banks'
attorneys - Mario Ortiz, Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This
action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and described as one for "Annulment of Title with
Damages." The complaint, dated October 20,1987, again involved the foreclosure of the three (3)
immovable above mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful, and premature
consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 22506. On defendants'
motion, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point...
plaintiffs right to seek annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when
plaintiff will ultimately and finally win Civil Case No. R-22506."

6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236

Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit" of his cause against
TRB and its officers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different tack by also suing (and thus also
venting his ire on) the members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in
the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not only the same parties
he had theretofore been suing - TRB and its officers and lawyers (HERSINLAW Mario Ortiz) - but
also the Chairman and Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court who had repeatedly
rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the Members of the 8th,
9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had likewise made dispositions unfavorable to
him. His complaint, dated August 22, 1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendant Justices
for -

". . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding evidence and pertinent
laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased resolutions and decisions bereft of signatures, facts or
laws in support thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and against
 32

deprivation of property without said process, tolerating, approving and legitimizing the patently
illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendant TRB, (which) constitute a) GRAVE
DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE OF POWER emanating from the people, b) FLAGRANT
VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS, DUE PROCESS, ART. 27,
32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for which defendants must be held
liable under said laws."

The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained fraudulently by
TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of "P100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages;
and P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On
motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated November 7, 1989,
dismissed the case.

7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069

It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause subject of two (2) prior
actions instituted by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers,
Wilfredo Navarro and Mario Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, on
the ground of res judicata - the subject matter being the same as that in Civil Case No. R-22506,
decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this
Court in G.R. No. 83306 - and litis pendentia - the subject matter being also the same as that in Civil
Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
22356.

8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344;

CA-G.R. SPNo. 28275; G.R. No. 112928

On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with the RTC of Cebu
(Branch 22) against Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law. This case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case
on the ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order of Judge
Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His Honor set an early date for
Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case "under a continuous trial system on the dates as may
be agreed by the defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his motion
was again found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the Court of
Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to nullify these adverse orders, his action being
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28275.

Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not show that there
had been unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and denied his petition for being
without merit.

Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated
January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of
Circulars Numbered 1-88 and 19-91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by
Resolution dated March 23, 1994.

a. Clarificatory Communications to Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-
Constitutional, Arbitrary and Tyrannical and a Gross Travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed
 33

only by a mere clerk and. . . (failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved
on MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere clerk."

The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some
patience drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo
vs. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) and on the
same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June 22,1994, after reiterating that the notices sent
by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions simply advise of and quote the
resolution actually adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter, additionally stated
that Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk of Court start
with the opening clause -

'Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court
dated_______,'

thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed the resolutions.
["]

This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Borromeo. The record
shows that on July 10,1987, he received a letter from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this
Court's Third Division) dealing with the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. The same matter was
also dealt with in the letter received by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno, dated April 4,
1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19,
1989. And the same subject was treated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice of which was
in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897.

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor of ignorance" — to
fasten not only civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and lawyers. Several other attempts
on his part to cause criminal prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt
with here.

1. I.S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188

On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Cebu City
Prosecutor against Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John Doe and Officers of
Traders Royal Bank." The complaints (docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents
of "Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed, among others that the bank and its
officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned by them: that by fraud, deceit
and false pretenses, respondents negotiated and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed)
properties from his (Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," agreed
to the sale thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing market prices, she
should have received P588,030.00 more.

In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, the Cebu City Fiscal's office dismissed the complaint
observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but
between the bank and Mrs. Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed  
properties; and that Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim injury or prejudice
thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the foreclosed properties was beyond
question as the matter had been raised and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there
was no proof of the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.
 34

a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234

Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal
also adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo - involving the same
foreclosed properties and directed against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the
former Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers - both of which were dismissed for lack of merit. These
were:

a. I.S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD SY) for
"Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False Pretenses." - This case was
dismissed by Resolution dated January 19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because based on
nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985, sent by the Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of
a portion of the foreclosed immovables, advising the latter to remit all rentals to the bank as the new
owner thereof, as shown by the consolidated title; and there was no showing that respondent Atty.
Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the
period of redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from the transaction to the prejudice of
complainant; and

b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa Through False
Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." - This case was dismissed by Resolution dated
January 31, 1990.

2. I.S. Nos. 88-205 to 88-207

While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the Supreme Court, an
affidavit was executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, in connection with the former's fire
insurance claim over property registered in its name - one of two immovables formerly owned by
Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin T. Borromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said bank. In that affidavit,
dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure
acquired real property together with the improvements thereon which property is located at F.
Ramos St., Cebu City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name of TRB." The affidavit was notarized
by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.

Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over the
foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant falsehood in that, among others:. . . the
consolidation was premature, illegal and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu
City Fiscal's Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for
"falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September 28, 1988, the Fiscal's
Office dismissed the complaint. It found no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any malice in its
execution, considering that Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in
TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in order.

3. OMB-VIS-89-00136

This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15, 1988 - sustaining
the judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No.
07015, supra, was made the subject of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the
Ombudsman, Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint - against "Supreme Court
Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div.)" - was dismissed for lack of merit in a
Resolution issued on February 14, 1990 which, among other things, ruled as follows:
 35

"It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available under the Rules of
Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative of this Office to make
a review of Decisions and Resolutions of judicial courts, rendered within their competence. The
records do not warrant this Office to take further proceedings against the respondents.

In addition, Sec. 20 of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act states that 'the Office of the Ombudsman
may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it
believes that (1) the complainant had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;'
and Sec. 21 of the same law provides that the Office of the Ombudsman does not have disciplinary
authority over members of the Judiciary."7 (Citations omitted, emphasis in the original)

As observed by this Court in In Re: Borromeo, Borromeo waged similar campaigns against United
Coconut Planters Bank,8 Security Bank & Trust Co.,9 their lawyers,10 and the
Judiciary11 culminating in at least 50 cases over the course of 16 years.

Because of his history of "groundless and insulting proceedings"12 in and against the courts, in
1995, this Court found Borromeo guilty of constructive contempt. He was sentenced to 10 days
imprisonment and ordered to pay a P1,000.00 fine:

Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may well be asked why it took
no less than sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent
Borromeo in the different rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present
administrative measure. The imposition on the time of the courts and the unnecessary work
occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self-evident and require no further elaboration. If
the Court, however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the repeated rebuffs
he suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would somehow seep into his
understanding and deter him from further forays along his misguided path. After all, as has
repeatedly been declared, the power of contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the
vindictive principle. Unfortunately, the Court's forbearance had no effect on him.

Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs of weakness and
impotence. Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened
others to just as flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings against the
courts, born of affected bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the extent of even involving the legislative
and executive departments, the Ombudsman included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in
pursuit of personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must come to an end, and it is time for the
Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude, between reasoned dissent and self-seeking
pretense. The Court accordingly serves notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it will
henceforth deal with them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely impose
such punitive sanctions as may be appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of the
judicial institutions of the country.

WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt

repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that
he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Court and
their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City
Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a
repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense
against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.13
 36

In 2001, Bank of Commerce acquired assets from Traders Royal Bank through a Purchase and Sale
Agreement.14 Among the acquired assets were the properties covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 59596, 59755, and 71509-Borromeo's foreclosed properties.15

On February 22, 2013, Bank of Commerce filed a Petition16 against Borromeo, praying that this
Court cite him for indirect contempt.

In its Petition, petitioner alleges that respondent instituted proceedings against petitioner's officials,
namely:

1 A 2011 criminal complaint for estafa against Bank of Commerce officers Arturo T.

Medrano, Maximo V. Estrada, and Roy Damole, filed with the Office of the Cebu City
Prosecutor, docketed as NPS Docket No. VII-09-INV-11-F-00918.17 The complaint was
dismissed because the properties were no longer owned by respondent,18 and that
respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied in 2012;19   

2 A January 20, 2012 criminal case (NPS Docket No. VII-09-INV- 12A-00129) for perjury
against the same three (3) Bank of Commerce officials, filed with the Office of the Cebu City
Prosecutor20 because of the Joint Counter-Affidavit21 filed by the three (3) in
the estafa case. The complaint was- dismissed because the officers did not commit perjury
when they stated that respondent had failed to redeem the foreclosed properties.22 After
respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied,23 he then filed an Appeal before the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Cebu City;24

3 An April 12, 2012 criminal case for perjury against the same Bank of Commerce officers,
docketed as NPS Docket No. VII-09-INV- 12-D-00628.25 This time, the complaint was based
on the Joint Counter-Affidavit26 filed by the three (3) in the January 2012 perjury case. The
complaint was again dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor;27 and

4 A case against the Cebu City Registrar of Deeds before the Office of the Ombudsman for
the Visayas, docketed as CPL-V-12-0296, for allegedly failing to cancel the "patently fake
titles" of United Coconut Planters Bank, Traders Royal Bank, and Bank of Commerce.28

According to petitioner, these new cases showed that respondent was doing the same acts that had
previously led him to be held in contempt by this Court.29 His repetitive filing of cases all founded on
the same transactions, with issues already resolved by the courts, should be deemed contempt of
court under the Rule 71, Section 3(c) and (d) of the Rules of Court.30

In compliance with this Court's April 1, 2013 Resolution,31 respondent then filed his Comment32 on
May 31, 2013. In his Comment, respondent claims that the Petition was intended to intimidate him
from filing cases to protect his and his family's properties. He claims that petitioner deliberately
concealed the fact that he had already tendered payment to Traders Royal Bank, but that Traders
Royal Bank rejected his payment and furtively executed a deed of sale in its favor.33

On October 7, 2013, petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment.34 In its Reply, petitioner points out
that respondent filed another perjury case with the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor against
Estrada, Corazon T. Llagas, and Honorato Hermosisima, Jr. (the bank's counsel), docketed as I.S.
No. 13-G-01296.35 Petitioner claims that the perjury case was retaliation for the delivery of
possession of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 87399, previously owned by
respondent, to petitioner.36
 37

On March 17, 2014, this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition and ordered the parties to
file their Memoranda.37 Petitioner filed its Memorandum on June 4, 2014,38 while respondent filed
his on June 2, 2014.39

In its Memorandum, petitioner also points to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by
respondent with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 07751.40 The petition for
certiorari assailed the grant by Regional Trial Court Judge Sylva Paderanga of a writ of possession
in favor of petitioner, in, the course of an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession.41 Again, the properties involved were respondent's, which petitioner acquired from
Traders Royal Bank. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on its September 19,
2013 Decision.42

In his Memorandum, respondent argues that he filed the new cases against petitioner's officers and
counsel because they kept falsely claiming that he failed to redeem the properties from Traders
Royal Bank.43 He points to the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, which
he claims affirmed that he had redeemed the properties.44

Further, he argues that, since he was already declared guilty of. constructive contempt in In Re:
Borromeo, he cannot be cited in contempt again, as this would violate the right against double
jeopardy in Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution. Finally, he claims that petitioner's officials and
counsel should be held liable for contempt.45

The sole issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not respondent should be cited in indirect
contempt of court.

As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that, on January 4, 2020, respondent filed a motion to refer
this case for mediation and conciliation.46 In his motion, respondent claims that this case is covered
by court-annexed mediation pursuant to A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA, and that he and petitioner's
counsel were negotiating towards an amicable settlement of their dispute.

This motion is denied.

Under A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA, otherwise known as the Consolidated and Revised Guidelines
to Implement the Expanded Coverage of Court-Annexed Mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution,
the following cases are under the mandatory coverage of court-annexed mediation and judicial
dispute resolution:

(1) All civil cases and the civil liability of criminal cases covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, including the civil liability for violation of B.P. 22, except those which by law may
not be compromised;

(2) Special proceedings for the settlement of estates;

(3) All civil and criminal cases filed with a certificate to file action issued by the Punong
Barangay or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo under the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law;

(4) The civil aspect of Quasi-Offenses under Title 14 of the Revised Penal Code;

(5) The civil aspect of less grave felonies punishable by correctional penalties not exceeding
6 years imprisonment, where the offended party is a private person;
 38

(6) The civil aspect of estafa, theft and libel;

(7) All civil cases and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, brought on appeal from the
exclusive and original jurisdiction granted to the first level courts under Section 33, par. (1) of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980;

(8) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer brought on appeal from the exclusive and
original jurisdiction granted to the first level courts under Section 33, par. (2) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980;

(9) All civil cases involving title to or possession of real property or an interest therein brought
on appeal from the exclusive and original jurisdiction granted to the first level courts under
Section 33, par. (3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980;

(10) All habeas corpus cases decided by the first level courts in the absence of the Regional
Trial Court judge, that are brought up on appeal from the special jurisdiction granted to the
first level courts under Section 35 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980[.] (Citations
omitted)

Contempt proceedings may be criminal or civil in nature. If the purpose is to vindicate and protect
the dignity of this Court's authority, the contempt is criminal. But if the purpose is to punish one party
for failing to comply with a court's order benefiting the other party, the contempt is civil.47 However,
regardless of the nature of the proceedings, it is always treated separately even when the allegedly
contumacious act is incidental to another action.48 It is not subject to compromise, mediation, or
conciliation between the parties.

Thus, respondent is gravely mistaken if he believes that he can evade liability on this basis,
especially when this Court had already expressly warned him that "a repetition of any of the offenses
of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges or court
employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions."49

All litigation must end. In In Re: Borromeo:

It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after
the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by
law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed.
To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict,
and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not
their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some
definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute
finality. As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, a party
"may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right.50

The end of litigation, upon the finality of judgment, is essential for the effective and efficient
administration of justice.51 This Court is duty-bound to put an end to any machination, scheme, or
measure taken by any party to defeat or frustrate the implementation of its decisions:
 39

We have time and again ruled that courts should never allow themselves to be a party to maneuvers
intended to delay the execution of final decisions. They must nip in the bud any dilatory maneuver
calculated to defeat or frustrate the ends of justice, fair play and prompt implementation of final and
executory judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential
to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be
not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.52

All litigants are warned that this Court does not tolerate attempts to squander its time rehearing
cases that are final and executory:

There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more
so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to
evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case,
the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and
indisputable.53

Respondent's case has already ended. Thus, his efforts to prolong it cannot be tolerated.

The foundation of respondent's estafa, perjury, and Ombudsman cases against petitioner's officials
and counsel is his unceasing refrain that he had timely exercised his right to redeem his and his
relatives' properties from Traders Royal Bank.

In his Motion for Reconsideration of the September 12, 2011 Resolution of the Office of the Cebu
Provincial Prosecutor in NPS Docket No. 11F-00918 for estafa, respondent stated:

I. With due respect, the Hon. Prosecutor has deplorably disregarded indisputable evidence that in
fact, TCT Nos. 87399 and 81400 were fraudulently acquired by [Traders Royal Bank]. This fact
hinges on respondents' assertion in par. 5 of their Joint Counter-Affidavit that "Complainant failed to
redeem the foreclosed properties ... thus, TRB consolidated its title thereto ... on June 24, 1985, the
Register of Deeds ... issued TCT Nos. 87399 and 87400 in the name of TRB in lieu of TCT Nos.
59755 and 71509.

However, this assertion under oath by respondents, as stressed in complainant's Comment is

FALSE, MISLEADING AND MALICIOUS AND PERJURIOUS, since as admitted by TRB counsel
Hermosisima Jr., "There is no question that he (complainant) has the right to make the redemption ...
the only obstacle is the amount he had offered." In his Comment, complainant stressed that TRB
itself had stated the redemption price of P83,043.91 which is accepted (albeit belatedly by its own
initial rejection).

Hence, it cannot be denied as respondents have NOT DENIED, hence ADMIT, that the foreclosed
properties had been redeemed.  Indeed, Hermosisima's junior associate, Atty. Wilfredo Navarro,
+3u.7!ydmb7

made such [damning] admissions under cross-examination by complainant in Civil Case No. CEB-
139609[.]54

Respondent even claims that the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, affirmed his right to
redeem.55

In respondent's January 9, 2012 affidavit in his first perjury case, later docketed as NPS Docket No.
VII-09-INV-12A-00129, he also stated:
 40

3. However, in a Decision dated Dec. 20, 1984, the court upheld my right to redeem the
properties at the auction sale price of P83,043.91 stressing that TRB could not insist in its
demand for payment also of the Trust Receipt account. Despite said ruling, TRB refused to
allow redemption but appealed the decision. Meantime, without my knowledge, my sister,
Socorro B. Thakuria, owner of TCT No. 87398 and fear of losing it, went to TRB and paid the
sum of P85,000.00. However, TRB refused to release the titles, claiming that said amount
was only a "downpayment" [sic] for her property's repurchase which it pegged at the price of
P160,000.00, thereby,defying the court's ruling.

4. In its Appeal Brief, TRB admitted that "there is no question that he (I) has the right to make
the redemption himself, but that "the only obstacle is the amount he has offered to effect the
redemption. This was the only formidable obstacle to the proposed redemption".

5. Unfortunately for TRB, the Court of Appeals sustained the lower court's decision upholding
my right to redeem the properties at the auction sale price of P83,043.91. But despite said
ruling and despite having received said amount, TRB still refused to release the titles, but
even worse, it coerced my sister to pay the sum of [P] 671,000.00 for her title to be
"repurchased" from the bank, while it continues to hold on to the two other titles it obtained in
defiance of the lower and appellate court's decisions.56

Further, in respondent's April 18,2012 affidavit in his first perjury case, later docketed as NPS Docket
No. VII-09-INV-12A-00129:

2. On December 20, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision upholding my right to redeem
the properties at the auction price and not as demanded by TRB. TRB appealed but in a
Decision dated January 27, 1988, in CA G.R. CV No. 07015, the Court of appeals sustained
the trial court on the sole issue of the redemption price. Despite said decision which TRB did
not appeal, and despite having accepted the redemption price in the amount of P83,043.91,
TRB refused to release the titles to the redeemed properties, but coerced Thakuria to
"repurchase" her property for the whopping sum of P671,000.00.

3. Recently, the Bank of Commerce which acquired TRB, thru Roy Damole, Maximo Estrada,
and Arturo Medrano, advertised over the Internet, the sale of TCT Nos. 87399 and 87400 
for the price of P1,122,00.00 and P8,209,000.00 respectively. For so doing, I filed a case for
Estafa against them docketed as I.S. No. VII-INV-II-F-00918.

....

4. In their Counter-Affidavit in said case, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex "A",
respondents admitted that "Indeed, complainant Borromeo instituted an action for
redemption docketed as CC No. R-22506 ... in a Decision dated 20 December 1984, THE
TRIAL COURT RULED IN HIS FAVOR" (par. 5). But in par. 6, they asserted that TRB
elevated the matter before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 ... in a
Decision on 27 January 1988, the Court of Appeals REVERSED the trial court, ratiocinating
that Borromeo "has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel TRB to allow
redemption of the properties in question", and in par. 10, they asserted that "therefore, there
is no grain of truth to Borromeo's claim of redemption, rather WE ONLY TOLD THE TRUTH
IN SAYING THAT "he failed to redeem the foreclosed properties".

The above underscored assertions of respondents are patently false, baseless, malicious and
misleading, hence penurious, for in fact, the Court of Appeals did not reverse, but SUSTAINED the
trial court on the sole issue of the redemption price thus:
 41

"WE SUSTAIN THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO

REDEEM ... AT THE PRICE FOR WHICH THEY WERE ACQUIRED AT THE AUCTION SALE AND
THAT DEFENDANTS CANNOT INSIST THAT THE REDEMPTION PRICE SHOULD ALSO
INCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S OUTSTANDING ACCOUNT UNDER THE TRUST RECEIPT."

Pertinent portions of said Decision is attached hereto as Annex "B". To reiterate, this ruling, coupled
with TRB's acceptance of the sum of P85,000.00, indubitably proves that the foreclosed properties
had long ago been redeemed. Hence, respondents are guilty of Perjury in asserting that
"Complainant failed to redeem the foreclosed properties".

With respect to the ruling of the Court of Appeals quoted by respondents that "Borromeo lost his
right of redemption and can no longer compel TRB to allow redemption", the same is not only void
for being contrary to law but is MOOT and ACADEMIC due to TRB's receipt of the redemption price
five years before said ruling. The self-contradictions and lack of legal basis in the premises relied
upon by the Court are quite apparent and glaring.57

Contrary to respondent's claim, the Court of Appeals did no such thing. The Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 07015 held that respondent lost his right of redemption. This was affirmed by this Court
in its August 15, 1988 Resolution in G.R. No. 83306. On May 12, 1989, entry of judgment was made.
All these facts were recognized by this Court in In Re: Borromeo:

On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific
performance and damages against TRB and its local manager, Bias Abril, docketed as Civil Case
No. R-22506. The complaint sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed
properties only at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without need of paying
the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned. Judgment was rendered in his favor on
December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of
Appeals - docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 - the judgment was reversed, by the decision dated
January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of
redemption and can no longer compel defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question."

Borromeo elevated the case to this Court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By
Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for
failure. . . to sufficiently show that the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible
error in its questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is supported by
substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable law." Reconsideration was
denied, by Resolution dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied
by Resolution dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated April 19,
1989. The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the remand of the case to the court of
origin for prompt execution of judgment. Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By
Resolution dated August 7, 1989, the Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside
judgment, and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the Court merely noted without action his
manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals be overturned, and
declared that "no further motion or pleading. . . shall be entertained[.]"58 (Emphasis supplied)

Decades after the courts have held that respondent had lost his right of redemption, he still
somehow persists in claiming that an opposite conclusion had been reached. He shamelessly
cherry-picks portions from court issuances that are favorable to him, and decries all adverse
findings, as though his allegations work like a magic wand that could reverse what is already final
and executory. Only courts can declare judgments void; respondent's repetitive assertions will not
change the validity and finality of the judgment rendered against him.
 42

Respondent's relentless and obstinate misrepresentation of the ultimate end of his cause is
incurable. It is a waste of court and National Prosecution Service resources, and the prosecution
service that could be better spent on cases impressed with merit. Moreover, it is tantamount to
harassment of the lawful owners of the properties involved. His actions are patently in flagrant
contempt of this Court.

Broadly, contempt of court is willful disregard of public authority that tends to, among others, impair
the respect due to such a body:

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its
broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or
judicial body or an interruption of, its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its
presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body.
In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice,
or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification
a variety of different acts.59 (Citations omitted)

Courts have the power to punish for contempt in order to preserve order in judicial proceedings,
enforce its judgments, orders, and mandates. Ultimately, they have the power to administer
justice.60 "[R]espect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee,
the institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation."61

Courts are mindful to wield the power to punish for contempt judiciously. "The power to punish for
contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle."62 As
an extraordinary remedy of the court, a person may only be held in contempt unless it is necessary
to do so, in the interest of justice.63 Parties that contend for what they believe is right, in good faith,
ought not to be considered contumacious, regardless of the error in their beliefs.64

Thus, it is only when the act of a party is willful, and for an illegitimate and improper purpose, will
courts find a party in contempt.65 Conduct that impedes, obstructs, or degrades the administration
of justice is contumacious.66 In Inonog v. Ibay:67

In Lu Ym v. Mahinay, we held that an act, to be considered contemptuous, must be clearly contrary
or prohibited by the order of the Court. A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt
unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there
can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or
required[.]68

It is all too evident that respondent here has a contumacious attitude that spans interminable
decades, in defiance of this Court and the Judiciary.69

Further, his refusal to recognize his defeat has resulted in an obnoxious campaign waged against
persons and parties that defeat their rights to peacefully enjoy ownership of properties awarded to
them by the courts. He has vexed and taxed the resources of the prosecution service and the courts
on baseless and repetitive proceedings. Not even imprisonment and a fine in 1995-imposed by no
less than this Court-deterred respondent, or caused him to make any appreciable corrections to his
behavior and attitude.

In Spouses Suarez v. Salazar,70 this Court imposed the penalty of three (3) months imprisonment to
a person who, having already once been declared in contempt of court, continued to commit the
same acts for which he was first cited in contempt. Considering respondent's decades-long refusal to
recognize the authority of this Court's rulings, a more severe penalty of both imprisonment and fine
 43

must be imposed upon respondent. Pursuant to Rule 71, Section 7 of the Rules of Court,71 he
should be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of three (3) months in the City Jail of Cebu
City and ordered to pay a fine of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P3 0,000.00).

However, this Court recognizes the extraordinary situation brought about by the global pandemic
due to the coronavirus disease caused by the virus SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19).72 Thus, in light of
respondent's age, and COVID-19's effects on the conditions of the City Jail of Cebu City,73 an
additional fine shall then be imposed upon respondent in lieu of imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Joaquin T. Borromeo is GUILTY of indirect contempt of

court. He is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
Borromeo, his representatives, and any persons acting in his behalf are ORDERED to refrain from
committing the same or similar acts tending to obstruct the full execution of this Court's August 15,
1988 Resolution and the May 12, 1989 entry of judgment in G.R. No. 83306. Borromeo
is WARNED that the failure to pay the fine, or any repetition of any of the offenses of which he is
found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges, or court employees, shall
constitute contempt of court; and result in the imposition of the penalty of three (3) months
imprisonment.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the National Prosecution Service, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator, which shall circulate the same to all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

Costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 44

[ G.R. No. 206077, July 15, 2020 ]

HELEN P. DENILA, PETITIONER, V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, CITY GOVERNMENT OF

DAVAO, BRGY. 74-A MATINA CROSSING FEDERATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, LOLITA P. TANO, MATINA BALUSONG NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, FE I. BETIOS, ST. PAUL NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, ESTRELLA E. NAMATA, ST.
BENEDICT XVI NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
MELCHOR LECIONAN, SHALOM NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY
ITS PRESIDENT, ROMEO PACHO, ALEJANDRO ALONZO, JR., MARITES ALONZO-LILOC,
ARACELI ALONZO-DIOLASO, ROBERTO ALONZO, EULALIA ANGELITUD, EVANGELINE
BAUTISTA, SALVADOR BAUTISTA, FELIMON BILIRAN, JR., LOURDES BILIRAN, REYNALDO
BILIRAN, ARSENIO BRIONES, NORMA CAL, MARILYN CAÑETE, EDGARDO COSTANTE, JOY
BILL DELA CRUZ, MARJORIE DELA CRUZ, JOHN JAMES ESPINOSA, ROMAR CAÑETE,
TIMOTEO[1] C. FLORES, JEMUEL GAUDICOS, LILY LISONDRA, ERWIN PACADA, ALMA
PAGALAN, LEONARDO PELOÑO, REYNALDO POLIQUIT, VIRGILIO REUYAN, JESUS
REUYAN, SR., ROGELIO REUYAN, ARLAN SILVA, CARMELITA SILVA, ROMMEL SILVA,
GRACE TEMONERA, ERLINDA VALENCIA, AND DEL CARMEN MATINA APLAYA
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

Compliance with jurisdictional requirements is strictly mandatory in a special proceedings case as it

is the operative fact which vests a court with the power and authority to validly take cognizance and
decide a case.

Preview

The case involves a Petition2 for Review filed by Helen Perez Denila seeking to: (a) reverse and set
aside the July 25, 2012 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) – Special Former Twenty-Second
Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 03270-MIN which granted the Republic of the Philippines' (Republic)
petition for relief from judgment; and (b) reinstate the March 4, 2008 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 14 (RTC) in SP. PROC. No. 7527-2004 which ordered the
reconstitution of the owner's duplicate Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. 164, 219, 220, 301,
337, 514 and 67 originally registered in the name of Constancio S. Guzman (Constancio).

Antecedents

Historical Background

The dispute traces its roots back to the time when Constancio and his common-law wife Isabel Luna
(Isabel) had several parcels of land in Davao City registered under their collective names in which
they were issued the aforementioned OCTs sometime in November 1925.5 When both Constancio
and Isabel passed away intestate during the Second World War, they left no direct heirs and were
survived by Heirs of Constancio Guzman, Inc. (HCGI) — a corporation whose stakeholders were
children and grandchildren of Constancio's only sibling, Manuel Guzman.6

On June 8, 2001, HCGI filed four (4) separate Petitions for Reconstitution of Title of Lost and/or
Destroyed OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164 before the RTC; and, during the initial hearing, the same
 45

court required Davao City's Register of Deeds (RD) to submit a report on the status of the
aforementioned Certificates of Title.7

On July 25, 2002, Davao City's Acting Register of Deeds, Atty. Florenda Patriarca, submitted a
report showing that: (a) OCT No. 337 in the name of both spouses Constancio and Isabel had
already been cancelled and had been the subject of several transfers, the latest being to the
Republic of the Philippines; (b) OCT No. 219 in the name of both spouses Constancio and Isabel
had likewise been cancelled and had been the subject of several transfers, the latest being in favor
of a certain Antonio L. Arroyo (Arroyo); (c) OCT No. 164 in the name of both spouses Constancio
and Isabel had been the subject of several transfers and is currently registered in the name of
Arroyo; (d) OCT No. 67 in the name of Constancio himself had also been cancelled and transferred
several times, the latest being in the name of Madeline Marfori.8

On May 12, 2003, the RTC dismissed all the petitions for reconstitution as it was clear from the
report of the RD that OCT Nos. 337, 219, 164 and 67 were neither mutilated, destroyed, nor lost, but
were in fact cancelled as a result of both voluntary and involuntary subsequent transfers.9

Aggrieved, HCGI directly elevated the case to this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari.

On November 24, 2003, this Court's Third Division issued a Resolution in Heirs of Don Constancio
Guzman, Inc. v. Judge Carpio (Heirs of Guzman, Inc.)10 denying HCGI's Petition for Review
ratiocinating that: (a) there was a blatant disregard of the hierarchy of courts and that no exceptional
or compelling circumstance had been cited; (b) there was no proof that the Certificates of Title
intended to be reconstituted were in fact lost or destroyed; and (c) that the evidence on record
reveals that OCT Nos. 337, 219, 164 and 67 were actually cancelled on account of various
conveyances.

Present Reconstitution Case

On June 22, 2004, petitioner filed an "Amended Petition for Reconstitution of Original Certificates of
Titles"11 before the RTC seeking to direct Davao City's RD to reconstitute OCT Nos. 164, 219, 220,
301, 337, 514 and 67 alleging, among others, that:

1) The subject OCTs were originally registered in the name of Constancio and Isabel;12

2) A certain Bellie S. Artigas (Artigas) had been entitled to a 40% share in Constancio's
estate and was authorized to recover, administer and dispose of all properties in the said
estate pursuant to her agreement with Constancio;13

3) The parcels of land covered under the subject titles were sold to her by Artigas, as
Constancio's attorney-in-fact, by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale;14

4) She is currently in possession of the lands covered by the subject OCTs;15

5) She had caused a re-survey of the parcels of land covered under the subject OCTs;16

6) The original copies of the subject OCTs were kept inside the repositories of Davao City's
RD;17

7) Davao City's RD issued a Certification which stated that the subject OCTs were "not
available among [its] files[,] the same maybe (sic) mutilated or destroyed;"18
 46

8) The parcels of land covered under the subject OCTs had "no co-owners, mortgagees
and/or lessees" and had no corresponding certificates of title issued to other persons which
had been lost or destroyed;19

9) The parcels of land covered under the subject OCTs had "no buildings or other structures
of strong materials" which "[did] not belong to [petitioner];"20

10) The fruit-bearing trees and other seasonal crops existing on the parcels of land covered
under the subject OCTs had also been "sold/ceded/transferred" to her;21

11) The parcels of land covered under the subject OCTs were free from all liens and
encumbrances;22

12) There exists no deed or instrument affecting the parcels of land covered under the
subject OCTs;23 and

13) She is willing to pay the real estate taxes on the parcels of land covered under the
subject OCTs.24

On September 6, 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Entry of Appearance and
deputized Davao City's Office of the City Prosecutor to handle the reconstitution case before the
RTC.25

Before the presentation of witnesses, the RTC issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad
Testificandum directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and Davao City's RD to produce in
court the certificates of title in the custody of their respective offices.26

During the course of the trial, petitioner presented the testimony of Myrna Fernandez (Fernandez),
Chief of the Document and Docket Division of the LRA. Fernandez testified that petitioner's
respective copies of OCT Nos. 164, 219, 301, 337 and 67 and of Decree No. 195448 pertaining to
OCT No. 514 are "faithful reproduction[s]" of the "original" copies "existing in [the LRA's] records
and/or volt (sic) section."27 She further attested that, as record custodian, her office only keeps a
record regarding the existence of the subject OCTs and that the Register of Deeds makes the
cancellation of these certificates of title though they are not required to notify or communicate such
fact of cancellation to the LRA.28 Finally, she also clarified that all matters pertaining reconstitution
are forwarded to the LRA's Reconstitution Division whose duty is to prepare technical reports29 after
plotting and examining the plan appearing on the technical description of the lots covered by the
certificates of title sought to be reconstituted.30

For its part, the Republic presented the testimony of Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra (Atty. Cruzabra),
Davao City's then Deputy and Acting Register of Deeds who: (a) brought typewritten representations
of OCT Nos. 164, 219, 2980, 220, 301 and T-514 as well as Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
356 and 1363; and (b) testified that the actual copies of the same certificates in her office's custody
which were subjects of the Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum are mutilated and beyond
recognition.31 She elaborated that, due to the subject OCTs' present condition, she issued the
Certification to the effect that the same certificates are "mutilated and/or destroyed."32 Moreover,
she explained that: (a) the typewritten representations of all the OCTs that she brought in open court
had already been cancelled; (b) OCT No. 2980 and TCT No. 356 were derived from OCT No. 219;
(c) TCT No. 1363 was derived from OCT No. 301; and (d) OCT No. T-514 brought in open court is a
typewritten original document.33 Finally, Atty. Cruzabra stated that the typewritten entries in the
certificates of title she presented in open court show that the same documents had been cancelled
and each had been replaced with a corresponding TCT.34
 47

Reacting to the Republic's evidence, petitioner objected to the admissibility and probative value of
Atty. Cruzabra's documents because the copies of the purported titles are "not in their normal forms
issued by the [RD] but were merely lifted and copied [from] a local [news]paper, the stroke and style
of the signature of the then [RD], Patrocinio Quitain, varies from one document to another."35 She
stressed that "[t]he discrepancies are so apparent that no less than [Atty. Cruzabra] admitted that the
strokes of Patrocinio Quitain are different."36 Finally, she pointed out that "the alleged copies of
OCT[s] and CTC[s] were typewritten on cheap onion skin bonds and that they were [so] typewritten
in 1972 when [photocopying] machines [were] already abundant."37

Regional Trial Court's Reconstitution Ruling

On March 4, 2008, the RTC – Branch 14 in SP. PROC. No. 7527-2004 through then Presiding
Judge George E. Omelio (Judge Omelio) rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner essentially
holding that: (a) the entries of cancellation at the back of the OCTs are not conclusive proof of the
truth of such entries as they were not the authenticated copies of the originals;38 (b) the testimonies
of Fernandez had convinced him that the subject OCTs did exist in the LRA's office and that the
same were all registered in the name of Guzman and Luna;39 and (c) the Republic presented no
proof (document or decree) as to the circumstances of the subject OCTs' cancellation.40 The
dispositive portion of such Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition well founded, the same is hereby granted.

The Registrar [sic] of Deeds of Davao City is hereby ordered to reconstitute the owner[']s Original
Duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Titles No. OCT No. 164, OCT No. 219, OCT No. 220, OCT
No. 301, OCT No. 337, OCT No. 514 and OCT No. 67 with the approved Technical Description of
said parcels of land attached with [sic] this petition be respectively inscribed thereto and that the
titles to the said mentioned parcels of land be duly registered in the name of the original owner
Constancio Guzman, and considering that the latter[,] through his attorney-in-fact Bellie S. Artigas[,]
sold the same to herein petitioner (Exhs. "G" to "M"), the Register of Deeds, Davao City is further
ordered to correspondingly issue Transfer Certificate of Titles over the subject parcels of land in the
name of herein petitioner.

Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.41

Post-Regional Trial Court Proceedings

On March 27, 2008, the OSG received Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008 Decision.42

On March 28, 2008, Clerk of Court V Atty. Ray Uson Velasco (Atty. Velasco) of RTC, Branch 14
issued a Certification43 stating that: (a) copies of Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008 Decision were
received by petitioner's counsel and Davao City's RD (as well as the Office of the City
Prosecutor)44 on March 5, 2008 and March 10, 2008, respectively; and (b) the same Decision had
become final and executory.

On March 31, 2008, an Entry of Judgment45 was issued by Atty. Velasco pursuant to the March 28,
2008 Certification.

On April 15, 2008, Atty. Cruzabra sent a letter to LRA Administrator Benedicto B. Ulep (LRA
Administrator Ulep) elevating Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008 Decision by way of en consulta.46
 48

On April 18, 2008, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Execution claiming that, since no Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by the adverse parties within the reglementary period, her motion must be
granted.47

On April 23, 2008, Judge Omelio granted petitioner's move for urgent execution and issued a
corresponding Writ of Execution.48

Petition for Relief from Judgment Proceedings

On May 26, 2008, the Republic through the OSG filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the
RTC seeking to set aside the March 4, 2008 Decision.49

On September 3, 2008, Judge Omelio issued an Order50 with the pertinent portions as follows:

That is why, it would appear that the undersigned Presiding Judge seemingly rendered the subject
decision with lightning speed which is not in reality.

As there is already a doubt cast by these concerned sectors against the sense of impartiality and
independence of the undersigned Presiding Judge he is therefore, voluntarily INHIBITING himself
from further sitting in this case.

Let the record of this case be transmitted to the Office of the Executive Judge of this Court for re-
raffling with the exception of Branch 14.

SO ORDERED.

Here, Judge Omelio directed the transmittal of the case records to the Office of the Executive Judge
for re-raffle.51 The case was eventually re-raffled to Judge Ridgway M. Tanjili (Judge Tanjili).52

On September 15, 2008, Judge Tanjili issued an Order re-setting the date and time of the hearing
previously set by Judge Omelio.53

On June 29, 2009, LRA Administrator Ulep issued a Resolution in Consulta No. 4581 holding that,
based on his office's records, the subject OCTs sought by petitioner to be reconstituted are all
previously cancelled titles making rendering Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008 Decision
unregistrable.54

On August 12, 2009, Judge Tanjili unexpectedly inhibited himself from handling the reconstitution
case.55

Petition for Relief Ruling

On September 3, 2009, Judge Omelio, despite the absence of any raffle and without conducting a
hearing,56 re-assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued an Order57 denying the Republic's
Petition for Relief from Judgment for having been filed sixteen (16) days beyond the reglementary
period based on the observation that the Prosecutor of Davao City received a copy of the March 4,
2008 Decision on March 10, 2008 and that the OSG belatedly filed the same petition for relief only
on May 9, 2008.58 Moreover, it also pointed out that Atty. Cruzabra, being Davao City's RD, "did
nothing," "made a wrong interpretation of the Rules," and elevated the March 4, 2008 Decision via
consulta to the LRA Commissioner instead of filing an appeal with the regular courts.59 The
dispositive portion60 reads as follows:
 49

Accordingly, the Petition for Relief from Judgment is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved by the Order, the Public Prosecutor of Davao City filed a Motion for Reconsideration from
the Order of the Honorable Court Denying the Petition for Relief Filed by the Solicitor General and
Inhibition of the Honorable Presiding Judge.61

On October 1, 2009, Judge Omelio issued an Order denying the Public Prosecutor's Motion for
Reconsideration.62

Petition for Certiorari Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

On October 22, 2009, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari [Under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court] with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order with the CA pointing out that Judge Omelio
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the September 3, 2009 and October 1, 2009 Orders
for: (a) being contrary to jurisprudence; and (b) denial of due process by exhibiting bias and partiality
towards petitioner as he unilaterally re-assumed jurisdiction over the petition for relief case despite
his previous inhibition.63

On March 17, 2010, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order via Resolution enjoining Judge
Omelio from enforcing the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision as well as the September 3, 2009, the
October 1, 2009 and the March 4, 2010 Orders.64

On May 18, 2010, the CA issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to prevent any grave and
irreparable injury to the rights of the Republic and Atty. Cruzabra pending the resolution of the
Petition for Certiorari.65

Fencing Permit, Writ of Demolition, and Intervention of herein Private Respondents

On May 25, 2010, despite the pendency of the certiorari proceedings before the CA, Judge Omelio
issued an Order (upon motion of petitioner) directing the Davao City Engineer's Office to issue a
Fencing Permit over the properties covered by OCT Nos. 164, 219, 220, 301, 337, 514 and 67.66

On June 30, 2010, Atty. Cruzabra filed a Manifestation with the CA informing the latter of Judge
Omelio's highly contumacious May 25, 2010 Order which directly violated the May 18, 2010 Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.67

In response to Atty. Cruzabra's June 30, 2010 Manifestation, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Clarification pointing out that: (a) the parcels of land subject in the instant reconstitution case are
being unlawfully occupied by informal settlers; (b) the "request" for Fencing Permit is to enclose the
same properties in order to prevent intrusion by unscrupulous informal settlers; (c) Judge Omelio's
May 25, 2010 is not a direct violation of the injunctive writ issued by the CA because it cannot be
considered an enforcement of the final and executory March 4, 2008 Decision of the RTC granting
the petition for reconstitution.68

On October 5, 2010, the CA, in a Resolution and in view of petitioner's move for clarification,
assented to Judge Omelio's May 25, 2010 Order for the issuance of a fencing permit as well as a
Writ of Demolition.69 Here, it opined that the issuance of a Fencing Permit would not violate or injure
the rights of all parties for it is a necessary measure for preservation which would, instead, tend to
"preserve and protect" the area in question from trespass and depredation by third persons.70
 50

On October 8, 2010, Judge Omelio issued an Order reiterating its directive to the City Engineer's
Office to issue a Fencing Permit in petitioner's favor.71 In the same Order, he also issued a Writ of
Demolition for the clearing of structures erected on the properties covered by the OCTs sought to be
reconstituted.72

On November 11, 2010, Brgy. 74-A Matina Crossing Federation, Inc. (represented by its President,
Lolita P. Tano), Matina Balusong Neighborhood Association, Inc. (represented by its President, Fe I.
Betios), St. Paul Neighborhood Association, Inc. (represented by its President, Estrella E. Namata),
St. Benedict XVI Neighborhood Association, Inc. (represented by its President, Melchor Lecionan),
and Shalom Neighborhood Association, Inc. (represented by its President, Romeo Pacho) filed a
Joint Motion to Intervene with Leave of Court with Prayer for Reconsideration (with attached Joint
Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention) with the CA claiming that they have a legal interest in the
matter in controversy because: (a) they are the actual occupants and possessors of the properties
covered by the subject OCTs; (b) they were not notified of the reconstitution proceedings in the court
below; (c) their intervention will not unduly delay the resolution of the case or prejudice the rights of
the original parties; (d) their rights will not be fully protected in a separate proceeding; and (e) the
issuance of a Fencing Permit will authorize the petition to enter the several parcels of land including
those possessed by them.73

On November 17, 2010, Judge Omelio recalled the "special" Writ of Demolition in an Order74 with
the relevant portions reproduced as follows:

THE Order of the Court dated OCTOBER 8, 2010 is hereby amended to the effect that the City
Engineer's Office or its Building Officials, Davao City, pursuant to the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated October 5, 2010 in Sp. Proc. No. 75-2004 is directed to issue a Fencing Permit to
Applicant Helen Denila after which the latter has to perform the act of fencing the metes and bounds
of her area subject of the instant case.

As to the special writ of demolition issued by the Court dated October 8, 2010, the same is
hereby SET ASIDE or RECALLED. Petitioner may instead file a separate ordinary action to this
effect if she so desire(s), but not under the instant special proceeding.

On November 26, 2010, Alejandro Alonzo, Jr., Marites Alonzo-Liloc, Araceli Alonzo-Diolaso, Roberto
Alonzo, Eulalia Anglelitud, Evangeline Bautista, Salvador Bautista, Felimon Biliran, Jr., Lourdes
Biliran, Reynaldo Biliran, Arsenio Briones, Norma Cal, Marilyn Cañete, Edgardo Costante, Joy Bill
Dela Cruz, Marjorie Dela Cruz, John James Espinosa, Romar Cañete, Timoteo C. Flores, Jemuel
Gaudicos, Lily Lisondra, Erwin Pacada, Alma Pagalan, Leonardo Peloño, Reynaldo Poliquit, Virgilio
Reuyan, Jesus Reuyan, Sr., Rogeleo Reuyan, Arlan Silva, Carmelita Silva, Rommel Silva, Grace
Temonera, Erlinda Valencia and Del Carmen Matina Aplaya Neighborhood Association filed a Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion for: (a) leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Hereto Attached
Petition-In-Intervention; (b) Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 05 October 2010; and (c) the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or in the
alternative to direct the Honorable Public Respondent Presiding Judge and Public Respondent City
Government of Davao through the City Engineer's Office to defer implementation of the Order dated
08 October 2010 and issuance of the Fencing Permit in favor of private respondent Helen Denila
with the CA claiming that: (a) they have a legal interest in the matter subject of the litigation and that
allowing them to intervene will not unduly delay the resolution of the case for it will prevent
multiplicity of suits; (b) petitioner had speciously asked for a Fencing Permit without disclosing that
they are actual occupants and possessors of the real properties subject in the reconstitution case;
and (c) the construction of a fence would cause them irreparable injury and injustice, especially if
they were deprived of their day in court.75
 51

On December 7, 2010, Davao City filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene with the RTC
stating that: (a) the Barangay Hall of Barangay 74-A, as well as the Talomo Police Station which it
funded, is within the lots covered by the OCTs sought to be reconstituted and the demolition of those
structures would result in the damage of these improvements; (b) one of the properties which will be
affected by Judge Omelio's October 8, 2010 Order is presently registered in the Republic's name
and is part of Maa Diversion Road which is a major road/highway forming part of the road network of
the City; (c) the issue of fencing was never raised in the reconstitution proceedings and it was never
required to file any Comment by the RTC through Judge Omelio in violation of its right to due
process; and (d) it intervened in the present case for it was constrained to protect its rights and
interest.76

On the same day, Davao City also filed its Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention with Urgent
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA seeking
to participate in the certiorari proceedings already initiated by the Republic.77

On April 11, 2011, the Republic through the OSG filed its Manifestation (in lieu of Comment) with the
CA stating that the intervenors should be allowed to intervene considering that they were not notified
of the reconstitution proceedings a quo.78

On April 28, 2011, the CA promulgated a Resolution79 granting all the motions to intervene and
recalling its October 5, 2010 Resolution which, in turn, assented to Judge Omelio's May 25, 2010
Order for the issuance of a fencing permit. The relevant portion of the Resolution reads:

Acting on the pertinent pleadings on file, the Court RESOLVES to: (1) NOTE the Rejoinder to
Intervenors-Petitioner's Reply to Respondents' Omnibus Comment/Opposition filed by private
respondent Helen P. Denila; (2) NOTE that per verification report by the Judicial Record's [sic]
Division, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has not filed its Comment to the Joint Motion to
Intervene with Leave of Court with Prayer for Reconsideration (with attached Joint Petition for
Certiorari-in-Intervention) filed by Lolita P. Tano, et al., and to the Omnibus Motion: (a) for Leave of
Court to Intervene and to Admit attached Petition-In-Intervention, (b) for Reconsideration of the
Court's Resolution dated 5 October 2010, and (c) for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by Alejandro Alonzo, Jr., et al.; (3) NOTE that no
compliance has been made by the OSG to the Court's 24 January 2011 directive to file a Comment
to the City of Davao's Motion for Leave to Intervene; (4) GRANT the Joint Motion to Intervene with
leave of Court filed by movants Lolita P. Tano, et al.; (5) GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene
filed by movants Alejandro Alonzo, Jr., et al.; (6) GRANT the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
filed by the movant City of Davao; (7) ADMIT the Petition-for-Certiorari-in-Intervention with Urgent
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by the City of
Davao as it has already paid the docket and other lawful fees; (8) DIRECT the prospective
intervenors, Lolita P. Tano, et al., and Alejandro Alonzo, Jr., et al., to pay the required docket and
other lawful fees within five (5) days from notice; (9) HOLD IN ABEYANCE the admission of the Joint
Petition-for-Certiorari-In-Intervention filed by Lolita P. Tano, et al., and the Petition-for-Intervention
filed by Alejandro Alonzo, Jr., et al. pending compliance with the preceding directive; (10) RECALL
the Resolution of July 13, 2010 insofar as it declared this case submitted for decision; and, (11)
RECALL Our October 5, 2010 Resolution, only in so far as We assented to the issuance of the
fencing permit.

SO ORDERED.80

Court of Appeals' Certiorari Ruling

 52

On July 25, 2012, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 03270-MIN rendered a Decision81 against petitioner
ratiocinating that: (a) the Republic had seasonably filed the petition for relief since the reglementary
period should be counted from the date of receipt of the OSG — not the Davao City's Office of the
City Prosecutor;82 (b) the present reconstitution case as regards OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164
cannot prosper for it is barred by res judicata pursuant to this Court's ruling in the case of Heirs of
Guzman, Inc. which Judge Omelio should have taken judicial notice of;83 (c) Judge Omelio acted
with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Republic's petition for relief without any
hearing;84 and (d) petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of Republic Act No. 2685 (R.A.
No. 26) because she failed to notify the intervenors-private respondents of the present reconstitution
proceedings before the RTC and her petition is not based on an existing owner's, co-owner's,
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate OCT.86 The decretal portion87 of the same Decision reads as
follows:

ACCORDINGLY, We GRANT the petition. The assailed 4 March 2008 Decision and 3 September
2009 and 1 October 2009 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, in Special Proceeding
Case No. 7527-2004 are VOIDED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved by the CA's judgment in granting the Writ of Certiorari in favor of the Republic, petitioner
moved for reconsideration.

On March 1, 2013, the CA issued a Resolution88 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on

the finding that the arguments raised "are merely reiterative of the same arguments or grounds
already discussed and passed upon in [its] decision."89

Post-Court of Appeals Proceedings

On April 22, 2013, petitioner assailed the CA's July 25, 2012 Decision and March 1, 2013 Resolution
through an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 primarily seeking for the reinstatement of the RTC's
March 4, 2008 Decision which ordered the reconstitution of OCT Nos. 164, 219, 220, 301, 337, 514
and 67 under the former's name.90

On October 10, 2013, Atty. Maria Theresa D. Biongan-Pescadera (Atty. Biongan-Pescadera), Davao
City's new Register of Deeds (RD), caused the reconstitution of OCT Nos. 30191 and 21992 while
the case was still pending with this Court and despite the existence of the CA's July 25, 2012
Decision.

Parties' Arguments

Petition

Petitioner faults the CA for granting the Republic's Petition for Certiorari and nullifying Judge
Omelio's March 4, 2008 Decision as well as his September 3, 2009 and October 1, 2009 Resolutions
because: (a) the certified photocopies, reconstitution reports, certifications (that all the subject OCTs
were not available among their files) purportedly issued by the RD as well as testimonies of key
employees of Davao City's RD office pertaining to the subject certificates of title are valid and
statutorily-recognized sources of reconstitution;93 (b) the Deed of Absolute Sale between her and
Artigas is enough to establish her interest over the properties subject of the reconstitution;94 (c) she
had complied with the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication for being able to post her
petition for reconstitution in the City Hall of Davao City as well as95 the Official Gazette which serves
 53

as notice to the whole world; (d) the lack of notice to the private respondents was cured when her
petition for reconstitution was published in the newspaper of general circulation;96 (e) the
intervenors-private respondents do not have a legal and valid interest over the certificates of title of
the lands in question because they are informal settlers who were not occupants at the time the
petition for reconstitution was filed;97 (f) the Republic failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration — a
condition sine qua non in the filing of a petition for certiorari — as the same was declared as pro
forma by Judge Omelio;98 (g) the CA's findings are not supported by the evidence found in the
records of the case because it "dwelt so much on the allegation[s] x x x raised by the intervenors-
private respondents;99 (h) the March 4, 2008 Decision had already become immutable for having
attained finality;100 (i) res judicata is inapplicable in the case at hand because the court that took
cognizance of the reconstitution cases pertaining to OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164 did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person as a party to the case and because this Court did not rule on the merits
of that case;101 (j) Judge Omelio did not abuse his discretion when he revoked his inhibition and
denied the Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment because he was merely exercising the
residual powers of the court that rendered judgment on the petition for reconstitution of title;102 (k)
Judge Omelio did not abuse his discretion in summarily denying the Republic's Petition for Relief
from Judgment without hearing because the same pleading was filed out of time;103 and (1) the
intervenors-private respondents should have litigated their cause in a separate proceeding because
the instant reconstitution case is not an adjudication of their ownership on the subject lands.104

Comments

The Republic, in response to petitioner's claims, contends that: (a) the Petition for Relief from
Judgment was seasonably filed because it received the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision on March 27,
2008 — not March 10, 2008 which is the date of receipt by the Public Prosecutor of Davao
City;105 (b) this Court had already held in Republic of the Philippines v. Mendoza,106 that the
reglementary period "should be counted from the date the Solicitor General received a copy of the
decision because the service of the decision upon the city fiscal did not operate as a service upon
the Solicitor General;"107 (c) Judge Omelio no longer had jurisdiction to rule on the Republic's
Petition for Relief from Judgment when he voluntarily inhibited himself prom participating in the
case;108 (d) Judge Omelio abused his discretion in failing to conduct a hearing before dismissing
the petition for relief;109 (e) Procedural Rules should "receive a liberal interpretation in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action;"110 (f) the CA did not err in holding that petitioner is barred by res
judicata from seeking another reconstitution for OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164;111 (g) Judge
Omelio should have taken judicial notice of this Court's Resolution in Heirs of Guzman, Inc.;112 (h)
the CA did not err in holding that the RTC did not comply with the requirements of Sections 12 and
13 of R.A. No. 26;113 (i) the doctrines of immutability of judgments and res judicata only apply to
final and executory decisions — not to Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008 Decision which did not acquire
jurisdiction to proceed with the reconstitution case for failure to comply with the requirements of
Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26;114 and (j) a Motion for Reconsideration need not be required in
a Petition for Certiorari when the decision or order being assailed, such as the RTC's March 4, 2008
Decision, is a patent nullity.115

Intervenors-private respondents Lolita P. Tano, Fe I. Betios, Estrella E. Namata, Melchor Lecionan

and Romeo Pacho also filed their joint Comment116 claiming that: (a) Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No.
26 pertaining to the service of notices to actual occupants or possessors of lands covered by
certificates of title subject in a petition for reconstitution of title were not complied with;117 (b) res
judicata applies to petitioner (as far as OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164 are concerned) even if she
was not a party in the case of Heirs of Guzman, Inc. because the latter was in the same predicament
as petitioner's in this previously-settled case;118 and (c) their belatedly-pursued intervention in this
case was warranted considering that they have not been served with any notice of the instant
petition for reconstitution of title as required by R.A. No. 26.119
 54

Intervenors-private respondents Alejandro Alonzo, Jr., Marites Alonzo-Liloc, Araceli Alonzo-Diolaso,

Roberto Alonzo, Eulalia Angelitud, Evangeline Bautista, Salvador Bautista, Felimon Biliran, Jr.,
Lourdes Biliran, Reynaldo Biliran, Arsenio Briones, Norma Cal, Marilyn Cañete, Edgardo Costante,
Joy Bill Dela Cruz, Marjorie Dela Cruz, John James Espinosa, Romar Cañete, Timoteo C. Flores,
Jemuel Gaudicos, Lily Lisondra, Erwin Pacada, Alma Pagalan, Leonardo Peloño, Reynaldo Poliquit,
Virgilio Reuyan, Jesus Reuyan, Sr., Rogeleo Reuyan, Arlan Silva, Carmelita Silva, Rommel Silva,
Grace Temonera and Erlinda Valencia, for their part, jointly filed their "Comment/Opposition (To
Petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari Dated 19 April 2013)"120 claiming that: (a) they are
actual occupants of the lots covered in the subject OCTs sought to be reconstituted being residents
therein;121 (b) the lands that they are presently occupying are actually owned by Arroyo;122 (c) the
RTC, even if it has jurisdiction to entertain Petitions for Reconstitution of Title, had no authority to
issue an order directing the demolition of the structures erected on the areas covered by subject
OCTs;123 (d) there was failure to faithfully comply with all jurisdictional requirements in R.A. No. 26
because the actual occupants of the lots covered by the subject OCTs were never notified of the
pendency of the Petition for Reconstitution of Title before the RTC;124 (e) they were not accorded
due process when Judge Omelio issued the Writ of Demolition for they were never given a day in
court to present their arguments;125 and (f) they have legal interest in the outcome of the instant
reconstitution of title as their rights will be adversely affected by the final verdict.126

The City of Davao likewise filed its Comment (Petition for Review on Certiorari127 arguing that: (a)
petitioner failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements enumerated in Section 12 of R.A. No.
26 because some areas embraced by the certificates of title sought to be reconstituted are situated
within the commercial and residential districts in the city and that several government properties
(Barangay Hall of Barangay 74-A situated in a lot covered by TCT No. T-2981 is located within the
property described in OCT No. 514; a portion of lot under TCT No. T-131158 derived from OCT No.
377 is registered in the name of the Republic; Talomo Police Station which is part of the Davao City
Police Office situated in a lot covered by TCT No. FP-1243 and registered in the name of Vicenta D.
Lastima is located within the property embraced in OCT No. 514) are "glaring to the eyes;"128 (b)
posting and publication cannot cure the defects in the petition for reconstitution which alleged that
there are no structures erected on the lands covered by certificates of title sought to be reconstituted
by petitioner;129 and (c) it has a legal and valid interest over the lands covered by the certificates of
title sought to be reconstituted because, aside from having properties situated in the lands described
in the subject certificates, the RTC had granted and tried to implement petitioner's motion to compel
the city to issue a Fencing Permit.130

Atty. Cruzabra, on her part, filed a Manifestation and/or Comment131 adopting132 the OSG's

Comment and adding that: (a) Judge Omelio proffered no valid reason in revoking his inhibition and
subsequently denying summarily the Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment;133 (b) Judge
Omelio indeed granted petitioner's motion for the issuance of a Fencing Permit on May 25, 2010 and
issued an Order directing the City Engineer of Davao City to issue the same permit;134 (c) the RTC
as presided by Judge Omelio had no residual jurisdiction on account of the CA's April 28, 2011
Resolution which hindered the implementation of the former tribunal's directive against the City of
Davao for the issuance of a Fencing Permit;135 (d) petitioner failed to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements under Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 regarding the allegations of absence or
presence of structures on the lands covered by certificates of title sought to be reconstituted and
service of notices to actual occupants;136 (e) Judge Omelio had already been dismissed by this
Court from judicial service on account of rendering the March 4, 2008 Decision;137 and (f) despite
the CA's Decision which nullified the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision, the current Register of Deeds
who replaced her upon retirement still proceeded to issue new original copies OCT Nos. 219138 and
301.139

Reply
 55

Petitioner, upon receiving the respective comments of all respondents, filed a couple of sets of
Reply140 arguing that: (a) respondents "failed to establish and prove with concrete and convincing
evidence" that they were present and were occupying the properties covered by the subject OCTs
"before or during the inception of the proceedings;141 (b) Judge Omelio was justified in issuing a
Fencing Permit because he had retained "general supervisory control over the process of the
execution" relative to the March 4, 2008 Decision;142 (c) the City of Davao "failed to prove" that she
failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements because the notice of hearing relative to the
instant petition for reconstitution of title case was posted at the main entrance of the City Hall
Building and that the structures erected on the properties under the subject OCTs have been
erected after the same petition was filed before the RTC;143 (d) this Court's ruling in Heirs of
Guzman, Inc. does not constitute res judicata because the same principle was only raised during
the certiorari proceedings before the CA and that same case was not decided on the merits and had
different sets of evidence;144 (e) Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008 Decision became immutable and
unalterable after it attained finality;145 (f) the OSG's recourse of seeking a relief from judgment is
not the proper remedy because it was guilty of gross negligence when it failed to timely file a Motion
for Reconsideration or an appeal against Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008 Decision;146 and (g) the
unilateral reversal of the voluntary inhibition was anchored on a valid reason as the lots covered by
the subject OCTs turned out to be different from those previously handled by Judge Omelio when he
was still engaged in the private practice of law.147

Issues

Whether the CA committed a reversible error in finding grave abuse of discretion and reversing the
RTC's September 3, 2009 Order which summarily denied the Republic's petition for relief from
judgment.

II

Whether the CA committed a reversible error in nullifying the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision through
the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari.

III

Whether the CA committed a reversible error in allowing the actual occupants of the lots subject in
the present reconstitution of title case to participate in the certiorari proceedings.

IV

Whether this Court should impose disciplinary sanctions on Atty. Lanelyn D. Pangilinan (Atty.
Pangilinan) and Atty. Maria Theresa D. Biongan-Pescadera (Atty. Biongan Pescadera) for
performing acts inconsistent with their sworn duties as Members of the Bar.

Ruling

Parameters of Review

At the outset, this Court reiterates the basic procedural rule that it is not a trier of facts and that only
pure questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.148 Although
jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to this rule,149 such exceptions must be alleged,
 56

substantiated and proved by the parties so that this Court may effectively evaluate and review the
factual issues raised.150 Notably, like all other modes of appeal, the function of a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 is to enable this Court to determine and correct any error of judgment
committed in the exercise of jurisdiction.151

By comparison, nothing is more settled than the principle that a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to
exist.152 Likewise, jurisprudence is also settled in defining the phrase "grave abuse of discretion" as
the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise
of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated
duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law.153 In some rare instances, the term "grave abuse"
even refers to cases in which there has been a gross misapprehension of facts154 — but only for
the limited purpose of establishing the allegation of grave abuse of discretion.155 Correspondingly,
the term "without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority; while the
term "excess of jurisdiction" means that the court transcended its power or acted without any
statutory authority.156 As such, petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the act of the public
respondent in issuing the impugned order (or decision, in some cases) lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction because mere abuse is not enough — it must be grave.157This is done by clearly
showing, to the satisfaction of the reviewing court, the presence of caprice and arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion on the part of the inferior court or tribunal.158

In seeking to utilize the benefit from a competent court's corrective hand of certiorari, a petitioner
must bear in mind that such procedural remedy is essentially supervisory and is specifically invoked
to keep lower courts and other tribunals within the bounds of their
jurisdiction.159 A Writ of Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy which may only be availed of when
there is no appeal or when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.160 Unlike the different modes of appeal, the supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the
issuance of a Writ of Certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a lower court judgment — on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of
the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision.161 This is because a Writ of Certiorari is a remedy
used to correct errors of jurisdiction — for which reason, it must clearly show that the public
respondent had no jurisdiction to issue an order or to render a decision.162 Viewed in a different
angle, such extraordinary writ is strictly confined to the determination of the propriety of the trial
court's jurisdiction — whether it had the authority to take cognizance of the case and if so, whether
the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.163 Therefore, the remedy itself is narrow in scope.164

At this juncture, it now becomes important to point out that, much like reviewing the legal correctness
of a CA decision in resolving a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 involving decisions and final
orders of the National Labor Relations Commission, this Court will evaluate the case in the prism of
whether the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the court a quo.165 The ruling in Inocente v. St. Vincent Foundation for Children and Aging,
Inc.,166 explains this concept in the following manner:

In resolving the present Rule 45 petition, we are therefore, bound by the intrinsic limitations of a Rule
65 certiorari proceeding: it is an extraordinary remedy aimed solely at correcting errors of jurisdiction
or acts committed without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It does not address mere errors of judgement, unless the error
transcends the bounds of the tribunal's jurisdiction.167
 57

Accordingly, the questions that need to be answered while keeping the aforementioned parameters
of review in mind are the following:

-1 Did the CA commit a reversible error in finding grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part for
issuing the September 3, 2009 Order which summarily denied the Republic's Petition for Relief from
Judgment?

-2 Did the CA commit a reversible error in nullifying the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision by issuing
a Writ of Certiorari?

This Court answers in the negative for the following reasons:

On reversing and finding grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's September 3, 2009 Order which
summarily denied the Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment

I. The CA was correct in holding that Judge Omelio went beyond the bounds of his authority when
he: (a) unilaterally withdrew his inhibition, (b) re-assumed jurisdiction, and (c) summarily denied the
Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment.

A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested

tribunal.168 All the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if
the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge.169 Such constitutional principle is
the basis of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just
or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

The aforementioned rule contemplates two (2) kinds of inhibition: (a) compulsory; and (b)
voluntary.170 Under the first paragraph of the afore¬cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that
judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned.171 The second paragraph,
which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether
to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.172 It is the latter
kind of inhibition which rests on the subjective ground of conscience; that is why cases under such
category should be analyzed on a case-to-case basis.

In the case of Judge Omelio's voluntary inhibition, this Court makes it clear that a trial judge who
voluntarily inhibits himself loses jurisdiction to hear a case.173 However, while a judge in extremely
rare instances may reconsider his previous inhibition and re-assume jurisdiction after a careful re-
assessment of the circumstances of the case,174 the better course is to disqualify himself to avoid
being misunderstood and to preserve his reputation for probity and objectivity.175

A judge who voluntarily inhibits himself from handling a case means that he had doubts regarding
his impartiality. Such recusal is commendable on his part for it preserves the integrity of the
 58

Judiciary's ability to dispense impartial justice. However, a re-assumption of jurisdiction on the part of
the judge who had previously inhibited from a particular proceeding gives the public an impression
that he may have acquired some form of personal interest in the outcome of the case. For reasons
of preserving the public's faith in the Judiciary's capability to dispense impartial justice, the best
option of a judge who made a prior voluntary inhibition is to continue the same. This is especially
applicable to multi-sala courts such as the RTC of Davao City.176 Section 8(a), Chapter V of A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC177 entitled "Guidelines on the Selection of Executive Judges and Defining their
Powers, Prerogatives and Duties," which also happens to govern the mechanism for assignment of
cases to different branches in a multi-sala court, provides:

SEC. 8. Raffle and re-assignment of cases in ordinary courts where judge is disqualified or
voluntarily inhibits himself/herself from hearing case.–

(a) Where a judge in a multiple-branch court is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself, the

records shall be returned to the Executive Judge and the latter shall cause the inclusion of the said
case in the next regular raffle for re-assignment. A newly-filed case shall be assigned by raffle to the
disqualified or inhibiting judge to replace the case so removed from his/her court. (citations omitted)

Indeed, no case may be assigned without being raffled, and no judge may choose the cases
assigned to him.178 The raffle of cases is intended to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases by
protecting the integrity of the process of distributing or assigning cases to judges.179 Such process
assures the public that the right of the parties to be heard by an impartial and unbiased tribunal is
safeguarded while also protecting judges from any suspicion of impropriety.180 More importantly,
"[t]his Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' as
the indispensable imperative of due process."181

It now becomes clear from the foregoing discussions that Judge Omelio exceeded the bounds of his
authority when he bypassed the raffling process and re-assumed jurisdiction over the Republic's
Petition for Relief from Judgment — both without any apparent justification. Judge Omelio's failure to
heed the guidelines provided in Section 8(a) of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC amounts to a serious
transgression of due process as the litigants (most especially respondents) were deprived of the
benefits of a fair and neutral resolution of their case. Worse, Judge Omelio also violated the basic
tenets of due process when he denied the Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment without
conducting a hearing; thereby denying the State an opportunity to raise its concerns or objections on
the re-assumption of jurisdiction as provided in Section 6, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.182 Due to
these serious jurisdictional transgressions, this Court considers him absolutely devoid of authority in
taking action on and expeditiously denying the Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment.
Since orders of inhibition are judicial in nature,183 due process requirements apply and the parties
should at least be heard before any act or resolution may be done resulting either in the denial of
any motion to inhibit or in the re-assumption of jurisdiction by a presiding magistrate; thereby making
the instant case under one of those several instances where the corrective hand of certiorari may be
utilized.

At this point, however, this Court is not yet ready to make a sweeping statement of totally prohibiting
judges from re-assuming jurisdiction in a case where he had already inhibited from as there might
still be some unforeseen and unpredictable instances calling for such an extraordinary measure.
Nevertheless, magistrates should be guided by the rule that a re-assumption of jurisdiction
may only be done in a manner that does not to contravene any existing administrative issuance of
this Court.
 59

Thus, this Court holds that the RTC's September 3, 2009 Order denying the Republic's Petition for
Relief from Judgment is void for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion as a result of Judge
Omelio's unauthorized re-assumption of jurisdiction.

II. The CA was correct in taking cognizance of an order denying the Petition for Relief from
Judgment because a Writ of Certiorari is a comprehensive remedy against errors of jurisdiction.

As discussed earlier, a Writ of Certiorari may only be issued for the correction of jurisdictional errors
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.184 Being an
"inflexible"185 remedy of "limited scope and of narrow character"186 "designed for the correction of
jurisdictional errors,"187 it cannot substitute for a lost appeal.188

However, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to

destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ.189 Jurisprudence
recognizes certain situations when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper,
such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the
trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a
failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate and insufficient; (e) where the issue
raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of
urgency.190 Moreover, the same remedy may be availed of even if the lost appeal was occasioned
by a party's neglect or error in the choice of remedies when: (a) public welfare and the advancement
of public policy dictates; (b) the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) the writs issued are null
and void; or (d) the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.191 Ultimately, it is better on balance that this Court look beyond procedural requirements
and overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers so that a void order of a
lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice.192

Relatedly, the principle of liberal construction of procedural rules has been allowed by this Court in
the following cases: (a) where a rigid application will result in manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and
executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (b) where the
interest of substantial justice will be served; (c) where the resolution of the motion is addressed
solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (d) where the injustice to the adverse
party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.193 In addition, jurisprudence also teaches us that, aside from matters of life,
liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory
character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact,
the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (b) the merits of the case; (c) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (d)
a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (e) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.194

In this case, the records show that the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision was received by Davao City's
Office of the City Prosecutor on March 10, 2008; while the same judgment was received by
the OSG only on March 27, 2008. Technically, the State through the OSG has fifteen (15) days from
its actual receipt on March 27, 2008 or until April 11, 2008 to appeal the RTC's March 4, 2008
Decision — not fifteen (15) days from the deputized prosecutor's receipt on March 10, 2008 or until
March 25, 2008. Suspiciously, Atty. Velasco, the RTC's Clerk of Court, prematurely declared the
RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision as final and executory on March 28, 2008 — only a day after the
OSG actually received the said judgment.195 This obviously goes against the established
jurisprudential principle that "copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized counsel, acting
 60

as an agent or representative of the Solicitor General, are not binding until they are actually received
by the latter;"196 all in acknowledgement of the OSG's principal role as the "principal law officer and
legal defender of the Government"197 as provided under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV
of the Administrative Code of 1987. This means that the proper basis for computing a reglementary
period and for determining whether a decision had attained finality is service on the OSG.198

Confoundingly, the OSG opted to file a Petition for Relief from Judgment against the RTC's March 4,
2008 Decision on May 26, 2008 — the sixtieth (60th) calendar day from receipt of such Judgment on
March 27, 2008.199 Regrettably, even if the same pleading was filed within the reglementary period
to file a Petition for Relief from judgment, the OSG still pursued the wrong remedy and
effectively lost its statutory right to appeal. It could have ignored the prematurely-issued March 31,
2008 Entry of Judgment and, instead, filed a Motion for Reconsideration or new trial from the March
4, 2008 Decision or a notice of appeal before the lapse of April 11, 2008.200

Nevertheless, this Court finds the attendant circumstances strongly compelling as to warrant the
suspension of the applicable mandatory rules regarding strict compliance of reglementary periods
and proper modes of review. The proceedings for the execution of the March 4, 2008 Decision —
pursuant to the prematurely-declared March 31, 2008 Entry of Judgment — had already
commenced even before the OSG's last day to file a motion for reconsideration (or new trial)
or notice of appeal on April 11, 2008 had lapsed. As such, Judge Omelio's acts of passively allowing
Atty. Velasco to issue the subject Entry of Judgment prematurely and failing to take any corrective
steps amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority because it unnecessarily forces the
aggrieved party (in this case, the Republic) to participate in parallel proceedings of pursuing
concurrent remedies (of execution and of appeal or certiorari, when pursued due to grave abuse of
discretion) — thereby giving rise to multiplicity of suits.201 Participating in multiple parallel
proceedings is not only vexatious;202 it also unnecessarily wastes the time and resources of the
adversely affected party. Given this observation, it now appears that Judge Omelio was indifferent to
both the misapplication of rules on strictly complying with reglementary periods as well as the
consequences on the part of the parties affected by the spawning of concurrent proceedings before
the RTC (for execution and writ of demolition proceedings) and the CA (for certiorari proceedings).
Since Judge Omelio's act — in giving due course to petitioner's Urgent Motion for Execution instead
of dismissing it outright — appears to be in tolerance of Atty. Velasco's erroneous issuance of the
March 31, 2008 Entry of Judgment, any likelihood that the OSG's Motion for Reconsideration or
Notice of Appeal from the March 4, 2008 Decision might be given due course or granted is
virtually nil.

Moreover, Judge Omelio's May 25, 2010 Order which directed the Davao City Engineer's Office
to issue a Fencing Permit over the properties covered by the OCTs sought to be reconstituted, as
well as the October 8, 2010 Writ of Demolition for the clearing of structures erected on the properties
covered by the same OCTs while the certiorari proceedings before the CA were still pending,
conclusively show that judicial authority had been exercised in an oppressive manner. The situation
should have called for the application of "judicial courtesy" on his part which is exercised by
suspending a lower court's proceedings although there is no injunction or an order from a higher
court as a matter of respect and for practical considerations.203 And even though judicial courtesy
remains the exception rather than the rule, it will apply as there is a strong probability that the issues
before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court.204

Since a substantial number of actual occupants (of the lots covered by the OCTs sought to be
reconstituted) had started to file their respective pleadings-in-intervention, the RTC through Judge
Omelio should have exercised a considerable amount of prudence by refraining from performing or
engaging in acts which are consistent with executing a final judgment. Issuing a Fencing Permit and
 61

a demolition writ for existing structures are the constitutive of final acts of execution which is almost
certain to inflict an irreversible damage on the parties involved and frustrate whatever action that the
CA may adopt to resolve the entire pending dispute. As such, Judge Omelio should have exercised
due restraint in giving due course to petitioner's pleadings which practically sought for the execution
of the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision even without an injunctive writ issued by the CA. His insouciant
attitude in continuing to conduct proceedings incidental to execution only added to the complexity of
the entire dispute, annoyingly belabored all parties into participating in several unnecessary
proceedings, and made the attendant conundrums considerably burdensome for higher courts to
untangle.

Hence, under these oppressive circumstances, it is fair to conclude that the CA correctly took
cognizance of respondents' petitions for certiorari in spite of the Republic having lost its right to
appeal.

On nullifying the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision through the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari

I. The CA correctly nullified the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision when it issued the subject Writ of
Certiorari.

The doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment articulates that a decision which has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable; it may no longer be modified in any respect
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.205 This principle is a matter
of sound public policy, which rests upon the practical consideration that every litigation must come to
an end.206

Nonetheless, the immutability of judgment doctrine admits of some exceptions which are: (a) the
correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.207 Of these exceptions, the last couple of items in
the enumeration (void judgments and supervening evident rendering the execution unjust and
inequitable) may not be summarily performed by the court concerned because they are necessarily
threshed out in another proceeding.

In a procedural context, a final and executory judgment may be set aside in one of the following: (a)
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38; (b) direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement
of the judgment;208 and (c) direct action either by certiorari or by collateral attack against the
challenged judgment which is void upon its face, or that the nullity of the judgment is apparent by
virtue of its own recitals.209 This means that some exceptions to the immutability of judgment
doctrine have been expanded to include the grounds of the foregoing remedies. "Void judgments,"
for example, encompasses the grounds enumerated under Rules 38 and 47 to include: (a) fraud; (b)
accident; (c) mistake; (d) excusable negligence; (e) denial of due process;210 (f) extrinsic fraud; and
(g) lack of jurisdiction. Likewise, supervening events which render the execution of an unjust and
inequitable final judgment also allow an aggrieved party to pursue the remedy of filing a Petition
for Certiorari against the order or writ of execution.211

In the case at hand, it was the RTC's September 3, 2009 Order which summarily denied the
Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment — not the March 4, 2008 Decision which granted the
petition for reconstitution — that was reviewed under certiorari. If Section 1, Rule 65 is to be followed
in its literal sense, the CA's actions would be limited to nullifying (or modifying) the RTC's September
3, 2009 Order of denial and directing the reinstatement of the proceedings relative to the
Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment.212 Doing so would only delay the resolution of the
 62

entire dispute leading to a circuitous and protracted litigation between all parties; thereby wasting not
only their time and resources but also the Judiciary's. Since the records available to the CA and this
Court are substantial enough to enable it to determine whether the March 4, 2008 Decision is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, there now arises a need to apply the concept of equity jurisdiction
and allow a pro tanto review — in a certiorari proceeding — of all the RTC's issuances in other
proceedings. This is because the March 4, 2008 Decision gave rise to the Republic's Petition for
Relief from Judgment. Thus, consistent with this Court's constitutional mandate to promulgate rules
which shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases,213 precursor proceedings and their corresponding issuances which are intimately related to
issuances being reviewed under extraordinary and comprehensive certiorari proceedings may be
passed upon pursuant to the concept of equity jurisdiction.

To start with, equity is the principle by which substantial justice may be attained in cases where the
prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.214 In relation to the concept of
equity, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to
adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility
when the law is applied to a given situation.215 For equity jurisdiction to be successfully invoked, the
factual antecedents of a plea for the exercise of liberality must be clear.216

As firmly established in the records of the case, special circumstances were indeed attendant (i.e.
the presence of several intervenors who are actual occupants of the lots covered by the OCT's
sought by petitioner to be reconstituted and who are in danger of being deprived of their occupation).
The same set of circumstances necessitates this Court to suspend the usual application of
procedural rules in order to address serious allegations of injustices brought about by the complexity
of the proceedings. As clarified earlier, when available records undoubtedly support the facts which
are enough for this Court to pass upon the merits of a case intimately related to the one being
reviewed at bench, a pro tanto review of such related case (especially in a certiorari proceeding)
becomes justifiable.

Here, the CA was justified in nullifying the March 4, 2008 Decision in a certiorari proceeding.

Considering the aforementioned special circumstances, a reinstatement of the proceedings relative
to the Petition for Relief from Judgment will only make the dispute between the contending parties
protracted and circuitous. Fittingly, this Court also deems it proper that the issue regarding the
March 4, 2008 Decision's jurisdictional validity be resolved now to avoid further delay in the
disposition of this case.217 Under the present circumstances and also by reason of the adequacy of
available records, the CA was justified in wielding the powers of a cert writ when it: (1) exercised
equity jurisdiction albeit unknowingly; and (2) resolved the issue on whether to grant or deny the
Petition for Relief from Judgment as if it were filed before it.

Relatedly, this Court deems it best to clarify that the CA also did not err in unknowingly or
subconsciously applying the concept of equity jurisdiction even if the grounds for a successful
Petition for Relief from Judgment were absent in this case. Admittedly, the records bear no evidence
that Atty. Velasco's act (of prematurely entering a judgment which had not yet become final) was a
result of petitioner's acts, fraudulent or otherwise. In both Rules 38 and 47, the grounds referred to
here are those which have been committed by prevailing parties — not those which have been
committed by the court or its personnel because the same may be corrected by means of
an appeal.218 This notwithstanding, equity jurisdiction may be exercised by the CA in
a certiorari proceeding for it to nullify a judgment being assailed in a petition for relief
because serious allegations of lack or absence of jurisdiction were raised. Failure to comply with
mandatory jurisdictional requirements in a special proceedings case is one such instance.
 63

Finally, as regards petitioner's assertion of the immutability of final judgments doctrine, this Court
rejects the same as respondents raised serious allegations affecting the RTC's authority to take
cognizance of the subject reconstitution case and power to render the March 4, 2008 Decision. In
this instance, a re-examination as to the jurisdictional validity of the March 4, 2008 Decision cannot
simply be barred or prevented by a simple invocation of the immutability doctrine. Once the
allegations of absence of jurisdiction are proven by the party assailing it, it now becomes the burden
of the other to prove presence of jurisdiction. Special proceedings cases are dependent on express
statutory requirements regarding jurisdiction in order for said proceedings and judgments to be
wholly valid. Thus, in the case of reconstitution of title, a petitioner has the burden to successfully
substantiate with evidence all the statutorily-mandated jurisdictional requirements.

II. The CA correctly found the RTC to have exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the petition for
reconstitution of title despite the failure of petitioner to comply with some jurisdictional requirements.

Jurisdiction is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings.219 It is simply defined as the power and
authority — conferred by the Constitution or statute — of a court to hear and decide a
case.220 Without jurisdiction, a judgment rendered by a court is null and void and may be attacked
anytime.221 Indeed, a void judgment is no judgment at all — it can neither be the source of any right
nor the creator of any obligation; all acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect.222

In adjudication, the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (a) jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (b) jurisdiction over the parties; (c) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (d)
in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the
litigation.223 Additionally, a court must also acquire jurisdiction over the remedy in order for it to
exercise its powers validly and with binding effect.224

First, jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court.225 Second, jurisdiction over the parties is the power of the courts to make
decisions that are binding on them and is based on due process.226 This is acquired through
voluntary appearance, in the case of the plaintiff or petitioner, or through the coercive power of legal
processes, in the case of the defendant or respondent.227 Third, jurisdiction over the issues pertains
to a tribunal's power and authority to decide over matters which are either disputed by the parties or
simply under consideration. This aspect of jurisdiction is closely tied to jurisdiction over the remedy
and over the subject matter which, in turn, is generally determined in the allegations of the initiatory
pleading (complaint or petition) and not the result of proof.228 However, unlike jurisdiction over the
subject-matter, jurisdiction over the issues may be conferred by either express or implied consent of
the parties.229 Fourth, jurisdiction over the res pertains to the court's authority over the object or
thing subject of the litigation as well as its power to bind the same with its judgment. Last, jurisdiction
over the remedy pertains to authority of a tribunal to take cognizance and pass upon the propriety of
petitioner or complainant's reliefs sought. The same aspect of jurisdiction is dependent on either the
statute providing for a specific procedure for the recognition of a particular right (i.e. reconstitution of
certificate of title, registration of title, etc.) or the procedure promulgated by this Court pursuant to its
constitutional powers (i.e. habeas corpus, quo warranto, declaratory relief, etc.).

Pertinently, certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority while others provide for
the procedure by which that power or authority is projected into judgment — the first deals with the
powers of the court in the real and substantive sense while the other class with the procedure by
which such powers are put into action.230 As in this case, special proceedings are creatures of
statutes (or constitutional provisions in the case of extraordinary writs like habeas corpus)
that do both — confer jurisdiction on specific courts while providing for a specific procedure to be
 64

followed in order for the resulting judgment to be valid. The reason is that a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.231 It is unlike
ordinary civil actions in which a party called a "complainant" who seeks for either the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.232 Here, the case has one definite
party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no
definite adverse party.233 As such, the trial court must have jurisdiction to take cognizance of such
petition or application in compliance with the specific procedure provided by law. The authority to
proceed is conferred by a statute which is why the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory and
the same must be strictly complied with.234 One must be mindful that the acquisition of jurisdiction
is not a direct result of the inherent power of courts to settle actual controversies involving injured or
conflicting rights per se — it traces its source from substantive laws which set or fix jurisdictional
requirements for petitioners to not only allege but also prove in order to vest and validate the
handling tribunal's authority as well as the proceedings already conducted. This makes jurisdiction in
special proceedings primarily dependent on petitioner's strict compliance with statutory requirements
which fix the authority of the court to take cognizance of the case and pass a judgment thereon.
Consequently, a petitioner's noncompliance with jurisdictional requirements in a special proceedings
case removes a court's authority thereby rendering the whole proceedings void.

At this juncture, the issue that needs to be resolved is: Was petitioner able to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements enumerated in R.A. No. 26?

This Court answers in the negative.

Reconstitution235 of title is a special proceeding.236 Being a special proceeding, a petition for

reconstitution must allege and prove certain specific jurisdictional facts before a trial court can
acquire jurisdiction.237 R.A. No. 26, as amended, is the special law which provides for a specific
procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title lost or destroyed; Sections 2 and 3
thereof provide how original certificates of title and transfer certificates of title shall be respectively
reconstituted and from what specific sources successively enumerated therein such reconstitution
shall be made.238 It confers jurisdiction upon trial courts to hear and decide petitions for judicial
reconstitution; however, before the court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or
authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for, petitioner must observe certain
special requirements and mode of procedure prescribed by the law.239 More importantly,
substantial compliance with jurisdictional requirement is not enough because the acquisition of
jurisdiction over a reconstitution case is hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the
law.240

Conversely, noncompliance with all jurisdictional requirements in special proceedings (such as

reconstitution of title) adversely affects the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
and, in cases where a specific procedure is outlined by law, over the remedy pursued by petitioner.
Failure to comply with any of the jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders
the whole proceedings null and void.241 Strict observance of this rule is vital to prevent parties from
exploiting reconstitution proceedings as a quick but illegal way to obtain Torrens certificates of title
over parcels of land which turn out to be already covered by existing titles.242 Comparatively, this
Court cannot even take a lenient approach in resolving reconstitution cases because liberal
construction of the Rules does not apply to substantive requirements specifically enumerated by a
statute,243 especially so if matters affecting jurisdiction are involved. In other words, the principle of
liberality cannot be applied to statutory requirements as they are not technical rules of procedure
which may be brushed aside by the courts to serve the higher reason of resolving the case on the
merits. In special proceedings, the merits directly hinges on petitioner's compliance with statutory
requirements proven in court to establish a status, right or particular fact.
 65

Accordingly, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or destroyed one, petitioner must be mindful of
R.A. No. 26 which laid down procedures that must be strictly followed in view of the danger that
reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy
substitute for original registration of title proceedings.244 Even in the absence of an opposition, a
petition for reconstitution which does not strictly adhere to the requirements of the law will not be
granted in the pretext that the same proceeding will not affect the ownership or possession of the
property.245 Hence, it is the reason why this Court has held in numerous cases involving
reconstitution of title that noncompliance with the prescribed procedure and requirements deprives
the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case and, consequently, all its
proceedings are rendered null and void.246

For the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution, the occupants of the
property should be notified of the petition.247 In other words, it is beyond cavil that the requirement
of actual notice to the occupants and the owners of the adjoining property under Sections 12 and 13
of R.A. No. 26 is itself mandatory to vest jurisdiction upon the court in a petition for reconstitution of
title and essential in order to allow said court to take the case on its merits.248 Verily,
noncompliance with these requirements, especially as regards the notice of hearing as provided for
under Section 13 of the same law, is fatal and the trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
petition for reconstitution.249 This Court emphasizes that the purposes of the stringent and
mandatory character of the legal requirement of mailing the notice to the actual occupants of
property covered by the certificates of title to be reconstituted are: (a) to safeguard against spurious
and unfounded land ownership claims; (b) to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such
action; and (c) to give them enough time to intervene in the proceeding.250 At all times, clear and
convincing evidence proving the jurisdictional requirements must exist before a court may order the
reconstitution of a destroyed or lost title.251

In this case, petitioner's allegation that the subject property was unoccupied at the time of the instant
case's inception, aside from being unsubstantiated, eventually turned out to be false when a Writ of
Demolition was sought after to execute the judgment of reconstitution. The presence of inhabited
artificial and permanent structures erected on a particular land is an obvious indication of occupation
or possession. To have such structures, inhabited by third persons, demolished through a court
process is a clear act of recognition that the same land is indeed adversely occupied or possessed.
Petitioner's act of seeking for the issuance of a Writ of Demolition is patently incongruous with the
allegations in her petition for reconstitution of title that "there are no buildings or other structures of
strong materials on the above-mentioned pieces of land which do not belong to [her]."252 Moreover,
she also failed to adduce any proof that the subject lots were actually unoccupied at the time she
filed her petition for reconstitution of title as the records bear that the TCTs in the name of the
intervenors-respondents have already been issued by the Registry of Deeds. These observations
can only mean that petitioner failed to prove the jurisdictional requirement of sending notices to
actual occupants and registered owners of the land covered by the certificate of title sought to be
reconstituted. Therefore, the proceedings before the RTC (as presided by Judge Omelio) which
resulted in the grant of the petition for reconstitution of title is void for being tainted with grave abuse
of discretion as a consequence of petitioner's failure to prove all the jurisdictional requirements set in
R.A. No. 26.

Besides, the Court En Banc's pronouncement here is in consonance with its dictum in Peralta v.

Judge Omelio (Peralta)253 — a portion of which pertains to an administrative complaint filed by Atty.
Cruzabra against Judge Omelio involving the latter's March 4, 2008 Decision and proceeds from
facts identical and intimately related to the case at hand — which reads:

Cruzabra charges respondent with ignorance of law and procedure, misconduct, bias, partiality and
oppression in granting Denila's petition for reconstitution despite the previous ruling of this Court
 66

in Heirs of Don Constancio Guzman, Inc. v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel Carpio against the reconstitution
of OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164, and the failure of Denila to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements under R.A. No. 26 (indicating (1) the nature and description of the buildings and
improvements not belonging to the owner of the land; and (2) the names and addresses of
occupants or persons in possession of the property).

Cruzabra likewise assails respondent for revoking his previous inhibition and denying the Republic's
petition for relief from judgment without conducting a hearing as required by Section 6, Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court. The reason for similar denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by the OSG
was also flimsy: the notice of hearing was addressed only to the Clerk of Court, even as the parties
were all furnished with copies of the motion.

xxxx

However, we find respondent administratively liable in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273 for gross ignorance of
the law in (a) refusing to adhere to a prior ruling of this Court against the reconstitution of certain
OCTs; (b) reversing his previous inhibition in Sp. Proc. No. 7527-2004; and (c) taking cognizance of
Denila's motion for indirect contempt.

In granting Denila's petition for reconstitution of original and owner's duplicate copies of OCTs
registered in the name of Constancio S. Guzman and Isabel Luna, respondent failed to take judicial
notice of this Court's previous ruling rendered in Heirs of Don Constancio Guzman, Inc. v. Hon.
Judge Emmanuel Carpio which involved the same OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164. The Resolution
rendered by this Court's Third Division is herein reproduced:

xxxx

But more important, respondent granted the petition for reconstitution in Sp. Proc. 7527-
2004 despite noncompliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 26.

The applicable provisions are Sections 2, 12 and 13 which state:

SECTION 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a
legal custodian thereof;

(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be,
pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of
which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated
copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
 67

[x x x x]

SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c),
3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the
registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall
state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of
title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been
issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and
boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any,
which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such
buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession
of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may have any interest
in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g)
a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the
documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition
for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act,
the petition shall be further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property
duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the
description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.

SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be
published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to
be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The
court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the
expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty
days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost
or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all
other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all
persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The
petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as
directed by the court.

In this case, the petition for reconstitution of the subject OCTs is based on Section 2(c), that is, on
certified true copies of the said titles issued by a legal custodian from the LRA. However, the
amended petition and the notice of hearing failed to state the names and addresses of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property and all persons who may have any interest in
the property as required by Section 12. There is also no compliance with the required service of
notice to the said occupants, possessors and all persons who may have any interest in the property.

Records reveal that Denila indeed failed to disclose in her amended petition for reconstitution that
there are occupants and possessors in the properties covered by the subject OCTs. Third parties,
including the City Government of Davao filed motions for intervention in CA-G.R. SP 03270-MIN and
manifested before the CA Cagayan de Oro City that several structures and buildings, including
a barangay hall, a police station and a major public highway would be affected by the order for the
issuance of a fencing permit and writ of demolition issued by respondent. These occupants and
possessors have not been notified of the reconstitution proceedings. The March 4, 2008 decision
itself shows that no notice was sent to any occupant, possessor or person who may have an interest
in the properties.
 68

The requirements prescribed by Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 are mandatory and compliance
with such requirements is jurisdictional. Notice of hearing of the petition for reconstitution of title must
be served on the actual possessors of the property. Notice thereof by publication is insufficient.
Jurisprudence is to the effect settled that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and
possessors of the land involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition.
Compliance with the actual notice requirement is necessary for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over the petition for reconstitution. If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is
served on a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of his day in
court and the order of reconstitution is null and void.

In Subido v. Republic of the Philippines, this Court ruled:

As may be noted, Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 specifically enumerates the manner of notifying
interested parties of the petition for reconstitution, namely: (a) publication in the Official Gazette; (b)
posting on the main entrance of the provincial capitol building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated; and (c) by registered mail or otherwise, to every
person named in the notice. The notification process being mandatory, noncompliance with
publication and posting requirements would be fatal to the jurisdiction of the reconstituting trial court
and invalidates the whole reconstitution proceedings. So would failure to notify, in the manner
specifically prescribed in said Section 13, interested persons of the initial hearing date. Contextually,
Section 13 particularly requires that the notice of the hearing be sent to the property occupant or
other persons interested, by registered mail or otherwise. The term "otherwise" could only
contemplate a notifying mode other than publication, posting, or [through] the mail. That other mode
could only refer to service of notice by hand or other similar mode of delivery.

It cannot be over-emphasized that R.A. No. 26 specifically provides the special requirements and
procedures that must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction
over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements, as the Court has
repeatedly declared, are mandatory. Publication of notice in the Official Gazette and the posting
thereof in provincial capitol and city/municipal buildings would not be sufficient. The service of the
notice of hearing to parties affected by the petition for reconstitution, notably actual occupant/s of the
land, either by registered mail or hand delivery must also be made. In the case at bar, the "posting of
the notice at the place where TCT No. 95585 is situated" is not, as urged by petitioner, tantamount to
compliance with the mandatory requirement that notice by registered mail or otherwise be sent to the
person named in the notice.

In view of what amounts to a failure to properly notify parties affected by the petition for
reconstitution of the date of the initial hearing thereof, the appellate court correctly held that the trial
court indeed lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance of such petition. And needless to stress, barring
the application in appropriate cases of the estoppel principle, a judgment rendered by a court without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case is void, ergo, without binding legal effect for any purpose.

In Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco, we have held Judge Tirso Velasco's acts of proceeding
with the reconstitution despite awareness of lack of compliance with the prerequisites for the
acquisition of jurisdiction under R.A. No. 26, and disregarding adverse findings or evidence of high
officials of LRA that militates against the reconstitution of titles, to be of serious character warranting
his dismissal from the service. We also charged Judge Velasco with knowledge of this Court's
pronouncement in Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela and other precedents
admonishing courts to exercise the "greatest caution" in entertaining petitions for reconstitution of
allegedly lost certificates of title and taking judicial notice of innumerable litigations and controversies
that have been spawned by the reckless and hasty grant of such reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles as well as of the numerous purchasers who have been victimized by forged or fake
 69

titles or whose areas simply expanded through table surveys with the cooperation of unscrupulous
officials.

Here, respondent's bad faith in disregarding the jurisdictional requirements in reconstitution

proceedings is evident in his order for the issuance of a fencing permit and writ of demolition in favor
of Denila. Respondent should have been alerted by the presence of actual occupants and
possessors when, after the finality of the March 4, 2008 Decision which ordered the reconstitution of
the subject OCTs, Denila moved for the issuance of a writ of demolition for such belied her allegation
in the amended petition that "[T]here are no buildings or other structures of strong materials on the
above-mentioned pieces of land, which do not belong to the herein petitioner" and the absence of
any name and address of any occupant, possessor or person who may have an interest in the
properties.

With the failure to serve actual notice on these occupants and possessors, Branch 14 had not
acquired jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. 7527-2004, and therefore the March 4, 2008 Decision
rendered by respondent is null and void. A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void;
hence, it can never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly
or collaterally.

But respondent's bad faith is most evident in his reversal of his inhibition in Sp. Proc. No. 7527-2004
to act upon the petition for relief from judgment. Respondent voluntarily inhibited himself after
rendition of the decision, only to resume handling the case and immediately denied the said petition
for relief despite the previous order of Judge Tanjili setting the petition for hearing, and completely
ignoring the jurisdictional defects of the decision raised by the OSG and Cruzabra.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge George E. Omelio, Presiding Judge of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 14 Davao City is found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and violation of
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE,
with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except his accrued leave credits, and with perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.254 (emphases supplied; citations omitted)

In this case, the afore-cited portion in Peralta clearly shows that Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008
Decision cannot be legally revived and reinstated. It is obvious that the very reason why Judge
Omelio was dismissed from the judicial service by the Court En Banc was precisely because he was
adjudged to be grossly ignorant of the law when he took cognizance of and eventually granted the
subject petition for reconstitution of the subject certificates of title filed by petitioner despite the lack
of jurisdictional requirements. Judge Omelio even failed to verify and cite a single evidence from the
records which reasonably supports petitioner's factual allegations pertaining to the jurisdictional
requirement of mailing notices to actual occupants or possessors of a property subject in a
reconstitution case. Clearly, the RTC's grant of reconstitution favoring petitioner in its March 4, 2008
Decision was devoid of factual basis. This is due to the basic principle that courts cannot grant a
relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof because due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and
evidence presented in court.255 Therefore, the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision penned by Judge
Omelio is beyond salvage.
 70

III. The RTC ignored the basic principles of res judicata in allowing the reconstitution of OCT Nos.
219, 337, 67 and 164.

Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment.256 Under this rule, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on
all points and matters determined in the previous suit.257 To invoke res judicata, the elements that
should be present are: (a) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (b) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c)
the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be as between the
first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.258

Corollarily, judgments and final orders constituting res judicata are categorized into different
concepts which have distinctive effects as provided under Section 47 of Rule 39 as follows:

SECTION 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by
a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the probate of
a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or
the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting
of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and,

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only
is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. (emphases supplied)

It can be deduced in the aforementioned provisions that there are three (3) loose categories of final
and executory judgments as regards their effects on subsequent and related proceedings.
Paragraph (a) of the foregoing rule is commonly known to speak of judgments in rem; paragraph (b)
is said to refer to judgments in personam; and paragraph (c) is the concept understood in law as
"conclusiveness of judgment."259

Traditionally, paragraphs (b) and (c) are both in personam proceedings technically pigeonholed in
prior cases before this Court under the blanket of the res judicata proper.260 Here, only two (2)
concepts of res judicata were previously recognized — (a) bar by prior judgment" as enunciated in
Section 47(b), Rule 39; and (b) "conclusiveness of judgment" as embodied in Section 47(c), Rule
39.261 However, the concept of res judicata also embraces in rem proceedings embodied in
paragraph (a) because "a judgment or final order against a specific thing ... is conclusive upon the
title to the thing [or the res]."262 This means that a judgment is directed "against the thing" which, as
a consequence, "binds the whole world" because persons dealing with such "thing" are bound by the
 71

disposition of the tribunal which ruled on its legal status.263 As a consequence, a final and
executory judgment concluding an in rem proceeding becomes part of the legal attributes of the
thing being litigated in which all persons dealing with it are bound to respect.

Accordingly, since special proceedings pertain to a declaration of status, right or particular fact,
judgments therein are said to be in rem as it binds the whole world. The reason for the all-
encompassing reach of final in rem judgments is that the "whole world" had been constructive
parties (with non-participants usually subjected to a prior order of general default) to the case the
moment the jurisdictional requirement of publication was met by petitioner. Such is also the reason
why special proceedings present a justiciable controversy as they treat the declaration of a thing's
legal status as a claim of interest against everyone. Here, what is crucial is the due publication of
such notice because it brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.264 In other words, an in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication.265

As applied in this case, this Court emphasizes that proceedings for judicial reconstitution of
certificates of title are proceedings in rem.266 The object of such proceeding is to bar indifferently all
who might be minded to make any objection against the right sought to be enforced, hence the
judgment therein is binding theoretically upon the whole world.267 Here, it is required that the court
must acquire jurisdiction over the res in order to render a valid judgment thereon — it is done either:
(a) by seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the
law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective.268 In other words, the exercise of in rem jurisdiction depends on the
court's exercise of exclusive custody and control over the res.269 Consequently, this makes the
requirement of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of petitioner in a subsequent reconstitution case
even unnecessary.270

More importantly, it is the compliance of jurisdictional requirements (such as the service of notice to
all the actual occupants of the land covered by the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted) that
vests the court with jurisdiction to validly take cognizance and rule on a reconstitution case.
Adequately proving all factual allegations which are part of jurisdictional requirements with
preponderant evidence is mandatory for the court to successfully acquire jurisdiction over
the res and to render its own adjudicative power effective. Once jurisdiction is validly obtained by the
court and the judgment in the reconstitution case becomes final, the findings therein can no longer
be opened for review.271 Thus, it follows that a person who is not a party to a previously settled
reconstitution of title case cannot seek for the same remedy without violating the principle of res
judicata.

In the case at hand, this Court had already ruled in the case of Heirs of Guzman, Inc. that OCT Nos.
219, 337, 67 and 164 in the name of Constancio and Isabel cannot be reconstituted because they
have already been cancelled, transferred and registered in the name of other owners; one of them
being Arroyo. Even if disposed by this Court through an unsigned resolution, the same ruling would
still constitute an actual adjudication on the merits because the legal basis cited to support the
conclusion on why there was an absence of reversible error committed in the challenged judgment
signifies this Court's assent to the findings and conclusion of the lower court.272 Though an
unsigned resolution is neither reported nor doctrinal,273 the judgment in this case is directed to the
properties themselves and, thus, binds not only those who participated therein but also those who
subsequently deal with the same properties involved. Obviously, the present case filed by petitioner
seeking to have the certificates of same title reconstituted cannot legally prosper for the simple
reason that she had already been prevented by the rule on res judicata from re-litigating the same
matter. Therefore, Judge Omelio committed a fatal error amounting to grave abuse of discretion for
 72

ordering the reconstitution of OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164 in the name of Guzman and for
disregarding the final and executory judgment regarding the legal status of these certificates of title.

IV. Judge Omelio denied the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration in utter disregard of established
jurisprudence. 1âшphi1

The general rule is that the three (3)-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5, Rule
15 of the Rules of Court is mandatory.274 Nonetheless, when the adverse party had been afforded
the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in opposition to
the motion, the purpose behind the 3-day notice requirement is deemed realized.275 In effect, the
defect was cured for the adverse party was still notified of the existence of said pleading.276

In perfunctorily denying the Republic's motion for reconsideration, Judge Omelio pointed out by
citing Col. Alvarez v. Judge Diaz, et al. (Col. Alvarez).277 that "[a] notice hearing addressed to the
clerk of court and not to the parties is no notice at all."278 However, he failed to take note of the fact
in Col. Alvarez that no proof was presented that the motion was indeed received by the counsel of
the adverse party (save for the testimony of the movant's counsel that he delivered the motion
personally to the adverse party's counsel) which was the reason why the same pleading was
considered as a mere scrap of paper. No such negative factual finding was made in the October 1,
2009 Order which denied the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, for lack of adequate
basis in ordering such denial, this Court finds that the same order is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Propriety of the Intervention

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes
a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or
interest that may be affected by those proceedings.279 However, it is not an absolute right for the
statutory rules or conditions for the right of intervention must be shown.280 Accordingly, to allow
intervention: (a) it must be shown that the movant has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or is
otherwise qualified; and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not — both requirements must concur, as the first is not more
important than the second.281 To sum it up, the legal interest as qualifying factor must be of a direct
and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of
the judgment.282 Hence, in all cases, the allowance or disallowance of a Motion for Intervention
rests on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.283

Here, the previous discussions are clear that R.A. No. 26 requires petitioners in reconstitution of title
cases to send notices to actual occupants of the land covered by certificates of title sought to be
reconstituted. Since the City of Davao and the intervenors-private respondents are indeed actual
occupants of different portions of lots covered by the subject certificates of title sought by petitioner
to be reconstituted, they have a clear legal interest to protect. While reconstitution does not vest
ownership because the only fact that has to be established its whether or not the original owner's
duplicate copy of a certificate of title is still in existence,284 it emboldens the person — whose name
appears on the face of the certificate of title as the registered owner — to exercise acts of dominion
over the land identified and described therein. Additionally, a registered owner also enjoys the
benefit and comfort of not having to ward off any collateral attack on the certificate of title.285 Such
complication was confirmed by the fact that petitioner applied for and was issued with a Writ of
Demolition as well as a favorable directive for the issuance of a Fencing Permit. This only bolsters all
respondents' claim that their interests will not be protected in a separate proceeding. Demolition of
permanent structures and perimeter fencing adversely affects the possessory rights of all occupants
 73

in an immensely onerous manner. It is an ample basis for a court handling a reconstitution of title
case to implead the un-notified occupants who may be deprived of their undisturbed possession.

For these reasons, it now becomes clear that such de jure recognition of ownership is favorable to
the registered owner because a reconstituted certificate of title has certain adverse implications
against the possessory rights of actual occupants. As a consequence, these actual occupants are
now forced to defend their possessory rights as they are likely to be considered as the intruders.
Verily, a separate proceeding undertaken for the purpose of assailing the true ownership of the
person whose name is registered on the face of the certificate of title is circuitous and only
contributes to the clogging of court dockets. Hence, the CA did not commit a reversible error in
allowing all respondents to intervene in the certiorari proceedings initiated by the Republic in seeking
to have its Petition for Relief from Judgment granted.

Administrative Sanctions Against Erring Members of the Bar

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the
Bar for them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times.286 Lawyers
should set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws.287 This is
because a lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of
his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect
of the community to the legal profession.288 That is why the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public.289 To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to at all times maintain the highest
degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their profession.290 Indeed, the
law is an exacting taskmaster. Membership in the Bar, as so appropriately put, is a privilege
burdened with conditions.291

Keeping in mind these general ethical guidelines, this Court proceeds to evaluate the acts of Atty.
Pangilinan (one of petitioner's counsels), Atty. Velasco (RTC Davao City – Branch 14's Clerk of
Court) and Atty. Biongan-Pescadera (Davao City's current Register of Deeds) which appear to be
inconsistent with their sworn duties as Members of the Bar.

I. Atty. Lanelyn D. Pangilinan

Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.292 It is the duty of all officers
of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court accurately.293 Misquoting or
intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard of the lawyer's
solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth.294

Atty. Pangilinan, in the present petition for review, cited this Court's ruling in Republic v. Marasigan,
et al. (Marasigan)295 which the pertinent portions reproduced in verbatim as follows:

Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. and provides, inter
alia, that:

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of
(1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

As regards publication, it specifically provides:

 74

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication
in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court x x x

This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting.
What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the
notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published "once in
the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However,
publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication.

That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which remain
mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were
otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all
persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining
properties, and occupants of the land.

The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree, which
is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards
to prevent anomalous titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in
land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to or could read the Official Gazette,
which comes out in few copies only per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of
hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, owners of both
unregistered and registered lands may someday painfully find out that others have certificates of title
to their land because scheming parties had caused their registration, or secured reconstituted
certificates of title thereto and sold the property to third parties.

The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the
private respondent the duty to comply with the requirement of service of notice because it was not
through her fault that the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable
since the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous
proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the duty of the trial
court to serve the required notices and private respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do
so. It suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that mandatory requirements of
notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with them is attributable to the court. It
likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which the
Constitution directs public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We should stress here that
lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason or a justification for non-
observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the first to obey the
laws.296 (emphases supplied)

In advocating for petitioner's cause, Atty. Pangilinan boldly claimed that this Court held that "[u]nder
Sec[tion] 13 of R.A. No. 26, the duty to send notices of the petition for reconstitution to adjoining
owners and actual occupants is imposed upon the [trial] court"297 instead of reflecting the real
ruling which clearly enunciated that "[e]qually unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was
the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and private respondent should not be
prejudiced if it failed to do so[;] [i]t suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that
mandatory requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with them is
attributable to the court." Such blatant act of misquoting jurisprudence is a clear badge of some
desperate effort to mislead this Court into thinking that it was the RTC's and not petitioner's duty to
notify actual occupants in a reconstitution of title case. It is the height of disrespect on the part of
 75

Atty. Pangilinan to insinuate that the RTC should have taken up petitioner's cudgels in complying
with the jurisdictional requirements for the latter's petition for reconstitution to prosper even when the
contrary statutory principle had already been clarified by jurisprudence. More so, her act of mangling
the unequivocal statements in Marasigan is intellectually dishonest and is insulting to the intelligence
of the Members of this Court.

Another important and fundamental tenet in legal ethics is that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his or her client — but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.298 As officers of
the court tasked with aiding this court in its dispensation of justice,299 lawyers take an oath that they
will not wittingly or willingly promote any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to
the same.300 Unfounded suits only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.301 Moreover, an appeal is not a matter of right but a statutory privilege.302 Being a mere
privilege, all lawyers should put in mind that an appeal cannot be abusively utilized to support or
advance utterly meritless causes. Thus, it is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the
judicial process such as prosecuting patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly
groundless actions.303

In advancing petitioner's desire to have OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164 reconstituted in the name of
both spouses Constancio and Isabel, Atty. Pangilinan greatly appears to have chosen to ignore this
Court's ruling in the case of Heirs of Guzman, Inc. which had already considered the same
certificates of title to have been validly cancelled, transferred and registered in the name of third
persons. Instead of disagreeing with petitioner's intransigent stance of pursing the reconstitution of
these certificates of title, she allowed herself to be used as an instrument of disruption in the
administration of justice. Arguing that res judicata does not apply for the flimsy reason that petitioner
is a stranger to the case in Heirs of Guzman, Inc. despite the obvious fact that the same judgment
involved the status and nature of the lands covered by OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164 even treads
dangerously along the border of gross ignorance of the law.304 Atty. Pangilinan should have been
totally familiar with the basic principle that "[t]he judicial reconstitution of title is a proceeding in rem,
constituting constructive notice to the whole world."305 To make matters worse, she argued before
this Court in this manner:

131 It must be noticed that the case of Heirs of Constancio Guzman, v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel
Carpio was primarily dismissed because of violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts, it being a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the trial court on its Order dated May 12, 2003 dismissing
the petition for reconstitution. The merits of the petition was not discussed by the Supreme
Court[.]306 (emphases supplied)

Contrastingly, the following portion of this Court's ruling in Heirs of Guzman, Inc. is hereunder
reproduced in verbatim as follows:

Moreover, even if we were to decide the instant case on the merits, the petition would still fail.
Reconstitution of certificates of title, within the meaning of RA 26, means the restoration of the
instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.
Petitioner failed to prove that the certificates of title intended to be reconstituted were in fact lost or
destroyed. On the contrary, the evidence on record reveals that the certificates of title were
cancelled on account of various conveyances. In fact, the parcels of land involved were duly
registered in the names of the present owners whose acquisition of title can be clearly traced
through a series of valid and fully documented transactions.307 (emphases supplied)

Such temerity of Atty. Pangilinan to deceive this Court into thinking that the ruling in Heirs of
Guzman, Inc. did not tackle the merits of the prior reconstitution cases involving OCT Nos. 219, 337,
 76

67 and 164 amounts to a betrayal of the Lawyer's Oath. Such act unbecoming of a respected
member of the Bar clearly warrants administrative disciplinary sanctions.

II. Atty. Ray Uson Velasco

Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest
laws and jurisprudence.308 There is less than full compliance with the demands of professional
competence, if a member of a bar does not keep himself abreast of the trend of authoritative
pronouncements.309 More importantly, it is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles.310 Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge
competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar.311 Falling short of this duty
amounts to gross ignorance of the law which is the disregard of basic rules and settled
jurisprudence.312

Relatedly, this Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy
burden of responsibility [which] requires that everyone involved in its dispensation — from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk — live up to the strictest standards of competence, honesty, and
integrity in the public service."313 As the assumption of public office is impressed with paramount
public interest, which requires the highest standards of ethics, persons aspiring for public office must
observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law.314 As to clerks of court who are
officers of the court,315 these principles place a great deal of responsibility on their shoulders being
the chief administrative officers of their respective courts.316 As chief administrative officers, clerks
of court must show competence, honesty and probity since they are charged with safeguarding the
integrity of the court and its proceedings.317 This is consistent with Section 1, Canon IV of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel318 which commands court personnel to perform their official duties
properly and diligently at all times.319

In this instance, this Court reproduces in verbatim the relevant portion of the March 28, 2008
Certification320 issued by Atty. Velasco as follows:

CERTIFICATION

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the DECISION issued by this Court dated March 4, 2008 in Special Proc.
Case No. 7527-2004, entitled PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECONSTITUTION OF ORIGINAL and
OWNER'S DUPLICATE OF ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS
FOR DAVAO CITY and THE INSCRIPTION OF THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION THERETO;
HELEN P. DENILA, Petition copies of which were received by the counsel for the petitioner on
March 5, 2008 and by the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao on March 10, 2008, has now
become FINAL and EXECUTORY.

This Certification is issued upon the request of the Petitioner.

Davao City, Philippines, March 28, 2008.

(signed)

ATTY. RAY USON VELASCO

Clerk of Court V
 77

The aforementioned Certification became the basis of the March 31, 2008 Entry of
Judgment321 also issued by Atty. Velasco which, in turn, became the basis of the April 23,
2008322 Writ of Execution323 which he also issued pursuant to Judge Omelio's grant of petitioner's
April 18, 2008 Urgent Motion for Execution. Undoubtedly, Atty. Velasco's March 28, 2008
Certification triggered the series of irregularities subsequently committed by Judge Omelio relative to
the untimely and hastily conducted execution proceedings of the March 4, 2008 Decision.

Atty. Velasco — being a member of the Bar employed by the Judiciary as Branch Clerk of Court —
had been utterly remiss of his duty to be conversant with prevalent jurisprudence. The Court
in National Power Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.324 had already
declared in an unequivocal manner that "copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized
counsel, acting as agent or representative of the Solicitor General, are not binding until they are
actually received by the latter." This means that the reglementary period to file an appeal or Motion
for Reconsideration begins to run against the government only upon receipt of the judgment or final
order by the OSG. For issuing a Certification attesting that the March 4, 2008 Decision had become
final and executory, even without any information as to the OSG's actual receipt of such judgment,
Atty. Velasco ignored very nature of the Solicitor General's unequivocal mandate for the government
in legal proceedings — more particularly in all land registration and related proceedings.325 Such
thoughtless disregard of basic principles on service of judgments or final orders to the OSG amounts
to gross ignorance of the law and is inconsistent with a Clerk of Court's duty to show competence,
honesty and probity. It besmirches the Judiciary's reputation and erodes the people's faith in the
justice system.

III. Atty. Maria Theresa D. Biongan-Pescadera

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." By virtue
of this Canon, lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the Constitution and
obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer's responsibilities under Canon 1
mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law; as servants of the law and officers of the
court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of
law.326 Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is included in the scope of "unlawful" conduct which, in turn,
does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to
include such element.327 In the context of Canon 1, respect for the law encompasses faithful
adherence to the legal processes.

Concomitantly, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court includes the "willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court" as one of the grounds for disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law. Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents
deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well.328 Graver responsibility is imposed
upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their
processes.329 Moreover, Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the same Rules makes "[disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court" one of the grounds from indirect
contempt. Since "contempt of court" has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a
public authority,330 even a defiance directed against a judgment of a superior court which has not
yet attained finality and is pending for review before this Court is considered contemptuous.

Before proceeding to examine Atty. Bionang-Pescadera's official actions as Register of Deeds in

relation to this case, this Court stresses that government lawyers in the discharge of their official
tasks have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice.331 Since public office is a public trust,
 78

the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the
standards for those in private practice.332 As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to
their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public
eye.333

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.334 However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may
be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.335

In this case, although the CA's July 25, 2012 Decision granting the Petition for Certiorari (as well as
the RTC's September 3, 2009 Order denying the petition for relief from judgment and the RTC's
March 4, 2008 Decision granting the Petition for Reconstitution of Title) had not yet become
final when the OCT Nos. 301 and 219 were re-issued, the fact still remains that Atty. Biongan-
Pescadera ignored a standing judgment of a superior court. Performing an act contrary to a decision
of a superior court, even if the same has not yet attained finality, is a clear act of contempt and
defiance against duly-sanctioned legal processes. Worse, her act of re-issuing some of the presently
disputed certificates of title only added to the factual complexity of this case making it more
burdensome for the courts in related or derivative disputes to resolve. The least that Atty. Biongan-
Pescadera could have done was to maintain the status quo and wait for the case to become final
and executory (or ultimately settled by this Court) before performing any act which would drastically
affect the rights and obligations of the parties. Additionally, as to OCT No. 219, Atty. Biongan-
Pescadera also ignored this Court's ruling in Heirs of Guzman, Inc. which had long attained finality
and has barred by res judicata any future litigation affecting the same certificate of title.

Rules establishing structured legal processes command respect, especially from lawyers from both
the public and the private sectors, for they are not empty rituals but part and parcel of the justice
system itself. Without deference to legal processes, the administration of justice will run haywire
causing confusion and instability as to the rights and obligations of the parties in all stages of
litigation. Hence, Atty. Biongan-Pescadera's utter indifference to established court processes and
complete disregard of the basic principle of res judicata are inconsistent with a government lawyer's
sworn duty to "obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."

Conclusion

In sum, this Court reiterates that noncompliance with all the statutorily-mandated jurisdictional

requirements in a Petition for Reconstitution of Certificate of Title renders the consequential
proceedings void. For the trial court's jurisdiction in a reconstitution of title case to be validated, it
must be clearly shown that petitioner had substantiated all the jurisdictional requirements with
preponderant evidence. Blatantly, petitioner failed to prove the jurisdictional fact that notices were
effectively sent to all occupants of the lots covered by the certificates of title sought to be
reconstituted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, this Court:

1) DENIES Helen P. Denila's Petition for Review on Certiorari and AFFIRMS the July 25,

2012 Decision of the Court of Court of Appeals – Special Former Twenty-Second Division, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 03270-MIN, for failure to establish that the latter committed a reversible
error in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial Court for
promulgating the March 4, 2008 Decision as well as the September 3, 2009 and October 1,
2009 Orders in Special Proceeding Case No. 7527-2004;
 79

2) NULLIFIES Original Certificates of Title Nos. 219 and 301 for being irregularly issued by
Atty. Maria Theresa D. Biongan-Pescadera;

3) REFERS the findings against Atty. Ray Uson Velasco to the Office of the Court
Administrator for appropriate action; and

4) REFERS the findings against Atty. Lanelyn D. Pangilinan and Atty. Maria Theresa D.
Biongan-Pescadera to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for appropriate action.

The Division Clerk of Court is hereby ORDERED to FURNISH the Office of the Court Administrator

and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines copies of this Decision.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 80

[ G.R. No. 219340, April 28, 2021 ]

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. STANDARD INSURANCE CO.,

INC., RESPONDENT.

HERNANDO, J.:

For Our Resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration1 of the November 7, 2018 Decision2 which
granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari3 of petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR),
which sought the reversal of the May 8, 2015 Decision4 and the July 10, 2015 Order5 in Civil Case
No. 14-1330 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66 of Makati City.

The RTC Decision and RTC Order granted respondent Standard Insurance Co. Inc.'s (Standard
Insurance) Petition for Declaratory Relief and permanently enjoined the CIR and its agents from
implementing Sections 108 and 184 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) against Standard
Insurance until Congress enacts House Bill No. 3235 (HB 3235) entitled An Act Rationalizing the
Taxes Imposed on Non-Life Insurance Policies into law.6

The Antecedent Facts:

Petitioner CIR is the head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), a government agency tasked
with the power and duty of assessing and collecting all national internal revenue taxes, fees, and
charges among others.7 Respondent Standard Insurance is a domestic corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine laws and engaged in the business of non-life insurance.8

On February 13, 2014, respondent received from the BIR a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN)
regarding its liability amounting to P377,038,679.55 arising from a deficiency in the payment of
documentary stamp taxes (DST) for taxable year 2011.9 Standard Insurance contested the
PAN10 but the CIR nonetheless sent it a formal letter of demand.11 Although respondent requested
reconsideration,12 it received on December 4, 2014 the Final Decision on Disputed Assessment
(FDDA) dated November 25, 2014, declaring its liability for the DST deficiency, including interest and
compromise penalty, totaling P418,830,567.46.13 On December 11, 2014, it sought reconsideration
of the FDDA, and objected to the tax imposed pursuant to Section 184 of the NIRC as violative of
the constitutional limitations on taxation.14

Meanwhile, respondent also received a demand for the payment of its deficiency income tax, value-
added tax (VAT), premium tax, DST, expanded withholding tax, and fringe benefit tax for taxable
year 2012 which respondent protested in its letter dated December 10, 2014 on the ground that the
VAT rate and DST rate imposed on premiums charged on non-life property insurance pursuant to
Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC are violative of the constitutional limitations on
taxation.15 Respondent also received a demand for payment of deficiency DST for taxable year
2013.16

On December 19, 2014, Standard Insurance commenced Civil Case No. 14-1330 in the RTC with
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
 81

for the judicial determination of the constitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC with
respect to the taxes charged against the non-life insurance companies.17

In its Petition, the respondent contended that the facts of the case must be appreciated in light of the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 10001 (RA 10001) entitled An Act Reducing the Taxes on Life
Insurance Policies, whereby the tax rate for life insurance premiums was reduced from 5% to 2%;
and the pendency of deliberations on House Bill 3235, whereby an equal treatment for both life and
non-life companies was being sought as a response to the supposed inequality generated by the
enactment of RA 10001.18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

On December 23, 2014, the RTC issued a TRO enjoining the BIR, its agents, representatives,
assignees, or any persons acting for and in its behalf from implementing the provisions of the NIRC
adverted to with respect to the FDDA for the respondent's taxable year 2011, and to the pending
assessments for taxable years 2012 and 2013.19

On January 13, 2015, the RTC issued an Order granting the application for WPI of respondent and
thereby ordering the CIR and his/her representatives to refrain from further proceeding with the
implementation or enforcement of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC until further orders, upon
posting by respondent of the requisite bond.20

Thereafter, the RTC issued the WPI on January 14, 2015 and an Order on February 18, 2015: (a)
dismissing the CIR's motion to set hearing for dismissal of the case on the ground that the issues
contained therein can be resolved simultaneously with the main case; (b) denying the CIR's motion
for reconsideration to the RTC's issuance of the WPI on January 13, 2015; and (c) denying Standard
Insurance's motion to declare petitioner in default.21 The RTC Orders dated January 13, 2015 and
February 18, 2015 thereafter became the subject of a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA).

On May 8, 2015, the RTC rendered its Decision holding that although taxes were self-assessing, the
tax system merely created liability on the part of the taxpayers who still retained the right to contest
the particular application of the tax laws; and holding that the exercise of such right to contest was
not considered a breach of the provision itself as to deter the action for declaratory relief, and
decreed thusly.22 The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent, its agents, representatives, or any persons
acting on its behalf is hereby permanently enjoined from proceeding with the implementation or
enforcement of Sections 108 and 184 of the National Internal Revenue Code against petitioner
Standard Insurance Co., Inc. until the Congress shall have enacted and passed into law House Bill
No. 3235 in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.23

The CIR moved for reconsideration which the trial court denied for lack of merit in its July 10, 2015
Order.24

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

On April 27, 2014, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA pursuant to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to (a) set aside the Orders dated January 13, 2015 and February 18, 2015 of the
 82

RTC granting respondent's application for issuance of a WPI and subsequent denial of the MR; and
(b) dissolve the WPI dated 14 January 2015.25 The Petition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 140403, was later dismissed by the appellate court in its October 30, 2015 Resolution for failure
of the petitioner to comply with the CA's August 19, 2015 Resolution to submit copies of pertinent
pleadings.26

Assailed Decision of the Court:

On September 7, 2015, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before Us praying for the
reversal and setting aside of the RTC Decision and RTC Order on the following grounds: (a) The
RTC erred in taking cognizance of the case because a Petition for Declaratory Relief is not
applicable to contest tax assessments and the petition is fatally defective for failing to satisfy the
basic requisites under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court; (b) The RTC erred in adjudging Sections 108
and 184 of the NIRC as violative of the equal protection clause; (c) The RTC gravely erred in
granting injunctive relief in favor of respondent, the same being specifically prohibited by Section 218
of the NIRC and for having been issued despite the absence of a clear legal right; and (d) The RTC
erred in granting the relief provided in the RTC Decision since the resultant remedy falls outside the
purview of an action for declaratory relief and it is violative of the rule that judicial decisions must
finally determine the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of parties.27

On November 7, 2018, We rendered the assailed Decision granting the Petition for Review
on Certiorari.28 We ruled that the RTC grossly erred and acted without jurisdiction in giving due
course to the petition for declaratory relief and permanently enjoining the enforcement of Sections
108 and 184 of the NIRC, in violation of Section 218 of the NIRC and Section 11 of Republic Act No.
1125. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; ANNULS and SETS

ASIDE the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 14-1330 on May 8, 2015 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, in Makati City; DISMISSES Civil Case No. 14-1330 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction; QUASHES the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in Civil Case No. 14-1330 for being issued without jurisdiction; and ORDERS the
respondent to pay the costs of suit.29

We opined that respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief failed to comply with the requisites for
the said action, since the subject provisions, i.e., Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC have been
infringed by respondent prior to the institution of the action. Moreover, respondent's allegation that it
could be rendered insolvent through the imposition of taxes imposed by Sections 108 and 184 of the
NIRC did not result in the action for declaratory relief becoming an actual controversy ripe for judicial
determination.

Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

Respondent argues that the Court erred in not dismissing the Petition outright on the ground that
petitioner committed deliberate and willful commission of forum shopping, and that the issues raised
in the Petition are factual in nature and are barred under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover,
respondent alleges that the RTC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent's action for
declaratory relief and that the latter has fully satisfied the essential requisites of a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of the Court.30

Lastly, the respondent argues that the Court erred in disregarding its clear and unmistakable right to
equal protection to uniformity and equitability of taxation, in relying in Section 218 of the NIRC and in
not finding that the RTC has jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs and the latter lie against the
 83

implementation of unconstitutional statutes, and in finding that the RTC violated the rule that judicial
decisions must finally determine the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the parties.31

Issues

To dispose of the instant case, the following issues must be resolved:

First, whether the Petition must be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping and/or non-
compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement;

Second, whether the Petition must be dismissed on the ground of raising issues of fact, which are
barred under a Rule 45 petition;

Third, whether the RTC had the jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent's petition for
declaratory relief and issue injunctive relief against the implementation of Sections 108 and 184 of
the NIRC; and

Fourth, whether the RTC should have dismissed respondent's petition for declaratory relief for failure
to comply with the essential requisites of a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court.

We resolve to deny the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping and has complied with the certification against non forum
shopping requirement under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation
thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal
or certiorari. There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights
or causes of action, and (c) identity of reliefs sought.32

In sum, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and
must raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Clearly, forum shopping does not
exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised,
and two objectives were sought.33

Under the foregoing test, we find that petitioner did not commit forum shopping in filing the instant
Petition during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 140403 with the CA.

A careful reading of the allegations of the instant Petition with the Court and the Petition
for Certiorari filed with the CA indicate that the elements of litis pendencia are not present. At the
outset, petitioner assailed different orders of the RTC – the first pertaining to interlocutory orders of
the RTC in connection with the grant of the WPI and the other which decided the main action.
Moreover, a comparison of the allegations and reliefs sought in the instant Petition and the Petition
for Certiorari undoubtedly shows that petitioner prayed for different reliefs and ultimately, sought
different objectives.

Being interlocutory in nature, the RTC orders assailed in CA-G.R. SP No. 140403 dealt with the
preliminary matter of whether the implementation of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC against
 84

respondent should be held in abeyance at a stage when the trial on the merits has yet to be held and
the judgment rendered. Thus, petitioner, in assailing the RTC orders which granted and upheld the
WPI in favor of respondent, merely sought the dissolution of the said writ which prevented petitioner
from implementing Sections 108 and 184 against respondent until further orders and while the main
case had yet to be decided on the merits.

On the other hand, the RTC Order and RTC Decision assailed in the instant Petition were in the
nature of a final judgment or order which disposed of the main case on the merits. This is so since
the Petition for Declaratory Relief was granted, thereby permanently enjoining petitioner from
enforcing Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC against respondent until the Congress shall have
enacted and passed into law HB 3235 in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution. Being in
the nature of a final judgment, petitioner merely pursued his correct remedy, which was to file a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, we note that the issue on forum shopping may be considered moot once the
proliferation of contradictory decisions, which is precisely what the prohibition on forum shopping
seeks to avoid, is no longer possible.34 In connection thereto, CA-G.R. SP No. 140403 has already
been dismissed by the appellate court on technical grounds; hence, the danger which the rules on
forum shopping seeks to prevent will no longer materialize in the instant case.

Respondent's claim that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement for a certification against
forum shopping must likewise fail. Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that the sworn
certification against forum shopping must be attached to the petition for review on certiorari.35 In
contrast, there is no requirement that motions for extension of time be accompanied by a certification
against forum shopping.36

While the Court is not unaware that petitioner failed to disclose the proceedings in the CA in the
certification against forum shopping attached to its motion for extension of time to file the Petition,
we emphasize that petitioner nevertheless promptly disclosed the said proceedings when it timely
filed the Petition with the required sworn certification against forum shopping. Thus, we consider the
same to be sufficient compliance with the requirement.

Petition raises only questions of law that are cognizable through a Rule 45 petition.

It is settled that only questions of law should be raised in a petition for review on certiorari filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.37

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question
of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.38

Respondent alleges that the Petition raises questions of fact that the Court cannot resolve without
re-evaluating established or undisputed facts on which the trial court based its ruling. However, an
examination of the present petition shows that petitioner is challenging the RTC's grant of the
petition for declaratory relief on the premise that a petition for declaratory relief is inapplicable to
contest tax assessments; that the petition for declaratory relief failed to comply with the basic
requisites of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court; and the constitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the
NIRC vis-à-vis the equal protection clause. Moreover, petitioner assailed the propriety of the RTC's
 85

grant of injunctive relief vis-a-vis Section 218 of the NIRC and the rule that a judicial decision must
bring a final determination of rights, obligations, and responsibilities of parties. These are clearly
questions of law which merely call for an examination and interpretation of the prevailing law and
jurisprudence, and are cognizable by the Court in a petition for review on certiorari.

The RTC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the Petition for Declaratory Relief and
issuing an injunction against the collection of taxes.7!ᕼdMᗄ7

To begin with, Commonwealth Act No. 55 (CA 55) provides that petitions for declaratory relief do not
apply to cases where a taxpayer questions his liability for the payment of any tax under any law
administered by the BIR. Section 1 of CA 55 provides:

Section 1. Section one of Act Numbered Thirty-seven hundred and thirty-six is hereby amended so
as to read as follows:

SECTION 1. Construction. — Any person interested under a deed, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, may bring an action in a Court of First Instance
to determine any question of construction or validity arising under such deed, contract, instrument or
statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder: Provided, however, That the
provisions of this Act shall not apply to cases where a taxpayer questions his liability for the payment
of any tax, duty, or charge collectible under any law administered by the Bureau of Customs or the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court has previously clarified that CA 55 has not been repealed by another statute and remains
to be good law.39 Thus, the courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief against
the imposition of tax liability or validity of tax assessments.

More importantly, a principle deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is that taxes being the lifeblood
of the government should be collected promptly, without unnecessary hindrance or delay. In line with
this principle, Section 218 of the NIRC40 expressly provides that no court shall have the authority to
grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge
imposed by the code. An exception to this rule, provided under Section 11 of RA 112541, obtains
only when in the opinion of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) the collection thereof may jeopardize the
interest of the government and/or the taxpayer.42

In the instant case, it is undisputed that respondent only proceeded with its petition after receiving
tax assessments from the BIR and after various requests for reconsideration, where it notably
already raised the alleged unconstitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC as a ground to
contest the tax assessment against respondent. However, instead of appealing the assessments in
the proper forum, respondent filed with the RTC the Petition for Declaratory Relief with a prayer for
issuance of a TRO and WPI to enjoin the implementation of the aforementioned provisions while the
said petition is pending. In reality, respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief is utilized as a vehicle
to assail and prevent the enforcement of the tax assessments by alleging the supposed
unconstitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC. On this basis, the RTC should have
dismissed respondent's petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Thus, we reiterate our statement in the assailed Decision that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in
not only taking cognizance of respondent's petition, but in issuing an injunction enjoining the BIR
from proceeding with the implementation or enforcement of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC
against respondent.
 86

Even assuming arguendo that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition, the RTC should have
dismissed respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief for failure to comply with the requisites for the
said action.

A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a person interested in a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction
or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration
of his rights and duties thereunder.43 The said action must comply with the following requisites: (1)
the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the
documents in question; (4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of
one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action
or proceeding.44

After a review of the records of the instant case, We find no reason to disturb our finding that the
RTC should have dismissed respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief for failure to comply with the
abovementioned third, fourth, fifth and sixth requisites.

In connection with the third requisite, the Court in City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone
Authority45 ruled that the trial court should have dismissed Philippine Economic Zone Authority's
Petition for Declaratory Relief for lack of jurisdiction in view of the City of Lapu Lapu and Province of
Bataan's demand for payment of real property taxes prior to the filing of the petition for declaratory
relief. The Court explained:

We rule that the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority] erred in availing itself of a petition for
declaratory relief against the City. The City had already issued demand letters and real property tax
assessment against the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority], in violation of the [Philippine
Economic Zone Authority's] alleged tax-exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic Zone
Act of 1995, the subject matter of [Philippine Economic Zone Authority's] petition for declaratory
relief, had already been breached. The trial court, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the petition for
declaratory relief."46 (Emphasis supplied)

It is undisputed that respondent had already received assessments from the BIR for deficiency
documentary stamp taxes for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013 and deficiency VAT for the year 2012,
which were imposed pursuant to Sections 184 and 108 of the NIRC respectively, when it filed its
Petition for Declaratory Relief assailing the constitutionality of the said provisions. In view thereof,
the RTC should have already dismissed respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief for lack of
jurisdiction.

Anent the fourth and fifth requisites, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.47

In the instant case, respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief does not present a justiciable
controversy ripe for judicial determination. Respondent's petition failed to demonstrate that
respondent's legal rights are subject of an imminent or threatened violation that should be prevented
by the declaratory relief sought; the apprehension that its business may be rendered technically
insolvent in view of the continued enforcement of the taxes under Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC
appear to be merely conjectural and anticipatory.
 87

Moreover, respondent's adequate remedy upon receipt of the FDDA for the DST deficiency for
taxable year 2011 was to file an appeal in due course with the CTA instead of resorting to a petition
for declaratory relief with the RTC.48 Similarly, the respondent's adequate remedy in the event of the
issuance of a FAN in connection with its assessments for deficiency VAT for taxable year 2012 was
to protest the same with the BIR and if denied, appeal such denial to the CTA or request for
reconsideration with the CIR.49 Thus, the sixth requisite is likewise absent. In view of the absence of
the aforementioned requisites, the RTC should have dismissed respondent's Petition for Declaratory
Relief.

All told, this Court finds no reason to overturn the assailed Decision. The assailed Decision is in
accord with law and existing jurisprudence and with due regard to extant facts and evidence.

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY for lack of

merit.

No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.